Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
5.2.25
best approach is like Rav Nahman of Breslov, “If you can find an opinion to depend on, then you can depend on it.”
I realize that the main objective of my learning partner, David Bronson, was to understand the Gemara. And, in fact, he found that Rabbainu Izhak (grandson of Rachi) most often held the key to this. [Tosphot is mostly based on Rabbainu Izhak.] David told me many times: Tosphot is always right. I mean to say that understanding all the different approaches to the Gemara made no sense to him. Rather what is important is to understand the Gemara itself. And, in fact, this is the main obligation of understand the Oral and Written Law. But to understand why the Beit Joseph decided the law in a certain way seems to me to be of little importance. The reason I feel this way is that there is no actual deciding of law after the Gemara. Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of the possibility of decided the law. רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה So, all we can do is to see how the Talmud itself decided. And here is where things get confusing. The principles deciding the law are not spelled out exactly. We have in Eruvin, the order of Tenaim –with whom the law goes. First R. Jose, then R. Yehuda etc. Then we have a different principle the law is always like stam (plain) Mishna which ןs like R. Meir who is at the bottom of the list of how the law goes. [An example of what I am saying here is that the rule that the law is like stam mishna, however most mishnas in Bava Metzia and Bava Kama and Bava Batra are like sumchos even though the law is like the sages against him except to the Rashbam.] Then, we have the law is not like a disciple instead of the teacher. However, the law is sometimes like Reish Lakish instead of R. Yochanan, his teacher. We have the majority opinion which is always like Beit Hillel except an entire tractate (Horayot) which every single law there is like Beit shamai (the minority opinion). I could go on and on, but in fact, to the Gemara itself, it was not very interesting to state openly how the law should go except in the few places where the Gemara itself says openly the final decision. Rather, it seems to me the best approach is like Rav Nahman of Breslov, “If you can find an opinion to depend on, then you can depend on it.” Rav Nachman did not hold with running after extra restrictions.
Then we have the law is always like the later authority in the order of the Amoraim after a certain point, and yet there are exceptions like the fact the law is like Rava against Abyee except in yal kegam even though later Amoraim disagreed.
Even though Rabbainu Yoseph Karo decided the law in the shulchan aruch, it was not because he thought that was objectivity the law. Rather he wrote it as a compromise between the sepharadim who were going with the Rif and Rambam and the Ashkenazim who were going with the Rif. [ Besides that, the law he decided was not in the shulchan aruch (which is supposed to be quick review), but in the beit yoseph on the Tur]. He wrote in the introduction to the Tur: the way he decided the law in writing is not because he thought that was accurate, but because that was the majority opinion between the three greats the Rif, Rambam, and Rosh. [I might add that Rav Yaakov Emden wrote in the teshuvot that he hated all the superfluous extra restrictions that the Ashkenazim are always adding in a continual progression. ]
__________________________________________________________________________________________I realize that the main objective of my learning partner David Bronson was to understand the גמרא. And in fact, he found that רבינו יצחק (grandson of רש''י) most often held the key to this. [תוספות is mostly based on ר' יצחק] and David told me many times” (תוספות is always right). I mean to say that understanding all the different approaches to the גמרא made no sense to him. Rather what is important is to understand the גמראitself. And in fact, this is the main obligation of understand the תורה שבכתב ותורה שבעל פה. But to understand why the בית יוסף decided the law in a certain way seems to me to be of little importance. The reason I feel this way is that there is no actual deciding of law after the גמרא. This is open in the גמרא itself: רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה are the end of the possibility of decided the law. רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה So, all we can do is to see how the תלמו itself decided. And here is where thing get confusing. The principles deciding the law are not spelled out exactly. we have in ערובין the order of תנאים –with who the law goes. First ר' יוסי , then ר' יהודה etc. Then we have a different principle the law is always like סתם משנה which ןs like ר' מאיר who at the bottom of the list of how the law goes. Then we have the law I not like a disciple instead of the teacher. However, the law is sometime like ריש לקיש instead of ר' יוחנן his teacher. We have the רוב opinion which Is always like בית הלל except and entire מסכת הוריות which every single there is like בית שמאי (the minority opinion). I could go on and on, but in fact to the גמרא itself, it was not very interesting to state openly how the law should go except in the few places where the גמרא itself says openly the final decision. Rather, it seems to me the best approach Is like רב נחמן of ברסלב, “If you can find an opinion to depend on, then you can depend on it.” רב נחמןdid not hold with running after extra restrictions.
Then we have the law is always like the later authority in the order of the אמוראים after a certain point, and yet there are exceptions like the fact the law is like רבא againstאביי except in יע''ל כג''ם even though later אמוראים disagreed.
Even though ר' יוסף קרו decided the law in the שלחן ערוך, it was not because he thought that was objectivity the law. Rather he wrote it as a compromise between the ספרדים who were going with the רי''ף and רמב''ם and the אשכנזים who were going with the רא''ש. [and besides that, the law he decided was not in the שלחן ערוך (which is supposed to be quick review), but in the בית יוסף on the טור]. He wrote in the introduction to the Tur that the way he decided the law in writing is not because he thought that was accurate, but because that was the majority opinion between the three greats the רי''ף רמב''ם ורא''ש. [I might add thatיעב''ץ רב יעקב עמדן wrote in the תשובות that he hated all the superfluous חומרות יתירות that the אשכנזים are always adding in a continual progression. ]