Nedarim page 2. See Rav Shach Laws of Vows chapter 1. halacha 1.

To all Rishonim [authorities from the Middle Ages] except the Rambam, the main vow is by attaching the vow to a sacrifice. I.e., he says “This is forbidden to me like a sacrifice.” If he leaves out the words “like a sacrifice” it is still forbidden because of Yad leNeder (a handle on a vow). (A vow that wass not stated clearly and yet is still valid because of extension of the vow.) The opinion of the Ran however seems at first glance to be contradictory as to the point whether a vow needs to be attached to a sacrifice. Rav Shach explains that to the Ran (Rabainu Nisim ben Reuven), the main vow is without hatfasa (extension) [like the Rambam], but for it to be valid one needs the words “like a sacrifice.” Without those words, it sounds like he is saying something untrue, not that he is actively making something forbidden to himself. However, there is something here that seems difficult in this answer of Rav Shach. he says to the Ran the words like a sacrifice are for clarification, not because of a yad leneder. but I seem to recall that in one of the several places where the Ran brings his opinion, he does bring the idea of a Yad leNeder. [The places are in Nedraim page 2, top and bottom of the page, page 14 and in Shavuot. Later I saw that the place the Ran brings the idea of yad neder (lit. hand of a vow)]. Now onto a different point. The point of Rav Shach is that saying “this is forbidden to me” does not imply a neder but rather a statement that seems untrue. this is how he explains the Ran. However the same point ought to be applied to the Rambam. The Rambam says “the main vow is the statement ‘this is forbidden to me.’” This is valid not because of a yad, but for clarity, (but if he says like a sacrifice there is an added degree of stringency because then meila applies). However even without that still the main neder is the simple statement. but don’t we need to pronounce with one lips"? How could the Rambam escape from this conundrum>? ______________________________________________________________________________________________________ I see I wrote about this already but I think I ought to repeat the basic points in a clearer exposition. To all ראשונים except the רמב’’ם, the main vow is by attaching the vow to a sacrifice. I.e., he says “This is forbidden to me like a sacrifice.” If he leaves out the words “like a sacrifice” it is still forbidden because of יד לנדר (a handle on a vow). (A vow that was not stated clearly and yet is still valid because of extension of the vow.) The opinion of the ר''ן however seems at first glance to be contradictory as to the point whether a vow needs to be attached to a sacrifice. רב שך explains that to the ר''ן, the main vow is without התפסה (extension) [like the רמב’’ם], but for it to be valid one needs the words “like a sacrifice.” Without those words, it sounds like he is saying something untrue, not that he is actively making something forbidden to himself. However, there is something here that seems difficult in this answer of רב שך. He says to the ר''ן the words "like a sacrifice" are for clarification, not because of a יד לנדר. But I seem to recall that in one of the several places where the ר''ן brings his opinion, he does bring the idea of a יד לנדר. [The places are in נדרים page 2, top and bottom of the page, דף י''ד 14 and in שבועות]. Now onto a different point. The point of רב שך is that saying “this is forbidden to me” does not imply a נדר but rather a statement that seems untrue. this is how he explains the ר''ן. However the same point ought to be applied to the רמב’’ם. The רמב’’ם says “the main vow is the statement ‘this is forbidden to me.’” This is valid not because of a יד לנדר for clarity, (but if he says like a sacrifice there is an added degree of stringency because then מעילה applies). However, even without that, still the main נדר is the simple statement. but don’t we need to לבטא בשפתיים? How could the רמב’’ם escape from this conundrum?

za91 C Minor midi file za91 C minor nwc file

ישנה מה שנראה כמו סתירה בחוק בסוכה דף ד' ובעירובין דף פ''ט. בסוכה, רב נחמן אמר שאנו רואים את הקירות כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה במקרה של ארבעה מוטות המונחים על צידי הגג. (גוד אסיק מחיצתא.) והרמב"ם פסק זאת כדין כפי שהוא כותב שתקע ארבעה מוטות בפינות הגג, ושם עליהם כיסוי של עלים, הסוכה תקפה, ואנו רואים את הקירות התחתונים כאילו הם משתרעים כלפי מעלה עד לפינות כיסוי העלים (סיכוך). אולם בעירובין, אמרו חכמים שכאשר יש גגות מחוברים, כולם נחשבים כרשות אחת. הגמרא אומרת שזהו הדין. אך שם איננו אומרים שקירות הבניינים שמתחת לגגות המחוברים נחשבים כאילו משתרעים כלפי מעלה. אני חושב שההבדל ברור ורמוז גם בתוספות. במקרה של גגות, הקירות התחתונים של הבניינים מוסתרים לחלוטין על ידי גגות והם בהחלט לא נראים. אבל בסוכה, לפחות קיר הבית נראה מבחוץ

Suka page 4 and Eruvin page 89b. there is what looks like a contradiction in law. In Suka Rav Nachman said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the Rambam decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put sa covering of leaves over them, the suka is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves. However in Eruvin, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The Gemara says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in Tosphot. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the suka the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside._______________________________________________There is what looks like a contradiction in law סוכה page 4 and עירובין page 89b. In סוכה,רב נחמן said we say see the walls as extending upwards in the case of a four poles put on the sides of a roof. And the רמב''ם decided this as the law as he writes one stuck four poles on the corners of the roof, and put a covering of leaves over them, the סוכה is valid, and we see the lower walls as if they extended upwards until the corners of the covering of leaves (סיכוך) . However in עירובין, the sages said the when you have joining roof tops that they are all considered as one domain. The גמרא says that is the law. Yet there we do not say the walls of the buildings under the joined roof tops are considered to extend upwards. The difference I think is clear and also hinted at in תוספות. In the case of the roof tops, the lower walls of the buildings are completely obscured by the roof tops and they are definitely not seen. But we the סוכה the wall of the house is at least seen from the outside.

za90 E minor midi file za90 E Minor nwc file

גיטין ס''ז ע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'תנו גט לאשתי' או לשלושה אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם כותבים אותו ונותנים אותו. אבל הם לא יכולים להגיד לאף אחד אחר לעשות זאת. אבל אם אמר לשלושה אנשים פשוט "תנו גט לאשתי", אז לפי ר' מאיר הם יכולים להגיד לסופר לכתוב אותו ולעדים לחתום עליו והם נותנים אותו לאשתו. ר' יוסי חולק על כך ואומר שגם במצב האחרון הם חייבים לכתוב ולתת אותו בעצמם. שמואל אמר, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם צריכים לעשות זאת בעצמם. אם יאמרו לסופר לכתוב והם חתמו, הגט אינו תקף, אולם נושא זה עדיין דורש לימוד." הגמרא שואלת על משפט זה של שמואל. היא שואלת מדוע זה דורש לימוד? אולי משום שהוא יכול לחשוב שיש אפשרות שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. השאלה שיש לי על גמרא זו היא זו. הדעה שניתן למסור מילים לשליח היא ר' מאיר והוא מסכים במשנה שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים לתת גט לאשתו, עליהם לעשות זאת בעצמם. (ואף על פי שמקרה של שמואל שונה מהמשנה, כי במקרה של שמואל הוא אמר "כתובו ותנו" בעוד שבמשנה הוא אמר רק "תנו", עדיין זה מחמיר את השאלה שלי, כי הוספת המילה "כתובו" אנו רואים במשנה שזה אפילו מחמיר יותר מאשר אם הוא רק אמר לתת. אם הוא גם אמר כתובו לשלשה, אז ר' מאיר מסכים שהם חייבים לכתוב את הגט בעצמם.) אז אפילו אם שמואל יכול להסכים עם ר' מאיר, עדיין לא אמור להיות ספק לגבי ההלכה. תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו היא שאולי בנקודה זו הגמרא חושבת שר' מאיר עצמו יכול לחלוק אפילו על תחילת המשנה, לא רק בבא שנייה

Gitin 67b The Mishna says if one says to two people give a get to my wife or to three people write and give a get to my wife they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a get to his wife then according to r Meir they can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. R Jose disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. Shmuel said if one says to two people write and give get to my wife they have to do it themselves. if they tell a scribe to write and they signed, it is not valid however this subject still requires study. The Gemara ask on this statement of Shmuel. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this gemara is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is R Meir and he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give get to his wife that they must do it themselves.(And even though the case of Shmuel is different from the Mishna because in the case of Shmuel he said “write and give” while in the Mishna he said only “give” still this makes my question even stronger because adding the words "write" we see in the Mishna that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also saidto three "write" , then R Meir agrees they must write it themselves.) So even if Shmuel might hold with R Meir there still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to thsi question is that perhaps at this point the gemara is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.---------------------------------------------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''ב The משנה says, "If one says to two people 'give a גט to my wife' or to three people, 'write and give a גט to my wife' they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a גט to his wife then according to ר’ מאירthey can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. ר' יוסי disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. שמואל said, "If one says to two people write and give גט to my wife they have to do it themselves. If they tell a scribe tp write and they signed, it is not valid, however this subject still requires study." The גמרא ask on this statement of שמואל. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this גמרא is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is ר’ מאירand he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give גט to his wife that they must do it themselves. [(And even though the case ofשמואל is different from the משנה because in the case of שמואל he said “write and give” while in the משנה he said to three only “give” tstill this makes my question even stronger because adding the word "write" we see in the משנה that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also said to three "write" then ר' מאיר agrees they must write it themselves.)] So even if שמואל might hold with ר’ מאירthere still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to this question is that perhaps at this point the גמרא is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.

za89 F Minor midi file za89 F minor nwc file

There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. Essay by Michael Huemer

3. Inclinations to Believe 3.1. Types of Inclination There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. You might be inclined to believe X because X just seems to be true. Or you might be inclined to believe X because X is emotionally comforting. Or because you think good people believe X. Or because your social group believes X. Notice how the last three are quite different from believing something because it seems correct. So here’s a theory: Unjustified beliefs result when non-appearance-based inclinations influence our credences or outright beliefs. Only appearances are (epistemically) justification-conferring. 3.2. Can We Control our Beliefs? Some philosophers would question whether we can control our beliefs and whether we can believe something on the basis of ordinary (non-epistemic) desires, such as the desire for emotional comfort, or to fit in, or to be a good person. Examples: If I offered you a million dollars to sincerely believe that you are a giraffe, I bet you still couldn’t do it. But maybe this only shows that you can’t believe for practical reasons when you have conclusive evidence that the proposition is false. So consider … If I offered you a million dollars to believe that the number of atoms in the universe is even, I bet you couldn’t do it. In #2, the evidence is evenly balanced; thus, if non-epistemic desires can ever influence belief, they should be able to do so in that example, right? It looks like they can’t, so desires can’t influence beliefs. 3.3. Doxastic Semi-voluntarism Consider two extreme positions: Doxastic Involuntarism: Desires can never have any influence on any beliefs. (Strong) Doxastic Voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs just as easily as they influence ordinary actions. Neither of these is the case. What is correct is Doxastic Semi-voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs sometimes, but their influence is limited. One cannot believe a thing that is too obviously false, or too obviously unjustified. There is a limit to how epistemically irrational a person can be, even if they want to (this limit varies across people). Thus, you can’t believe you are a giraffe, no matter the reward, because that’s obviously false. Nor can you believe the number of atoms is even, because that is obviously unjustified. But suppose that your child is accused of a heinous crime (say, deadnaming Caitlin Jenner). If the evidence is complex and hard to evaluate, so that it is not too obvious what the right judgment is, then it becomes much easier for your love for your child and desire to believe that she is good to influence your judgment, causing you to believe the child innocent even when the evidence does not justify this. There will be some degree of evidence that would induce you to admit that your child had committed the heinous act, but the evidentiary threshold will just be much higher than it would be for an impartial observer. Everyone knows that things like this can happen; that is why defendants’ family members are not allowed to sit on juries. If you try talking to a political ideologue some time and giving them evidence against their beliefs, you’ll probably become convinced that the same thing is happening to them. So the first thing that enables people to adopt unjustified beliefs is evidential ambiguity. There should be mixed evidence, evidence pointing in different directions, and it should be unclear how to weigh the evidence, perhaps because the evidence for and against X is of different kinds. 3.4. Confusing Feelings with Appearances In some cases, people may confuse their emotions with appearances. When you hear a claim that you don’t like, you may have an aversive reaction, which includes a sense of the clash between that claim and others of your current attitudes. E.g., you hear a negative claim about someone you like, or a positive one about someone you dislike. You might confuse that feeling with an appearance that the claim is factually wrong. Likewise, it is possible to confuse a positive feeling, a feeling of fit with your other current attitudes, with an appearance that a claim is correct. This, in turn, partially disguises the fact that your desired belief is unjustified; it makes this sufficiently unobvious that it becomes possible to adopt the belief. 4. Corruption of Belief-Forming Practices You’re obligated, before forming a belief on a controversial issue, to conduct a responsible inquiry. This typically requires things like: listening to both sides (or multiple sides), looking for counter-evidence, and trying to find objections to arguments that you are initially attracted to. Most people are terrible at this. They only listen to news sources who they already know agree with their political orientation; they accept evidence supporting their favored view at face value, while carefully scrutinizing only the evidence that undermines their favored view (if they happen to accidentally run into some); they don’t think about objections to their views but focus their attention on reasons for their views. This violation of epistemic norms stops many beliefs from being justified (the 3rd kind of irrationality mentioned in sec. 2). Why do people do these things? Again, doxastic semi-voluntarism is important. If involuntarism were true (so that only epistemic reasons could influence beliefs and not desires), then these measures would be impotent. E.g., you could still deliberately select news sources that already agree with you, but then your credences would automatically update on the fact that you did that, and that there were many other news sources that would very likely have given you evidence against your favored view, and that would prevent you from adopting a high credence in your favored view. On the other hand, if strong voluntarism were true (so that we could form beliefs based on our desires just as easily as we take actions based on our desires), then there would be no need for these measures. You would just directly believe X based on your desire to believe it, with no need to select evidence sources, direct your attention away from objections, etc. We do these things because our desires have some power to affect our beliefs, but only when it’s not too clear what epistemic rationality demands. 5. Conclusion Actually, it’s not hard to be irrational. Everybody has non-epistemic belief preferences—desires to believe something for reasons unrelated to truth or evidential justification. These have a limited, direct influence on our beliefs, which is most important when the evidence is ambiguous and when our feelings about a proposition can be confused with appearances. Desires can also directly influence how we conduct inquiry, enabling us to take advantage of our predictable cognitive shortcomings, such as the tendency to under-adjust for biases in our evidence sources. The beliefs that we form after such an inquiry are unjustified due to failure to satisfy obligations of responsible inquiry. This is bad because unjustified beliefs are more likely to be false, and false beliefs can wreak havoc. E.g., false political beliefs prevent us from solving social problems, and often make the problems worse. The mechanisms for generating unjustified beliefs will operate more or less automatically unless you make specific, positive efforts to stop them—which you should do to be a good person. That is why the points developed above are important to know. [After the above essay I might mention here that Michael Huemer is with the school of thought of the intuitionists which is different from the Kant Fries school and also different from Hegel. As for me I see value in all three schools and see each as relating to a different stratum of level of reality phenomenal world, the rational world and the world beyond reason the dinge an sich. All this along the lines of Plotinus the philosopher who was mainly with Plato but used modifications from Aristotle]

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות בראש הדף

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות ראשון. עלה בדעתי בזמן שהייתי על שפת הים שתוספות מסתמכת על אחת משתי הדעות בגמרא לגבי מה שאדם יכול להתכוון כשאומר לכתוב גט (מסמך גירושין) ולתת אותו לאשתו. האם הוא מתכוון רק שעליהם לחתום, או שעליהם לכתוב אותו ולחתום עליו? בלי ההנחה ש"לכתוב אותו" פירושו רק שעליהם לחתום עליו, תוספות לא תהיה הגיונית. כדי להסביר למה אני מתכוון, הרשו לי להביא את התוספות. הוא שואל זאת. ר' מאיר סבור שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. מילי ממסרן לשליח. לכן הוא יכול לומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני אנשים אחרים לכתוב ולתת גט לאשתו. אבל אנחנו יודעים מר' ירמיה שאם זה החוק, אז הסופר לא יכול לחתום על הגט. אבל אם כן, יש שאלה. המשנה אומרת בגלוי שר' מאיר מסכים שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים "כתוב ותן גט לאשתי", הם כותבים ונותנים אותו. מכיוון שיש רק שני אנשים במצב הזה, לכן, אחד מהם שכותב את זה גם חותם. התשובה של תוספת היא שהמשנה בעצם אומרת שהם חותמים על זה, וסופר כותב את זה. הבעיה עם תשובה זו היא שאנחנו מתחילים עם הגישה ש"אומר אמרו" אינה תקפה כלל. הסיבה היא שאם זה יהיה תקף, אז לא יכול להיות שחתימת הסופר על הגט (מסמך הגירושין) תהיה בסדר. כלומר, "הוא אומר לומר לאחרים" ("אומר אמרו") אינה תקפה מהתורה דאורייתא. לאחר מכן אנו עונים על סמך שינוי המשמעות הפשוטה של ​​המשנה בגלל גזירה שלא מוזכרת בשום מקום במשנה, ואנו משנים את ההנחה המקורית שלנו ש"הוא אומר, 'אמור'" מלהיות לא תקפה מהתורה לתקפה על סמך ראיות קלושות. ההסבר של תוספת צריך להיות כמו הגישה הזו בדף גמרא ס''ו ע''ב, שלכתוב את הגט פירושו רק לחתום עליו. אבל עם הדעה השנייה שזה מכווין לכתוב ולחתום, אז לתוספת לא תהיה תשובה לשאלתו

Gitin 67 side a Tosphot. it occurred to me while at the sea shore that Tosphot is relying on one of the two opinions in the Gemara about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it Tosphot would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the Tosphot. he asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger. thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. but we know from R. Jeremiah that if that is the law then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The Mishna says openly that "R Meir holds if one says to two people 'write and give a get to my wife' they write and give it." Since there are only two people in this case. Therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of Tosphot is the Mishna really means they sign it, and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say he says say is not valid from the Torah. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the Mishna because of a gezera (decree) that is nowhere mentioned in and Mishna, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of Tosphot has to be like that one approach in the Gemara page 66b that to write the get only means to sign it. but with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then Tosphot would not have an answer for his question.--------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות. It occurred to me while at the sea shore that תוספות is relying on one of the two opinions in the גמרא about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it תוספות would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the תוספות. He asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger.מילי מימסרן לשליח Thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. But we know from ר ' ירמיה that if that is the law, then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The משנה says openly that ר' מאיר מסכיםנ if one says to two people write and give a get to my wife, they write and give it. Since there are only two people in this case, therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of תוספות is the משנה really means they sign it and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say "he says, 'say'" is not valid from the תורה דאורייתא. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the משנה because of a גזירה that is nowhere mentioned in the משנה, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of תוספות has to be like that one approach in the גמרא page ס''ו ע''ב that to write the get only means to sign it. But with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then תוספות would not have an answer for his question.

Gitin page 66 side b. Rambam laws of divorce chapter 2 laws 5 and 6.

This coming piece is to give an approach to the Rambam. But another approach I recall is that a gift needs to be accepted. That might be an answer for the Rambam. Another answer is in the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. The main question is why, ''he says 'say''' (he says to two people to two witnesses write a doc of a gift and give it to someone --or to two people tell two witnesses write a doc of divorce and give it to my wife) is not valid for a document of a gift, but for a ''get''(doc of divorce) the Rambam brings that it is not valid derabanan or maybe from the Torah. The coming essay is my explanation for this problem. _____________________________ There is no argument between the Rambam and the Ramban about the case in which one says to two people, “Write and sign a document of divorce to my wife,” that they can do so, but they cannot tell anyone else to do so. [Laws of Divorce chapter 2 law 5.] And they also agree if he tells them to tell a scribe to write a get and for them to sign it, and give it to his wife, that they cannot do so. [Ch. 2 law 6] However in the reason for this, they disagree. To the Ramban the reason for the last law is that we need it to be written for her sake. In other words, this is a regular case of making a messenger. And a person can make messengers to tell others to appoint others to write sign and give a get to his wife. However, the problem is the scribe needs to hear the command from the husband directly. therefore, the get in this case is not valid from the law of the Torah. So, in other cases of, “Tell others to do something” that is valid. The Rambam however holds this last case of telling others to write sign and give a get to his wife is not valid from the words of the Scribes and perhaps from the Torah. So he definitely does not agree with the Ramban about the problem being the need for lishma--for her sake. I think the reason for the Rambam is this. There is an argument in the gemara Gitin page 66. We know the law is like R. Jose, “Words cannot be handed over to a messenger.” But the question is does that also mean if he tells two people, “tell others to write a get “is not valid or not. The Rambam holds we see in the Gemara Gitin page 67 that even if he says, “Tell to others” is valid from Torah law, still there is a decree from the words of the scribes that he must not do so since they might ask the scribe to sign in a case where the husband said openly that the scribe must write, and the two others must sign. (That is he said that they should sign, not the scribe.) However there is also an opinion in the Gemara that R. Jose holds he says, “tell others” is in fact not valid from the Torah. This the reason for these two opinions being brought in the Rambam. Now to go on in this subject a little. The Ramban holds to tell others to write a document of acquisition as a present to someone is valid. Clearly the reason is he holds “He says ‘tell others’” is valid. But the Rambam holds if he says to two people “tell to two others to write a document of acquisition and give it to someone” is not valid at all. The reason is that at that point the Rambam decided that “he said to tell others,” is not valid from the law of the Torah like that alternative opinion in Gitin page 66.][this is a involved subject, but here i just wanted to give my take on the reason for the rambam. The reason for the Ramban is alredy pretty clear in the Ramban himself as quoted by the Ran and more openly said in the Drisha and Rav Naftali Trouphf and Rav Shach. I think my take on the Rambam here is original]------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- This coming piece is to give an approach to the רמב''ם. But another approach I recall is that a gift needs to be accepted. That might be an answer for the Rambam. Another answer is in the אבי עזרי of רב שך. The main question is why, ''he says 'say''' (he says to two people tell two witnnesses write a doc of a gift and give it to someone ; or write a doc of divorce and give it to my wife) is not valid for a document of a gift, but for a ''גט''(document of divorce) the רמב''ם brings that it is not valid דרבנן or maybe from the תורה דאורייתא. The coming essay is my explanation for this problem. _____________________________ There is no argument between the רמב’’ם and the רמב’’ן about the case in which one says to two people, “Write and sign a document of גירושין to my wife,” that they can do so, but they cannot tell anyone else to do so. [Laws of גירושין chapter 2 law 5.] And they also agree if he tells them to tell a scribe to write a גט and for them to sign it, and give it to his wife, that they cannot do so. [Ch. 2 law 6] However in the reason for this, they disagree. To the רמב’’ן the reason for the last law is that we need it to be written for her sake. In other words, this is a regular case of making a messenger. And a person can make messengers to tell others to appoint others to write sign and give a גט to his wife. However, the problem is the scribe needs to hear the command from the husband directly. Therefore, the גט in this case is not valid from the law of the Torah. So, in other cases of, “Tell others to do something” that is valid. The רמב’’ם however holds this last case of telling others to write sign and give a גט to his wife is not valid from the words of the סופרים and perhaps from the תורה. So, he definitely does not agree with the רמב’’ן about the problem being the need for לשמה for her sake. I think the reason for the רמב’’ם is this. There is an argument in the גמרא גיטיןpage ס''ו ע''ב. We know the law is like ר' יוסי, “Words cannot be handed over to a messenger.” מילי לא מימסרו לשליח But the question is does that also mean if he tells two people, “tell others to write a גט “is not valid or not. The רמב’’ם holds we see in גיטין ס''ז that even if he says, “אומר אמרו” is valid דאורייתא, still there is a גזרה from the words of the scribes that he must not do so since they might ask the scribe to sign in a case where the husband said openly that the scribe must write, and the two others must sign. (That is he said that they should sign, not the scribe.) However, there is also an opinion in the Gemara that ר' יוסי holds אומר אמרו is in fact not valid דאורייתא. This the reason for these two opinions being brought in the רמב’’ם. Now to go on in this subject a little. The רמב’’ן holds to tell others to write a document of acquisition as a מתנה to someone is valid. Clearly the reason is he holds “אומר אמרו’” is valid. But the רמב’’ם holds if he says to two people “tell to two others to write a document of acquisition and give it to someone” is not valid at all. The reason is that at that point the רמב’’ם decided that “he said to tell others,” is not valid from the law of the Torah like that alternative opinion in גיטין ס''ו ע''ב. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ הקטע הבא נועד לתת גישה לרמב"ם. אבל גישה נוספת שאני זוכר היא שצריך לקבל מתנה [דעת המקבל]. זו עשויה להיות תשובה לרמב"ם. תשובה נוספת נמצאת באבי עזרי של רב שך. השאלה העיקרית היא מדוע, "הוא אומר 'תגידו'" (הוא אומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני עדים וסופר לכתוב מסמך מתנה ולתת אותו למישהו; או לומר לשני עדים וסופר לכתוב מסמך גירושין ולתת אותו לאשתי) אינו תקף למסמך מתנה, אבל עבור "גט" (מסמך גירושין) הרמב"ם מביא שהוא אינו תקף דרבנן או אולי מהתורה דאורייתא אין ויכוח בין הרמב"ם לרמב"ן לגבי המקרה שבו אדם אומר לשני אנשים, "כתבו וחתמו על מסמך גירושין ותן אותו לאשתי", שהם יכולים לעשות כן, אך אינם יכולים לומר לאף אחד אחר לעשות כן. [הלכות גירושין פרק ב', חוק ה']. והם גם מסכימים אם הוא אומר להם לומר לסופר לכתוב גט ולחתום עליו ולמסור אותו לאשתו, שהם אינם יכולים לעשות כן. [פרק ב', חוק ו']. אולם בנימוק לכך, הם חולקים. לרמב"ן, הסיבה לחוק האחרון היא שאנחנו צריכים שהוא (הגט) ייכתב למענה. במילים אחרות, זהו מקרה רגיל של יצירת שליח. ואדם יכול למנות שליחים לומר לאחרים למנות אחרים לכתוב, לחתום ולתת גט לאשתו. אולם, הבעיה היא שהסופר צריך לשמוע את הפקודה מהבעל ישירות. לכן, הגט במקרה זה אינו תקף מדין התורה. לכן, במקרים אחרים של, "אמרו לאחרים לעשות דבר מה" זה תקף. הרמב"ם, לעומת זאת, סבור שהמקרה האחרון של אמירת אמרו לאחרים לכתוב ולחתום ולתת גט לאשתו אינו תקף מדברי הסופרים, ואולי גם מהתורה. לכן, הוא בהחלט לא מסכים עם הרמב"ן לגבי הבעיה שהיא הצורך של לשמה (למענה). אני חושב שהסיבה לרמב"ם היא זו. יש ויכוח בגמרא גיטין דף ס"ו ע"ב. אנו יודעים שההלכה היא כמו ר' יוסי, "דברים לא יימסרו לשליח". מילי לא מימסרן לשליח. אבל השאלה היא האם זה אומר גם שאם הוא אומר לשני אנשים, "תאמר לאחרים לכתוב גט" זה לא תקף או לא.[אומק אמרו] הרמב"ם קובע שאנו רואים בגיטין ס''ז שגם אם הוא אומר "אמרו" תקף דאורייתא, עדיין יש גזרה מדברי הסופרים שאסור לו לעשות זאת מכיוון שהם עלולים לבקש מהסופר לחתום במקרה שבו הבעל אמר בגלוי שהסופר חייב לכתוב, ושני האחרים חייבים לחתום. (כלומר, הוא אמר שהם צריכים לחתום, לא הסופר). עם זאת, יש גם דעה בגמרא שר' יוסי סבור ש"אומר אמרו" למעשה אינו תקף דאורייתא. זו הסיבה לכך ששתי דעות אלו מובאות ברמב"ם. ועכשיו נמשיך קצת בנושא הזה. הרמב"ן סבור שאם הוא אומר לאחרים לכתוב מסמך רכישה כמתנה למישהו, זה תקף. הסיבה לכך היא שהוא סבור ש"אומר אמרו" תקף. אבל הרמב"ם סבור שאם הוא אומר לשני אנשים "אמרו לשני אחרים לכתוב מסמך רכישה ותתנו אותו למישהו" זה בכלל לא תקף. הסיבה היא שבנקודה זו הרמב"ם החליט ש"אמר לומר לאחרים", זה לא תקף מדין התורה, כמו אותה דעה חלופית בגיטין ס"ו ע"ב

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Turning Point by Michael Huemer Sep 28

Charlie Kirk was assassinated on September 10th this year. He was a conservative activist, the founder of the conservative organization Turning Point USA. He went around debating people about hot-button issues, especially on college campuses. The shooter appears to be a pro-trans activist who was angered by Kirk’s right-wing stance about transgenderism. What does this mean for America? 1. Reactions What should concern us is not simply that there was a violent extremist who decided to murder someone he disagreed with. That guy is in jail and will probably never be able to kill again; anyway, one person (who doesn’t work in government) can only do so much damage. What should concern us now is the reaction to the murder. Left-wing social media videos quickly leapt to celebrate the murder without compunction. This really has to be seen; in the following video, watch from 5:04-8:10: Most of those individuals seem genuinely thrilled, with no sense of shame and no concern that maybe they shouldn’t reveal this about themselves. That is why I have come to write this explanation of why the murder was bad. 2. The Case Against Murder 2.1. Charlie Kirk as a human being Charlie Kirk was a human being. Killing human beings is normally wrong. In this case, he was 31, so the murder deprived a human being of perhaps 50 years of life, along with all the goods that he could ever have experienced in that time. His wife was left without a husband, his children without a father. If you have trouble empathizing with him because of his political views, just think about a family member of yours who has conservative views (virtually everyone has one or more such person in their life). Imagine that someone murdered your family member because he was putting forth his political views. Your family member’s views, and his reasons for holding them, are probably pretty similar to Kirk’s, or at least not dramatically superior. 2.2. The propagandistic impact Still, you might think (as I guess the above video-makers thought) that Charlie Kirk was being so harmful through his activism that the reasons for silencing him outweighed the general wrongness of murder. One problem is that it is not at all clear what the overall impact of Kirk’s assassination will be on public perception of the issues on which Kirk spoke. It is unclear, in particular, how the cause of trans rights will be affected by this. On the one hand, Kirk can no longer campaign for his views on transgenderism. Perhaps, if he hadn’t died, he would have made much more content, which would have persuaded more people that, e.g., transwomen aren’t really women. On the other hand, the assassination has put Kirk’s existing videos into the public spotlight. Probably many more people have now watched his content due to hearing about his assassination on the news. In addition, the assassination obviously makes left-wing people, especially trans activists, look much worse. Most people are not so keen on violence, so the side of a disagreement that appears more violent is usually going to lose sympathy with normal people. That’s why Martin Luther King and Gandhi chose nonviolent protests, and that’s part of why they succeeded. It’s not implausible that the assassination might help the cause of trans rights, nor is it implausible that the assassination might set back trans rights. In such a situation, even just on consequentialist grounds, you have to rest with the general presumption against murder. 2.3. A Culture of Violence Left-wing people used to worry about problems like the “cycle of violence”. Basically, this refers to a phenomenon in human interactions, including group interactions, in which violence spirals out of control because each side keeps retaliating for the other side’s last act of violence, and there is a tendency for the retaliation to be more severe than the act that it is retaliating for. This is one theory of how wars start. The left used to be against violence, so they would warn people about the cycle of violence. In this case, one plausible consequence of the Kirk assassination is greater anger and extremism on the right, which could in turn provoke still greater anger on the left. Another plausible consequence is increased social acceptance of violence. Human beings are more strongly influenced by perceived social norms than they are by genuine morality. For this reason, if it starts to seem like physically attacking those we disagree with is the sort of thing people in our society do, then more people who are presently peaceful may tip over into violence. And we’ve had indications that the social norms may be changing in the direction of tolerance for political violence. I am not going to try to measure which side is worse (nor am I thereby declaring that the two are exactly equal, nor am I saying that the left is worse, nor am I saying that the right is worse. The fact that people are focused on that is part of the problem.) I recall Trump talking about wanting to punch protestors at a rally. Leftists also developed the “punch a Nazi” meme (where “Nazi” can refer to a huge range of people). We didn’t used to attack people physically for their political views. The last time this sort of thing was prominent was the 1960’s, when there was a great deal of general social unrest. America will get through this time, just as we made it through the 60’s, but there may be a lot more trouble in the meantime. Bear in mind that what changes social norms is the perception of what the norms are; if people perceive that the norms have changed, then the norms in fact change. For that purpose, it matters a lot more that a bunch of people are openly celebrating a political assassination, without any sense of shame, than that one person committed such an assassination (for which he was arrested and sent to prison). Other people see that, and they conclude that endorsing murder is socially acceptable after all, which it never used to be, and perhaps thence that murder is socially acceptable. There will be some small percentage of people for whom this will give them the little push in the direction of giving in to their violent impulses that leads them to go out and start a riot or kill someone. By the way, don’t assume that all those people will agree with you politically. Once we have a culture of violence, the violence can come from any direction. 2.4. Disadvantages of violence The immediate disadvantages of a culture of political violence are obvious (more people hurt, killed, etc.). But the knock-on effects can include a worsening of other institutions. Academics and journalists are afraid to speak about politics, so we all get dumber about politics. Fewer people are willing to serve in public office due to the risks to their safety, so we get lower quality leaders. The people who rise to positions of influence in a violent culture tend not to be the best people; indeed, they tend to be close to the worst people. So there is a risk that everything else gets worse. People in any society are going to have disputes about how that society should be run. Our tradition has been that these disputes get resolved through debate and democratic process. If we give that up, and we decide that our disputes are to be resolved through violence, everything else that’s good in our society is going to collapse. We’re not at that point yet, nor am I predicting that that will happen. But if we kept having events like this, and people kept celebrating them, then there is some point, which no one can predict in advance, at which social order would fall apart. 3. What Happened to Us? We’ve slid from thinking that people with other political views are wrong to thinking they are evil. This is lazy and dumb. If there are two large factions of society, each close to half the population, it is unlikely that one of them is generally evil while the other is generally good. It is unlikely that the mainstream position on an issue is just pure evil, such that anyone who holds that position deserves to die. Of course, it is possible that the people who disagree with you are evil. But if things often seem that way to you, the more likely explanation is that you are a dogmatic ideologue. That is more plausible than that lots of seemingly ordinary people are pure evil. In the case of transgenderism, the mainstream position is probably that transwomen are men, not women. There is no need to posit demonic evil or hate to explain why people think this, when the simple explanation is that transwomen were born with penises, which most people grew up thinking was incompatible with womanhood. At the same time, the “arguments” given by trans activists are generally extremely unpersuasive; e.g., “transwomen are women, because if you say otherwise you’ll be hurting their feelings” or “transwomen are women, because people who say otherwise are bigots.” The simplest explanation for someone’s being unpersuaded by these arguments is that they are obviously terrible arguments. Better arguments can be given, but they rarely are, and most people have never heard them. Still worse is the “argument” that “transwomen are women, because if you say otherwise, we’re going to kill you.” People with this kind of rage leave the rest of us with the impression that they have to resort to violence because they know they can’t win an actual debate. 4. What to Do What should we do? When a prominent public figure is murdered, act sad. If you aren’t sad, pretend that you are anyway. Or at least shut up. Don’t go on social media bragging about how much schadenfreude you have. Those people are damaging the culture. More broadly, if someone disagrees with you, start with the presumption that it is a good faith disagreement; they, just like you, want what’s best, despite disagreeing about what that is.

za86 C Minor MIDI format ditto nwc format

השלחן ערוך כותב כי עדים צריכים להעיד בעל פה, לא בכתב (חושן משפט פרק כ''ח ס''ק י''א). אבל כדי לאמת מסמך, בחושן משפט סימן מ''ו סעיף ז' הרמ''א אומר שאפשר להעיד בכתיבה בשם הריב''ש (יצחק בן ששת). ואף על פי כן, לאחר שכותב השלחן ערוך (פרק מ''ו הל''ו) אם אחד הוא עד, ואז פתאום לא יכול לדבר, הוא אינו יכול להעיד על תוקף חתימתו (אפילו בכתב). והרמ''א אינו חולק שם. מַדוּעַ? רב שמואל רוזובסקי עונה את זה. רב יוסף קרו סבור כמו תוספות שמסמך עם עד אחד בלבד אינו נחשב כמסמך תקף, ולכן כדי לאמת אותו, צריך להעיד בעל פה, לא בכתב. נראה שזה מרמז שרב קרו סבור שמסמך שנכתב בניגוד להסכמת הלווה גם אינו נחשב כמסמך, ולכן גם שם יש להעיד על תוקפו בעל פה, בעוד שהרמ"א סבור שאפשר להעיד בכתב על תוקפו. ----בהתחלה היה נראה לי קשה להבין למה רב שמואל מתכוון בזה שיש מסמך שיש לו תוקף ועדיין צריך לאמת אותו. הוא לא מסביר למה הוא מתכוון בדיוק. עם זאת, עלה בדעתי שהוא חייב לסבור שהשלחן ערוך סבור כמו הרמב"ם שאף מסמך אינו תקף מדין התורה, רק דברי הסופרים הופכים מסמכי הלוואה לתקפים בכלל. אבל אפילו אז, צריך לאמת אותם כאשר המלווה מגיע לבית המשפט כדי לגבות את התשלום שלו. לכן, תמיד צריך להעיד על תוקפו של מסמך בעל פה, כי הפסוק "מפיהם" מרמז "ולא מפי כתבם". עם זאת, הרמ"א חייב לקבוע שמסמכי הלוואות ועסקים תקפים מהתורה. מכיוון שהם כבר תקפים, אז אפשר להעיד על תוקפם בכתב. [רק כאשר מסמך נכתב עם רק עד אחד, אז אין לו תוקף מהתורה, ולכן צריך להעיד על תוקפו מדברי הסופרים בעל פה.] ויכוח זה בין השלחן ערוך לרמ"א מבוסס על תוספת כתובות עמוד כ'. דעה אחת היא ש"שטר" שנכתב ללא הסכמת הלווה אינו נחשב כמסמך, ורב קרו מסכים לכך, והרמ"א חולק על כך. דעה נוספת היא שמסמך עם עד אחד בלבד אינו נחשב כמסמך. גם השלחן ערוך וגם הרמ"א מסכימים

The Rav Joseph Karo (author of the Shulchan Aruch) writes that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing (Choshen Mishpat chapter 28, law 11). But to validate a document, in Choshen Mishpat (vol 4 of the Shulchan Aruch), chapter 46, law 7, the Rema says one can testify by writing in the name of the Rivash (Izhak ben Sheshet). And yet, later on when the Shulchan Aruch writes (chapter 46, law 36) if one is a witness, and then suddenly became unable to speak , he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the Rema does not disagree there. Why? Rav Shmuel Rozovski [Rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach] is this. Rav Joseph Karo holds like Tosphot that a document with only one witness does not have a valid category of a document, and therefore to validate it, one needs to testify verbally, not in writing. This seems to imply that Rav Karo holds a document written against the consent of the borrower is also not considered to be a document, and therefore there also one must testify for it’s validity verbally, while the Rema holds one can testify in writing about its validity. It seemed to me hard to understand what Rav Shmuel means by a document having validity, and yet still needing to be validated. He does not explain what he means exactly. However, it occurred to me that he must hold that the Shulchan Aruch (Rav Karo) holds like the Rambam that no document is valid from the law of the Torah, only the words of the sages makes documents of loans valid at all. But even then, one needs to validate them when the lender comes to court to collect his payment. Therefore one must always testify for the validity of a document verbally because the verse, "from their mouth" which implies not from their writing. However the Rema must hold that documents of loans and business are valid from the Torah. Since they are already valid, then one can testify as for their validity in writing. Only when a document was written against with only one witness, then it has no validity from the Torah, so one has to testify as for its validity from the words of the sages verbally. This argument between the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema is based on Tosphot, Ketuboth page 20. One opinion is a document written without consent of the borrower does not have the status of a document, and Rav Karo agrees with this, and the Rema disagrees. Another opinion is a document with only one witness does not have the status of a document. Both the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema agree. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The שלחן ערוך writes that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing (חושן משפט פרק כ''ח ס''ק י''א ). But to validate a document, in חושן משפט סימן מ''ו סעיף ז' the רמ''א says one can testify by writing in the name of the ריב''ש (יצחק בן ששת). And yet later on when the שלחן ערוך writes (chapter מ''ו lawל''ו ) if one is a witness, and then suddenly became unable to speak , he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the רמ''א does not disagree there. Why? the רב שמואל רוזובסקי is this. רב יוסף קרו holds like תוספות that a document with only one witness does not have a valid category of a document, and therefore to validate it, one needs to testify verbally, not in writing. This seems to imply that רב קרו holds a document written against the consent of the borrower is also not considered to be a document, and therefore there also one must testify for it’s validity verbally, while the רמ''א holds one can testify in writing about its validity. ----It seemed to me at first hard to understand what רב שמואל means by a document having validity and yet still needing to be validated. He does not explain what he mean exactly. However, it occurred to me that he must hold that the שלחן ערוךholds like the רמב''ם that no document is valid from the law of the תורה, only the words of the סופרים makes documents of loans valid at all. But even then, one needs to validate them when the lender comes to court to collect his payment. Therefore, one must always testify for the validity of a document verbally because the verse "מפיהם" which implies ולא מפי כתבם. However, the רמ''א must hold that documents of loans and business are valid from the תורה. Since they are already valid, then one can testify as for their validity in writing. Only when a document was written against with only עד אחד, then it has no validity from the תורה, so one has to testify as for its validity from the words of the סופרים verbally. This argument between the שלחן ערוך and the רמ''א is based on תוספות כתובות page כ''. One opinion is a שטר written without consent of the borrower does not have the status of a document and רב קרו agrees with this and the רמ''א disagrees. Another opinion is a document with only one witness does not have the status of a document. Both the שלחן ערוך and the רמ''א agree.

השלחן ערוך חושן משפט סימן מ''ו ס''ק ל''ו

הש''ך (חושן משפט מ''ו ס''ק ז') שואל שאלה על הרמ''א בשלחן ערוך. הגר"א עונה על זה בצורה אחת ורב שמואל רוזובסקי עונה על זה אחרת על סמך תוספות בכתובות דף כ' ד''ה ר''י. הנושא בקצרה הוא זה. השלחן ערוך והרמ''א כותבים שהעדים צריכים להעיד בעל פה ולא בכתב. אבל כדי לאמת מסמך, הרמ''א אומר שאפשר להעיד בכתב. ואף על פי כן, כשכותב השלחן ערוך חושן משפט סימן מ''ו ס''ק ל''ו אם הוא עד, ופתאום לא יכול לדבר, אינו יכול להעיד על תוקף חתימתו (אפילו בכתב). והרמ"א אינו חולק על כך. מדוע? ----תשובתו של הגר"א קצרה, אבל רב שך מסביר זאת כך. הרמ"א סבור כמו (הריב"ש) רב יצחק בן ששת שעד יכול לאמת את חתימתו על ידי כתיבה. זה בא כמו רב כהנא בגיטין דף ע"א צד א' שאומר שחירש יכול לכתוב, "כתוב ותן גט לאשתי," וזה תקף. אבל אדם שאינו יכול לדבר אינו יכול לתת עדות כי חוסר היכולת לדבר הוא פגם בגוף. לכן, כדי להעיד לגבי תקפות החתימה של אדם אנו זקוקים לעדים תקפים, ואם יש לנו את זה, אז הם יכולים לכתוב שהחתימה תקפה. אבל מי שאינו יכול לדבר אינו עד תקף כלל. הבעיה שאני רואה היא שרב כהנא לא אומר כלום על תוקף חתימתו. הוא מדבר רק על חירש שנותן פקודה בכתב לגרש את אשתו. אני יכול להזכיר שלמרות שר' יוחנן חולק על רב כהנא, עדיין יש ר' יצחק בדף ע''א ע''ב שמסביר את המשנה שם בהתאם לרב כהנא. אז נוכל לראות מדוע הריב''ש (ר' יצחק בן ששת) החליט כמו רב כהנא נגד ר' יוחנן

The Shach asks a question on the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch . The Gra answers it in one way and Rav Shmuel Rozovski of Ponovitch answers it differently based on a Tosphot in Ketuboth page 20. The subject in short is this. The Shulchan Aruch and Rema write that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing. But to validate a document, the Rema says one can testify by writing. And yet later on when the Shulchan Aruch writes if one is a witness, and then became unable to speak , he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the Rema does not disagree there. Why? The answer of the Gra is short, but Rav Shach explains it thus. The Rema holds like the Rivash [Rav Izhak ben Sheshet] that a witness can validate his signature by writing. This is coming like Rav Kahana in Gitin 71 side a who says a deaf person can write, ‘’Write and give a divorce to my wife, and it is valid. But a person who cannot speak cannot give testimony because not being able to speak is a defect of the body. So, to testify as for the validity of one’s signature we need valid witnesses, and if we have that then they can write that the signature is valid. But one who cannot speak is not a valid witness at all.] The problem I see is that Rav Kahana says nothing about validating one’s signature. He only speaks about a deaf person giving a command in writing to divorce his wife. I might mention that even though R. Yochanan disagrees with Rav Kahana still there is R. Isaac on page 71 side b who explains the Mishna there to be in accord with Rav Kahana. {So we can see why the Rivash [Issac ben Sheshet] decided like Rav Kahana against R. Yochanan.} ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The ש''ך asks a question on the רמ''א in the שלחן ערוך. The גר''א answers it in one way and רב שמואל רוזובסקי answers it differently based on a תוספות בכתובות דף כ'. The subject in short is this. The שלחן ערוך and רמ''א write that witnesses need to testify verbally, not by writing. But to validate a document, the רמ''א says one can testify by writing. And yet later on when the שלחן ערוך סימן מ''ו ס''ק ל''ו writes if one is a witness, and then became unable to speak, he cannot testify as for the validity of his signature (even by writing). And the רמ''א does not disagree there. Why? The answer of the גר''א is short, but רב שך explains it thus. The רמ''א holds like the (ריב’’ש) רב יצחק בן ששת that a witness can validate his signature by writing. This is coming like רב כהנא in גיטין דף ע''א side a who says a deaf person can write, ‘’Write and give a divorce to my wife, and it is valid. But a person who cannot speak cannot give testimony because not being able to speak is a defect of the body. So, to testify as for the validity of one’s signature we need valid witnesses, and if we have that, then they can write that the signature is valid. But one who cannot speak is not a valid witness at all.] The problem I see is that רב כהנא says nothing about validating one’s signature. He only speaks about a deaf person giving a command in writing to divorce his wife. I might mention that even though ר’ יוחנן disagrees with רב כהנא still there is ר' יצחק on דף ע''א who explains the משנה there to be in accord with רב כהנא. {So, we can see why the ריב''ש יצחק בן ששת decided like רב כהנא against ר’ יוחנן.}

כתובות תוספות בדף כ' ע''ב מביא את הירושלמי. יוצא מהירושלמי שגם אם העדים על שטר הלוואה לא זוכרים כלום, הם עדיין יכולים להעיד על חתימותיהם וזה כמו האי גאון שהובא בשיטה מקובצת, אבל לא כמו הרמב''ם. אני חושב שהדרך להסביר את ההבדל הזה היא שלדעת רש''י תוספות ורמב''ן שטר בהלוואה יש תוקף מהתורה, וזו לדעתי הסיבה של האי גאון. כיוון שהשטר תקף גם בלי שאף אחד אמר דבר בבית המשפט, אז כדי להוסיף לו תוקף נוסף, די לעדות בעדים על תוקף חתימתם. אולם לדעת הרמב"ם, לשטרי הלוואות אין תוקף מהתורה, אלא חכמים נתנו להן תוקף כדי שלא תיסגר הדלת בפני אנשים שרוצים ללוות כסף. הרשו לי להביא כאן את ירושלמי. המשנה אומרת ר' יהודה הנשיא אמר שכאשר שטר של הלוואה מגיע לבית דין, העדים עליו צריכים להעיד על תוקף חתימתם, וגם להביא מישהו אחר שיעיד על כל חתימה. אבל חכמים אמרו שדי אם כל עד יעיד על תוקף חתימתו. הירושלמי אומר שאם איש אינו זוכר את ההלוואה, אין ויכוח בין ר' יהודה לחכמים. שניהם מסכימים שהעדים מעידים על חתימותיהם ומביאים עדים אחרים לאותה מטרה. אם שני העדים זוכרים את ההלוואה, אין ויכוח. כולם מסכימים שהם מעידים על ההלוואה, וזה מספיק. הוויכוח הוא כאשר הם שכחו את ההלוואה ורק לאחר שהשטר הזכיר להם עליה, הם זוכרים. בעיני ירושלמי השטר יכול להיות תקף גם אם אף אחד לא זוכר את ההלוואה כלל, וזו דעת האי גאון. בעיני הרמב"ם מקרה זה אינו תקף כלל. הוא מתבסס על הגמרא שלנו ועל העובדה שהשטר ממילא פסול מהתורה. הגמרא שלנו מביאה את המשנה ואומרת שרב הונא אמר שצריך לזכור את ההלוואה. ר' יוחנן אמר שאם זוכרים את ההלוואה על ידי כתב האישי שלהם, זה מספיק. הרמב"ם פסק את הדין כמו ר' יוחנן והגמרא שלנו

Ketuboth page 20 side Tosphot brings the Yerushalmi. It comes out of the Yerushalmi that even if the witnesses on a doc of a loan remember nothing they ca still testify on their signatures and this is like Rav Hai Gaon brought in the Shita Mekubetzet, but not like the Rambam. I think the way to explain this difference is that Rashi, Tosphot and Ramban hold a document on a loan has validity from the Torah, and this is I think the reason of Hai Gaon. Since the doc is valid even without anyone saying anything in court, so to add extra validity to it, it is enough for witnesses to testify as to the validity of their signatures. However To the Rambam, documents of loans have no validity from the Torah, but the sages gave them validity so that the door will not be shut in front of people that want to borrow money. Let me bring here the Yerushalmi. The Mishna says R Judah Hanasi said when a document of a loan comes to court, the witnesses on it need to testify on the validity of their signatures, and also bring someone else to testify on each signature. But the sages said it is enough if each witness testifies on the validity of his own signature. the Yerushalmi says if no one remembers the loan, there is no argument between r Judah and the sages. both agree they testify on their signatures and bring another witness as for the same purpose. If both witnesses recall the loan, there is no argument. Everyone agrees that they testify as to the loan, and that is enough. The argument is when they recall the loan only after being reminded of it by the document. To the Yerushalmi the doc can be valid even if no one recalls the loan at all, and that is the opinion of Hai Gaon. To the Rambam this case is totally not valid. He bases himself on our Gemara and the fact that the doc is anyway no valid from the Torah. Our Gemara brings the Mishna and says Rav Huna said they need to recall the loan. R. Yochanan said if they recall the loan by being reminded by their own personal document, that is enough. The Rambam decided the law like R Yochanan and our Gemara.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- כתובות תוספות בדף כ' ע''ב brings the ירושלמי. It comes out of the ירושלמי that even if the witnesses on a שטר of a loan remember nothing they ca still testify on their signatures and this is like האי גאון brought in the שיטה מקובצת, but not like the רמב’’ם. I think the way to explain this difference is that רש''י תוספות ורמב''ן hold a שטר on a loan has validity from the תורה, and this is I think the reason of האי גאון. Since the שטר is valid even without anyone saying anything in court, so to add extra validity to it, it is enough for witnesses to testify as to the validity of their signatures. However To the רמב’’ם, שטרי of loans have no validity from the תורה, but the sages gave them validity so that the door will not be shut in front of people that want to borrow money. Let me bring here the ירושלמי. The משנה says ר' יהודה הנשי said when a שטר of a loan comes to court, the witnesses on it need to testify on the validity of their signatures, and also bring someone else to testify on each signature. But the sages said it is enough if each witness testifies on the validity of his own signature. The ירושלמי says if no one remembers the loan, there is no argument between r Judah and the sages. both agree they testify on their signatures and bring another witness as for the same purpose. If both witnesses recall the loan, there is no argument. Everyone agrees that they testify as to the loan, and that is enough. The argument is when they recall the loan only after being reminded of it by the שטר. To the ירושלמי the שטר can be valid even if no one recalls the loan at all, and that is the opinion of האי גאון. To the רמב’’ם this case is totally not valid. He bases himself on our גמרא and the fact that the שטר is anyway invalid from the תורה. Our גמרא brings the משנה and says רב הונא said they need to recall the loan. ר’ יוחנן said if they recall the loan by being reminded by their own personal שטר, that is enough. The רמב’’ם decided the law like ר’ יוחנן and our גמרא.

za85 c minor midi format ditto in nwc format

בבא מציעא כ''ח

מי שמוצא חפץ אבוד שיתבלה עם הזמן נדרש למכור אותו, והכסף שייך לבעל החפץ (ונשמר לעתיד שיקבל את חפצו). בינתיים, המוצא יכול להשתמש בכסף. הוא נחשב כמי ששאל חפץ של מישהו אחר, ולכן אם הוא מאבד את הכסף בכל מקרה עליו להחזיר. בבא מציעא כ"ח ע"ב כ"ט ע"א וכ"ט ע''א. זה כמו רב יוסף שמחזיק במי ששומר על חפץ אבוד שאינו חייב לתת צדקה בזמן שהוא עסוק בשמירה שלו. לכן, הוא כמו שומר בשכר, ואז מכיוון שהוא גם יכול להשתמש בכסף, הוא עולה מדרגה אחת להיות שואל של הכסף שיש לו מידה גדולה יותר של אחריות לשמור על הכסף. כך קבעו ר' חננאל והר''ם את החוק (הלכות גזלה ואבדה פרק י''ג הלכה י''ז). {תוספת חולקים על כך וקובעים שהוא כמו שומר שלא מקבל שכר.} זה סותר את בבא מציעא מ''ג שבו יש לך מקרה של אדם שהפקיד צרור כסף לא קשור אצל חלפן כספים. מכיוון שהוא יכול להשתמש בכסף, יש לו את הקטגוריה של שומר בשכר שאחראי אם הכסף אבד בגניבה, אך אינו אחראי לדברים בלתי נמנעים כמו אם הסירה (שהיה עליה) טבעה. כך רב נחמן פסק את החוק והרמב"ם פסק במקרה זה כמו רב נחמן. [הבעיה היא שהיתר להשתמש בכסף במקרה אחד (מוצא) הופך אותו ללווה או שואל, ובמקרה השני לשומר בשכר.] הסיבה ניתנת על ידי רבינו אפרים והמגיד משנה ששומר הכסף של החפץ האבוד צריך לעלות ברמה שונה משומר בשכר ללווה מכיוון שהוא מקבל את היתרון של אי-הצורך לתת צדקה בזמן שהוא מעורב בשמירה ובטיפול בחפץ, ואז הוא גם מקבל אישור להשתמש בחפץ. רב שך הציע ששמירה על החפץ האבוד נדרשת על פי התורה, ולכן זה הופך אותו לאחראי יותר. עם זאת, תשובה זו נראית קשה. הסיבה היא שההבדל בין שומר בשכר ובין שואל הוא שכל התועלת הולכת לשואל, בעוד שבמקרה של שומר בתשלום, בעל החפץ מקבל תועלת מסוימת. זו, אחרי הכל, הסיבה שהוא משלם את השומר. אבל בשני המקרים שלנו כאן תועלת מסוימת הולכת לבעל הכסף ולכן בשני המקרים השומר צריך להיות שומר בתשלום, לא לווה או שואל. הסיבה היחידה שהוא יכול להפוך ללווה היא שהוא מקבל תשלום נוסף אך התועלת עדיין תגיע לבעל החפץ האבוד. מכיוון שהתורה דורשת ממנו לשמור על החפץ האבוד, זה לא אומר שאין תועלת לבעלים. אחרי הכל, הסיבה היחידה שהתורה דורשת מהמוצא לשמור על הכסף היא לטובת בעל החפץ האבוד. עם זאת, אני יכול לראות את הרעיון שמכיוון שהתורה דורשת ממנו לשמור על החפץ האבוד, זה יוצר דרגה גבוהה יותר של אחריות

A finder of a lost object that will deteriorate over time is required to sell it and the money belongs to the owner of the object (saved for later when he claims his object.) In the meantime, the finder can use the money. He is considered to be like ne who borrows someone else’s object, and so if he loses the money under any circumstances he has to repay. Bava Mezia 28b and 29 a. This is like Rav Joseph who holds one who guards a lost object is not required to give charity at the time he is involved in his guard obligation. Therefore, he is like a paid guard, and then because he also can use the money, he gets stepped up one notch to be a borrower of the money who has a greater degree of responsibility to guard the money. This is how the Rabbainu Chananel and Rambam decided the law. (laws of theft or loss chapter 13 law 17) {Tosphot disagrees holds he is like an unpaid guard like the decision of Raba.} This conflicts with Bava Metzia page 23 where you have a case of a person who deposited a untied bundle of money with a money changer. There since the money changed can use the money, he has the category of a paid guard who is liable if the money was lost by theft, but not liable for unavoidable things like if the boat it was on sank. This is how Rav Nachman decided the law and the Rambam decided in that case like Rav Nachman. [The problem is permission to use the money in one case (finder) makes him a borrower, and in the other into a paid guard.] The reason is given by Rabbainu Ephraim and the Magid Mishna that the guard of the money of the lost object has to levels stepped up from an unpaid guard to a borrower because he gets the benefit of not having to give charity while involved in guarding and taking care of the object and then also, he gets permission to use the object. Rav Shach suggested that guarding the lost object is required by Torah, and so that makes him more liable. However this answer seems difficult. The reason is that the difference between a paid guard and a borrower is that all benefit goes to the borrower while in the case of a paid guard, the owner of the object gets some benefit, That is after all why he is paying thee guard. But in both of our cases here some benefit goes to the owner of the money and so in both cases the guard should be a paid guard, not a borrower The only reason he could become a borrower is that he gets extra paid but benefit still come to the owner of the lost object. just because ethe Torah requires him to guard thee lost object that does not means that no benefit comes to the owner. after all the only reason the Torah requires the finder to guard the money of the sake of the object is for the benefit of the owner of thee lasts object. However I ca see the idea that since the torah requires him to guard the lost object tah t makes ahigher degree of responsibility. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A finder of a lost object that will deteriorate over time is required to sell it and the money belongs to the owner of the object (saved for later when he claims his object.) In the meantime, the finder can use the money. He is considered to be like ne who borrows someone else’s object, and so if he loses the money under any circumstances he has to repay. בבא מציעא כ''ח ע''ב כ''ט ע''א and 29 a. This is like רב יוסף who holds one who guards a lost object is not required to give charity at the time he is involved in his guard obligation. Therefore, he is like a paid guard, and then because he also can use the money, he gets stepped up one notch to be a borrower of the money who has a greater degree of responsibility to guard the money. This is how ר' חננאלand הר''ם decided the law. {תוספות disagrees and holds he is like an unpaid guard like the decision of.} This conflicts with בבא מציעא מ''ג where you have a case of a person who deposited a untied bundle of money with a money changer. There since the money change can use the money, he has the category of a paid guard who is liable if the money was lost by theft, but not liable for unavoidable things like if the boat )it was on( sank. This is how רב נחמן decided the law and the רמב''ם decided in that case like רב נחמן. [The problem is permission to use the money in one case (finder) makes him a borrower, and in the other into a paid guard.] The reason is given by רבינו אפרים and the מגיד משנה that the guard of the money of the lost object has to levels stepped up from an unpaid guard to a borrower because he gets the benefit of not having to give charity while involved in guarding and taking care of the object and then also, he gets permission to use the object. Rav Shach suggested that guarding the lost object is required by Torah, and so that makes him more liable. However this answer seems difficult. The reason is that the difference between a paid guard and a borrower is that all benefit goes to the borrower while in the case of a paid guard, the owner of the object gets some benefit, That is, after all, why he is paying thee guard. But in both of our cases here some benefit goes to the owner of the money and so in both cases the guard should be a paid guard, not a borrower The only reason he could become a borrower is that he gets extra paid but benefit still come to the owner of the lost object. Because the תורה requires him to guard the lost object, that does not mean that no benefit comes to the owner. After all, the only reason the תורה requires the finder to guard the money of the sake of the object is for the benefit of the owner of thee lasts object. However I can see the idea that since the תורה requires him to guard the lost object that makes a higher degree of responsibility.

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תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק שישי מביא דיון בין ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש שקשה להבין. שאלת ריש לקיש: שלפי דעת ר' יוחנן שמי שאינו כהן שגנב תרומה מאבי אמו שהוא כהן, ואחר כך יורש את הדוד, צריך לשלם לכל שבט הכהנים. ריש לקיש מחזיק שהוא מחזיר לעצמו. ריש לקיש שואל אם ר' יוחנן צודק, אז המשנה המאוחרת שאומרת מי שגנב ואכל תרומה שהוא הקדש חייב לשלם קרן אחד (סכום עיקרי) ושתי חמישיות, צריך לומר, הוא מחזיר שלוש". ר' יסא אמר בשם ר' יוחנן שהגניבה כלולה. הרידב''ז מסביר שלהראב''ד, הנקודה של ריש לקיש הייתה שהוא צריך להחזיר שלושה קרניים, אחד עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור תרומה. הסיבה לשניים היא שכל מקרי גניבה דורשים תשלום כפול. בסך הכל יהיה זה פי שלושה מהערך המקורי. אבל איך זה טוב לריש לקיש? במקרה של המשנה השנייה הגנב אינו כהן. אז למה לא להחזיר שלושה? ריש לקיש יכול לענות שתרומת הקדש אינו רכוש הכהנים. הרי המקרה הוא כזה שכהן קיבל תרומה, ואז הקדיש אותה לבית המקדש. אז הוא בוודאי אינו הבעלים שלה יותר. הבעלים היחיד הוא בית המקדש, ולכן הוא מחזיר קרן אחת להקדש. הבעיה עם התשובה הזו היא שהיא עובדת באותה מידה גם עבור ר' יוחנן. אני חושב שהתשובה היא שריש לקיש טוען שלמרות שהתרומה שייכת למקדש, היא עדיין תרומה, ולכן עליו להחזיר שלושה קרניים, אחד להקדש, ושניים לשבט אם צריך להחזיר תרומה גנובה לשבט. אבל ריש לקיש טוען כאן שתרומה גנובה אינו מוחזר לשבט אלא לבעלים הפרטי, וכאן לאחר שהכהן נתן אותו למקדש, הוא אינו שייך לאף כהן פרטי

The Talmud Yerushalmi Trumot chapter 6 brings a discussion between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish that is difficult to understand. The question of Reish Lakish is that according to the opinion of R. Yochanan that one who is not a kohen who stole trumah from the father of his wife who is a kohen, and then inherits his property, has to make payment to the whole tribe of kohanim. Riesh Lakish holds he pays back himself. Reish Lakish asks if R . Yochanan is correct, then the later mishna which says one who stole and ate truma that is hekdesh must pay one kern (main amount) and two fifths, should say, He pays back three.” R. Yesa said in the name of R Yochanan that the theft is included. The Ridvaz explains that to the Raavad the paint of Reish Lakish was he ought to pay back three kerens [main amounts] one for hekdesh and two for truma. The reason for two is that all cases of theft require double payment. All together there would be three times the original value. But how then is this good to Reish Lakish? In this later case the thief is not a kohen. So why not pay back three? To the Ridvaz, Reish Lakish can answer that the trumah of hedesh is not property of the kohanim. The case is after all such that a kohen received trumah, and then dedicated it to the temple. So he is certainly not the owner of it any more. The only owner is the temple, so he pays back one keren to hedesh. The problem with this answer is that it works just as well for R Yochanan. I think the answer is that Reish Lakish claims that even though the trumah belongs to the temple, it still is trumah, and so he should pay back three kerens, one to hekdesh, and two to the tribe if one has to pay back stolen trumah to the tribe. But Reish Lakish might claim here that stolen trumah is not paid back to the tribe but to the individual owner, and here after the kohen gave it to the temple, it belongs to no individual kohen.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק שישי brings a discussion between ר’ יוחנן and ריש לקיש that is difficult to understand. The question of ריש לקישis that according to the opinion of ר’ יוחנן that one who is not a kohen who stole תרומה from the father of his wife who is a kohen, and then inherits his property, has to make payment to the whole tribe of kohanim. ריש לקיש holds he pays back himself. ריש לקיש asks if ר’ יוחנן is correct, then the later משנה which says one who stole and ate תרומה that is הקדש must pay one kern (main amount) and two fifths, should say, He pays back three.” ר' יסא said in the name of ר’ יוחנן that the theft is included. The רידב''ז explains that to the ראב''ד the point of Reish Lakish was he ought to pay back three קרניים [main amounts] one for הקדש and two for תרומה. The reason for two is that all cases of theft require double payment. All together there would be three times the original value. But how then is this good to ריש לקיש? In this later case the thief is not a kohen. So why not pay back three? To the ridvaz, ריש לקיש can answer that the תרומה ofהקדש is not property of the kohanim. The case is after all such that a kohen received תרומה, and then dedicated it to the temple. So he is certainly not the owner of it any more. The only owner is the temple, so he pays back one קרן toהקדש . The problem with this answer is that it works just as well for ר’ יוחנן. I think the answer is that ריש לקיש claims that even though the תרומה belongs to the temple, it still is תרומה, and so he should pay back three קרניים, one to הקדש, and two to the tribe if one has to pay back stolen תרומה to the tribe. But ריש לקיש might claim here that stolen תרומה is not paid back to the tribe but to the individual owner, and here after the כהן gave it to the temple, it belongs to no individual כהן----------

רב שמואל רוזובסקי היה ראש הישיבה המרכזית של פונוביז' לפני רב שך. הוא מביא הוכחה שמעילה [השתמשות פריט המוקדש למקדש] כוללת אחריות על גזל.] ההוכחה שהוא מביא היא בירושלמי תרומה פרק ו' משנה ראשונה ושניה. הגמרא שם אומר שאם גנב תרומה מאבי אמו שהוא כהן, אז ר' יוחנן אומר שהוא מחזיר את הסום לשבט היינו הכהנים. אבל ריש לקיש אמר שהוא מחזיר לעצמו [אם הוא היורש היחיד. שאל ריש לקיש על ר' יוחנן מהמשנה המאוחרת: "אם גנב תרומה של הקדש, הוא מחזיר שתי חמישיות וסכום אחד מלא, הקרן ." אם ר' יוחנן יהיה צודק, יש להחזיר שלושה. ר' ייסא אמר הפסוק שאומר להחזיר על מעילה פירושו שהגזלה נכללת בתשלום. הרידב''ז הסביר שאלת ריש לקיש היא שיש להחזיר שלושה סכומים מלאים, האחד עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור גניבת תרומה, (ותשלום הגניבה הוא תמיד שני סכומים מלאים, כלומר מלוא הסכום וכפלו. (אבל כפל לא חל על הקדש.) הרידב"ז מסביר שהרמב"ם קובע שהשאלה היא שיש להחזיר שלוש חמישיות, אחת עבור הקדש, אחת עבור תרומה, ואחת עבור שבועת הכחשת הגניבה. אבל אף אחת מההסברים לא נראית כמספקת הוכחה לרב שמואל רוזובסקי. כל מה שמקבלים מהירושלמי הוא שכאשר יש מעילה, גם הגזלה נכלל. אבל בכל מקרה, כאשר מעילה לא תחול, גם גזלה לא תחול. מה שאנחנו צריכים הוא מקרה שבו מעילה לא תחול וגזל יחול. [כאן אני מניח שזה מה שרב רוזובסקי התכוון אליו. עם זאת, ייתכן שזה לא כן. יכול להיות שרק אני צריך את המסקנה הזו כדי להסביר את התוספות קידושין דף נ''ה.] עם זאת, אנו יכולים להבין זאת מהמשנה עצמה אם הגרסה הנכונה היא שמעילה חלה במקרה של נפח של זית, בעוד שגזלה חלה כאשר נפח זה חסר, אך יש שווה פרוטה. הערה אגב, ברצוני לציין שבאופן שבו הריב"ז מסביר את הראב"ד, איני רואה כיצד תשובתו של ר' ייסא עונה על השאלה על ר' יוחנן. השאלה הייתה בדרך של ר' יוחנן, עלינו לדרוש שלוש כמויות מלאות (קרניים), כלומר אחת עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור תרומה. כעת, משגזלה כלולה בהקדש, עדיין יש לנו שתי קרניים עבור התרמה. כיצד עברנו משלוש קרניים לקרן אחת בלבד?

Rav Shmuel Rozovski was the major rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach. He brings a proof that meila [using an item dedicated to the temple] includes liability for robbery.] The proof he brings is the Yerushalmi tractate Truma chapter 6 the first and second mishna. The Gemara there says that if one stole truma from the father of his mother who is a priest [kohen], then R. Yochanan says he pays back the tribe of kohanim priests (descendants of Aaron). Reish Lakish said he pays back himself [since he is the only inheritor. Reish Lakish asked on R Yochanan from the later Mishna: “If one stole trumah of hedesh, he pays back two fifths and one full amount.” If R. Yochanan would be right, three should be paid back. R Yeesa said the verse that says to pay back for meila means the theft is included in the payment. The Ridvaz (Rav Yakov David of Sluzk and later Safed) explains the Yerushamli thus. To the Raavad, the question of Reish Lakish is three full sums should be paid back, one for hedesh and the other for theft of trumah, and payment of theft is always two full amounts i.e. the full amount and its double. (But double does not apply to hedesh.) The Ridvaz explains that the Rambam holds the question was three fifths ought to be paid back, one for hedesh, one for trumah and one for thee oath denying the theft. But neither explanation seems to provide a proof for Rav Shmuel Rozovski. All you get from the Yerushalmi is that when there is meila, the robbery is included. But in any case, where meila would not apply, neither would robbery. What we need is a case where meila would not apply and robbery would apply. [Here I assume that that is what R. Rozovski meant. However that might not be the case. It could be only I need this conclusion in order to explain Tosphot in Kidushin page 55.] However we can get this from the mishna itself if the correct text (version) is that meila applies in a case of a volume of an olive, while robbery applies when that volume is lacking, but there is a an amount of a coin called a pruta. On a side note, I would like to mention that in the way the Ridvaz explains the Raavad, I can not see how the answer of R Yeesa answers the question on R Yochana. The question was in the way of R Yochanan we should require three full amounts, i.e. one for hedesh, and two for truma. Now that robbery is included in hedesh, we still have two full amounts for the truma. How did we go from three to one full amount alone?------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- רב שמואל רוזובסקי was the major ראש ישיבה of פונוביז' before רב שך. He brings a proof that מעילה [using an item dedicated to the temple] includes liability for robbery.] The proof he brings is the ירושלמי tractate תרומה chapter ו' the first and second משנה. The גמרא there says that if one stole תרומה from the father of his mother who is a כהן, then ר' יוחנן says he pays back the שבט היינו כהנים. BUT ריש לקיש said he pays back himself [ IF he is the only inheritor[. ריש לקיש asked on ר' יוחנן from the later משנה: “If one stole תרומה of הקדש, he pays back two fifths and one full amount (קרן .” If ר' יוחנן would be right, three should be paid back. ר' ייסא said the verse that says to pay back for מעילה means the גזלה is included in the payment. The רידב''ז (ר' יעקב דוד מסלוצק and later צפת) explains the ירושלמי thus. To the ראב'’ד, the question of ריש לקיש is three full sums should be paid back, one for הקדש and the other for theft of תרומה, and payment of theft is always two full amounts, i.e. the full amount and its double. (But double does not apply to הקדש.) The רידב’’ז explains that the רמב''ם holds the question was THAT three fifths ought to be paid back, one for הקדש, one for תרומה and one for the oath denying the theft. But neither explanation seems to provide a proof for רב שמואל רוזובסקי. All you get from the ירושלמי is that when there is מעילה, the robbery is included. But in any case, where מעילה would not apply, neither would robbery. What we need is a case where מעילה would not apply and robbery would apply. [Here I assume that that is what רב רוזובסקי meant. However that might not be the case. It could be only I need this conclusion in order to explain תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה.] However, we can get this from the משנה itself if the correct גירסה is that מעילה applies in a case of a volume of an olive, while robbery applies when that volume is lacking, but there is an amount of a פרוטא. On a side note, I would like to mention that in the way the רידב’’ז explains the ראב’ד, I can not see how the answer of ר' ייסא answers the question on ר' יוחנן. The question was in the way of ר' יוחנן we should require three full amounts, i.e. one for הקדש, and two for תרומה. Now that robbery is included in הקדש, we still have two full amounts for the תרומה. How did we go from three to one full amount alone? [Zichron Shmuel is the book which brings the ideas of Rav Shmuel Rozovski which I bring here.]

הסתכלתי על ההוכחה של ר' שמואל רוזובסקי [ספר זיכרון שמואל דף ש' ] שגזילה נכללת במעילה [חפצי המקדש], ולכן אם יש מקרה שבו מעילה אינה חלה, עדיין ישים גזל. אבל ההוכחה באה מהירושלמי (תרומה פרק ו') ושם כתוב אם גונב תרומה של הקדש, אז הוא משלם את הערך הרגיל של החפץ, אבל מוסיף שתי חמישיות, האחת לתרומה והשנייה למעילה. אם החפץ שווה פרוטה, אבל אין לו נפח של זית, אז לר' ינאי הוא משלם חמישית וזה הולך לכהן. אם יש לו נפח של זית, אך אינו שווה פרוטה, החמישי הולך להקדש (אוצר המקדש). אם זו הגרסה הנכונה, אז ר' שמואל הגיוני. אבל הגרסה של הגר''א והרמב''ם היא הפוכה. אם יש לו ערך של פרוטה, אך חסר לו הנפח, אז הוא הולך להקדש. אם יש לו את הנפח, אך לא את הערך הכספי הנכון, הוא הולך לכהן. בגרסה זו, אין שום דבר שמצביע על כך שגזל כלול במעילה. אלא, הוא אינו אומר דבר על גזל, וגם אם גזל היה נכלל, לעולם לא היה מקרה שבו אחד (מעילה) חל והשני (הקדש) לא

I was looking at the proof of Reb Shmuel Rozovski [Zichron Shmuel page 300] that robbery is included in meila [using objects of the Temple], and therefore if there is a case where meila does not apply, robbery would still be applicable. But the proof comes from the Jerushalmi Talmud (Trumah chapter 6) and there it says if one steals trumah of hekdesh, then he pays the regular value of the object, but adds two fifths, one for truma and the other for meila. If the object has the worth of a pruta, but does not have the volume of an olive, then to R Yanai he pays only one fifth and it goes to the priest. If it has the volume of an olive but is not worth a pruta, the fifth goes to hekdesh (temple treasury). If this is the right version, then Reb Shmuel makes sense. But the version of the Gra and the Rambam is the opposite. If it has the worth of a pruta, but lacks the volume, then it goes to hedesh. If it has the volume, but not the right monetary value, it goes to the priest. In this version, there is nothing to indicate that robbery is included in meila. Rather it says nothing about robbery, and even if robbery would be included, there would never be an instance in which one applies and not the other. __________________________________________________________________________________I was looking at the proof of ר' שמואל רוזובסקי [ספר זיכרון שמואל page ש' ] that גזילה is included in מעילה [using objects of the Temple], and therefore if there is a case where מעילה does not apply, robbery would still be applicable. But the proof comes from the ירושלמי (תרומה chapter ו') and there it says if one steals תרומה of הקדש, then he pays the regular value of the object, but adds two fifths, one for תרומה and the other for מעילה. If the object has the worth of a פרוטה, but does not have the volume of an זית, then to ר' ינאי he pays only one fifth and it goes to the priest. If it has the volume of an olive but is not worth a פרוטה, the fifth goes toהקדש (temple treasury). If this is the right version, then ר' שמואל makes sense. But the version of the גר''א and the רמב''ם is the opposite. If it has the worth of a פרוטה, but lacks the volume, then it goes to הקדש. If it has the volume, but not the right monetary value, it goes to the priest. In this version, there is nothing to indicate that robbery is included in מעילה. Rather it says nothing about robbery, and even if robbery would be included, there would never be an instance in which one applies and not the other.____________________

za83 F Minor midi file za83 nwc file

היה ראש ישיבה של פונוביץ לפני רב שך. שמו היה ר' שמואל רוזובסקי. היום התבוננתי בכמה מרעיונותיו ושמתי לב שהוא סבור כדלקמן: לדעת הר"ם, אדם שגונב מהקדש [פריטים המוקדשים למקדש] צריך להחזיר את ערך הפריט, לא בגלל עבירה של שימוש בחפצי קודש אלא פשוט בגלל עבירה של גניבה. אבל למרות זאת, הוא לא משלם כפליים כי הפסוק בתורה פוסל אותו מלשלם כפליים. עבור הרבא''ד, עליו להחזיר את הסכום העיקרי שהיה שווה הפריט בגלל מעילה, לא בגלל גניבה רגילה, [ואם גנב בטעות אז עליו גם להחזיר חמישית ולהביא קרבן, קורבן אשם]. אולם רב שמואל אומר שגם הר''ם וגם הראב''ד מסכימים שאם גנב את הקדש, אז עליו להחזיר את הסכום העיקרי בגלל גזל, לא מעילה. כלומר, הראב''ד אינו חולק על הר''ם במקרה זה. בגלל זה, ניתן להבין את התוספות בקידושין נ''ה ע''א שקובע שפקיד בית דין (גזבר) שלוקח את הקדש שברשותו למשמרת ונותן אותו לאדם אחר בכוונה מוציא את החפץ מקטגוריה של הקדש והוא מאבד את קדושתו. הסיבה היא שמדובר במקרה של גזל, לא גניבה בהסתרה כמו גנב בלילה. לכן הגזבר אחראי על גזל וזה לא מקרה של מעילה. לכן, החפץ יוצא מלהיות הקדש. מה שאני מתכוון כאן הוא שאם החטא היה מעילה, אז הוא היה מוציא את החפץ מקטגוריה של מעילה רק אם היה מוסר אותו בטעות כמו ר' יהודה בקידושין נ''ה

There was a rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach. His name was Reb Shmuel Rozovski. I was lookinng at some of his ideas todayת and noticed that he holds as follows: To the opinion of the Rambam, a person that steals from hedesh [items that are dedicated to the Temple] has to pay back the value of the item, not because of the transgression of using holy items, but rather simply because of the transgression of stealong. But even so, he does not pay double because the verse of the Torah excludes him from paying double. To the Raavad, he has to pay back the main amount the item was worth because of meila, not because of normal theft, [and also if he stole by mistake then he also has to pay back a fifth and bring a sacriifice, a guilt offering.] However Reb Shmuel says both the Rambam and Raavad agree if he robbed hedesh, then he has to pay back the main amount because of rebbery, not meila. i.e., the Raavad does not disagree with the Rambam in this case. Because of this, it is possible to understand Tosphot in Kidushin page 55 that holds that a officer of the court that takes hedesh that is in his possesion for safekeeping and gives it away to another person on purpse, takees the object out of the category of hedesh, and it loses its holiness. The reason is that this is a case of robbery, not stealing by consealment like a thef in the night. And so, the gizbar is liable for robbery, and this is not a speacial case of meila. Therefore the obkject goes out of being hedesh. What I mean here is that if the sin would be meila, then he would take the object out of the categotry of meia only if he gave it away by mistake like R. Judah there in kidushin page 55.===============================================There was a ראש ישיבה of פונוביץ before רב שך. His name was ר' שמואל רוזובסקי. I was looking at some of his ideas today, and noticed that he holds as follows: To the opinion of the הר’’ם, a person that steals from הקדש [items that are dedicated to the temple] has to pay back the value of the item, not because of the transgression of using holy items (meila), but rather simply because of the transgression of stealing. But even so, he does not pay double because the verse of the Torah excludes him from paying double. To the ראב''ד, he has to pay back the main amount that the item was worth because of מעילה, not because of normal theft, [and if he stole by mistake then he also has to pay back a fifth and bring a sacrifice, a guilt offering.] However, רב שמואל says both the הר’’ם and ראב''ד agree if he robbed הקדש, then he has to pay back the main amount because of robbery, not מעילה. I.e. the ראב''ד does not disagree with the הר’’ם in this case. Because of this, it is possible to understand תוספות in קידושין that holds that a officer of the court that takes הקדש that is in his possession for safekeeping and gives it away to another person on purpose takes the object out of the category of הקדש and it loses its holiness. The reason is that this is a case of robbery, not stealing by concealment like a thief in the night. So, the גזבר is liable for robbery, and this is not a special case of מעילה. Therefore, the object goes out of being הקדש. What I mean here is that if the sin would be מעילה, then he would take the object out of the category of מעילה only if he gave it away by mistake like ר' יהודה in קידושין נ''ה.

היום הסתכלתי על הגמרא בקידושין דף נ''ה, ועלה בדעתי שתוספות נראית במבט ראשון כקובעת את ההלכה כר' מאיר שאומר "הקדש {חפץ שהוקדש לבית המקדש} בכוונה יוצא לחולין, אבל בטעות הוא לא".[הקדש במזיד מתחלל] זה הפריע לי, כי הגמרא עצמה מבהירה שההלכה היא כמו ר' יהודה, שבשוגג הקדש מאבד את קדושתו, אבל במזיד הוא נשאר קדוש. אבל בדרך חזרה מהים, עלה בדעתי למה התוספות מתכוון. הוא אומר שהוויכוח בין ר' יהודה לר' מאיר מתייחס רק לשימוש בקודש. השימוש בקודש בידיעה שהוא קדוש הוא הוויכוח. לר' יהודה נשאר הקדש. אבל תוספות כאן בקידושין דף נ''ה מתייחס לגניבת הקדש. לשיטת תוספות, אם הגזבר גונב אותו בכוונה (על ידי מתן אותו ביודעין לאדם אחר), זה מוציא אותו מקטגוריית הקדש גם לר' מאיר וגם לר' יהודה

I was looking at the Gemara in Kidushin page 55 today and it occurred to me that Tosphot seems at first glance to decide the law to be like R. Meir who holds “Hedesh {an object that has been dedicated to the Temple}on purpose goes out to be secular, but accidently it does not.” This bothered me because the Gemara itself is clear that the law is like R. Judah that accidently it loses its holiness, but on purpose it stays holy. But on the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what Tosphot intends. He is saying that the argument between R. Judah and R. Meir refers only to using Hedesh. Using hedesh while knowing it is hedesh is the argument. To R. Judah it stays hedesh. But Tosphot here in Kidushin page 55 refers to stealing hedesh. To Tosphot if the gizbar intentionally steals it (by giving it knowingly to another person), that takes it out of the category of hedesh to both R. Meir and R Judah.--------------------------------------------------------------------------I was looking at the גמרא in קידושין דף נ''ה today and it occurred to me that תוספותseems at first glance to decide the law to be like ר' מאיר who holds “הקדש {an object that has been dedicated to the Temple}on purpose goes out to be חולין, but accidently it does not.” This bothered me because the גמרא itself is clear that the law is like ר' יהודה that accidently it loses its holiness, but on purpose it stays holy. But on the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what תוספותintends. He is saying that the argument between ר' יהודהand ר' מאיר refers only to using הקדש. Using הקדש while knowing it is הקדש is the argument. To ר' יהודהit stays הקדש. But תוספות here in קידושין דף נ''ה refers to stealing הקדש. To תוספותif the גזבר intentionally steals it (by giving it knowingly to another person), that takes it out of the category of הקדש to both ר' מאיר and ר' יהודה.

אני חושב שקיבלתי קצת בהירות לגבי תוספות והר''ם לגבי מעילה. מה שהייתי רוצה לומר הוא זה. יש טיעון תלת כיווני לגבי מעילה: (1) הר''י (רבינו יצחק) בתוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א, (2) תוספות בקידושין עמוד נ''ה ע''א, (3) ר''ם בפירושו על המשנה. אבל לכולם, אם משהו היה הקדש (קדוש על ידי הקדשה לבית המקדש) והוא יוצא מעצם היותו הקדש, ​​אז מי שמשתמש בו אינו אחראי על מעילה. (רק זה שגרם לו לצאת מקטגוריה זו חייב.) אם משהו הוא הקדש, ​​ומישהו משתמש בו, הוא חייב. השאלה היא מה יכול לגרום לחפץ לצאת מלהיות הקדש? (זה מתייחס לחפץ רגיל, אבל לא לבהמה ולא לכלים ששימשו להכנת הקורבנות.) לר''י (רבינו יצחק) עבור גזבר (פקיד בית דין) להשאיל חפץ של הקדש (שהוקדש למקדש) לא גורם לו לצאת מקטגוריה של הקדש, ​​אבל נתינתו כן גורמת לו לצאת מקטגוריה זו. [זוהי מסקנתו הסופית. אבל בהתחלה הר''י חשב שאפילו השאלה של החפץ גורמת לו לאבד את קדושתו.] נראה שעשיית זאת בכוונה, או בטעות, אינה משנה. (2) תוספת בקידושין עמוד נ''ה ע''א. אם הגזבר בטעות חושב שהחפץ שייך לו, והוא משאיל או נותן אותו, הוא נשאר קדוש. אבל אם הוא יודע שזה הקדש (של המקדש) ונותן אותו, הוא מאבד את קדושתו. כל מי שמשתמש בו לאחר מכן אינו חייב. (3) הרמב"ם מסתמך על הגמרא בקידושין עמוד נ"ה שמשווה פדיון בהמה שעתידה להיות קורבן ואין בה מום, למי שגורם לחפץ הקדש לאבד את קדושתו. (בדרך כלל, אי אפשר לפדות בהמה שהוקדשה להיות קורבן אלא אם כן יש בה מום.) לר"ם, אם הקצין (גזבר) יודע שהחפץ הוא הקדש והשתמש איתו בכל זאת, החפץ נשאר הקדש. זה כמו דעת ר' יהודה בקידושין עמוד נ"ה. אבל, אם הגזבר לא ידע או שכח שזהו הקדש והשתמש איתו בטעות, החפץ מאבד את קדושתו. זה בניגוד לדעת ר' מאיר שסובר ההפך. ר' מאיר סבור שאם והשתמש איתו ביודעין, אז הוא מאבד את קדושתו, לא אם והשתמש איתו בטעות ושכח שזהו הקדש.

Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 99a, (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a, (3) Rambam in his commentary on the Mishna מסכת מעילה

t I think I have gained some clarity about Tosphot and the Rambam about trespass. What I would like to say is this. There is a three way argument about trespass: (1) The RI (rabbainu izhak) in Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 99a, (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a, (3) Rambam in his commentary on the Mishna. But to everyone, if something was hedesh (holy by being dedicated to the Temple) and has goes out of being hedesh, then anyone that uses it is not liable for trespass. (Only the one that caused it to go out of that category is liable.) If something is hedesh, and someone uses it, he is liable. The question is what can cause an object to go out of being hedesh? (This refers to a regular object, but not an animal nor vessels used in preparing the sacrifices.) To the RI (Rabainu Izhak) for a gizbar (officer of the court) to loan out an object of hedesh (that was dedicated to the Temple) does not cause it to leave the category of hedesh, but giving it away does cause it to go out of that category. [That is his final conclusion. But at first the RI thought even loaning out the object also causes it to lose it’s holiness.] It seems doing this on purpose, or by accident makes no difference. (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a. If the officer (gizbar) by mistake thinks the object belongs to him, and he loans or gives it out, it stays holy. But if he knows it is hedesh (of the Temple) and gives it out, it loses its holiness. Anyone that uses it after that is not liable. (3) Rambam bases himself on the Gemara in Kidushin page 55 that equates redeeming an animal that is to be a sacrifice and has no blemish, to one causing an object of hedesh to lose its holiness. (Normally, one cannot redeem an animal that is dedicated to be a sacrifice unless it has a blemish.) To the Rambam, if the officer (gizbar) knows the object is hedesh and gives it out anyway, the object stays hedesh. This is like the opinion of R. Judah in Kidushin page 55. But if the officer did not know or forgot it is hedesh and gave it out by mistake, the object loses its holiness. This is against the opinion of R. Meir who holds the opposite. R. Meir holds if he gave it out knowingly, then it loses it holiness, not if he gave it out by mistake forgetting that is hedesh. --------------------------------------------------------------------I think I have gained some clarity about תוספות and the ר’’ם about מעילה. What I would like to say is this. There is a three way argument about מעילה: (1) The ר''י (רבינו יצחק) in תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ט ע''א, (2) תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה ע''א, (3) ר’’ם in his commentary on the משנה. But to everyone, if something was הקדש (holy by being dedicated to the Temple) and has goes out of being הקדש, then anyone that uses it is not liable for מעילה. (Only the one that caused it to go out of that category is liable.) If something is הקדש, and someone uses it, he is liable. The question is what can cause an object to go out of being הקדש? (This refers to a regular object, but not an animal nor vessels used in preparing the sacrifices.) To the ר''י (רבינו יצחק) for a גזבר (officer of the court) to loan out an object of הקדש (that was dedicated to the Temple) does not cause it to leave the category of הקדש, but giving it away does cause it to go out of that category. [That is his final conclusion. But at first the ר''י thought even loaning out the object also causes it to lose its holiness.] It seems doing this on purpose, or by accident makes no difference. (2) תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה ע''א. If the גזבר by mistake thinks the object belongs to him, and he loans or gives it out, it stays holy. But if he knows it is הקדש (of the Temple) and gives it out, it loses its holiness. Anyone that uses it after that is not liable. (3) רמב''םbases himself on the גמרא in קידושין page נ''ה that equates redeeming an animal that is to be a sacrifice and has no blemish, to one causing an object of הקדש to lose its holiness. (Normally, one cannot redeem an animal that is dedicated to be a sacrifice unless it has a blemish.) To the ר’’ם, if the officer (גזבר) knows the object is הקדש and gives it out anyway, the object stays הקדש. This is like the opinion of ר' יהודה in קידושין page נ''ה. But, if the גזבר did not know or forgot it is הקדש and gave it out by mistake, the object loses its holiness. This is against the opinion of ר' מאיר who holds the opposite. ר' מאיר holds if he gave it out knowingly, then it loses it holiness, not if he gave it out by mistake forgetting that is הקדש.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ג ע''א. הגמרא אומרת אם פקיד בית דין שמונה לטפל בכסף או בחפצים המוקדשים למקדש (גזבר) נותן צרור כסף שאינו קשור לחלפן כספים, הפקיד חייב לפי דין מעילה. זהו החוק הקובע כי אסור להשתמש בחפצים המוקדשים למקדש לכל שימוש אחר מזה שלשמו נועדו. הרמב"ם כותב בהלכות מעילה פרק ז', הלכה י': אם אדם מוסר צרור כסף שאינו קשור לחלפן כספים או לבעל חנות, לא הוא ולא החלפן הכספים חייבים. זה נראה בסתירה מוחלטת לגמרא. תשובתי מבוססת על תוספת (בבא מציעא צ''ט ע''א). בתוספות, רבינו יצחק אמר שהפעם היחידה שיכולה להיות מעילה אחרי מעילה היא כאשר גזבר אחד נותן לאחר, והשני לאחר, וכן הלאה. כל אחד אחראי משום שהחפץ מעולם לא יצא מרשות המקדש למרות שכל אחד שימש לשימוש אישי. יש לציין: הרמב"ם לעולם אינו אומר שהוא מדבר על גזבר. אלא, הוא כותב שאדם (פרטי) שיש לו כסף שמוקדש למקדש בחבילה שאינה קשורה נותן אותו לאחר, אף אחד לא אחראי. הראשון משום שלא אמר לאחר להשתמש בכסף, והוא מעולם לא הוציא אותו מרשות המקדש, מכיוון שהכסף עדיין לא הגיע לידי גזבר. אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שבתוספת ישנן שתי דרכים להיות אחראי על מעילה, או הוצאה מרשות הקדש, או שימוש בחפץ אפילו כשהוא עדיין ברשות הקדש. אבל, הוצאה מרשות הקדש בכוונה תחילה או בשוגג אינה משנה דבר-----------בעיה אפשרית בתשובתי כאן היא שהרמב"ם מביא את אותה תוספתא כמו שתוספות, שאומרת שאם אדם אחד משתמש בהקדש (חפץ השייך למקדש), ואז מוסר אותו לאחר והוא משתמש בו וכן הלאה וכן הלאה, כל אחד אחראי על מעילה. כעת, התוספות אומרות שזה מתייחס לפקידי בית המשפט (גזברים), והרמב"ם כותב זאת בפשטות ללא כל אינדיקציה להבחנות כמו שתוספות עושה. אבל הרמב"ם אומר שזה מתייחס לבהמה של הקדש, ולכן אין בעיה בתשובתי שבמקרה שלנו אנחנו מדברים על כסף. בכך שאין מעילה אחרי מעילה, ואף אחד מהם לא מתכוון להוציא את החפץ מתחום המקדש.