If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a pruta [penny], and here is a pledge until I give the pruta." She is not married because there is no pruta [penny], and there is no pledge. Thus sayeth Rava in Kiduhin. What does this mean, "There is no pledge?" Tosphot holds there is no pledge because there is no obligation to give the pruta. But if had written a document saying that he would give a pruta or had made kinyan sudar [acquisition by a scarf] she would be married, But what is the regular case of a pledge? Is it specifically from a decree of the Torah that there is such a thing as a pledge --. If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But is a pledge is a general sort of thing that a pledge can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how Rav Shach seems to explain the Tosphot.
But on the other side, there is the Rambam and Rashba that hold she is not married and there is no pledge because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of Rav Shach is that this approach of the Rambam and the Rashba goes according to the way of understanding a pledge as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the Rambam and Rashba either. I admit I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender either,
So Rav Shach must mean the opposite. A pledge is only in a case of an obligation as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. and this is the reasoning of Tosphot that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the Rambam and Rashba is that there is in general an acquiring of a pledge that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition. But if so, then in the case of kidushin, why is the pledge any less than any other pledge that is given on condition?
So what the Rambam and Rashba mean is that even though this pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no kidushin. This is the same reason why a present on condition to return also does not cause a category of a kidushin
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If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a פרוטה and here is a משכון until I give the פרוטה." She is not married because there is no פרוטה and there is no משכון. Thus sayeth רבא in קידושין ח. What does this mean, "There is no משכון?" And תוספות holds there is no משכון because there is no obligation to give the פרוטה. But if had written a שטר saying that he would give פרוטה or had made קניין סודר (handkerchief) she would be married. But what is the regular case of a משכון? Is it specifically from a גזירת הכתוב that there is such a thing as a משכון . If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But if a משכון is a general sort of thing that a משכון can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how רב שך seems to explain the תוספות. But on the other side, there is the רמב''ם and רשב''א that hold she is not married and there is no משכון because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of רב שך is that this approach of the רמב''ם and רשב''א goes according to the way of understanding a משכון as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the רמב''ם and רשב''א either. I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender either, So רב שך must mean the opposite. A משכון is only in a case of an obligation as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. And this is the reasoning of תוספות that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the רמב''ם and רשב''א is that there is in general an acquiring of a משכון that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition.
But if so, then in the case of קידושין, why is the pledge any less than any other pledge that is given on condition?
so what the רמב''ם and רשב''א mean is that, even though the pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no קידושין. This is the same reason why a present on condition to return also does not cause a קידושין
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אם אומר לאישה "את נשואה לי בפרוטה
והנה משכון עד שאתן פרוטה". היא לא נשואה כי אין פרוטה ואין משכון. כה אומר
רבא בקידושין ף ח. מה זה אומר "אין משכון?" תוספות מחזיק אין משכון כי
אין חובה לתת את הפרוטה. אבל אם היה כותב שטר שייתן פרוטה או עשה קניין סודר
(מטפחת) היא נשואה. אבל מהו המקרה הרגיל של משכנתא? האם זה ספציפית מגזירת הכתוב
שיש דבר כזה משכון. אם כן, זה רק במקרה של הלוואה. אבל אם משכון הוא מעין דבר כללי
שאפשר לתת משכון עד שתתקיים חובה כלשהי? כך נראה רב שך שמסביר את התוספות. אבל
מהצד השני יש את הרמב''ם והרשב''א שמחזיקים שהיא לא נשואה ואין משכון כי שום דבר
בעל ערך כספי לא הגיע אליה. המשמעות של רב שך היא שגישה זו של הרמב''ם ורשב''א
הולכת לפי דרך הבנת משכון כנגזרה מגזרת התורה, שהיא להלוואה. אבל נראה שגם זה לא
מתאים לרמב''ם ורשב''א. התלבטתי בנושא זה כי במקרה של התורה, (במקרה של הלוואה),
גם שום דבר בעל ערך לא הגיע למלווה, אז רב שך חייב להתכוון להיפך. משכון הוא רק
במקרה של התחייבות לפי גזירת התורה כגון במקרה
של הלוואה. וזהו נימוק התוספות שאם היה מסמך המחייב אותו, אז הייתה נשואה. והנימוק
של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הוא שיש בכלל רכישת משכון שפשוט רכישת חפץ בתנאי שההלוואה לא
תשולם או כל תנאי אחר
אבל אם כן, אז במקרה של קידושין, מדוע המשכון פחות מכל משכון אחר שניתן בתנאי?
אז מה שהרמב''ם והרשב''א מתכוונים זה שאף על פי שלמשכון הזה יש קטגוריה אמיתית של משכון, עדיין על ידי זה שהוא לא נשאר אצלה, אין קידושין. זו אותה סיבה שגם מתנה בתנאי להחזיר אינה גורמת לקידושין
