I should mention that the way I learned Torah was mainly influenced by the two yeshivas I went to in NY. One place was for in depth learning that was mainly interested in what was going on on that page. The next place--the Mir in N.Y. was  more about how what was going on on the page fit in with the rest of the Talmud. I benefited from both approaches and I think that both approaches are implicit in what God has granted to me to write in these two booklets.

My background in California was Temple Israel in Hollywood. I had learned some Torah in Newport Beach before we moved to Beverly Hills, but I don't remember where or who. It was certainly Reform, but I don't remember what was the name.  But I gained a great deal at Temple Israel. I think the rabbi's name was Nussbaum.
[Later my family had a different rabbi,  Rabbi Roth, who is Reconstructionist. I don't know him very well because I was in NY, and later went to Israel. But he has been the family rabbi for my family for a long time.] [I should mention that I think Reform Temples are good, but we should learn more Torah.]
Incidentally, I see I wrote on my blog a lot of ideas about Shabat that never got into the Hebrew book. Most of the essays I found by typing Chaim Soloveitchik Shabat. But I have to look over them to see what I was saying.
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Ok Here is what I wrote in English that I was looking for:

"The question on this is that something not intended is not at all the same thing as being obligated a sin offering. So I still have to do some thinking about this way of explaining what Reb Chaim might be getting at. Until I can get this idea past my learning partner, I don't want to present it as anything but ad hoc.
I would like to say there is a connection between not intended and normal sin offerings. My idea is that sin offerings need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on Shabat that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to Abyee. So some knowledge is needed to be liable--but not too much. And that is what makes something an accident."


What I seem to be saying is that in the Gemara we have R Yehuda and R Shimon. R Shimon is says מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה  and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not liable. R Yehuda says they are both liable. Shmuel goes by R Yehuda in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like R Shimon in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the Rambam goes. What I seem to be asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all sin offerings that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing--but not too much.

But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me. 

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The question on this is that דבר שאינו מתכווין is not at all the same thing as being מחויב חטאת. But there is a connection between דבר שאינו מתכווין and normal חויב חטאת. My idea is that חטאות need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on שבת that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to אביי. So some knowledge is needed to be liable, but not too much. And that is what makes something an שוגג.


In the גמרא we have רבי יהודה and רבי שמעון. The opinion of  רבי שמעון is  מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה  and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not מחויב. But רבי יהודה says they are both liable. שמואל goes by רבי יהודה in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like רבי שמעון in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the רמב''ם goes. What I am asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all קרבן חטאת that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing, but not too much.

But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me. 

השאלה: דבר שאינו מתכווין הוא בכלל לא אותו הדבר כמו להיות מחויב חטאה. אבל יש לומר שישקשר בין הדבר שאינו מתכווין וחויב חטאת. הרעיון שלי הוא שצריך בחטאות מידה מסוימת של ידע, אלא שלא להיות בפועל מתכוון. למשל להרים צנון בשבת שבמחשבתו   הוא כבר הורם אבל התברר להיות מחובר לאדמה אינו מחויב חטאת, אלא לחתוך אותו  מחויב חטאת לאביי. אז יש צורך בקצת ידע להיות מחויב, אבל לא יותר מדי ידע. וזה מה שעושה משהו שוגג. בגמרא יש לנו  רבי שמעון ורבי יהודה. דעתו של רבי שמעון היא מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה ודבר שאינו מתכווין שניהם לא מחויבים. אבל רבי יהודה אומר שניהם מחויבים. שמואל סובר כרבי יהודה במלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה וכמו רבי שמעון בדבר שאינו מתכווין וכך לרמב''ם . מה שאני שואל הוא שהדבר שאינו מתכווין גם אם הוא פסיק רישא עדיין לא צריך להיות מחויב. תירוץ: מדוע היא מחויב? בגלל שזה דבר הנורמלי בכל קרבן חטאת שאנחנו צריכים שהבן אדם קצת ידע על מה שהוא עושה, אבל לא יותר מדי

I should mention that to be obligated in a sin offering one needs one of two lacks of knowledge. He might not know that the action is forbidden. But he knows what he is doing. The other thing is he did something by accident. See the Mishna LeMelech at chapter two of the Rambam's Hilchot Shegagot.
It is this second kind of accident that I am referring to in the above essay.

 If one serves an idol from love thinking that that is allowed then he brings a sin offering. If on purpose then that is the death penalty. If he makes a mistake in material facts like if the statue is in fact an idol, then we see right in the Talmud itself that Abyee says, "that is nothing."



Now we find in tractate Shabat that there is an argument between Abyee and Rava about cutting a radish and it turns out that it was attached. Abyee says he is liable a sin offering. Rava says no.[Shabat 72b]. But in the case where he picked up a radish and it tuned out that it was attached then both agree he is not liable. So what do we have from this? This: if one picks up a radish on shabat thinking that it is allowed to do so then he brings a sin offering. If he did not know it was attached it is nothing. Exactly like idolatry.--except it is not exact. What is the difference between this and cutting the radish?


What I suggest is to look at Shmuel in Kritut where he discusses the Mishna about what kind of accidents are liable and what kind not. [circa pages 19, 20]. The fact is he requires both intention and thought, to be liable. And though it is hard to see how this can help us right now, still I think it is an important area to keep in ind because of the essential fact that the Rambam's opinion about work not intended and work not needed for its own sake comes directly from Shmuel.  So whatever Shmuel thinks is going to be directly related to anything the Rambam says.

I did not know the date of my mother's death. I had always observed it on the Hebrew calender. But my younger brother wrote and mentioned at it was today on the English calendar.

My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.

The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To  make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.

mp3 folder

I have been looking at Musar (Ethics) books for a while and at some point I started to notice that they  divide a persons obligations into two parts. בין אדם לחיברו and בין אדם למקום- Between man and his fellow man and between man and God.

You find some people stress one area over the other. But from what I can tell the books of Musar have the viewpoint that both areas are important.

What that means in a practical vein is that if you want to repent, you would have to look at each different area individually. That is probably so hard that you can see why some people stress one area over the other. And there might not be any choice but to take that approach. Still it is important to realize that at least in theory ones' obligations are divided evenly between these two areas.

Though the source of obligation is Divine the approach in Musar that the obligations between man and man precede those between man an God.  See Nahar Shalaom of Shalom Sharabi where he gives a mystic reason for this.

The evil inclination is also divided into two parts. One physical and the other spiritual. The spiritual is the tricky one. That is the one that gets and impersonates a Torah scholar and gets people to sin as they think they are doing a great mitzvah.

 "The evil inclination is dressed in Mitzvot." That is the evil inclination does not try to seduce people with "Let's go and do a sin."  It says rather, "Let's go and do a mitzvah."

Tracate Yoma about work on Shabat

  יומא ל''ד ע''ב


האם זה אפשרי שמשהו יהיה דבר שאינו מתכווין ועדיין להיות מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
  אני מציע שזה יכול להיות. תן לי להסביר. אפשר שמלאכה שצריכה לגופה אין שום קשר עם כוונה. אחרי הכל אין שום דבר האמור בזה על כוונה.  הדבר היחיד שחשוב הוא האם  נצרך  או לא. אבל בתוספות ביומא ל''ד וכריתות נראה כי תוספות חושבים שלא מדובר במשתנים בלתי תלויים. יכול להיות מתכווין ועדיין מלאכה שאינה צריך לגופה, אבל לא להפך. הדוגמא הקלסית היא לחפור בור למטרה אחרת מאשר למטרת שלשם חפירה שנעשתה במשכן. כלומר הוא צריך העפר, לא בור. אבל כפי שניתן לראות בתוספות בכריתות, תוספות שם מחזיק אלה הם עצמאיים. יכול להיות דבר שאינו מתכווין אבל הוא עדיין צריך לגופה. אז מה הוא שיש לנו שלושה רעיונות בסיסיים של מה היא מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה. בשבת יש לנו רבינו יצחק, תוספות בכריתות, ותוספות בתחילת בבא קמא. אני רוצה להזכיר שאלות על תוספות זה בגמרא הכריתות יש לנו המקרה של הפיכה של גחלים 

Is it possible for something to be דבר שאינו מתכווין  and still be a מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
 But I suggest there can be. Let us say we understand a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה has nothing to do with כוונה. After all there is nothing mentioned in it about כוונה. Rather the only thing that matters is whether it is נצרך or not.


In the תוספות  in יומא ל''ד  and כריתות it seems  that תוספות thinking that these are not independent variables. Rather something can be מתכווין and yet מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. But not להפך. The classical example is digging a hole for a purpose other than the purpose for which digging was done in the משכן. That is he needs the עפר, not the בור.

But as we can see in the תוספות in כריתות, the תוספות there holds these are independent. One can have a דבר שאינו מתכווין but it is still צריכה לגופה


So what we have in is three basic ideas of what is a מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה.  In שבת we have רבינו יצחק, the תוספות in כריתות that I am dealing with in this next essay, and the תוספות in the beginning of בבא קמא


\

I wanted to mention questions on this תוספות

In גמרא כריתות we have the case of turning over coals. For turning over the bottom coals רבי שמעון says he is not obligated. תוספות says there are three reasons to say he is ought to be obligated in a sin offering. It is מלאכת מחשבת and it is  damaging by fire which רבי שמעון says is obligated, and it is a case of   דבר שאינו מתכווין שהוא פסיק רישא. So why is he not obligated ? Answer תוספות. A מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
Then why, תוספות asks, does not the גמרא say this? Why does it say the case is דבר שינו מתכווין? Answer to show the strength of רבי יהודה who says even though it is דבר שינו מתכווין, he is still obligated in a sin offering.

תוספות then approaches the גמרא in גמרא שבת דף ק''ג ע''א. There he is picking עולשים that can be eaten. If he does it to eat, then to רבי שמעון he is obligated only once and not for the additional obligation of making his field look nicer. But we ask is it not דבר שאינו מתכווין אינו מכווין בפסיק רישא?
 Answer: It is someone else's field.
That is just the straight גמרא.
The two questions on תוספות concerns the way he treats this later גמרא.
Question one: תוספות is satisfied with his being not obligated in someone else's field since it is אינו מכווין בפסיק רישא . This is in direct contradiction to what he said in כריתות concerning the parallel case of coals.
Think about it. The Gemara said R Shimon should have said it is liable and then answered it פסיק רישא ודבר שאינו מתכווין. But back in Kritut we said some thing can be that exact case and be liable. In fact it was listed by Tosphot as a reason to be liable!!!! The only reason in Kritut it is not is because מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה

Actually I just looked at my notes in Hebrew and I saw that I wrote there that this is in fact the intention of Tosphot--that is to ask on the previous idea in Kritut.




Question Two. In his own field, we should also make a distinction if it is  מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה or not.

The second question is really just a note, but not really a קושיה.


תוספות says the reason in כריתות that the גמרא said it is a case of דבר שאינו מתכווין שאינו פסיק רישא is because it wanted to show the strength of רבי יהודה. So why, תוספות asks, then in a later on case when he draws the coals closer to himself, the גמרא does not say the same thing? Why does it say it is a case of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה?

Answer: In drawing coals it could be that he does not mind if they get hotter. So the גמרא can't say it is not intended. Only in the case of turning over coals in which case he is against the idea of the bottom coals getting hotter. He would rather they would not . But he simply has no choice since he has to get the top ones to the bottom of the pile where they will cool down and  become usable coals. My point here is that תוספות says that even so, רבי שמעון would say he is obligated to bring a sin offering except for the fact that it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה .

So why then in גמרא שבת is תוספות satisfied with the fact that it being דבר שאינו מתכווין שאינו פסיק רישא  makes him not obligated even thought it is simply a case of his not caring whether the field gets improvement in value.

I probably should mention here that I do not mind if he is not obligated in שבת ק''ג because it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. I only wish that that would be the reason that the גמרא or תוספות would use over there.

My learning partner made a suggestion that perhaps תוספות meant for the original three means of being obligated to רבי שמעון  were meant to work together. I.e.  that the idea דבר שאינו מתכווין שהוא פסיק רישא with the idea of מקלקל by fire.  Maybe תוספות meant for those three original means to be obligated to work together. But if you look at the actual language of תוספות you can see that is not what he says. But at least it might save תוספות in a conceptual manner, even if it is not exactly what he said.



[1] Work done not for its own sake. Classical example. Digging a pit for the dirt, not for the hole to plant in.
Work not intended: Classical example. He does something permitted but something forbidden might result.
פסיק רישא is he does something permitted, but something forbidden must result.

[3] There is a third question also on the same תוספות. It concerns the issue of how תוספות treats the גמרא in כריתות. In that גמרא there is a case where someone pulls burning coals closer to himself. the גמרא itself says it is not obligated in a  sin offering because it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה

Now to some degree we can accept this. We already are understanding that the only time lighting a fire is חייב is when he needs the coals. I might like to argue about this here but I am anxious to get to a much more glaring difficulty. Before תוספות says one of the three reasons רבי שמעון would say tuning over the bottom coals is חייב is that even though it is אינו מתכווין it would be חייב for even מקלקל by אש is obligated. I mean to say that תוספות. That is, you do not need intention to be חייב for lighting a fire. So even if he thinks he is pulling apples closer to him, he would be obligated in a קרבן חטאת. how then do we say he is not obligated because of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה? That is for רבי שמעון you do not need מלאכת מחשבת for fire.

I saw a small booklet with a picture of Yaakov Abuchatzeira on it. [You know the one. It is all over the place.] I have to admit whenever I see a picture of Yaakov Abuchatzeira or his grandson Bava Sali  I get the shivers. The Fear of God gets into me. You might ask well then why not go for it? Find some descendant of that family? The reason for my hesitation is several fold.

First of all I am trying to combine for myself several aspects of the service of God. That is I try to divide my day into small sessions so that I can accomplish a small amount in every field that I feel is important. That means learning Torah and prayer and also involvement in the natural sciences.

In any case the Abuchatzaira thing I should say is for Sephardi people mainly. There is a great deal of tension when an Ashkenazic Jew shows up in a Sephardi neighborhood. Inevitably there is some hot head who makes it his business to get rid of the Ashkenazic guy no matter how nice he tries to be.
But the actual family of  Abuchatzaira tend to be pretty holy people. So to go to them for  a blessing certainly makes sense.

In fact if you are near Netivot I recommend going to Shimon Buso for a blessing. He is a grandson of Bava Sali from the side of one of Bava Sali's daughters.

Also I have to say the basic path of Bava Sali was straight forward. What he did and what he recommended to others was nothing more that learn and keep Torah in the most basic and simple fashion possible with no side dishes.


Each group of Sephardi and Ashkenazim seems to have its pluses and minuses. But for an Ashkenazi fellow to meander into a Sephardi areas is a guaranteed invitation for disaster. On the other hand whenever there is some Ashkenazic Rav that wants a following around him, and lacks the right amount of talent for that, he goes to some Sephardic community and recruits them and he gets his own cult of followers.
In fact, almost every well known Ashkenazic group you can think of was made in exactly this way.

q41 in mp3 format   [q41 in midi]   q41 in nwc

insane religious "frum" world.

How to improve one's character?  Musar.


It might not be the best way to work on ones character. It might not even be that effective. But Israel Salanter thought learning books that were written to instill good character is the best type of way of going about thus that he saw. I mean you could ask what good does it do to learn about good character? Still compared to whatever else he saw this was the most effective means. You could say the Boy Scouts of the USA had the same purpose in mind. But you see where they have fallen to.


From what I can tell Musar has very limited effectiveness.


Musar  can lead to fanaticism. And today it seems to have in fact become associated with being extra frum. That seems like an aberration from its intended purpose.

The main problem I think there is with the way Musar is practiced today is the idea of social norms. People assume the message of Musar is to be frum (religious) as defined by the generally insane religious "frum" world.  Musar after all does say to keep all the commandments of the Oral and Written Law. But where they are wrong is they think Musar says to keep the social norms of the  religious world. I should say I am completely against being frum and against trying to get people to be frum. Being frum (religious) and keeping Torah are two exact opposites.
In what way can you see this? In the area of social norms. Torah itself has no concern or interest in any one's opinions or conventions.

Let me see if I can make this clear. The religious  world is accustomed to going off in certain directions crusading for one cause or the other. These are most often against the Torah. But they present their crusade as being a part and parcel of keeping Torah.

That is the most obvious area. But there are many others --more subtle things. How it comes out in the end is if you want to keep Torah, stay away from the frum as far as you can possibly get. However Lithuanian yeshivas do  make an effort in keeping the Torah like it says in the most basic and simple way. So even if they may seem frum their center of attention is in fact the Torah so that makes them OK. [But the kelipa of frumkeit does seems to have infiltrated them to some degree.]

In almost every major Torah principle that I can think of the frum are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Examples.
Learning Torah is one area for example. Their major concern is to make money off of the Torah.
Honor of one's parents.
Settling in Israel or at least support for Israel.
Monotheism.
Kindness for its own sake. I.e where do you go in a time of emergency? Who will help you in a time of emergency. Not the frum. If you find yourself out of luck they will do their best to push you down further.

Conservative or Reform are good places but the frum are a trap.

Though I can't compare myself to Rav Shach in any way, but I should mention that he was not afraid to voice criticisms in public. And when he was asked about it he quoted a Mishna: "Any argument that is for the sake of Heaven will be established."
Of course he did not exact win any popularity contests. But he certainly wrote the most important Torah book to come out in the last hundred years.

Bava Metzia page 14
 A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the improvements. Rav said the buyer gets the amount of the improvements from the thief along with the money he paid for it. Shmuel said he does not get the improvements.
Tosphot says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page 101 where someone goes into  a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.

I wanted today to say what is bothering Tosphot. I did not put that in my essay yesterday since I thought it was enough that at least I said what Tosphot was thinking. But today I wanted to say why he is thinking what he is thinking. He is bothered by several questions.  Lets say the case is the improvement is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the improvement directly to Rav? And it seems strange that on page 101 a  someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on pg 14  gets nothing to Samuel. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering Tosphot. Thus Tosphot comes up with an elegant solution.--He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did--but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.

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 A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the שבח. The law is this.  רב said the buyer gets the amount of the שבח from the thief along with the money he paid for it. שמואל said he does not get the שבח.
On page 14 תוספות says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page ק''א where someone goes into  a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.

I wanted today to say what is bothering תוספות.  He is bothered by several questions.  Let us say the case is the שבח is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the שבח directly in the opinion of רב? And it seems strange that on page ק''א a  someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on page י''ד  gets nothing to שמואל. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering תוספות. Thus תוספות comes up with an elegant solution. He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did, but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.

פה אני מסביר למה תוספות אומר מה שהוא אומר. שדה נגנב. הגנב מכר אותו והקונה עבד עליו. אז השדה חוזר לבעלים עם השבח. החוק הוא זה. רב אמר הקונה מקבל את סכום השבח מהגנב יחד עם הכסף שהוא שילם על זה. שמואל אמר שהוא אינו מקבל את השבח. בעמוד י''ד תוספות אומר שזה אותו העיקרון שחל כמוחל על דף ק''א שבו מישהו נכנס לשדה של מי שהוא ונטע עצי שדה וצמחים. שם הבעלים משלמים או השבח או ההוצאה לפי הנמוך מביניהם. אני רוצה לומר היום מה מטריד את התוספות. תן לי לומר המקרה הוא השבח הוא פחות. אז מדוע הבעלים לא נותנים לקונה את סכום השבח ישירות בדעתו של רב? עוד שאלה: זה נראה מוזר שעל דף ק''א מישהו שהולך ישירות לתוך שדה מישהו  שהוא מקבל תשלום הסכום שהוא שיפר את השדה בעוד הקונה על י''ד הדף אינו מקבל שום דבר לשמואל. זה אולי הדבר העיקרי שמטריד את תוספות. כך תוספות מגיע עם פתרון אלגנטי. הוא אומר שזה אותו העיקרון בשני המקומות. כלומר הוא חושב שהקונה מהגנב גם מקבל תשלום עבור העבודה שהוא עשה, אלא שהוא מקבל את הסכום ישירות מהבעלים.

Music for the glory of the God of Israel.

q41 mp3   q41 midi   w41 nwc format

I should mention that Mozart sometimes takes a motif into 5 or three measures instead of what you would usually expect. I am not sure why he does this but I feel that if he thinks it is OK to do so --well that is good enough for me also.  Go and check and you will see that Mozart does this more often than people are aware of.

Bava Metzia 14b 101a

I wanted to preface my remarks with thanks to God for granting me even a little bit of learning Torah. I wish I could do it like it is supposed to be done but I don't have the merit for that. My sins block my way to Torah. But when God grants me to see the light from the deep dark places I have fallen to I am enormously grateful.

The case here is you have a thief. He took a field and he sold it. The field goes back to it original owner. The thief has to give back the money he took. But what happens if the buyer spend money and time planting trees? Or maybe he did other kinds of improvement? Now the field goes back to the original owner with the improvement who pays the buyer? Rav said logically enough the thief pays for the improvement. That makes abundant sense. So here is my essay on this



You have a thief and the owner and the buyer of a field. Rav said מעות יש לו שבח יש לו.(lit he gets money and improvement.) I.e. The buyer gets the price of the field and  שבח (improvement) from the thief. On page 101 you have a person that went into the field of his friend without permission and planted trees. The owner there  has to pay either the improvement or the expense which ever was less (ידי על התחתונה). Tosphot says this is the same case and the same law.

[note: the Rambam and Rashi have a different approach. I am only trying to deal with Tosphot here.]

It occurred to me what this Tosphot means. The question you have to think about to make this all clear is who pays whom?

To Rav the owner pays the thief for the improvement, and then the thief pays the buyer. But to Shmuel the thief does not pay the buyer for the improvement. But to Samuel the buyer goes to the owner and gets back the same amount that was fixed on page 101.



בבא מציעא יד: קא.
אני רוצה לפתוח את דבריי בתודה לאלוהים על שהעניק לי אפילו קצת לימוד תורה. הלוואי שהייתי יכול לעשות את זה כמו שהוא אמור לעשות, אבל אין לי את הזכות לזה. החטאים שלי חוסמים את הדרך לתורה. אבל כאשר אלוהים מעניק לי לראות את האור מהמקומות העמוקים והאפלים שנפלתי אני מאוד אסירת תודה.

יש לך גנב ובעל הבית ולוקח שדה. בעמוד יד: רב אמר קרן יש לו שבח יש לו. לוקח מקבל שבח מהגנב. בעמוד קא. יש לך אדם שנכנס לשדה של חברו ללא רשות ונטע עצים. הבעלים שם יש להם לשלם וידי הנוטע על התחתונה. בעמוד יד: תוספות אומר שזה אותו המקרה ואותו החוק.  לרב הבעלים משלמים לגנב השבח (או היציאה איזה שהוא פחות), ולאחר מכן הגנב משלם הקונה את כל השבח. (אם הבעלים נתנו לו רק היציאה בגלל שזה פחות אז הגנב צריך לשלם את היתר להגיע לסכום של כל השבח). אבל לשמואל הגנב אינו משלם הקונה לשיפור. אבל לשמואל הקונה הולך לבעלים ומקבל בחזרה את אותה כמות שהיה קבועה בעמוד קא., או השבח או היציאה

Ideas in Talmud

\Idea in Bava Metzia version C

The reason these are here again is I had to do editing and God granted to me an answer I had to a question on Tosphot on Bava Metzia page 14

See the "letter of ethics"  אגרת המוסר of Reb Israel Salanter



There is what one could call a physical evil inclination. That is what you might say is the desires and bad character traits that are just a part of being human. This evil inclination has aspects of hatred, anger, desires, greed, etc. There is also a spiritual evil inclination that is cunning. It excels in getting a person to fall into traps, it is what we usually call the Satan. It hates good because it is good. And it affects mainly people that have been freed from the first level of evil inclination. So you usually find the greatest evil in people that you would normally consider to be saints. They in fact are saints since they have been freed from hatred and anger and greed etc, but that instead of making them  better, it just exposes them to the more subtle level of evil inclination the actual Satan.

What irony it is that when a person wants to find a true saint for guidance, that he finds instead a person who has in fact killed his lower evil inclination, but is subject to the higher evil inclination.
and you can  SEE THIS ALL THE TIME. You have perfectly normal well adjusted kids that find some so called tzadik and then they become disaster zones.

And this tzadik because he has killed his passions and separated himself from the pleasures of this world has in fact spiritual powers. But since he is subject to the Satan the powers are used in the wrong ways.

In a practical sense this is all too simple. Don't go to tzadikim.


Rather learn and keep Torah just like it says.

As far as Kabalah is concerned it is usually very damaging. Not that it is bad. But people in general just are not properly prepared. Mainly the problem is because of pseudo Kabalah. Some try to make a buck off of it by presenting their own messed up versions. So if you can manage to get through the Talmud a few times then it is time to plow into the writings of Isaac Luria.

 It seems many people have some kind of problems that they find unsolvable.

Sometimes people have been labeled schizo or some pseudo scientific label. 

My advice is 

First of all stop trying to be normal, The more you try, the worse things are. Try to just be yourself. Don't try to fit into any mold that others have labeled normal. Maybe you are normal and they are crazy? In fact I am sure all the people that label others with psychological labels, certainly are insane. That is 100% certain. But still even after all that you do have problems.But that is just being human. You just have to do your best every day to be good and learn Musar [Classical and medieval Ethics] and Torah. That means  a very specific set of classical ethics. חובות לבבות אורחות צדיקים מסילת ישרים נפש החיים המספיק לעובד השם שערי תשובה ספר הישר של רבינו תם

For a more general audience I would recommend Shimshon Refael Hirsh's Horev.

I should mention that the Musar movement itself produced some very good books. The direct disciples of Israel Salanter wrote some excellent stuff, like the מדגרת האדם. That is a  very powerful character changing book that really gets the idea about trust in God into you.

Recently Musar has seemed to gone off in some tangents. Some seem to be "frumaks" that is people that make being frum [religious] into a business. But that is because every good thing can be used for bad also.
Some people find in Musar reason to cease working and depend on charity or to be against Israel or weird kinds of pantheism. This is lamentable. Musar is simply a tool for character improvement and fear of God. It is not meant to advance any political agenda.

Isaac Luria's major book the Eitz Chaim was called a great Musar book 


And this in fact is true. But it is also a dangerous tool. What I think is to learn Isaac Luria's book in the context of regular Torah study and not to "make a thing" out of it. People that "make a thing" of kabalah tend to ריבוי אור--too much bright light that breaks the vessels. It is best to work on the Ari after finishing Shas a few times.


The best approach to Musar and Kabalah is to do both in the context of a straight Lithuanian yeshiva in which most of the day the Gemara is learned in depth. That context provides a protective shield against the dark side which tries to take hold of a person when it sees him involved in such things.

Music for the glory of the God of Israel

q37


q38

The way I have done the Shofar is _________  the length of three beats then ___ ___ ___  for exactly three beats. Then ... ... ... ... ... ...  for six beats. Then the original three beats again. That is to say for the truah I do exactly 18 short bursts that last double the original tekia. This is subject to an argument. Some hold the length of the whole truah has to be the same length as the original tekia. And each burst a third of each of the individual shevarim.

I am not saying I have any great ideas about this. It is after all subject to debate and I went with the opinion that even the other opinion would hold to be valid. Look it up in Shulchan Aruch of Joseph Karo and you will see.  There was another reason I choose this opinion. It was that the 9 short burst truah opinion seemed to have some problems involved in it.

So the first thing is tekia _________. Shevarim ___ ___ ___;   (a going up sound). Then truah ... ... ... ... ... ... Then Tekia _________.
I did have some thoughts about the idea of setting Rosh HaShanah to correspond with the actual conjunction of the sun and moon --which is called the molad. And I already wrote  a little about that I think. mainly I based this idea on Tosphot in Sanhedrin 10.

) סנהדרין י: רב אשי אמר שבית דין אין מקדשים את הלבנה, אלא מחשבים את המולד. התוספות מביאים דעה אחת שראש חודש תמיד מתחיל בזמן המולד [היינו יש שנייה אחת שהשמש והירח הם ביחד בדיוק על קו מאונך זקוף. היום שהשנייה הזאת נופלת בו, הוא ראש חודש]. (ולפי הדעה הזאת בתוספות, זאת דעת רבא ורב אשי.) וגם תוספות מביאים גמרא ירושלמי שמשמע כזה, וגם רש''י כאן על הדף משמע כזה. ("קדשו אתו בית דין של מעלה מאתמול"). נראה לי שזאת מחלוקת בין גמרות.  שבמסכת ראש השנה משמע שהכול תלוי בראיה או אפשרות של ראיה (בסוגיא של ריש לקיש ורבי יוחנן שם). הכסף משנה  בהלכות יובל איפה שהרמב''ם מחשב את תאריך היובלות והשמיטות הולך בשיטה הזאת שראש חודש והמולד הם אותו דבר

Bava Metzia 14 b third Tosphot.

We have the case of a lender a borrower and the borrower had a field (field 1) at the time of the loan. After that he bought a second field. Then he sold the first field (field 1). The usual way a loan is written is "Whatever I will buy can be used to pay for this loan." Then he sells the second field.

The lender goes after the first field (field 1) and the buyer goes after the second field (field 2).

Tosphot asks so let's prove from this that, "What I will buy" and he sells, what he then bought is not obligated.

There are four possible reasons why the lender did not collect from the second field.
That is there are four things that can cause the lender to go after the first field.
The fact that Tospot says the only possible reason is the reason he gives shows that Tosphot holds no other reason can be valid.


Reason 1: The reason Tosphot gives. There is not any "shiabud" or what I think in English is called a lean or an obligation.
Reason 2: We always say the  buyer can tell the lender "I left a place for you to collect from" does not work after the second field was sold.
Reason 3: The lender had to go after the first field,
Reason 4: The lender could have gone after the first field if he had wanted to, or the second. In our case he decided to go after the first field, but he could have gone after the second one.

In all four cases the second field would not have been touched.
What we see from the question of Tosphot is that Tosphot considers the other three reasons as invalid.

The Maharshal {Shelomo Luria} and the Maharam Shif both say the same thing.  That from the question of Tosphot we see that when we always say "The buyer can tell the lender, 'I left a place for you to collect from,'" that applies even after the second field was sold.

What I want to point out further is that we see Tosphot does not hold from the third or fourth reason either. Tosphot holds there is no option. The lender must go after the second field. I want to point out that even if there had been a option for the lender to go after either field, then Tosphot would not have had any proof of his thesis. So it has to be the case that the only possible reason the second field was left is the reason Tosphot gives--that when one says, "What I will buy will be obligated to this loan" after he sells it, it is not obligated.

That is this is simple process of elimination Tosphot says the reason the second field was left is reason 1. Therefore Tosphot must hold reason 2 and 3 and 4 are not valid.  So Tosphot says he had to go after field one and the reason can only be because of reason 1.

Why am I pointing this out you might ask? Because of the simple fact that the there is some doubt about this point. Because there is a Maharsha on Tosphot in Bava Basra 157 that holds the lender. goes after the first field even if the second one is possible to collect from.  Only in our case he does not collect from the first one because he already collected from it once.That is the Maharsha hold that the Tosphot in Bava Batra has a different opinion from our Tosphot here.


I should also mention that I did not learn this with my learning partner so obviously this is on a much lower level that if I had merited to learn this with him. I am sorry about that and I apologize to all Israel and the whole world that this could have been a lot clearer than it is.

I also want to add two points.One is why is there any question in the first place. And the second point is maybe in fact it means either buyer can collect from the other buyer if the lender has collected from him. That is even if the lender collected from the second one the second one can collect from the first one.

First point why is there any question of תוספות how is it that the lender did not collect from the second field. Why not? Maybe because he had his whole loan paid up by collecting from the first field? Answer. The point of Tosphot it does not matter how much money was owed to the lender. It could have been the exact amount of the field . It could be the field was a thousand acres and he was owned only 100 dollars or it could be he was owned a million dollars and he collected from the field that was worth ten dollars. The point is what every the lender collected from the first field the first buyer goes and collects from the second field that exact amount.

The second point I don't know how to answer.











_________________________________________________________________________________ב''מ יד ע''ב

We have the case of a מלווה a לווה and the לווה had a שדה שדה הראשון at the time of the הלוואה. After that he bought a שדה השני. Then he sold the שדה הראשון. The usual way a loan is written is מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה Then he sells the שדה השני  after the הלוואה and after he sold the שדה הראשון

The מלווה goes after the first field שדה הראשון and the buyer goes after the second field.

תוספות asks could we prove  from this that מה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד

There are four possible reasons why the מלווה did not collect from the שדה השני.
That is there are four things that can cause the מלווה to go after the first field.
The fact that תוספות says the only possible reason is the reason he gives shows that תוספות holds no other reason can be valid.


Reason 1 The reason תוספות gives. There is not any שיעבוד  for a case of מה שאקנה קנה ומכר
Reason 2 We always say the  לוקח can tell the מלווה הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו does not work after the second field was sold.
Reason 3 The מלווה had to go after the שדה הראשון.
Reason 4 The מלווה could have gone after the שדה הראשון if he had wanted to, or the second. In our case he decided to go after the first field, but he could have gone after the second one.

In all four cases the second field would not have been touched.
What we see from the question of תוספות is that תוספות considers the other three reasons as invalid.

The מהרש''ל and the מהר''ם שיף both say the same thing.  That from the question of תוספות we see that when we always say לוקח can tell the מלווה הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו that applies even after the second field was sold.

What I want to point out further is that we see תוספות does not hold from the third or fourth reason either. תוספות holds there is no option. The מלווה must go after the second field. I want to point out that even if there had been a option for the מלווה to go after either field, then תוספות would not have had any proof of his thesis. So it has to be the case that the only possible reason the second field was left is the reason תוספות gives, that מה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד
That is this is simple process of elimination. תוספות says the reason the second field was left is reason 1. Therefore תוספות must hold reason 2 and 3 and 4 are not valid.  So תוספות says he had to go after field one and the reason can only be because of reason 1.

Why am I pointing this out you might ask? Because of the simple fact that the there is some doubt about this point. Because there is a מהרש''א on תוספות in בבא בתרא קנ''ז that holds the lender must go after the first field. That is the מהרש''א holds that the תוספות in בבא בתרא has a different opinion from our תוספות here.

I also want to add two points. One is Why is there any question in the first place? And the second point is maybe in fact it means either לוקח can be גובה from the other לוקח if the מלווה has been גובה from him. That is even if the מלווה has been גובה from the second לוקח the second לוקח can be גובה from the first לוקח.

First point why is there any question of תוספות how is it that the מלווה did not גובה from the second field. Why not? Maybe because he had his whole loan paid up by   being גובה from the first field? Answer. The point of תוספות it does not matter how much money was owed to the מלווה. It could have been the exact amount of the field . It could be the field was a thousand acres and he was owned only 100 dollars or it could be he was owned a million dollars and he was גובה from the field that was worth ten dollars. The point is what every the מלווה was גובה from the first field the first לוקח goes and is גובה from the second field that exact amount.

The second point I don't know how to answer.








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) ב''מ יד: (וב''מ קי:) יש לנו הדיון של מלווה לווה, והלווה היה לו שדה (השדה ראשון) בזמן של ההלוואה. אחרי ההלוואה הוא קנה שדה שני. ואז הוא מכר את השדה הראשון. הדרך המקובלת של הלוואה היא שהלווה כותב מה שאקנה יהיה משועבד לחוב הזה. ואז הוא מכר את השדה השני לאחר ההלוואה ולאחר שמכר את השדה הראשון. המלווה הולך אחרי שדה הראשון והקונה הולך אחרי שדה השני. (בלשון הגמרא הלוקח גובה את הקרן ממשוחררין את השבח ממשועבדים של הלווה.) תוספות בדף י''ד שואל אולי אפשר להוכיח מזה שמה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד? (זאת אומרת הסיבה שהמלווה אינו גובה משדה השני היא שאינו משתעבד מאחר שנמכר.) ישנם ארבע סיבות אפשריות שהמלווה לא גבה משדה השני. כלומר יש ארבעה דברים שיכולים לגרום למלווה ללכת אחרי שדה הראשון. העובדה שתוספות אומר שהסיבה היחידה האפשרית היא הסיבה שהוא נותן מראה כי תוספות סובר שאין שום סיבה אחרת שיכולה להיות תקפה. סיבה ראשונה, הסיבה שתוספות נותן. אין שיעבוד במקרה של מה שאקנה קנה ומכר. סיבה שנייה, זה שאנחנו תמיד אומרים שהלוקח יכול להגיד למלווה "הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו" לא עובד אחרי ששדה השני נמכר. סיבה שלישית, מלווה היה חייב ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון . סיבה רביעית, המלווה היה יכול  ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון, אם הוא היה רוצה, או השני. במקרה שלנו הוא החליט ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון, אבל הוא היה יכול ללכת אחרי השני. בכל ארבעת המקרים לא היה נוגע בשדה השני. מה שאנו רואים מהשאלה של תוספות הוא שתוספות רואה  שהשלוש סיבות לא תקפות. המהרש''ל והמהר''ם שיף שניהם אומרים את אותו דבר. כי מהשאלה של תוספות אנו רואים שכאשר אנו אומרים תמיד שהלוקח יכול להגיד להמלווה "הנחתי לך מקום לגבות ממנו", שזה חל גם לאחר ששדה השני נמכר. מה שאני רוצה להציין נוסף הוא שאנו רואים תוספות אינו מחזיק מסיבה השלישית או רביעית. תוספות סובר אין אפשרות אחרת. המלווה חייב ללכת אחרי שדה השני אם זה היה משועבד. אני רוצה לציין שגם אם היה אפשרות למלווה ללכת אחרי או שדה, אז תוספות לא היו לו כל הוכחה לתזה שלו. אז זה חייב להיות שבמקרה זה, הסיבה האפשרית היחידה ששדה השני נותר היא הסיבה שתוספות נותן, כי "מה שאקנה קנה ומכר אינו משתעבד". ואם היה משתעבד היה חייב ללכת אחר שדה השני. תוספות אומר שהסיבה ששדה השני נותר היא הסיבה הראשונה. לכן התוספות חייב להחזיק סיבות 2 ו- 3 ו- 4 אינן תקפות.  למה אני מציין על זה אתם שואלים? בגלל העובדה הפשוטה שיש ספק על נקודה זו. המהרש''א על תוספות בבא בתרא קנ''ז מחזיק שמלווה חייב ללכת אחרי השדה הראשון אפילו אם הוא יכול ללכת אחרי השני על פי דין. (היינו אפילו אם יש שיעבוד על שדה שני,עדיין הוא חייב לגבות משדה שראשון אם הוא יכול.) רק שכאן הוא כבר גבה מן הראשון פעם אחת ולכן הוא הלך אחרי השני. מהרש''א גורס כי התוספות בבא בתרא יש דעה שונה משלנו תוספות כאן.





) ב''מ ק''י אני גם רוצה להוסיף שתי נקודות. אחת מהן הוא מדוע יש כל שאלה בכלל? והנקודה השנייה היא אולי  איזה לוקח שיהיה יכול לגבות מן  לוקח האחר אם מלווה היה גובה ממנו. כלומר, גם אם המלווה  גבה ממן השני אז הלוקח השני יכול להיות גובה מלוקח הראשון . נקודה ראשונה מדוע יש כל שאלה של תוספות בכלל איך זה שהמלווה לא גבה משדה השני. למה לא? אולי בגלל שהוא  נפרע כל הלוואתו על ידי כך שגבה משדה הראשון? תשובה. נקודת תוספות היא שזה לא משנה כמה כסף היה מגיע למלווה. זה היה יכול להיות הסכום של השדה המדויק. זה יכול להיות השדה היה אלף דונם והוא היה והחוב היה רק מאה דולרים או שזה יכול להיות שהיה חוב של מיליון דולרים והוא  גבה מהשדה שהיה שווה עשרה דולרים. הנקודה היא מה שהמלווה  גבה מן השדה הראשון הלוקח הראשון הולך וגובה משדה השני אותו סכום מדויק. הנקודה השנייה אני לא יודע איך לענות עליה.

Rosh Hashanah was the time I first learned the Or Israel (Light of Israel) of Isaac Blazer (a disceple of Israel Salanter). So though I had heard of Musar before that, still that was the time that I understood the reasoning behind the Musar movement.
And though that was more than  a few years back, it still makes the most sense to me. So what I suggest is to get the basic set of Medieaval Ethics books and plow through them. That is do every day a little bit. A page when you get up before you start your day. And also a page or two during the day to keep up the effect of fear of God.

But make sure you get authentic Musar --not the cheap knock offs or inferior copies.
The later in time period Musar gets, the more diluted it gets. People write so called Musar books with all kinds of strange agendas in mind or to make up for their own guilt complexes. None of it is straight Torah. To get to authentic Torah nowadays is  basically impossible. Everyone has some agenda and they use the name of Torah to advance it. The more religious they seem, the more you can be sure there is some hidden agenda. The old Lithuanian yeshivas where Torah was authentic are mainly gone. You only have left a hand-full of places like Ponovitch in Bnei Brak or the Mir Yeshiva in NY. [Apparently some of these places have branches. I have a friend who was a teacher in a branch of Ponovitch in Jerusalem. So I admit I don't know where all the authentic places are. What makes a place authentic is not what you see on the surface. It is not if physically they are learning Torah all day. What makes a place authentic is a reason why they are learning Torah all day.

Music for the glory of God

n8

n1


n3

Black Hole
n5


Mathematics

Organ piece

Orchestra piece


CHS

I don't always make it a point to thank God publicly for his kindnesses.
Usually I leave that to be between Him and me. That He granted to me to write two booklets on the Gemara is something so out of the expected that I have to say that I am overwhelmed with this. There really is not known to me any reason why God would grant this amazing and tremendous merit to fall to me. I am really not any good in learning Talmud and I hardly even do so at all. It is just for some reason that is unknown to me I was a disciple of authentic Torah scholars  and was born into a home of amazing fear of God and wholesomeness and love and I was granted a learning partner with whom the ideas just seem to flow. So I publicly  acknowledge my debt to God for doing for me yet another two kindness for which there is no clear reason for. [The truth the same could be said about my children and my whole amazing family and the music he has granted to me and grants to me and to be able to learn Physics at all, and to be in Uman right before Rosh HaShanna. For all these and the many more kindness he has granted to me I thank him openly.]

I can pin point the four areas where I have to do repentance easily. But how to go about correcting these wrongs is not simple. As we  see with מעפילים לעלות. Moses said,  "Go to Israel" and the spies said "No." So people decided not to go. The God got mad. So what would be the natural reaction? To repent right? The sin was not to go, so they decided yes to go. And it was perfect repentance. Because they did not want to because they thought God would not help them. So true repentance was to go even though they knew that God would not help them. [That we normally say that repentance is true when one is in  the same situation he sinned in but this time he does not sin.] But we know what happened. They went up and were killed.

The sages of the Talmud said the same thing. "The letter ה is open on the bottom so anyone who wants can fall. But to get back in one needs to go through the upper opening. By why not get back in the same way he fell? לא אסתיא מילתא It won't work."

But at least I can say my repentance revolves around  major points. My parents, the land of Israel, Isaac Luria. Lack of learning Torah might be included also but I don't have an exact proof of that as I do for the other four. {ביטול תורה כנגד כולם}. That is the lack of learning Torah is considered as bad as the three major sins plus gossip. The three major ones are idolatry, murder, and the sexual relationship forbidden in Leviticus.





Of course I know there are probably millions of wrongs and bad thoughts and words and deeds I do all the time. But here I am looking for the major areas of interest. 

I had to add a little to the essays on Sanhedrin 61 and the part about my chavruta's question was not written rightly. I had to correct it.

At that point in the Talmud's logic השתחוויה is coming to forbid quadrant 2 and 3 which leaves quadrant 4 open for איכה יעבדו to forbid.

"Don't sacrifice to idols."

Introduction: The Gemara forbids area I and III [see diagram below] by means of How do they serve? [That is service in its way and in the way of honor] And it forbids part of area II (three kinds of service) because of, "Don't sacrifice to idols." [that is service not in its way but in the way of honor] (See the diagram at the bottom of the page.) And it uses "Don't bow" for itself. The Gemara asks, "Why not use, 'Don't bow' to forbid all of area II?" And it gives and answer. But in the meantime someone asks, "If we would use 'Don't bow' to forbid area II (all kinds of honor), then what would how do they serve come to permit?"

The Baal HaMeor and Tosphot both ask, "Why did he not ask the same question when we were learning from 'Don't sacrifice?'" Certainly sacrifice permits even more than bowing so it should be even more of a strong question.




I was looking at my old notes on Sanhedrin 61 and I noticed something odd. It is this: why is it that there is a question on the Gemara by both Tosphot and the Baal HaMeor? I forgot the whole sugia but just glancing at my notes I began to wonder why is it that there is any problem with the Gemara that needs to be answered?
Why cant we say זביחה forbids one thing and permits something else. And איכה יעבדו also forbids one thing and permits something else? I mean to say  זביחה forbids a small section of quadrant II and permits the rest of quadrant II. and איכה יעבדו forbids all of quadrant I and IV and permits all of quadrant III.

I am not saying this is unanswerable, Rather it is clear that everything permitted by sacrifice is also permitted by איכה יעבדו. And the same goes for if you would permit all quadrant III by means of השתחווייה.  So in one sense the question of the Baal HaMeor and Tosphot makes sense. All I am wondering is why this would not be the simplest answer?

My question is really more to the Baal HaMeor because he in fact uses זביחה in a limited sense.But  he answers in a way that divides up quadrant II in three sections.

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הקדמה: The גמרא forbids  רביע השני והשלישי  by means of איכה יעבדו. And it forbids part of רביע השני that is שלש עבודות פנימיות because of זביחה.  And it uses לא תשתחווה for itself. The גמרא asks Why not use לא תשתחווה to forbid all of רביע השני? And it gives an answer. But in the meantime someone asks if we would use לא תשתחווה to forbid רביע שני, then what would איכה יעבדו come to permit?

The בעל המאור and תוספות both ask, why did he not ask the same question when we were learning from זביחה. Certainly זביחה permits even more than השתטחות so it should be even more of a strong question.




I was looking at my old notes on סנהדרין סא and I noticed something odd. It is this: why is it that there is a question on the גמרא by both  בעל המאור and תוספות? Why is it that there is any problem with the גמרא that needs to be answered?
Why can't we say זביחה forbids one thing and פוטר something else? And איכה יעבדו also מחייב one thing and פוטר something else? I mean to say  זביחה forbids a small section of רביע השני and פוטר the rest of רביע השני, and איכה יעבדו forbids all of רביע ראשון ורביעי and פוטר all of רביע השלישי?

I am not saying this is unanswerable. Rather it is clear that everything פטור by sacrifice is also פטור by איכה יעבדו. And the same goes for if you would פוטר all רביע השלישי by means of השתחווייה.  So in one sense the question of the  בעל המאור and תוספות makes sense. All I am wondering is why this would not be the simplest answer?

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הקדמה: גמרא אוסרת רביע שני ושלישי באמצעות איכה יעבדו.  ואוסרת חלק מרביע השני שהוא שלש עבודות פנימיות בגלל זביחה. והיא משתמשת עם לא תשתחווה לעצמו. הגמרא שואלת למה לא להשתמש עם לא תשתחווה לאסור כל הרביע השני? והיא נותנת תשובה. אבל בינתיים מישהו שואל אם היינו משתמשים עם לא תשתחווה לאסור רביע השני, אז מה היה איכה יעבדו באה להתיר? בעל המאור ותוספות שואלים, למה הוא לא שואל את אותה השאלה כאשר אנו לומדים מזביחה? בהחלט זביחה פוטרת אפילו יותר מהשתטחות, כך זה צריך להיות עוד יותר שאלה חזקה. אני מסתכל על ההערות הישנות שלי בסנהדרין סא והבחנתי במשהו מוזר. זהו זה: למה יש שאלה על הגמרא על ידי בעל המאור ותוספות? למה יש בעיה כלשהי עם הגמרא שצריכה להיות עונה? למה אנחנו לא יכולים לומר זביחה אוסרת דבר אחד ופוטרת משהו אחר? ואיכה יעבדו גם מחייבת דבר אחד ופוטרת משהו אחר? אני מתכוון לומר זביחה אוסרת סעיף קטן של הרביע שני ופוטרת שאר רביע השני, ואיכה יעבדו אוסרת כל הרביע הראשון ורביעי ופוטרת כל רביע השלישי?

אני לא אומר שזה חסר מענה. ברור שכל מה שפטור על ידי זביחה גם  פטור  ידי איכה יעבדו. וכנ"ל לגבי אם אתה  פוטר  כל רביע השלישי באמצעות השתחווייה. אז במובן אחד השאלה של בעל המאור  ותוספות  הגיונית. כל מה שאני תוהה למה זו לא תהיה התשובה הפשוטה?

My Hebrew teachers in Temple Israel in Hollywood never got very far with Torah  since the program there was very limited. Besides Hebrew, you had to learn Old Testament stories and general Jewish history and that was all on Shabat morning. It was a lot to fit into Shabat morning.


And once I got to my first Lithuanian yeshiva in NY, grammar was not a priority. Rather Gemara in depth is what they concentrated on there. And that seems to me to be a good idea, but it also means I had to pick up grammar much later.]

 [I have noticed that people that don't do Talmud in depth in their first two yeshiva years, never get the idea afterwards. So I definitely advocate learning Gemara in depth before anything else.]

A drop of the infinite depths of Tosphot and the Gemara itself is the most important thing to learn before anything.

There is a somewhat extended market for health products in the USA. Not only that but if you consider the amount of time and effort people spend on getting cured from different problems the amount probably grow to staggering amounts. Couple that with doctors and drug companies and medical schools, the amounts get up to levels beyond petty cash.

Then if you think about what people spend on mental health and the hope to be cured from mental problems pretty soon you are talking about real money,-- more than pocket change.

But if you have faith in the wise אמונת חכמים there is already available a simple and easy cure Musar.[Medieaval Books of Ethics.]

Musar in this context has a very limited and specific definition. It does not mean any book that talks about fear of God or good character traits. [The first thing when you mention the word Musar to anyone is they claim some other practice is enough Musar for them. Or some other book has Musar in it. Or some other book can replace Musar. These are all false claims. They come from the fact that Musar is hard to learn. And it is as fun as a dentist's chair. It is hard but its rewards are great.


Musar means  the  very limited number of Medieaval Ethics. The main requirement for something to be counted as Musar is that it be written by a rishon. There are traditional Musar books written after the Middle Ages, but they get more and more doubtful as you get further from the Middle Ages.

Whom is the sage that said Musar is a cure for mental and physical disease? Isaac Blazer. He was disciple of Israel Salanter.  And he based his idea on the Rambam in the beginning of his book אור ישראל.

What I think are the best ones: Duties of the Heart חובות לבבות, Paths of the Righteous אורכות צדיקים, המספיק לעובדי השם by the son of the Rambam, ספר הישר which is attributed to Rabbainu Tam.


What is the reason for this? It is because the books of Ethics from the middle ages have  a spirit o Fear of God that permeates them in a way that nothing that came later can do.

But you should not make Musar yeshivas. While there are good Musar yeshivas, but yeshivas for the most part have become businesses. [Some are however sincere. But in the main yeshivas are business and run like businesses. And that as we know against the Torah.]]

\

Music for the glory of God

q36

Homosexuality is considered rather negatively in the Bible. The fact that it gets the death penalty in Leviticus should provide us with a hint about whether it is a matter of taste. Most things that get the death penalty in the Old Testament it is safe to assume that they are looked on with a kind of disapproval. The reason that פרשת עריות [the Torah portion that deals with forbidden relationships] is read on Yom Kippur is because it takes the power and fear  of Yom Kippur to drive in the point that homosexuality is  among the most serious sins of the Torah. It is hard to go much further than the death penalty. However I admit there are a few sins that in fact go beyond the death penalty like idolatry. But they are rare.

So in the USA it comes down to this question Man has to ask himself, "God or government? Which will it be?"

But the major pathway that pantheism took to become the official doctrine of insane religious world. was through Kabalah. While it is clear that kabbalah is monotheistic, through the effects of amei haaretz ignorant people, it became assumed that it is pantheistic.

It was well known when I was growing up that the basic approach of Torah is monotheism.

Clearly the pantheism that became  apart of insane religious  world. was a kind of conspiracy. It has some ancient roots.  But the major pathway that pantheism took to become the official doctrine of the insane religious world was through  Kabalah.  While it is clear that kabbalah is monotheistic, through the effects of amei haaretz ignorant people, it became assumed that it is pantheistic. 

Even though the Rambam and his son went to great lengths to show that the world view of the Torah is Monotheism still  there is a lot of ("fenegaling") word games people do to twist the meaning of Torah.

What I suggest in order to have this issue clear is to make  a distinction between the ideas of emanation of the Ari as opposed to the concept of pantheism. The truth is it is easy to see the difference if you try. What makes it hard is that some people have made it their business to twist the Torah into pantheism and then claim that that is traditional Torah.

If you try to tell someone that not everything is Divine, and the universe is not God, you get the strangest kinds of looks  as if you just said some kind of terrible heresy.  

phony tzadik.

 Following a true tzadik [saint]. The obvious pitfall which happens at least 99.99999... of the time is that when one is looking for a true tzadik he falls into the hands of a phony tzadik.



This is a hard subject. I have my own approach in which I go by the basic approach of my parents towards life and Torah. This is based on the idea that my parents were the best human beings I ever knew. But it is not as if I am considering them as tzadikim. It is more along the lines of when I look at what I consider  as human perfection, I tend to see my parents as the best examples of that.

What I mean is they contained the idea of balance. When we look at the idea of  a tzadik we tend to see a religious person who may not have balance. And that is not in general a very good example. The path of the Torah is not fanaticism. It is balance.
But some people are connected with a certain area of value more than others. What you need is  away of combining different areas of value. And that my parents were good at.

The major problem of looking for a tzadik is that even when you want to play it safe , still there is the trap door of the many fakers that use some name of  a real tzadik to build their own following.

\ For one thing we do in fact find the idea that the tabernacle in the desert  was filled with the glory of God. So we do find this concept of God's glory being in a limited time and space zone. So we find only Moses was allowed to put the Tabernacle together. 

Rosh HaShanah 15a

I understand Tosphot to have two ways of understanding Abyee. One is the way I wrote before. The other way is the way he writes openly. The reason I say Tosphot has this hidden way is because where he introduces his way started out saying even if  there is a doubt. That means Tosphot is understanding the Gemara in the simple way I wrote that there is no doubt. Rather Raba is being strict with reference to the Braita. But even if there is a doubt you can understand Raba. But my question is that I think the hidden explanation of Tosphot is better than the one they actually wrote.

Tosphot says Abyee was asking Raba as I wrote before that we understand the end because he is being strict with reference to the Braita. That is he is being strict to go by ripening as opposed to being not obligated in anything. But even if you say that Raba was being strict because of a doubt whether we go by ripening or by picking then also the end is good because in fact he is liable in the laws of the seventh year because of ripening and he is not liable in tithes because even though he would be because of the doubt about picking still when there is doubt there is decree to let the fruits be הפקר.

But the beginning is a problem because of tithes.
And Raba answers his question about why he should be not obligated in tithes. יד בכל ממשמשין בו ויתחייב במעשר?

But the beginning there is  problem in terms of the laws of the seventh year because of the same decree. We are saying we are in doubt whether to go by ripening or picking. So we are strict. So in the beginning why are we not strict to say he is liable in ביעור?
After all if we are going by picking time it is the seventh year and he should be liable in ביעורץ
Abyee only asked about tithes and Raba only answered about tithes. If Tosphot is right then why was there not also a question about ביעור?
So everything I wrote is contained in one word of Tosphot "even"

Another question here is that in the סיפא תוספות says it is OK that he is not חייב in מעשר because even if we go by לקיטה still because of the ספק he has to be מפקיר his fruit. If so then how can you say he is liable in ביעור? We know ביעור is not the same as הפקר. So the end would have to mean that he has to be מפקיר and also to do ביעור. Fine. But then in the רישא it would have to say he is liable in ביעור.
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I understand תוספות to have two ways of understanding אביי. One is the way I wrote before. The other way is the way he writes openly. The reason I say תוספות has this hidden way is because where he introduces his way, he starts out saying אפילו מחמת ספק. That means תוספות is understanding the גמרא in the simple way  that there is no ספק. Rather רבה is being strict with reference to the ברייתא. But even if there is a ספק you can understand רבה. But my question is that I think the hidden explanation of תוספות is better than the one they actually wrote.






תוספות says אביי was asking רבה  that we understand the סיפא because רבה is מחמיר with reference to the ברייתא. That is he is being strict to go by חנטה as opposed to being פטור לגמרי. But even if you say that רבה was being מחמיר because of a ספק whether we go by חנטה or by לקיטה קטיפה, then also the סיפא is good because in fact he is liable in ביעור because of חנטה, and he is not liable in מעשר because even though he would be because of the ספק about לקיטהת still when there is ספק there is תקנה to let the fruits be הפקר.

But the רישא is a problem because of מעשר.
And רבה answers his question about why he should be not obligated in tithes. יד בכל ממשמשין בו ויתחייב במעשר?

But the רישא there is  problem in terms of the ביעור because of the same תקנה. We are saying we are in ספק whether to go by חנטה or לקיטה. So we are מחמיר. So in the רישא why are we not מחמיר to say he is liable in ביעור?

After all if we are going by לקיטה time it is the שביעית and he should be liable in ביעור
אביי only asked about מעשר and רבה only answered about מעשר. If תוספות is right then why was there not also a question about ביעור?

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אני מבין תוספות שיש שתי דרכים של הבנת אביי. אחת הוא הדרך שכתבתי לפני זה. דרך האחרת היא הדרך שהוא כותב בגלוי. הסיבה שאני אומר יש לתוספות דרך נסתרת היא בגלל שבאופן שהוא מציג את דרכו, הוא מתחיל לומר "אפילו מחמת ספק". זאת אומרת שלתוספות יש הבנה בגמרא בדרך הפשוטה שאין ספק. רק שרבה הוא מחמיר עם התייחסות לברייתא שאחר כך. אבל גם אם יש  ספק יכולים להבין רבה ואביי. אבל השאלה שלי היא שאני חושב שההסבר הנסתר של תוספות הוא טוב יותר מזה שהם בעצם כתבו.
תוספות אומרים אביי שאל  גם אם אתה אומר שרבה מחמיר בגלל ספק אם הולכים לפי חנטה או  לקיטה (קטיפה), אז גם הסיפא היא טובה, כי  הוא חייב בביעור בגלל חנטה, והוא אינו חייב מעשר מפני שלמרות שהוא יהיה בגלל ספק על לקיטה עדיין כאשר יש ספק יש תקנה לתת הפירות לכל, היינו להפקיר אותם. אבל הרישה היא בעיה בגלל מעשר. ורבה עונה על שאלתו מדוע הוא צריך להיות לא מחויב במעשר, "יד בכל ממשמשין בו ויתחייב במעשר?" אבל ברישא יש בעיה במונחים של הביעור בגלל אותה תקנה. אנחנו אומרים שאנחנו נמצאים בספק אם ללכת לפי חנטה או לקיטה. אז אנחנו מחמירים. אז ברישה למה אנחנו לא מחמירים לומר שהוא עלול בביעור? אחרי הכל, אם אנחנו הולכים לפי לקיטה, זמן הזה הוא שביעית והוא וצריך להיות חייב בביעור. אביי שאל רק על מעשר ורבה  ענה על מעשר. אם תוספות נכונים אז למה גם לא הייתה שם שאלה על ביעור

Tractate rosh hashana

Rosh Hashanah 15a.

Raba said the fruit called estrog going from year 6 to 7 is not obligated in anything. But from year 7 to 8 it is obligated in ביעור.
Abyee asked Raba It is OK the end of your statement where you are being strict but what about the beginning?
What I suggest Abyee means is this, Raba is being strict in reference to the next Braita where both going from 6 to 7 and from 7 to 8 is not obligated in anything. In comparison to that in fact Raba is being strict to go by חנטה ripening. So the natural question is then why then in the beginning  from 6 to 7 is Raba not being also going by חנטה?

What I am saying is it is not that Abyee is saying Rabah is in doubt whether we go by חנטה or picking and therefore is being strict. Rather he is saying Rabah is being strict in reference to the next Braita where neither 6 to 7 nor 7 to 8 is obligated in anything.

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ראש השנה טו ע''א

רבה said the אתרוג going from ששית to שביעית is not obligated in anything. But from שביעית to שמינית it is obligated in ביעור.
אביי asked רבה It is OK the סיפא where you are being מחמיר but what about the רישא?
What I suggest אביי means is this, רבה is being strict in reference to the next ברייתא where both going from ששית to שביעית and from שביעית to שמינית is not obligated in anything. In comparison to that in fact רבה is being מחמיר to go by חנטה. So the natural question is then why then in the רישא  from ששית to שביעית is רבה not being also going by חנטה?
What I am saying is it is not that אביי is saying רבה is in doubt whether we go by חנטה or picking and therefore is being strict. Rather he is saying רבה is being מחמיר in reference to the next ברייתא where neither ששית to שביעית nor שביעית to שמינית is obligated in anything.


ראש השנה טו ע''א רבה אמר אתרוג שנכנס משישית לשביעית אינו מחויבת בכל דבר . אבל מהשביעי לשמינית היא מחויב בביעור. אביי שאל רבה זה בסדר בסיפא שבו אתה מחמיר אבל מה לגבי הרישה? מה שאני מציע אביי כיוון  את זה, רבה הוא  מחמיר בהתייחסות לברייתא הבאה שבו שניהם  שישית לשביעית ומהשביעית לשמינית אינו מחויב בשום דבר. בהשוואה לזה רבה הוא מחמיר ללכת לפי חנטה. אז השאלה המתבקשת היא מדוע אז ברישה מהשישית לשביעית רבה לא  הולך לפי חנטה? מה שאני אומר הוא שאביי לא אמר לרבה הוא בספק אם נלך לפי חנטה או קטיפה ולכן הוא מחמיר. במקום זאת הוא אומר רבה הוא מחמיר בהתייחסות לברייתא הבאה שבו לא שישית לשביעית ולא לשביעית לשמינית מחויב בכל דבר.

Christians have stood against the tidal wave of homosexual-ism

 Christians have stood against the tidal wave of homosexual-ism. For this they should be complemented. However many are unaware that this issue is not ambiguous. There is nothing in doubt about the Law of the Torah concerning this.  What is in doubt to many is the question if the law of the government supersedes the law of God.  In fact until recently many thought loyalty to the government of the USA and Christianity were compatible and in fact identical. Now it is clear that they are not.

Antigone in Sophocles. So the question for Christians is to whom are you going to listen? God or the Supreme Court? Or your lying pastors that claim the law of God is ambiguous?

Antigone asks the crucial question "which law is greater: the Divine Law or man's?."" 

In "Antigone" she is buried alive because of her refusal to obey the law of the State and instead obey the Divine Law which required her to give burial rights to a person who was perhaps unworthy. But still that minimum amount of respect was due.
Her brother Creon says the opposite. Creon demands obedience to the law above all else, right or wrong. He says that "there is nothing worse than disobedience to authority" (An. 671)

 Antigone responds that the  law of the government is not absolute, and that it can be broken in cases, such as honoring the gods whose rule and authority outweigh Creon's.



Most Christians have heard lot of sermons about how much they should love homosexuals. But the main idea is not so much love as they are being told to obey the State instead of the law of God.

So the question for Christians is to whom are you going to listen? God or the Supreme Court? Or your lying pastors that claim the law of God is ambiguous?
Just to add a drop of clarity let me say that in Hebrew there is no word for the sexual act. In Leviticus we have  in two places the laws of עריות--forbidden relationships. Take for example the law not to have sex with one's aunt? How does the Bible put it? Don't uncover her ערוה nakedness. That is the Torah way of saying not to have sex with her. It does not mean not to lift her skirt . And that is the way God puts it in most of the laws there. But when it comes to homosexuals the word ערוה  cant be applied because it refers to the female ערוה. So instead it uses a different expression a man that lies with another man gets the death penalty.

Laws of the Torah

Laws and the meaning of Torah don't change because of supreme court decisions
They don't change because of what the insane religious world  says. The attempts to change the meaning of Torah are as perennial as the seasons.


Just as the supreme court can't touch the meaning of the Laws of the Torah, neither can the insane religious world  It does not matter whether it they try to find some excuse for homosexuality or pantheism of whatever it is.

an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva

However for people of yeshiva ages it is best to be in an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva during the year. And it is my impression that it takes a special kind of human being to be a real Rosh Yeshiva. I knew a few of the authentic types--like Reb Shmuel Berenbaum and the other teachers at the Mir in NY. [Avraham Kalmonovitch, and the author of the Sukat David--I forgot his name, But I really liked his book on Ketubot. ]But these types are rare. If you have met, the real thing you can't be fooled anymore. 
It is like the storyabout a merchant that had a servant. He was on a trip and came to an inn and they served to him what they claimed was Hungarian wine--the rarest and best. The servant told the master, "This is not Hungarian wine." 
"How do you know?" he asked.
"Because I was in Hungary and tasted the real thing. Once you have tasted the real thing you can never forget it. And this is not the real thing." 
I say also one you have seen and sat in a class of an authentic Rosh yeshiva, you cant be fooled anymore.

The difference between the Gra and the Duties of the Heart in terms of trust in God is to the Duties of the Heart one is allowed to do effort, but not to the Gra. That is to say we have the verse in Mishlei [Proverbs 3] "Trust in God with all your heart and do not depend on your own intellect." The Gra learns from the end of that verse not to do effort. And in the commentary of Mishlei there is an  note from Menachem Mendel from Shkolov [a famous disciple of the Gra which adds an idea that he heard in the name of the Gra.]

The Duties of the Heart on the other hand says one should trust in God, but do effort. Just that one should trust in God concerning the results of his efforts.
But it can happen that if one accepts on himself the yoke of service of God, and removes from himself the pleasures of this world, then God might take away the need for him to do effort to reach his needs.


The Alter of Navardok brings this opinion of the Gra in the name of the Ramban. He got this from  Israel Salanter who printed a magazine in Vilnius called Tevuna. In that magazine he wrote an article where he brings this opinion of "no effort" in the name of the Ramban.
So your end result is to the Gra you are not supposed to do effort, and to the Duties of the Heart you  are allowed to but it is better not to.

To both of them it is best to sit and learn Torah.
Personally, I should admit I found it hard to learn Torah. And I also find it hard to learn. A lot depends on the kind of synagogue in your area. The insane religious world  are obstacles towards learning Torah. Generally they are dens of the sitra achra [dark side]. Lithuanian yeshivas are clearly going to be places where if you are accepted you can learn Torah. But in general they tend to be picky about whom they let in, [and they should be picky.]  So there is nothing simple about how to answer the question how to go about learning Torah. Learning at home I have also found almost impossible. So while I think learning is important, I have not found a good solution to the question of how to go about it.

The difference between the Gra and the Duties of the Heart in terms of trust in God is to the Duties of the Heart one is allowed to do effort, but not to the Gra. That is to say we have the verse in Mishlei [Proverbs 3] "Trust in God with all your heart and do not depend on your own intellect." The Gra learns from the end of that verse not to do effort. And in the commentary of Mishlei there is an  note from Menachem Mendel from Shkolov [a famous disciple of the Gra which adds an idea that he heard in the name of the Gra.]

The Duties of the Heart on the other hand says one should trust in God, but do effort. Just that one should trust in God concerning the results of his efforts.
But it can happen that if one accepts on himself the yoke of service of God, and removes from himself the pleasures of this world, then God might take away the need for him to do effort to reach his needs.


The Alter of Navardok brings this opinion of the Gra in the name of the Ramban. He got this from his Israel Salanter who printed a magazine in Vilnius called Tevuna. In that magazine he wrote an article where he brings this opinion of "no effort" in the name of the Ramban.
So your end result is to the Gra you are not supposed to do effort, and to the Duties of the Heart you  are allowed to but it is better not to.

To both of them it is best to sit and learn Torah.
Personally, I should admit I found it hard to learn Torah. And I also find it hard to learn. A lot depends on the kind of synagogue in your area. The insane religious world  are obstacles towards learning Torah. Generally they are dens of the sitra achra [dark side]. Lithuanian yeshivas are clearly going to be places where if you are accepted you can learn Torah. But in general they tend to be picky about whom they let in, [and they should be picky.]  So there is nothing simple about how to answer the question how to go about learning Torah. Learning at home I have also found almost impossible. So while I think learning is important, I have not found a good solution to the question of how to go about it.