One of the most important lessons I gained from the teachings of Rav Nachman of Breslov is his approach to learning. This is the idea that all one needs in learning is to say the words in order ,and then to go on until the end of the book, and then to start over from the beginning. This was not the approach in Shar Yashuv of Reb Shelomo Freifed nor the Mir Yeshiva, however it helped me to at least find a balance between deep learning with lots of review on one hand, and ''bekiut''learning fast--saying the words one time in order and then going on. This helped me a lot in Gemara, Physics, and Mathematics, and I recommend this for anyone willing to listen. However, sadly enough, no one wants to listen. [They just think it makes no sense, and so forget about it, and end up learning nothing at all.] Even so, it has been my secret goal to convince others about the importance of this approach. I might mention that the Litvack Yeshiva World does have some awareness of the importance of fast learning, but that not the same as with Rav Nachman because they’re simply more engaged in going faster than in the morning, but they are still not doing anything even vaguely approaching the approach of simply saying the words and going on. [In the morning they learn in great intense depth, and in the afternoon they learn faster , but not fast. Simply ‘’faster’’ with Rashi and Tosphot.]

מה שאני רוצה לומר אינו עניין גדול, אך נראה לי שיש ערך בציון הדברים. הרמב"ם פסק (בהלכות מלווה ולווה, פרק י"ג הלכה ד') שאם לווה מודה שהמשכון שווה פחות מסכום ההלוואה, עליו לשלם את היתרה [שהרי הוא מודה לפחות בסכום זה], ועליו להישבע על שווי המשכון – ואינו משלם מעבר לכך [במקרה שהמשכון אבד ברשלנות]. אולם הרמב"ן מקשה על כך: "הרי זהו מקרה של 'חמישים אני מודה שאני חייב, וחמישים – איני יודע'" (ואינו מודה במקצת), שבמקרה כזה אין משלמים את היתרה. רב שך מביא תשובה לקושיה זו ממסכת בבא מציעא (דף ק'), שם סומכוס מודה בדין חולקים במקרה של שבועה מן התורה; ורב שך למד מכך שכאשר התורה מחייבת צד אחד להישבע שבועה שהיא דאורייתא, הצד השני אינו יכול לטעון שאינו מאמין לשבועה. שאלתי כאן נובעת מכך שאני זוכר במעורפל דיון בספר "אבי עזרי" בנושא זה. ראשית, השבועה שמטילים על המלווה – לטעון שהמשכון אינו ברשותו – כלל אינה מוזכרת בתורה. היא מוזכרת בדברי רב הונא(בבא מציעא פרק ג'), והרמב"ם אכן פוסק שהיא נדרשת, אך ייתכן שמדובר בשבועה מדרבנן בלבד----(השבועה "(המשכון) אינו ברשותי" היא מהתורה על פי הרבא''ד בהלכות טוען ונטען פרק ה' הלכה ו והסוגיא) נמצא בבא מציעא דף ל''ד

what I want to say is no big deal, however it seems to me to mention it is worth something. The Rambam (Maimonides) decided the law (in laws of loans 13 law 4) that if a borrower admits the guarantee is worth less than the loan, that he pays the remainder [because he admits at least to that much] and takes an oath on the value of the pledge and pays nothing more [if the pledge was lost by negligence. The Ramban (Nachmanides) however asks on this is this not a case of 50 I admit I owe, and the other 50 I do not know, in which case the remainder is not paid. Rav Shach brings an answer to this question from Bava Metzia page 100 where Sumchos admits the law of dividing in a case of an oath from the Torah. Rav Shach learns from that that when the Torah requires one side to take an oath, the other side cannot claim they do not believe the oath]. My question here is that I vaguely recall some discussion in the Avi Ezri about this issue. First of all, the oath that the lender takes that the pledge is not is his domain is not mentioned in the Torah at all. It is mentioned by Rav Huna (in bava metzia chapter 3), and the Rambam does decide that it is required, but it might be only an oath from the words of the sages.The oath, "It is not in my domain" is from the Torah according to the Raavad in laws of disputes chapter 5 law 6..)---------------------------------------what I want to say is no big deal, however it seems to me to mention it is worth something. The רמב''ם decided the law (in ה' מלווה ולווה י''ג הלכה ד') that if a borrower admits the guarantee is worth less than the loan, that he pays the remainder [because he admits at least to that much] and takes an oath on the value of the pledge and pays nothing more [if the משכון was lost by negligence. The רמב''ן however asks on this, "Is this not a case of חמישים I admit I owe, and the other חמישים I do not know," in which case the remainder is not paid. רב שך brings an answer to this question from בבא מציעא דף ק' where סומכוס admits the law of dividing in a case of an oath from the תורה. ANDרב שך learns from that that when the תורה requires one side to take an oath שהוא דאורייתא , the other side cannot claim they do not believe the oath]. My question here is the discussion in the אבי עזרי about this issue (הלכות שכירות פרק ב' הלכה ג'). First of all, the oath that the lender takes that the pledge is not is his domain is not mentioned in the תורה at all. It is mentioned by רב הונא (in bava metzia chapter 3, and the רמב''ם does decide that it is required, but it might be only an oath דרבנן.--- The oath, "It is not in my domain" is from the תורה according to the ראב''ד in ה' טוען ונטען פרק ה' הלכה ו

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אחר שלמדתי אצל הליטאים והלכתי לים,הבנתי אם בוחנים את דברי התוספות במסכת בבא מציעא (דף פ"ב ע"ב), הרי שגם שיטת רש"י וגם שיטת התוספות מסתדרות היטב; הקושי בהבנה מתעורר רק לגבי דברי הרי''ף והרמב"ם. שכן לפי התוספות, ר' יצחק סבור שמלווה המחזיק במשכון נחשב לשומר שכר. מכאן שהגמרא התכוונה לומר כי המחלוקת בין רבי עקיבא לרבי אליעזר נוגעת למקרה שבו המלווה קיבל את המשכון בעת ​​מתן ההלוואה: לדעת רבי אליעזר הוא נחשב לשומר חינם, ולדעת רבי עקיבא הוא נחשב לשומר שכר. לעומת זאת, אם המלווה קיבל את המשכון במועד שונה ממועד ההלוואה, הרי שלדעת שניהם הוא נחשב לשומר שכר, שכן במקרה זה שניהם מסכימים עם דעת רבי יצחק. אולם, רש"י סבור שהמלווה נחשב לשואל. לפיכך, כוונת הגמרא היא שאם המלווה קיבל את המשכון במועד שונה ממועד מתן ההלוואה, הרי הוא נחשב לשואל; אך אם קיבל את המשכון בעת ​​ההלוואה – לדעת רבי אליעזר הוא שומר חינם, ולדעת רבי עקיבא הוא שומר שכר

I realized that if we look at תוספות on בבא מציעא פ''ב ע''ב that both רש''י and תוספות come out fine. It is only the ר''ף and רמב''ם that I am having trouble understanding. For according to תוספות, ר' יצחק holds a lender with the pledge is a שומר שכר. So, the גמרא intended to say that ר' עקיבא and ר' אליעזר disagree about a case when the lender received the pledge at the time of the loan. To ר' אליעזר, he is an unpaid guard, and to ר' עקיבא he is a paid guard. However, if the lender received the pledge at a different time from the time of the loan, the lender is a paid guard according to both since in that case both agree with ר' יצחק. However, רש''י holds the lender is a שואל. Therefore, the גמרא intends that if the lender received the pledge at a different time than when he gave the loan, he is a borrower. But if he received the pledge at the time of the loan, to ר' אליעזר, he is an unpaid guard, and to ר' עקיבא he is a paid guard. [----The unpaid guard swears about everything, and does not pay for an accident. The paid guard swears about large accidents like a ship sinking, and pays for small accidents. A borrower pays for everything, i.e., no matter how the object was lost, he pays.] [----The unpaid guard swears about everything, and does not pay for an accident. The paid guard swears about large accidents like a ship sinking, and pays for small accidents. A borrower pays for everything, i.e., no matter how the object was lost, he pays.]

I realized that if we look at Tosphot on Bava Metzia page 82b that both Rashi and Tosphot come out fine. It is only the Rif and Rambam that I am having trouble understanding. For according to Tosphot, R Isaac holds a lender with the pledge is a paid guard (has to pay for small accidents, and swears for large accidents.). So, the Gemara intended to say that R Akiva and R Eliezer disagree about a case when the lender received the pledge at the time of the loan. To R Eliezer, he is an unpaid guard [swears for everything,ie he swears it was not his fault], and to R Akiva he is a paid guard. However, if the lender received the pledge at a different time from the time of the loan, the lender is a paid guard according to both since in that case both agree with R Isaac. However, Rashi holds the lender is a borrower [who pays for any accident]. Therefore, the Gemara intends that if the lender received the pledge at a different time than when he gave the loan, he is a borrower. But if he received the pledge at the time of the loan, to R Eliezer, he is an unpaid guard, and to R Akiva he is a paid guard.