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26.4.24

 The Mishna Bava Kama 49b. One digs  pit in a private domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. Rashi writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a braita [law not contained in the Mishna] that says R. Ishmael said one who opens a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain is liable. R. Akiva said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. Raba said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only R. Akiva says he is liable, but R. Ishmael says he is not liable. [That means that R Akiva is disagreeing with R Ishmael and holds the case of R Ishmael is  not liable.   That is, if he abandons his domain but not the pit, Raba says R Ishmael holds he is not liable.]

  So if Rashi wants to explain the Mishna according to Raba to both R. Akiva and R. Ishmael, he must mean he abandoned the domain and the pit. Because if he only abandoned the domain and not the pit, then he is not liable according to R Ishmael.  But then Rav Josef said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable. But in a public domain, R. Akiva  said he is  liable and R. Ishmael said he is not liable.  (Thus they disagree about digging in a private area and he opens the pit in a public domain where R Ishmael says he is not liable. but a case of digging a pit in his own area and then abandoning that area but not the pit is liable. ) If Rashi is  going like Rav Josef, then Rashi would mean to both R. Akiva and R. Ishmael that he abandoned only the domain, not the pit .


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The משנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. One digs  pit in a private domain and opens it up in a private domain is liable. רש''י writes there that he abandoned the domain.  There is a ברייתא  that says ר' ישמעאל  said one who opens a pit in a private domain and opens it up in a public domain is liable. ר' עקיבא said one who digs a pit in a private domain and then abandons his domain, but not the pit is liable. רבה said all agree opening a pit in a public domain is liable. But for digging a pit in a private domain, only ר' עקיבא says he is liable, but ר' ישמעאל says he is not liable.  [[That means that ר' עקיבא is disagreeing with ר' ישמעאל and holds the case of ר' ישמעאל is  not liable.   That is, if he abandons his domain but not the pit, רבה says ר' ישמעאל holds he is not liable.]] So if רש''י wants to explain the משנה according to רבה to both ר' עקיבא and ר' ישמעאל, he must mean he abandoned the domain and the pit. Because if he only abandoned the domain, and not the pit, then he is not liable according to ר' ישמעאל.  But then רב יוסף said everyone  agrees if he dug a pit in a private domain, he is liable.  But in a public domain, ר' עקיבא said he is  liable and ר' ישמעאל said he is not liable.  ((Thus they disagree about digging in a private area and he opens the pit in a public domain where ר' ישמעאל says he is not liable. but a case of digging a pit in his own area and then abandoning that area but not the pit is liable. ))) If רש''י is  going like רב יוסף, then רש''י would mean to both ר' עקיבא and ר' ישמעאל that he abandoned only the domain, not the pit. 


המשנה בבא קמא מ''ט ע''ב. חופר בור ברשות פרטית ופותח אותו ברשות פרטית הוא אחראי. רש''י כותב שם שהוא נטש את הרשות. יש ברייתא שאומר ר' ישמעאל אמר מי שפותח בור ברשות פרטית ופותח ברשות הרבים חייב. אמר ר' עקיבא החופר בור בשטח פרטי ואחר כך נוטש רשות הזו, אבל לא הבור חייב. רבה אמרו שכולם מסכימים שפתיחת בור ברשות הרבים היא באחריות. אבל על חפירת בור בשטח פרטי, רק ר' עקיבא אומר שהוא חייב, אבל ר' ישמעאל אומר שאינו חייב (זה אומר שר' עקיבא חולק על ר' ישמעאל ומחזיק במקרה של ר' ישמעאל אינו אחראי. כלומר, אם הוא נוטש את התחום שלו אבל לא את הבור, רבה אומר ר' ישמעאל סבור שהוא לא אחראי). אז אם רש''י רוצה להסביר את המשנה לפי רבה לר' עקיבא וגם לר' ישמעאל, הוא חייב להתכוון שהוא נטש את התחום ואת הבור. כי אם רק נטש את התחום, ולא את הבור, הרי אין הוא חייב לפי ר' ישמעאל. אבל אז רב יוסף אמר שכולם מסכימים אם הוא חפר בור בשטח פרטי, הוא אחראי. אבל ברשות הרבים אמר ר' עקיבא חייב ור' ישמעאל אמר שהוא אינו חייב.

לפיכך חלוקים בדעתם על חפירה בשטח פרטי והוא פותח את הבור ברשות הרבים שבו ר' ישמעאל אומר שאינו אחראי. אבל מקרה של חפירת בור בשטח שלו ואז נטישת השטח הזה אבל לא את הבור הוא עָלוּל.

 אם רש''י הולך כמו רב יוסף, אז רש''י היה מתכוון גם לר' עקיבא וגם לר' ישמעאל שהוא נטש)) רק את התחום, לא את הבור





23.4.24

learning Torah equals all the other commandments.

 One of the unfamiliar ideas of the Gra is that every word of learning Torah equals all the other commandments. The Mishna in tractate Peah brings this in short without going into it but the Gemara Yerushalmi explains in great detail that every word of Torah equals all the other commandments. That means that even if one would keep all the commandments of the Torah with the greatest love and fear of God, with the greatest degree of burning love and attachment with God, still if you would place all that one one side of a scale and just one word of Torah on the other, they would be equal in weight. All the more so if you would place two words of Torah on the opposite side that scale would immediately tip over to the side of the two words of Torah. however if there is a commandment   that can not be done by someone else, then one ought to interrupt learning to fulfill it and then return to learning as brought also in the Yerushalmi where one person sent his son to learn Torah in Tiberias and heard that he was involved in helping burying the dead. He asked his son' "Did I send you there to bury the dead or to learn Torah? [The Yerushalmi says when the commandment can not be done by another, one should interrupt one' learning. however there is also a principle one involved in a mitzvah doe not have to interrupt to do another. This is the case with the penny of Rav Josef. That is since one is guarding a lost object, he doe not have to give a penny to a pauper.  ]

What counts as Torah? See the letter to Yemen of the Rambam: "Just as there is no adding nor subtracting from the Written Law, so there is no adding nor subtracting from the Oral Law."

That means that just as one can not add to the books of the prophets from Moses until the last prophets of the First Temple period, so one can not add the the Oral Law as redacted by the Tenaim of the Mishna and Amoraim of the two Talmuds. The Gemara also mentions this: "Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of rendering a halachic decision."  רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה

        I would like to add here that there are two ways of learning Torah. One is that of Reb Chaim of Brisk which is global or you might say a hawk eyes approach that learns the whole Shas [Talmud] by learning one page. The other is that of Rav Naftali Yeager of Shar Yashuv and David Bronson which is an electron microscope approach. You can least see the Reb Chaim approach in his writings and the other great sages of the Litvak world. The other I think is not so available. I myself could get to this approximately by learning one Tosphot for about a month and then I could start to see the infinite depth of Tosphot. .  





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9.4.24

[The difference between Fries and Hegel

 Hegel is considered to be defending  law and order,  and that everyone has their place in society and  their obligation is to fulfill the duties and obligations that are naturally part of that place. Kant was quite opposite to this. Individual autonomy was the rule. So you might sum-up the argument thus: Hegel saw the disaster of the Reign of Terror of the French Revolution and sought a principle by which freedom can be preserved without disintegrating into chaos. Kant had developed his system before the French revolution, and had a portrait of Rousseau [the ideal of the French  revolutionaries] in his room.

In my view, both are a necessary advancement in philosophy, and reflect the ancient tension between individual and the group, and I do not think that anyone has come up with an answer to this tension. I am mainly on the side of the modified approach to Kant of the Kant-Friesian school  that Kelley Ross so ably defends in his web site, but I can not share the distain that most Kantians feel towards Hegel.[I admit I might be wrong. After all, see the book by Hobhouse, The Metaphysical State. And I do see that communism took a certain degree of Hegel, and yet I do not agree with communism. I hold with John Locke and the Two Treaties.  ]

[BUT I admit my regard for Hegel is probably because I read his Logic ( part of his Encyclopedia) rather than the Phenomenology that everyone else reads--or is assigned to read for their homework. Plus I think the best book on Hegel is McTaggart's.  I also like Cunningham ]   

At any rate, I would like here to recommend the founders of the second Friesian school, Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross who provide a necessary amendment to Kant, since I do not think that the B deduction of Kant stands very well on its own, and anyway there is absolutely not the slightest bit of agreement about what Kant actually says there in the first place. [Modern scholars do not agree on the argument of Kant and some of the ambiguity revolves around the question why should things be amenable to be unified into the mind of one subject even before we get to the categories? ] I can see how wonderful it is that Kant is being reintroduced in some universities, still  I  can't see why people do not adopt the modification of Leonard Nelson. [Even though Nelson was just a continuation of Fries in his own mind, I see a lot more rigorous logic in Nelson. But you do not have to take my word for it. Take a look yourself, and I think you will  see what I mean.  ]

[The difference between Fries and Hegel is that the connection between sensory perception and the intellectual categories or why, where, when and what are through non intuitive immediate knowledge in the Friesian approach because Kant did not explain any better way that concepts and senses can exist. To Hegel, even sense objects are manifestations of the Logos of Plato-so there is no place where the intellect can't penetrate. ]

Maybe there is disagreement between them, but I see both as modifications of Plotinus and his Neoplatonist approach

i would like here to suggest looking at the phd thesis of kelley ross where he explains the problems of the b deduction and where he whole issue of ''who is the user?''' is explained. i mean that dr ross shows that kant doe not explain well how synthesis of perceptions or consciousness itself comes about and hegel never asks this question and it is only in the leonard nelson approach that this question gets a good answer.


7.4.24

Bava Mezia 93b. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep and one fell into the river. Raba said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. Abayee asked on this from a braita a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. Abayee suggested that the break was a normal kind and yet he is still liable and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident]and so the shepherd is liable. Raba answered, no. rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. abaye asked if the case is he took an unusual break then it it is a case of the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident is liable. Tosphot learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered the beginning  in transgression and the end in accident.

The Ramban brings the gemara in Bava Kama 45a to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for Abayee. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the unpaid guard pay kofer a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the unpaid guard is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression (for all guards). My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding? [I noticed later that the Ramban, in fact, only meant his argument to apply to the unpaid guard.]


I might mention that Rav Shach and Rav Meltzer had an argument about this Ramban. Rav Meltzer claimed the argument of the Ramban only worked if the obligation of the guard is towards the owner of the animal, while Rav Shach showed that the Ramban's argument works even if the guard is obligated toone whom gets injured by an animal he was guarding.

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בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. There was a shepherd who was shepherding his sheep, and one fell into the river. רבה said the shepherd is not liable for what could he have done? That is he considered this a case of a a unavoidable (big) accident that a paid guard does not pay for. אביי asked on this from a ברייתא a shepherd was watching his sheep and went into the city for a  short break and a lion came and took one of the sheep. If he could have saved the sheep if he had been there he is  liable. אביי suggested that the break was a normal kind, and yet he is still liable; and so we see this is considered a case of an  avoidable accident [small accident] and so the shepherd is liable. רבה answered, no. Rather it is a case of taking an unusual break and so it is considered an avoidable accident, but for an unavoidable accident  he would not be liable. אביי asked if the case is he took an unusual break, then it it is a case of "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in אונס is liable." תוספות learns from here that a minimal amount of guarding is not considered "the beginning  in פשיעה and the end in accident."

The רמב''ן brings the גמרא in בבא קמא מ''ה ע''א to show that this same principle is accepted universally, not just for אביי. There the teaching is that four types of guards take the place of the owner. If they are guarding an dangerous ox (that had been seen to kill on three other occasions) that got loose and killed someone. The ox is killed, and the guards except the שומר חינם pay כופר a fine and pay for the loss of the ox to the owner. So we see by the fact that the שומר חינם is not liable that the minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression. My question here is that perhaps a minimal amount of guarding is not considered transgression for an unpaid guard, but perhaps it is considered transgression for a paid guard since he is obligated in a higher standard of guarding?


בבא מציעא צ''ג ע''ב. היה רועה צאן ואחד נפל לנהר. רבה אמר שהרועה אינו אחראי. מה הוא היה יכול לעשות? כלומר הוא ראה בזה מקרה של תאונה בלתי נמנעת (גדולה) ששומר בתשלום לא משלם עליה. אביי שאל על כך מברייתא רועה צאן שומר כבשיו ונכנס לעיר להפסקה קצרה, ובא אריה ולקח את אחת הכבשים. אם הוא היה יכול להציל את הכבשה לו היה שם הוא אחראי. אביי הציע שההפסקה היא רגילה, ובכל זאת הוא עדיין אחראי; ולכן אנו רואים שזה נחשב למקרה של תאונה נמנעת [תאונה קטנה] ולכן הרועה אחראי. רבה ענה לא. אלא מדובר בהפסקה חריגה, ולכן היא נחשבת לתאונה שאפשר להיות נמנעת, אך בגין תאונה בלתי נמנעת הוא לא יהיה אחראי. אביי שאל אם במקרה הוא לקח הפסקה חריגה, אז זה מקרה של "ההתחלה בפשיעה והסוף באונס שהוא אחראי". תוספות לומדת מכאן שכמות מינימלית של שמירה אינה נחשבת "התחלה בפשיעה וסוף בתאונה.

הרמב''ן מביא את הגמרא בבבא קמא מ''ה ע''א להראות שאותו עיקרון מקובל בכל העולם, לא רק על אביי. שם ההוראה היא שארבעה סוגי שומרים תופסים את מקומו של הבעלים. אם הם שומרים על שור מסוכן (שראו אותו הורג בשלוש הזדמנויות אחרות) שהשתחרר והרג מישהו. השור נהרג, והשומרים חוץ מהשומר חינם משלמים כופר (קנס) ומשלמים על אובדן השור לבעלים. אז אנו רואים בעובדה שהשומר חינם אינו אחראי שכמות השמירה המינימלית אינה נחשבת לעבירה. שאלתי כאן היא שאולי כמות שמירה מינימלית אינה נחשבת עבירה לשומר ללא שכר, אבל אולי היא נחשבת עבירה לשומר בתשלום שכן הוא חייב ברמת שמירה גבוהה יותר?


28.3.24

Bava Kama page 6a

In the Rambam laws of damages 13:19 there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In Bava Kama page 6a  Abyee says we learn from the Mishna in the beginning of Bava Kama "the common denominator" comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The Rif and  Rambam leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. Rav Shach writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  a question is that Abyee derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while Ravina derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The Rif and Rambam do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  another question is if the Rif and Rambam do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between Abyee,  Rava, Rav Ada bar Ahava and Ravina,  and we do not go with Abyee against Rava except in 6 specified cases. [Yal Kegam]. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 
Also I would like to mention that the Rosh learns from Tosphot that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the Rif and Rambam hold the same way.   
I would like to add here for clarification the  Gemara on page 6a of Bava Kama. The Gemara asks what is the "common denominator" of the Mishna coming to add? Abyee says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. Rava said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. Rav Ada Bar Ahava said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. Ravina said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 To Tosphot any damage the wall or tree do at the time of falling is not liable because the owner is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to Rav Isar Melzter damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell. However the answer to this is one learns from an ox that one is obligated in damage even if the thing that causes damage was not dangerous from its inception. But furthermore, with fire there is also the fact that another power i.e. wind is mixed with it and makes it more dangerous. In fact Rav Isar Melzar suggested that this is the reason Tosphot holds the wall and tree are not obligated because of fire     


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In the רמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון  פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט there is a law that if a tree or wall fall down and cause damage there is no liability unless they were not sturdy and  unsteady and the court told him to take them down. Then he is obligated. In בבא קמא ו' ע''א says we learn from the משנה in the beginning of בבא קמא "the common denominator" צד השווה comes to include his stone, knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell because of a common wind that even after they fall he is liable. The רי''ף and  רמב''ם leave out the law about a stone knife or burden. רב שך writes that that can be derived from the case of the wall.  A question is that אביי derives the stone from a hole in a public domain (pit) and fire, while רבינא derives the tree and wall from a pit and an ox. Therefore we can not derive the stone and knife from the wall  because the knife might not be obligated since a different force is mixed with their fall.  I thought of the answer to this last question. The רי''ף and רמב''ם do bring other cases which we derive from hole (pit) and fire, and so we can derive the stone and knife from those cases.  Another question is if the רי''ף and רמב''ם do not bring the law of the stone and knife on the roof, maybe they do not hold from it at all.  After all that law is from Abyee, and they might say that this whole subject is an argument between אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה and רבינא,  and we do not go with אביי against רבא except in 6 specified cases. יע''ל כג''ם.. But this last question does not seem very likely since the case of the stone and knife seem more severe that the tree since he put them on the roof where he was aware that a common wind could knock them down. 
Also I would like to mention that the רא''ש learns from תוספות that all these cases have the law of  a hole in a public domain, and we need to derive them from the common denominator only to show that they are liable, but their main law is that of a hole. It is likely that the רי''ף and רמב''ם hold the same way.   
I would like to add here for clarification the  גמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א  . The גמרא asks what is the "common denominator" of the משנה coming to add? אביי says his stone knife or package that he left on a roof and they fell in a common wind and caused damage after they  were already at rest. This is derived from  hole and fire. רבא said a hole that is being pushed around in a public domain from hole a fire. רב אדא בר אהבה said opening the drain pipes and that drainage causes damage from pit and fire. רבינא said a wall and tree that fell from pit and ox.     

 To תוספות any damage the wall or tree do at the time of falling is not liable because the owner is considered innocent of wrongdoing. But to רב איסר מלצר damage they do at time of falling is obligated because they are  like fire that damages while moving. But the problem I see with that is fire and a knife that fall from a roof are liable because there was a transgression from the beginning when he put them there while there was no transgression in planting the tree and building the wall that fell.

But furthermore, with fire there is also the fact that another power i.e. wind is mixed with it and makes it more dangerous. In fact, רב איסר מלצר suggested that this is the reason תוספות holds the wall and tree are not obligated because of fire. This is in spite of the fact that תוספות holds that having another power mixed with it would be more of  a reason to acquit from responsibility.

ברמב''ם הלכות נזקי ממון פרק י''ג הלכה י''ט יש דין שאם עץ או חומה נופלים וגורמים נזק אין אחריות אלא אם לא היו יציבים והזהירו הבית הדין להוריד אותם. ואז הוא מחויב. בבבא קמא ו' ע''א אומר למדים מהמשנה בתחילת בבא קמא "המכנה המשותף" צד השווה בא לכלול את אבן, סכינו או חבילה שהשאיר על גג ונפלו בגלל רוח מצויה שגם לאחר שנפלו הוא אחראי. הרי''ף ורמב''ם משאירים בחוץ את הדין על סכין אבן או משא. רב שך כותב שאפשר ללמוד את זה ממקרה הקיר. שאלה היא שאבי שואב את האבן מבור ברשות הרבים ואש, ואילו רבינא לומד את העץ והקיר מבור ושור. לכן לא נוכל ללמוד את האבן והסכין מהקיר כי ייתכן שהסכין לא חייבת כיון שכוח אחר מעורב בנפילתם. חשבתי על התשובה לשאלה האחרונה הזו. הרי''ף והרמב''ם אכן מביאים מקרים אחרים שאנו נובעים מבור ואש, וכך נוכל להפיק את האבן והסכין מאותם מקרים. שאלה נוספת היא אם הרי''ף והרמב''ם אינם מביאים דין האבן והסכין על הגג, אולי אינם מחזיקים ממנו כלל. הרי הדין הזה הוא מאבי, וייתכן שיגידו שכל הנושא הזה הוא ויכוח בין אביי, רבא, רב אדא בר אהבה ורבינא, ואין אנו הולכים עם אביי נגד רבא אלא בשש מקרים מוגדרים, יע''ל כג''ם.. אבל השאלה האחרונה הזו לא נראית סבירה מאוד שכן המקרה של האבן והסכין נראים חמורים יותר מהעץ מאז שהניח אותם על הגג שם היה מודע לכך שרוח רגילה עלולה לדפוק הם למטה

כמו כן אני רוצה להזכיר שהרא''ש לומד מתוספות שלכל המקרים האלה יש דין של בור ברשות הרבים, וצריך ללמוד אותם מהמכנה המשותף רק כדי להראות שהם חייבים, אבל החוק העיקרי הוא של בור. סביר להניח שהרי''ף והרמב''ם מחזיקים באותו אופן.

אני רוצה להוסיף כאן לבירור את הגמרא בבא קמא ד''ו ע''א . הגמרא שואלת מהו "המכנה המשותף" של המשנה שבא להוסיף? אביי אומר כי סכין האבן או החבילה שלו שהשאיר על גג והם נפלו ברוח מצויה וגרמו נזק לאחר שכבר היו על הקרקע. זה נגזר מבור ואש. אמר רבא בור שדוחפים אותו ברשות הרבים מבור ואש. רב אדא בר אהבה אמר פתיחת צינורות הניקוז וכי הניקוז גורם נזק מבור ואש. רבינא אמר חומה ועץ שנפלו מבור ושור

 

   לתוספות כל נזק שיגרמו הכותל או עץ בשעת נפילה אינו אחראי כי הבעלים נחשבים חף מפשע. אבל לרב איסר מלצר נזק שעושים בשעת נפילה חייב משום שהם כאש הפוגעת תוך כדי תנועה. אבל הבעיה שאני רואה בזה היא אש וסכין שנפלו מגג אחראים כי הייתה עבירה מלכתחילה כשהניח אותם שם, אבל לא הייתה עבירה בנטיעת העץ ובבניית החומה שנפלו

אולם התשובה לכך היא לומדים משור שחייב בנזק, גם אם הדבר הגורם נזק לא היה מסוכן מראשיתו

אבל יתרה מכך, עם אש יש גם את העובדה שכוח אחר כלומר רוח מתערבב בו והופכת אותו למסוכן יותר. למעשה, רב איסר מלצר הציע שזו הסיבה שתוספות מחזיקים את שהקיר והעץ אינם חייבים בגלל שריפה. זאת, וזה למרות שתוספות גורסת כי כשמעורבת בה כוח אחר תהיה סיבה יותר לזכות מאחריות


5.3.24

learning Torah is important.

 I would like to recommend learning the book Nefesh haChaim by Reb Chaim of Voloshin [a disciple of the Gra] in in particular the fourth volume.    This is a part of book that explains why learning Torah is important. A large part of my own approach to the world is to a large extent based on this idea, even though I got the idea originally by being in two great Litvak yeshivot, Shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY. The actually reading of the Nefesh HaChaim came after I had already been in the Mir for a few years. It just confirmed what I already felt intuitively.  Nowadays I think that it is hard for most people to get the idea of the importance of learning Torah without that book. [I might mention here that the best way to learn Torah is to hear classes from an authentic Litvak rosh yeshiva. Happily I had the opportunity to hear such classes myself from Reb Shmuel Berenbaum. However the important thing is that they should be in fact expert. That can be found mainly in people that have learned in Ponovitch, Brisk, Mir or the other great Litvak yeshivot.]

I would also like to mention I define "learning Torah" in a rather limited way. That is the Old Testament, the two Talmuds. the Midrashei Halacha  and Midrashei Agada. So anything written after the finishing of the Talmud does not count except as commentary. [I do think that here it is important to mention the opinion of some early authorities like ibn Pakuda and the Rambam who held learning Physics and Metaphysics is in the category of learning Talmud as you can see in Mishna Torah laws of Learning Torah in the law about dividing ones time into thirds: one third for Talmud, and in that category comes the subjects dealt with in the first four chapters of Mishna Torah. And if that is not clear enough, the Rambam makes sure that you get the point in the Guide.] Metaphysics in the early authorities means Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus.  Physics in the Rambam  includes Chemistry.

Torah is the Law of Moses.  The point of the Gemara is to understand how to apply it. Not to change it or to add or subtract. Thus I see that what the world needs is the Law of Moses.  


The problem in dealing with the Law of Moses is not to add and not to subtract and not to change it or change its meaning. And to accomplish this is very much an individual endeavor.   It is impossible to keep the Law of Moses except as an individual and ignore all groups.


Why Do Progressives Like Islam? MICHAEL HUEMER

 



1. Pro-Muslim Progressivism

Leftists have been trying to promote the cause of the oppressed for as long as I can remember. When I was in college, they mainly thought of the oppressed groups as women, blacks, and the poor. In the last 20 years, the ranks of oppressed groups have grown. Of particular interest, Muslims are now thought of as an important oppressed group, on whose side good progressives must fight. After warning about racism and patriarchy, the left is also eager to warn against “Islamophobia”. Left-wing protestors now seek to silence speakers who criticize Islam, as happened to Richard Dawkins when he was scheduled to speak in Berkeley. (Dawkins rejects all religion, but only his anti-Islam comments anger people on the left.)

It was also woke activists who got the film Jihad Rehab cancelled. This was a documentary containing interviews with ex-terrorists who were being rehabilitated at a Saudi detention center. It was initially critically acclaimed, before Muslim/woke filmmakers embarked on a campaign to label it “Islamophobic” (with no rational basis) and keep it from being publicly shown.

After the Hamas attack on October 7, left-wing students on American university campuses began passionate anti-Israel protests, among which you could find such slogans as “queers for Palestine” displayed unironically. Immediately after the attack, a group of 33 Harvard student organizations released a statement blaming Israel entirely for the attack.

2. The Strangeness of Pro-Islamic Progressivism

Let’s review what is odd about this.

a. Women

Progressives usually speak against what they view as the oppression of women in Western nations, e.g., the fact that women earn 20% less money than men on average (which is due to their choosing different kinds of work). Women in Muslim countries, however, are actually oppressed.

In Saudi Arabia, women have male guardians (typically their fathers or husbands). Until very recently, they needed the permission of their male guardian to get a passport, get married, get official documents, or get a job. Only in 2017 did the Saudi patriarchs decide that women could be allowed to drive.

In Islamic tradition, women are expected to cover their heads. In Iran and Afghanistan, women are legally required to wear the hijab. The most committed Muslims want women to cover their faces as well.

Some forms of Islam consider female genital mutilation mandatory, to prevent women from ever experiencing sexual pleasure.

b. Gays

For context, recall that gay marriage was legalized in the U.S. by the Supreme Court in 2015. Before that, this was a major issue for progressives, who viewed the lack of recognition for gay marriage as a form of intolerable oppression of gays. Even now, many still regard America as oppressive towards gays.

In many Muslim nations, however, the idea of gay marriage is completely beyond the pale; just being gay is illegal. In Saudi Arabia, Iran, Yemen, Mauritania, Nigeria, and Brunei (all majority Muslim countries), homosexuality is a death penalty offense.

Given how much progressives criticize America for its alleged mistreatment of women and gays, one would expect that they would be apoplectic about the horrific oppression of women and gays in many Muslim nations. Yet among those who are most vocal about the oppression of minorities in other contexts, it’s hard to find a critical word spoken about Islam.

3. Progressive Explanations

How could progressives explain this?

a. It’s only a few extremists

Perhaps progressives would say that these forms of oppression are only supported by the more extreme, fundamentalist Muslims and that we should avoid allowing our general view of Islam to be colored by a few extremists.

But we’re not just talking about a small, fringe element in the Islamic world. Again, multiple Muslim nations literally, legally prescribe death to homosexuals. After the October 7 attack, 72% of Palestinians surveyed supported the attack — an attack that massacred teenagers at a music festival, raped and mutilated women, and burned babies.

Progressives don’t seem particularly concerned about portraying Americans, white people, or men as oppressive. Yet the forces of intolerance within each of those groups are a minute fraction of what they are within the Islamic world.

b. US/Israel is worse

Perhaps progressives would say that Israel and the U.S. have caused more harm to Muslims than Muslims have caused to Israel and the U.S.; therefore, it’s more important to protest Israel and the U.S. Perhaps progressives just don’t want to dilute this most important message by adding criticisms of Islam.

Bear in mind, however, that hundreds of millions of people in the world live in Islamic theocracies. So this really doesn’t seem like a kind of oppression that someone whose political worldview revolved around oppression could afford to overlook.

Progressives are also not usually very sympathetic to the “someone else is worse” defense. For instance, during the Cold War, they didn’t see as a good reason suppress their criticisms of the United States that the Soviet Union was worse. They don’t hold off from attacking America’s history with slavery when informed that Arab slavery was worse; they regard that as quite irrelevant.

c. The obligation to fix one’s own society

Perhaps progressives would say that they tend to focus on problems with the West, America, Christianity, etc., because we have an obligation to fix the problems in our own society.

I’m not sure, though, why it wouldn’t also be important to address huge problems in other societies — at least important enough that you would frequently hear progressives talking about the oppression of women and gays in the Islamic world.

Progressives living in America also don’t seem to have any reticence about criticizing Israel, so it doesn’t seem as if the relevant distinction is between one’s own and other societies. It seems that the distinction is Muslims versus (Jews & Christians).

4. Hate

I have a suspicion about the answer. It is not a nice explanation, but it seems to me to fit the evidence.

When did Muslims gain favor with the American left? As far as I recall, it started after 9/11/2001. Before that, I can’t remember the left caring about the plight of Muslims or including them in their “diversity” goals. Before that, Islam wasn’t really on the radar screen of American politics.

Right after 9/11, most Americans were horrified and enraged. But not everyone. Some people on the far left gleefully seized the chance to blame America, just as those Harvard students took the chance to blame Israel for the October 7 attack. An Ethnic Studies professor at the University of Colorado posted an essay on “the justice of roosting chickens”, seemingly explaining the attack as the natural and just consequence of American evil. He compared America to the Nazis and justified killing people in the World Trade Center thus:

“As for those in the World Trade Center... Well, really, let's get a grip here, shall we? True enough, they were civilians of a sort. But innocent? Gimme a break. They formed a technocratic corps at the very heart of America’s global financial empire … If there was a better, more effective, or in fact any other way of visiting some penalty befitting their participation upon the little Eichmanns inhabiting the sterile sanctuary of the twin towers, I’d really be interested in hearing about it.”

Needless to say, the idea that Islamic terrorists are crusaders for socialism and progressive causes as Western leftists understand them is a narcissistic delusion. Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Islamic extremist groups don’t give two craps about American leftist causes. They are crusaders for Islam. Osama bin Laden attacked America because he wanted to end U.S. support for the Saudi government, so that he could depose them and establish a different, more extreme fundamentalist theocracy in Saudi Arabia. Many people fail to understand this because they can’t imagine a society having completely different issues and different belief systems from ours.

Returning to the point: What do far leftists like about Islam? They like that Islamic extremists hate America. That’s what really matters to them. It’s more important to hate America than to recognize democracy, or free speech, or to treat women or gays like human beings.

The far left’s hatred of America is not explained by America’s mistreatment of this or that group, else they would hate the countries that treat those groups far worse. Rather, hatred of America is a fundamental ideological axiom. Their complaints about America’s alleged oppression of minorities are not driven by concern for those minorities; they are just a tool for attacking America. That is why woke activism doesn’t focus on practical steps to improve the lives of minorities (e.g., programs to reduce out-of-wedlock births, increase graduation rates, or reduce gang violence); it focuses almost entirely on convincing everyone that America is evil.

Granted, most people on the left side of the political spectrum are moderate leftists who don’t really hate America (just as most rightists are moderate rightists, not white supremacists). But people on the left stick together: they’re afraid to criticize anyone on the left side of the spectrum, however extreme. They’re afraid even to undermine the messaging that anyone on their side has undertaken. Hence, even moderate leftists won’t criticize Islam, since that would show disloyalty to their side, since the extremists have decided that the Islamic world is a leftist ally.

Why do the extreme leftists hate America? I still don’t know. This is very strange because most people throughout history, regardless of the society they lived in, had a very strong bias in favor of their own society. What trauma have left-wing extremists suffered that left them with such a deep-seated resentment toward their own society?


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© 2024 Michael Huemer

4.3.24

My approach to war is like General Sherman

 My approach to war is like General Sherman who burnt every town he walked into on his way through Georgia.  Not from cruelty, but from the sense that war is hell, and the most compassionate way about it is to end it as soon as possible. That is by making people not want to fight. He made no differences between soldiers or civilian. All the more so in Gaza where there is in fact no difference. 

 In the approach of Torah there have been three compromises. Faith with reason was the compromise of the Middle Ages. It is the approach of Saadia Gaon, the Chovot Levavot (Josef ibn Pakuda), and Rambam. [This I think is not that of the Ramban.] The separation of faith from reason, I think is a mistake. 


  There is another approach of Torah with pleasure. In this approach people follow Torah because it is the best way to "get laid" i.e., to get one's desires fulfilled. 

  There is a modern approach where the compromise is Torah with community. That is that Torah is a way to have a place in the religious community.

In these last two of these choices, boredom is the main motivation. People follow them because they are bored.

Mysticism also got mixed up with Torah because it tend to be tasty --much more than Talmudic arguments. But most of its influence has been baneful. However I have a lot of respect for Izhak Luria. The fact  that he is misused does not remove his value. Even Hegel quotes him. The Romans had a saying: "Misuse does not cancel use."


3.3.24

monastery of Mount Cassino

 The Allies bombed the monastery of Mount Cassino which they thought was being used by the Germans as an observation post or perhaps even more. The Allies were mistaken,(the Germans were on the slopes below the monastery), but in any case the monastery was bombed out of existence. So I do not understand why Moshe Dayan thought Muslim holy places were off limits- while in fact they were being used for military purposes during the pervious decade by Jordan and during the six day war.[

29.2.24

For Schopenhauer there is only one thing in itself.

For Schopenhauer there is only one thing in itself, not many. by this he intends to belay the problems on Kant raised by Schulze, Fichte and others. That is the WILL, but this will is not automatically good.  There is a non-rational aspect to God, as the verse we say in the morning states  יוצר אור ובורא רע ''forms light and creates evil.'' However that blessing changed to actual words of the verse to be ''...creates darkness.'' This you can see in Job where the suffering  in fact did not come from sin, but from a bet God had with the devil. The non rational aspect of God can be seen through-out the Torah. God gave Avraham a son and later told him to kill him to show how religious he is. He brings Moses to the edge of the Land of Israel but does not let him enter because Moses hit the rock similarly to what he was told 40 years prior to that right after they left Egypt. The events with David and Bat Sheva also shows this aspect  where he was never supposed to be married with her and yet that is the union from which all kings of the House of David come. in the Torah there is a command to appoint a king but when Israel wanted to fulfill that command the prophet Shmuel showed to them a miracle to show that they had sinned.

This irrational aspect is because reason is a creation of God. It does not control Him.

Bava Metzia Chapter Hamafkid pg. 35b. Rambam Laws of Renting chapter 1 halacha 6. see also the letter rav shach sent to reb isar meltzar

A guard that hands over an animal to another guard is an argument if the animal dies.   Does the responsibility go back to the owner or to the first guard. In what way does this relate to the case where a guard lends out the object, and thus borrower has an added degree of responsibility? (In case of accident a unpaid guard swears it was an accident but a borrower pays.) [Thus the first guard ought to take an oath that it was an accident, and thus not be obligated to pay. Then the second guard should pay the first guard. Only because of the reason that, "How can the guard be making business with the animal of the owner" that in fact the borrower has to pay the owner. ] In the second case, Idy bar Abin said the owner can say to the first guard, ''Do not take an oath, and I will deal with the borrower.'' Abyee said, ''Do you think the responsibility of the loss begins with the oath. No. It begins with the death of the animal.'' Rav Shach brings this statement as a proof that the plea of a big accident like the sudden death of the animal is a good plea, and so the money the borrower has to pay ought to go to the first guard. [This is unlike Reb Aaron Kotler who held this is not a strong plea.][I assume at this point that the guard was there when the animal died, so he can swear an oath about what happened, and also that he had permission to lend to animal to the borrower.  ]

But at the sea shore I was thinking that this point of Abyee must mean that  the added responsibility of the borrower is what causes the ownership of the animal to revert from the owners to the first guard. That is, if one holds a guard of a guard goes to the owner. But what about the reverse? What if a the responsibility of a guard of a guard goes to the first guard. Then the statement of Idy bar Abin is hard to understand. Just because of an oath, the ownership changes? [After all, in all oaths of the Torah, there is no change in ownership. they are oaths to retain possession, not to change possession. ]

It could be that Idy bar Abin holds that the responsibility of a  second guard or a borrower goes to the owner, not to the first guard. So even if the first guard takes an oath, the borrower would pay the owner.  And I guess that Abyee holds the main obligation of a second guard or a borrower from the first guard goes to the first guard. For to me it seems that just because there is a certain amount of added responsibility for the borrower, that should not change the status of ownership.

The main problem here comes from the fact that R. Yochanan  holds a guard that hands the animal over to another guard is obligated in paying if the animal was stolen. That is an argument between R. Yochanan and Rav and the halacha is like R. Yochanan as per the general rule.  So we see the obligation of the second guard is to the first guard. So why in our case the borrower  from the  first guard pays the owner, not the first guard? 

   

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A שומר that hands over an animal to another שומר is an argument if the animal dies.   Does the responsibility go back to the owner or to the first שומר. In what way does this relate to the case where a guard lends out the object, and thus השואל has an added degree of responsibility? [Thus the first שומר ought to take an oath that it was an accident, and thus not be obligated to pay. Then the שואל should pay the first שומר. Only because of the reason that, "How can the שומר be making business with the animal of the owner?" that in fact the שואל has to pay the owner. ] In the second case, אידי בר שבין said the owner can say to the first guard, ''Do not take an oath, and I will deal with the borrower.'' אביי said, ''Do you think the responsibility of the loss begins with the oath? No. It begins with the death of the animal.'' רב שך brings this statement as a proof that the plea of a אונס like the sudden death of the animal is a good plea, and so the money the borrower has to pay ought to go to the first שומר.

I assume at this point that the guard was there when the animal died, so he can swear an oath about what happened, and also that he had permission to lend to animal to the borrower.  ] 

 I was thinking that this point of אביי must mean that  the added responsibility of the borrower is what causes the ownership of the animal to revert from the owners to the first guard. That is, if one holds a guard of a guard האחריות goes to the owner. But what about the reverse? What if a guard of a guard האחריות goes to the first guard? The the statement of אידי בר אבין is hard to understand. Just because of an oath the ownership changes?

It could be that  אידי בר אבין holds that the responsibility of a  second guard or a borrower goes to the owner, not to the first guard. So even if the first guard takes an oath, the borrower would pay the owner.  And I guess that אביי holds the main obligation of a second guard or a borrower from the first guard goes to the first guard

The main problem here comes from the fact that ר' יוחנן  holds a guard that hands the animal over to another guard is obligated in paying if the animal was stolen. That is an argument between ר' יוחנן and רב and the הלכה is like ר' יוחנן as per the general rule.  So we see the obligation of the second guard is to the first guard. So why in our case the borrower  from the  first guard pays the owner, not the first guard? 

   

 

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שומר שמוסר בעל חיים לשומר אחר הוא ויכוח אם החיה מתה. האם האחריות חוזרת לבעלים או לשומר הראשון. באיזה אופן זה קשור למקרה שבו שומר משאיל את בהמה, ובכך לשואל יש מידה נוספת של אחריות? [לכן השומר הראשון צריך להישבע שמדובר בתאונה, ולפיכך לא חייב בתשלום. אז השואל צריך לשלם את השומר הראשון. רק בגלל הסיבה ש"איך יכול השומר לעשות עסקים עם החיה של הבעלים?" שבעצם השואל צריך לשלם לבעלים. ] במקרה השני, אידי בר שבין אמר שהבעלים יכולים לומר לשומר הראשון ''אל תישבע, ואני אתמודד עם הלווה'' אביי אמר, ''האם אתה חושב שאחריות ההפסד מתחיל בשבועה? לא. זה מתחיל במות החיה.'' רב שך מביא קביעה זו כהוכחה לכך שהטענה של אונס כמו מותו הפתאומי של החיה היא טענה טובה, ולכן הכסף שעל שואל לשלם צריך לשלם הולך לשומר הראשון. 


אני מניח בשלב זה שהשומר היה שם כשהחיה מתה, אז הוא יכול להישבע על מה שקרה, וגם שהיה לו רשות להלוות את החיה ללווהחשבתי שנקודה זו של אביי חייבת לומר שהאחריות הנוספת של השואל שגורמת לבעלות על החיה לחזור מהבעלים לשומר הראשון. כלומר, אם מחזיקים שאחריות של שומר של שומר הולכת לבעלים. אבל מה עם ההפך? מה אם אחריות של שומר של שומר אחר תלך לשומר הראשון? קשה להבין את האמירה של אידי בר אבין. רק בגלל שבועה הבעלות משתנה?

שהרי בכל שבועות התורה אין שינוי בבעלות. הן שבועות לשמור על בעלות, לא לשנות בעלות

יכול להיות שאידי בר אבין סבור שהאחריות של שומר שני או לווה עוברת  לבעלים, לא לשומר הראשון. אז גם אם השומר הראשון נשבע, הלווה ישלם לבעלים

ואני מניח שאבי מחזיק שחובה העיקרית של שומר שני או של הלווה מהשומר הראשון הולך לשומר הראשון

כי לי נראה שרק בגלל שיש מידה מסוימת של אחריות נוספת על הלווה, זה לא אמור לשנות את מצב הבעלות

עיקר הבעיה כאן נובעת מכך שר' יוחנן מחזיק בשומר המוסר את הבהמה לשומר אחר חייב בתשלום אם הבהמה נגזלה. זה ויכוח בין ר' יוחנן לרב, וההלכה היא כמו ר' יוחנן לפי הכלל. אז אנחנו רואים שחובת השומר השני היא לשומר הראשון. אז למה במקרה שלנו הלווה מהשומר הראשון משלם לבעלים, לא לשומר הראשון?

28.2.24

Litvak Yeshiva World follows the Gra to some degree

 My recommendation in terms of the Gra are to follow his approach in several areas 1. Learning bekiut (saying the words in order ) of all the books of the Written and Oral Torah (the two Talmuds and all the Midrashim) and iyun of the Achronim from Reb Chaim of Brisk until Rav Shach.  2. The famous herem (excommunication) 3. The study of the seven wisdoms. 4. Trust in God for all things spiritual and physical.  Trust without effort for parnasa [money]. 5.Coming to the Land of Israel. 6. Make sure before you get married that you will learn TORAH at all cost lishma (i.e., for no money), and will never compromise on this for any reason what-so-ever. If she wants to leave because of that, then good riddance.

Even though the Litvak (Lithuanian) Yeshiva World follows the Gra to some degree, but not to depend on that for any kind of example. After all, if Torah is the standard, then volunteering for IDF on the first day of the war ought to have happened without any prompting, [not to fight the draft at all cost]. 

Also I should mention that I think some of the Seven Wisdoms that the Gra mentioned have made advances since the time of the Ancient Greeks.   Thus one  should not be restricted to Aristotle in these subjects.

27.2.24

Why Kant is important is that the approach of the Torah is Faith with Reason; and the sort of synthesis of the Rambam is based on Aristotle, and that approach has some major flaws

 There is a kind of problem in Kant which I think is best answered by Jacob Fries. THIS problem is really many aspects of the same problem. how do we know the dinge an sich exists? How can the a priori categories tell us anything about reality since they are all in mind? Is not is or is not a a priori category? With Fries the role of reason or knowledge is expanded into immediate non intuitive knowledge. Normally we would think that there is a kind of immediate knowledge that comes along with perception. That is the second half of the B deduction. But  Fries postulates that there is a kind of immediate knowledge that precedes the senses that knows the categories but also the level of knowledge of the One or the Good in Plato and Plotinus..

That should not be taken to dismiss Hegel who I think deals with a lower level of Logos [of Plotinus]. To me that seems clearly what Hegel meant by the Geist.

The next level is the foundationalists, Huemer, Prichard, G. E. Moore. There you are dealing with a level of cognition after we already can perceive universals.

the best approach to fries is leonard nelson and kelley ross--and even there the best i kelley ross because there are things that fries gets wrong and nelson corrects. and other areas the opposite. to get a full and consistent picture the best is kelley ross.

Why Kant is important is that the approach of the Torah is Faith with Reason; and the sort of synthesis of the Rambam is based on Aristotle, and that approach has some major flaws--as pointed out by Berkley and Thomas Reid.