faith in Rav Shach and the Gra

With Rav Nahman of Uman and Breslov there is a kind of רצוא ושוב -going up and then falling back process towards the truth. But Hegel has a different kind of process in which one goes back and forth between two extremes and by a process of synthesis rises up to the next level. I can see both kind of processes at work in my own life. For a certain period when I was at the Mir in NY--I felt I was in a kind of רצוא  state. [Going up] I was involved in learning Gemara [the Oral and written Law] and also Musar. Then coming to Israel certainly helped accelerate that process. But then came the period of falling away. And in that period I learned a thing or two about reality and the truth and the importance of Rav Shach and the Gra.

So I have learned a lot. But the lessons have been hard to put into writing. I would like to find a way of expressing the importance of the straight Litvak path [the Gra and Rav Shach, and Rav Israel Salanter--Musar] but along with that to show a synthesis with Rav Nahman and also the path of my parents (to emphasize good character and also to learn Physics and Mathematics as also brought in most rishonim based on Saadia Gaon]

So far I have not been able to find for myself any kind of simple way to explain the difficulties and the kind of synthesis that I am looking for. It is a kind of path of balance. To learn from the great sages of the past but also the greater need for common sense to discern who is worth listening to as opposed to who is actually from the Dark Side. In terms of this kind of common sense it seems to me that even for one who lacks that kind of sense still faith in Rav Shach and the Gra to believe that they knew what they were talking about can make up for the difference of what one lacks.

Natural law itself is actually brought openly in the gemara.

Natural law itself is actually brought openly in the gemara. It forms the basic of the debate between the sages and R Shimon ben Yochai if we go by the reason for the commandment or by the literal meaning. [See e.g. Bava Metzia page 119.] So everyone agrees there is a known and rational reason for every commandment except for the red heifer.  

Bava Kama page 85

I have not had a chance to take a good look at it yet but in Bava Kama there is brought on circa page 85 the subject of compensations for physical injury.

One thing that has to be paid for is (נזק (היזק בלשון הגמרא that is the actual damage. This is evaluated in this way. We look at the fellow as if he was a slave being sold in the marketplace. And the actual damage is let's say that it is some kind of injury in which he can not work as well as he could without the injury. The difference is what the amount of damages that have to be paid. But there is also the pain and the cost of the doctors and the שבת time that he can not work. That is we look at him as if he is guarding a potato patch and he gets paid for that

So what comes up in Nahmanides [The Ramban] in his questions on the Baal HaMeor--what if the guy is a nuclear physicist? So clearly if he is a slave with a PhD no one cares about the PhD. If they will buy him, they will buy him to work on their cotton crops. Not their nuclear physics projects.


This issue comes up in Nachmanides and it seems to be the source of his question on the Baal HaMeor. So he says that in fact if he was working before the accident as a nuclear physicist then that is part of the assessment of the damages. That is how the Ramban explains Rava in the gemara over on page 85. [The actual mishna I think is on page 83].

But again I have to apologize because I have not had a chance yet to take  a good look at this subject. I just am saying over what I could gather from the little time I had to glance at it. [There seems to be some reason I do not have the merit to learn Torah.]

הלא יראתך כסלתיך

הלא יראתך כסלתיך from the book of Job. "Is not your fear your stupidity?" Rav Nahman of Breslov brings this verse in his book the LeM 154 to show that fear of God needs to be coupled with intelligence. In another place in the LeM he also brings this verse to show that faith in  a tzadik needs to be coupled with Intelligence. [Daat].

From this it is possible to see how fear of God can get a person off track when it is done without common sense.

It is hard to know how to accomplish this. It does not seem to be a matter of what you learn alone. But I think it helps. For if a person has a faulty idea of what the big picture is--it puts him at a disadvantage to even know between right and wrong.

The closest I can see to aa balanced approach to Torah and fear of God is tat of the Gra and Rav Shach. That is to combine lerning Gemara with the Musar approach of Rav Israel Salanter

Gemara Brachot page 2 side a

The Mishna starts out מאמתי קוראים את השמע בערבית? בשעה שהכוהנים נכנסים לאכול בתרומתם. When does one say the Shema at night? Answer: when the priest come to eat their truma

The Gemara Brachot says we need the mishna to tell us that כפרה אינה מעכבת מלאכול בתרומה. Bringing the sacrifices that one is required as an atonement do not stop a priest from eating Trumah. [They were learning this in the Na Nach Breslov group today when I walked in in the morning]. I asked that most priest do not have to bring a sacrifice for an atonment. So the Mishna can easily be talking about regular priests that have touched something like a lizard. [i.e. a dead lizard]. So they have to go to a natural body of water and then wait until nightfall. And the Mishna might simply be saying that הערב שמש [waiting for nightfall] is needed.

My question is based on the fact that lots of people need to bring a sin offering for lots of different things. [There are about 43 of these things.] Also a Zav or zava or a leper. The point of the rule that the need to bring a sin offering does not stop a person from eating truma. But it would stop a person from eating any kind of sacrifice. --and it would be Karet if he would eat a sacrifice under such circumstances.


Tosphot does not deal with this question but asks a different question that this rule we know from somewhere else.

So I am thinking perhaps this rule that a kohen needs nightfall and to dip into a natural body of water from ealsewhere also? So that the only possible new idea of the mishna would be to tell us that bringing a sacrifce does not stop one from eating truma.


[The basic idea of the Gemara itselfbefore I got to my question is this. Did the fellow already go to a natural body of water the previous day and then today bring his sacrifices? Then he would have been able to eat the truma today. So it must be he did not bring his sacrifices yet and still afetr he has gone to a natural body of water and then waited until nightfall he is allowed to eat truma.. So we see אין הכפרה מעכבת מלאכול בתרומה.]

So the fact that someone is religious --in the sense that the religious world takes it to mean--has nothing to do with the question if they are a decent human being-.

Morality and one's belief system are two separate areas of value. Even if they are related they are still dealing with different subject matter.  So the fact that someone is religious --in the sense that the religious world takes it to mean--has nothing to do with the question if they are a decent human being-. In fact it was this revelation that caused me to be less enchanted with the religious world.

Furthermore it seems to me that the amount of mental energy that people put into religious observance seems to take away how much energy they can put into being decent people.

You can see in the writings of Rav Israel Salanter and also the events of his life that he wanted to solve this problem. It could be that he had succeeded to some degree in the Litvak yeshiva world--where his teachings were more or less accepted. 

too many pictures in the religious world

There are too many pictures in the religious world. This seems to have seeped in slowly. But it is common now. It probably has something to do with the natural human need for some idol. Everyone in the religious world worships some idol-but it is however called a "tzadik" (saint). [The problem would be even if the saint was actually saintly. But in fact the reverse seems to be the case most often.]

Isaac Blazer in the end of his book of Rav Israel Salanter brings the idea of learning Gemara and trust in God. His basic idea there is that one ought to care only for the needs of that day and sit and learn Torah and not worry about the needs of tomorrow.

This is on the Mishna about the "path of Torah" to eat bread and water and to labor in Torah and to live a life of pain. So he asks what is the life of pain is the mishna talking about since it already stipulated that you eat bread and water and sleep on the ground. He answers that that is not a life of pain in the sense that one feels the pain. rather it is a life of pain for one who has no trust in God. But one who trusts in God it is  a life of joy.

In a practical sense however we see the basic approach of Rav Isaac Blazer was the same as that of Navardok about sitting and learning Torah and not worrying about tomorrow.

This is clearly the ideal of Torah. The only thing that I would modify now would be what is included in the category of learning Torah. In my view this would include Physics and Mathematics as you see in the obligations of the Heart and most other rishonim from Spain.  [Those from Germany did not hold this way.]

path of balance in Torah and wisdom of God as revealed in Physics and Mathematics and the natural sciences.

It seems to me to be hard to know why the rishonim [medieval authorities] from Spain were going with the learning of Aristotle to the degree that they did.

It does not at first glance seem to be based on the Gemara.
 Still because of my peculiar situation when I could not and still can not learn Torah, at least the opinion of the rishonim gives me an opening in which I feel I can learn the wisdom of God [Physics and Mathematics and the natural sciences. Not pseudo science like psychology.]
So I have at least a few opinions in the rishonim to depend on. Still it seems hard to know why the rishonim themselves took such a radical approach.

The basic approach I think comes from Saadia Gaon but is most clearly enunciated in the Musar Book the Hovot Levavot/Obligations of the Heart. [By Ibn Pakuda].

In Bava Kama at around page 82 there is a discussion of the "wisdom of the Greeks". Raban Shimon Ben Gamliel was part of  large household and he said that 500 students learned Torah and another 500 learned Greek wisdom and only two were left, him and another student. So the Gemara brings this as a question on the idea that Greek wisdom is forbidden. The Gemara answers since the household of R Gamliel was close to the government they needed to know Greek wisdom. In one rishon in the back of the printed edition I saw yesterday I noticed that he says thus it is permitted in case of need.



In any case it seem to me that a path of balance is the best idea.

Sanhedrin page 14. No ordination nowadays. Rambam about the Tribe of Levi.

The idea that there is no ordination nowadays is well known in the Gemara. But I admit that I forget the exact source. The fact that there is no ordination outside of Israel is however in Sanhedrin page 14.

This is brought in Bava Kama around page 84 where the issue of things that can be judged outside of Israel comes up. חבלות והודעות.

Why it seems necessary to mention this is that this is one area that is rarely touched upon by religious authorities that want to pull the wool over people's eyes to make them think that they have actual ordination. In that way they monetize Torah. [I.e., they use Torah as a means to make money and gain prestige and power.]

 A different issue is that in any case, it is  forbidden to use Torah to make money. And that Rambam about the Tribe of Levi has nothing to do with this issue because there the Rambam says for one that accepts on himself the yoke of serving God, God will provide. He say nothing there in relation to the question of one can use Torah to make money. [And the question of using Torah to make money  is dealt with by the Rambam in a different place, i.e., laws of learning Torah.]

laws about marriage.

I wanted to bring up a few issues in laws about marriage. The library here is closing soon so I only have a few minutes.
Property of the wife is explained in Yevamot but the major subjects are gone into in Ketuboth. [It is brought also  in the Code of Laws by Rav Joseph Karo, the Shulhan Aruch, Vol. Even HaEzer ch 85. paragraph 3]

In short there are three major areas. One is נכסי צאן ברזל "iron sheep." That is property that the bride brings into the marriage that the husband takes responsibility for in case they are lost. This kind of property he has to pay for if there is a divorce.  He can use the property. [Property that is mentioned in the Ketuba is a sub set of this. That is to say the iron sheep does not have to be at the time of getting married. It simply is any property that he takes responsibility for.
There is another type called נכסי מלוג "sheared property" [as when you shear the wool of a sheep and the sheep is left but you take the wool]. In this he also can use it and also if it is rented property he gets the rent. But if it is lost, he does not pay for it.

But there is no concept that the wife owns the property of the husband just by getting married.

The idea of serving God with balance--not to be a fanatic is brought in the book of Rav Nahman, The Le'M in vol I chapter 49.

The idea of serving God with balance--not to be a fanatic is brought in the book of Rav Nahman, The Le'M in vol I chapter 49.
There he brings the basic idea of Rav Isaac Luria in the start of the Eitz Haim about the condensation.[Zimzum]. The idea there is is that in the beginning everything was filled with the light of God so there was no place to create any world. So God condensed his light to the sides to create an empty space that was a sphere, and also left a point of light in the middle. Then He sent down a beam of light that went down a drop and then turned to the sides to become a sphere. Then the light went down a drop more and became a smaller sphere.  And thus the light went down more until ten times and these are the ten spherot in the shape of spheres.

Rav Nahman brings that this happens in every person. That when one wants to serve God the light fills him with such excitement that he or she can not contain themselves. --and can do things wrong because of over excitement. So one must contain ones own excitement to serve God with good character that neither goes off to one direction or the other.

This is well known among newly religious people --that they get overly excited and do things wrong because of it. or sometimes imagine that they already understand everything. They become know it alls.

But there is usually a great amount of trouble in figuring out exactly how to apply this lesson.

There is some lack of knowledge about marriage relations in the Bible.
[I was clearer myself about these issue when I was learning Gemara Yevamot. But I have forgotten most of what I knew. Still I would like to mention a few things that I still recall.]
Homosexual relations between males in mentioned twice in Leviticus among the type of relations that are called עריות "Arayot". That is all the things there mentioned "do not reveal the nakedness of your sister." "your mother," etc. Most of them have a death penalty --including homosexual relations.

But relations with  menstruating woman do not. That is just simple Karet. [A spiritual penalty] Adultery is with a married woman has a death penalty. But a man can have many wives. That is not adultery. But in the case of adultery, both the adulterer and adulteress both get the death penalty. [It is clear, but traditional Catholic teaching has made this issue foggy.]


Rav Nahman from Breslov rightfully noted the essential aspect of the human soul of sexuality. In fact he saw this issue at the core of the Torah. So Moharosh [Rav Shick] emphasized getting married  early.  The Tikun HaKlali also I believe is very important. That is to say the ten psalms that Rav Nahman designated on the day one has done  asexual sin. That is 16,32,41,42,59,77,90,105,137,150.

The Torah has a specific set of values which are clear. However politics and government is a different area. The Torah does have some rules about that, but mainly leaves government open. So my approach to this issue is basically to take a look at the Constitution of the USA, and see that it has greatest the most free and amazing society that has ever existed within human memory. I see no contradictions between personal keeping and learning Torah on one hand- and support of the Constitution of the USA or its closest ally Israel.

There is some kind of hidden evil in the religious authorities that only the Gra and Rav Shach saw. Besides those two great sages, everyone else seems to have been taken in.

Hobhouse made a good point about religion and politics. That religion, even though at its core is the Torah, still the religious parties are also people. So even though one ought to learn and keep Torah that does not mean to try to put religious parties into power. In particular Rav Nahman pointed out the problem with Torah Scholars that are demons --(the LeM of Rav Nahman in vol I ch 12 and ch 28.) which he brings from the Zohar. But even without that, there are plenty of statements in the Gemara that indicate that religious leaders ought not to be in power. Learning and keeping Torah is a personal matter.

I would not say so myself years back when I was part of Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY. But after that  I began to see the problems of the religious world more clearly. And saw that Rav Nahman was not exaggerating. I guess young people who have not experienced the demonic reign of religious leaders up front and personally might easily be taken in by the facade--like I was. So I think that though the damage has been done to many people who have fallen for their sanctimonious act, still there is hope for future generations.

So in short I do not see the participation of religious parties in Israel in Government to be a positive thing --even from the aspect of Torah and especially not from the aspect of Torah.


[One place for example you see this in the Talmud is in Shabat (--I forget the page number-)"If you see a generation that has problems coming upon it go out and check the judges of Israel. For all problem that come into the world come only because of the judges of Israel." Then the gemara brings a verse to prove its point. "Its judges judge with bribes etc." But in any case the issue is  that there is some kind of hidden evil in the religious authorities that only the Gra and Rav Shach saw. Besides those two great sages, everyone else seems to have been taken in. 

I know that L.T. Hobhouse [the English philosopher] blamed WWI on the ideas of Hegel (in his book the Metaphysical Theory of the State) about the State. This did not bother me because I thought it was too far fetched.

But then I noticed that Shirer blamed both Fichte and Hegel for WWII (in his Rise and Fall of the Third Reich). At that point I am thinking maybe Hobhouse was onto something. After all Shirer you can not exactly accuse of  not understanding the German language!

So perhaps it makes more sense to  do what thinkers were doing in the Middle Ages in terms of getting to a comprehensive world view--to combine faith with reason that is the Old Testament with Aristotle and Plato and Plotinus.

This is at least what Saadia Gaon was doing and all the rishonim that wrote of the issues of the overall world view of Torah.


This has a great deal of support from the best of modern thinkers also for example Ed Feser and Kelley Ross (The Kant-Fries School ). Kelley Ross has stated openly that his point of view is from essentially Plato. Feser is basing himself on Aristotle and Aquinas to some degree but is not trying to explain either one but ratter to use their insights to build his own true and comprehensive world view.] [Huemer is related to what is known as the intuitionist school. But in a nutshell he is basically with Aristotle in terms of universals and that universals depend on particulars.] 

Rav Nahman of Breslov comes about as close as I can see into making the Old Testament and the Gemara into a comprehensive system--that is a interconnected system based on a small number of basic principles.

Rav Nahman of Breslov comes about as close as I can see into making the Old Testament and the Gemara into a comprehensive system--that is a interconnected system based on  a small number of basic principles. This kind of task was taken up to a a large degree by the baali HaMusar [sages and authors of works on Athics.] from the Middle Ages  the  Obligations of the Heart by Ibn Pakuda חובות הלבבות and Saadia Gaon. But Rav Nahman brought the task to its completion.

Maimonides was doing something similar--showing that Torah does not contradict Aristotle. But Rav Nahman was trying rather to show that the Torah makes sense. he was not concerned if it agreed with Aristotle.

Still his synthesis seems to leave out a few major principles that were noted by the baali HaMusar and especially the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter. [Midot/good character, learning Torah, trust in God]]

I was reminded about this because on my way to the sea I spoke briefly another secular Jew like myself and he said something along the lines that the main thing is Rav Nahman and that everyone needs the ideas of Rav Nahman. I forget his exact language. But it reminded me of this fact that Rav Nahman has a good advice and ideas about almost any and every human problem.

I think the father in law of Rav Shach [Issar Meltzar] said the Derara dememona is a doubt about where the money ought to go. I forget because I no longer have an Avi Ezri [of Rav Shach] to look up. But if that is what he said it makes sense anyway.
The reason I say this is that the Gemara in Bava Mezia 79 seems to take this as a simple matter.
The basic gemara over there says [in the third case] that if a ship with a cargo of wine sinks the if the ship owner said, "I am renting to you this ship," and the wine owner said "I am hiring you to carry this wine," then wherever the money is that is where it stays. If both said (in forth case) ("stam") "I am renting to you a ship," [not this ship] and "I am hiring you to bring wine," not this wine then they divide.

It looks like a exact copy of the mishna on page 100 and also the mishna on page 97. On page 100 the same issue came up in the Gemara and the Gemara concludes the mishna there is like Sumhos.

No one on page 79 says anything about Sumhos. Not the Tur, the Rosh, the Shulhan Aruch or the Maharsha. But interestingly enough right there the Tosphot says the reason for the case when they are both definite this ship and this wine  is hezkas mamon [prior status of where the money is]. And the reason for the end when they divide is the doubt.

I recall I brought up these issues also on page 100 in my small booklet on Bava Mezia chapters 8 and 9.
[The regular way to understand Derara Demmona is a doubt to the court even without their words. Also the issue seems divided between Bava Metzia page 2b and the Gemara is Bava Batra as to what are the conditions under whcih Sumhos says they divide. Whether you need Derara Demmona or if he hold they divide with D.M. then all the more so without D.M.]

So to make it short, the major issues I see here are these. Why does Rav Papa on page 79 in the forth case not say he is going like Sumhos? And even if he would why is he not saying like Sumhos in the third case? So it looks here that you have to say this Gemara holds Drara Demmona is when there is a doubt. Furthermore why does the Gemara not go straight with the sages that say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה? One who take money out of a prior status needs proof.

The 15th of the Federalist Papers says that the essence of government is to make laws and by implication to enforce them. This in itself seems to be an argument why not to give power or vote for religious parties in Israel. [Even though the argument in the Federalist papers was arguing for a union of the states  as opposed to staying as they were an confederacy with no unifying centre.]

Even religious people in Israel would not like the religious powers to be to have power over their individual lives.

Learning Torah really ought not be mixed with politics.

Mind can not be a epiphenomenon of Body.

 By analytic means it was shown that the epiphenomenon approach to the Mind Body Problem entails and self contradiction in one of the intermediate steps.
That is to say that Mind can not be a epiphenomenon of Body.
[The epiphenomenon approach is a suggestion of John Searle. But Searle himself says that it is not an adequate solution.

Rav Nahman [from Uman and Breslov].

Rav Nahman had a goodly number of amazing pieces of advice. But I realize also that sometimes his ideas can be taken in ways that do not seem to be so great. For an example I think I was learning Torah a lot better when I was part of the Mir Yeshiva in NY. Getting involved with Breslov seems to have given me some great things, but also seems to have gotten me off track in other ways.

So what you have to say I think is that in terms of learning authentic Torah it is the Litvaks [Lithuanian] Yeshivas that have it down pat--i.e. that have authentic Torah (keeping and learning).

On the other hand, for specific issues, no one is greater that Rav Nahman to get into the core of problems, and find solutions (at least as far as humanly possible).

One bit of advice comes from the last Torah lesson he said in his lifetime in Uman [Le''M vol II chapter 8]--the problem of מפורסמים של שקר famous leaders who are false. [i.e. scam artists]. And it was well known in Breslov that that warning applies even inside of Breslov itself.
The problem nowadays seems to be that a great number of people claim to be presenting authentic Torah who are what Rav Nahman said are "demons." ["תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודיים"] (Le''M volume I chapter 12 and 28) So how do you tell who is who?
Experience is one way. As Rav Nahman himself brought in the end of sipurei Maasiot that some kinds of knowledge come only with time and experience. They are not known simply by logic.
But if one does not want that kind of experience then there is also the possibility of simply listening to the warnings of the Gra and Rav Shach. That is by אמונת חכמים [faith in the wise]. But that also has a pitfall since often people will assume that Rav Nahman himself was in the category of what the Gra was warning about. I assumed as much myself until I had an opportunity to take a look at a book that printed up the original documents from the court testimony in Vilna and in the actual letter of excommunication that was signed by the Gra.

Kant, Hegel

A certain degree of animosity towards Kant, Hegel seems to have been generated by WWI. So people of the 20th century would go to great lengths to find almost any kind of world view that would by pass Kant and Hegel. Almost to the degree of making them unmentionable.

Though I am no expert in Philosophy at all, but I understood that the English people that were more or less continuing the legacy of Kant and Hegel pretty much denounced the whole thing after WWI. That is what I understood about Bradley anyway. Certainly Hobhouse's critique on the Metaphysical State was in reaction to WWI.

This to me seems unfair--as if Kant and Hegel were responsible for WWI. [See Patrick Buchanan's The Unnecessary War] [That book is not philosophy, but simply showing that WWI was pointless (which is clear) and led inevitably to WWII which already at that point was necessary]

Ayn Rand on the other hand seems to have objected to Kant on the basis of Neo Kantianism which took a psychological turn. as opposed to the objective approach of Schelling, Hegel, and Fichte.
Kant himself seems to have anticipated the problems in his second edition of the Critique of Pure reason when he put in a whole section just to reply to Berkley's lunatic idealism. That seems to settle the issue.

[In terms of the actual critique of Hobhouse I recall that Brand Blanshard had a pretty good answer. It was based as I recall on the consequential theory of political power. [See Danny Frederick on Huemer on that same issue.]

In terms of that issue I might mention that Hegel is right that people are defined a lot by their relationships as much and perhaps more so than their inner essence. It is from my standpoint interesting to note a whole branch of math based on that idea arose in the 1940's Category Theory --that the main thing to look at are the maps from elements in a set or group as much as the elements themselves.

[Though I admit that that idea can be misused as Steven Dutch makes a note of.

The idea of saying the name of God as it is written.

The idea of saying the name of God as it is written. Sanhedrin 90 side one and Avoda Zara 17b 18a and the Maharsha in Kidushin at the end of chapter three in the agada section.

Sorry I do not remember the exact page but the Maharsha there is talking about this exact subject and mentions the people in his days who were dabbling in mysticism and speaking publically about it.In particular abiout this very aspect that they were saying different ways of saying the name. He was clearly not very happy about this.

In Segulat Israel there are brought different combinations of the names. And also we find in the Ari this subject. Rav Nahman himself brings such an idea in his Sefer HaMidot.

The basic source of the whole issue is in Sanhedrin 90a that says one who says the name of God as it is written has no portion in teh world to come. In Avoda Zara there is brought the case of one sage who was put into prison and killed and the Gemara there on page 18 attributes his fate to teh fact that he was saying the name as written.

Issues of the best type of government are not the same kinds of issues that come up in the Gemara.

Issues of government were not even relevant during the events of ancient Israel. For  along time there were no kings at all and when Israel asked for a king the prophet Samuel made a point to show that God's anger was kindled against Israel.

During the rule of kings government also was not relevant since the kings rule was directly towards protection from outside enemies, not internal issues. 

During the second Temple period Israel was under Persian rule for the first part. Then later, there was the Syrians [part of the empire of Alexander] and then the  descendents of the Maccabees and later the rule of Rome.
[The kings of the Maccabees were not so great. See Kidushin in chapter 3. Yanai [One king of the Maccabees] came back from a battle and wanted to celebrate. There were there wise men of Israel. One person there [the joker] told him the heart of the wise is not with you. How can I tell he asked? Put on the Urim and Tumim and test them. He did so and decided in fact they were against him. The joker said, "Murder them." The king asked תורה מה תהא עליה? What will happen with Torah? The joker said it is available for anyone who want to learn it. [he forgot about the Oral Law] So the king killed all the wise men of Israel



Gemara does not deal with issue of how to make a just government anywhere.

In the world of the religious it is assumed with no evidence that they ought to be in charge of everyone.--Yet there is no indication that that would be  a just or fair kind of rule.

It simply foes with unfounded assumption that the religious are examples of perfect wisdom and perfect virtue. --All the available evidence seems to indicate the exact opposite.

The reason this is relevant is that there are great paces that learn and try to keep Torah on the highest possible level like the Mir in NY or Ponovitch or Brisk in Israel. (Litvak yeshivas--i.e. Lithuanian types that are based on the Gra and Rav Israel Salanter to some degree) But these kinds of places are in general not interested in political power.

Just to be clear..I feel questions about how to create the most just kind of society are mainly answered in the Federalist papers by Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.


Another aspect of this issue is that it is natural for people to look for a just group to be a part of. This is why people join the religious world in the first place. That sadly is not that much different than people joining Scientology of some eastern ashram for the same reasons. The trouble is that usually the expectations are not fulfilled and there is a great deal of exploitation --plus the groups are dishonest in terms of representing a false picture of what the essential core beliefs are.

Best type of government is not at all dealt with in the Gemara and this leaves me in doubt why the religious in Israel believe they ought to be in charge of government. From what I can see the Federalist papers are right that certain principles of government have been found over the ages to be effective and workable and bring about as much as possible a fair and decent society.  Republican government [not Democracy], separation of powers, protection of private property etc. None of which the religious care about.

New Idea. Gemara in Kidushin 64 Bava Batra 134b This is what I believe to be a very good new idea. I have not had a lot of these recently but this one looks good.

I had a chance [thank God] to take a look at the Gemara in Kidushin 64 yesterday and gained a bit of clarity about the issue. In short I would like to suggest an answer to the question of R Akiva Eiger on Bava Batra 134b--but I also want to add that this answer only goes according to one answer of Tosphot on Kidushin 64b.
The Mishna in Bava Batra says one says I have a son is believed. I have a brother is not. [So his wife is permitted to the whole world when he dies and is not obligated to marry his brother--if he dies without children.]

במשנה בבא בתרא קלד: מובא את הדין האומר יש לי בן נאמן יש לי אח אינו נאמן. הגמרא שואלת שיש לנו כבר משנה כזו. היא עונה המשנה כאן היא כשיש חזקה שיש אח. רע''א שואל לא רק חזקה אלא גם אם יש עדות שיש אח היא צריכה להיות מותרת לשוק בגלל הדין כשהוא אומר גירשתי את אשתי נאמן. נראה לי לתרץ שאם הייתה עדות שיש אח היא לא הייתה מותרת לשוק לפי דעת ר' נתן  והגמרא רוצה שהמשנה כאן תהיה גם לפי דעת ר' נתן. אבל התירוץ הזה עובד רק לפי דעת אחת בתוספות קידושין סד:. הגמרא שם מביאה את הדין כמו כאן ושואלת שכנראה  המשנה אינו כמו ר' נתן שמובא עוד לימוד הואמר בשעת קידושין יש לי בן  ובשעת מיתה הוא אומר  אין לו בן או בשעת קידושין אין לי אח ובשעת מיתה הוא אומר יש לו אח ר' יהודה הנשיא אומר הוא נאמן להתיר  ולא לאסור  ור' נתן אומר גם לאסור הוא נאמן. אביי עונה המשנה היא כשאין חזקה של אח או בן  והלימוד האחר הוא כשיש חזקה של אח אבל לא ידוע שום מידע על בן. הסיבה של ר' יהודה הנשיא היא שדבריו בשעת קידושין יש להן דין של עדות שמבטל את החזקה. לכן היא מותרת. לדעת ר' נתן דבריו בשעת קידושין יש להן את הדין של חזקה. לכן החזקה הזאת אינה יותר מועילה  מן חזקת אח.
ונראה שהגמרא בבא בתרא גם מחזיקה שהדין של המשנה שם גם היא לפי דעת ר' נתן ולכן המצב הוא שיש חזקת אח אבל הוא אומר שיש לו בן ולכן היא מותרת. אבל התירוץ הזה הולך רק לפי דעת אחת בתוספות קידושין סד" שבמצב שיש חזקת אח אבל הוא אומר שיש לו בן הוא נאמן. ולפי הדעת האחרת שם בתוספות אין לי תירוץ על הקושיא של רע''א.







The Gemara [Talmud] there asks why do we need this mishna when we learn the same thing in Kidushin? Answer. This mishna is when there is a Hazaka [prior status] that there is a brother.

R Akiva Eiger asks even if there would be witnesses that there is a brother he ought to be believed that he has a son as the very next section of the Gemara makes clear that if he says I divorced my wife he also is believed to make her permitted.[Not require Yibum--to marry his brother.]

The answer I think is that the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking like the Gemara in Kidushin that the mishna can also go according to R Nathan--who would hold with Hazaka but not if there were witnesses.

The Gemara in Kidushin  brings the same idea of the mishna and then asks that it does not seem to be like R Nathan. For we learn in another teaching: One says I have a son when he gets married and then says he does not before he dies. Or he says I have no brother when he gets married and then says he does not before he dies. R Yehuda HaNasi says he is believed to permit not to forbid. R Nathan says also to forbid he is believed.

Abyee says our mishna can also be like R Nathan because the mishna here in kidushin is when there is no hazaka of a brother or a son. In the other teaching there is a hazaka that there is a brother but we know nothing about a son. So in case of the other teaching the reason R Yehuda permits is that the words he says at the time he gets married have a category of  witnesses which is stronger that hazaka that he has a brother.] R Nathan hold what he says at the time he gets married has only the category of another hazaka.

So what one can answer to R Akiva Eiger is the case in Bava Batra is there is a hazaka of a brother but he also says he has a son and those words also have the category of a hazaka. But if there were witnesses that he has a brother it would be a hazaka against witnesses and that would not be enough.

But in Kidushin in the end of Tosphot there is a debate about this exact issue. To one opinion there in such a case he would be believed that he has a son and in the other opinion he would not be believed. So to that second opinion my answer here would not work.

problem of Change, Faith and Reason, -the Mind Body problem.

Philosophy started with the problem of Change. (How is change possible? What is, is. What is not, is not. Parmenides) That led up to Plato and Aristotle. Then that puttered down until Plotinus made his synthesis between Plato and Aristotle [Neo Platonism]. Then the Middles Ages were about the possibility and way to combine faith with reason. Then a new thing started with Descartes --the Mind Body problem. That led up until Kant and Hegel. Now we are in a post Kant era. What comes next is any one's guess. [But my feeling is that these questions are all connected. The development is not random]

There were some great thinkers after Kant and Hegel, but great in terms of commentary.

The people after Kant that seems to me to have great value are, Kelley Ross {Friesian School}, McTaggart, Huemer, Steven Dutch, Habermas. and Maverick Philosopher

Sometimes it seems to me the best thing about some thinkers like Kelley Ross or Habermas is when they evaluate other philosophers. Like Habermas' critique on Rawls' Theory of Justice. Or Huemer's Why I am not an Objectivist


I want to add that the issue of faith and reason started early with Philo but really picked up with the debate between Christians and Muslims. The whole issue really reached its climax with Aquinas. Then also puttered out until Descartes.

country of Jewish Law and insane religious fanatics

In Israel at present it looks that the issue of a country of Jewish Law is becoming a big issue in the coming elections. From practical experience I can say confidently that such a state of affairs would be  a disaster. This is in fact in spite of the greatness of personal keeping of the laws of the Torah. But to give power to the insane religious fanatics that control the interpretation of Jewish law would be a horrible nightmare.


[The issue seem to be that the middle and slightly left wing think that Prime Minister Netanyahu is on course to give power to the insane religious parties. That is my impression]

The issue on one hand would be freedom. And that is an issue.But the more important issue is that idea of Rav Nahman of Torah Scholars that are demons in his LeM vol I ch 12 and chapter 28.

[But the issue is brought up many other times in the books of Rav Nahman. For example in the very last Torah lesson of his life in LeM vol II ch. 8 the same issue is brought in terms of religious leaders that are liars. מנהיג של שקר


It is hard to put this into a larger context because you do find in Eastern Religions cults like Adi Da and even secular cults. But the problem in the Jewish world with the religious seems to be a bit different. It is a certain kind of kelipa [evil force] that has some kind of similarity with other kinds of evil forces, but still has it own unique characteristics.

Even more there is great doubt about how much good yeshivas do. After the fact that the Gra's signature on the letter of excommunication is ignored, the Sitra Achra [Realm of Evil] basically has a foothold in every yeshiva. Even the best. [My feeling is that the excommunication did not apply to Rav Nahman and that is why I quote him.This is based on my reading of the original documents that were printed up in a book I saw a few years ago.]

My own experience with even the best of the yeshivas has proved to me that the whole enterprise has limited benefit.

[Of curse the issue of freedom is a big issue. Wanting the means is the same as wanting the goal. If the religious want to impose their world view that would be to murder and enslave everyone that does anything they do not like, And they do not like a lot of stuff. And wanting to give them power means to wanting their goals. Their goals are not innocent]


Torah is important but something went way off in the religious world.

Bava Batra 134b. Kidushin 64b.

You have to say the Gemara in Bava Batra is thinking there is a hazaka for a brother and still she is permitted to marry (without yibum or halitza) because he is also saying he has a son. This is because in Kidushin the whole difference between the Mishna and the Braita over there is when there is a hazaka that there is a brother. The Gemara over in Kidushin clearly say that is the only difference and that is the reason R Nathan forbids her. So then what do you do with the Mishna in Bava Batara that is the exact same law? You have to say in Bava Batra he is also saying he has a son.

[I did not get a chance to do any learning today but it occurs to me that this might be the very reason the Ramban (Nahmanides) is disagreeing with the approach of the Baal Hameor and Rashi.

Besides one other reason he gives that כיוון שהגיד שוב אינו מגיד. [Once he says something and believed he is no longer believed to change his mind. But besides that I can imagine the Ramban (Nahmanides) also is thinking that it makes no sense to  put in an extra condition in the Mishna in Bava Batra--especially when over there it is clearly divided into two case. One when he says he has  a son and the other when he claim to have  a brother.

Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [

I had a few minutes to look at the Rosh on Kidushin page 64b. [One of the major poskim (people that wrote on the Talmud from the standpoint of determining the law--as different from people that wrote on it with a view to explain the difficulties) of the Middle Ages.] And I see that I need to do a lot more work on that subject there because there seems to be a debate among the rishonim how to understand that subject. You have Rashi and the Baal Hameor [Rav Zarahia HaLevi] on one side. On the other you have the Rosh and the Ramban.

Still from what I could see my answer for R. Akiva Eiger still looks valid -- at least if you look at the subject from the viewpoint of Rashi. [I might mention here that I have heard this before when I was at the Mir in NY--that often the questions of R Akiva Eiger are only to one opinion. Just switching to the other opinions will often  answer the question. So you have to assume he was asking his question according to the viewpoint of the alternative opinion. I actually had that experience once while at the Mir. In those days it was the custom for young married men to give a kind of informal class that was separate from the regular scheduled classes. I was giving such a class there and in fact discovered that a question of R Akiva Eiger in Shabat could be answered based on a Tur in the laws of festivals.]

So just to make this short: The Gemara in Bava Batra [if memory serves me correctly] asks why do you need an extra mishna to tell us if the husband says before he dies "I have a son" he is believed. If he says "I have a brother" he is not. Answer: the Mishna is telling us even when there is a Hazaka  (prior status) that there is a brother. [What this seems to mean (at least the way Rashi and the Baal HaMeor understand it) is that he says also I have a son. So when he says "I have brother" and there is also a Hazaka (prior status) that there is a brother she is still permitted to marry someone without Yibum. [Yibum is when a woman is married and her husband dies without seed, she has to marry his brother. --or do Haliza (taking off the sandal) as mentioned in the Torah.]

R Akiva Eiger asks right there why does the gemara say a hazaka. Even with witnesses she also should be allowed to marry without Yibum.[It seems to me clear in any case that R Akiva Eiger is asking only according to the opinion of the baal Hameor since to the other opinion his question would not make sense.]
My answer is based on Kidushin 64 that wants the Mishna to be like R. Nathan not just R Yehuda Hanasi.
The point is over there in Kidushin R Nathan goes  with Hazaka (prior status) if he says "I have a brother" to believe him to make her forbidden to remarry without yibum. But if he also says I have a son she is permitted. But my point is that if there would be more than a Hazaka but also witnesses, then R Nathan would say no.--and forbid her unless there was some evidence that there is a son.

And just by taking a quick look at Rashi and the Rosh today I saw that this answer is very clear in Rashi since Rashi says that if a brother would come later and say that he is the brother then he would not be believed. But from that Rashi you can see that if there would be witnesses at the time she wants to be permitted to remarry then we would need evidence that there is a son.

I also had another proof for this answer but I forgot it.

Philosophy queen of the sciences? or bankrupt?

Philosophy used to be the queen of the sciences. It has fallen to irrelevance. [As Steven Weinberg (NoblePrize Physics--for combining electromagnetism with the weak force that causes neutron decay) wrote about the unreasonable ineffectiveness of philosophy.] [This as compared to the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics]]  This is similar to large corporations that at one time hold first place and then sink into bankruptcy. [Same with England. Once the prime world power. Now an afterthought.] The situation is not so different when it comes to religion which once was thought to contain all truth. Now is simply a matter of personal preference on where to hang out.

What does this mean in a practical sense?

I mean this question also in terms of the discredited ideologies that swept through Europe and Russia in the later 1800's.


Faith and Reason was the formula that worked for the Middle Ages. And still is a working combination. Not just one or the other. But the very meaning of faith and reason can not be the same as in the Middle Ages.
[Like the Renaissance that looked towards ancient Attica [Greece] for inspiration, but went beyond that.]

Not that philosophy itself is irrelevant. It is still necessary to get an accurate idea of what is everything all about. Just philosophy as a study has undergone a systematic decay.


[Perhaps if we could all go back to basics would be best. Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson. If we could just get through that material maybe we would be doing a lot better.]- See robert hanna about the vacuous twentieth century analytic philosophy. 

Gemara in Bava Batra page 134b and seeing the question of Rav Akiva Eiger בבא בתרא דף קלד ע''א ע''ב

But on last Friday after looking at the Gemara in Bava Batra page 134b and seeing the question of Rav Akiva Eiger there, I had an idea of how to answer his question.

גמרא בבא בתרא דף קלד ע''א ע''ב. המשנה האומר יש לי בן נאמן. יש לי אח אינו נאמן. זה אומר יש לו בן ולכן אשתו אינה חייבת ביבום. יש לי אח ולכן אשתו חייבת ביבום. הגמרא שואלת שיש לנו כבר משנה בזה בקידושין  דף ס''ד ע''א. הגמרא .עונה פה יש חזקה על שיש אח. רע''א שואל אפילו אם יש עדים שיש לו אחים הוא צריך להיות נאמן כשהוא אומר שאין לו
בגלל הדין המובא להלן כשהוא אומר גירשתי את אשתי נאמן וזה אפילו כנגד עדים. התירוץ נראה בא מן הגמרא בקידושין סד ע''ב. שם מובא את הדין שיש לי בן נאמן יש לי אח אינו נאמן. הגמרא שאול שכנראה שזה אינו כר' נתן. שכך מובא  האומר בשעת קידושין יש לי בן ובשעת מיתה אין לי בן או האומר בשעת קידושין אין לי אח ובשעת מיתה יש לי אח. ר' יהודה הנשיא אומר נאמן להתיר ואינו נאמן לאסור. ר' נתו אומר גם נאמן לאסור. אביי אומר לא קושיא. המשנה היא כשאין חזקה והברייתא היא כשיש חשזה שיש אח ואין חזקה על בן. ולכן שם ר' נתן אומר שהיא אסורה וחייבת ביבום בגלל החזקה.
לי נראה שהגמרא בבבא בתרא גם מחזיקה בשיטת הגמרא בקידושין שהמשנה שם גם כמו ר' נתן. ור'נתן מאמין בו בגלל החזקה אבל לא היה מאמין לו אם הייתה עדות בגלל שהנאמנות של הבעל בשעת מיתה הוא רק בגלל שהוא מפספס ומשנה את הטיעון שלו אבל עדות ר' נתן היה מאמין


From what I recall the Gemara there goes like this. The Mishna says one who says he has a son is believed but one who says he has a brother is not. The Gemara asks that this seems to be extra since we already learn this same rule in Kidushin 64 side A. It answers, here in Bava Batra there is a prior status that he has a brother [Hazaka.]  Rav Akiva Eiger asks that even more that a Hazaka but even with witnesses that he has a brother and he says he does not he should be believed like the case when he is married and he says he gave a get [divorce ] to his wife.
The answer I think is this. The Gemara in Kidushin brings the same rule [He says he has a son he is believed. he says he has brother he is not believed.] and asks that it seems to not be like R. Nathan.]
For we have a teaching: He says at the time of marriage I have a son and later before he dies he says I do not have a son. Or at the time of marriage he says I have no brother and later before he dies he says I have brother. R Yehuda the Prince says he is believed to permit not to forbid. R Nathan says also he is believed to forbid. [That is R Natan is going by what he says at the end. R Yehuda goes by what he says at the beginning.]






Abyee answers the mishna [is where] there is no hazaka (prior status). The teaching is where there is a hazaka that he has a brother but no hazaka (prior status) about a son.

The answer to the question of R.A. Eiger is that the Gemara in Bava Batra is also thinking like the Gemara in Kidushin that wants the Mishna to be like R Nathan, not just like R Yehuda. And R Nathan in the teaching is going with Hazaka.  But that is because the husband himself flip flops.But in a case where there would be witnesses R Nathan would disagree with the Mishna.

The problem I see in the religious world is that of con. Getting people to believe that what is not authentic Torah really is. This I see is the ultimate reason for the fact that the Gra signed on the letter o excommunication. But it also explains why so many people ignore it. Because we are all more liable to being fooled that we believe. For this reason it is a good idea to have an idea of what authentic Torah is. And also to read a few books about the widespread practice of con and scam--to show how easy it is to be fooled.

The great thing about Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY [two very great Litvak yeshivas] is authenticity.

This is very much different from the majority of what goes on in the religious world where deception and scamming secular Jews is the rule--not the exception.

And this I think one of the major reasons for the signature of the Gra on the letter of excommunication.

The problem he saw was not just falsifying what the Torah says but scamming and conning people about it.

"Authentic" means that certain places are into learning Torah--nothing more or less. They are not claiming anything else. This is the major characteristic of Litvak yeshivas in Israel also. There is no aspect of scam that is so common place in the rest of the religious world. 

R Yohanan had a disciple R. Zeiri. R Yohanan wanted R Zeiri to marry his daughter. [The daughter of R Yohanan.] R Zeiri did not want her. One day they were crossing a river. R Zeiri carried R Yohanan over teh river on his shoulders. [All this is in the last chapter of Kidushin.] R Yohana asked him, "My Torah is good enough for you but my daughter is not?" [R yohanan was born in Israel. R. Zeiri came to Israel from Babylon]

[The point was that the people in Babylon were considered to be more myuhas [pure lineage] than people born in Israel.

I have trouble understanding this story because if I would have had a chance to marry the daughter of a true Torah scholar [not the modern phonies] I would have jumped at the opportunity.[If I would have I probably would still be learning Torah until this very day]