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18.11.15

Talmud Bava Metzia, pg 104

Ideas in Talmud   Ideas in Tractate Bava Metzia ch.s 8 and 9


The ideas in Bava Metzia needs a correction "possibility"אפשרות in Hebrew is feminine.  Thus it takes a feminine verb. [You can see this all the time in Tenach where such nouns are considered feminine. But there is an exception I think in Job
[for example in the beginning of the prayer of Chavakuk chapter 3.] פלצות in the prayer of חבקוק is treated as feminine.[While on grammar, I think בורא נפשות רבות  are feminine. That it should be וחסרונן על כל מה שברא להחיות בהן נפש כל חי, ברוך אתה ה' חי העולמים. That is anyway what I do.]
I also noticed at page 104 the essays need some clarifications. I was trying to present two ideas. One from my learning partner about the Rambam. And one from me about Rav Papa and how my idea can help understand the Rambam. But I don't think I presented these ideas clearly.




Also I think I need to make it clear that the halacha is like Rabbainu Tam and my answer for the Gra is just a kind of excuse. It should not be understood as I think that is the halacha.

I would add a few other halachas here and there (like electricity on Shabat), but if I have nothing new to say there does not seem to be any purpose. I am generally lenient when it comes to halacha. If there is a posek {Rishon} that is enough for me.. But not achronim. That is in any argument between any rishonim I always decide to be lenient.  And all the more so I pay no attention to any of the crazy added restrictions of the the religious world today which are all pure insanity and have nothing to do with Torah.

But  how can I attack what has no halachic basis (electricity on Shabat is a good example)? If people want to make up restrictions, because it makes them feel holy, what can I do?

Being extra strict I began to notice has no connection with being a normal decent human being. The extra strict types of people I think do not understand the Torah requires both obligations between man and his fellow man and also between man and God.

I also suggest that this is the exact reason why all the great Lithuanian yeshivas  like the Mir learned in a basic seven year cycle the tractates that had to deal with obligations between man and his fellow man {נשים נזיקין} and they learned Musar also [normative ethics].
On BM page 104
I was looking over what I wrote about cleanliness  and leaning. I think at least at the end of that essay I need to explain that when I was putting the opinion of the Ri and Rav Shimshon ben Avraham together I was intending to explain Rashi. That is leaning in the case of a strong  or weak tree with not make the person that is leaned on by the Zav to be unclean. Only if the Zav moves him as in the case of the weak tree.

[I should mention that in Elul usually some other tractates than the major ones are studied. For example in my first Elul period in Shar Yashuv in NY we learned Rosh HaShanah about the way to blow the Shophar. [That is the last page of Rosh Hashana].]



Another important issue in Bava Metzia is on page 100A with the second tosphot and the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot. The issue is that in Tosphot they are going with the idea found in in Nida 2b) that a "Hazaka" steady state of now (חזקה דהשתא) can only defeat a previous steady state חזקה מעיקרא if combined with some other Chazaka. That is not how Tosphot understands the gemara in Nida itself on the page over there. But it might very well be in fact how the Rashbam understands this because of his opinion on a divorce document that has witnesses but no time written in it. This last subject is the object of a debate between Tosphot, the Rambam, and the Rashbam. See Rav Shach's Avi Ezri where he goes into this in the Rambam Laws of Gittin chapter 1.
Now you might say in Bava Metzia Tosphot intends his answer to be two separate answers. [I do not have a Bava Metzia to be able to look this up but I hope someday that God will grant to me a Bava Metzia so I can look more carefully in Tosphot to see what he means.]
In any case , just to introduce you to the topic let me mention the basic issue. Rambam Laws of Divorce ch 1:25 says if there are witnesses on the document, it needs to have the  date. The Ramban (Nachmanides) says it always needs the date. The Rashbam says even if it has witnesses, it does not need the date.
The issue is: why is there a date on the document? Because of the daughter of his sister that is brought to court for having sex with another man while being married. Thus, we require every divorce to have the time in it- so he does not write a document after the act with a dater before the act and thus try to show she was not married at the time. But then the question from tractate Nida comes up. She is not married now, so the state now (חזקה דהשתא) goes backwards. In Nida, the Gemara says the state now only can work backwards if it has something else helping it. At any rate, we can see what the Rashbam was thinking -the case of the divorce is the same as the mikve. There is a state of the mikve or the woman  now, but the state of being first חזקה מעיקרא defeats the later state (חזקה דהשתא) unless the later state has some help. Therefore the document is valid, and it is as if it has a time written onto it which is right now. So at least the Rashbam is clear.

I also had to take out one idea on Bava Metzia page 104 that I heard from someone. But now it looks that it really made no sense, so I delete it.
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