Gitin 73, Rambam Laws of divorce 9:18 and 19 that is: "Things in the heart are not things". The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]] that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear,

Later note. However Rav Shach understands that the cases in giving a divorcee document are not dependent on ''Things in the heart" because  the statement "This is your divorce if I do not recover from this illness" can mean either that the husband is establishing the time of the divorce, or it might mean that it is a condition. And if it is a condition, it would include an unusual event. It would not matter what was in the heart of the husband. But if so, then how does one explain the case of selling a field under all conditions, and then when some unusual event occurs, the sale does not go through? Tht i clearly a condition and yet the sale is not valid

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גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט:י''ח י''ט that is: "דברים שבלב אינם דברים ". The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band of robbers robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear

Later note. However רב שך understands that the cases in giving a גט are not dependent on ''Things in the heart" because  the statement "This is your גט if I do not recover from this illness" can mean either that the husband is establishing the time of the divorce (שעה אחת לפני מיתה), or it might mean that it is a תנאי. And if it is a תנאי, it would include an unusual event. It would not matter what was in the heart of the husband. But if so, then how does one explain the case of selling a field under all conditions, and then when some unusual event occurs, the sale does not go through? That  clearly a condition, and yet the sale is not valid

גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט: י''ח י''ט. המקרה הוא כשמישהו אומר: "זה הגט שלך אם אני לא אקום מהמיטה החולה הזו", ואיזה אירוע לא צפוי קורה כמו אריה אוכל אותו. יש ספק אם הגירושין תקפים. כמו כן, יש מקרה שבו מוכרים משהו וקובעים שהמכירה תקפה גם אם מתרחש אירוע בלתי צפוי כמו להקת שודדים שודדת אותו. אבל אז מתרחש אירוע שהוא כל כך נדיר שאף אחד לא יכול היה לחשוב עליו כגון הנהר שהיה משקה אותו נפסק. אז המכירה לא תקפה והקונה מקבל את כספו בחזרה. השאלה שלי היא "דברים בלב הם לא דברים". אז למה זה צריך לשנות אם אירוע היה צפוי או לא? התשובה חייבת להיות כמו תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב שיש מקרים שברור מן הנסיבות [אומדנא דמוקח ]שכוונת המוכר ברורה.

אולם רב שך מבין שהמקרים במתן גט אינם תלויים ב''דברים שבלב'' כי האמירה 'זה הגט שלך אם לא אבריא מהמחלה הזאת' יכולה להיות משמעות או שהבעל קובע את זמן הגט (שעה אחת קודם מיתה), או שאולי זה אומר שזה תנאי. ואם זה תנאי, זה יכלול אירוע חריג. לא היה משנה מה היה בלב הבעל. אבל אם כן, אז איך מסבירים את המקרה של מכירת שדה בכל התנאים, ואז כשמתרחש אירוע חריג כלשהו, ​​המכירה לא יוצאת לפועל? ברור שזה תנאי, ובכל זאת המכירה לא תקפה

Rambam laws of acquiring 11 laws 8 and 9. Rav Shach brings there the Rema [Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 207 law 4] that there are some Rishonim that hold that we say, "Things in the heart are not things'' in buying and selling, but not in the case of a gift. I think this opinion comes from the Gemara Ketuboth page 79b. There, there is a case of a woman who became a widow, and she wanted to remarry. But she did not want her next husband to get possession of her property, so she wrote a document giving it all to her daughter. Then she got married and divorced, and came to the court of Rav Nahman asking for her property back from her daughter. Rav Nahman tore up the document, and so she got her property back. Thus we see "things in the heart are things" in the case of a gift. 

I am being a bit short here. For to Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]  there are cases when one needs to state the conditions. There are other cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear and he do not need to state the conditions of the sale openly. and there are other cases when a sale is final, no matter what the intentions were. But the case of the Rema is that even when you can not tell from the circumstances what the intentions were, [circumstances pointed in that direction but were not absolutely clear [אומדנא דמוכח ], still by a gift we say ''things in the heart are things.''

This opinion that we say thing in the heart are things for gifts can not  come from Bava Batra 146b because there there are circumstances that show his intention. That is how Rav Nahman shows that the opinion of the Mishna [that when there are circumstances that show his intention we say things in the heart are things] comes from from R Shimon ben Nuri. But the Rema needs a proof that for a gift we say things in the heart are things even when the circumstances do not show it. 

 Gitin 73, Rambam Laws of divorce 9:18 and 19.  The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]] that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear,

   

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רמב''ם הלכות מכירה י''א הלכה ח' וט'.There רב שך brings  the רמ''א שלחן ערוך חושו משפט ר''ז ס''ק that there are some ראשונים that hold that we say, "דברים שבלב לא הווי דברים  in buying and selling, but not in the case of a gift. I think this opinion comes from the גמרא כתובות ע''ט ע''ב. There there is a case of a woman who became a widow, and she wanted to remarry. But she did not want her next husband to get possession of her property, so she wrote a document giving it all to her daughter. Then she got married and divorced, and came to the court of רב נחמן asking for her property back from her daughter. רב נחמן tore up the document, and so she got her property back. Thus we see "דברים שבלב הווי דברים" in the case of a gift. 

I am being a bit short here. For to תוספות כתובות צ''ז ע''ב 97b]there are cases when one needs to state the conditions. There are other cases when it is clear from the circumstance that the intention  of the seller is clear and he do not need to state the conditions of the sale openly. and there are other cases when a sale is final, no matter what the intentions were. But the case of the רמ''א is that even when you can not tell from the circumstances what the intentions were [circumstances pointed in that direction but were not absolutely clear [אומדנא דלא מוכח ],  by a gift we say things in the heart are things   ---------

This opinion that we say "things in the heart are things" for gifts can not  come from בבא בתרא קמ''ו ע''ב  because there there are circumstances that show his intention. That is how רב נחמן shows that the opinion of the משנה [that when there are circumstances that show his intention we say things in the heart are things] comes from from ר' שמעון בן נורי. But the רמ''א needs a proof that for a gift we say "things in the heart are things" even when the circumstances  do not show it/

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גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט:י''ח י''ט. The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band of robbers robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear

  

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רמב''ם הלכות מכירה י''א הלכות ח' וט'. שם רב שך מביא את הרמ''א שלחן ערוך חושן משפט ר''ז ס''ק   ד' שיש ראשונים שגורסים שאנו אומרים "דברים שבלב לא הוי דברים" בקנייה ומכירה, אבל לא במקרה של מתנה. אני חושב שדעה זו באה מהגמרא כתובות ע''ט ע''ב. יש מקרה של אישה שהתאלמנה, וכן היא רצתה להתחתן בשנית. אבל היא לא רצתה שבעלה הבא יקבל את הרכוש שלה, אז היא כתבה מסמך שמסרה הכל לבתה. ואז היא נישאה והתגרשה, ובאה לבית הדין של רב נחמן ובקשה רכוש בחזרה מבתה. רב נחמן קרע את המסמך, וכך היא קיבלה את רכושה בחזרה. כך אנו רואים "דברים שבלב הוי דברים" במקרה של מתנה.

 

אני קצת מקצר כאן. כי לתוספות כתובות צ''ז ע''ב יש מקרים שצריך לציין את התנאים. וישנם מקרים נוספים בהם ברור מהנסיבות שכוונת המוכר ברורה ואין הוא צריך לציין את תנאי המכירה בגלוי. ויש מקרים אחרים שבהם מכירה היא סופית, לא משנה מה היו הכוונות. אבל המקרה של הרמ''א הוא שגם כשאי אפשר לדעת מהנסיבות מה היו הכוונות, במתנה אנו אומרים דברים שבלב הם דברים.

דעה זו שאנו אומרים "דברים שבלב הם דברים" למתנות אינה יכולה לבוא מבבא בתרא קמ''ו ע''ב כי יש נסיבות המעידות על כוונתו. כך מראה רב נחמן שדעת המשנה [שכאשר יש נסיבות המראות את כוונתו אנו אומרים דברים שבלב הם דברים] באה מר' שמעון בן נורי. אבל הרמ''א צריך הוכחה שבשביל מתנה אומרים "דברים שבלב הם דברים" גם כשהנסיבות אינן מראות זאת. 

היינו הנסיבות הצביעו בכיוון זה אך לא היו ברורות לחלוטין [אומדנא  שאינו מוכח

גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט: י''ח י''ט. המקרה הוא כשמישהו אומר: "זה הגט שלך אם אני לא אקום ממיטת החולה הזו", ואיזה אירוע לא צפוי קורה כמו אריה אוכל אותו. יש ספק אם הגירושין תקפים. כמו כן, יש מקרה שבו מוכרים משהו וקובעים שהמכירה תקפה גם אם מתרחש אירוע בלתי צפוי כמו להקת שודדים שודדת אותו. אבל אז מתרחש אירוע שהוא כל כך נדיר שאף אחד לא יכול היה לחשוב עליו כגון הנהר שהיה משקה אותו נפסק. אז המכירה לא תקפה והקונה מקבל את כספו בחזרה. השאלה שלי היא "דברים בלב הם לא דברים". אז למה זה צריך לשנות אם אירוע היה צפוי או לא? התשובה חייבת להיות כמו תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב שיש מקרים שברור מן הנסיבות [אומדנא דמוקח ]שכוונת המוכר ברורה.

 I do not agree with most of modern education, I my mind the thing to concentrate on are Mathematics Physics and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach  But I would also agree to learning Mechanical Engineering -which after all was what my father father majored in in school. But you might ask, "What if I am not talented in Math?" To answer that question I have mentioned that to some Rishonim, learning Physics and Metaphysics is in the category of learning the Oral Law.  [These would be Rishonim that were going by Rav Saadia Gaon Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam] That means that it is a mitzvah to learn them whether one i talented or not.

 רב לכם בני לוי In the chapters that we read this week in parshat Korah, both Moses  and the congregation of Korach accuse each other of being the rav of the "kelipa"[that is rav *(religious teacher) of the Dark Side] [This is how Rav Isaac Luria explains these verses]. For in the congregation of Korah were the greatest teachers of Torah in that generation as the second Rashi in the Parsha explains--that they were the 250 heads of the sanhedrins

[background note--Korah and his group were against Moses [Moshe], At  the beginning of their revolt they said to moses [''we have had enough of you children of Levi. Literally that is "That is too much of you Children of Levi" But the language also can mean, "You have a Rav (of the kelipa)" and Moses threw at them the exact same accusation "You have a Rav (of the kelipa)"  

One flaw in John Locke and the Declaration of Independence is the assumption that all men are created equal. This is a fiction. Just like in animal species, there is a divergence into different species, so the human species is diverging into separate species. And we know that the Constitution of the USA was never meant to work for  vastly different kinds of groups as the Founding Fathers said openly. It was meant mainly for a homogenous group of people: White Anglo Saxon Protestants. Other groups with a different kind of value system might need a different kind of government. One example is the former Soviet Union, even though it was founded on a flawed system of economics, still the brutality of the later czars gave people the idea that a system that favored working people [the proletariat ]  would be better that being slaves to the parasitic nobles and aristocracy.  And when the system failed, many people felt that they had fallen into chaos, not a liberal free democracy. For there to be any safety to walk on the street, there had to be unofficial war lords in charge of each area of a city in order to preserve peace and order.

 The world is shifting from the USA to the Russian -Chinese alliance. The Chinese space station is a case that already shows this shift. Rewarding merit instead of racial or sexual preference shows up in actual accomplishment.

[This is enough for me to wonder if Hegel actually had some good points as an extension of Kant. There is something odd going on in the USA, and it makes me wonder if perhaps there might be some essential flaw in the system itself? I admit to being somewhat in favor of Hegel because the only Hegel I read was  the Logic part of the Encyclopedia--almost the last thing he wrote which is closely reasoned--rather than the earlier works where most people start. Plus McTaggart who is a formidable proponent of Hegel. But I am not saying either that McTaggart got everything right either--even in Hegel.   

Idea Bava Metzia ch.8-9

Continued from yesterday. Rav Shach   never actually wrote that the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that Tosphot must hold the law of a pledge comes from a decree of the Torah where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. Tosphot in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her 100 zuz and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the mana [100 zuz"] she would in fact be by that married. In other words, if he just says, "You are married to me by  a mana that I will give you, and here is a  pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.

But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the mana. And thus she is married. 

This is similar to the question on the law that if lashon hara/slander is said in front of three people one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it i considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known. 

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 רב שך   never actually wrote that the argument between תוספות and the רמב''ם depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that תוספות must hold the law of a pledge comes from a גזירת הכתוב where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. תוספות in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her מאה זוז and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the מנה'" she would in fact be by that married. In other words if he just says "You are married to me by  a מנה that I will give you, and here is a  pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.

But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the מנה. And thus she is married. 

This is similar to the question on the law that if לשון הרע is said in front of three people, one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it  considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known. 

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רב שך מעולם לא כתב שהוויכוח בין תוספות לרמב''ם תלוי איך אתה מבין את הקטגוריה של משכון. נראה שמה שהוא התכוון היה שתוספות חייב להחזיק שחוק המשכון מגיע מגזירת הכתוב שבו הוא נמצא במקרה של הלוואה. לפיכך היא חייבת לבוא רק במקרה שישנה התחייבות. תוספות מחזיק אם היה נותן לה מסמך שאומר שהוא חייב לתת לה מאה זוז ולומר ש"את נשואה לי בזאת במסמך הזה, והנה משכון עד שאתן את המנה" היא בעצם תהיה על ידי זה שנשוי. כלומר אם רק יאמר "את נשואה לי במנה שאתן לך, והנה משכון עד שאתן", היא לא נשואה בזה כי אין לו חובה לתת את המנה. אבל כאן אפשר לשאול: יהא הדין שעל ידי האמירה ההיא היא נשואה כך, ואז הוא יהיה חייב לתת לה את המנה. ועכשיו היא נשואה. הדבר דומה לשאלה על הדין שאם נאמר לשון הרע בפני שלושה אנשים, מותר לאחר מכן לומר. הסיבה היא שמאחר שיש כבר שלושה אנשים שמודיעים, זה נחשב כבר ידוע. אלא שיהא הדין שאי אפשר לומר זאת אף על פי שנאמר בפני שלושה אנשים, ואז לא יהיו שלושה אנשים שמפרסמים

Kidushin 8. Rambam Marriage chapter 5 halacha 23

If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a pruta [penny], and here is a pledge until I give the pruta." She is not married because there is no pruta [penny], and there is no pledge. Thus sayeth Rava in Kiduhin. What does this mean, "There is no pledge?" Tosphot holds there is no pledge because there is no obligation to give the pruta. But if had written a document saying that he would give a pruta or had made kinyan sudar [acquisition by a scarf] she would be married, But what is the regular case of a pledge? Is it specifically from a decree of the Torah that there is such a thing as a pledge --. If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But is a pledge is a general sort of thing that a pledge can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how Rav Shach seems to explain the Tosphot.

 But on the other side, there is the Rambam and Rashba that hold she is not married and there is no pledge because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of Rav Shach is that this approach of the Rambam and the Rashba goes according to the way of understanding a pledge as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the Rambam and Rashba either. I admit I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender  either,

So Rav Shach must mean the opposite. A pledge is only in a case of an obligation  as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. and this is the reasoning of Tosphot that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the Rambam and Rashba is that there is in general  an acquiring of a pledge that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition. But if so, then in the case of kidushin, why is the pledge any  less than any other pledge that is given on condition? 

So what the Rambam and Rashba mean  is that even though this pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no kidushin. This is the same reason why  a present on condition to return also does not cause a category of a kidushin  

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If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a פרוטה and here is a  משכון until I give the פרוטה." She is not married because there is no פרוטה and there is no משכון. Thus sayeth רבא in קידושין ח. What does this mean, "There is no משכון?" And תוספות holds there is no  משכון because there is no obligation to give the פרוטה. But if had written a שטר saying that he would give  פרוטה or had made קניין סודר  (handkerchief)  she would be married. But what is the regular case of a משכון? Is it specifically from a גזירת הכתוב that there is such a thing as a משכון . If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But if a משכון is a general sort of thing that a משכון can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how  רב שך  seems to explain the תוספות. But on the other side, there is the רמב''ם and רשב''א that hold she is not married and there is no משכון because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of  רב שך is that this approach of the  רמב''ם and רשב''א goes according to the way of understanding a משכון as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the  רמב''ם and רשב''א either.  I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender  either, So רב שך must mean the opposite. A משכון is only in a case of an obligation  as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. And this is the reasoning of תוספות that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the  רמב''ם and רשב''א is that there is in general  an acquiring of a משכון that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition.

But if so, then in the case of קידושין, why is the pledge any  less than any other pledge that is given on condition? 

so what the  רמב''ם and רשב''א  mean  is that, even though the pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no קידושין. This is the same reason why  a present on condition to return also does not cause a  קידושין   

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אם אומר לאישה "את נשואה לי בפרוטה והנה משכון עד שאתן פרוטה". היא לא נשואה כי אין פרוטה ואין משכון. כה אומר רבא בקידושין ף ח. מה זה אומר "אין משכון?" תוספות מחזיק אין משכון כי אין חובה לתת את הפרוטה. אבל אם היה כותב שטר שייתן פרוטה או עשה קניין סודר (מטפחת) היא נשואה. אבל מהו המקרה הרגיל של משכנתא? האם זה ספציפית מגזירת הכתוב שיש דבר כזה משכון. אם כן, זה רק במקרה של הלוואה. אבל אם משכון הוא מעין דבר כללי שאפשר לתת משכון עד שתתקיים חובה כלשהי? כך נראה רב שך שמסביר את התוספות. אבל מהצד השני יש את הרמב''ם והרשב''א שמחזיקים שהיא לא נשואה ואין משכון כי שום דבר בעל ערך כספי לא הגיע אליה. המשמעות של רב שך היא שגישה זו של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הולכת לפי דרך הבנת משכון כנגזרה מגזרת התורה, שהיא להלוואה. אבל נראה שגם זה לא מתאים לרמב''ם ורשב''א. התלבטתי בנושא זה כי במקרה של התורה, (במקרה של הלוואה), גם שום דבר בעל ערך לא הגיע למלווה, אז רב שך חייב להתכוון להיפך. משכון הוא רק במקרה של התחייבות לפי גזירת התורה  כגון במקרה של הלוואה. וזהו נימוק התוספות שאם היה מסמך המחייב אותו, אז הייתה נשואה. והנימוק של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הוא שיש בכלל רכישת משכון שפשוט רכישת חפץ בתנאי שההלוואה לא תשולם או כל תנאי אחר

אבל אם כן, אז במקרה של קידושין, מדוע המשכון פחות מכל משכון אחר שניתן בתנאי?

אז מה שהרמב''ם והרשב''א מתכוונים זה שאף על פי שלמשכון הזה יש קטגוריה אמיתית של משכון, עדיין על ידי זה שהוא לא נשאר אצלה, אין קידושין. זו אותה סיבה שגם מתנה בתנאי להחזיר אינה גורמת לקידושין

 Rav Nahman did not hold with learning philosophy nor any secular studies. He echoed Rav Hai Gaon. But this was not the approach of Ibn Pakuda and Rambam. I went with the approach of Rav Nahman for a few years and yet my experiences with the more or less ghetto [frum] ultra religious world gave me reason to  reconsider. And so with due respect to Rav Nahman, I tend to the approach of Ibn Pakuda, Rambam and Gra who all held from the importance of some secular disciplines - but with a lot of limitations. In the long run, I have to conclude that certain philosophers of the ancient Greeks are important, and Kant also. The natural sciences also. However psychology is pseudo  science. See Karl Popper for the reason.

[In the approach of the Rambam, physics and metaphysics are apart of the mitzvah to learn Gemara. in laws of learning Torah where he says divide the learning into three parts--written law, oral law, gemara. and the subjects brought in the first four chapters are in the category of gemara.]

a good argument for the role of faith that goes beyond reason

There is a good argument for the role of faith that goes beyond reason, This is in Kant when he showed

even to begin reason one needs categories of space and time and causality that can not be known by reason. Nor can they be known by empirical reasoning as Hume showed 

 Whitehead suggested a third kind of fact that is not a mind fact  nor a physical fact in order to escape the Mind -Body Problem. {Process and Reality published 1929}. This has been excluded  from academia from around 1980. But this idea dovetails nicely with the Friesian kind of third source of knowledge that i non intuitive immediate knowledge.[And that too has been excluded from Academia]. [The third kind of fact is what is known by the third kind of knowledge.]

For someone like me this sort of thing that Whitehead suggested make a lot of sense because I am used to seeing in Quantum Mechanics formulations based on Lagrange [Kinetic without potential energy] or Hamilton. In these formulations f Physics the electron knows where to go. It goes where there is minimum of energy, the lowest energy level. But it doe not try out other venues before it does so. So how does the electron know? 

The advantage of Whitehead and Fries is in the categories of Kant. The Kant proof of their validity has been a problem almost immediately after  the ink was dry on The Critique of Pure Reason

 In the beginning of Roman history there is an event that is brought about ''the gods that avenge parents''.[This was the event that caused the downfall of the last Roman king at which it became a republic.] While on one hand, we do not believe in  other gods, but we are also aware that God has angels and archangels  that are appointed over certain tasks (as is brought in the Gemara). To be aware that there are Furies that will never forgive nor ever forget can be helpful to remind one that there is a Judge and there is judgment, people may think they have no responsibility to honor and obey their parents and to blame all their troubles on their parents as Saint Freud taught. And even their parents may forgive and forget. But the gods that avenge parents will never forget  nor forgive and will always collect payment- sooner or later , because they are the ''Furies''--the gods that even the gods of Mount Olympus fear. No sacrifice can appease them. No  prayer can turn away their wrath.

A dimension where time goes backwards and entropy also goes backwards

 In String Theory there are 26 dimensions that have to be curled up to make our  dimensional world. This is promising because only in String Theory is there a viable theory  of quantum gravity. Also there i the advantage of no need for artificial steps to get re-normalization. In these extra dimensions I think there  must be some in which time goes forward and entropy also goes forward. But there must be one in which time goes backwards and entropy goes forward. Also another in which time goes forward and entropy backwards. And another in which time goes backwards and entropy also goes backwards. The reason for  i partly based on Feynman who put forward a paper in 1948 about time reversal and later some people suggested entropy reversal. Even later Georg Ryzanov suggested showed in unpublished papers that the values of electron and proton mass result automatically from these assumptions.

His mechanism for the physical process which would resutt in this was flawed, but it would work well in the context of String Theory'

I spent a lot of time with the papers of Ryzanov but have no more of them and I think they might be lost. It i ad because he showed amazing results in hi equations  

      

scroll of Ruth

In the scroll of Ruth it looks that Ruth was subject to Yibum. That is curious. When he was the wife of Mahlon, she was not Jewish.  How then would yibum apply? Plus Yibum is only for brothers from the father. Not uncles.

The whole discussion between Boaz and Ploni Almoni would have made sense if they were brothers of Mahlon, not Elimelech.

Plus what was that about if Ploni would buy the field then he would have to marry Ruth?

Just to be clear Yibum is when when one brother marries but then dies before he has children. Then one of hi brothers takes the wife [so that his memory will not be lost. Children that that net brother will have ill be considered a children of the first brother.]  

 

 Robert Hanna does a great service to philosophy in showing the flaws of all USA and British ''analytic'' philosophy of the 20th century. And he is quite right about the ''Forward to Kant'' approach, but he does also acknowledge the great contributions of G. E. Moore [who forms the approach of Michael Huemer]

Still, I am waiting for someone to acknowledge Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross.   It must be that too much of the lashon hara [slander] of Husserl stuck. [i.e., psychologism].   

 It does take a certain kind of sense or intuition to feel the importance of learning Torah and I think that it is something that  needs to be nourished, for it can be lost. This is the reason I think that the sages said one should marry only the daughter of a Torah scholar. For (as it was said in the great Litvak yeshivot): "If one's wife wants him to learn, he will learn; and if she does not, he won't." The wife of Rav Kinyevsky one time when he was learning  told a visitor to come back at a later time when the Rav was accepting visitors saying "Do you want my husband to be an am haaretz?"[i.e. "ignoramus" ]

I actually wanted to marry the daughter of a talmid chacham [Torah scholar] for that very same reason, but did not succeed. The interesting thing is that my wife [Leah/aka Paula Finn]  did have a great sense and intuition about the importance of learning Torah, even though she was not really a daughter of a Torah scholar. But that is not so clear in itself for her father [Bill Finn] certainly had a sense of the importance of trust in God and in learning Torah though he was a working guy.

So, to conclude, I think it is more important to marry someone with a sense of Torah rather than someone who is publicly learning, but might be doing so just because it is a way to make money nowadays.

 

the reasons for the signature on the letter of excommunication(herem): Monotheism and not to do idolatry,

The major theme of  Old Testament is Monotheism and not to do idolatry, You can see this especially in the chapters f Deuteronomy from about chapters 4  to 10 and in the events surrounding the kings of Judah and Israel.  I was reminded of this today listening to the events surrounding  the anointing of Yehu. [He was anointed king in order to wipe out the house of Ahab --because they did idolatry, Not because of Jewish identity. For King Ahab was as Jewish as can be. But in the eyes of God, Jewish identity makes not the slightest bit of difference. What matters to God is only one question: did Ahab serve idols or not,   Of course in those days this was an easier question to answer. Nowadays they dress idols in Jewish garments and that is supposed to make it ok. 

For anything besides God can be an object of idolatry, It does not have to be a statue. It can be a person even true tzadikim. All the more so fake tzadikim. This is in fact one of the reasons for the signature on the letter of excommunication(herem). That is  the reasons of idolatry.

Spiritual vision

  Spiritual vision is not unknown. If it was totally illegitimate then the Gra would have said so. And Rav Yaakov Abuchazteira used to call the Ari [Isaac Luria] ''our teacher''. But there is something parasitic about mysticism that seduces people away from straight faith and reason. [Sri Aurobindo refers to the danger of mysticism as the "Intermediate Zone"] 

Aurobindo asserted that spiritual aspirants may pass through an intermediate zone where experiences of force, inspiration, illumination, light, joy, expansion, power, and freedom from normal limits are possible. These can become associated with personal aspirations, ambitions, notions of spiritual fulfilment, and even be falsely interpreted as full spiritual realization....  Those who go astray in it may end in a spiritual disaster, or may remain stuck there and adopt some half-truth as the whole truth, or become an instrument of lesser powers of these transitional planes. According to Aurobindo, this happens to many sadhaks and yogis

Humans are stupid, and the stupidest think they know how best to run everyone’s lives in minute detail and are bound and determined to force the rest of us to go along with their stupidity.

real authentic Oral Law

 In the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities] there is an emphasis on Reason and Faith. But they do not mean  faith in anything  nor any reasonable sounding doctrines. As the Rambam puts it: "Just like one can not add nor subtract from the written Law so one can not add nor subtract from the Oral Law." So he means to eliminate pseudo Torah and books that pretend to be Torah. To him there is a cut-off point when the Oral Law was redacted.  That means the Two Talmuds, and the Midrashim are the only real authentic Oral Law and everything else which claims to be Torah is Torah from the Dark Side. [Midrash means two things Midrash Agada and Midrash Halacha]. [Zohar does not count as midrash because of the phrase עם כל ד "although". That way of saying although was an invention of the Ibn Tibon family during the Middle Ages. In the time of the Mishna this was said as "אף על פי" or "אף על גב"

 something is odd about mysticism. But I would rather not dismiss it in toto. 

     

When the Rambam refers to Reason he also makes it clear he is referring to Aristotle [and to a lesser degree Plotinus] 

How the Gemara approaches this issue of learning in depth. There is brought the event of the teacher that used to review 400 times the lesson with his student and there is also the suggestion of 40 time review,  Four times review is mentioned in the Gemara also in terms of how much the Children of Israel reviewed each lesson from Moshe Rabbainu [Moses] in the Sinai desert.

I would like to suggest John Locke's Two Treaties as a better idea of government.

 In some great Jewish Philosophers you find the importance of learning Philosophy and Physics . But in those days not much had gone beyond Plato and Aristotle. And the ideas of Plato as regards government I think require a bit of modification. I would like to suggest John Locke's Two Treaties as a better idea of government. Government is an area which is not gone into in the Gemara and in Plato there is a sort of spartan government. I think John Locke provides a better model of government which protects individual liberties.

Other kinds of government do not respect the values of Torah. For example, socialist  government does not respect private property. But religious leaders do not either as they tend to be demons as Rav Nahman [in the LeM I:112 and I:28] pointed out about Torah scholars that are demons Part of the reason for that is they want power and money and use Torah to get them. But Torah is transcendental. It has nothing to  do with social structures. Torah does not give any significance to group dynamics or forms of government. It i personal between a man and God  

My favorite theme about John Locke is that people need to be aware of the development of his ideas in the Magna Carta and the Provisions of Oxford. 

new Friesian school

The Abhandlungen [published journal] of the new Friesian school was quite critical of the Special Theory of Relativity. However it was pointed out by Kelley Ross that that rejection of Relativity did not flow or come automatically from Friesian principle as you can see in  Dr. Ross's web site.

[The reason of Dr. Ross is that non intuitive immediate knowledge is not infallible. Rather that it can be modified because of empirical findings. And that synthetic a priori knowledge has to flow from starting axioms  and not be self contradictory.

[I can see why the Friesians were alarmed by Relativity because to Kant all reason has to start  with space and time--the categories.]

This is close to Michael Huemer's idea that what is known by reason is not necessarily infallible, but can and must be modified by new information. [This is his approach by means of probability (of Bayes)]. And it is not too far from Hegel either in which the door to the real reality can be opened by means of the dialectical approach of Socrates. But that dialectic in Socrates was not meant to be the only way in,  [though it is possible that for Hegel, only the dialectical method is an open the door to real reality, but I am not sure . Concrete abstract synthesis might be almost by definition contain an element of empirical ''concrete''evidence. ]   

 in high school most people thought I was a philosopher.  Even people who were much smarter than me thought I had a certain insight in that direction. And yet I never went into philosophy in college because I could already tell that 20th century philosophy was on its way toward a train wreck, But even so I consider the subject to be important. Of course Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus and Kant are important but I would like to suggest Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross at his web site to be the best [i think the approach of Nelson is great, but had a serious flaw in the categories of space and time that only Kelley Ross was able to correct.]

My reasoning is that the British American "Analytic Philosophy" is a train wreck and so well pointed out in  books by Robert Hanna. The other 20th century ones are beyond contempt since they are incoherent. Heidegger just substituted Being in place of God and being authentic to oneself instead of moral obligations  to others. Freud I have always thought was a fraud since I could not stand his steam engine model of the human mind. Marx was wrong since the Labor theory of value is false--things have value outside of what amount of work went into making them--for example: AIR.    

 one important idea of Rav Nahman {of Uman and  Breslov}is that not everyone is fit to rebuke, o even though it is one of the 613 commandments to rebuke anyone who is not acting properly, still not everyone i able to give rebuke. For by rebuke that is not proper one can make things worse.  However  "מחאה" is different than rebuke. That is the need to object  in public to actions that are not right. Like in the incident of Kamza and Bar Kamza. One person was invited to a wedding feast by accident. There was a mixup of the wedding invitations. so an enemy of the family was invited to the wedding. When he was thrown out many of the religious scholars were there but did not object. Because of that incident the sages aid the second Temple was destroyed

When a woman or a slave cause damage, Gemara in Bava Kama [perek hachovel] page 87:a.[בבבא קמא פז ע''א] Rambam laws of damage 4 law 21

Ideas in Shas

 When a woman or a slave cause damage,  they do not pay [because they do not own property].רמב''ם הלכות חובל ומזיק 4' כ''א My question here is why should not she sell her ketubah for the benefit of the person she damaged? (After all, someone could buy it for a reduced price because the husband might die before the wife, and then the buyer would collect the whole amount. Or the husband might die first, and then the buyer would collect nothing.)

The Gemara in Bava Kama [perek hachovel] asks this question about property she owns but which is not written in the ketubah. [נכסי מלוג] But that suggestion is only going according to Rav Huna ben Yehoshua who holds even if she would sell that property, the fruit would still go to her husband. [That is how Rav Shach answers this question:  why the Rif, Rambam and Rashi leave out this suggestion of the Gemara?] But I ask about selling the actual ketubah. . And the money from that buyer would then belong to the wife as the Rambam writes in laws of marriage 22 law 27. And then she would then pay for the damage that she caused 

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 When a woman or a slave cause damage,  do not pay [because they do not own property]. My question here is why should not she sell her ketubah for the טובת הנאה ? The גמרא in  בבא קמא פז ע''א ] asks this question about property she owns but which is not written in the ketubah [נכסי מלוג]. But that suggestion is only going according to רב הונא בן יהושע who holds even if she would sell that property, the fruit would still go to her husband. [That is how רב שך answers this question:  why the רי''ף רמב''ם ורש''יleave out this suggestion of the גמרא?] But I ask about selling the actual כתובה. After all, someone could buy it for a reduced price because the husband might die before the wife, and then the buyer would collect the whole amount. But thee husband might die first, and then the buyer would collect nothing. And the money from that buyer would then belong to the wife as the רמב''ם writes in הלכו אישות  כ''ב הלכה כ''ז. And then she would then pay for the damage that she caused 

בבבא קמא פז ע''א

כשאישה או עבד גורמים נזק, לא משלמים [כי אין להם רכוש].(רמב''ם הלכות חובל ומזיק ד' הלכה כ''א) השאלה שלי כאן היא למה שהיא לא תמכור את הכתובה שלה עבור טובת הנאה? (כי יכול להיות שהבעל ימות לפני האישה, ואז הקונה יגבה את כל הסכום. אבל אם האישה תמות קודם, אחר כך הקונה לא יגבה דבר.) הגמרא בבבא קמא פז ע''א  שואלת שאלה על הרכוש שבבעלותה אך אינו כתוב בכתובה [נכסי מלוג]. אבל ההצעה הזאת הולכת רק לפי רב הונא בן יהושע שמחזיק אפילו אם הייתה מוכרת את הנכס הזה, הפירות עדיין היו הולכים לבעלה. [כך עונה רב שך לשאלה זו: מדוע הרי"ף רמב"ם ורש''י משאירים את הצעת הגמרא הזו בחוץ?] אבל אני שואל לגבי מכירת הכתובה בפועל. הרי מישהו יכול לקנות אותו במחיר מופחת. הכסף מאותו קונה היה אז שייך לאישה כמו שכותב הרמב''ם בהלכות אישות כ''ב הלכה כ''ז. ואז היא תשלם על הנזק שהיא גרמה

ten times review

 When I was in Shar Yashuv I heard this idea about review ten times and I am seeing that this helps. It was how I used too do the Maharsha and Pnei Yehoshua and the other achronim like Rav Chaim of Brisk and Rav Shach I have started to see that this idea help also for  Mathematics. [I do not mean to diminish the importance of fast learning also- but I think the main emphasis ought to be on lots of review and in depth learning as my son Izhak told me 

children need a wholesome environment

 One reason to obey the excommunication of the Gra is that children need a wholesome environment that you just can not find anywhere outside of the straight Litvak world.  You might be inspired by Rav Nachman and that is fine. But there is a difference between what you can learn and the  environment in which children ought to be raised

[Anyway my opinion is that Rav Nahman himself was not an object of that "herem" because that  was more specific than most people realize. To see this you ought to look up the actual language of the herem which I found in one book that contained  the actual language plus the testimonies that were collected in Villna before the publication of the herem.

It should not matter what the herd thinks. What should matter is what is objectively true

 I was going to Uman Ukraine every year for Rosh Hashanah and staying for some months and sometimes longer. They used to have a very nice celebration on may 9. Every class in the local schools would put on its own presentation for the victory over the Nazis. This went on the whole day. But at one point, that was silenced. Then one after the other, all the statues of WWII heroes were taken down. Then even the central Russian orthodox church that was packed every  Sunday was locked and shuttered.  

It is almost as if they regret their victory over the Nazis 

 I think the  approach of the Litvak world is the right thing: to learn in depth in the morning and to learn fast in the afternoon. The learning in depth I think should be with ten times review of every section. Even though learning with depth and understanding should be the main emphasis still there is a place for fast learning--jut saying the words and going on. 

Counterfeit Torah

 Most of what is sold as Torah nowadays is not Torah at all. It is a fake and not authentic. This is the very reason for the signature of the Gra on the famous letter of excommunication--to warn people to stay away from Torah of the Dark Side.  The is idolatry which dresses up in Jewish rituals in order to seem kosher

Politics is not a part of Torah thought

 Politics is not a part of Torah thought. I do not know from where the Reform get the idea that "social justice" is somehow a part of Torah While on one hand, I can see some slight indications of some kind of   government in Torah, but these are only slight. Even for a king that is made by a prophet, there is an argument in Tractate Sanhedrin what powers he has. To one opinion all the threats of Samuel were legal. To another opinion they were just threats, but not actual legal powers.

Note: Samuel got angry at Israel for asking for  king,  and even made  a miracle to show the people of Israel that God was angry at them for asking for  king . Then he told them all the terrible things that a king would do to them, To one opinion, these threats were just Samuel telling them what in fact a king would do, not that they be legal. To another opinion these things that a king will do would be legal.

In TORAH the mitzvah of making a king is only when people ask for a king. But the prophet Samuel showed that asking for a king is a terrible sin. It is like brining a sin offering. There is a mitzvah to bring a in offering if one has sinned, but it is better not to sin in the first place.

 i was reading Robert Hanna' works and his blog and noted that he thinks all American so called "Analytic Philosophy" is destined for the trash bin and instead advocates a Forward to Kant Approach. This makes a lot of sense except for one particular problem--that Kant's solution to  the synthetic a-priori never really worked that well. There were lots of different approaches after him trying to answer the same problem and later there was the Neo Kant approach- all of which fell into oblivion.

[One problem in Kant was noticed right away by a close friend of his Scholz and his critique was printed  and Kant claimed after that that he would answer. The question was about the Transcendental Deduction--not at all a trivial side issue, but rather the fulcrum upon which the entire Critique of Pure Reason revolves.

And my mind there is another flaw. It is that philosophy is supposed to help us understand the world and ourselves-not create a system that is not credible without a lot of evidence. I mean, in natural sciences or mathematics, you do not start with assumptions that sound good but are not very obvious, You start with simple things. The shortest line between two points is  straight line, Not a set of questions based on Berkley and Hume.

By this I do not mean to trivialize Kant, but rather suggest the modification of Fries and Leonard Nelson to Kant in which the realm that reason can penetrate is limited but that by immediate non intuitive knowledge there is knowledge of the 12 categories  and possibly even faith a per Otto

[hume made a mistake for some reason Kant did not pick up and which was a stumbling block for him i.e that reason can tell us only when a definition entails a contradiction--a per Euclid. ]

Bava Metzia end of Hamafkid page 43 side a

 If one  hands over to another  coins that are not tied up, then he can use them. If they are robbed then to Rav Huna he has to pay them back. To Rav Nahman he does not have to since he is in the category of a paid guard who is not obligated to pay back in case of robbery, [But in case they were lost or stolen then he would have to pay.] Rav Nahman asks on Rav Huna from a teaching" If a gizbar [a person in charge of the money of the Temple] hands loose coins to a money changer and the money changer uses that money then the Gizbar is guilty of meila] [using money that was dedicated to the Temple for private use]. To Rav Huna he should be guilty even if the money changer did not use the money. My question here is that acquiring of a paid guard or a borrower  is by picking up. Not by usage. But to be guilty of meila does require use. so the same question applies to Rav Nahman. changing domain and acquiring of the money as a loan or as a paid guard happens before usage. But if you want to say that anyway, there is no meila until usage, then to both Rav Nahman and Rav Huna cases there should not be meila until it is used and in any case it not clear why the gizbar is guilty of meila when the money changer uses the money. He should be guilty right away.

 I was at the sea again and on the way back it occurred to me how one  might answer the question I asked yesterday night. I think Rav Nahman must be understanding Rav Huna to mean that the money is considered a loan,  not as a borrowing of an object where the object is considered as belonging to the original owner. That it unlike a loan where the money belong to the borrower but he has to pay back that same amount. so both Rav Nahman and Rav Huna are understanding that for there to be meila there has to be change of ownership or  usage. This is like Rav Huna in Bava Metzia page 99 Rav Huna said one who borrows an ax, if he chopped with it he transgress and if not then not. so now the question of Rav Nahman makes sense. If the money that was handed to the money changer was a loan then if the money changer doe not use it, still since it is a loan the gizbar should transgress the prohibition of meila right away 

I would like to mention that this is also how Rav  Shach  understands the question of Rav Nahman on Rav Huna in Laws of Robbery and Loss chapter 13 halacha 17

I 

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 If one  hands over to another coins that are not tied up, then he can use them. If they are robbed then to רב הונא he has to pay them back. To רב נחמן he does not have to since he is in the category of a paid guard who is not obligated to pay back in case of גזילה, [But in case they were lost or גנבה then he would have to pay.] רב נחמן asks on רב הונא from a teaching" If a גזבר [a person in charge of the money of the Temple] hands loose coins to a money changer  (שולחני), and the money changer uses that money then the גזבר is guilty of מעילה. To רב הונא he should be guilty even if the money changer did not use the money. My question here is that acquiring of a paid guard or a borrower  is by picking up. Not by usage. But to be guilty of מעילה does require use. so the same question applies to  רב נחמן. changing domain and acquiring of the money as a loan or as a paid guard happens before usage. But if you want to say that anyway, there is no מעילה until usage, then to both  רב נחמן and רב הונא cases there should not be מעילה until it is used and in any case it not clear why the גזבר is guilty of מעילה when the money changer uses the money. He should be guilty right away.

 It occurred to me how one  might answer the question. I think רב נחמן must be understanding Rav Huna to mean that the money is considered a loan,  not as a borrowing of an object where the object is considered as belonging to the original owner. That it unlike a loan where the money belong to the borrower but he has to pay back that same amount. so both רב נחמן and רב הונא are understanding that for there to be מעילה there has to be change of ownership or  usage. This is like רב הונא in בבא מציעא צ''ט רב הונא said one who borrow an ax, if he chopped with it, he transgress מעילה and if not then not. so now the question of רב נחמן makes sense. If the money that was handed to the money changer שלחני was a loan then if the money changer אינו משתמש , still since it is a loan the גזבר should transgress the prohibition of מעילה right away 

אם אחד מוסר לאחר מטבעות שאינם קשורים, אז הוא יכול להשתמש בהם. אם הם נשדדו אז לרב הונא הוא צריך לשלם. לרב נחמן אינו חייב כיון שהוא בקטגוריה של שומר בתשלום שאינו חייב להחזיר במקרה של גזלה, [אבל במקרה שאבדו או גנבו אז יצטרך לשלם.] רב נחמן שואל על רב הונא מהוראה: אם גזבר [אחראי על כספי המקדש] מוסר מטבעות לחלפן (שולחני), והחלפן משתמש בכסף זה אז הגזבר אשם במעילה. לרב הונא הוא צריך להיות אשם גם אם חלפן הכספים לא השתמש בכסף. השאלה שלי כאן היא שקניין שומר שכר או לווה היא על ידי הגבה, לא על ידי שימוש. אבל כדי להיות אשם במעילה כן דורש שימוש. אז אותה שאלה חלה על רב נחמן. שינוי רשות ורכישת הכסף כהלוואה או כשומר שכר קורה לפני השימוש. אבל אם אתה רוצה להגיד בכל מקרה אין מעילה עד השימוש, אז גם לרב נחמן וגם לרב הונא אין מעילה עד שנעשה שימוש. ובכל מקרה לא ברור למה הגזבר אשם במעילה רק כשהחלפן משתמש בכסף. הגזבר צריך להיות אשם מיד

עלה בדעתי איך אפשר לענות על השאלה. אני חושב שרב נחמן חייב להבין את רב הונא בכך שהכסף נחשב כהלוואה, לא כהשאלה של חפץ שבו החפץ נחשב כשייך לבעלים המקורי. שזה לא כמו הלוואה שבה הכסף שייך ללווה אבל הוא צריך להחזיר את אותו הסכום. אז גם רב נחמן וגם רב הונא מבינים שכדי שתהיה מעילה צריך להיות שינוי בעלות או שימוש. זה כמו רב הונא בבא מציעא צ''ט רב הונא אמר השואל גרזן, אם בקע בו, עובר על מעילה, ואם לאו אז לא. אז עכשיו השאלה של רב נחמן הגיונית. אם הכסף שנמסר לחלפן (שלחני) היה הלוואה, אז אם החלפן אינו משתמש אתו , עדיין מכיוון שמדובר בהלוואה, הגזבר צריך לעבור על איסור מעילה מיד

 It is  useful to clarify thinkers in terms of enlightenment thinkers as opposed to anti enlightenment. This is more useful than empirical as opposed to rational. And then, even enlightenment  thinkers can also be classified in how much or little does faith have its place, and also in terms of the place of the state.  

That goes for thinkers in philosophy. But since the advent of the Frankfurt school and post modernism, it even more useful to classify  thinkers in term of America or anti America, [Freedom, Individual rights private property, the Rule of Reason, capitalism].

There is a lot to unpack here and I doubt if I can do justice to these gigantic subjects. I might mention here that John Locke and Hobhouse (The Metaphysical State) are two significant figures.

In the meantime, I might mention that the Middle Ages did provide a sort of synthesis between faith and reason to make an opening for a John Locke kind of Democracy.  

There is a bridge from Aristotle to John Locke. Too much of the religious world is directed against freedom, individual rights and pure reason. Too much of the academic world is against faith. There is a middle way.[In particular, the academic world nowadays is in direct antagonism towards Christianity.]

 a problem in Enlightenment philosophy is that "education" per se is good for everyone. And along with that came the assumption that education can lift up all mankind.

The problem is education in what?

If the idea was education in Torah Physics and Mathematics, then I would have to agree. But that i not how that idea was applied. Now it can mean in the most ridiculous things. Or it might mean education in law--so you get not noble people, but vicious people with a law degree. Or it might mean queer studies

but then you might ask why should people that are not talented in Math be educated in math? To that I answer that in the hard sciences there is a commandment to learn. It i included in the commandment to learn Torah as we see in Rambam chapter 3 of laws of learning Torah that learning the subject called "pardes" as he defined them in the first four chapters are in the category of learning Gemara

 The mediaeval idea of combining faith and reason got accepted to a large degree by the Litvak world. This came about because of the emphasis of Rav Israel Salanter of learning Musar, and musar is started with the Chovot Levavot and Saadia Gaon. Both were firmly in the Reason and faith camp.

But with the advent of the Enlightenment this approach took a beating. At that point you get enlightenment philosophers and anti enlightenment philosophers.  And the anti enlightenment ones are going with emotion, not faith. 

To answer modern day problems, I think we still need the Reason with Faith approach.