חזרתי מחוף הים ועלתה בדעתי הגישה הבסיסית של רב שך בנוגע לבבא מציעא דף ג'. השאלה העיקרית היא זו. הרמב"ם מביא גם את המשנה הראשונה בבבא מציעא וגם את המשנה על המאה השלישית ללא הסבר נוסף, ומשמיט את העובדה שהגמרא מוצאת את שתי המשניות הללו כסותרות זו את זו ומשמיט את תשובת הגמרא. [הלכות טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז', שאלה ופיקדון פרק ה' הלכה ד'] אני חושב שהנקודה העיקרית של רב שך היא שהמשנה על שניים המחזיקים בגד היא מקרה של ודאות ואוחזים את הבגד, ושבכל מקרה של ודאות ואוחזים, הדין יהיה לחלק. אז מה ההבדל בין זה לבין המאה השלישית? זה ששניים מחזיקים וכל אחד ודאי,בעוד שהשני הוא שאחד מחזיק עבורם. ההבדל הוא שכאשר שניים מחזיקים, ודאי איזו מחצית שייכת למי, אבל עם המאה השלישית, זה לא ודאי. יש ספק ולכן המאה השלישית נשארת במקומה. אבל אז השאלה היא מהסירה (ארבא) בבבא בתרא ד' ל''ד, שם אנו אומרים שמי שחזק יותר, מקבל אותה. שם גם יש ספק למי היא שייכת. אבל שם אף אחד לא מחזיק אותה עבורם. זה שונה מהתשובה לאותה שאלה של רב נחום של מיר שמחזיק את התשובה לבעיה זו ברמב"ם היא זו. הגמרא שואלת בבבא מציעא מה ההבדל בין שתי המשניות כי הגמרא כאן מחזיק כמו רב פפא בבבא בתרא, שמי מחזיק אם אנחנו מחזיקים, אנחנו מרפים גם במקרה של ספק (אי תפסינן מפקין). לפיכך, לגמרא בבבא מציעא לא הייתה דרך לענות שהצד השלישי מחזיק עבורם את המאה השלישית, כי הוא היה צריך לשחרר אותה בכל מקרה. זה חייב להיות משום שהחלוקה לא הייתה בהתאם למציאות האובייקטיבית. אבל ההלכה היא שאם אנחנו מחזיקים, אנחנו לא מרפים. אי תפסינן, לא מפקינן. לפיכך, לרמב"ם לא הייתה סיבה להביא את תשובת הגמרא בבבא מציעא.------רקע. אם שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד, הם מחלקים אותו. אם אדם אחד מחזיק מאה לאדם אחד ומאתיים לשני, ואם נשכח למי זה מה, החוק הוא שהמאה השלישית נשארת במקומה. אבל עבור הרמב"ם, שני המקרים נחשבים כאילו שני האנשים מחזיקים את הסכום הכולל. המקרה השלישי הוא של סירה ששני אנשים מתווכחים עליה. מי שחזק יותר מקבל אותה. בית המשפט אינו מציע דעה לגבי מה שהוא לא יכול לקבוע------ אני יודע שרב איסר מלצר קבע שבמקרה שבו שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד וכל אחד טוען שהוא שלו, הדין הוא שיש ספק אם כל חצי שייך לכל אחד מהם. זה נובע מספק, לא מוודאות. אני חושב שהסיבה לכך היא שבמשנה הדין הוא שכל אחד נשבע. זוהי שבועת משנה, לא השבועה שנקבעה מאוחר יותר בתקופת האמוראים, שאדם נשבע ללא ספר תורה כדי להיפטר מתביעה. לדוגמה, נניח שאדם אוחז בבגד, ומישהו אחר ניגש אליו וטוען שהוא שלו, הראשון נשבע את השבועה המאוחרת הזו שנקראת שבועת היסת. הסיבה לכך היא שהבגד בהחלט שייך לראשון. מה שנמצא בתחום של אדם אנו מניחים ששייך לו. אבל זו לא טענת משנתינו. במשנה שלנו, השבועה היא שבועת המשנה שזה למקרה שיש ספק-------------------- עם זאת, רב שך סבור שהמקרה של שניים המחזיקים בגד הוא שבו כל אחד מהם הוא ודאי. ויש דרך להבין זאת. זה מבוסס על הגמרא בדף ג', שם הגמרא שואלת על המקרה של שניים המחזיקים בגד שמחלקים אותו מהמקרה של המאה השלישית, שם הוא נשאר במקומו. הגמרא אומרת שההבדל הוא שהמקרה שבו הם מחלקים, החלוקה יכולה להיות נכונה, כי ייתכן שהם הרימו את החפץ האבוד יחד. שם גם אמר ר' יוסי שאף אחד לא מקבל כלום, כי אם התוצאה היחידה של הספק הייתה שהמאה השלישית נשארת במקומה, "אז מה יפסיד השקרן?" ואז הגמרא שואלת, אבל מה יאמר סומכוס על המקרה של המשנה שלנו? (כי סומכוס קובע, "כסף בספק מתחלק ללא שבועה". אז מדוע יש שבועה במשנה שלנו אם זה הולכת כמו סומכוס? הגמרא עונה שר' יוחנן כבר הסביר שהשבועה במשנה שלנו היא גזירת חכמים כדי שלא נגיע למצב שבו כל אחד יכול ללכת ולתפוס בגד של חברו ונאמר לחלק. לכן, אם ר' יוחנן שייך גם לדעת החכמים (שחולקים על סומכוס וסבורים שמי שמוציא מרשותו של אחר צריך הוכחה, אז גם המשנה שלנו מדברת על מקרה שבו אנו מניחים שכל אדם המחזיק בבגד הוא הבעלים של חצי זה בוודאות, לא בספק. כלומר, שבועה זו נקבעה לפני השבועה שנקבעה על ידי האמוראים, שבועת היסת, אפילו במקרה של ודאות

I was coming back from the sea shore and it occurred to me the basic approach of Rav Shach concerning Bava Metzia page 3. The main question is this. The Rambam brings both the first Mishna in Bava Metzia and the Mishna about the third hundred with no further explanation and leaves out the fact that the Gemara finds these two Mishnayot to be in contradiction one with the other and leaves out the answer of the Gemara. I think that the main point of Rav Shach is that the mishna about two are holding a garment is a case of certainty, and that in any case of certainty the law would be to divide. So, what then is the difference between this and the third hundred? It is that two are holding and they are certain, while the other is that one is holding for them and there is a doubt. The difference is that when two are holding, it is certain which half belongs to whom, but with the third hundred it is uncertain. There is a doubt, and therefore the third hundred stays in its place. But then the question is from the boat in Bava Batra page 34 where we say who ever us stronger, gets it. There also there is a doubt to whom it belongs. But there no one is holding it for them. This is different from the answer to the same question of Rav Nachum of the Mir who holds the answer to this problem in the Rambam is this. The Gemara is asking in Bava Metzia what is the difference between the two mishnayot because it holds like Rav Papa in Bava Batra who holds if we hold, we do let go even in the case of a doubt. Thus, the Gemara in Bava Metzia had no way of answering that the third party is holding the third hundred for them because he would have had to let it go anyway. It had to be because the division would not have been according to objective reality. But the law is if we hold, we do not let go. Thus, the Rambam had no reason to bring the answer of the Gemara in Bava Metzia.---------------------I know that rav Isar meltzer (the father in law of Rav Shach and Rav Ahron Kotler )held that the case when two people are holding a garment and each one claims it is his that the law is that there is a doubt if each half belongs to each one. This is from doubt, not from certainty. I think the reason is because in the mishna the law is each one takes an oath. That is a oath of the Mishna not the oath that as instituted later in the time of the amoraim that one swears without a sefer Torah in order to be absolved from a claim. Eg lets say a person is holding a garment and someone else comes up to him and claims it is his. the first one takes this later oath called shvuat heset. The reason is the garment definitely belongs to the first one. What is in a person’s domain we assume belongs to him. But that is not the claim of our mishna. in our mishna the oath is shvuat hamishna which is for a case when there is doubt.-----However, Rav Shach holds that the case of two holding a garment is that where each one is a certainty. and there is a way to understand this. That is based on the gemara on page three where the gemara asks on the case of two holding a garment that divide it from the case of the third hundred where it stays in its place. The gemara says the difference is where they divide the division might be correct because they might have picked up the lost object together. There also R. Jose said no one gets anything because if the only result of the doubt was that the third hundred stays in its place, “Then what would the liar lose?” Then gemara then asks but what would Sumchos say about the case of our Mishna? (For Sumchos holds, “Money in doubt is divided with no oath.” So, why is there an oath in our Mishna I it is going like Sumchos? The gemara answer that R. Yochanan already explained that the oath in our Mishna is a decree of the sages so that we do not end up in a situation where anyone can go and grab a garment of his fellow man and we would say to divide. Thus, if R Yochanan is applicable to the opinion of the sages also (who disagree with Sumchos and hold one who takes out of the domain of someone else needs a proof, then our mishna is also talking about a case where we assume each person holding the garment owns that half by a certainty, not by doubt. That is to say, this oath was instituted before the oath instituted by the Amoraim (shvuat heset) even on a case of certainty.------------------------------------------[[[[[I was coming back from the sea shore and it occurred to me the basic approach of רב שך concerning בבא מציעא page ג'. The main question is this. The רמב’’ם brings both the first משנה in בבא מציעא and the משנה about the third hundred with no further explanation and leaves out the fact that the גמרא finds these two משניות to be in contradiction one with the other and leaves out the answer of the גמרא. I think that the main point of רב שך is that the משנה about two are holding a garment is a case of certainty and that in any case of certainty the law would be to divide. So, what then is the difference between this and the third hundred? It is that two are holding and certain, while the other is that one is holding for them. The difference is that when two are holding it is certain which half belongs to whom, but with the third hundred it is uncertain. There is a doubt and they are not holding it, and therefore the third hundred stays in its place. But then the question is from the boat in בבא בתרא page ל''ד where we say who ever us stronger, gets it. There also there is a doubt to who it belongs. But there no one is holding it for them. This is different from the answer to the same question of רב נחום of the מיר who holds the answer to this problem in the רמב’’ם is this. The גמרא is asking in בבא מציעא what is the difference between the two משניות because it holds like רב פפא in בבא בתרא who holds if we hold, we do let go even in the case of a doubt אי תפסינן מפקינן. Thus, the גמרא in בבא מציעא had no way of answering that the third party is holding the third hundred for them because he would have had to let it go anyway. It had to be because the division would not have been according to objective reality. But the law is if we hold, we do not let go אי תפסינן לא מפקינן. Thus, the רמב’’ם had no reason to bring the answer of the גמרא in Bava Metzia. Background information. If two people ae holding a garment, they divide it. If one person holds a hundred for one person and two hundred for the other, the third hundred and forgotten whom is what, the law is the third hundred stays in its place. But to the Rambam, both cases are considered as if both people are holding the sum total the third case is that of a boat that two people hold is theirs alone. whoever is stronger gets it. The court offers no opinion about what it cannot determine--------------------------------- I know that רב איסר מלצר held that the case when two people are holding a garment and each one claims it is his that the law is that there is a doubt if each half belongs to each one. This is from doubt, not from certainty. I think the reason is because in the משנה the law is each one takes an oath. That is an oath of the משנה ,not the oath that as instituted later in the time of the אמורים that one swears without a ספר תורה in order to be absolved from a claim. E.g., let’s say a person is holding a garment and someone else comes up to him and claims it is his. the first one takes this later oath called שבועת היסת. The reason is the garment definitely belongs to the first one. What is in a person’s domain we assume belongs to him. But that is not the claim of our משנה. In our משנה, the oath is שבועת המשנהwhich is for a case when there is doubt.--------- However, רב שך holds that the case of two holding a garment is that where each one is a certainty. and there is a way to understand this. That is based on the גמרא on page three where the גמרא asks on the case of two holding a ferment that divide it from the case of the third hundred where it stays in its place. The גמרא says the difference is where they divide the division might be correct because they might have picked up the lost object together. There also ר' יוסי said no one gets anything because if the only result of the doubt was that the third hundred stays in its place, “Then what would the liar lose?” Then גמרא then asks but what would סומכוס say about the case of our משנה? (For סומכוס holds, “Money in doubt is divided with no oath.” So, why is there an oath in our משנה I it is going like סומכוס? The גמרא answer that ר’ יוחנן already explained that the oath in our משנה is a decree of the sages so that we do not end up in a situation where anyone can go and grab a garment of his fellow man and we would say to divide. Thus, if ר’ יוחנן is applicable to the opinion of the חכמים also (who disagree with סומכוס and hold one who takes out of the domain of someone else needs a proof, then our משנה is also talking about a case where we assume each person holding the garment owns that half by a certainty, not by doubt. That is to say, this oath was instituted before the oath instituted by the אמוראים (שבועת היסת) even on a case of certainty. ]]]]

הדרך שבה אני מציע להבין את הגמרא בבא מציעא בדף ג' היא שהגמרא הולך כמו סומכוס, אבל אפשר להבין אותו גם כהולך לפי חכמים אבל בקושי. [הסבר הגמרא הזה כמו סומכוס הוא איך עניתי על השאלה ברמב''ם שהוא מביא אותה משנה של פיקדון, אבל בלי תשובת הגמרא.] הריב''א אומר השומר על חפץ אינו נחשב כאילו הם אוחזים בו. לפיכך, אנו יכולים להבין את המשנה בדף ג' ככוונתנו לומר ששני אנשים המחזיקים בבגד שמצאו הוא מקרה שאין דררא דממונא. עתה דררא דממונא משמע לפי תוספות והריב''א שלא מפסידים כסף. משמעות הדבר היא שמאחר ששניהם מצאו בגד אבוד, המקרה אינו דרא דמונא, שכן גם אם אדם לא יקבל דבר, הוא לא יפסיד דבר. הוא פשוט לא ירוויח דבר. מאחר שאין דרא דמונא, והגמרא בבבא בתרא קובעת היכן שאין דרא דממונא, סומכוס מסכים עם החכמים, ולכן הוא אינו אומר את דינו הרגיל של "מחלקים בלי שבועה". אבל אז הגמרא שואלת על משנתינו ממקרה של נפקד שמחזיק מאתיים לאדם אחד ומאה לאחר, והוא אינו זוכר למי מה, וזה נחשב כלא מחזיק במקומם. זה דווקא מקרה שבו הוא מחזיק את זה עבורם, אבל לא כאילו הם מחזיקים את זה. ואנחנו מבינים את הסיבה שהמאה השלישית נשארת במקומה, זה מקרה של דרא דמונא, שכן מי שנתן מתאיים לשמירה מפסיד חלק מהכסף שנתן לצד השלישי לשמירה. מאחר שהוא מפסיד מאה, זה מקרה של דרא דמונא. אז למה הם לא מחלקים? ומדוע יש שבועה? תשובה: אם הם יחלקו, זה יהיה מקרה שבו פסק הדין לא יתאים לעובדה האובייקטיבית שרק אחד מהם נתן מאתיים. [לכן, למרות שזו דרא דמונא, הם עדיין לא מחלקים-----------------------אני רוצה להוסיף שהבנת הגישה של הריב"א היא אתגר. רב שך ציין שיש הוכחה על הדף כשאדם שלישי שומר על ה-300, זה נחשב כאילו הם בעצמם מחזיק אותם. זוהי הפרכה ישירה של הריב"א. אבל רב מחום של המיר, בכל זאת, מוצא דרך להסביר וליישב את השאלות על הריב"א. נראה לי שהכי טוב לומר שהדיון על דף ג' בבא מציעא פשוט מתנהל לפי סומכוס

The way I suggest understanding the Gemara in Bava Metzia on page three is that the Gemara is going like Sumchos, but can also be understood as going according to the sages but with difficulty. [Explaining this gemara like Sumchos is how I answered the question on the Rambam who brings it but without the answer of the gemara.] The Riva says the one guarding an object is not counted as if they are holding it. Thus, we can understand our Mishna as intending to say that two people holding onto a garment that they found is a case where there is no derara demomona. Derara demomona means according to Tosphot and the Riva that they lose no money. That means since they both found a lost garment, the case is not derara demomona since even if one would not recieve anything he not be losing anything. He simply would not be gaining anything. Since it is no Derara Demomona and the gemara in Bava Batra holds where there is no derara demomona, Sumchos agrees with the sages, and so he does not say his usual law of ''they divide with no oath.'' But then the gemara asks on our Mishna from the case of a third party that is holding an 200 for one person and a hundred for another and he does not recall to whom is what, and that is considered as not as holding in their place. It is rather a case where he is holding it for them but not as if they are holding it. and we understand the reason the third hundred stays in its place this is a case of derara demomonaa since the one who gave 200 to guard is losing some of the money that he gave to the third party to guard and since he loses a hundred. It is a case of derara demomona. So then why do they not divide? and why is there an oath? Answer: If they would divide, that would be a case where the verdict would not correspond to the objective fact that only one of them gave two hundred. [Thus, even though it is derara demomona, they still do not divide.]------------------------------------The way I suggest understanding the גמרא in בבא מציעא on דף ג' is that the גמרא is going like סומכוס, but can also be understood as going according to the sages but with difficulty. [Explaining this גמרא like סומכוס is how I answered the question on the רמב''ם who brings it but without the answer of the גמרא.] The ריב''א says the one guarding an object is not counted as if they are holding it. Thus, we can understand our משנה as intending to say that two people holding onto a garment that they found is a case where there is no דררא דממונא. NOW דררא דממונא means according to תוספות and the ריב''א that they lose no money. That means since they both found a lost garment, the case is not דררא דממונא since even if one would not receive anything, he not be losing anything. He simply would not be gaining anything. Since it is no דררא דממונא and the גמרא in בבא בתרא holds where there is no דררא דממונא, סומכוס agrees with the חכמים, and so he does not say his usual law of ''מחלקים בלי שבועה.'' But then the גמרא asks on our משנה from the case of a נפקד that is holding 200 for one person and a hundred for another, and he does not recall to whom is what, and that is considered as not as holding in their place. It is rather a case where he is holding it for them, but not as if they are holding it. And we understand the reason the third hundred stays in its place this is a case of דררא דממונא since the one who gave 200 to guard is losing some of the money that he gave to the third party to guard . Since he loses a hundred, It is a case of דררא דממונא. So then why do they not divide? and why is there an oath? Answer: If they would divide, that would be a case where the verdict would not correspond to the objective fact that only one of them gave two hundred. [Thus, even though it is דררא דממונא, they still do not divide.]---------------------------In terms of my this blog post, I would like to add that understanding the approach of the Riva is a challenge. Rav Shach made a note that there is a proof on the page that the person that is guarding the 300 is considered as if they themselves are holding it. That is a direct refutation to the Riva. Rav Nachum of the Mir however does find a way to explain and settle the questions on the Riva. To me, it seems best to say that discussion on the beginning on pg 3 Bava Metzia is simply going according to Sumchos.

I would like to suggest that the גמראholds that the first Mishna in Bava Metzia is like Sumchos. This assumption of the Gemara would be based on the fact that most Stam Mishnas [Mishnas without name] in Bava Kama, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra all are like Sumchos. Yet the Gemara also tries to find a way in each case to show that the Sages (Rabanan) could also hold with the law (din) of that Mishna. The reason the Gemara would want to do this is because Shmuel said: "The law is like the Rabanan (opposed to Sumchos)" and the law is like Shmuel in dinim (monetary laws). The significance of this idea is that it answers a question on the Rambam. The Rambam wrote the law of the first mishna in Bava Metzia where they are holding the garment they divide it, and also the law about the third hundred where if they disagree, the third hundred stays with the person it was guarded by. The Gemara brings this second case as a question on the first case. Why in the first case they divide and as opposed to this in the second case they leave the garment where it was. Yet the Rambam brings both laws, and does not give the answer of the Gemara that in the case of our Mishna, "The division might be true". I would like to suggest that the Rambam [and Rabbainu Chnanel and the Ri Migash] understood that Gemara is going like Sumchos, and since that law of Sumchos is not the halacha, he therefore held that a different answer must be the right answer, that is "holding is different". And how can Rambam know that same answer would not work for Sumchos? Answer it is going like the Gemara page one hundred side A, where the Gemara asks, “Let us go and see in whose domain the animal is in,"and the Gemara answersm, “Rather, It is like Sumchos." That means to say that to Sumchos, the fact that the object is held by two people does not raise or diminish the claim each one has the object. Thus the answer to the question, ""Let's go and see" the gemara retracks from its original answer and now claims that even seeing in whose domain the animal is in would not help any side since we are going like sumchos who holds money in doubt is divided.----------------------------------I would like to suggest that the גמראholds that the first משנה in בבא מציעא is like סומכוס. This assumption of the גמרא would be based on the fact that most סתם משניות [משניות without name] in בבא קמא, בבא מציעא, and בבא בתרא all are like סומכוס. Yet the גמרא also tries to find a way in each case to show that the חכמים (רבנן) could also hold with the law (דין) of that משנה. The reason the גמרא would want to do this is because שמואל said: "The law is like the רבנן (opposed to סומכוס)" and the law is like שמואל in דינים monetary laws). The significance of this idea is that it answers a question on the רמב’’ם. The רמב’’ם wrote the law of the first משנה in בבא מציעא where they are holding the garment they divide it, and also the law about the third hundred where if they disagree, the third hundred stays with the person it was guarded by. The גמרא brings this second case as a question on the first case. Why in the first case they divide and as opposed to this in the second case they leave the garment where it was. Yet the רמב’’ם brings both laws, and does not give the answer of the גמרא that in the case of our משנה, "The division might be true". I would like to suggest that the רמב’’ם [and ר' חננאל and the ר''י מיגאש] understood that גמרא is going like סומכוס, and since that law of סומכוס is not the הלכה, he therefore held that a different answer must be the right answer, that is "אוחזים שונה". And how can רמב’’ם know that same answer would not work for סומכוס? Answer it is going like theק' ע''א גמרא, where the גמרא asks, “Let us go and see in whose domain the animal is in," and the גמרא answers, “Rather, It is like סומכוס." That means to say that, to סומכוס, the fact that the object is held by two people does not raise nor diminish the claim each one has in the object. Thus, the answer to the question, ""Let's go and see" the גמרא retracks from its original answer, and now claims that even seeing in whose domain the animal is in would not help any side since we are going like סומכוס who holds money in doubt is divided.

משנה הראשונה בבבא מציעא. רב שך מתרץ שאלה על הרמב''ם

אם שני אנשים מחזיקים בגד שכל אחד מהם טוען שהוא שלו, הוא מתחלק. זוהי המשנה הראשונה בבבא מציעא. הגמרא שואלת על כך מהמקרה שאדם אחד נותן למישהו לשמור מאתיים מטבעות ואחר נותן לו לשמור מאה למשמרת. האדם שכח למי הולכות המאתיים, ולמי הולכות המאה. המאה השלישית לא מוחזרת לאף אחד מהאנשים. הגמרא שואלת מה ההבדל, ועונה שהסיבה לחלוקה במשנה שלנו היא שהחלוקה יכולה להיות נכונה. הרמב"ם מביא את שתי המשנות ללא הסבר. הדרך שבה רב שך מסביר את הרמב"ם היא שהרמב"ם הוא כמו ר' חננאל והר''י מיגש שההבדל בין שתי המשניות הוא במשנה שלנו הן מחזיקים את החפץ. אז מדוע הגמרא לא ענתה כך? רב שך מביא מבבא מציעא דף ו' שכאשר יש ספק, בית המשפט לא עושה דבר. {{[התשובה לשאלה מדוע הגמרא לא עונה על ההחלטה השונה היא שהיא הולכת לפי הדעה בבבא בתרא לגבי סירה ששני אנשים מתווכחים עליה שאם בית המשפט תופס את החפץ, הוא יכול לשחרר אותו גם אם אין הוכחה. אבל אנחנו הולכים לפי הדעה שאם בית המשפט תופס חפץ, הוא לא יכול לשחרר אותו עד שתהיה הוכחה. אי תפסינן לא מפקינן.]}} לכן, במשנה שלנו אין ספק, ולכן הם מחלקים. במשנה על המאה השלישית יש ספק, ולכן המאה השלישית נשארת אצל האדם ששומר עליה, עד שניתן להביא הוכחה. אי תפסינן לא מפקינן.[אני חושב שרב שך אומר שכדי לחלק צריך שני תנאים: האחד הוא ודאות שמה שכל אחד מחזיק שייך לו, והתנאי השני הוא ששניהם מחזיקים.] רב שך שואל שאלה על תשובתו שלו, ואינו מוצא תשובה. השאלה היא מאדם שמוכר חפץ ומקבל את הכסף כדי לשלם עבורו משני אנשים ואינו יודע ממי קיבל את הכסף מרצונו וממי קיבל בניגוד לרצונו. מכיוון שהחפץ אינו מוחזק על ידי שני האנשים שקנו אותו, לכן מדובר במקרה שבו החפץ אינו נשאר במקומו, אלא מחולק. נראה שזה סותר את כל מה שאמר רב שך קודם לכן. התשובה במקרה של השומר היא כמו זו של אדם שמוצא חפץ שאבד. יש לו אחריות לא לתת אותו עד שהוא בטוח שהוא מחזיר אותו לאדם הנכון. זה שונה לחלוטין ממוכר שאינו שומר ואין לו אחריות כזו. ראיתי שרב נחום של ישיבת מיר מביא רעיון זה כדי לתמוך בתשובתו שלו באותה שאלה

If two people are holding a garment that each one claims is his, it is divided. That is the first Mishna in Bava Mezia. The gemara asks on this from the case of one person gives to someone to guard two hundred coins and another gives him to guard a hundred for safekeeping. The person forgot to which person goes the two hundred, and to which the one hundred. The third hundred is not returned to either person. The gemara asks what is the difference?, and answers the reason for dividing in our mishna is the dividing could be correct. The Rambam brings both Mishnas with no explanation. The way Rav Shach explains the Rambam (טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז) is that the Rambam is like R. Chananel and the Ri Migash that the difference between the two Mishnas is in our Mishna, they are holding the object. So then why did the Gemara not answers this? Rav Shach brings from Bava Metzia page 6 that where there is a doubt the court does nothing. [[The answer to the question why the gemara does not answer holding is different is that it is going according to the opinion in Bava Batra about a boat that two people are arguing about that if the court seizes the object, they can release it even if there is no proof. But we go by the opinion that if the court seizes an object, they cannot release it until there is proof.] So, in our Mishna there is no doubt, so they divide. In the Mishna about the third hundred, there is doubt, so the third hundred stays with the person guarding it, until proof can be brought. [I think Rav Shach means that to divide you need two conditions: one is certainty that what each one holds belongs to him, and the second condition is that they are both holding.] Rav Shach asks a question on his own answer. The question is from a person sells an object, and receives the money to pay for it from two people and does not know from whom he received the money willingly and from whom he received against his will. Since the object is not being held by the two people that bought it, therefore it should be a case of the object is left in place, but instead it is divided. This seems to contradict everything Rav Shach said beforehand. The answer the case of the guard is like that of a person who finds a lost object. He has a responsibility not to give it until he is sure he is returning it to the right person. That is totally different from the seller who is not a guard and has no such responsibility. I saw that Rav Nachum Partzovitz brings this idea to support his own answer on this same question. --------------------------------------If two people are holding a garment that each one claims is his, it is divided. That is the first משנה in בבא מציעא. The גמרא asks on this from the case of one person gives to someone to guard two hundred coins and another gives him to guard a hundred for safekeeping. The person forgot to which person goes the two hundred, and to which the one hundred. The third hundred is not returned to either person. The גמרא asks what is the difference, and answers the reason for dividing in our משנה is the dividing could be correct. The רמב’’ם brings both משנהs with no explanation. The way רב שך טוען ונטען פרק ט' הלכה ז explains the רמב’’ם is that the רמב’’ם is like ר' חננאל and the ר''י מיגש that the difference between the two משניות is in our משנה they are holding the object. So then why did the גמרא not answers this? רב שך brings from בבא מציעא page 6 that where there is a doubt the court does nothing.[[the answer to the question why the גמרא does not answer holding is different is that it is going according to the opinion in בבא בתרא about a boat that two people are arguing about that if the court seizes the object, they can release it even if there is no proof. But we go by the opinion that if the court seizes an object, they cannot release it until there is proof.] So, in our משנה there is no doubt so they divide. In the משנה about the third hundred there is doubt, so the third hundred stays with the person guarding it, until proof can be brought. [I think רב שך means that to divide you need two conditions: one is certainty that what each one holds belongs to him, and the second condition is that thEy are both holding.] רב שך asks a question on his own answer, and does not find an answer. The question is from a person sells an object and receives the money tרבo pay for it from two people aNd does not know from whom received the money willingly' and from whom he received against his will. Since the object is not being held by the two people that bought it, therefore it should be a case of the object is left in place, but instead it is divided. This seems to contradict everything רב שך said beforehand. The answer the case of the guard is like that of a person who finds a lost object. He has a responsibility not to give it until he is sure he is returning it to the right person. That is totally different from the seller who is not a guard and has no such responsibility. I saw that רב נחום של ישיבת מיר brings this idea to support his own answer on this same question.