Black people are now enslaving white people. Forcing them to work for them for what is called welfare, but is in fact forced labor--forcing people to work without recompense. So the objection to slavery is not sincere. Rather the objection is that blacks want to be the masters.
[The goal is a exchange of white masters for black masters.]
History is I think the main reason for the opposition towards Jesus. Especially the expulsion from Spain is certainly foremost in the minds of most Sephardim. Yet learning the actual history of the bitter struggle to rid Spain of Muslim overlords gave me an idea of why Isabella and Ferdinand thought it would be best not to have a "fifth column" of people that were either active in helping the Muslims, or at least were certainly on the Muslim side in terms of ideology --thinking (as they still do) the Muslims were not idolaters as they think Christians are.
Columbus received his commission to just as Isabella and Ferdinand were entering Granada, the last stronghold of Muslim rule in Spain. And that is exactly when the decree was issued. I.e. in simple terms the king and queen were not making any distinctions at that time. All enemies had to go.
And as for the idea of Christians being idolatrous has seemed to me less than accurate after learning some of the books of Avraham Abulafia [a mystic of the middle ages.] [Only printed recently. Mainly he is brought in the Remak [Rav Moshe of Cordova] and Rav Chaim Vital. I saw his books only in microfilm. Later they were printed.]
So then why would it not be idolatry? You would have to resort to the idea of souls of Emanation [a frequent concept in the Ari/Rav Isaac Luria]. And Emanation is pure Godliness.
The major reason why some rishonim [mediaeval authorities] hold one ought to learn Physics and Metaphysics is that they see this as the fulfillment of the commands to love and fear God. So the issue does not depend on talent. Rather they see these two subjects as an integral part of Torah. But as you can see in the Guide for the Perplexed that they were referring to these subjects as understood by Aristotle. But they have gained in the meantime. So I think that today one ought to learn Physics up until String Theory. Metaphysics is a bit less well established --exactly what it includes. I suggest Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson. [There is a certain tension between this school of thought and Hegel, but both seem to have good points.]
Kelley Ross has a great web site introducing the approach of Kant and Fries
SPERBER also has a nice essay on this
I can see why the testing system that you find in school is important to some degree. You do not want unqualified people teaching Physics or other subjects. On the other hand, tests can be frustrating and can discourage people.
My feeling is that everyone can learn Physics and Mathematics, but not everyone can be a physics professor.
The first thing one needs is the idea that it is important to learn, even for one that is not particularly talented. Why is it important? Mainly you see this in חובות לבבות ומעלות המידות ומורה נבוכים Obligations of the Hearts, Greatness of Good Character, and the Guide for the Perplexed.
[Ibn Pakuda, Binyamin the doctor, and Rambam/Maimonides.] In particular the Rambam spells it out in the Guide in the parable of the country of the king at the end of vol. III or vol. IV [I forget which].
The next thing one needs is to say the words and go on from beginning to end. That type of fast learning is brought in Gemara, and Ways of the Righteous, and also Rav Nahman of Breslov brings it in Conversations of Rav Nahman 76.
Then the next thing is review. But I have not figured out about review if there is any one method. Myself I go back page by page. But review might have other methods.
It seems to me that I ought to mention a bit of my background. I was at two very great Litvak yeshivas that walk in the path of the Gra: The first was Shar Yashuv in Far Rockaway for what I think was 3.5 years. The second year was tracate Chulin. The third was tractate Ketuboth. Then for half that year was tractate Yevamot. Then I was at the Mir in NY also for about three years and then Israel. During the time I preparing for Israel, I got interested in Rav Nahman of Breslov. And during that first period in Israel, I was pretty much going with the path of Rav Nahman--that is a lot of going out into the forests doing "hitbodadut" [that is private prayer and talking with God in one's own language.]. Looking back on it all it seems to me that I would have done better to stick with the straight Torah approach of the Mir and the Litvak yeshiva, and tried to combine that with the great advice and ideas of Rav Nahman.
That is to say,- I think it would have been better to try to stick with the great aspects of the path of the Gra--in terms of learning Torah and Musar, and to combine that with the good ideas of Rav Nahman.
There is a tendency with Breslov to get off the track of learning Torah and straight Torah. Not that this was any fault of Rav Nahman himself, but there does seem to be that sort of danger. The mistake is understandable since the actual letter of excommunication of the Gra is not well known and who it applied to. What I suggest is that letter of excommunication is valid and yet does not apply to Rav Nahman as you can see if you see the actual language of that letter. I think the actual herem is valid and yet does not apply to Rav Nahman.
I think that the worship of dead people that permeates the religious world is some sort of idolatry. The reason I say this is that you can see in the Rambam that he defines idolatry as the worship of any being at all besides the First Cause. So worship pf dead people probably fits with that definition.
The worship and love the religious have for the dead takes over their souls and bodies and they become zombies.=people with dead souls.
That would be the reason for the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication. He apparently thought worship of dead people is not in accord with Torah.
Gerard 't Hooft [Physics] has an interesting idea that Quantum Mechanics is due to variables that move very fast. Not hidden variables. Nor any pilot wave. And in his theory space time itself is quantized. So how do you get from here to there? Maybe by worm holes? I mean to say that the connections between space might be worm holes. [This worm holes that connect between black holes in the core of atomic particles I think was suggested by Robert Penna in NY [I should mention that I saw this idea of Robert Penna in a paper by Salwa Alsaleh whose papers I was reading.]
Emma Goldman wrote a book that was against the Bolsheviks. Her Disappointment with Russia she called it. Socialism sounds good until it is put into practice.
But I was never impressed with Socialism the first place because I always felt that no matter how good a theory seemed or how logical it was, if the facts showed it is wrong, then it is wrong.
I have been thinking about a Rashba [Rav Shmuel Ben Aderet] in Kidushin page 17 for some time already. He asks from inheritance of a convert. He could not say to his brother "take the idols and I will take the other stuff," if inheritance of a convert was from the Torah. So we see "there is no choice" אין ברירה [going back in time.] But one brother can say to another, "You take the produce in one place, and I in another," and his idea is to get the produce which already has the tithes taken from it. The Rashba answers that there is choice in one sort of things, but not in two sorts. Then he asks from a gemara in Temura where you have two partners dividing up ten sheep against 9 and a dog. All the ten that are opposite to the set with the dog are considered the "price of a dog" and therefore can not be brought as sacrifices. The Gemara asks let one sheep be for the dog and the rest would be OK. So from that question we see there is choice even by two types. אפילו בשני מינים יש ברירה
Rav Shach suggests that even in dividing among inheritors there is some ambiguity if the act is as they are buyers, but the actual things they are dividing are thought to be simply inheritance. Or if in the objects themselves there is an ingredient of being buyers. So the Gemara that holds one brother could not say "Take the idols," holds they are buyers, but the other Gemara in Temura holds they are inheritors [in two types] and so the saying of ''take the idols" would not be forbidden except for the fact that he agrees to the existence of the idols which makes that act forbidden. [It would not be forbidden because of "no choice since we see in Temura that "there is choice"יש ברירה even by two sorts of things.]
Rav Avraham Abulafia was the most neglected of all the mystics of the middle ages. I learned a lot from him. In particular the idea that even in languages of gentiles there is holiness. So that idea combined with the idea of the Ari Isaac Luria to say the words of verses forwards and backwards gave me the idea of using this method in Physics which in fact helped me get through my Physics courses at Polytechnic Institute of NYU. But I have not mentioned this on my blog because I did not want to distract from the fast learning. But both methods seem to be important. Certainly one can see that the Litvaks that walk in the path of the Gra get to great depth in Gemara by means of intense review. Yet without the fast learning type of approach of saying the words and going on that you see in the Conversations of Rav Nahman [76] one lacks a certain perspective in learning.
[The general Litvak approach based on the Gra is to emphasize in depth learning for the morning hours and "bekiut" fast learning in the afternoon. But for some reason, I left the Litvak world and went more in the direction of Torah with Derech Eretz [work and Torah]. But, I can see the greatness of just siting and learning Torah all day-- for those that can manage to do so.]
Rav Nahman of Breslov mentions often in the LeM the problem with Torah scholars that are demons even though he does not refer to this problem in the same way all the time. For example in LeM vol I:61 he refers to the importance of not granting "semicha" [ordination] to people that are not really proper or prepared. So let's say there would be no such thing. What approach would be possible? Could people just go to any student of Ponovitch or the Mir to ask what the Torah says about such and such a question? I imagine that would be the best approach. At least to me this makes sense because in fact when I got to the Mir I was astounded at the high level of learning of even the first year students. My experience has been that almost any student of any of the great Litvak yeshivas tends to have a great grasp of Torah.
[Besides this we already know that "semicha" is a fraud. Authentic semicha disappeared in the middle of the time of the amoraim. That is why later amoraim are just known as "Rav" or just their first names. Apparently it continued somewhere into the Talmud period but the farther you go it gets less and less until it is accepted that at the end it simply no longer existed. [Semicha means a continuous granting of authority to teach Torah from Moses on Sinai down to the middle of the Talmud period.]
Another point to take into consideration is that Torah ought not be used as a means to make money. So why support that? Better give the same money to the great Litvak yeshivas that learn Torah for its own sake.
Kant is really a different sort of approach than Hegel. Hegel does deal a lot with Kant, but does not actually refute him in any points at all. So my thinking about philosophy is that it branches out into three separate directions. These might be reconciled in some way, but it is not that they are all the same.
The Kant direction has tons of interpretations, but the best to my mind is the Kant-Fries school [see Kelley Ross.] The main point is the immediate non intuitive knowledge [faith] about the things in themselves. [Or the thing in itself in Schopenhauer's modification of Kant.] [You would need this immediate non intuitive knowledge to get to the dinge an sich, since neither reason alone or sense perception alone can do so.]
The Hegel aspect also has this sort of approach that we can know the dinge an sich things in themselves, but not some other faculty besides reason, but by reason itself. [He is not all that different from G.E. Moore in that respect.] Reason gets there because of a give and take process he calls the dialectic. That is in fact the way science progresses.[Reason and sense perception work together. See Huemer ]
Then there is the intuitionists-- G.E. Moore, Prichard, Huemer. I am not sure where to place them. That is in some way the analytic school, but somewhat different.
In Shar Yashuv [of Rav Friefeld] there was a tremendous emphasis on review and in depth learning. This was in some sense at the Mir also except at the Mir there was the afternoon sessions which was devoted to fast learning. I should admit however that at both places I was out of my depth. The only way I can explain the way they were learning would be if you would learn the Chidushei HaRambam of Rav Chaim of Brisk or the Avi Ezri.
But I felt the need to learn fast--to cover ground. So I developed this sort of style that every paragraph in the Gemara I would learn twice with Rashi and the Maharsha [plus what ever rishonim or achronim that were available.] That way I could satisfy myself that I was doing some review-- but not lingering overly long. [That was the way I went through a lot of the large tractates.]
[Some time after that I was in Uman and David Bronson came there, and we started learning. In his sort of learning I saw the same kind of depth I had seen in Shar Yashuv and the Mir. But after that I left Uman.]
[Since This balanced approach between in depth learning and fast learning of the Mir seems best to me. I later applied this balanced approach to Physics and it seems to work for me.
[Later, I began to learn even without understanding based on the Gemara Shabat pg 63.One should learn even if he forgets and even though he does not know wat he is saying.לעלם ליגרס אינש אע''ג דמשכח ואע''ג דלא ידע מאי קאמר The learning gets absorbed into ones subconscious even though he thinks he did not understand. The subconscious processes the raw data as he sleeps at night. The saying of the words is not for understanding but rather for the uptake of the data.
Kant changed from the transcendental deduction in the Critique A to a more inclusive sort in B. [in order to answer the critique of Schultz]. However, even the second version suffers from the mind-body problem. The body receives the signals, and then the categories [of Aristotle, how, where, why, when, how much, etc.] unify the information. But what information? There still is no way we know that can combine the signals with the mind. Computer chips in a bathtub are not a computer. And even when you put them together who is the user? So you need immediate non intuitive knowledge to unify the sense perception with the mind.
That is not new. That is the basic idea of the Kant/Fries/Nelson approach. However I would like to ask if this is so different from Hegel? Hegel wants to collapse the mind body problem all into the mind--the absolute Idea [what you might know more familiarly as the Logos]. But Hegel's concept of reason and the mind is not at all like Kant. [That is the source of the famous critique on his Smaller and Greater Logic.]
His logic does not suffer from the Humean, "Reason can only tell us something is wrong if it is self contradictory," [an unproven postulate, and one that seems wrong on the face of it as G.E. Moore and Prichard and Huemer noticed.]
Hegel's Reason and Fries's are the same thing. Some source of knowledge that is beyond reason and beyond sensory perception.
[I owe Kelley Ross gratitude for explaining the idea of non intuitive immediate knowledge in a way that I began to understand that it means some deeper source of knowledge that branches out into empirical or a priori knowledge or both together.] [The G.E. Moore approach and Huemer is that reason simply recognizes universals. It is not going into the particulars of how. And the how is the question of Kant. How do we know synthetic a priori (universals)?] So Kelley Ross noted that Huemer could have benefited from the Friesian/Leonard Nelson approach.]
The letter of excommunication [cherem] that has the signature of the Gra is ignored. I am not sure why no one pays any heed to it. One of the reasons I think it was signed was because of the problem of worshipping dead people which the Gra thought does not represent Torah very well. [That is an understatement. It is plain idolatry and not Torah in the slightest sense. ] Another issue is the "everything is God" which is not what the Torah says or holds. The Torah is monotheism. That is God created the world; he is not the world.
[I do not think that Rav Nahman came under the herem after I read the actual language and whom it was meant to include. However there is a odd tendency that when people get involved in Rav Nahman (which in itself is a great thing) that they go off into directions that are not good and highly destructive. It seems to open the door to leave the straight path of Torah.]
Moral philosophers in the West hold that adult children have no more moral obligation to support their elderly parents than does any other person in the society, no matter how much sacrifice their parents made for them or what misery their parents are presently suffering. This is because children do not ask to be brought into the world or to be adopted.
This is similar to a case I am walking by a lake and there is a child drowning in the lake. So obviously I jump in and save her. Does she owe me any any obligation or gratitude? Why should she? After all she did not ask to be rescued. It is the exact same logic as the case of a child towards his or her parents.
[That is not to say that there are no great philosophers today. On the top of my list is Kelley Ross of the Kant Fries School. A bit lower are Huemer, and Robert Hanna. Though perhaps a bit off the subject but related to the political aspect of philosophy I think the two greatest masterpieces of the 20th century were the Closing of the American Mind by Allan Bloom and The Lucifer Principle by Howard Bloom.]
I would like to mention that Rav Israel Salanter's idea of learning Musar [Ethics] seems to me to be very important. His point was that a lot of the essentials of Torah are forgotten because of over much religiosity or sometimes the opposite. While we know from Musar that the essential aspect of Torah is to have good character traits, this point is often ignored or forgotten. And what is good character is well defined in the basic set of Musar from the Middle Ages אורחות צדיקים, חובות הלבבות, שערי תשובה, מעלות המידות, ספר היראה המיוחס לרבינו תם. [ Ways of the Righteous, Obligations of the Hearts, Gates of Repentance, Greatness of Good Character.]
[The books of the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter were for me very helpful in getting the idea since the books of the Middle Ages although great can be hard to get the idea.--since after all they are mediaeval.]
[I might mention that I was aware of the basic idea of the Torah that the essential thing is "to be a mensch" (a decent human being). From my home and also before I got to the Mir in NY. Still one has to have musar to be able to define what good character is.]
חשבתי על השאלה שיש לרב שך על הרמב''ם בהלכות שקלים. ואף על פי ששאלתי על כך עכשיו הצהיר לי להיות הגיוני. אז מאיפה אני מתחיל? תן לי קודם לומר את הנקודה של רב שך. אם נלמד כמו הרמב''ם את המשנה וסוגיה בכורות דף נ''ו באו לומר לנו יש ברירה. זה יהיה כל העניין של הרעיון שהאחים שמתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב אינם חייבים במעשר של בהמה. כלומר, הם נותרו חייבים אפילו כשהם מחולקים בגלל יש ברירה. קשה היה לי להבין למה אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם לא צריכים להיות פטורים אם אנחנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. עכשיו אני רואה את הטעם של רב שך .אנו יודעים שהאחים שמצטרפים מחדש הם פטורים. אבל כל העניין של המשנה הייתה לומר שרק כשהם מצטרפים שוב הם לא חייבים. אז המשנה הייתה צריכה לומר שהם [האחים המתחלקים] ממשיכים להיות חייבים עד שהם יצטרפו שוב. ואנחנו יכולים לראות מדוע אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם אינם מחויבים גם אם אנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. הסיבה לכך היא שהצטרפות חזקה יותר מ”יש ברירה”. יש ברירה רק אומר שכאשר הם מתחלקים זה לא כאילו הם קונים כי הם כבר היו מפוצלים בפוטנציאל. אבל זה לא הולך להצטרפות חדשה כי כל העניין של הפסוק שאומר לנו שאחים או שותפים שהצטרפו אינם חייבים. כלומר שני הפסוקים אומרים לנו חייבים רק בעלי חיים שנולדו לאחר שכבר קיימת שותפות. ועכשיו זו הצטרפות חדש
I might just mention for the sake of clarity that Rashi and the Raavad both hold that brothers that inherit are obligated in maasar behema and business partners are not. It is the Rambam that learns the subject differently because of his version in the gemara.
I was thinking about the question Rav Shach has on the Rambam in laws of Sheklim. And though i asked on it last week today it stated to make sense to me. So where do I start? Let me first say the point of Rav Shach. If we learn like the Rambam the mishna in bechorot 56 is coming to tell us there is choice. That would be the whole point of the idea that the brothers that divide and then rejoin are not obligated in the tithe of animals. That is that they remained obligated even while divided because of "there is choice." But then the simpler thing to do would have simply to say that brothers that divide are still obligated in maasar behema for sheep that were born while they were joined.
Before it was hard for me to see why if they rejoin they should not be obligated any more if we hold "there is choice." Now I see the point of Rav Shach. In any case we know the brothers that rejoin are not obligated. But the whole point of the mishna was to say that only when they rejoin are they not obligated. So the mishna should have said they [brothers that divide] continue to be obligated until they rejoin. And we can see why if they rejoin they are not obligated even if we hold there is choice. That is because the rejoining is stronger than there is choice. There is choice only says that when they divide that is not as if they are buyers because\ they were already in potential divided. But that does not go for a new rejoining because the whole point of the verse that tells us that brothers or partners that joining are not obligated. that is the two verses tell us what comes into the partnership is not obligated. only animals what were born after there is already a partnership are obligated.
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[The Raavad and Rashi learn that subject differently and to them these issues come out fine.]
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I was thinking about the question רב שך has on the רמב''ם in laws of שקלים. And though I asked on it last week today it stated to make sense to me. So where do I start? Let me first say the point of רב שך. If we learn like the רמב''ם the משנה וסוגיא in בכורות דף נ''ו is coming to tell us יש ברירה. That would be the whole point of the idea that the brothers that divide and then rejoin are not obligated in the tithe of animals. That is that they remained obligated even while divided because of יש ברירה." But then the simpler thing to do would have simply to say that brothers that divide are still obligated in מעשר בהמה for sheep that were born while they were joined. Before it was hard for me to see why if they rejoin they should not be פטורים if we hold יש ברירה." Now I see the point of רב שך. In any case, we know the brothers that rejoin are פטורים. But the whole point of the משנה was to say that only when they rejoin are they not obligated. So the משנה should have said they [brothers מתחלקים] continue to be obligated until they rejoin. And we can see why if they rejoin they are not obligated even if we hold יש ברירה. That is because the rejoining is stronger than יש ברירה. There is choice only says that when they divide that is not as if they are buyers because they were already in potential divided. But that does not go for a new rejoining because the whole point of the verse that tells us that brothers or partners that joining are not obligated. That is the two verses tell us what comes into the partnership is not obligated. Only animals what were born after there is already a partnership are obligated. ועכשיו זו הצטרפות חדש
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חשבתי על השאלה שיש לרב שך על הרמב''ם בהלכות שקלים. ואף על פי ששאלתי על כך עכשיו הצהיר לי להיות הגיוני. אז מאיפה אני מתחיל? תן לי קודם לומר את הנקודה של רב שך. אם נלמד כמו הרמב''ם המשנה וסוגיא בכורות דף נ''ו בא לומר לנו יש ברירה. זה יהיה כל העניין של הרעיון שהאחים שמתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב אינם חייבים במעשר של בהמות. כלומר, הם נותרו חייבים אפילו כשהם מפולגים בגלל יש ברירה. קשה היה לי להבין למה אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם לא צריכים להיות פטורים אם אנחנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. עכשיו אני רואה את הטעם של רב שך.אנו יודעים שהאחים שמצטרפים מחדש הם פטורים. אבל כל העניין של המשנה היה לומר שרק כשהם מצטרפים שוב הם לא חייבים. אז המשנה היה צריך לומר שהם [אחים מתחלקים] ממשיכים להיות חייבים עד שהם יצטרפו שוב. ואנחנו יכולים לראות מדוע אם הם יצטרפו שוב הם אינם מחויבים גם אם אנו מחזיקים יש ברירה. הסיבה לכך היא שהצטרפות חזקה יותר מ”יש ברירה”. יש ברירה רק אומר שכאשר הם מתחלקים זה לא כאילו הם קונים כי הם כבר היו מפוצלים בפוטנציאל. אבל זה לא הולך להצטרפות חדשה כי כל העניין של הפסוק שאומר לנו שאחים או שותפים שהצטרפו אינם חייבים. כלומר שני הפסוקים אומרים לנו חייבים רק בעלי חיים שנולדו לאחר שכבר קיימת שותפות. ועכשיו זו הצטרפות חדש
I noted that some have suggest worm holes between black holes in the core of atoms. That was the first time time I had some indication that faster than light might be possible. But now I noticed that someone has noted a similar process https://physicsworld.com/a/spacecraft-in-a-warp-bubble-could-travel-faster-than-light-claims-physicist/
Copernicus did not predict new effects. Even his calculations were less accurate than that of astronomers working on the Ptolemy model. But he explained things better. Rather than keeping on adding new rings he was able to make simple sense of the solar system by postulating that the earth goes around the sun.No new rings were needed.
Newton did not predict new effects. He simply explained the same force of gravity we see here on Earth is also in the heavens. It made more sense to explain the Kepler laws rather that leaving them unexplained. But there were no new predictions.
String theory explains things that do not and can not work in quantum gravity. That it has not be developed enough to know what new predictions at present day scales that can be tested is not a lack. And it is testable. See this: https://physicsworld.com/a/quantum-gravity-could-soon-be-tested-using-ultracold-atoms/ So string theory or other approaches to gravity can be tested.
Philosophy has been in a rut for some time. Robert Hanna's approach is to place pretty much everything since Kant into the waste basket. ["Forward to Kant" is his motto.] And judging by the astounding emptiness of academic philosophy, who can blame him? But I still can see a lot of value in the Kant-Fries School of thought that takes an approach based on Kant, but diverges from him in some ways. And this school is so much ignored that even in lists of philosophers you will not even find Fries or Leonard Nelson mentioned.
But my own interest is in understanding my own experience in the world and making sense of it, [not to understand philosophy]. And for that I found the basis of the Kant-Friesian approach to be helpful.
I should add that the Fries approach and also the Nelson approach also have kinks that need to be worked out. I found that the web site of Kelley Ross does this job the best. [and this seems to be thanks to the efforts of Greta Hermann.] [Dr Ross is the best of all philosophers in over view and scope. but there is still plenty to learn from Huemer and Hegel. And I can see how some might say there are deep contradictions between them, but I can not see that. Humer bases himself on the Intuitionists that reason is a faulty,--which is true. But that does not contradict the subtleties of Kant. And Hegel does not deal with the Mind Body problem at all-. He sees the Notion as being the synthesis of both. But he does not explain how and that is the very problem for those that deal with it. Hegel is not interested in that at all. He simply sees empirical and a priori knowledge as two outer sides of some inner coin.] I still must say that Hegel has some good points that seem to be missed by this school of thought, plus the Intuitionists like Michael Huemer also have some points. They all seem to me to be some aspect of a deeper world view that I can not put my finger on exactly.
{I truly feel guilty that I can not see the great chasm between Hegel and Fries. To me the whole issue is this: the Friesian school is a post Kant Platonism. (That is the doctrines of Plato, but taking into account the three critiques). Hegel is a post Kant Plotinus. {That is Neo Platonism taking Kant into account.}
One problem I have noticed in religious leaders is that of self deception. That is to say you can not accuse them of being hypocrites since they sincerely believe that they are super geniuses super wise and in contact with the ultimate wisdom, when in fact they are mostly pretty stupid and obsessed with sex and power. And they very much desire the money of secular Jews-- as you can see by the fact that they are asking for it all the time.
They are people that have never accomplished anything and act and pretend as of the whole world depends on them. And resort to degrading anyone besides them who has accomplished great deeds.
You can see that I am not the first person to notice this. In fact, this theme is mentioned in the books of Rav Nahman of Breslov when he refers to the Torah scholars that are demons in LeM vol I chapters 8, 12, 28. It is a theme that occurs often in the LeM, but also is brought in the Gemara itself in the end of tractate Shabat. There the Gemara says says that most of the problems in the world come from Torah scholars that are evil. [The whole quotation is this: "If you see a generation that troubles come upon it, go and check the judges of Israel; for all troubles that come into the world come only because of the judges of Israel.'']
There is a point to what many people say about religious fanaticism. I.e. that it is insane. And that is a true point. And also well justified by observation. But the opposite extreme seems also somewhat off. The way I think is best to deal with this issue is to find the good and throw out what is wrong. [One good way to see this issue is like Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School where religious belief comes under the category of immediate non intuitive knowledge. So where as id one find the path towards holiness that has the most energy and light, the problem is if one misses the target even by the slightest amount he or she falls into the Dark Side where the energy and power of evil is infinite. And even worse is the fact that these two opposite poles are often contained in the same person. (as people often have that characteristic of containing opposite in one body.)
[Another problem in the religious world is the worship of dead people. In Torah we find that there is a prohibition of worship of any other gods besides the One and only First Cause. The religious worship other gods but they get away with this because they pretend that what they are doing is not idolatry. They clothe their worship of dead people in Jewish religious clothing and that is supposed to make it OK.]
Clearly the Gra signed the famous letter of excommunication for this very reason but the fact that he was ignored is what caused the entire religious world to fall and remain deeply imbedded in the worship of dead people.
I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the אבי עזרי of רב שך in הלכות of שקלים. It is this in the רמב''ם there is this approach to מעשר בהמה. Sheep or cows come into the domain of יורשים it is is not obligated. That is where is disagrees with the ראב''ד. But in the domain, what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated. The question רב שך has on this רמב''ם is based on the משנה that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. רב שך asks would it not be more of a חידוש to say that the inheritors that divide are מחויבים if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה. The lack of understanding on my part is this. The משנה certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly רב שך here is understanding the רמב''ם that that משנה is coming to tell us יש ברירה. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide. On one hand I can see the point of רב שך. In the way of the רמב''ם, that משנה has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear. What I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the מעשר for animals is that there is a change in domain, from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain..
It occurred to me later today to mention that my basic point is that there is not much difference with the brothers going into a new partnership of coming out of one when it comes to the issue of "breira". If אין ברירה [no choosing] then going into one is the same as coming out, and same is there is choosing. While Rav Shach's question revolves on the idea that there is a difference. Going into a new partnership he holds is clearly like they are buyers. But not coming out of one. But if we hold "there is choosing", it ought not to make a difference. Rav Shach is saying since there is choosing the mishna could have simply told us coming out of the partnership does not change anything and they are still obligated in maasar behama. [As the Mishna obviously hold that way anyway.] So why come onto the next case of rejoining? [It is doubtful to me why this should be different] Rav Shach holds that this is where the mishna tells us there is choosing and this new partnership is what makes them obligated.
בכורות נ''ו רמב''ם הלכות שקלים
תמהתי על נושא מסוים באבי עזרי של רב שך בהלכות של שקלים. זה ברמב''ם יש גישה זו למעשר בהמה. כבשים או פרות נכנסים לרשות של יורשים הם לא מחויבים. שם הוא לא מסכים עם הראב''ד. אך מה שנולד ברשות היורשים חייב. השאלה שיש לרב שך על רמב''ם זה מבוססת על הנושא שאם היורשים מתחלקים ואז מצטרפים שוב, הם אינם חייבים במעשר. רב שך שואל האם זה לא יהיה יותר חידוש לומר שיורשים שמתחלקים הם מחויבים אם המשנה באה לומר לנו יש ברירה. חוסר ההבנה מצדי הוא זה. המשנה בהחלט מחזיקה יש ברירה. האחים עדיין חייבים במה שנולד בזמן הצטרפותם. ההצטרפות השנייה היא זו שגורמת להם לא להיות חייבים. ברור שרב שך כאן מבין את הרמב''ם שאותו משנה בא לומר לנו יש ברירה. אבל נראה שכך או אחרת זה לא אומר כלום אם האחים מתחלקים. מצד אחד אני יכול לראות את הטעם של רב שך. בדרך של הרמב''ם, אותו משנה צריכה ללכת על פי הדעה שיש ברירה. כי אם לא [כלומר אם החוק יהיה אין ברירה], אז כאשר האחים מתחלקים הם ייחשבו כקונים שלא יהיו חייבים במעשר בהמה. ובכל זאת קשה לומר שגם לפי אין ברירה שההתחייבות שכבר הייתה עליהם לתת כל חיה עשירית תיעלם. מה שאני מתכוון. הדרך הרגילה בה אנו מבינים שאנשים שקונים אינם חייבים במעשר בהמה היא שיש שינוי בתחום, מאדם אחד לאחר. אבל כאן בעלי חיים שנולדו כשהאחים היו ביחד הם עכשיו בבעלות זה או אחר בלבד. זה לא ממש שינוי בעלות.
I have been puzzling about a certain issue in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach [in the only law in Laws of Shekalim that there is a chapter in the Avi Ezri]. It is this in the Rambam there is this approach to tithe of animals [every tenth animal must be given away]. It comes into the domain of inheritors it is is not obligated. [That is where is disagrees with the Raavad.] But in the domain --i.e. what is born the the domain of the inheritors is obligated [That is both to the Raavad and Rambam.] The question Rav Shach has on this Rambam is a different. The question is based on the fact that if the inheritors divide and then rejoin, they are not obligated in the tithe. Rav Shach asks would it not be more of a "chidush" [new idea] to say that the inheritors that divide are obligated if the Mishna is coming to tell us יש ברירה [what is divided reveals what was already divided in potential in the past.].
The lack of understanding on my part is this. The mishna certainly holds just dividing changes nothing. The brothers are still obligated in what was born while they were joined. It is the rejoining that makes them not obligated. Clearly Rav Shach here is understanding the Rambam that that mishna is coming to tell us something about there is "braira" יש ברירה or there is not braira [choosing]. But one way or the other does not seem to say anything about if the brothers simply divide.
On one hand I can see the point of Rav Shach. In the way of the Rambam, that mishna has to go according to the opinion יש ברירה [there is choosing]. For if not [that is if the law would be אין ברירה], then when the brothers divide they would be considered as buyers who would not be obligated in the animal tithe. Still it is hard to say that even according to אין ברירה that the obligation they already had of giving every tenth animal would disappear.
I think you can see what I mean. The normal way we understand that people that buyers are not obligated in the maasar for animals is that there is a change in domain--from one person to another. But here animals that were born when the brothers were together are now owned by just one or the other. That is not really a change in domain.
The fact of my accepting way of learning of saying the words and going on [mentioned in the Musar book אורחות צדיקים ורב נחמן the Ways of the Righteous and Rav Nahman Conversations 76 ] does not mean I see no place for intense review and in depth learning. It is just that this sort of in depth type has never been clear to me how to go about it. One of the many ways I have tried is this. Once I get to a place in a book where things simply stop making any sense to me [let's say for example in Algebraic Topology] it is at that point that I figure I need to do review. So I simply start where I am already holding and go back page by page to the very beginning. That seems to work for some subjects. But Tosphot is more self contained. You do not need to know every other Tosphot in Shas in order to understand one. So in terms of that kind of learning I would take just one particular Tosphot or some chapter in the Avi Ezri or Rav Haim of Brisk, and just review that one chapter day after day. So it seems to me that in depth learning depends on the subject.
One finds in some rishonim the importance of Metaphysics. Mainly that would be Ibn Pakuda [author of the Obligations of the Hearts], Binyamin the doctor [author of Maalot HaMidot], Rambam and others. [They do not see this as bitul Torah [waste of time that should be used for learning Torah].] So while clearly they are referring to the discipline, still I would say the main reference is the Book Metaphysics by Aristotle.
So what does that mean for today? My impression is that this discipline has developed in three different directions. Kant (along the lines of Leonard Nelson); Hegel; G.E. Moore. That is I would not venture to say which of these is right because each school seems to have very great and important points. But not the whole picture.
[The Kant Friesian school tends towards reason in areas of physical reality. It is in spiritual reality it tends towards a sort of fifth sense [non intuitive immediate perception. While Hegel agrees totally with these realms of spiritual reality, he holds that reason can penetrate even there. The G.E. Moore School simply holds that that way that Hume limited the range of reason is just not so. So he is like Hegel.]
[So in philosophy it seems you have the Kant Fries school of Leonard Nelson. Then Hegel and then G.E. Moore. It is hard to know which one is correct, but all have something to add to understanding.
There is an aspect of Hegel that is similar to the Kantian School of Fries and Leonard Nelson. That is in the self contradictions in every thought and every aspect of being things.
So it seems to me that these two traditions are not as contrary as one might think at first.
In the Leonard Nelson approach this beyond logic and reason occurs in the dinge an sich, the areas beyond possibilities of experience. In Hegel the contradictions are in every stage of being and are resolved only in the Absolute [God]. So to me, it seems these are not all that different.
[I mean in terms of metaphysical reality. But as for how we know stuff, there is a difference.]
I was at the Na Nach place today and there came up an interesting discussion about important it is to marry only a woman who does not listen to religious authorities. The reason being that marriage is a union of minds and when someone else is in your wife's mind, that is not a real marriage.
It occurred to me then that in the LeM of Rav Nahman that this same idea came up in the LeM vol I:61 where it says not to give religious authority to people that are not fit for it since by that is cause that Israel goes into exile. And the language Rav Nahman uses is על ידי זה מגרשים ישראל ממקומם which is the same language used to causing of divorce between couples.
There are things that the Tora is strict about. This can not be derided as "religious fanaticism." And example is idolatry. So what makes the world of the religious problematic is not whether to be strict of not. It is what to be strict about. If only the things that the Torah actually cares about were the top of the list of importance, then everything would be alright. That is why the path of the Gra is so important. Not because of the Gra as much as it accurately defines what Torah is about.
Kant actually never shows how mind and body are connected. Rather he shows that they must be connected-but does not show how. [That is not my new idea here. This has been noticed even from the very first review of the Critique by Shultz.]
So to me it seems that Fries and Leonard Nelson were right in the claim that there is a deeper source of knowledge, non intuitive immediate knowledge, that empirical knowledge and a priori knowledge are just secondary manifestations of. But how do they combine? I think that Hegel was right in this that the way these two origins of knowledge combine together is by a give and take process where each modifies the other --what he terms ''dialectics.'' [Hegel actually also never shows how they are connected. But he does come onto this dialectical process to show how the kind of knowledge that is a part of intuition and the kind of knowledge that is independent of intuition work together.--basing himself on Socrates.]
[And this fact was noticed by Michael Huemer in one of his essays where he shows that there is no such thing as empirical knowledge without some a priori assumptions built into it. [See his list of essays.]
So what you have is the primary source of knowledge that Fries and Nelson call immediate non intuitive. Them the two parts split off into empirical and a priori parts. Then they recombine to create actual knowledge.
The importance of learning Torah and the basic message of Musar which is Fear of God and good character traits you really only get with the path of the Gra. The path of Rav Nahman does not really have "hatmada" to be learning Torah constantly as an essential part of it, not the sort of basis of Musar. You get other great things in the advice of Rav Nahman but not those few points which really relate to the Gra.
And I see these points of the Gra as being the essence of Torah. Diligence in learning Torah, Musar and fear of God in the way described in the books of Musar and not to speak lashon hara [slander]. To me it seems that without these points that nothing else can even begin. Sine que non. But if you have the Gra, then there is tremendous benefit in the advice and ideas of Rav Nahman.
[And I admit that my idea of expanding the idea of learning Torah to include Physics is not really part of the path of the Gra though it is hinted at in other rishonim. Still it seems to me that everything has to start with the Gra. The Gra is sine que non.
The idea of the natives that Columbus encountered were peace loving is somewhat inconsistent with the facts. Columbus encountered the Caribs when he returned on the second trip. The Caribs controlled three islands. They used to make raids on other islands to eat the men and enslave the women. The other islanders were terrified of the Caribs. They had nothing of the noble savage myth.
One of the really great things I learned in Shar Yashuv of Rav Freifeld was the idea of review. I had learned the Musar book Ways of the Righteous and also had see the a book bringing the path of learning of Rav Nahman which was to say the words and go on. So the fact that Motti Freifeld [Rav Freifeld's son] kept on telling me about the importance of Iyun [in depth learning] and review gave me a sort of balance. [In fact, it was the conflict between these two extremes that gave me the idea of doing every paragraph of the Gemara with Rashi twice in Hebrew and once in English, and then going on.] So nowadays, I still try to find a sort of balance between these two approaches-- whether in the Gemara, Tosphot and/or the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach or in Mathematics and Physics.
I once mentioned to my learning partner in Uman, David Bronson that it seems to me that without the emphasis on learning in depth that I got in Shar Yashuv in my beginning of learning, that I never would have gotten the idea at all. For I noticed that unless one gets the idea of learning in depth at the very start of one's learning, then no matter how much "bekiut" fast learning he does later, he never gets the idea of the in depth sort. [They just tend to skip over Tosphot as if the details are irrelevant. Therefore even with much learning, they never get the essence of Torah.]
נראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. היא שואלת איך זה שבני ישראל נצטוו לשרוף את כל העצים האלילים כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? אחרי כל הארץ ניתנה לאברהם ושום אדם לא יכול לגרום לאסור את מה שלא שייך לו. האם גמרא זו יכולה להיות על פי הדעה אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר, או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה ישראל? פירוש הדבר שכאשר ישראלי קונה את התבואה מהעכו''ם, הוא עצמו יצטרך לקחת את תרומה ומעשרות ולתת אותם לכהן ולוי. נראה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה לא יכולה להיות לפי אחת הדעות, שכן שניהם מדברים רק על תרומה ומעשר, אך שניהם מסכימים כי עכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל כשמדובר בחוקים על כסף והוא יכול לבנות לחפור וכו'. אז איך בכלל מתחילה שאלת הגמרא? הכנעניים היו בעלי אדמות מבחינת החזקה כספית. אז הם יכלו לשתול עצים ולגרום להם להיות אסורים! אולי אתה יכול לענות שהכנענים לפני כניסת ישראל לארץ לא ממש נקלעו לקטגוריה של "קניית האדמה". זו היתה שייכת לצאצאיו של אברהם, אבל הם גם לא היו גנבים. אם הם היו קונים את האדמה, היינו אומרים שלמעשה הם יכולים לאסור על העצים ששתלו וסגדו. אך למעשה הם לא קנו את האדמה.
I should add that after I thought of this I saw that Rav Shach intended the same question and answer in the Avi Ezri. But he did write this openly. Only after I thought of this question and answer I saw that Rav Shach really intended to to say the same thing.
Anyway there is a lot more to go into this sugia but I was not prepared to write all my thoughts so I just wrote this short piece. In the meantime for those interested the best thing is to look at Rav Shach in Law of Idolatry.
It seems to me that the Gemara in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב is hard to understand. It asks how is it that the Israelites were commanded to burn all the idolatrous trees when they entered the land of Canaan? After all the land was given to Abraham and no on can cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him.
Could this Gemara be according to the opinion אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה [the opinion when a gentile owns land in Israel that means the grain grown on it is not obligated in the presents truma, tithes etc. Or that it is obligated? (That would mean that when a Israeli buys the grain from the gentile, he would himself have to take the truma and tithes and give them to a priest and a Levi.)
It seems that Gemara in Avoda Zara can not be according to either opinion since both are talking only about truma and maasar but both agree that a gentile can own land in Israel when it come to laws about money and he can build and dig etc. So how does the question of the Gemara even start? The Canaanites owned land in terms of monetary possession. So they could plant trees and cause them to be forbidden!
Perhaps you can answer that the Canaanites before Israel entered the land did not actually come under the category of "buying the land". It was owed by the descendants of Abraham but neither were they thieves. If they had bought the land then we would say that in fact they could forbid the trees they planted and worshipped. But in fact they did not buy the land.
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It seems to me that the גמרא in עבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב is hard to understand. It asks how is it that the Israelites were commanded to burn all the idolatrous trees when they entered the land of Canaan? After all the land was given to Abraham and no on can cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him. Could this גמרא be according to the opinion אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה [the opinion when a gentile owns land in Israel that means the grain grown on it is not obligated in the תרומה ומעשרות. Or that it is obligated? That would mean that when a Israeli buys the grain from the עכו''ם, he would himself have to take the תרומה and tithes and give them to a כהן and a Levi. It seems that גמרא in עבודה זרה can not be according to either opinion since both are talking only about תרומה and מעשר, but both agree that a עכו''ם can own land in Israel when it come to laws about money and he can build and dig etc. So how does the question of the גמרא even start? The Canaanites owned land in terms of monetary possession. So they could plant trees and cause them to be forbidden! Perhaps you can answer that the Canaanites before Israel entered the land did not actually come under the category of "buying the land". It was owed by the descendants of Abraham, but neither were they thieves. If they had bought the land, then we would say that in fact they could forbid the trees they planted and worshipped. But in fact they did not buy the land.
נראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ענראה לי שקשה להבין את הגמרא בעבודה זרה כ''ג ע''ב. היא שואלת איך זה שבני ישראל נצטוו לשרוף את כל העצים האלילים כשנכנסו לארץ כנען? אחרי כל הארץ ניתנה לאברהם ושום אדם לא יכול לגרום לאסור את מה שלא שייך לו. האם גמרא זו יכולה להיות על פי הדעה אין כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת ר' אלעזר, או לפי השיטה יש כוח ביד עכו''ם להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשרות שזו שיטת רבה ישראל? פירוש הדבר שכאשר ישראלי קונה את התבואה מהעכו''ם, הוא עצמו יצטרך לקחת את תרומה ומעשרות ולתת אותם לכהן ולוי. נראה כי הגמרא בעבודה זרה לא יכולה להיות לפי אחת הדעות, שכן שניהם מדברים רק על תרומה ומעשר, אך שניהם מסכימים כי עכו''ם יכול להחזיק אדמה בישראל כשמדובר בחוקים על כסף והוא יכול לבנות לחפור וכו'. אז איך בכלל מתחילה שאלת הגמרא? הכנעניים היו בעלי אדמות מבחינת החזקה כספית. אז הם יכלו לשתול עצים ולגרום להם להיות אסורים! אולי אתה יכול לענות שהכנענים לפני כניסת ישראל לארץ לא ממש נקלעו לקטגוריה של "קניית האדמה". זו היתה שייכת לצאצאיו של אברהם, אבל הם גם לא היו גנבים. אם הם היו קונים את האדמה, היינו אומרים שלמעשה הם יכולים לאסור על העצים ששתלו וסגדו. אך למעשה הם לא קנו את האדמה.
Some of the major points of Rav Nahman are the Tikun Chazot, Hitbodadut, Seder HaLimud, Not to be stubborn about anything, to be joyful always. Tikun haKlali.
(1) The Tikun Chazot thing he saw as the main job of every Israeli. That is the midnight prayer for the rebuilding of the Temple. [That does not have to include the "piyutim" [added songs]. It just is a short Tikun Rachel and a somewhat longer Tikun Leah. []I actually have not been able to fulfill this for long time but I still see the hours after midnight as a very important time to learn and pray.
(2) Hitbodadut is thought to be his major point. It is talking with God as one talks with your parents or a close friend in your own language. This was so important to him that he would spend whole days on this and he said that if one really wants to serve God properly he ought to spend the whole day on this every day. [I actually did try to do that fr awhile when I first got to Safed in the forests surrounding that city.]
[3] Seder HaLimud is also fairly well known but not as much as the Hitbodadut idea. It is to learn by saying the words and going on. It is how he advice one disciple Rav Nathan to go through the entire Shulchan Aruch with all the commentaries [Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc.] in one year. As I have mentioned before I found this very helpful for me when I majored in Physics at the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. [And in fact that is how I think Physics ought to be learnt. You do not have to be a genius to learn Physics. If a block of wood would learn in this way, it would also become a physicist in time.]
[4] To not be stubborn about anything is something that I have also found helpful. Not to force any issues. When the waves of life come along, to lower my head and let the wave pass over me.
[5] To be joyful Rav Nahman saw as the very essence of Torah. Joy he said is the very essence of holiness.
[6] Tikun haKlali. To say ten psalms the day one has sinned any kind of sexual sin. [16, 32, 41, 42, 59, 77, 90,105, 137, 150.]
One thing David Bronson pointed out to me in the LeM of Rav Nahman. That one word religious authorities love is "No." They see one's "Ratzon" [Desire, Will.] as an evil thing. It is only Rav Nahman that see the Ratzon [Will] as the great and highest of all things. Just that one needs to raise his desires towards God. That is what you see in the LeM chap.13 about how the tzadik helps to raise the desires of people towards God.
[This reminds me of Schopenhauer who also saw the root of everything as being the Will. Logos to him is a secondary derivative.]
There is a whole section of the Hayee Moharan about the idea "לא להתעקש על שום דבר" ("not to be stubborn about anything.") I noticed that one of the examples he brings there is about sleep. That is by trying to force oneself to go to sleep, that is exactly what causes sleep to evade him. And there are other examples there.
But that is not to say that there are not some things that one needs to be ("makpid") stubborn about. But that one ought to choose one's battles wisely.
[You could apply this to learning also. By being overly stubborn about getting the details perfectly, one can lose the big picture. I mean to refer here to the Conversations of Rav Nahman Conversation 76 where he discusses the importance of learning fast--saying the word and going on until the end of the book and only then to review. It is implicit in this that he is suggesting not to insist on understanding all the details. And in fact I found this method helpful in my Physics courses at NYU.]
The book Chaiye Moharan [the life of Rav Nahman] was not edited. You can see this in a few places. One that come to mind is the statement that Columbus died in chains. This is brought as a proof that who so ever brings some great thing into the world suffers for it. While there are plenty of proofs plus the verse "one who increases knowledge increases pain], still Columbus did not die in chains. He was put into chain in the New World by a favorite of the court, and sent back to Spain in chains. They were removed by Isabella and Ferdinand immediately when he arrived. As far as we know they were buried with him when he died as he cherished them as a symbol of his loyalty to his monarchs.
But it also should be noted that he was extremely dishonored and died poor. [But he still had credit he could draw on to pay his rent at an inn.]
There are five major books from Rav Nahman. The most well edited are LeM, Midot, and Stories. The Conversations and Life of Rav Nahman were put together from the writings of Rav Natan. But the publishing took on a series of sad events. It was not edited by Rav Natan, and tons were left out. Later, Rav Shmuel Horwitz's "Left out Parts" helped make up some of the lack.
[But of all the books of Rav Nahman, the Conversations and the Life are the most instructive for me. I mean the path of learning in Conversation 76 you see only in the Conversations and only slight hints of that in the LeM itself.
The idea of idolatry is the worship of anything that is not just simply the First Cause who has no form nor image. So worship of pictures of tzadikim or their graves ought to be considered idolatry as much as worship of stars. So the term עובד כוכבים עכו''ם a worshiper of stars [or worshippers of stars and constellations] does not refer to ethnic group or nationality. It is not a synonym of "gentile".
[And since this kind of worship pervades the religious world from top to bottom, I tend to avoid all of them. If there was a Litvak yeshiva in my area, I might go into that, but even then I would be uncomfortable because of the pervasiveness of idolatry anywhere and everywhere in the religious world. Certainly the Gra and Rav Shach were "מוחה" [objected], but their objections went largely unheeded.
[I ought to add that there is an obligation to be "מוחה" [object], even if you know your objection will not be heeded as we see in the event of the concubine of Givat Binyamin in the book of Judges and the event of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza in tractate Gitin. ]
[In fact I was hoping to study the connection between hametz and idolatry in terms of the ashes after they are burnt. But so far I have not gotten to that.]