The way I have done the Shofar is _________  the length of three beats then ___ ___ ___  for exactly three beats. Then ... ... ... ... ... ...  for six beats. Then the original three beats again. That is to say for the truah I do exactly 18 short bursts that last double the original tekia. This is subject to an argument. Some hold the length of the whole truah has to be the same length as the original tekia. And each burst a third of each of the individual shevarim.

I am not saying I have any great ideas about this. It is after all subject to debate and I went with the opinion that even the other opinion would hold to be valid. Look it up in Shulchan Aruch of Joseph Karo and you will see.  There was another reason I choose this opinion. It was that the 9 short burst truah opinion seemed to have some problems involved in it.

So the first thing is tekia _________. Shevarim ___ ___ ___;   (a going up sound). Then truah ... ... ... ... ... ... Then Tekia _________.
I did have some thoughts about the idea of setting Rosh HaShanah to correspond with the actual conjunction of the sun and moon --which is called the molad. And I already wrote  a little about that I think. mainly I based this idea on Tosphot in Sanhedrin 10.

) סנהדרין י: רב אשי אמר שבית דין אין מקדשים את הלבנה, אלא מחשבים את המולד. התוספות מביאים דעה אחת שראש חודש תמיד מתחיל בזמן המולד [היינו יש שנייה אחת שהשמש והירח הם ביחד בדיוק על קו מאונך זקוף. היום שהשנייה הזאת נופלת בו, הוא ראש חודש]. (ולפי הדעה הזאת בתוספות, זאת דעת רבא ורב אשי.) וגם תוספות מביאים גמרא ירושלמי שמשמע כזה, וגם רש''י כאן על הדף משמע כזה. ("קדשו אתו בית דין של מעלה מאתמול"). נראה לי שזאת מחלוקת בין גמרות.  שבמסכת ראש השנה משמע שהכול תלוי בראיה או אפשרות של ראיה (בסוגיא של ריש לקיש ורבי יוחנן שם). הכסף משנה  בהלכות יובל איפה שהרמב''ם מחשב את תאריך היובלות והשמיטות הולך בשיטה הזאת שראש חודש והמולד הם אותו דבר

Bava Metzia 14 b third Tosphot.

We have the case of a lender a borrower and the borrower had a field (field 1) at the time of the loan. After that he bought a second field. Then he sold the first field (field 1). The usual way a loan is written is "Whatever I will buy can be used to pay for this loan." Then he sells the second field.

The lender goes after the first field (field 1) and the buyer goes after the second field (field 2).

Tosphot asks so let's prove from this that, "What I will buy" and he sells, what he then bought is not obligated.

There are four possible reasons why the lender did not collect from the second field.
That is there are four things that can cause the lender to go after the first field.
The fact that Tospot says the only possible reason is the reason he gives shows that Tosphot holds no other reason can be valid.


Reason 1: The reason Tosphot gives. There is not any "shiabud" or what I think in English is called a lean or an obligation.
Reason 2: We always say the  buyer can tell the lender "I left a place for you to collect from" does not work after the second field was sold.
Reason 3: The lender had to go after the first field,
Reason 4: The lender could have gone after the first field if he had wanted to, or the second. In our case he decided to go after the first field, but he could have gone after the second one.

In all four cases the second field would not have been touched.
What we see from the question of Tosphot is that Tosphot considers the other three reasons as invalid.

The Maharshal {Shelomo Luria} and the Maharam Shif both say the same thing.  That from the question of Tosphot we see that when we always say "The buyer can tell the lender, 'I left a place for you to collect from,'" that applies even after the second field was sold.

What I want to point out further is that we see Tosphot does not hold from the third or fourth reason either. Tosphot holds there is no option. The lender must go after the second field. I want to point out that even if there had been a option for the lender to go after either field, then Tosphot would not have had any proof of his thesis. So it has to be the case that the only possible reason the second field was left is the reason Tosphot gives--that when one says, "What I will buy will be obligated to this loan" after he sells it, it is not obligated.

That is this is simple process of elimination Tosphot says the reason the second field was left is reason 1. Therefore Tosphot must hold reason 2 and 3 and 4 are not valid.  So Tosphot says he had to go after field one and the reason can only be because of reason 1.

Why am I pointing this out you might ask? Because of the simple fact that the there is some doubt about this point. Because there is a Maharsha on Tosphot in Bava Basra 157 that holds the lender. goes after the first field even if the second one is possible to collect from.  Only in our case he does not collect from the first one because he already collected from it once.That is the Maharsha hold that the Tosphot in Bava Batra has a different opinion from our Tosphot here.


I should also mention that I did not learn this with my learning partner so obviously this is on a much lower level that if I had merited to learn this with him. I am sorry about that and I apologize to all Israel and the whole world that this could have been a lot clearer than it is.

I also want to add two points.One is why is there any question in the first place. And the second point is maybe in fact it means either buyer can collect from the other buyer if the lender has collected from him. That is even if the lender collected from the second one the second one can collect from the first one.

First point why is there any question of תוספות how is it that the lender did not collect from the second field. Why not? Maybe because he had his whole loan paid up by collecting from the first field? Answer. The point of Tosphot it does not matter how much money was owed to the lender. It could have been the exact amount of the field . It could be the field was a thousand acres and he was owned only 100 dollars or it could be he was owned a million dollars and he collected from the field that was worth ten dollars. The point is what every the lender collected from the first field the first buyer goes and collects from the second field that exact amount.

The second point I don't know how to answer.











_________________________________________________________________________________ב''מ יד ע''ב

We have the case of a מלווה a לווה and the לווה had a שדה שדה הראשון at the time of the הלוואה. After that he bought a שדה השני. Then he sold the שדה הראשון. The usual way a loan is written is מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה Then he sells the שדה השני  after the הלוואה and after he sold the שדה הראשון

The מלווה goes after the first field שדה הראשון and the buyer goes after the second field.

תוספות asks could we prove  from this that מה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד

There are four possible reasons why the מלווה did not collect from the שדה השני.
That is there are four things that can cause the מלווה to go after the first field.
The fact that תוספות says the only possible reason is the reason he gives shows that תוספות holds no other reason can be valid.


Reason 1 The reason תוספות gives. There is not any שיעבוד  for a case of מה שאקנה קנה ומכר
Reason 2 We always say the  לוקח can tell the מלווה הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו does not work after the second field was sold.
Reason 3 The מלווה had to go after the שדה הראשון.
Reason 4 The מלווה could have gone after the שדה הראשון if he had wanted to, or the second. In our case he decided to go after the first field, but he could have gone after the second one.

In all four cases the second field would not have been touched.
What we see from the question of תוספות is that תוספות considers the other three reasons as invalid.

The מהרש''ל and the מהר''ם שיף both say the same thing.  That from the question of תוספות we see that when we always say לוקח can tell the מלווה הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו that applies even after the second field was sold.

What I want to point out further is that we see תוספות does not hold from the third or fourth reason either. תוספות holds there is no option. The מלווה must go after the second field. I want to point out that even if there had been a option for the מלווה to go after either field, then תוספות would not have had any proof of his thesis. So it has to be the case that the only possible reason the second field was left is the reason תוספות gives, that מה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד
That is this is simple process of elimination. תוספות says the reason the second field was left is reason 1. Therefore תוספות must hold reason 2 and 3 and 4 are not valid.  So תוספות says he had to go after field one and the reason can only be because of reason 1.

Why am I pointing this out you might ask? Because of the simple fact that the there is some doubt about this point. Because there is a מהרש''א on תוספות in בבא בתרא קנ''ז that holds the lender must go after the first field. That is the מהרש''א holds that the תוספות in בבא בתרא has a different opinion from our תוספות here.

I also want to add two points. One is Why is there any question in the first place? And the second point is maybe in fact it means either לוקח can be גובה from the other לוקח if the מלווה has been גובה from him. That is even if the מלווה has been גובה from the second לוקח the second לוקח can be גובה from the first לוקח.

First point why is there any question of תוספות how is it that the מלווה did not גובה from the second field. Why not? Maybe because he had his whole loan paid up by   being גובה from the first field? Answer. The point of תוספות it does not matter how much money was owed to the מלווה. It could have been the exact amount of the field . It could be the field was a thousand acres and he was owned only 100 dollars or it could be he was owned a million dollars and he was גובה from the field that was worth ten dollars. The point is what every the מלווה was גובה from the first field the first לוקח goes and is גובה from the second field that exact amount.

The second point I don't know how to answer.








_______________________________________________________

) ב''מ יד: (וב''מ קי:) יש לנו הדיון של מלווה לווה, והלווה היה לו שדה (השדה ראשון) בזמן של ההלוואה. אחרי ההלוואה הוא קנה שדה שני. ואז הוא מכר את השדה הראשון. הדרך המקובלת של הלוואה היא שהלווה כותב מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה. ואז הוא מכר את השדה השני לאחר ההלוואה ולאחר שמכר את השדה הראשון. המלווה הולך אחרי שדה הראשון והקונה הולך אחרי שדה השני. (בלשון הגמרא הלוקח גובה את הקרן ממשוחררין את השבח ממשועבדים של הלווה.) תוספות בדף י''ד שואל אולי אפשר להוכיח מזה שמה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד? (זאת אומרת הסיבה שהמלווה אינו גובה משדה השני היא שאינו משתעבד מאחר שנמכר.) ישנם ארבע סיבות אפשריות שהמלווה לא גבה משדה השני. כלומר יש ארבעה דברים שיכולים לגרום למלווה ללכת אחרי שדה הראשון. העובדה שתוספות אומר שהסיבה היחידה האפשרית היא הסיבה שהוא נותן מראה כי תוספות סובר שאין שום סיבה אחרת שיכולה להיות תקפה. סיבה ראשונה, הסיבה שתוספות נותן. אין שיעבוד במקרה של מה שאקנה קנה ומכר. סיבה שנייה, זה שאנחנו תמיד אומרים שהלוקח יכול להגיד למלווה "הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו" לא עובד אחרי ששדה השני נמכר. סיבה שלישית, מלווה היה חייב ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון . סיבה רביעית, המלווה היה יכול  ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון, אם הוא היה רוצה, או השני. במקרה שלנו הוא החליט ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון, אבל הוא היה יכול ללכת אחרי השני. בכל ארבעת המקרים לא היה נוגע בשדה השני. מה שאנו רואים מהשאלה של תוספות הוא שתוספות רואה  שהשלוש סיבות לא תקפות. המהרש''ל והמהר''ם שיף שניהם אומרים את אותו דבר. כי מהשאלה של תוספות אנו רואים שכאשר אנו אומרים תמיד שהלוקח יכול להגיד להמלווה "הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו", שזה חל גם לאחר ששדה השני נמכר. מה שאני רוצה להציין נוסף הוא שאנו רואים תוספות אינו מחזיק מסיבה השלישית או רביעית. תוספות סובר אין אפשרות אחרת. המלווה חייב ללכת אחרי שדה השני אם זה היה משועבד. אני רוצה לציין שגם אם היה אפשרות למלווה ללכת אחרי או שדה, אז תוספות לא היו לו כל הוכחה לתזה שלו. אז זה חייב להיות שבמקרה זה, הסיבה האפשרית היחידה ששדה השני נותר היא הסיבה שתוספות נותן, כי "מה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד". ואם היה משתעבד היה חייב ללכת אחר שדה השני. תוספות אומר שהסיבה ששדה השני נותר היא הסיבה הראשונה. לכן התוספות חייב להחזיק סיבות 2 ו- 3 ו- 4 אינן תקפות.  למה אני מציין על זה אתם שואלים? בגלל העובדה הפשוטה שיש ספק על נקודה זו. המהרש''א על תוספות בבא בתרא קנ''ז מחזיק שמלווה חייב ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון אפילו אם הוא יכול ללכת אחרי השני על פי דין. (היינו אפילו אם יש שיעבוד על שדה שני,עדיין הוא חייב לגבות משדה שראשון אם הוא יכול.) רק שכאן הוא כבר גבה מן הראשון פעם אחת ולכן הוא הלך אחרי השני. מהרש''א גורס כי התוספות בבא בתרא יש דעה שונה משלנו תוספות כאן.





) ב''מ ק''י אני גם רוצה להוסיף שתי נקודות. אחת מהן הוא מדוע יש כל שאלה בכלל? והנקודה השנייה היא אולי  איזה לוקח שיהיה יכול לגבות מן  לוקח האחר אם מלווה היה גובה ממנו. כלומר, גם אם המלווה  גבה ממן השני אז הלוקח השני יכול להיות גובה מלוקח הראשון . נקודה ראשונה מדוע יש כל שאלה של תוספות בכלל איך זה שהמלווה לא גבה משדה השני. למה לא? אולי בגלל שהוא  נפרע כל הלוואתו על ידי כך שגבה משדה הראשון? תשובה. נקודת תוספות היא שזה לא משנה כמה כסף היה מגיע למלווה. זה היה יכול להיות הסכום של השדה המדויק. זה יכול להיות השדה היה אלף דונם והוא היה והחוב היה רק מאה דולרים או שזה יכול להיות שהיה חוב של מיליון דולרים והוא  גבה מהשדה שהיה שווה עשרה דולרים. הנקודה היא מה שהמלווה  גבה מן השדה הראשון הלוקח הראשון הולך וגובה משדה השני אותו סכום מדויק. הנקודה השנייה אני לא יודע איך לענות עליה.

Rosh Hashanah was the time I first learned the Or Israel (Light of Israel) of Isaac Blazer (a disceple of Israel Salanter). So though I had heard of Musar before that, still that was the time that I understood the reasoning behind the Musar movement.
And though that was more than  a few years back, it still makes the most sense to me. So what I suggest is to get the basic set of Medieaval Ethics books and plow through them. That is do every day a little bit. A page when you get up before you start your day. And also a page or two during the day to keep up the effect of fear of God.

But make sure you get authentic Musar --not the cheap knock offs or inferior copies.
The later in time period Musar gets, the more diluted it gets. People write so called Musar books with all kinds of strange agendas in mind or to make up for their own guilt complexes. None of it is straight Torah. To get to authentic Torah nowadays is  basically impossible. Everyone has some agenda and they use the name of Torah to advance it. The more religious they seem, the more you can be sure there is some hidden agenda. The old Lithuanian yeshivas where Torah was authentic are mainly gone. You only have left a hand-full of places like Ponovitch in Bnei Brak or the Mir Yeshiva in NY. [Apparently some of these places have branches. I have a friend who was a teacher in a branch of Ponovitch in Jerusalem. So I admit I don't know where all the authentic places are. What makes a place authentic is not what you see on the surface. It is not if physically they are learning Torah all day. What makes a place authentic is a reason why they are learning Torah all day.

Music for the glory of God

n8

n1


n3

Black Hole
n5


Mathematics

Organ piece

Orchestra piece


CHS

I don't always make it a point to thank God publicly for his kindnesses.
Usually I leave that to be between Him and me. That He granted to me to write two booklets on the Gemara is something so out of the expected that I have to say that I am overwhelmed with this. There really is not known to me any reason why God would grant this amazing and tremendous merit to fall to me. I am really not any good in learning Talmud and I hardly even do so at all. It is just for some reason that is unknown to me I was a disciple of authentic Torah scholars  and was born into a home of amazing fear of God and wholesomeness and love and I was granted a learning partner with whom the ideas just seem to flow. So I publicly  acknowledge my debt to God for doing for me yet another two kindness for which there is no clear reason for. [The truth the same could be said about my children and my whole amazing family and the music he has granted to me and grants to me and to be able to learn Physics at all, and to be in Uman right before Rosh HaShanna. For all these and the many more kindness he has granted to me I thank him openly.]

I can pin point the four areas where I have to do repentance easily. But how to go about correcting these wrongs is not simple. As we  see with מעפילים לעלות. Moses said,  "Go to Israel" and the spies said "No." So people decided not to go. The God got mad. So what would be the natural reaction? To repent right? The sin was not to go, so they decided yes to go. And it was perfect repentance. Because they did not want to because they thought God would not help them. So true repentance was to go even though they knew that God would not help them. [That we normally say that repentance is true when one is in  the same situation he sinned in but this time he does not sin.] But we know what happened. They went up and were killed.

The sages of the Talmud said the same thing. "The letter ה is open on the bottom so anyone who wants can fall. But to get back in one needs to go through the upper opening. By why not get back in the same way he fell? לא אסתיא מילתא It won't work."

But at least I can say my repentance revolves around  major points. My parents, the land of Israel, Isaac Luria. Lack of learning Torah might be included also but I don't have an exact proof of that as I do for the other four. {ביטול תורה כנגד כולם}. That is the lack of learning Torah is considered as bad as the three major sins plus gossip. The three major ones are idolatry, murder, and the sexual relationship forbidden in Leviticus.





Of course I know there are probably millions of wrongs and bad thoughts and words and deeds I do all the time. But here I am looking for the major areas of interest. 

I had to add a little to the essays on Sanhedrin 61 and the part about my chavruta's question was not written rightly. I had to correct it.

At that point in the Talmud's logic השתחוויה is coming to forbid quadrant 2 and 3 which leaves quadrant 4 open for איכה יעבדו to forbid.

"Don't sacrifice to idols."

Introduction: The Gemara forbids area I and III [see diagram below] by means of How do they serve? [That is service in its way and in the way of honor] And it forbids part of area II (three kinds of service) because of, "Don't sacrifice to idols." [that is service not in its way but in the way of honor] (See the diagram at the bottom of the page.) And it uses "Don't bow" for itself. The Gemara asks, "Why not use, 'Don't bow' to forbid all of area II?" And it gives and answer. But in the meantime someone asks, "If we would use 'Don't bow' to forbid area II (all kinds of honor), then what would how do they serve come to permit?"

The Baal HaMeor and Tosphot both ask, "Why did he not ask the same question when we were learning from 'Don't sacrifice?'" Certainly sacrifice permits even more than bowing so it should be even more of a strong question.




I was looking at my old notes on Sanhedrin 61 and I noticed something odd. It is this: why is it that there is a question on the Gemara by both Tosphot and the Baal HaMeor? I forgot the whole sugia but just glancing at my notes I began to wonder why is it that there is any problem with the Gemara that needs to be answered?
Why cant we say זביחה forbids one thing and permits something else. And איכה יעבדו also forbids one thing and permits something else? I mean to say  זביחה forbids a small section of quadrant II and permits the rest of quadrant II. and איכה יעבדו forbids all of quadrant I and IV and permits all of quadrant III.

I am not saying this is unanswerable, Rather it is clear that everything permitted by sacrifice is also permitted by איכה יעבדו. And the same goes for if you would permit all quadrant III by means of השתחווייה.  So in one sense the question of the Baal HaMeor and Tosphot makes sense. All I am wondering is why this would not be the simplest answer?

My question is really more to the Baal HaMeor because he in fact uses זביחה in a limited sense.But  he answers in a way that divides up quadrant II in three sections.

_________________________________________________________________________________

הקדמה: The גמרא forbids  רביע השני והשלישי  by means of איכה יעבדו. And it forbids part of רביע השני that is שלש עבודות פנימיות because of זביחה.  And it uses לא תשתחווה for itself. The גמרא asks Why not use לא תשתחווה to forbid all of רביע השני? And it gives an answer. But in the meantime someone asks if we would use לא תשתחווה to forbid רביע שני, then what would איכה יעבדו come to permit?

The בעל המאור and תוספות both ask, why did he not ask the same question when we were learning from זביחה. Certainly זביחה permits even more than השתטחות so it should be even more of a strong question.




I was looking at my old notes on סנהדרין סא and I noticed something odd. It is this: why is it that there is a question on the גמרא by both  בעל המאור and תוספות? Why is it that there is any problem with the גמרא that needs to be answered?
Why can't we say זביחה forbids one thing and פוטר something else? And איכה יעבדו also מחייב one thing and פוטר something else? I mean to say  זביחה forbids a small section of רביע השני and פוטר the rest of רביע השני, and איכה יעבדו forbids all of רביע ראשון ורביעי and פוטר all of רביע השלישי?

I am not saying this is unanswerable. Rather it is clear that everything פטור by sacrifice is also פטור by איכה יעבדו. And the same goes for if you would פוטר all רביע השלישי by means of השתחווייה.  So in one sense the question of the  בעל המאור and תוספות makes sense. All I am wondering is why this would not be the simplest answer?

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הקדמה: גמרא אוסרת רביע שני ושלישי באמצעות איכה יעבדו.  ואוסרת חלק מרביע השני שהוא שלש עבודות פנימיות בגלל זביחה. והיא משתמשת עם לא תשתחווה לעצמו. הגמרא שואלת למה לא להשתמש עם לא תשתחווה לאסור כל הרביע השני? והיא נותנת תשובה. אבל בינתיים מישהו שואל אם היינו משתמשים עם לא תשתחווה לאסור רביע השני, אז מה היה איכה יעבדו באה להתיר? בעל המאור ותוספות שואלים, למה הוא לא שואל את אותה השאלה כאשר אנו לומדים מזביחה? בהחלט זביחה פוטרת אפילו יותר מהשתטחות, כך זה צריך להיות עוד יותר שאלה חזקה. אני מסתכל על ההערות הישנות שלי בסנהדרין סא והבחנתי במשהו מוזר. זהו זה: למה יש שאלה על הגמרא על ידי בעל המאור ותוספות? למה יש בעיה כלשהי עם הגמרא שצריכה להיות עונה? למה אנחנו לא יכולים לומר זביחה אוסרת דבר אחד ופוטרת משהו אחר? ואיכה יעבדו גם מחייבת דבר אחד ופוטרת משהו אחר? אני מתכוון לומר זביחה אוסרת סעיף קטן של הרביע שני ופוטרת שאר רביע השני, ואיכה יעבדו אוסרת כל הרביע הראשון ורביעי ופוטרת כל רביע השלישי?

אני לא אומר שזה חסר מענה. ברור שכל מה שפטור על ידי זביחה גם  פטור  ידי איכה יעבדו. וכנ"ל לגבי אם אתה  פוטר  כל רביע השלישי באמצעות השתחווייה. אז במובן אחד השאלה של בעל המאור  ותוספות  הגיונית. כל מה שאני תוהה למה זו לא תהיה התשובה הפשוטה?

My Hebrew teachers in Temple Israel in Hollywood never got very far with Torah  since the program there was very limited. Besides Hebrew, you had to learn Old Testament stories and general Jewish history and that was all on Shabat morning. It was a lot to fit into Shabat morning.


And once I got to my first Lithuanian yeshiva in NY, grammar was not a priority. Rather Gemara in depth is what they concentrated on there. And that seems to me to be a good idea, but it also means I had to pick up grammar much later.]

 [I have noticed that people that don't do Talmud in depth in their first two yeshiva years, never get the idea afterwards. So I definitely advocate learning Gemara in depth before anything else.]

A drop of the infinite depths of Tosphot and the Gemara itself is the most important thing to learn before anything.

There is a somewhat extended market for health products in the USA. Not only that but if you consider the amount of time and effort people spend on getting cured from different problems the amount probably grow to staggering amounts. Couple that with doctors and drug companies and medical schools, the amounts get up to levels beyond petty cash.

Then if you think about what people spend on mental health and the hope to be cured from mental problems pretty soon you are talking about real money,-- more than pocket change.

But if you have faith in the wise אמונת חכמים there is already available a simple and easy cure Musar.[Medieaval Books of Ethics.]

Musar in this context has a very limited and specific definition. It does not mean any book that talks about fear of God or good character traits. [The first thing when you mention the word Musar to anyone is they claim some other practice is enough Musar for them. Or some other book has Musar in it. Or some other book can replace Musar. These are all false claims. They come from the fact that Musar is hard to learn. And it is as fun as a dentist's chair. It is hard but its rewards are great.


Musar means  the  very limited number of Medieaval Ethics. The main requirement for something to be counted as Musar is that it be written by a rishon. There are traditional Musar books written after the Middle Ages, but they get more and more doubtful as you get further from the Middle Ages.

Whom is the sage that said Musar is a cure for mental and physical disease? Isaac Blazer. He was disciple of Israel Salanter.  And he based his idea on the Rambam in the beginning of his book אור ישראל.

What I think are the best ones: Duties of the Heart חובות לבבות, Paths of the Righteous אורכות צדיקים, המספיק לעובדי השם by the son of the Rambam, ספר הישר which is attributed to Rabbainu Tam.


What is the reason for this? It is because the books of Ethics from the middle ages have  a spirit o Fear of God that permeates them in a way that nothing that came later can do.

But you should not make Musar yeshivas. While there are good Musar yeshivas, but yeshivas for the most part have become businesses. [Some are however sincere. But in the main yeshivas are business and run like businesses. And that as we know against the Torah.]]

\

Music for the glory of God

q36

Homosexuality is considered rather negatively in the Bible. The fact that it gets the death penalty in Leviticus should provide us with a hint about whether it is a matter of taste. Most things that get the death penalty in the Old Testament it is safe to assume that they are looked on with a kind of disapproval. The reason that פרשת עריות [the Torah portion that deals with forbidden relationships] is read on Yom Kippur is because it takes the power and fear  of Yom Kippur to drive in the point that homosexuality is  among the most serious sins of the Torah. It is hard to go much further than the death penalty. However I admit there are a few sins that in fact go beyond the death penalty like idolatry. But they are rare.

So in the USA it comes down to this question Man has to ask himself, "God or government? Which will it be?"

But the major pathway that pantheism took to become the official doctrine of insane religious world. was through Kabalah. While it is clear that kabbalah is monotheistic, through the effects of amei haaretz ignorant people, it became assumed that it is pantheistic.

It was well known when I was growing up that the basic approach of Torah is monotheism.

Clearly the pantheism that became  apart of insane religious  world. was a kind of conspiracy. It has some ancient roots.  But the major pathway that pantheism took to become the official doctrine of the insane religious world was through  Kabalah.  While it is clear that kabbalah is monotheistic, through the effects of amei haaretz ignorant people, it became assumed that it is pantheistic. 

Even though the Rambam and his son went to great lengths to show that the world view of the Torah is Monotheism still  there is a lot of ("fenegaling") word games people do to twist the meaning of Torah.

What I suggest in order to have this issue clear is to make  a distinction between the ideas of emanation of the Ari as opposed to the concept of pantheism. The truth is it is easy to see the difference if you try. What makes it hard is that some people have made it their business to twist the Torah into pantheism and then claim that that is traditional Torah.

If you try to tell someone that not everything is Divine, and the universe is not God, you get the strangest kinds of looks  as if you just said some kind of terrible heresy.  

phony tzadik.

 Following a true tzadik [saint]. The obvious pitfall which happens at least 99.99999... of the time is that when one is looking for a true tzadik he falls into the hands of a phony tzadik.



This is a hard subject. I have my own approach in which I go by the basic approach of my parents towards life and Torah. This is based on the idea that my parents were the best human beings I ever knew. But it is not as if I am considering them as tzadikim. It is more along the lines of when I look at what I consider  as human perfection, I tend to see my parents as the best examples of that.

What I mean is they contained the idea of balance. When we look at the idea of  a tzadik we tend to see a religious person who may not have balance. And that is not in general a very good example. The path of the Torah is not fanaticism. It is balance.
But some people are connected with a certain area of value more than others. What you need is  away of combining different areas of value. And that my parents were good at.

The major problem of looking for a tzadik is that even when you want to play it safe , still there is the trap door of the many fakers that use some name of  a real tzadik to build their own following.

\ For one thing we do in fact find the idea that the tabernacle in the desert  was filled with the glory of God. So we do find this concept of God's glory being in a limited time and space zone. So we find only Moses was allowed to put the Tabernacle together. 

Rosh HaShanah 15a

I understand Tosphot to have two ways of understanding Abyee. One is the way I wrote before. The other way is the way he writes openly. The reason I say Tosphot has this hidden way is because where he introduces his way started out saying even if  there is a doubt. That means Tosphot is understanding the Gemara in the simple way I wrote that there is no doubt. Rather Raba is being strict with reference to the Braita. But even if there is a doubt you can understand Raba. But my question is that I think the hidden explanation of Tosphot is better than the one they actually wrote.

Tosphot says Abyee was asking Raba as I wrote before that we understand the end because he is being strict with reference to the Braita. That is he is being strict to go by ripening as opposed to being not obligated in anything. But even if you say that Raba was being strict because of a doubt whether we go by ripening or by picking then also the end is good because in fact he is liable in the laws of the seventh year because of ripening and he is not liable in tithes because even though he would be because of the doubt about picking still when there is doubt there is decree to let the fruits be הפקר.

But the beginning is a problem because of tithes.
And Raba answers his question about why he should be not obligated in tithes. יד בכל ממשמשין בו ויתחייב במעשר?

But the beginning there is  problem in terms of the laws of the seventh year because of the same decree. We are saying we are in doubt whether to go by ripening or picking. So we are strict. So in the beginning why are we not strict to say he is liable in ביעור?
After all if we are going by picking time it is the seventh year and he should be liable in ביעורץ
Abyee only asked about tithes and Raba only answered about tithes. If Tosphot is right then why was there not also a question about ביעור?
So everything I wrote is contained in one word of Tosphot "even"

Another question here is that in the סיפא תוספות says it is OK that he is not חייב in מעשר because even if we go by לקיטה still because of the ספק he has to be מפקיר his fruit. If so then how can you say he is liable in ביעור? We know ביעור is not the same as הפקר. So the end would have to mean that he has to be מפקיר and also to do ביעור. Fine. But then in the רישא it would have to say he is liable in ביעור.
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I understand תוספות to have two ways of understanding אביי. One is the way I wrote before. The other way is the way he writes openly. The reason I say תוספות has this hidden way is because where he introduces his way, he starts out saying אפילו מחמת ספק. That means תוספות is understanding the גמרא in the simple way  that there is no ספק. Rather רבה is being strict with reference to the ברייתא. But even if there is a ספק you can understand רבה. But my question is that I think the hidden explanation of תוספות is better than the one they actually wrote.






תוספות says אביי was asking רבה  that we understand the סיפא because רבה is מחמיר with reference to the ברייתא. That is he is being strict to go by חנטה as opposed to being פטור לגמרי. But even if you say that רבה was being מחמיר because of a ספק whether we go by חנטה or by לקיטה קטיפה, then also the סיפא is good because in fact he is liable in ביעור because of חנטה, and he is not liable in מעשר because even though he would be because of the ספק about לקיטהת still when there is ספק there is תקנה to let the fruits be הפקר.

But the רישא is a problem because of מעשר.
And רבה answers his question about why he should be not obligated in tithes. יד בכל ממשמשין בו ויתחייב במעשר?

But the רישא there is  problem in terms of the ביעור because of the same תקנה. We are saying we are in ספק whether to go by חנטה or לקיטה. So we are מחמיר. So in the רישא why are we not מחמיר to say he is liable in ביעור?

After all if we are going by לקיטה time it is the שביעית and he should be liable in ביעור
אביי only asked about מעשר and רבה only answered about מעשר. If תוספות is right then why was there not also a question about ביעור?

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אני מבין תוספות שיש שתי דרכים של הבנת אביי. אחת הוא הדרך שכתבתי לפני זה. דרך האחרת היא הדרך שהוא כותב בגלוי. הסיבה שאני אומר יש לתוספות דרך נסתרת היא בגלל שבאופן שהוא מציג את דרכו, הוא מתחיל לומר "אפילו מחמת ספק". זאת אומרת שלתוספות יש הבנה בגמרא בדרך הפשוטה שאין ספק. רק שרבה הוא מחמיר עם התייחסות לברייתא שאחר כך. אבל גם אם יש  ספק יכולים להבין רבה ואביי. אבל השאלה שלי היא שאני חושב שההסבר הנסתר של תוספות הוא טוב יותר מזה שהם בעצם כתבו.
תוספות אומרים אביי שאל  גם אם אתה אומר שרבה מחמיר בגלל ספק אם הולכים לפי חנטה או  לקיטה (קטיפה), אז גם הסיפא היא טובה, כי  הוא חייב בביעור בגלל חנטה, והוא אינו חייב מעשר מפני שלמרות שהוא יהיה בגלל ספק על לקיטה עדיין כאשר יש ספק יש תקנה לתת הפירות לכל, היינו להפקיר אותם. אבל הרישה היא בעיה בגלל מעשר. ורבה עונה על שאלתו מדוע הוא צריך להיות לא מחויב במעשר, "יד בכל ממשמשין בו ויתחייב במעשר?" אבל ברישא יש בעיה במונחים של הביעור בגלל אותה תקנה. אנחנו אומרים שאנחנו נמצאים בספק אם ללכת לפי חנטה או לקיטה. אז אנחנו מחמירים. אז ברישה למה אנחנו לא מחמירים לומר שהוא עלול בביעור? אחרי הכל, אם אנחנו הולכים לפי לקיטה, זמן הזה הוא שביעית והוא וצריך להיות חייב בביעור. אביי שאל רק על מעשר ורבה  ענה על מעשר. אם תוספות נכונים אז למה גם לא הייתה שם שאלה על ביעור

Tractate rosh hashana

Rosh Hashanah 15a. Raba said the fruit called estrog going from year 6 to 7 is not obligated in anything. But from year 7 to 8 it is obligated in ביעור. Abyee asked Raba It is OK the end of your statement where you are being strict but what about the beginning? What I suggest Abyee means is this, Raba is being strict in reference to the next Braita where both going from 6 to 7 and from 7 to 8 is not obligated in anything. In comparison to that in fact Raba is being strict to go by חנטה ripening. So the natural question is then why then in the beginning  from 6 to 7 is Raba not being also going by חנטה? What I am saying is it is not that Abyee is saying Rabah is in doubt whether we go by חנטה or picking and therefore is being strict. Rather he is saying Rabah is being strict in reference to the next Braita where neither 6 to 7 nor 7 to 8 is obligated in anything. ____________________________________________________________________________ראש השנה טו ע''א רבה said the אתרוג going from ששית to שביעית is not obligated in anything. But from שביעית to שמינית it is obligated in ביעור. אביי asked רבה It is OK the סיפא where you are beingמחמירbut what about the רישא?What I suggest אביי means is this, רבה is being strict in reference to the next ברייתא where both going from ששית to שביעית and from שביעית to שמינית is not obligated in anything. In comparison to that in factרבהisbeingמחמירto go by חנטה. So the natural question is then why then in the רישא fromששיתtoשביעית isרבהnot being also going by חנטה? What I am saying is it is not that אביי is saying רבה is in doubt whether we go by חנטה or picking and therefore is being strict. Rather he is saying רבה is being מחמיר in reference to the next ברייתא where neither ששית to שביעית nor שביעית to שמינית is obligated in anything. ראש השנה טו ע''א רבה אמר אתרוג שנכנס משישית לשביעית אינו מחויבת בכל דבר . אבל מהשביעי לשמינית היא מחויב בביעור. אביי שאל רבה זה בסדר בסיפא שבו אתה מחמיר אבל מה לגבי הרישה? מה שאני מציע אביי כיוון את זה, רבה הוא מחמיר בהתייחסות לברייתא הבאה שבו שניהם שישית לשביעית ומהשביעית לשמינית אינו מחויב בשום דבר. בהשוואה לזה רבה הוא מחמיר ללכת לפי חנטה. אז השאלה המתבקשת היא מדוע אז ברישה מהשישית לשביעית רבה לא הולך לפי חנטה? מה שאני אומר הוא שאביי לא אמר לרבה הוא בספק אם נלך לפי חנטה או קטיפה ולכן הוא מחמיר. במקום זאת הוא אומר רבה הוא מחמיר בהתייחסות לברייתא הבאה שבו לא שישית לשביעית ולא לשביעית לשמינית מחויב בכל דבר.

Christians have stood against the tidal wave of homosexual-ism

 Christians have stood against the tidal wave of homosexual-ism. For this they should be complemented. However many are unaware that this issue is not ambiguous. There is nothing in doubt about the Law of the Torah concerning this.  What is in doubt to many is the question if the law of the government supersedes the law of God.  In fact until recently many thought loyalty to the government of the USA and Christianity were compatible and in fact identical. Now it is clear that they are not.