I don't have a  Gemara to look this up, but it occurred to me an important question about Bava Metzia and Shavuot 44. [The same Gemara is in Bava Metzia perek האומנים]That is what does Rabbi Akiva hold? The Gemara concludes in Shavuot that the argument of Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva depends on the argument of Raba and Rav Joseph. So what we do know so far is RA holds the lender is a paid guard and RE hold he is an unpaid guard.
Now I admit that if one had the Gemara in front of him this might seem like a silly question. But my question is this. What does Rabbi Akiva hold? Does he mean he is a paid guard and thus patur in the case of armed robbery completely? And this get his entire loan? And in the case of loss or not armed robbery [theft] then he is obligated meaning he lose the entire loan? But this can not be right because the the Gemara would have a way of making Rabbi Akiva and Shmuel coincide! And the Gemara pushed that off right at the beginning! [Unless you would want to say the Gemara is changing its mind here and is thinking it is OK for Shmuel and Rabbi Akiva to agree. Now normally this would be impossible but in our case it might be try because we know Tosphot does Poskin like Shmuel. So you might say Tosphot is in fact thinking the Gemara changed its mind without saying so!]
So Fine maybe this is how Tosphot learns the sugia. I just do not know and have no way to look it up.

But what about the Rif and Rambam? I mean lets look at the other side of things. Maybe the Gemara means Rabbi Akiva hold he is a paid guard and thus patur in a case of armed robbery but still loses the amount of the משכון? Fine. Then what about the case of theft or loss? Then he is obligated  and loses the whole loan. This is definite like Shmuel. and that is not good at all because the Rif and Rambam do not poskin like Shmuel.

One way I think makes sense here is this: Rabbi Akiva holds he is a paid guard and so he loses nothing in the case of armed robbery. And in a case of not armed robbery but rather theft or loss he loses just the amount of the pledge משכון. This would be great if this were true. Because then there would not be any case in which Rabbi Akiva and Shmuel are agreeing. And we certainly need this according to the beginning of the Gemera and also the fact is the Rambam and Rif do not poskin like Shmuel.

In summery: What we might have here is two different ways of learning this Gemara. One like Tosphot and the other like the Rif and Rambam.

________________________________________________________________________________
I don't have a  גמרא to look this up, but it occurred to me an important question about בבא מציעא and שבועות מ''ד. The same גמרא is in בבא מציעא פרק האומנים.That is what does רבי עקיבה hold? The גמרא concludes in שבועות that the argument of רבי אליעזר and רבי עקיבה depends on the argument of רבה and רב יוסף. So what we do know so far is רבי עקיבה holds the מלווה is a שומר שכר and רבי אליעזר hold he is an unpaid guard.
Now I admit that if one had the גמרא in front of him this might seem like a silly question. But my question is this. What does רבי עקיבה hold? Does he mean he is a שומר שכר and thus פטור in the case of armed robbery completely? And this get his entire loan? And in the case of אבידה or גניבה then he is obligated meaning he loses the entire loan? Or just the amount of the משכון? But this can not be right because the the גמרא would have a way of making רבי עקיבה and שמואל coincide! And the גמרא pushed that off right at the beginning! Unless you would want to say the גמרא is changing its mind here and is thinking it is OK for שמואל and רבי עקיבה to agree. Now normally this would be impossible but in our case it might be try because we know תוספות does decide like שמואל. So you might say תוספות is in fact thinking the גמרא changed its mind without saying so!
So Fine maybe this is how תוספות learns the סוגיא. I just do not know and have no way to look it up.

But what about the רי''ף and רמב''ם? I mean lets look at the other side of things. Maybe the גמרא means רבי עקיבה hold he is a paid guard and thus פטור in a case of armed robbery but still loses the amount of the משכון? Fine. Then what about the case of theft or loss? Then he is obligated  and loses the whole loan. This is definitely like שמואל. and that is not good at all because the רי''ף and רמב''ם do not decide like שמואל.

One way I think makes sense here is this: רבי עקיבה holds he is a paid guard and so he loses nothing in the case of armed robbery. And in a case of not armed robbery but rather theft or loss he loses just the amount of the pledge משכון. This would be great if this were true. Because then there would not be any case in which רבי עקיבה and שמואל are agreeing. And we certainly need this according to the beginning of the גמרא and also the fact is the רמב''ם and רי''ף do not decide like שמואל.

In summery. What we might have here is two different ways of learning this גמרא. One like תוספות and the other like the רי''ף and רמב''ם.
_________________________________________________________________________________

Something to consider in light of the above. Does any of this help us when it comes to the argument between Rashi and Rabbainu Chananel? I mean: the Gemara's original question was is there an argument between Shmuel and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer? The Gemara answers no. One is when the lender explained and the other case is when he did not. Rashi says the case of Shmuel is when he did not.
Tome it makes sense to say Rabbainu Hananal must have meant that the Gemara did not use the word "lender," because it would make no sense for the lender to explain the pledge is for the whole loan if that would weaken his position! 
Now I wonder if going back to the original position of the Gemara as I mentioned in the above essay is related to this?  For I have been suggesting that the Gemara did go back to its original position according to Tosphot and the Rif. So now understanding this original position makes sense.

And the fact of the matter is according to this idea of mine that Rabbainu chanel is when the borrowers spoke and Rashi is when the lender spoke we come out with the outstanding and amazing conclusion that there is no argument.
If the borrower spoke he increased his power and so if the lender lost the pledge it goes for the whole loan. If the lender spoke then it was he who increased his power and the pledge is only according to it monetary value.

Furthermore according to what I wrote before that the cases in Bava Metzia 104 and Shavuot 44 are different this also might make  a difference. That is: I wrote Shavuot is when the pledge was lost and the Gemara in Bava Metzia is when the loan was not paid back and so the lender can go after the whole pledge. Going after the whole pledge might be when it was the lender who spoke. The case in Shavuot is when the borrower spoke. And so these two are not disagreeing at all!
And this idea that the different gemaras in different places do not disagree is certainly a starting prima facie assumption of Tosphot.
This might help u in terms of Rosh Hodesh also.
 I wrote in my little booklet Iyunai Bava Metzia that the two gemaras in rosh hashana and Sanhedrin seem to disagree. The Gemara in Sanhedrin the day of rosh hodesh does not depend on the Sanhedrin and to one opinion in Tosphot that means the molad even though you can never see the actual molad
The gemara in Rosh Hashana makes clear everything depends on the ability to see the new moon. To resolve this it is possible to say the difference is when there is a sitting Sanhedrin or not.

Ideas in Bava Metzia chapters 8 and 9 I corrected some grammar and did general editing.

I also took out one paragraph on BM page 98 that today looks to me that it was simply wrong. I am not in a yeshiva and I have no Gemara with me. But from what I recall the Riva and Rashi hold the same about נאנסה and it is specifically on כפירה that they disagree. So whatever I was saying in that note could not have been right. However the original book was just my notes that I was taking as I was learning with David. It probably was not written properly and then I did not have  a chance to correct it until now.



I made the essay on BM pg 98 a little shorter in the questions.

Ideas in Shas

I should say a lot of credit for this booklet goes to my learning partner David, but he did not want to be mentioned by last name. So I just mentioned the places where I learned to some degree how to learn. But none of this would have been written without the influence of my learning partner.

I should mention that they way he learns is closer to what they were doing in Shar Yashuv in Far Rockaway more than at the Mir. That is; his method is more looking closely at what he is learning more than trying to see how what he is learning fits in with other areas. That is he is not a system builder. In the Mir in Brooklyn, on the other hand, the emphasis was seeing how the sugia in front  of you fits in to other areas. But you can see in this booklet I chose to go with the first approach.

Talmud Bava Metzia, pg 104

[I am only here presenting my own ideas and those of my learning partner. I do not claim these books to be the best in "Lumdus" that are around. In my opinion, the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach deserves first place in terms of depth of thought.]
The Ideas in Bava Metzia needs a correction "possibility"אפשרות in Hebrew is feminine.  Thus it takes a feminine verb. [You can see this all the time in Tenach where such nouns are considered feminine. But there is an exception I think in Job
[for example in the beginning of the prayer of Havakuk chapter 3.] פלצות in the prayer of חבקוק is treated as feminine.[While on grammar, I think בורא נפשות רבות  are feminine. That it should be וחסרונן על כל מה שברא להחיות בהן נפש כל חי, ברוך אתה ה' חי העולמים. That is anyway what I do.]
I also noticed at page 104 the ideas need some clarifications. I was trying to present two ideas. One from my learning partner about the Rambam. And one from me about Rav Papa and how my idea can help understand the Rambam. But I don't think I presented these ideas clearly.






I would add a few other laws here and there (like electricity on Shabat), but if I have nothing new to say there does not seem to be any purpose. I am generally lenient when it comes to halaka. If there is a posek {Rishon} that is enough for me.. But not achronim. That is in any argument between any rishonim I always decide to be lenient.  And all the more so I pay no attention to any of the crazy added restrictions of the the religious world today which are all pure insanity and have nothing to do with Torah.

But  how can I attack what has no halakic basis (electricity on Shabat is a good example)? If people want to make up restrictions, because it makes them feel holy, what can I do?

Being extra strict I began to notice has no connection with being a normal decent human being. The extra strict types of people I think do not understand the Torah requires both obligations between man and his fellow man and also between man and God.

I also suggest that this is the exact reason why all the great Lithuanian yeshivas  like the Mir learned in a basic seven year cycle the tractates that had to deal with obligations between man and his fellow man {נשים נזיקין} and they learned Musar also [normative ethics].
On BM page 104
I was looking over what I wrote about cleanliness  and leaning. I think at least at the end of that essay I need to explain that when I was putting the opinion of the Ri and Rav Shimshon ben Avraham together I was intending to explain Rashi. That is leaning in the case of a strong  or weak tree with not make the person that is leaned on by the Zav to be unclean. Only if the Zav moves him as in the case of the weak tree.

[I should mention that in Elul usually some other tractates than the major ones are studied. For example in my first Elul period in Shar Yashuv in NY we learned Rosh HaShanah about the way to blow the Shophar. [That is the last page of Rosh Hashana].]



Another important issue in Bava Metzia is on page 100A with the second tosphot and the argument between the Rashbam and Tosphot. The issue is that in Tosphot they are going with the idea found in in Nida 2b) that a "חזקה" steady state of now (חזקה דהשתא) can only defeat a previous steady state חזקה מעיקרא if combined with some other חזקה. That is not how Tosphot understands the gemara in Nida itself on the page over there. But it might very well be in fact how the Rashbam understands this because of his opinion on a divorce document that has witnesses but no time written in it. This last subject is the object of a debate between Tosphot, the Rambam, and the Rashbam. See Rav Shach's Avi Ezri where he goes into this in the Rambam Laws of Gittin chapter 1.
Now you might say in Bava Metzia Tosphot intends his answer to be two separate answers. [I do not have a Bava Metzia to be able to look this up but I hope someday that God will grant to me a Bava Metzia so I can look more carefully in Tosphot to see what he means.]
In any case , just to introduce you to the topic let me mention the basic issue. Rambam Laws of Divorce ch 1:25 says if there are witnesses on the document, it needs to have the  date. The Ramban (Nachmanides) says it always needs the date. The Rashbam says even if it has witnesses, it does not need the date.
The issue is: why is there a date on the document? Because of the daughter of his sister that is brought to court for having sex with another man while being married. Thus, we require every divorce to have the time in it- so he does not write a document after the act with a dater before the act and thus try to show she was not married at the time. But then the question from tractate Nida comes up. She is not married now, so the state now (חזקה דהשתא) goes backwards. In Nida, the Gemara says the state now only can work backwards if it has something else helping it. At any rate, we can see what the Rashbam was thinking -the case of the divorce is the same as the mikve. There is a state of the mikve or the woman  now, but the state of being first חזקה מעיקרא defeats the later state (חזקה דהשתא) unless the later state has some help. Therefore the document is valid, and it is as if it has a time written onto it which is right now. So at least the Rashbam is clear.

I also had to take out one idea on Bava Metzia page 104 that I heard from someone. But now it looks that it really made no sense, so I deleted it.
.