The path of my parents, the Gra, Musar, and Rav Shach.
Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
19.10.26
בדרכי חזרה מהים, הרהרתי בהבחנה שעורך הראב"ד בין "משכון" לבין "פיקדון", בהקשר לדין "הא לך". עלתה בדעתי אפשרות אחת: לא ניתן להבחין ביניהם על בסיס השאלה למי שייך החפץ. {הסיבה לכך היא שבכל המקרים האפשריים, השאלה היכן צריך להימצא החפץ כדי להיחשב כ"הוחזר", אינה תלויה בשאלה אם מדובר במשכון או בפיקדון.} לדעתי, ההבדל טמון בשאלה האם המלווה נחשב ל"שומר שכר" (שומר המקבל תשלום) או שאינו כזה; ושאלה זו רלוונטית באותה מידה גם לגבי פיקדון. אם הוא "שומר שכר", הרי שאינו רשאי להניח את החפץ באגם או בביצה ולומר "הא לך", שכן הוא מקבל תשלום עבור השמירה עליו – ובוודאי שאין להניחו במקום שבו הוא עלול להינזק בקלות. אפשרות נוספת היא שהראב"ד אינו מקבל את דינו של ר' יצחק. ייתכן שהמשכון אינו בבעלות המלווה; אולי הוא רק מוחזק אצלו עד לפירעון החוב, ולאחר מכן עליו להשיבו. במקרה כזה, אם הוא גם "שומר שכר", הרי שבוודאי אינו רשאי להניחו בביצה. יש הסבורים כי המלווה נחשב ל"שומר חינם" (שומר שאינו מקבל תשלום), ולכן התנאים לגבי המקום שבו יש להשיב את החפץ עשויים להיות מקלים יותר – לא בתוך ביצה, אך אולי במקום כלשהו המוגן באופן חלקי בקרבת מקום
Bava Metzia pg 4 and page 34
On my way back from the sea I was thinking about the difference the Raavad [(in laws of pleas chapter 4 law 6)] makes between a pledge and a deposit. in terms of the law of, “Here it is.” One possible answer occurred to me is that we can not make a distinction between them by who owes the object. {The reason is that in all possible cases, the question of where the object must be to be considered to have been returned is not dependent of if it is a pledge or a deposit.} The difference I think must lay in the question is the lender a paid guard or an unpaid guard and similarly that same question applies to the deposit. If he is a paid guard, he cannot out the object in a lake or swamp and say here it is because he is paid to guard it, not put it in a place where it can be easily damaged. A different answer is that it is possible that the Raavad does not hold with the law of r Isaac. Perhaps the pledge is not owned by the lender? Maybe it is just his to keep until the debt is paid and then he has to give it back. And in such a case if he is a paid guard also, he cannot put it in a swamp. Some people hold a lender is an unpaid guard, thus there are less stringent conditions of where to return the object. Not a swamp but maybe some semi guarded place near one?=-----------------------------------------On my way back from the sea I was thinking about the difference the ראב’’ד makes between a משכון and a deposit. in terms of the law of, “Here it is.” One possible answer occurred to me is that we can not make a distinction between them by who owes the object. {The reason is that in all possible cases, the question of where the object must be to be considered to have been returned is not dependent of if it is a משכון or a deposit.} The difference I think must lay in the question is the lender a שומר שכר or an unשומר שכר and similarly that same question applies to the deposit. If he is a שומר שכר, he cannot out the object in a lake or swamp and say here it is because he is paid to guard it, not put it in a place where it can be easily damaged. A different answer is that it is possible that the ראב’’ד does not hold with the law of ר' יצחק. Perhaps the משכון is not owned by the lender? Maybe it is just his to keep until the debt is paid and then he has to give it back. And in such a case if he is a שומר שכר also, he cannot put it in a swamp. Some people hold a lender is an שומר חימם, thus there are less stringent conditions of where to return the object. Not a swamp but maybe some semi guarded place near one?
רמב"ם הלוואות יג:ד. טענות א:ג. מלווה מלווה סלע [4 דינרים] וקיבל משכון. הוא מאבד את המשכון ברשלנות. הוא אומר שהמשכון היה שווה חצי סלע. הלווה אומר שהוא היה שווה שלושה דינרים. המלווה נשבע שזה לא בתחום שלי. המלווה נשבע כי הוא מודה בחלקו ומשלם את מה שהוא מודה. הרמב"ן שואל שהלווה יאמר למלווה שיחזיר לי את המשכון ואני אחזיר את ההלוואה. בהלכות טענות א:ג, הרב שך מביא שהראב"ד קבע שדיני משכון שונים מפיקדון מבחינת "הילך". כמו כן, שמואל אמר: אם מישהו נותן ידית של לשעבר עבור משכון להלוואה והמלווה מאבד את הידית, הוא מאבד את כל ההלוואה.
הר"ן אומר שהוא חייב את התוספת בכל מקרה. בדרך כלל אני לא נמצא ליד הים מאוחר בלילה, אבל הלילה עשיתי יוצא מן הכלל ובדרך חזרה הוצפתי במחשבות ובשאלות בנושא.
(1) שאלת הרמב"ן מתקיימת גם אם החוק הוא כמו שמואל שהמשכון נחשב לכל ההלוואה.
(2) המקרה הרגיל של "הילך" הוא שהלווה מחזיר חלק מהחוב ונשבע על היתרה, אולם לראב"ד, המשכון נחשב להילך כתשלום חלקי. אם נלך עם שמואל, אז המשכון נחשב לתשלום מלא.
(3) לרש"י, שבועת המלווה "לא ברשותי" היא מהתורה. לרמב"ם זה דרבנן. זה מרב הונא במוד 34. אבל לשמואל זה בכלל חל? הרי אם הוא שולם במלואו, אז למה להישבע. אבל מצד שני, השבועה אינה עבור ההלוואה. היא רק נוגעת למיקום המשכון.
(4) לחלק מהדעות, דינו של שמואל הוא החוק. ר' יצחק נכדו של רש''י, ויש הסוברים ששמואל הוא הבסיס לפסיקתו של ר' יוחנן שאם אדם מאבד משכון, זה נחשב לכל ההלוואה.
[5] לראב''ד המשכון נחשב ל"הילך" ולכן הלווה לא יישב שבועה בגלל הודאה חלקית. ולשמואל המשכון נחשב לכל ההלוואה וזה יותר תואם את הרמב''ן שהמלווה צריך לקבל בחזרה את הכסף עבור ההלוואה רק לאחר שהלווה מקבל בחזרה את המשכון.
היו לי מיליוני מחשבות אחרות אבל זה כל מה שאני זוכר כרגע.
Rambam loans 13:4. Pleas 1:3. A lender lends a sela [4 dinars] and gets a pledge. He losses the pledge by negligence. He says the pledge was worth 1 half sela. The borrower says it was worth three dinars. The lender takes an oath ''It is not in my domain.'' The lender takes an oath because he admits in part and pays what he admits. The Ramban asks let the borrower tell the lender give m back the pledge and I will repay the loan. In laws of pleas 1:3 Rav Shach brings down that the Raavad held the law of a pledge is different than a deposit in terms of "Here it is".Shmuel said: If one gives a handle of an ex for a pledge for a loan and the lender losses the handle, he loses the whole loan.
the Ran says he owes the extra anyway. I usually am not by the sea late at night, but to night i made an exception and on the way back I was flooded with thoughts and questions about this.
(1) the question of the Ramban holds even if the law is like Shmuel that the pledge counts for the whole loan.
(2) the normal case of "here it is" is the borrower repays part of the debt and swears on the remainder however to the Raavad, the pledge counts for here it isas partial payment. If we go with Shmuel then the pledge counts for full payment.
(3) To Rashi the oath of the lender "it is not in my domain "is from the Torah. To the Rambam it is derabanan. This is from Rav Huna on page 34b. But to Shmuel does it apply at all? after all if he has been paid back in full, then why take an oath. But on the other hand, the oath isn’t for the loan. It is only concerning the whereabout of the pledge.
(4) To some opinions the law of Shmuel is the law. R. Isaac the grandson of Rashi, and some hold Shmuel is the basis of the ruling of R Yochanan that if one loses a pledge, it counts for the whole loan.
[5] to the Raavad the pledge counts for "here it is" and thus the borrower would not take an oath because of admission in part. and to Shmuel the pledge counts for the whole loan and this i s more in line with the Ramban that the lender should get back the money for the loan only after the borrower gets back the pledge.
i had millions of other thoughts but then this is all I can recall right now.
------------------------------------------------------------------רמב''ם loans 13:4. Pleas 1:3. A lender lends a sela [4 dinars] and gets a pledge. He losses the pledge by negligence. He says the pledge was worth 1 half sela. The borrower says it was worth three dinars. te lender taks an oath it is not in my domain. the lender takes an oath because he admits in part and pays what he admits. The Ramban asks let the borrower tell the lender give m back the pledge and I will repay the loan. In laws of pleas 1:3 Rav Shach brings down that the ראב’’ד held the law of a pledge is different than a deposit in terms of "הילך".ALSO—שמואל said: If one gives a handle of an ex for a pledge for a loan and the lender losses the handle, he loses the whole loan.
the ר''ן says he owes the extra anyway. I usually am not by the sea late at night, but to night i made an exception and on the way back I was flooded with thoughts and questions about this.
(1) the question of the ארמב''ן holds even if the law is likeשמואל that the pledge counts for the whole loan.
(2) the normal case of "הילך" is the borrower repays part of the debt and swears on the remainder however to the ראב’’ד, the pledge counts for הילךas partial payment. If we go withשמואל then the pledge counts for full payment.
(3) To רש’’י, the oath of the lender "it is not in my domain "is from the Torah. To the רמב''ם it is derabanan. This is from Rav Huna on page 34. But toשמואל does it apply at all? after all if he has been paid back in full, then why take an oath. But on the other hand, the oath isn’t for the loan. It is only concerning the whereabout of the pledge.
(4) To some opinions the law of שמואל is the law. ר' יצחק the grandson of רש’’י, and some hold שמואל is the basis of the ruling of ר’ יוחנן that if one loses a pledge, it counts for the whole loan.
[5] to the ראב’’ד the pledge counts for "הילך" and thus the borrower would not take an oath because of admission in part. and to שמואל the pledge counts for the whole loan and this i s more in line with the רמב''ו that the lender should get back the money for the loan only after the borrower gets back the pledge.
i had millions of other thoughts but then this is all I can recall right now.
18.10.26
The idea of Rav Nachman of Breslov about bekiut—i.e., learning fast (just saying the words outloud, and in order, and going on).
The idea of Rav Nachman of Breslov about bekiut—i.e., learning fast (just saying the words outloud, and in order, and going on). That is the famous number 76 in the book, “Conversations of Rav Nachman.” My own experience with this was that as soon as I stepped into a Litvack Yeshiva Shar Yashuv, I was inundated with the idea of learning in depth, while bekiut seemed to most people to be a waste of time. (Side note: Litvack or Lithuanian yeshivas go with the approach of the Gra from Villna.) But I found a sort of balance between fast learning and in-depth learning. [I knew very little Hebrew then so I used the excellent translation of the Soncino edition.] However, for some reason, I never found a place in the litvack world, probably because of my non conformist kind of character, so I could not be in kollel and so to make a living I went to the Polytechnic Institute of N.Y.U. to major in Physics;-- and interestingly enough, there also this method of learning of bekiut (--just saying the words outloud and in order, and going on) was very helpful. So, in conclusion, I would like to recommend to people to learn those three paragraphs in the book “Conversations of Rav Nachman” section #76 about the learning fast. —I might add here that in those days, I did not have the books of Rav Shach or Reb Aaron Kotler. So, to do in depth learning, I mainly concentrated on the Maharsha and Pnei Yehoshua. -----if you would like my recommendation about what to learn at first, i think doing a few pages of gemara with tosphot and maharsha every day makes sense, until yu have gone through shas at least once. then to get the books of rav shach and reb aaron kotler and plow through them.
17.10.26
הדיון הזה נמצא אבי עזרי בטוען ונטען פרק א' הכה ג'. דברי הראב''ד הם בטוען ונטען פרק ד' הלכה ו'
חשבתי על דברי הרב שך בהקשר לשיטת הראב"ד, המבחין בין משכון לבין פיקדון (בנוגע לדין "הא לך"). נראה ברור שהרב שך אינו מעוניין לטעון שבשני המקרים החפץ אינו בבעלות המחזיק בו; שכן, לדעת ר' יצחק, המשכון בבעלות המלווה, בדיוק כפי שהפיקדון בבעלות המפקיד. על כן, הרב שך מבחין בין המועדים השונים שבהם נוצרת ההתחייבות חזרה– האם בעת קבלת הפיקדון, או שמא בעת התרחשות נזק לחפץ. אינני בטוח למה בדיוק מכוון הרב שך בדבריו אלו. עם זאת, נראה לי שניתן להציע הבחנה ברורה יותר: במקרה של פיקדון, המועד להשבת החפץ הוא בדיוק הרגע שבו המפקיד דורש את השבתו (דבר זה נכון הן לגבי שומר חינם והן לגבי שומר שכר – אם כי ייתכן שהרב שך מתייחס למקרה של "שואל", שבו קיים הבדל זה). לעומת זאת, המועד להשבת המשכון ללווה הוא הרגע שבו הלווה פורע את חובו, ולא הרגע שבו הוא מבקש את החזרת המשכון. אי לכך, כאשר הלווה מוסר את המשכון, אין לראות בכך פעולה שמשמעותה המיידית היא "הרי כספך משולם במלואו"; אלא, החוב נחשב כנפרע רק במועד שבו הכסף מוחזר בפועל
I was thinking about the answer of Rav Shach in terms of the Raavad who makes a distinction between a pledge and a deposit (as it relates to the law of, "Here it is")]. Clearly Rav Shach does not want to take the path that the both are not owned by the person who has the object because according to R. Isaac the pledge is owned by the lender just like the deposit is owned by the depositor. So Rav Shach makes a distinction between when the time of the obligation starts, the time he receives the deposit or the time some accident occurs to it. I am not sure what Rav Shach intends here. However, I think there is a much clearer distinction. For a deposit, the time to give it back is exactly when the depositor asks for it back. (This would apply to both an unpaid and a paid guard. But Rav Shach might be referring to a borrower. However, the time to give back the pledge to the borrower is when the borrower pays back the debt, not when he asks for it back. So, when the borrower gives the pledge that is not immediately here is your money paid in full. Rather when he pays back the money, that is when the debt is paid back.---------------------------------------------I was thinking about the answer of רב שך in terms of the ראב''ד who makes a distinction between a pledge and a deposit (as it relates to the law of, "Here it is")]. Clearly רב שך does not want to take the path that the both are not owned by the person who has the object because according to ר' יצחק the pledge is owned by the lender just like the deposit is owned by the depositor. So רב שך makes a distinction between when the time of the obligation starts, the time he receives the deposit or the time some accident occurs to it. I am not sure what רב שך intends here. However, I think there is a much clearer distinction. For a deposit, the time to give it back is exactly when the depositor asks for it back. (This would apply to both an unpaid and a paid guard. But רב שך might be referring to a שואל איפה שיש חילוק הזה. However, the time to give back the pledge to the לווה is when the לווה pays back the debt, not when he asks for it back. So, when the לווה gives the pledge that is not immediately, "Here is your money paid in full." Rather, when he pays back the money, that is when the debt is paid back.
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