Kant changed from the transcendental deduction in the Critique A to a more inclusive sort in B. [in order to answer the critique of Schultz]. However, even the second version suffers from the mind-body problem. The body receives the signals, and then the categories [of Aristotle, how, where, why, when, how much, etc.] unify the information. But what information? There still is no way we know that can combine the signals with the mind. Computer chips in a bathtub are not a computer. And even when you put them together who is the user? So you need immediate non intuitive knowledge to unify the sense perception with the mind.
That is not new. That is the basic idea of the Kant/Fries/Nelson approach. However I would like to ask if this is so different from Hegel? Hegel wants to collapse the mind body problem all into the mind--the absolute Idea [what you might know more familiarly as the Logos]. But Hegel's concept of reason and the mind is not at all like Kant. [That is the source of the famous critique on his Smaller and Greater Logic.]
His logic does not suffer from the Humean, "Reason can only tell us something is wrong if it is self contradictory," [an unproven postulate, and one that seems wrong on the face of it as G.E. Moore and Prichard and Huemer noticed.]
Hegel's Reason and Fries's are the same thing. Some source of knowledge that is beyond reason and beyond sensory perception.
[I owe Kelley Ross gratitude for explaining the idea of non intuitive immediate knowledge in a way that I began to understand that it means some deeper source of knowledge that branches out into empirical or a priori knowledge or both together.] [The G.E. Moore approach and Huemer is that reason simply recognizes universals. It is not going into the particulars of how. And the how is the question of Kant. How do we know synthetic a priori (universals)?] So Kelley Ross noted that Huemer could have benefited from the Friesian/Leonard Nelson approach.]
