Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
27.2.25
gemara bava kama pages 17, 18 and 19.
It occurred to me to mention here something that I have been puzzled about. It is this. There are two places in the Gemara Bava Kama where Rav Ashi is asking about the approach of Sumchos, but these two places do not seem to correspond. Also, there comes up the question in the Gemara about whether you go by the beginning or end, and there seems to be some connection with another question about whether you consider force of a force to be the same as a force?
But, perhaps it makes more sense to bring the subject itself as an introduction to explain what I am puzzled about. In some cases where an animal causes damages, one pays full damage. But, there is a case where the sages say one pays only half damages. That is, when an animal is walking, and steps on pebbles and they fly off and break a vessel. That is obligated in half damages according to the sages, but Sumchos holds that pays full damage. Rava asked about a case of force. Is force like the body of an animal, or not? Clearly, to Sumchos, it is like the body. But what about the sages? If it is like the body, then he should pay full damage. If not, he should not have to pay anything. Rava answered his own question, and said that everyone agrees force is like body. But the sages learn a law handed down from Sinai about half damages of pebbles to reduce full damages of force to half damages. You can see Rava thinks half damages comes to reduce payment, not increase from nothing to half.
Later Rava asked do you go by the start or the finish. The case that Rava is asking on is this. An animal stepped on a vessel, and it rolled away and then broke on a stone. If you go by the beginning, it is full damage. If you go by the end, it is half damage according to the sages. [Another example of this question would be: if one shot an arrow at a vessel, and then before it reached its destination, someone broke the vessel by a hammer. If the law goes by the start, that makes the first person obligated. Going by the finish would make the second person obligated.] The Gemara tried to answer this question by a braita that says in a case of force of a force where only half damage is required. The gemara answers this and says that braita is like Sumchos. The gemara then says that this cannot be so, since then Rav Ashi would have an answer to his question. [Rav Ashi would not have asked it if the answer was immediate and simple.] The question of Rav Ashi was, "If force of a force is like a force according to Sumchos or not?" The place page 19 where Rav Ashi asks this question however is somewhat different. There, he asks according to Sumchos, "Is force of a force like a force of not?' Does he learn the law of half damages and applies it to force of a force, or do he not? s
If Rav Ashi learns like Rava that the law of half damages come to reduce the fine, then this would mean that Sumchos holds if force of a force is like a force, then full payment would be required. But it might be that Rav Ashi learns that the law of half damages comes to increace required payment in a place that otherwise would not be obligated at all. Also, the two question of Rav Ashi seem to be related. One, If force of a force is like force or not? The other is if Sumchos learned to law of half damages at all? It seems reasonable to say that if he applies the law of half damages at all, it could only be by force of a force and that if he does not apply that law, then force of a force be might be completely not obligated at all, or that it might be obligated in full damages.
I would like to add that the Rosh holds that one can learn from the question of Rav Ashi about the approach of the sages. They would hold that force of a force is obligated in full damage, but the Tosphot and Rambam hold the sages would say in the case of force of a force that one is not obligated at all. Yet, the braita that the gemara brings (to answer the question of force of a force to the sages) says if a chicken scratchs the string holding the bucket, and it breaks and the bucket falls and breaks another vessel, that is half damage. Also, on page 22 Tosphot is apparently bringing a proof that force of a force is not obligated at all, and yet it is possible to learn that Gemara to be like the Rosh that it would be full damage. At any rate, that Gemara is hard to understand. Why ask in the first place, "For what is fire obligated?" R Yochanan says because of “his arrows” and Reish Lakish says because of his money. Why not answer because there is a verse in the Torah which says that fire is obligated? Also, why does Reish Lakish have to turn the situation of the dog carrying a loaf that has a burning coal in it to a having to be a case of the dog throwing the loaf. Maybe it is because he thinks if the dog would put it down that would be full damages? But at any rate, Tosphot says that R. Yochanan has to have the situation to be that the dog put the loaf down because if he would have thrown it, it would be force of his force which would be completely not obligated. I think Tophot means to say that R. Yochanan wants to explain the Mishna [that says if a dog carries a loaf with a coal inside to a stack of sheaves, and eats it, and the stack burns up, the obligation is that on the loaf full damages and half damage for the stack of sheaves.] that the burning the whole stack of sheaves is obligated in half damage, and so if the dog would have thrown the loaf, he would not be liable at all. But on the other hand, to R Yochanan, fire is because if his arrows, and arrows you throw, so maybe if the dog would have thrown the loaf, it would be full damages like the Rosh understands the law to the sages.
At any rate, one thing we can see is that the Gemara equates the question of Rava if we go by the start or finish to be the same as if force of his force is like his force or not. Thus, things are symmetric. Rava asked according to the sages if we go by the start or finish, that is if force of his force is like direct force or indirect. And the same question Rav Ashi asks according to sumchos. so, we see why Rav Ashi did not ask his question also according to the sages. And furthermore, since Raba said we go by the start, now we have an answer to the question of force of a force. Answer: It is like the force. so if an animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and then broke, even though it is a case of force of a force, we judge it to be like the direct force to the sages, and it obligated in half damage. That is definitely how the Rosh learns this subject. But how the Tosphot and Rambam learn it is beyond me at this point
However, I think that Tosphot holds that Bivi bar Abaye explained the Tosefta (Braita) to mean that the chicken is pushing the vessel until it broke, and so it does not imply that we go by the beginning, and therefore force of his force might be not like force. But still, that does not mean that to the sages it might be not obligated at all. But that is probably what Tosphot saw. That it cannot be completely obligated in full damages because then, it would be even more strict than direct force which is obligated only in half damages. so Tosphot holds that we learn from Bivi bar Abaye (who is the conclusion of the subject) that force of his force to the sages is not obligated at all. It could not be half damages because then it would be like direct force which the gemara shows that it cannot be since then Rava would have had a simple answer to his question. However, there is a question on this answer. It is this. In the question of Rava, if you go by the start or the end when the vessel is broken, he says openly that if you go by the end, that would be obligated in half damages. If you equate this with force of his force that cannot be like Tosphot and the Rambam who hold force of his force is completely not obligated at all. On the other hand, if you would go with the idea of Rava that it like force, then there is no difference between if it is like force or force of a force. I might mention here that the Tosephta itself is not a problem if you learn like Rav Bivi bar Abaye because the first damage is direct, and therefore obligated in full damage, Then the second vessel that is broken is the first force, not force of his force.
It occurred to me that the reason Tosphot and the Rambam both hold that force of a force is not obligated at all is because of the subject on pages 21 and 22. There the Mishna says if a dog carries a loaf of bread with a burning coal inside it to a stack of sheaves and it is burned up, the owner of the dog pays full damage for the loaf and half damage for the hay stack. There R. Yochanan ay fire is obligated because of "his arrows” and the case of the Mishna is when the dog placed the loaf on the haystack. That would be first degree force. Therefore, o if the dog threw the loaf or dragged it along the haystack, that would be second degree force and that would be not obligated at all. so Tosphot and the Rambam both said to themselves, even though the situation of force of a force is doubtful to Rava, it is clear to R. Yochanan. and also it could be that even Reish Lakish agrees since he in fact say that if the dog threw the loaf on the haystack, the owner of the dog is not obligated at all [but the owner of the coal would be obligated if he did not put that coal in a place that was guarded.]
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It occurred to me to mention here something that I have been puzzled about. It I this. There are two places in the בבא קמא where רב אשיis asking about the approach of סומכוס but these two place do not seem to correspond. Alo there come up the question in the גמרא about whether you go by the beginning or end and there reem to be some connection with another question about whether you consider force of a force to be the same a force. But perhaps it makes more sense to bring the subject itself as an introduction to explain what I am puzzled about. In some case where an animal cause damages one pays full damage. But there is a case where the חכמים say one pays only half damages. That Is when an animal is walking, and steps on pebbles and they fly off and break a vessel. That is obligated in half damages according to the חכמים , but סומכוס holds that pays full damage. רבא asked about a case of force. Is force like the body of an animal or not. Clearly, to סומכוס it is like the body. But what about theחכמים ? If it is like the body, then he should pay full damages. If not, he should not have to pay anything. רבא answered his own question and אמר everyone agrees force is like body. But the חכמים learn a law handed down from Sinai about half damages of pebble to reduce full damages of force to half damages. You can see רבאthinks the law of half damages comes to reduce payment, not increase from nothing to half. Later רבא asked,” Do you go by the start or the finish.” An example of this question would be if one shot an arrow at a vessel and then before it reached it destination someone broke the vessel by a hammer. If the law goes by the start, that makes the first person obligated. Going by the finish would make the second person obligated. The גמרא tried to answer this question by a ברייתא that say in a case of force of a force where only half damage I required. The גמראanswers this and says that ברייתא is סומכוס. The גמרא then says that this cannot be so since then רב אשי would have an answer to his question. [רב אשי would not have asked it if the answer was immediate and simple] The question of רב אשי was If force of a force like a force according to סומכוס or not. The place where רב אשי asks this question however הוא somewhat different. There he asks according to סומכוס is force of a force like a force of not? Does he learn the law of half damages and apply it to force of a force or do he not? If רב אשי learns like רבא that the law of half damage come to reduce the fine, then this would mean that סומכוס hold if force of a force is like a force, then full payment required. But it might be that רב אשי learn that the law of half damage come to required payment in a place that otherwise would not be obligated at all. Also, the two question of רב אשי seem to be related. One If force of a force is like force or not. The other if סומכוס learned to law of half damage at all. It seems reasonable to say that if he applies the law of half damage at all it could only be by force of a force and that if he does not apply that law then force of a force be might be completely not obligated at all or that it might be obligated in full damage. I would like to add that the רא''ש holds that one can learn from the question of רב אשי about the approach of the חכמים. They would hold that force of a force is obligated in full
damage, but the תוספות and רמב''םhold the חכמים would say in the case of force of a force that one is not obligated at all.
Also, on page כ''ב תוספות is apparently brining a proof that force of a force is not obligated at all, and yet it is possible to learn that גמרא to be like the רא''ש that it would be full damage. And at any rate that גמרא is hard to understand. Why ask in the first place "For what is fire obligated?" ר' יוחנן says because of “his arrows” and ריש לקיש says because of his money. Why not answer because there is a verse in the תורה which says that fire is obligated? Also, why does ריש לקישhave to turn the situation of the dog carrying a loaf that has a burning coal in it to a having to be a case of the dog throwing the loaf. Maybe it is because he thinks if the dog would put it down that would be full damages? But at any rate, תוספות says that ר' יוחנן has to have the situation to be that the dog put the loaf down because if he would have thrown it, it would be force of his force which would be completely not obligated. I think תוספות means to say that ר' יוחנן want to explain the משנה that the burning the whole stack of sheaves is obligated in half damage, and so if the dog would have thrown the loaf, he would not be liable at all. But on the other hand, toר' יוחנן , fire is because if his arrows, and arrows you throw, so maybe if the dog would have thrown the loaf, it would be full damages like the רא''ש understands the law to the חכמים.
At any rate, one thing we can see is that the גמרא equates the question of רבא if we go by the start or finish to be the same as if force of his force is like his force or not. Thus, things are symmetric. רבא asked according to the חכמיםif we go by the start or finish, that is if force of his force is like direct force or indirect. And the same question רב אשי asks according to סומכוס. so, we see why רב אשי did not ask his question also according to the חכמים. And furthermore, since רבה said we go by the start, now we have an answer to the question of force of a force. Answer: It is like the force. so if an animal stepped on a vessel and it rolled away and then broke, even though it is a case of force of a force we judge it to be like the direct force to the sages and it obligated in half damage. That is definitely how the רא''ש learns this subject. But how the תוספות and רמב''ם learn it is beyond me at this point
However, I think that תוספות holds that ביבי בר אביי explained the תוספתא.(ברייתא) to mean that the chicken is pushing the vessel until it broke and so it does not imply that we go by the beginning, and therefore force of force might be not like force. But till that does not mean that to the חכמיםit might be not obligated at all. But that is probably what תוספות saw. That it cannot be completely obligated in full damage because then it would be even more strict than direct force which is obligated only in half damages. so תוספותholds that we learn from ביבי בר אביי (who is the conclusion of the subject) that force of his force to the חכמים is not obligated at all. It could not be half damages because then it would be like direct force which the גמרא shows that it cannot be since then רבא would have had a simple answer to his question
However, there is a question on this answer. It is this. In the question of רבא , if you go by the start or the end when the vessel is broken, he says openly that if you go by the end, that would be obligated in half damages. If you equate this with force of his force that cannot be like תוספותand the רמב''ם who hold force of his force is completely not obligated at all. On the other hand, if you would go with the idea of רבא that it like force, then there is no difference between if it is like force or force of a force. I might mention here that the תוספתא itself is not a problem if you learn like רב ביבי בר אביי because the first damage is direct and therefore obligated in full damage, Then the second vessel that is broken is the first force, not force of his force.
It occurred to me that the reason תוספותand the רמב''םboth hold that force of a force is not obligated at all is because of the subject on pages ב''א and כ''ב. There the משנה says if a dog carries a loaf of bread with a burning coal inside it to a stack of sheaves and it is burned up, the owner of the dog pays full damage for the loaf and half damage for the hay stack. There ר' יוחנן אמר fire is obligated because of "his arrows” and the case of the משנה is when the dog placed the loaf on the haystack. That would be first degree force. Therefore, o if the dog threw the loaf or dragged it along the haystack, that would be second degree force and that would be not obligated at all. so תוספותand the רמב''ם both said to themselves, even though the situation of force of a force is doubtful to רבא, it is clear toר' יוחנן . and also, it could be that even ריש לקיש agrees since he in fact say that if the dog threw the loaf on the haystack, the owner of the dog is not obligated at all [but the owner of the coal would be obligated if he did not put that coal in a place that was guarded.