Continued from yesterday. Rav Shach never actually wrote that the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that Tosphot must hold the law of a pledge comes from a decree of the Torah where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. Tosphot in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her 100 zuz and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the mana [100 zuz"] she would in fact be by that married. In other words, if he just says, "You are married to me by a mana that I will give you, and here is a pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.
But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the mana. And thus she is married.
This is similar to the question on the law that if lashon hara/slander is said in front of three people one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it i considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known.
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רב שך never actually wrote that the argument between תוספות and the רמב''ם depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that תוספות must hold the law of a pledge comes from a גזירת הכתוב where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. תוספות in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her מאה זוז and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the מנה'" she would in fact be by that married. In other words if he just says "You are married to me by a מנה that I will give you, and here is a pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.
But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the מנה. And thus she is married.
This is similar to the question on the law that if לשון הרע is said in front of three people, one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known.
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רב שך מעולם לא כתב שהוויכוח בין
תוספות לרמב''ם תלוי איך אתה מבין את הקטגוריה של משכון. נראה שמה שהוא התכוון היה
שתוספות חייב להחזיק שחוק המשכון מגיע מגזירת הכתוב שבו הוא נמצא במקרה של הלוואה.
לפיכך היא חייבת לבוא רק במקרה שישנה התחייבות. תוספות מחזיק אם היה נותן לה מסמך
שאומר שהוא חייב לתת לה מאה זוז ולומר ש"את נשואה לי בזאת במסמך הזה, והנה
משכון עד שאתן את המנה" היא בעצם תהיה על ידי זה שנשוי. כלומר אם רק יאמר
"את נשואה לי במנה שאתן לך, והנה משכון עד שאתן", היא לא נשואה בזה כי
אין לו חובה לתת את המנה. אבל כאן אפשר לשאול: יהא הדין שעל ידי האמירה ההיא היא
נשואה כך, ואז הוא יהיה חייב לתת לה את המנה. ועכשיו היא נשואה. הדבר דומה לשאלה על הדין שאם נאמר לשון הרע
בפני שלושה אנשים, מותר לאחר מכן לומר. הסיבה היא שמאחר שיש כבר שלושה אנשים
שמודיעים, זה נחשב כבר ידוע. אלא שיהא הדין שאי אפשר לומר זאת אף על פי שנאמר בפני
שלושה אנשים, ואז לא יהיו שלושה אנשים שמפרסמים
