I have not any success in convincing anyone at all about my approach to learning. however based on the off chance that anyone will listen I would like to suggest first of all learning Torah-in the narrow definition of the Rambam in his letter to Yemen. And I quote, ''Just like there is no adding or subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law.'' So you do not add prophets to the Old Testament. Even if Joe Shmoo down the street claims to be a prophet of God, and even if you believe it, still you do not add a new book to the Old Testament containing The Visions and Revelations of Joe Shmoo. So you do add nor subtract any books to the Oral Law--the tradition that was handed down by the sages of the Talmud and Mishna [i.e.,  the two Talmuds and the midrashim.][You can add explanations that make the intension clear but they are not The Oral Law" except in a second hand kind of way.]

There is an argument to support the Raavad in his argument against the Rambam in laws of marriage 12 law 9.     The argument is that the way the Rambam himself understands the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka  Bava Batra pg 130 is that it refers only to someone close to death. Also one can argue that the law of R. Yohanan ben Broka has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife.

Here is the Rambam, if a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the Sages still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the Torah.  conditions about inheritance are not valid.

The Raavad writes there is no need for the Sages to make their law like the law of the Torah because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. 

Rav Shach tries to bring support to the Rambam from the law of R Yohanan ben Broka that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. he can say this son alone will inherit me. 

But the Rambam himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [laws of inheritance 6 law 2]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her since when she is married, only one person inherits her, and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the Rambam. After all, you do see with R Yohanan ben Broka that there can be a condition that applies to inheritance. So the sages wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the Torah, ]

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There is an argument to support the proof for the ראב''ד his argument against the רמב''ם in הלכות אישות  פרק י''ב הלכה ט.     The argument is that the way the רמב''ם himself understands the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא  בבא בתרא דף ק''ל is that it refers only to someone close to death (שכיב מרע). Also one can argue that the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא has no application in dealing with the inheritance that a husband inherits from his wife. Here is the רמב''ם, If a husband makes an agreement  with his wife that he will not inherit her property, that condition is not valid. Even though the inheritance of a husband is from the words of the חכמים still here they made this law that a husband inherits like the law of the תורה.  Conditions about inheritance are not valid. The ראב''ד writes there is no need for the חכמים to make their law like the law of the תורה because in any case a person can not make a condition not to own or inherit something that has not yet come into the world. רב שך tries to bring support to the רמב''ם from the law of ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that one can choose one of his inheritors alone to inherit him. He can say, "This son alone will inherit me." But the רמב''ם himself writes that that law only applies to a person close to death [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. Also there can not  be any actual case in which a wife could say only someone will inherit her among several people that could inherit her, since when she is married, only one person inherits her and that is her husband.

[I am not saying that there is no defense for the רמב''ם. After all, you do see with ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא that there can be a תנאי that applies to inheritance. So the חכמים wanted to eliminate that possibility by making their decree like the law of the תורה, 

יש הוכחה לטענתו של הראב''ד נגד הרמב''ם בהלכות אישות פרק י''ב הלכה ט. הטענה היא שהדרך בה הרמב''ם עצמו מבין את דינו של ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא בבא בתרא דף ק''ל היא שהכוונה היא רק למישהו הקרוב למוות (שכיב מרע). כמו כן, ניתן לטעון שלדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא אין כל יישום במציאות עם הירושה שהבעל יורש מאשתו. הנה הרמב''ם, אם הבעל הסכים עם אשתו שלא יירש את רכושה, אין תוקף לתנאי זה. אף על פי שירושת בעל היא מדברי החכמים עדיין כאן עשו את הדין הזה שבעל יורש כחוק התורה. תנאים לגבי ירושה אינם תקפים. הראב''ד כותב שאין צורך שהחכמים יעשו את דינם כדין התורה כי ממילא אדם לא יכול להתנות לא להחזיק או לרשת משהו שעדיין לא בא לעולם. רב שך מנסה להביא תמיכה לרמב''ם מדין ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שאפשר לבחור באחד מיורשיו לבדו לרשת אותו. הוא יכול לומר: "הבן הזה לבדו יירש אותי". אבל הרמב''ם עצמו כותב שדין זה חל רק על אדם הקרוב למוות [הלכות נחלות פרק ו' הלכה ב' ]. כמו כן, לא יכול להיות מקרה ממשי שבו אישה יכולה לומר שרק מישהו יירש אותה מבין כמה אנשים שיכולים לרשת אותה, שכן כשהיא נשואה, רק אדם אחד יורש אותה וזה בעלה.

איני אומר שאין הגנה לרמב''ם. הרי אתה כן רואה אצל ר' יוחנן בן ברוקא שיכול להיות תנאי שיחול על ירושה. אז החכמים רצו לבטל את האפשרות הזאת על ידי שחיזקו את גזירתם כמו חוק התורה,

The approach of the Litvak Yeshiva World based on the Gra is this: to will sincerely believe in the Torah [the Tenach and the Two Talmuds and Midrash], to critically evaluate these teachings, and to attempt seriously to model their lives on its tenets. 

The approach of Rav Nahman of Breslov is: to adhere to the the Torah out of sincere conviction, but to disagree with important tenets; to attempt to recast the Torah in more personally palatable terms, and to work to redirect the Torah itself into more agreeable lines. The changes are real reforms, and sometimes redefinition into something more palatable.

This is honest and sincere but this still is not the same thing as straight unadulterated TORAH. And in spite of this the teachings of Rav Nahman are valuable and important --as long as one is aware that there can be slight or major deviations from straight Torah  

The problem I see in some Israeli cities is that there are no Litvak Yeshivot. Nor even kollels. Why specifically the Litvak brand? That is because [a a rule] that is where Torah is learned for its own sake, not for money,  nor for any agenda at all except to learn and keep Torah.

the problem with being too smart

 The Midrash says that the mother of Samuel the Prophet prayed that her son should not be too smart, nor dumb. You can see the problem with being too smart in a lot of intellectuals when their over extended minds mislead them. This is a point that Rav Nahman made in the Lekutai Moharan [The Le.M for short]. In particular you can see this in collage campuses where Harvard and Yale students and professors are cheering for Hamas. 

In philosophy however there was one philosopher who noticed the limits of reason and in fact that is the name of his book--The Critique of Pure Reason. The answer to the question "What is the limit of reason?" is the possibility of experience. i mean to say [from Kant] that outside of that realm of possible experience, reason collapses and starts to come up with self contradictions. --iI am not saying that is the end of the story. Rather there was the Friesian approach to Kant which to me makes the most sense. See the web site of Kelley Ross who shows some of the wider aspects of that approach in how it applies to faith. That aspect of the Kant Fries approach was first noticed by Otto.

There is a Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b.

There is a a law in the Rambam that does not seem to ''shtim'' [be in accord] with the Gemara in Ketuboth 76b. The Gemara brings a case where a cow was exchanged with an ass, and the cow was present, but the ass was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.   Rav Yehuda said in the name of Shumel, the owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Mari bar Yechezkeil said ''Pay no attention to what Yehuda said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The Rambam writes in laws of sales 20 law  14 in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an ass. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the ass, it was found dead.  The owner of the ass has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the Rambam brings the statement of Mari who disagrees with Rav Yehuda and right away the statement of Rav Yehuda. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the Rambam is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the ass, still since the ass is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the ass, the previous owner must bring proof.  While Mari is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of Mari is when he says ''domain''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as Rav Yehuda with whom he is disagreeing. 

this is clearly very relevant to bava mezia page 100a but i do not recall that sugia. i recall writing about it in my little booklet on bava metzia chapters 8 and 9 but i have no recollection of what i wrote. while i am at it i might mention that this idea here i jut put into a different book on shas

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 I am confused about a רמב''ם that does not seem to be in accord with the גמרא in כתובות ע''ו ע''ב. The גמרא brings a case where there a cow was exchanged with an חמור, and the cow was present, but the חמור was still in the barn of its owner. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.   רב יהודה said in the name of שמואל, the owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. מרי בר יחזקאל said ''Pay no attention to what יהודה אחי said. Rather in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring a proof.'' The רמב''ם writes in בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד   in whose domain a doubt arose, upon him is to bring proof. For example  a cow was exchanged with an חמור. When the owner of the cow went to pick up the חמור, it was found dead.  The owner of the חמור has to bring proof that it was alive at the time of the exchange. Here the רמב''ם brings the statement of מרי who disagrees with רב יהודה and right away the statement of רב יהודה. To make my question clearer, let me make clear that the רמב''ם is saying even though the owner of the cow now owns the חמור, still since the חמור is in the barn of the [previous] owner of the חמור, the previous owner must bring proof.  While מרי is saying that the owner of the cow has to bring proof. Besides this, the meaning of מרי is when he says ''רשות''  means ownership, not in the property or on the land of. Otherwise he would be saying the exact same thing as רב יהודה with whom he is disagreeing. 

 הרמב''ם לא נראה כמתאים לגמרא בכתובות ע''ו ע''ב. הגמרא מביאה מקרה שבו הוחלפה פרה עם חמור, והפרה הייתה נוכחת, אבל החמור עדיין היה ברפת של בעליה. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. אמר רב יהודה בשם שמואל, בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה חי בזמן ההחלפה. מרי בר יחזקאל אמר ''אל תשים לב למה שאמר יהודה אחי. אלא שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה.'' הרמב''ם כותב בהלכות מכירה כ' הלכה י''ד של מי שבתחומו התעורר ספק, עליו להביא הוכחה. למשל פרה הוחלפה עם חמור. כשבעל הפרה הלך לקחת את החמור, היא נמצאה מתה. בעל החמור צריך להביא הוכחה שהוא היה בחיים בזמן ההחלפה. כאן מביא הרמב''ם את דברי מרי החולק על רב יהודה ומיד את דברי רב יהודה. כדי להבהיר את שאלתי, הרשו לי להבהיר שהרמב"ם אומר אף על פי שבעל הפרה הוא עכשיו בעל החמור, עדיין כיון שהחמור נמצא ברפת של הבעלים [הקודמים] של החמור, הבעלים [הקודמים] חייבים להביא הוכחה. ואילו מרי אומר שבעל הפרה צריך להביא הוכחה. חוץ מזה, הכוונה של מרי היא כשהוא אומר ''רשות'' פירושו בעלות, לא בקרקע של. אחרת הוא היה אומר בדיוק אותו דבר כמו רב יהודה שהוא לא מסכים איתו

I was at the sea shore and on the way back it occurred to me that the law in the Rambam laws of gifts 8 law 6 (if one says if my wife gives birth to a  son he will take 100 zuz and if he gives birth to a daughter she will get 200 zuz.) might refer to a kinyan sudar [handkerchief]. But that is not how the Magid Mishna explains it there [and he says it refers to a person dying] because of the gemara in Gitin page 40 side b that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the Rambam brings that law in laws of gifts chapter 4. The Rashba however brings the Magid Mishna that there might be a difference between a kinyan sudar and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is derabanan [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the Torah explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a kinyan sudar is from the Torah as a valid exchange [halifin]. Thus it makes sense to say that the Rambam is referring to a kinyan sudar which is clearly more powerful than a document.

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 The Rambam  writes הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: If one says, "If my wife gives birth to a  son, he will take מנה.  If she gives birth to a daughter, she will get מאתיים. This might refer to a קניין סודר [handkerchief]. But that is not how the מגיד משנה explains it there. [He says it refers to a person dying שכיב מרע]. The reason the מגיד משנה explains this differently is because of the גמרא in גיטין מ' ע''ב that if a person writes in a document ''I will give such and such a thing to so and so'' that it is not valid, and there is no obligation incurred by means of that document.  And the רמב''ם brings that law in laws of giftsהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. The רשב''א however brings the מגיד משנה that there might be a difference between a קניין סודר and a document. It occurred to me that the Rambam himself writes that the validity of documents is מן הרבנן [from the sages, not from the Torah except where the תורה explicitly says one needs a document like with divorce.] while a קניין סודר is from the תורה as a valid exchange [חליפין]. Thus it makes sense to say that the רמב''ם is referring to a קניין סודר which is clearly more powerful than a document.

הרמב"ם כותב הלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ח' הלכה ו: אם יאמר "אם אשתי תלד בן, ייקח מנה. אם היא תלד בת, היא תקבל מאתיים. זה יכול להתייחס לקניין סודר [מטפחת]. אבל לא כך מסביר זאת המגיד משנה שם. [הוא אומר שזה מתייחס לשכיב מרע]. הסיבה שהמגיד משנה מסביר זאת אחרת היא בגלל הגמרא בגיטין מ' ע''ב שאם יכתוב אדם במסמך ''אתן כזה וכזה'' שאינו תקף, ואין התחייבות שנגרמה על ידי אותו מסמך. והרמב''ם מביא את הדין הזה בהלכות זכיה ומתנה פרק ד. הרשב"א לעומת זאת מביא את המגיד משנה שאולי יש הבדל בין קניין סודר למסמך. עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם בעצמו כותב שתוקף המסמכים הוא מן הרבנן [מהחכמים, לא מהתורה אלא במקום שבו התורה אומרת במפורש שצריך מסמך כמו בגירושין.] ואילו קניין סודר הוא מהתורה כחילופין. לפיכך הגיוני לומר שהרמב''ם מתייחס לקניין סודר שהוא בבירור חזק יותר ממסמך

 In the ketubah there is a clause ''I will work.'' But in any document, if one writes ''I will do such and such a thing'' it is קניין דברים acquisition of words which has no validity.  So why is it in the ketubah-- because of the obligation that exists anyway. Even though the obligation to provide for a wife is an argument if it is from the Torah or the words of the scribes, still there is no doubt that there is such an obligation which amounts to about two kilograms of flour every week. 

there is a lot to go into about all this which i might get to someday. 

 When Christians talk about Bible Studies for Wednesday night [or some other time they get together during the week], they do not ever learn the Old Testament in depth, and most of the time not even the New Testament except for the letters of Paul.  But that just goes to show that Christianity is really based on Paul. But that requires a belief that Paul understood the approach of Jesus better that any of the actual people that heard and saw him, and wrote down his teachings directly from first hand knowledge.  But if they want to learn Paul as an authority on Jesus, well so be it. But then, why is it that the ''Bible Studies''never include the Old Testament.

[One place where you can see the problem of not learning the Old Testament is when Christians try to take a verse from the Old Testament to show something is morally wrong, but ignore other verses. When they take the words of the Old Testament to be authoritative, they are depending on Jesus. When they ignore the Law of Moses, they depend on Paul. But this weakens their position . You can not have it both ways. Either the Law of Moses means what it  says, or it does not. I ask them to make up their minds.]

I might add here that the way I see morality of the Old Testament is that it is based on a synthesis of faith and reason. This is as we see in the Talmud where there is a great deal of discussion about how to understand the verses of the Law of Moses based on reason. Very few times is any discussion based on the idea that someone's opinion is halacha le'Moshe miSinai [a law to Moses from Sinai]. [There are a few places where it is considered that a law is halacha to Moses from Sinai. More often it is just clear that some things are in fact ''from the Torah''; e.g., things like the 39 types of work on the sabbath, or the many laws about the temple or marriage]. Rather all discussions are based on the idea of how can we reconcile seemingly contrary verses or later teachings that themselves were based on verses.

I hope that Christians start to learn the Old Testament in depth, not superficially. In fact, I recall that there was once a long time ago a father who read to his family a few chapters of the Bible at the dinner table every night until the family had finished the Bible several times over.

The issue about the need for knowledge in the writing of  the get [divorce] or kidushin is unclear to me like I wrote a few days ago. The main point of confusion is the Ramban brought by the Ran that for a get one needs both for her sake and the husband should write it. That is how the Ramban gets out of the problem about why he could not say to a messenger [or two] to go and tell so and so to write a get and give it. The answer מילי לא מימסרי לשליח ''words are not given to a messenger'' clearly does not work as the Ramban himself noted. After all you can tell a messenger to take trumah or to write a document of ownership and give it to someone--and lots of things that require intension. But if you need the man to write the get, then that should be that. I noticed that Rav Shach deals with this issue, and I imagine many of the other Achronim also try, but to me the whole issue is unclear. [I might just give up. Or i might wait until i can gain clarity by learning further on.]

 I get the impression that most people do not have an idea about  learning Torah. They see it is only applicable to people that want to use it to make money.

And I think that the fact that people in kollel use Torah to make money adds to this misimpression.

 But it should be obvious that learning Torah is incumbent on every person, and that no one should use it to make money. 

But while I am on the subject, I would like to suggest and offer here my approach. That is- I think people should learn in depth in the morning right when they wake up and learn fast in the afternoon when it is harder to concentrate.  So the morning should be like in the great Litvak yeshivot-- with staying on one page of Gemara for a few weeks. That is either in depth with Reb Chaim of Brisk or Rav Shach or the other great sages of the Litvak world [i.e., Birchat Shmuel, Shaari Yosher of R. Shimon Shkopf etc.] The afternoon for getting through Shas with Tosphot and Maharsha. Also there should be a few sessions in Mathematics and Physics-- to get through fast the basic material. [I mean to get through it,-- and then review.]

 Kant's synthesis between empirical knowledge and rational knowledge has been a problem as soon as the ink was dry on the first Critique as was immediately noted by Schulze  and Maimon. The answer to their objections I have thought was best answered by Jacob Fries until I noticed what I think is the similar answer given by Reinhold. [I saw this answer in a paper by   Peter Sperber]. Schulze had objected to a sort of circularity in Kant  [that  sense perception works by way of cause and effect. The object outside of oneself causes the perception. But if causality is the only thing that makes perception possible, then it can't be part of perception.][The problem is that without causality, perception is pure delusion] and Salomon Maimon had objected to any possible contact between a priori concepts and empirical senses. The answer is there are concepts that are known immediately without have to go through  reasoning process--they are the categories of where, when, how, why, etc.

Kidushin page 9

 I have been puzzled about a Rambam that says if one writes a document of marriage and it is given to a messenger of the woman, then it must be written with the agreement of the messenger. The Magid Mishna brings there [Laws of Marriage chapter 3-law 18] that the Ramban disagrees with this and says it has to be written with the knowledge and agreement of the woman. This is just like the fact that  a husband  can not say, ''Tell so and so to write a divorce doc and give it to my wife.'' The Ramban is bringing this from a Gemara in Kidushin page 9 that says a doc of marriage has to be written with the knowledge of the woman. [ That is an argument there, but this is the agreed upon conclusion.] What is the puzzle about this to me is the general law, ''Words are not given over to a messenger.''  That means one can appoint a messenger to do things, but not to say things. And for a divorce doc  to be for a particular woman requires the husband to say so. But this in itself is the source of my confusion. Why is it that a scribe could not write a doc of divorce for a particular man and wife?  If we say a scribe  is ok to write the doc, then why should he have to hear it from the husband. If we say the verse says that the husband himself has to write it, then why should a scribe be ok-- even if the husband tells him to write it?

 The sages of the Gemara [Talmud] said that Gog and Magog [Armageddon] would come three times against Israel and that at the third time they will reach Yerushalaim [Jerusalem]. That is based on Yechezkel [Ezekiel] chapters 38 and 39. Then in the next chapters, Yechezkel [Ezekiel] goes into the dimension and building  of the third temple. Now it is clear that Russia, China and Iran are aligned against Israel. So even if Israel would be able to finish off Hamas, that would do nothing to take care of the larger threats. [That is, even if Israel would have any specific targets inside of Gaza. But there is no such thing. The entire population is determined to destroy Israel. There is no specific target.] So what ought to do is to learn Gemara, Rashi and Tosphot every day as the sages said: ''What should one do to be saved from Armageddon--learn Torah.'' [But to learn Torah as a mitzvah means not to take money for doing so. To get paid for learning negates the value.] [And I might add here my basic approach to learning Torah. It is divided into in depth learning in the morning and includes the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, Mathematics, and Physics. The afternoon or evening is for fast learning, I.E., to get through the Talmud with Rashi, Tosphot, Maharsha, and then the Yerushalmi, plus getting through the basic math and physics, Algebraic Topology, Quantum Field Theory, String Theory. There should also be a few hours for exercise.][string theory is important as the only viable explanation of gravity. To see what i mean, take a look at Feynman's papers on quantum gravity showing that it is not renormalizable.]

[people are too discouraged from the hard subjects because of lack of faith in God. they ought to believe that by saying the words and going on, that they will eventually understand. this is like the same wat trust in god works in other areas where one does a minimum amount of effort and trust God to do the rest.]

 There is a sort of Achilles heel in Breslov in that in spite of the tremendous advice of Rav Nahman, there is a kind of tendency for it to take people away from straight Torah. The advice really works best in a context of a place that is devoted to learning Gemara.--i.e. a regular Litvak yeshiva.  This is hinted at in a letter Rav Nahman wrote to his group in Breslov מאסתי בישיבת ברסלב ''I have become disgusted with Yeshivat Breslov'', -Even though the intension of the letter was to say that he was upset with the town and would no longer dwell there, still there is a hint in that letter.

In the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] Rav Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [There is such a thing a being too smart.]]

Rav Nachman of Breslov said the trait of wisdom spread out [like all the other ten sephirot] until God established a limit for it. You can see this idea in other places in the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] where R' Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [''The main thing is to be simple and straight, for too much smarts tricks a person..]] You can see this same idea in Kant where he wants to expand the role of reason into synthetic a priori [ i.e., what other philosophers call ''universals;;]--but he does place a limit on this role of reason. The limit is that it is applicable only in the realm of possible experience.  [The way to see this is to think of a computer. A bathtub full of computer chips is not a computer. To have knowledge of the real world, one's own computer chips--his way of sensing time space color etc. have to be ordered and structured.[Space and time are the forms of intuition aka sense perception. They are not concepts of reason.] But we do not have sense perception outside of our 3-d world.]

 My basic idea of what to do in these horrific times is to learn Torah. But I should add that I have a very limited idea of what ''Torah'' is--that is only the actual Oral and Written Law. This is like the Rambam wrote, ''Just like one can  not add nor subtract from the Written Law, so one cannot add nor subtract from the Oral Law.''-which is only the actual set of books written down by the Tenaim and Amoraim [Sages of the Talmud and Mishna]. After them, there is no authentic tradition. [The idea here is that just like if one would come along today and claim to prophecy, no one would or should believe him or her because we already have the prophets, and that age is finished. So it is with the Oral Law, that age is finished. So no one could come along after the finishing of the Talmud and claim they found a lost book of the Oral Law, nor make up his own ideas in Torah and call them the Oral Law.]

[Since learning Torah is equal to all the other mitzvot [and out weighs them as shown in Nefesh Hachaim vol 4], thus one ought to take as an obligation on oneself to get through the entire oral and written law, Tenach, the two Talmuds [with Rashi, Tophot and corresponding commentaries], and all the midrashim. Also to have an in depth session in the AVI EZRI of Rav Shach, Mathematics and Physics.] 

the third temple.

 The Third Temple is not well  understood by many people including myself. But today i saw a book by a fellow Izhak Cohen [in a yishuv called Elad] who brings the Rashi and Ramchal on the verses in Ezekiel and does a great job in laying it all out in detail. However to actually build it would require a red cow without which there is no way of getting out of tumat met [uncleanliness that come from touching a dead body.] [But I imagine nowadays that should be fairly easy by genetic modification]

[ii admit to having read Ezekiel and also seeing the Ramchal without having the slighted understanding until this morning when I looked at that book.]

One of the major reasons the third temple is not understood in the Mishna and Gemara talk only about the second temple. The parts of the gemara that are relevant to the third temple are only the parts about sacrifices

for some odd reason the chapters in ezekiel which explain all about the third temple are almost never studied by anyone.

Of course Muslim would nor be pleased with us jews for making a third temple, but we are in any case not winning any popularity contests in the muslim world. our mere exitance is a thorn in their side. Christians also would not be in favor of this because the last chapters of revelations seem to indicate a third temple that would not be for sacrifices. all the more so Paul is down on keeping the commandments of the torah which include building a temple. however paul anyway go into the new testament for reasons that do not seem valid since he had no first hand information about anything that jesus ever said or did.

advice to school

 Get rid of the social studies pseudo science departments. I do not agree with anything of what the teach. I agree however with art and hard sciences. Also the Old Testament. I would agree with philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and Kant.

 There is one way of learning in depth that I have not mentioned. This is to hold your place where you already are in the book and work around that point. That is to review that page. then go back  one page and then go forward a few more pages.  Then go back a few more pages. But I do not mean this in place of a regular in depth session with review back to the very beginning, nor in place of the sort of very fast learning [called ''girsa'']. 

 no one is asking my opinion, but it seems clear to me that Gaza ought to be flattened. i mean, they have had plenty of chances to become peaceful. they were always saying that if they could have their own area then that is all that would be needed for peace..since they got it all the have done is to try to make war against Israel.  fool me once-shame on you. fool me twice shame on me

 Even though the Litvak world is about as close to the Gra as anyone could get, I still find a few things,  amiss. What about the herem of the Gra that is completely ignored? And I find this to be the root of many other things that are amiss. [Nor do I claim to be innocent in this regard. For I do learn the books  of Rav Nahman of Breslov. bBut I do have a reason for that. That is that after looking at a book that contained the original herems including that of the Gra, I noted that Rav Nahman would not be in that category. ]

 I think it is agreed that the Hegelian attempt to replace Aristotelian logic with his own was not successful. Even though there are fuzzy logics,  they have nothing in common with Hegel. The many attempts to discard Kant and the distinction between a priori and empirical truths have also not proven to be valid as Robert Hanna has pointed out. [Michael Huemer however goes along with Prichard and what are called the intuitionists, that school comes from G.E. Moore and to some degree is the beginning of the Analytic School which Robert Hanna has rightfully put into its place. However, I still can not decide the winner. To me it seems like a draw between the Friesian school based on Kant [i.e. Kelley Ross] and Huemer. 

to get through the two Talmuds

Simchat Torah is the best time to make a commitment to get through the two Talmuds with all the commentaries-every day to do a few pages with Rashi, Tosphot and Maharsha.  Beside that to do a few in depth sessions with the Reb Chaim of Brisk [Chidushai Harabam] and Rav Shach's Avi Ezri.

the Talmud asks since only the light of Torah can bring a person to the revival of the dead, [as is mentioned in the verse -טל תורה מחייה אותו that the dew of Torah will ring a person to be revived at the time of the revival of the dead] then how can women merit to a portion in the next world [since women are not obligated in the commandment to learn Torah -    so they get no reward by doing so]. The Gemara answers by bringing up their children to learn Torah and waiting for their husband to return from the study hall.

 I was looking at the Gate of Intentions by Rav Chaim Vital about Sukot, and it mentions there the importance of repentance on the night of Hoshana Raba. [The 7th day of Sukot after midnight] That is when the memo is given to the angels that was sealed on Yom Kipur. There it says there is still hope to repent before the angel of judgment gets the memo. But how to repent or on what to repent is the question. The most obvious answer is to learn Musar [books of ethics].  This is because every person is on their own path and can't know what they are doing wrong except by seeing what others do wrong. כל הפוסל במומו פוסל, all who cancel cancel with their own defect. SO only by seeing what is wrong with others, can one see what is wrong with himself.

 There is a fine line between exploitation and a  legitimate structuring of society. A hierarchy of a group is a natural phenomenon in all mammals and ants and lobsters.   To see all hierarchy as exploitation is a mistake. But there can be exploitation also--and often it is not easy to see the difference. You need a balance as the ancient Romans had figured out when there was a peasant rebellion, and instead of making war against them, someone had the brilliant idea of creating institutions that would insure the lives and liberties of the people while leaving the patricians in power to insure law and order. Thus was created the office of the tribune.

    Everyone has a place and just because one is low in the hierarchy  that does nor mean he or she is exploited. But there is a line that can be crossed. The advantage of  some systems is they give one the chance to excel based on ability and competence--not birth.

 I am not doing much in depth learning nowadays, but just occurred to me at the beach to ask an obvious question. With a gift we say that if the external circumstances show it was given with a mistaken assumption, then the gift is invalid--even though it was signed and sealed in a legitimate court of law according to halacha. To Tosphot [Ketuboth 37] this applies also to sales. But a forced sale is valid. You might answer that in a forced sale, there is no mistake about the circumstances. But even in the first case, it seems that the mistake in circumstance also ''forced'' the sale.

What I mean here you can see in a few examples. Let's say a person has heard that his son died in a faraway country, and then signs away all his property. Then we discover that his son is alive. We say that gift is invalid. 

But if someone ties up a person, and forces him to sign a document of a sale, that sale is valid- since we say because of the circumstances, he really did intend for the sale to be complete and valid. 

     Even though a lot of the woke and gender insanity depends on the Frankfurt School, that does not mean that Kant and Hegel had nothing to say of importance. Rather it is indicative of where philosophy  went wrong after them. And there were a lot of false leads and trails that veered off into lunacy. But it is hard to get to some sort of '''' birur'' [separating the wheat from the chaff].   High I.Q. does not seem to help much, since the philosophy professors in the USA universities are very smart.  [The highest I.Q.s in universities are the physics and math students and teachers, while the lowest are the teachers in the psychology departments.] 

 My son Izhak held with the importance of Rav Nahman of Breslov but in the way that many do so in the Litvak yeshiva world--that is to accept many of his major principles but not to take it all--especially when it seems not to apply to some present situation.  And I would have to agree with this. After all you do not see real Torah learning except in the Litvak Yeshiva World. and there are clearly no real Torah scholars outside of the Litvak world. 

 You can see in some of the books on ethics from the middle ages the synthesis of faith with reason. But this was not universal. The dividing line seems to be the Geonim from Saadia Gaon down through the Obligations of the Hearts until the Rambam. On the other side [against secular studies] are Rav Hai Gaon Tosphot and the Ramban. 

 But even the side that held with the importance of learning physics and metaphysics there are some differences. Ibn Gavirol went with Plato.In fact his book on platonic philosophy was widely used as an introduction to Plato. And even the system of Ibn Pakuda [author of Obligations of the Hearts] was neo platonic. But Rambam clearly thought Aristotle was superior. [I don't mean that Plato and Aristotle are the end. Rather philosophy did make progress in Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson.]

[There is a way for everyone to become an expert in Physics and Mathematics; that is mentioned in the gemara tractate Shabat pg 63--to say the words and go on. This is called ''bekiut'' in Litvak yeshivot, but it is not meant tor replace in depth learning, but as a supplement. Even so when Rav Nahman learned in this fast way, it was I think a major part of his learning. See Conversations of Rav Nachman 76 where it is brought that he said in the few minutes in the morning before the morning prayer, began he would go through four pages of the Shulchan Aruch with all the commentaries, i.e., Shach, Taz, Pri Chadash, Beer Hagola etc.