Torah as monotheism is opposed to idolatry and pantheism.

The issue of idolatry you can see mainly in the Books of Kings and Chronicles. There almost all commandments of the Torah are hardly mentioned. The issue is always centered on idolatry. The idea is simple. One who does idolatry will be punished. One who does not and instead directs his heart towards God alone will be rewarded. Kings and the people of Israel were constantly warned abut this one issue. It is the issue where the religious have failed because they worship people.

Also the belief system of the Torah is Monotheism, not pantheism. [Pantheism makes everything into idolatry.\] You can see this clearly in Rav Saadia Gaon and the later rishonim who clarify the subject of the faith of the Torah. 

You can also see this in the Ari'zal [start of the Eitz Chaim] and Rav Nahman [LeM vol I chapter 4 and vol II chapter 4]. 

However at this point I would like to defend the idea of Monotheism. One, not a composite and that God is an infinite Conscious Being. And completely "other". Not the same as the universe He made. 

But he is also the Absolute Reality outside of which there is nothing.

So what does consciousness mean?

 (1) Consciousness always has a content. There is always something other than the consciousness itself, which exists as the object of it. It is thinking about something. If it is not thinking about something, then it is not thinking.

(2) But consciousness  includes its thoughts  and content as something essentially its own. The content is not received by consciousness as if it were a stranger to be momentarily entertained and then lost forever: on the contrary, the content is the very life of the consciousness that possesses it. There is a unity that exists between consciousness and its content - a unity that is absolutely fundamental to the integrity of each. (3) Consciousness is never identical with, but is always something more than, its content. Notwithstanding the fact that the content is always received by consciousness as its very own, as its other self in fact, still there is a distinction between the two that never disappears; consciousness and its content never fall together in an undifferentiated identity.

The fundamental importance of these three characteristics of consciousness, as well as their vital interconnectedness, may be emphasized by a brief analysis of self-consciousness. It is evident that as a self-conscious being I am of a two-fold nature. In the first place, I am a bundle of sensations, feelings, impulses, desires, volitions, and ideas. And from this point of view I am eternally changing. At any moment of my existence I am never what I have been, or shall be, at any other moment. At one instant I am a center of impulses and passions; at another, a center of ideas and ideals. Today I am a self of pleasures; tomorrow, a self of pains.  But there is another fact about this self-consciousness that must be taken into account. It is true that I am eternally changing, that I am not what I have been heretofore, and that I shall never be again just what I am now. And yet, paradoxical as it may sound, what I have been I am, and what I am I shall be. Underlying the panorama of change, deeper than the self that is in a never-ceasing process of transformation, is another self that gives unity and coherence to the process. This is the subject-self. And this it is that makes education, spiritual development in general, possible; without it our experience would be at best but a chaos of meaningless sensations and incoherent desires. These two aspects or phases seem to be present in all self-consciousness. Take a cross-section of consciousness at any moment, and you will discover that it is of this two-fold nature. Even in our moments of most intense introspection, when we enter as intimately as possible into ourselves, we find that this duality is present; indeed, one is inclined to say, it is then that its presence is most strongly impressed upon us.

It is to be noticed, moreover, that the duality is absolutely essential to self-consciousness. Not only do we find it actually present in self-consciousness; the implication of experience is that it must exist so long as consciousness itself exists. For self-consciousness is just this duality: the subject-self and the object-self exist only as they co-exist. 

And from this follows immediately a further result. Since this duality is essential to consciousness, these two phases of subject and object cannot fall into identity with each other. Take any case of consciousness that you please, whether it be consciousness of objects in the mental or in the physical world. Do you find there a coincidence between subject and object? Certainly not. The object is never its own consciousness; there is, and can be, no identity between them. It is inconsistent with the very nature of consciousness that these two phases collapse into identity. The presupposition of consciousness is that there shall be something, an object in the physical world, an object in the mental world, something other than the consciousness itself, of which the consciousness shall  not be identical with each other. 

So concerning an Absolute Consciousness. In the first place, such a Consciousness would necessarily have a content; that is, there would have to be an Other of which the Absolute is conscious. In the second place, this Other would not be regarded by the Absolute as something foreign or external, in the sense that it lay genuinely outside of the Absolute; rather would it be possessed as an essential element within the Absolute. And, lastly, the Absolute would necessarily differentiate this Other from itself in such a way as to preserve the duality that we have found to be essential to the conscious life. And our justification for making these assertions concerning an Absolute Consciousness is simply that these characteristics which we have attributed to the Absolute are those that experience shows us to be fundamental to all consciousness as we know it; and unless we are to reduce our discussions to meaningless talk, we must test them by concrete experience. Certainly it seems that we must assume that the conditions prerequisite to finite consciousness must be fulfilled in an Absolute Consciousness.

What now must be our answer to the dilemma with which we began our discussion? In the first place, it would seem that we have found a way of escape from pantheism in our doctrine of the Absolute. For so long as we maintain the self-consciousness of the Absolute, we are forced to maintain also that the Absolute and the world are differentiated from each other. Really, pantheism is logically possible only to the metaphysician who denies the self-consciousness of the Absolute. For pantheism, if it means anything, means identity between the Absolute and the world of finite existence; whatever form the theory may take, it ultimately reduces everything in the universe to an undifferentiated unity with the all-inclusive One. But, if the Absolute be regarded as a self conscious Individual, this abstract identity becomes impossible; because, as our analysis of the category has disclosed, consciousness always demands a content from which it is differentiated. Destruction of this duality is the destruction of the possibility of consciousness. Therefore no theory that maintains that the Absolute is Self-Consciousness can legitimately be accused of pantheism so long as it is consistent. But have we escaped the other horn of our dilemma? Our own argument has forced us to admit that an Other to the Absolute is essential; indeed, it is this fact that relieves us from any fears concerning pantheism as the outcome of our doctrine. And have we not virtually limited the Absolute by positing this Other, which our analysis of consciousness has compelled us to assume is necessary? The answer to this objection is involved in what we have just been saying about the fact that the two extremes of the equation of consciousness are not foreign to each other; and it might perhaps be sufficient simply to point to this fact in meeting the objection. 

 

Bezmenov: how to subvert.

 

Some say that he disappeared on purpose. Others think the KGB got to him after he got to be too public. Sadly, I knew the agent that discovered the whereabout of Bezmenov and I must accept that led to the  demise of Bezmenov. The KGB did not like him much.

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here is a link to Kelley Ross's PhD thesis on Kant, Fries, and Leonard Nelson. To me it looks like  masterpiece.

[Dr. Ross is building his system, and does not spend much time showing the problems with other Neo Kantian schools. Nor with other problems with "Analytic philosophy". [Robert Hanna does a great job in that area.] 

But I still have trouble with the arguments on Hegel that tend to be part and parcel of the Kant-Friesian approach.

I just can not see what the problem is. Non intuitive immediate knowledge was a part of Kant's approach as Dr Ross points in Kant's CPR pg 65. ["Immediate" means not through anything. Non intuitive means not through the senses.]

And though Hegel disagrees with this, this disagreement is not a major part of his points.

The problem that people have with Hegel is that the Marxists use his ideal state as a justification for their failed socialist experiments.  Might as well attack Plato for the same reasons. Or Leonard Nelson also! [But of all people, Hegel ought not to be used for justification for socialism. He was a capitalist.]

Because I have been influenced by Plotinus [the beginning of Neo Platonism],  I tend to see all mentions of pure reason in Kant as being the Logos in the heavens. [The order is the One, who emanates Logos which brings forth Being.] And I do the same when I read Hegel. So I just do not see much conflict between Kant and Hegel. Just that they are addressing different issues.  

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בבבא בתרא דף ס''ג ע''א Bava Batra 63 Rav Shach on the Rambam in Laws of Selling. 23:4

In the case of selling a tree and leaving the fruit for oneself [Laws of Selling. 23:4] Rav Shach suggests that even though the Rambam leaves out the question if the children inherit that right, it seems probable that they would. But to me it seems hard to imagine that a law that the Rambam does not mention one way or the other would be so different from the Gra, the Rashbam and the Ramban. I mean after all, how much can you derive from something that the Rambam does not even mention? I have seen that plenty of times--like in laws of  "tzarat" where in the case of clothes he leaves out plenty of details that are openly important in the Gemara itself!

My point here is that in Bava Batra [63] we have the case of the Levi that sells his field on condition that he gets the first tithe every year. He does get that, but that right does not go on to his inheritors. That we know from the Gemara itself. But what about the case of selling a house and keeping the the roof and extending a walkway from the roof to the walls of the courtyard? There the Ramban says that right does go on to his children, but that is only because it is a "definite thing"-- not like fruit that has not yet come into the world. So the Ramban right here is openly making a distinction between the  extensions and the fruit of  a tree. 

[I should mention that I am not thinking of this question as being final. Rather, it is just a question that I hope eventually to find some answer for. In our case, there might be some reason and a way to answer for Rav Shach. After all, the cases of the roof extensions and the fruit seem different that the first tithe that is not exactly some thing owned by the Levi. And that seem overly obvious. So that very well might be the reason for Rav Shach. After all, even when the Levi owned his field, he did not exactly "own" the first tithe. It still had to be taken and given to some Levi -- which could be himself. So he did not "own it".

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There is an argument of one can give or gain possession of something that has not come into the world. ר' מאיר said one can. However the sages said "no", and so throughout Shas, you see it is a given that one can not. There is a certain order among the  authors of the Mishna with whom is the law. R Jose, R Yehuda, etc. according to order. ר' מאיר is near that bottom unless it is a stam mishna" [no authorship is attributed] in which case the law is like ר' מאיר. [That is how R Yehuda the Prince arranged the Mishna]. In the case of a fruit tree, if one sells it to one person and sells its fruit to another, the other has acquired nothing except fruit which is on it right now. Not anything that will grow in the future. But in a case where he sells the tree to one person and he says, "I am selling to you the tree, but keeping the fruit for me," he keeps the fruit --for it is considered as if he kept the place where the fruit is growing for himself. Same with a sell of a house where he says "I am keeping the upper porch to be able to build upper extensions into the courtyard." But in both cases, there is an argument among ראשונים if he can pass that right along to the people that inherit him. The גר''א and רשב''ם say "no." The רמב''ן says yes. The issue is that the right to build an extension is thought to be a thing that has no substance. The גמרא there in בבא בתרא ס''ג ע''א says the case of the לוי who sells his land on condition that the first tithe he מקבל. That arrangement does not continue with his יורשיו that inherit him. The idea is he keeps in theory the actual ground that the tithe grows on. From there ריש לקיש learns from there about a person that sells his house on condition he keeps the roof space. But he keeps it anyway in the ancient usage of Iraq when if one sells a house the seller keeps top of the roof unless that is specified. To the רשב''ם  saying openly "I sell you the house on condition the גג space is mine" היינו דיוטא העליונה means he added a condition that was implicit anyway. So it comes to include הזכות to extend the גג to the other side of the courtyard and to make  a walkway there. זיזין, To the  רמב''ן that is not because of the language, but part of the actual arrangement in any case. The גר''א holds like the רשב''ם that the case of a לוי and roof are similar in that the children do not inherit the right, but the case of the roof is because of owning a thing that has no substance, not because of the language used in the deal.

In the case of selling a tree and leaving the fruit for oneself Laws of Selling 23:4 רב שך suggests that even though the רמב''ם leaves out the question if the children inherit that right, it seems probable that they would. But to me it seems hard to imagine that a law that the רמב''ם does not mention one way or the other would be so different from the גר''א, the רשב''ם and the רמב''ן. 

My point here is that in בבא בתרא דף ס''ג ע''א we have the case of the לוי that sells his field on condition that he gets the first tithe every year. He does get that, but that right does not go on to his inheritors. That we know from the גמרא itself. But what about the case of selling a house and keeping the the roof and extending a walkway from the roof to the walls of the courtyard? There the רמב''ן says that right does go on to his children, but that is only because it is a definite thing, not like fruit that has not yet come into the world. So the רמב''ן right here is openly making a distinction between the  extensions and the fruit of  a tree.תירוץ: After all, the cases of the roof extensions and the fruit seem different that the first tithe that is not exactly some thing owned by the לוי.  So that might be the reason for רב שך. After all, even when the לוי owned his field, he did not own the first tithe. It still had to be taken and given to some לוי,  which could be himself. So he did not own it.

יש ויכוח על כך אם אפשר לתת או להשיג רכוש שלא הגיע לעולם. ר' מאיר אמר שאפשר. עם זאת, החכמים אמרו "לא", ולכן בכל הש"ס אתה רואה שזה נתון שאי אפשר לעשות זאת. יש סדר מסוים בקרב מחברי המשנה בשל מי החוק? ר' יוסי, ר' יהודה וכו' לפי הסדר. ר' מאיר נמצא קרוב לתחתית הסדר, אלא אם כן מדובר בסתם משנה "[לא מיוחסת לאיזה מחבר] ובמקרה של סתם משנה, החוק הוא כמו ר' מאיר. [כך ר 'יהודה הנסיך סידר את המשנה]. במקרה של פרי עץ, אם אחד מוכר אותו לאדם אחד ומוכר את פריו לאחר, האחר לא רכש דבר מלבד פירות שנמצאים עליו כרגע. לא שום דבר שיגדל בעתיד. אבל במקרה שהוא מוכר את העץ לאחד והוא אומר, "אני מוכר לך את העץ, אבל שומר לי את הפירות", הוא שומר את הפירות - שכן זה נחשב כאילו שמר לעצמו את המקום שבו הגידול גדל. בדין של בית בו הוא אומר "אני שומר על המרפסת העליונה כדי שאוכל לבנות הרחבות עליונות לחצר." אבל בשני המקרים, יש ויכוח בקרב ראשונים אם הוא יכול להעביר את זה לאנשים שירשו אותו. הגר"א ורשב"ם אומרים "לא." הרמב''ן אומר כן. העניין הוא שהזכות לבנות הרחבה נחשבת לדבר שבו אין חומר. הגמרא שם בבא בתרא ס''ג ע''א אומר המקרה של לוי שמוכר את אדמתו בתנאי שמעשר הראשון הוא יקבל. ההסדר הזה לא ממשיך עם יורשיו שלו שירש אותו. הרעיון הוא שהוא שומר בתיאוריה את הקרקע שעליה צומח המעשר. ריש לקיש לומד משם על אדם שמוכר את ביתו בתנאי שהוא שומר על שטח הגג. אבל הוא שומר את זה בכל מקרה בשימוש העתיק בעיראק, אם מוכרים בית, המוכר שומר על הגג אלא אם כן צוין. הרשב''ם אומר "אני מוכר לך את הבית בתנאי שמרחב הגג הוא שלי" היינו דיוטא העליונה פירושו שהוא הוסיף תנאי שהיה ממילא מרומז. אז זה מכווין לכלול הזכות להאריך את הגג לצד השני של החצר ולעשות שם שביל. זיזין, לרמב''ן זה לא בגלל השפה, אלא חלק מההסדר בפועל בכל מקרה. הגר"א גורס כמו הרשב"ם כי המקרה של לוי וגג דומים בכך שהיורשים אינם יורשים את הזכות, אך המקרה של הגג הוא בגלל בעלות על דבר שאין לו חומר, ולא בגלל השפה בה משתמשים בעסקה. 

בדין של מכירת עץ והשארת פרי עבור במוכר הלכות מכירה פרק כ’’ג הלכה ד’ רב שך מציע שלמרות שהרמב''ם משאיר את השאלה אם היורשים יורשים זכות זו, נראה סביר שהם יורשים זאת. אבל קשה לדמיין שחוק שהרמב''ם אינו מזכיר כך או אחרת יהיה שונה כל כך מהגר''א, הרשב''ם והרמב''ן. הנקודה שלי כאן היא שבבבא בתרא דף ס''ג ע''א יש לנו את המקרה של לוי שמוכר את השדה שלו בתנאי שהוא יקבל את המעשר הראשון בכל שנה. הוא אכן משיג זאת, אך זכות זו אינה עוברת ליורשיו. זה אנחנו יודעים מהגמרא עצמה. אך מה לגבי המקרה של מכירת בית והשארת הגג למוכר והארכת שביל מהגג לקירות החצר? שם אומר הרמב''ן שהזכות אכן עוברת ליורשיו, אבל זה רק בגלל שזה דבר מסויים, לא כמו פרי שטרם הגיע לעולם. אז הרמב''ן כאן מבחן באופן גלוי בין הרחבות הגג לפרי עץ. תירוץ: אחרי הכל, המקרים של הארכת הגג והפרי נראים שונים מהמעשר הראשון שהוא לא בדיוק איזה דבר בבעלות מהלוי. אז זו עשויה להיות הסיבה לרב שך. הרי גם כאשר לוי היה בעל השדה שלו, הוא לא היה הבעלים של המעשר הראשון. עדיין היה צריך לקחת את זה ולתת לאיזה לוי שיכול להיות הוא עצמו. אז הוא לא היה הבעלים של זה  

The reason the religious world is so messed up

 The first time in the LeM of R. Nahman of Breslov that he brings the problem with religious teachers is the the LeM volume I, chapter 8. רברבי עשיו The princes of Esau. This Rav Nahman says refers to religious leaders of the Dark Side.

The basic idea in that chapter is that the spirit of life comes from Torah. So to be attached to Torah is the source of the spirit of life. But from where do evil people get their spirit of life? From the religious leaders of the Dark Side. The princes of Esau. רב דקליפה The Rav of the Dark Side.

Pretty scary. How do you tell who is who? I say listening to the Gra is the way to go about that. That is: the Gra made clear exactly who are the religious leaders of the Dark Side,--- and the fact that he is ignored is the reason the religious world is so messed up. 

One way you can see that the Gra was right is the who are the people that are in fact attached to Torah?--the obvious answer is: the Litvak yeshivas.

Eliyahu on Mount Carmel

 Eliyahu on Mount Carmel asked the People of Israel, "How long will you jump between two extremes? If the Lord is God then serve him, but if the Baal is God then serve him."

Why did they not just answer "Both?" After all that was the ancient Canaanite religion: that the Lord [Yod he vav he] is the ruler of the heavens and the Baal was the ruler of the Earth. I think that the point of Eliyahu was that there can be only one First Cause. [There can only be one first of any series.] This is the same point that the Chovot Levavot brings in answer to this same question. [That is the first book of Musar The Obligations of the Hearts by Ibn Pakuda

I was reading that whole incident and I had  a few observations. One is the Eliyahu was eating bread and meat in the morning and bread and meat at night. That was from what the ravens were bringing to him. That seems odd in itself in terms of tractate Hulin. [The sages said the meat was coming from the table of Ahav. So the only problem was בשר הנעלם מן העין. Meat that was hidden and then found. But there is an answer to that.]

Another thing is that even after the People of Israel had repented, still the later prophecy when Eliyahu was at Mount Horev said to anoint a king on Aram, then one of Israel and then Elisha who would kill all those who had bowed before the Baal. And you see later that in fact only 7000 people were left of all Israel. That is another thing that is hard to understand.

Another point is that the way the Canaanite religion was, was that the Lord is the God of the heavens which means he has final and absolute control over the heavens. The same with the Baal on the Earth. So the point of Eliyahu was that God has the final and absolute control of both heaven and earth. But we do find in the Torah that people did ask prophets to pray for them. Like Hezekiah asking Isaiah to pray for him. So the idea that there can be an intermediary between one and God is possible. But "asking" is not the same thing as "praying." "Praying" is when one knows there one he is praying to is the final court of appeals and has absolute power over the subject one is asking about. "Asking" is not the same thing. And one does not worship the intermediary. Only askes to pray for one.  

Aliens. My dad used to work in area 51.

 I would like to mention that my dad used to work in area 51. That was when the USA government asked him to develop an extreme long distance camera to mount on the U-2 in order to see what was going on on the ground in the USSR. [There were two teams to develop a camera so in history you do not see my Dad's name (Rosenblum) since he was in charge of the second team.] And he never mentioned anything about aliens to me. OK, (you might say), it was after all Top Secret. However he never hid from my brothers and me (when we were just kids) his work on SDI - Star Wars in making Infra Red spy satellites and later laser communication between satellites;-- and even with him and his friends discussing how far advanced or behind the USSR was from us. [As far as that goes, he and his buddies at TRW explained that the USSR was actually more advanced than the USA in developing the tech and math needed for a SDI program, but then towards the end of the 1960's the USA caught up, and out stripped them. That was even before either government admitted that they had such a project.]

To be up front with you all, I think there probably are aliens, and they probably have been around here looking at earth. [But I am not afraid of them. It from the humans down here that I am afraid of.]

 However as for Area 51, I doubt if anything is going on there with that. 

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Sorry I put this on before checking it. [I forgot to change the key back into A Major at the end. ] Now it seems to be OK. 

sexual purity

 Rav Nahman said for the sake of Tikun HaBrit/sexual purity to go a natural body of water. [That is if one has accidently spilled seed in vain  to go a dip into a natural body of water and say the ten psalms called the Tikun Klali 16, 32, 41, 42, 59, 77, 90, 105, 137, 150.

Bit I have noticed that going into a natural body of water seems to help me get my equilibrium back. (I usually go in with my clothing on and just change into dry clothes when I return to where I am staying.) That is: whenever I am upset or taken off balance for some reason, I run to the nearest body of natural water like a sea or a river.  [If you go in a sea with clothing, then rise them when you get home because the salt eats away at the material unless thoroughly washed out.]  ]Sometimes I have been in area where there is a spring. That is when I was in Safed and also in Jerusalem by the site of Shmuel the prophet. [It can not be man made like a pool.]  This helps purify my spirit. And at the same time, I do some exercise to help me regain physical health also.

Still even though the great ideas of Rav Nahman are important, one needs to be careful that one's focus should be on God, not on the tzadik.

Eliyahu  said to Klal Israel, "How long will you skip between the two ends. If the Lord is God  then serve Him; if the Baal is god, then serve him."  This seems to be ignored by religious people who tend to take some middle agent to serve.

Rav Shach in the Rambam's Laws of Buying and selling, Chapter 23. Bava Batra 63.

There is an argument of one can give or gain possession of something that has not come into the world.

R Meir said one can. However the sages said "no", and so throughout Shas, you see it is a given that one can not.

[There is a certain order among the tenaim/ authors of the Mishna with whom is the law. R Jose, R Yehuda, etc. according to order. R. Meir is near that bottom unless it is a "stam mishna" [no authorship is attributed] in which case the law is like R. Meir. [That is how R Yehuda the Prince arranged the Mishna]

In the case of a fruit tree, if one sells it to one person and sells its fruit to another, the other has acquired nothing except fruit which is on it right now. Not anything that will grow in the future. But in a case where he sells the tree to one person and he says, "I am selling to you the tree, but keeping the fruit for me," he keeps the fruit --for it is considered as if he kept the place where the fruit is growing for himself.

Same with a sell of a house where he says I am keeping the upper porch to be able to build upper extensions into the courtyard. But in both cases, there is an argument among rishonim if he can pass that right along to the people that inherit him. The Gra and Rashbam say no. The Ramban [Nachmanides] says yes. The issue is that the right to build an extension is thought to be a thing that has no substance.

The Gemara there in Bava Batra says the case of the Levi who sells his land "on condition" that the first tithe he gets. That arrangement does not continue with his children that inherit him. The idea is he keeps in theory the actual ground that the tithe grows on.

From there Reish Lakish learns from there about a person that sells his house on condition he keeps the roof space. But he keeps it anyway in the ancient usage of Iraq when if one sells a house the seller keeps top of the roof unless that is specified. To the Rashbam  saying openly "I sell you the house on condition the rood space is mine" means he added a condition that was implicit anyway. So it comes to include teh right to extend the rood to the other side of the courtyard and to make  a walk way there.

To the Ramban [Nachmanides] that is not because of the language but part of the actual arrangement in any case

The Gra holds like the Rashbam that the case of a Levite and roof are similar in that the children do not inherit the right, but the case of the roof is because of owning a thing that has no substance, not because of the language used in the deal.

 x48 F Major

My Dad [Philip Rosten/Rosenblum]

 My Dad [Philip Rosten/Rosenblum] had a way of downplaying anything good or great that he did. When he volunteered for the USA Air Force, he could have said it was for patriotic motives. But instead he said, "Well, everyone was getting drafted."  I realized that joining the Air Force had a significant effect on his life. For he had just got his master's degree from Cal Tech. So when he got to the Air Force, they must have seen that had someone they could use. So they put him into the development of the top secret B-29.  Then he was sent to fight for the war in Europe. But after the war, he developed the first Infra Red telescope. The the army base where he made that the focus of Senator McCarthy who had noticed that there were hidden communists in the USA government [like nowadays.] So when my Dad came to work on Monday morning, the whole place was empty, except for Berny Marcus, his friend. All the others were fired. So even though it was just window dressing because all the workers were back at work in a couple of days, still my dad and Marcus had been offered to work on a new government project--the top secret U-2 airplane. So he and Berny came to California. [They were flown out every Monday morning to Area 51, and came back home on Friday. [That is how it came about that I was born in California.] Then that was finished and there was apparently some other project at Hycon Corporation. But after that was finished, my dad invented a new kind of xerox machine called the "copymate machine." But that was the first time he was working in a private capacity. That lasted for five years, and then the USA government came calling again. They wanted him to put his infra-red kind telescope onto satellites that would spy on the USSR.  So they got a constellation of satellites into space for that, and then asked my dad to work on laser communication between satellites for SDI (Star Wars).

And that is when the whole incident when the KGB started stealing the documents from  TRW corporation where my dad was working. [That was made into a movie.] But my dad quit there, and started working for himself. He sold our house, and made a tidy sum, and started investing with that. 

[I am not saying he stopped because of the KGB. Rather it seemed to me, that he was going to quit even before that was revealed. He told me that better experts were up and coming from the universities and that his areas of experience were no longer needed.] 

When my dad was making his invention, the copymate machine in Newport Beach, we went to Temple Sharon in a nearby city. Then we moved when he started work on SDI, and I started going to Temple Israel in Hollywood. Then when I graduated from high school, I decided to go to a very great Litvak yeshiva, Shar Yashuv in NY. [My motivation was mainly philosophical. I had spent a lot of time studying Plato, Dante, Spinoza, and Chinese philosophy. To go and learn Torah seemed to me to be the natural next step.] Shar Yashuv had a beginners program, but rapidly advanced to deep "Lumdus" learning. [So my first year there was sort of confusing, but the second year in when we started on Hulin and the third year was for Ketuboth. In the middle of the fourth year, I decided to go to the Mir in NY. That is where I discovered a second kind of deep learning that you see in books of Rav Haim of Brisk and Rav Shach. It is very different from the type done in Shar Yashuv which was more analytic. [Kind of like G.E. Moore in philosophy.] The type of Rav Shach is more "global". [Sort of like Hegel.]

So my education in Physics was delayed by some years and I am finding it hard to catch up.

 x47

 In the introduction to the Chovot Levavot you find he divides wisdom into knowledge of nature, knowledge of how to use nature, and knowledge of Godliness. But within that discussion he says the Arabic names. You can see there he is referring in this last to the subject known in the Muslim world as metaphysics. [He actually says that is what is talking about and then continues that this last subject is necessary to know for the sake of Torah. (So they are not the same thing.) So while he is referring to the actual book of Aristotle of that name he also clearly means the Muslim commentaries on that books which comprised that subject. [I assume he must have meant Al Farabi and Al Kindi.]

The thing about Metaphysics as a subject of study is that it seems to have its ups and downs. In fact I might have gone into philosophy myself if not for the fact that I felt that something was "off" about twentieth century philosophy. But some people did go into it anyway and retained their own common sense Like Dr Kelley Ross of the Kant Friesian School. Dr Ross, Huemer, Robert Hanna and a few others have also noticed this and suggested more or less just skipping twentieth century philosophy. [Dr. Ross wants to start with Leonard Nelson and Fries, Hanna wants to go straight back to Kant and skip everyone in-between, Humer goes back to Prichard and G.E. Moore.]

In the book of Rav Nahman of Uman he deals with the issue of Torah scholars that are themselves demons in the LeM vol I ch 12. Later in vol I chapter 28 he deals with a slightly different issue of people that hear Torah lessons from Torah scholars who themselves receive their Torah lessons from the Dark Side.

 

The basic idea there is that there are the "alef"s in the higher worlds. But often what some higher spiritual essence comes down into this world , it gets physicalized  in such a way that the dark forces have a hold on it. So when Torah scholars who receive their lessons from teh demons, when they see someone who is serving God with simplicity and with no "wisdoms", they try to stop them.

This I can imagine was the case in the days of Rav Nahman himself who had a lot of enemies and certainly his students. And this Torah lesson was probably said in relation to that fact. But I think it applies all the more so nowadays. When there is someone who just wants to sit and learn Torah for its own sake and not work and just trust in God to provide his needs, often the very enemies of that person are Tora scholars who are demons.

the beginning of בבא מציעא also page 7 and the end of that chapter.

  It occurred to me as I was at the sea thinking about the issue that רב שך laws of שאלה ופיקדון bring about a person that finds a document among his documents and he does not know whether the lender or borrower gave it to him to guard, [at the end of the first chapter of בבא מציעא]. Now רב שך answers that it reverts to a verbal loan in which the borrower can say "I paid". But I was thinking that exactly the same answers that רב שך had been giving before that in other cases like the third hundred might work. So in the case of the third hundred he is guarding the 300 hundred for both, so both have a חזקה. [The word "hazaka" means holding onto the object.] But רב שך [Rav Shach] himself says about a lost object that it stays by the finder because he is not guarding it for both, but only the real owner. So I was wondering why not use that same exact answer here with finding a document among his documents. It could be that both people gave it to him to guard. But we do not know that. It is possible that only one person gave it to him. Since it is doubtful, we should not say "divide" but leave it as in fact is the law. Apparently רב שך did not want to use this as an answer, and I am not sure why. [I think it is proper to add here that this is the very issue which is at the center of רב שך's approach in that entire section, the fact that a person that is guarding something for someone else means that person for whom he is guarding it for is considered to have a חזקה in the object. If this was not the case, then you would always say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. That is the only reason that in the beginning of בבא מציעא that the law is to divide, because there is a חזקה for both people.]

עלה בדעתי כשהייתי בים וחשבתי על הנושא שרב שך מביא בהלכות שאלה ופיקדון. אדם מוצא מסמך בין המסמכים שלו והוא לא יודע אם המלווה או הלווה מסרו לו אותו לשמירה, [ בסוף הפרק הראשון של בבא מציעא]. כעת רב שך עונה שזה חוזר להלוואה מילולית בה הלווה יכול לומר "שילמתי". אבל חשבתי שאותן תשובות שרב שך נתן לפני כן במקרים אחרים כמו המאה השלישית עשויים לעבוד גם פה. אז במקרה של המאה השלישית הוא שומר על 300 המאות לשניהם כך שלשתיהן יש חזקה. אבל רב שך עצמו אומר על אובייקט אבוד שהוא נשאר על ידי המוצא כי הוא לא שומר עליו לשניהם, אלא רק לבעלים האמיתי. אז תהיתי מדוע לא להשתמש באותה תשובה מדויקת כאן במציאת מסמך בין המסמכים שלו. יכול להיות ששני האנשים נתנו לו את זה לשמירה. אך איננו יודעים זאת. יתכן שרק אדם אחד נתן לו את זה. מכיוון שזה ספק, אנחנו לא צריכים לומר "לחלק" אלא להשאיר את זה כמו שהחוק למעשה. כנראה שרב שך לא רוצה להשתמש בזה כתשובה, ואני לא בטוח למה. [אני חושב שנכון להוסיף כאן שזה הנושא שעומד במרכז הגישה של רב שך באותו סעיף, העובדה שאדם ששומר על משהו עבור מישהו אחר פירושו אותו אדם שהוא שומר עליו נחשב כבעל חזקה באובייקט. אם זה לא היה כך, תמיד היית אומר המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. זו הסיבה היחידה שבתחילת בבא מציעא שהחוק הוא חלוקה, כי יש חזקה לשני האנשים.  

 It occurred to me as I was at the sea thinking about the issue that Rav Shach [laws of שאלה ופיקדון] bring about a person that finds a document among his documents and he does not know whether the lender or borrower gave it to him to guard, [at the end of the first chapter of Bava Metzia] Now Rav Shach answers that it reverts to a verbal loan in which the borrower can say I paid. But I was thinking that exactly the same answers that Rav Shach had been giving before that in other cases like the third hundred might work. So in the case of the third hundred he is guarding the 300 hundred for both so both have a "Hazaka". But Rav Shach himself says about a lost object that it stays by the finder because he is not guarding it for both but only the real owner. So I was wondering why not use that same exact answer here with finding a document among his documents. It could be that both people gave it to him to guard. But we do not know that. It is possible that only one person gave it to him. Since it is doubtful we should not say divide but leave it as in fact is the law. Apparently Rav Shach did not want to use this as an answer, and I am not sure why.

[I think it is proper to add here that this is the very issue which is at the center of Rav Shach's approach in that entire section--the fact that a person that is guarding something for someone else means that person for whom he is guarding it for is considered to have a hazaka in the object. If this was not the case then you would always say המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה. That is the only reason that in the beginning of Bava Metzia that the law is to divide--because there is a hazaka for both people.

 x46 B minor mp3

x46 midi

x46 nwc file

Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

 Rav Avraham Abulafia held that Jesus was what is called in the Gemara Suka "messiah son of Joseph"

I asked Professor Moshe Idel about this since he brings it up in his first book which was actually his PhD thesis. But this does not imply what Christians are usually thinking about this issue.

But it is also not the same things as just a saint.

Rather if you look in the LeM of Rav Nahman of Breslov, vol I chapter 65 you can see what the idea of the "Baal Hasade" [lord of the meadow].

The idea there is that there is a meadow which has beautiful grasses and flowers and trees and fruit. And these trees and plants are all souls. And they need watering and taking care of. There can be weeds and diseases that try to attack these beautiful souls. So there has to be someone to do that work. That is a true tzadik. But even to get to that level to do the slightest smallest work  in meadow requires a very great saint.  

[There is a lot of animosity towards Jesus, but that is because people are not aware of Avraham Abulafia. Even among Christians people are ambivalent towards Abulafia, even if they hear about his insights. This seems sad to me. Now while he was not at all positive towards the catholic church that is clearly because of the problem of worshiping Jesus which  can not be correct. But that does not mean to go to the opposite extreme and start speaking slander about who was really a very great tzadik and even more. For most tzadikim do not have a soul from azilut/emanation. ] 

The sugia of messiah son of Joseph is brought at length in the Gra's Kol HaTor.

[It does seem that Rav Nahman himself was not careful about the signature  of the Gra. However he was not in that category himself.]

There are three cases that Rav Shach brings in the beginning of laws of שאלה ופיקדון in which you say, "Let it be". [Let it stay where it is until proof can be brought.] (1) The case of the third hundred, (2) signs and signs, [He found an object and two different people give signs that the object is theirs. So he does not know to who to return it.] (3) he found a document of  a loan among his documents. [The lender and borrower each claim that he alone was the one that gave it to him to guard.] 

These cases are like an unpaid guard who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But in a case of transgressing, he is somewhat similar to the borrower. The borrower pays for everything. But in the case of the third hundred he is not borrowing anything. Still the fact that he should have written down the names of each one, he is thought to have trespassed and so he pays both. That is like a borrower. 

In the cases above the fellow is somewhat like an unpaid guard since you just leave the found object where it is. He does not know to who to return it. But he does not take an oath because one never takes an oath of  "I do not know."

So  all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are simply still in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects.

 For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The un-paid guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the third hundred. There a person is given three hundred dollars to keep safe for two people. One gave 100 and the other 200. When they come to get it each says the 200 is his. There we say the third person has to pay 200 to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a unpaid guard who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל

The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the third hundred. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the 200 and whom is the 100. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives 100 to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each 200.

_________________________________________________________________________________

There are three cases that רב שך brings in the הלכות פיקדון ואבדה in which you say, יהיה מונח. The case of the מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. It is clear that these cases are not considered to be like an שומר חינם who lost the object he was supposed to guard. But he is somewhat similar to the שואל. The borrower pays for everything. שואל משלם את הכל. But in the case of the מנה שלישית he is not borrowing anything. So it seems that in all three cases the lost object or monies are not considered lost at all since they are in fact not lost. They are in the possession of the person that given to guard. But he does not know to who to return the objects. For if they were anything like lost objects, we would say שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. The שומר חינם נשבע על הכל guard swears on everything.

It occurred to me  today that that is nothing like the law of the מנה שלישית. There a person is given three שלש מאות שקלים to keep safe for two people. One gave מאה and the other מאתיים. When they come to get it each says the מאתיים is his. There we say the third person has to pay מאתיים to each since it was his fault. The thing here is that he seems to be simply a שומר חינם who takes an oath that he does not know where the object is and then pays nothing. So it seems this case is simply not thought to be anything like a guard of a lost object. The reason is the object last hundred was not lost. He simply does not know to who to give it. And for that he is thought to have transgressed. And so he pays like a borrower, שואל משלם את הכל. The basic steps to get to this conclusion are these: We have the מנה שלישית. There two people give him three hundred dollars in one envelope and tell him to whom is the מאתיים and whom is the מאה. But they gave it in one package. So he did not write it down. He forgot which one was whose. He gives מאה to each and the last hundred stays where it is. But if they were given in two envelopes then he gives each מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על הכסף שלו

ישנם שלושה מקרים שרב שך מביא בהלכות פיקדון בהם אתה אומר, יהיה מונח. המקרה של מנה שלישית, סימנים סימנים, ומצא שטר בין שטרותיו. המקרים אלה כמו שומר חינם שאיבד את החפץ עליו היה אמור לשמור. אלא שאינו נשבע שלא לוקחים שבוע על איני יודע. אבל אם הוא פושע זה דומה לשואל. שואל משלם את הכל. כך בשלושת המקרים החפץ האבוד או הכספים אינם נחשבים לאבודים כלל מכיוון שהם למעשה לא אבודים. הם נמצאים ברשות האדם שנתן לשמור. אבל הוא לא יודע למי להחזיר את החפצים. כי אם הם היו משהו כמו חפצים אבודים, היינו אומרים שומר חינם נשבע על הכל. שומר חנם נשבע על הכל השומר נשבע על הכל. היום עלה בדעתי שזה לא דומה לחוק מנהלת השלישית. שם נותנים לאדם שלושה שלש מאות שקלים כדי לשמור על בטיחותם של שני אנשים. אחד נתן את מאה ולשני מאתיים. כשבאים לקחת את זה כל אחד אומר המאתיים הוא שלו. שם אנו אומרים שהאדם השלישי צריך לשלם מאתיים לכל אחד מכיוון שזו הייתה אשמתו. העניין כאן הוא גם נראה שזה קצת שונה ששומר חינם נשבע שהוא לא יודע איפה החפץ ואז לא משלם כלום. לכן נראה שמקרה זה פשוט לא נחשב לשומר של אובייקט אבוד. הסיבה היא שהאובייקט [המאה] לא אבד. הוא לא יודע למי לתת את זה. ולשם כך חושבים שהוא פושע. וכך הוא משלם כמו לווה, שואל משלם את הכל. [הצעדים הבסיסיים להגיע למסקנה זו הם אלה: יש לנו את מנה שלישית. שם שני אנשים נותנים לו שלוש מאות שקלים במעטפה אחת ואומרים לו למי הוא שתי מאות ומי המאה. אבל הם נתנו את זה בחבילה אחת, והוא לא כתב את זה. הוא שכח מי מהם. הוא נותן מאה לכל אחד, והמאה האחרונה נשאר במקום שהוא נמצא. אבל אם הכסף ניתן בשתי מעטפות, אז הוא נותן לכל אחד מאתיים בגלל שהוא פושע שלא כתב שם כל אחד על מעטפה שלו]

 In the subject of the third mana [the third hundred] (מנה השלישית). [ note 1] The law is to leave it as long as the middleman was not negligent. [If he was, then he has to pay.] The question that come up in the gemara in Bava Metzia is why is this not divided? They answer division happens only when it could be true. [note 2] Rav Akiva Eigger askes from page 28 what about the case of signs and signs that is left. That is, there is  a lost object. two people give signs to show that it belongs to them. It is left by the finder until some absolute proof can be brought. But it could be of both so why not divide? Answers Rav Shach: division only happens when there is derara demomona [דררא דממונא] a doubt about the money and both have some prior "hazaka" ( "חזקא" holding", that is a reason to say the object is theirs.) But here the finder is not holding the object for both but only for the true owner-even if we do not know who that is.  

[I am being a bit short here because Rav Shach brings up a second question about the last mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia where also you leave the document even though the middleman is in fact holding the document for two people.

And I have not worked out how the argument between Sumchos and the sages fits in here--o if it is relevant at all.

[note 1] Two people give three hundred zuz  to a middleman to take care of. When they return each claims 200. If it was given together in one envelope, it stays with the middleman.

[note 2] Two people might pick up an object in the street at the same time. But the third mana belongs to one or the other, Not both. 

Rav Nahman of Breslov and Uman actually has two places in the LeM where he seems to contradict himself. In one place he says to learn "Poskim" [the medieval authorities that wrote on law. This is different than medieval authorities that wrote commentaries.] separates the good from evil--since that is the whole purpose of the poskim --to come to clarification of the law. [However I should add that in the terminology of Rav Nahman, the word "poskim" means basically the actual Shulchan Aruch of Rav Joseph Karo (who was not a Rishon). He was the beginning of the period of the Achronim. However, it is clear throughout his writings that "poskim" to Rav Nahman means especially the actual Shulchan Aruch with its commentaries , the Shach, Taz, Magen Avraham, etc. 

But in Le.M vol. I, chapter 54, he says the "כוח הדמיון שורה על שונה הלכות" ["Delusions rest upon those that learn halacha."] And there is no mistaking his intension there as he goes into great detail explaining this.

But I think that a simple answer is that he uses the word "shone halachot" שונה הלכות not "lomed halachot." לומד הלכות [To be "Shone" is  meant to to say the words and go on. The word "lomed" means to learn in depth.

So the best idea in terms of Halacha according to this would be not to be "shone halachot",  but rather to learn in depth starting from the Gemara and going through the Rosh, Rif, Tur, Shulchan Aruch with the basic commentaries on the Shuclan Aruch. [Later note, actually I think the best of all halacha books, the Tur with the Beit Yoseph is the best.] 

Incidentally, this is how I was taught in my second year in Shar Yashuv (the yeshiva of Rav Friefeld). Only in the third year there did they start with deep "lumdus" [learning] as you can see examples in Rav Shach and Rav Chaim of Brisk.

[There is a way of learning in depth which is to review the paragraph 10 times, and  that helps me to learn Physics and Math.] 

 "Social Justice Warrior"s advocate theft. They call it "redistribution" but changing the words that describe something still does not change the actual act.

This last so called "election" was not an election at all. There was was an astounding amount of open fraud. It was just a test of how much Democrats could get away with cheating. And if the voices that object would make any difference. It takes about two minutes to open any computer that count the votes and program it to count all the votes for Bidden or simply put in as many votes for Bidden as you want. This was already demonstrated in the Conference in Los Vegas at a computer conference.

The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia

When there is a doubt about money the law is in some cases to divide, in other cases to let the money or object remain where it is until Elisha the prophet comes. The Gemara and Tosphot in the beginning of Bava Metzia deal with this.

One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית [the third hundred.] That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred dollars.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the $200 and who gave the $100, then he has to give 200 to each and pay from his own pocket.

The question Rav Shach brings from the last Mishna in the first chapter of Bava Metzia מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

Rav Shach answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in Bava Metzia when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the Mishnas goes like Sumchos [ממון המוטל בספק חולקים] , not the sages ( המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) [like on page 100 side a]. But sometimes the mishna is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the Gemara deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last mishna might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

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One issue that come up is the מנה שלישית . That is when two people come to a someone they trust and give him an envelope with three hundred שקלים.  Then they return sometime later and each one says the 200 was mine and the hundred was of the other. Then he gives each 100 and the last hundred he keeps until some proof is brought, one way or the other. But if each comes in and separately give him their own envelope. Then he forgets who gave him the 200 and who gave the 100, then he has to give 200 to each and משלם from his own pocket.

The question רב שך brings from the last משנה in the first chapter of בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח a person finds a document of a loan among his documents and does not remember who gave it to him and the lender and borrower both ask for it. There he leaves it. Is this not the same as the above case where he has to pay from his own pocket since he forgot?

רב שך answers the case of the loan reverts to a verbal loan in which case the lender is believed to say: "I paid". So we leave the document and give it to neither.

The question here is that most of the time in בבא מציעא when issues about money that we do not know to whom it belongs, the משנה goes like סומכוס ממון המוטל בספק חולקים, not the sages  המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) like on page 100 side a. But sometimes the משנה is a case where even the Sages agree. Sometimes the גמרא deals with this issue, and sometimes leaves it. So that last משנה might be like the sages that you leave the document where it is because it is המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

נושא אחד שעולה הוא מנה שלישית. זה כאשר שני אנשים מגיעים למישהו שהם סומכים עליו ונותנים לו מעטפה עם שלוש מאות שקלים. ואז הם חוזרים זמן מה אחר כך וכל אחד אומר שה -200 היו שלי והמאה היו של השני. ואז הוא נותן לכל אחד את 100 ואת המאה האחרונה שהוא שומר עד שמביאים הוכחה כלשהי, כך או אחרת. אבל אם כל אחד נכנס ונפרד נותנים לו מעטפה משלהם. ואז הוא שוכח מי נתן לו את ה200 ומי נתן את ה100, ואז הוא צריך לתת 200 לכל אחד ומשלם מכיסו.

השאלה שרב שך מביא מהמשנה האחרון בפרק הראשון בבא מציעא מצא שטר בין שטרותיו ואינו יודע מה טיבו יניח (אדם מוצא מסמך של הלוואה בין מסמכיו ואינו זוכר מי נתן לו המלווה או הלווה. שניהם מבקשים את המסמך. שם הוא משאיר את זה. האם זה אינו זהה למקרה דלעיל בו עליו לשלם מכיסו מאז ששכח?

רב שך עונה על המקרה של ההלוואה חוזר להלוואה מילולית ובמקרה זה מאמינים שהמלווה שאומר: "שילמתי". אז אנחנו עוזבים את המסמך ונותנים אותו לאף אחד מהם.

השאלה כאן היא שרוב הזמן בבבא מציעא כשנושאים על כסף שאיננו יודעים למי הוא שייך, המשנה הולכת כמו סומכוס (ממון המוטל בספק חולקים), ולא החכמים (המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה) כמו בעמוד 100 בצד א. אבל לפעמים זה מקרה שבו אפילו החכמים מסכימים. לפעמים הגמרא עוסקת בנושא זה ולעיתים עוזבת אותה. כך שבמקרה האחרון של שיכחת השטר יכול להיות כמו החכמים שאתה משאיר את המסמך במקום שהוא נמצא בגלל שהוא המוציא מחבירו עליו הראיה

 x45 F Major

x45 nwc file

x45 Midi file

I suggest getting up in the morning and saying right away the Shema [first paragraph], then a bit of Musar/ Ethics. [That is from some few paragraphs of what one feels he needs strength and encouragement in.] Then the Oral Law [in such a way as to get through the oral law, i.e. two Talmuds and Midrashim]. Then what the Rishonim essential Physics and Metaphysics. That approach you can see in Chovot Levavot and More Nevuchim/ the Guide for the Perplexed.  

As for halacha -my approach is that any opinion in the Gemara counts as Halacha unless openly dismissed. רב שלמה לוריא מחבר של החכמת שלמה  Shelomo  Luria writes [in his commentary on the Gemara which is printed with every Gemara at the bottom of the page of the Mahrasha] that it is better to decide the halacha straight from the Gemara even if one is wrong, rather than to decide from the Shulchan Aruch even if that is right. He thought the whole idea of taking away the authority form the Gemara into later on books was a terrible idea.

the problem with USA universities.

 Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind pointed out the problem with USA universities. Maybe it all starts from philosophy as Ayn Rand suggested. If Ayn Rand is right the place to begin would be a different kind of Philosophy program. My suggestion would be the steps leading to the Kant Fries School of thought. That is Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Kant, Hegel, Leonard Nelson.

But to ignore philosophy does not seem like a good idea. The Mediaeval approach to combine faith and reason seems like to the best idea to me.

I just noticed in the LeM of Rav Nahman vol. I 64 the subject of the limitation of reason which comes up in Kant. The way Rav Nahman deals with this is in relation to the "Halal Hapanui" the empty space.

[You have to say two opposite things about it. One: That God withdrew his presence from within for otherwise there would have been no room for the creation of all the worlds. But it did exist and nothing can exist without God creating it and so God presence was there.] Kant reached his conclusion about the limitation of reason from John Locke that said there   are primary characteristics and secondary. Kant noticed even what Locke thought were primary really also depend on the observer. So what really is the "ding an sich" [thing in itself]? There we have the limit of reason. Now reason is not limited to what can be observed. Nor just what is contained in definition. It can perceive universals. It can figure out synthetic a priori. But the limit is conditions of possible experience.

 Right in the beginning of Bava Metzia in Tosphots and on page 7, there is raised the issue of when the law is to divide, when "who is stronger", when we say it should remain as it is until Eliyahu comes.

So one of the issues is this a document of a loan is in the hands of a middle man and he has forgotten who gave it to him, the lender or the borrower. There we say it should remain where it is until Eliyahu come.

Rav Shach asks why is this any different from an object that was given to a middle man to help until the people that gave it to him come to get it. And he has forgotten who gave it to him and he gives it to one and pays the other since it was his fault for not writing it down or remembering who gave it to him. 

The answer of Rav Shach I admit is a bit  hard to understand. The document he says has a category of a verbal loan and that makes sense since the only difference between a verbal loan and one in a document is the borrower can say "I paid" in a verbal loan. The written loan he can not say that because the lender can ask, "Then why do I still have the document?"  [So in the case the document is in the hands of teh third party the lender can not say that.] Still it is hard to understand why here also we do not say it is the fault of the middle man for not writing down who gave the document to him.

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I am not sure why there are so many problems in my life or in other peoples' lives. Mainly I think the problems come from sin. But it helps to know which sin so that one can repent. So what I do is to try to think back in my life to see exactly what were my sins so as to know what to repent on. That approach can help others also.

That is to say,-- that when you see things not going well, you ought to think back in your life to try to discover what exact sins triggered the problems.

I can do this fairly well in my life. I can recognize not listening to my parents, leaving the Land of Israel, leaving the good advice of Rav Nahman, and also pushing off a kind of state of inspiration. But clearly others have all kinds of other sorts of sin. And I think that with a little thought most people can discern what sins they need to repent on. But I am not saying that these are my major sins. Also I am not saying that one  can easily discover what their major sins are. Rather I think that if you repent on the things you know you need to repent on, then (in that merit) I believe God reveals to one what further sins he or she needs to repent. on.

[What do I say that problems come from sin? Because in the Musar book Shaarie Teshuva [Gates of Repentance] of R. Yona, he brings from the Gemara that אין ייסורים בלי עוון ("There are no troubles without sin.")

You Can't Turn a Whore into a Lady · Rebel Son.

Listen to me friend I know her kind
She'll just tear up your nerves if you fall for her
So just walk away and leave her behind
'Cause when you fall in her lap, you're falling in her trap
And she'll rob you blind of your last dime

She'll lie to you and leave you
With nothing but depression
A heartache and sorrow and shame

 

To Rav Shach when we say R Shimon goes by the reason for the verse

 To Rav Shach when we say R Shimon goes by the reason for the verse that means when both are written, the reason and the isur [[prohibition] then we go by both. So when it says by a king not to have more than 18 wives because she might tilt his heart away from God -- that means we go by both the letter of the law and also the reason.

That is how Rav Shach explains the contradiction in the Rambam where in general he does not go by R Shimon. [Well, no one does because that is R Shimon against the sages. That is the reason the Tur does not decide like R Shimon either.] But in the debate if one can not marry any girl from the nations that worship idols [עכו''ם] or only a girl from the seven Canaanite nations-- it is R. Shimon who says all nations (that worship idols) are forbidden. So why does the Rambam decide the law like that against the sages? Answer (of Rav Shach): because the letter of the law means all nations, and there R Shimon forbids all nations because of the letter of the law.

On the way by from the sea, I thought about this and asked myself,  "What about a widow?" There we know R. Shimon says one can take a pledge from a rich widow. And then I realized what Rav Shach means. He means to say that when both the isur (prohibition) and the reason are written, then R Shimon goes by both. But if only one is written, then he goes by the reason. 

This is the opposite of R Yehuda. For to R Yehuda, if only the prohibition is written then he goes by the letter of the law,-- but if both are written, then he goes only by the reason for the verse. That is why he say a king can marry as many women as he likes as long as they do not turn his heart. 

[This is  a three way debate. It is R Shimon who goes by the reason for the verse always. Do we know the reasons for the verses? Yes. No one in the Gemara disagrees with that. If that would be in doubt, then the sages would bring that objection against R Shimon and ask him, "but we do not know the reasons for the verses." And in fact what are the reasons? they are spelled out in Sefer HaHinuch from a disciple of Nahmanides. Generally they are these: peace of the state, to lessen pleasures, to get rid of idolatry, to gain good character.]

 There is something very odd about judges in the USA. I would not be surprised if somehow the Frankfurt school had a hand in getting Marxist ideas into the legal system in the USA. I used to think it was from the KGB, but now I think that the infiltration was too vast and comprehensive for it to be from the KGB. It has to be from the inside. And from where else but the Frankfurt school in Columbia University? That is where the main policy makers of the the American education system were trained.

 I had a chance today to look at the last Torah lesson Rav Nahman of Breslov said in his lifetime the Le.M. vol. II, chapter 8, and I thought to bring here a few of the ideas he mentions there. 

One idea he says is not to give rebuke because unless one has great merit, because he can make things worse by giving rebuke in the wrong kind of way.\אף על פי שתוכחה היא דבר גדול ומוטל על כל אחד להוכיח את חברו כשרואה בו דבר שאינו הגון אף על פי כן לאו כל אחד ראוי להוכיח כמו שאמר ר. עקיבא תמה אני אם יש בדור הזה מי שראוי להוכיח כי כשהמוכיח אינו ראוי הוא יכול להביש את השומעים את תוכחתו  ["Even though rebuke is a great thing and it is incumbant on every person to rebuke his friend when he sees in him something not proper ,still not everyone is fit to rebuke as R. Akiva said, 'I would be surprized if there was anyone in this generation that is fit to give rebuke,' because when the one who gives rebuke is not fit, he can cause damage and make ugly the souls of those who hear his rebuke."

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"revival of the dead"

 I think about the issue of the "revival of the dead" that you see it very clearly in Ezekiel. You have there the valley of bones and then God telling Ezekiel that that whole event of reviving those people was a sort of preliminary example of what would be eventually with all Israel. That is, that He would bring about the revival of the dead for all Israel.

So that means when the Gemara asks How do we know revival of the dead from the Torah, it must mean how do we know it from the Five Books of Moses. They can not be asking how do we know it from teh Prophets. 

Leonard Nelson

The thing about Leonard Nelson that I think is a bit off putting to people is that his approach of non intuitive immediate knowledge is thought to be a  species of psychologism. That is that truths of logic or science depend on the human mind. Well Dr. Kelley Ross shows that that is not what Nelson was saying at all. But Husserl attacks that problem head on. He brings three proofs against it.[in the first part of Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (Logical Investigations, Vol. 1)] 

The thing that I noticed  is Husserl's proof depends on there being absolute truth. That is, that there are truths that do not depend on the observer. And the best proof of that from what I have seen is John Searle's.  Searle shows that if all truth is relative it sinks into there being no truth at all by means of "dis-quotation." That is the "sentence snow is white", only if snow is white. (And  snow is white is true only if it is true with respect to a background in which things can be white or not white.) It is a short proof.  [It is good that Searle was attacked, since nowadays when universities attack someone, it just shows the greatness of that person.] 

I noticed there is a new Kant-Friesian on the horizon- Michael Cuffaro.   

The answer of Rav Shach for the Rambam Laws of Divorce chapter 3 law 9

[The idea here is that a divorce has to be written on a piece of paper that says "You are herby permitted to any man," and given into her hand or her courtyard. That is the basic essence of divorce. But I must add that it must be done in front of two witnesses. Also there is a decree of the scribes that the date should be on the document.]

 If  a husband gives a divorce  document to his wife and says that it will be valid after 30 days, and she puts it in an alley, and on the thirtieth it is still in the alley but after that it is stolen she is divorced.

This seems to be in contradiction to the Gemara in Ketuboth 86 which says the law of saying to one's wife, "This document of your divorce will be valid after 30 days," equals the law when one sells an animal and also says, "This sell will be valid after 30 days." In both cases if the object is in an alley on the thirtieth day, the transaction is valid. And the Gemara on page 82 says in the case of a sell that he must say "from now" and only then it is valid.

And in fact Tosphot says this exact fact. So the question is why does the Rambam ignore this and say "from now" only in the case of a sell, [but in the case of a divorce, he ignores this distinction.]

Rav Shach says because these are two different kinds of things. The divorce has to be in her domain or he hand and it is so on the thirtieth day. But the sell is valid by means of pulling the animal and that is no longer happening on the thirtieth day. The point of Rav Shach is clear. [The Magid Mishna says the difference is that the document in still around on the 30th day which is not the case with pulling. But it is not clear what that has to do with the need to say "from now."

[There is a possibility that this is what the Magid Mishna meant even though he did not say so openly.]