20.9.15
My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.
The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.
That is to say the Torah has two areas of obligation. One is between Man and God and the other between Man and his fellow Man. The peak of human perfection is fulfilling both areas.
My parents were the closest I ever saw anyone come to fulfill this balanced approach.
[In a practical sense, Reform Judaism is right for the emphasis on obligations between man and his fellow Man. That is clear in all books of Musar. And see the Nahar Shalom by the Yemenite Mystic Shalom Sharabi who gives a deep explanation for this. In any case however obligation between Man and God are also obligations. But there is no reason to be searching for extra things to be strict about that the Torah does not require. It is a fact that there are people who just can't get enough strictness. That however is not the approach of the Torah. One can serve God though anything. Hillel went to a bathhouse and his disciples asked him what he was doing. He explained he was doing a mitzvah. Similarly with others things he was doing.
The danger of ריבוי אור. Too much light. Too much excitement in the service of God can be from the evil inclination. As it says in the Torah that God told Moses to warn the people not to go up on Mount Sinai.
גם בעבודת השם יש יצר הרע גדול דהיינו התלהבות יותר מדאי וזה בחינת מה שהשם אמר למשה הזהרתה את העם מלעלות על הר סיני
There is another way in which Reform and Conservative Judasim are admirable. They don't do idolatry. That is they don't worship people nor try to get others to worship people.
19.9.15
I should mention that the way I learned Torah was mainly influenced by the two yeshivas I went to in NY. One place was for in depth learning that was mainly interested in what was going on on that page. The next place--the Mir in N.Y. was more about how what was going on on the page fit in with the rest of the Talmud. I benefited from both approaches and I think that both approaches are implicit in what God has granted to me to write in these two booklets.
My background in California was Temple Israel in Hollywood. I had learned some Torah in Newport Beach before we moved to Beverly Hills, but I don't remember where or who. It was certainly Reform, but I don't remember what was the name. But I gained a great deal at Temple Israel. I think the rabbi's name was Nussbaum.
[Later my family had a different rabbi, Rabbi Roth, who is Reconstructionist. I don't know him very well because I was in NY, and later went to Israel. But he has been the family rabbi for my family for a long time.] [I should mention that I think Reform Temples are good, but we should learn more Torah.]
Incidentally, I see I wrote on my blog a lot of ideas about Shabat that never got into the Hebrew book. Most of the essays I found by typing Chaim Soloveitchik Shabat. But I have to look over them to see what I was saying.
______________________________________________________________________________
Ok Here is what I wrote in English that I was looking for:
"The question on this is that something not intended is not at all the same thing as being obligated a sin offering. So I still have to do some thinking about this way of explaining what Reb Chaim might be getting at. Until I can get this idea past my learning partner, I don't want to present it as anything but ad hoc.
I would like to say there is a connection between not intended and normal sin offerings. My idea is that sin offerings need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on Shabat that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to Abyee. So some knowledge is needed to be liable--but not too much. And that is what makes something an accident."
What I seem to be saying is that in the Gemara we have R Yehuda and R Shimon. R Shimon is says מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not liable. R Yehuda says they are both liable. Shmuel goes by R Yehuda in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like R Shimon in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the Rambam goes. What I seem to be asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all sin offerings that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing--but not too much.
But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me.
_________________________________________________________________________________The question on this is that דבר שאינו מתכווין is not at all the same thing as being מחויב חטאת. But there is a connection between דבר שאינו מתכווין and normal חויב חטאת. My idea is that חטאות need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on שבת that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to אביי. So some knowledge is needed to be liable, but not too much. And that is what makes something an שוגג.
In the גמרא we have רבי יהודה and רבי שמעון. The opinion of רבי שמעון is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not מחויב. But רבי יהודה says they are both liable. שמואל goes by רבי יהודה in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like רבי שמעון in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the רמב''ם goes. What I am asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all קרבן חטאת that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing, but not too much.
But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me.
השאלה: דבר שאינו מתכווין הוא בכלל לא אותו הדבר כמו להיות מחויב חטאה. אבל יש לומר שישקשר בין הדבר שאינו מתכווין וחויב חטאת. הרעיון שלי הוא שצריך בחטאות מידה מסוימת של ידע, אלא שלא להיות בפועל מתכוון. למשל להרים צנון בשבת שבמחשבתו הוא כבר הורם אבל התברר להיות מחובר לאדמה אינו מחויב חטאת, אלא לחתוך אותו מחויב חטאת לאביי. אז יש צורך בקצת ידע להיות מחויב, אבל לא יותר מדי ידע. וזה מה שעושה משהו שוגג. בגמרא יש לנו רבי שמעון ורבי יהודה. דעתו של רבי שמעון היא מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה ודבר שאינו מתכווין שניהם לא מחויבים. אבל רבי יהודה אומר שניהם מחויבים. שמואל סובר כרבי יהודה במלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה וכמו רבי שמעון בדבר שאינו מתכווין וכך לרמב''ם . מה שאני שואל הוא שהדבר שאינו מתכווין גם אם הוא פסיק רישא עדיין לא צריך להיות מחויב. תירוץ: מדוע היא מחויב? בגלל שזה דבר הנורמלי בכל קרבן חטאת שאנחנו צריכים שהבן אדם קצת ידע על מה שהוא עושה, אבל לא יותר מדי
I should mention that to be obligated in a sin offering one needs one of two lacks of knowledge. He might not know that the action is forbidden. But he knows what he is doing. The other thing is he did something by accident. See the Mishna LeMelech at chapter two of the Rambam's Hilchot Shegagot.
It is this second kind of accident that I am referring to in the above essay.
If one serves an idol from love thinking that that is allowed then he brings a sin offering. If on purpose then that is the death penalty. If he makes a mistake in material facts like if the statue is in fact an idol, then we see right in the Talmud itself that Abyee says, "that is nothing."
Now we find in tractate Shabat that there is an argument between Abyee and Rava about cutting a radish and it turns out that it was attached. Abyee says he is liable a sin offering. Rava says no.[Shabat 72b]. But in the case where he picked up a radish and it tuned out that it was attached then both agree he is not liable. So what do we have from this? This: if one picks up a radish on shabat thinking that it is allowed to do so then he brings a sin offering. If he did not know it was attached it is nothing. Exactly like idolatry.--except it is not exact. What is the difference between this and cutting the radish?
What I suggest is to look at Shmuel in Kritut where he discusses the Mishna about what kind of accidents are liable and what kind not. [circa pages 19, 20]. The fact is he requires both intention and thought, to be liable. And though it is hard to see how this can help us right now, still I think it is an important area to keep in ind because of the essential fact that the Rambam's opinion about work not intended and work not needed for its own sake comes directly from Shmuel. So whatever Shmuel thinks is going to be directly related to anything the Rambam says.
I did not know the date of my mother's death. I had always observed it on the Hebrew calender. But my younger brother wrote and mentioned at it was today on the English calendar.
My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.
The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.
My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.
The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.
18.9.15
I have been looking at Musar (Ethics) books for a while and at some point I started to notice that they divide a persons obligations into two parts. בין אדם לחיברו and בין אדם למקום- Between man and his fellow man and between man and God.
You find some people stress one area over the other. But from what I can tell the books of Musar have the viewpoint that both areas are important.
What that means in a practical vein is that if you want to repent, you would have to look at each different area individually. That is probably so hard that you can see why some people stress one area over the other. And there might not be any choice but to take that approach. Still it is important to realize that at least in theory ones' obligations are divided evenly between these two areas.
Though the source of obligation is Divine the approach in Musar that the obligations between man and man precede those between man an God. See Nahar Shalaom of Shalom Sharabi where he gives a mystic reason for this.
The evil inclination is also divided into two parts. One physical and the other spiritual. The spiritual is the tricky one. That is the one that gets and impersonates a Torah scholar and gets people to sin as they think they are doing a great mitzvah.
"The evil inclination is dressed in Mitzvot." That is the evil inclination does not try to seduce people with "Let's go and do a sin." It says rather, "Let's go and do a mitzvah."
You find some people stress one area over the other. But from what I can tell the books of Musar have the viewpoint that both areas are important.
What that means in a practical vein is that if you want to repent, you would have to look at each different area individually. That is probably so hard that you can see why some people stress one area over the other. And there might not be any choice but to take that approach. Still it is important to realize that at least in theory ones' obligations are divided evenly between these two areas.
Though the source of obligation is Divine the approach in Musar that the obligations between man and man precede those between man an God. See Nahar Shalaom of Shalom Sharabi where he gives a mystic reason for this.
The evil inclination is also divided into two parts. One physical and the other spiritual. The spiritual is the tricky one. That is the one that gets and impersonates a Torah scholar and gets people to sin as they think they are doing a great mitzvah.
"The evil inclination is dressed in Mitzvot." That is the evil inclination does not try to seduce people with "Let's go and do a sin." It says rather, "Let's go and do a mitzvah."
17.9.15
Tracate Yoma about work on Shabat
יומא ל''ד ע''ב
האם זה אפשרי שמשהו יהיה דבר שאינו מתכווין ועדיין להיות מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
אני מציע שזה יכול להיות. תן לי להסביר. אפשר שמלאכה שצריכה לגופה אין שום קשר עם כוונה. אחרי הכל אין שום דבר האמור בזה על כוונה. הדבר היחיד שחשוב הוא האם נצרך או לא. אבל בתוספות ביומא ל''ד וכריתות נראה כי תוספות חושבים שלא מדובר במשתנים בלתי תלויים. יכול להיות מתכווין ועדיין מלאכה שאינה צריך לגופה, אבל לא להפך. הדוגמא הקלסית היא לחפור בור למטרה אחרת מאשר למטרת שלשם חפירה שנעשתה במשכן. כלומר הוא צריך העפר, לא בור. אבל כפי שניתן לראות בתוספות בכריתות, תוספות שם מחזיק אלה הם עצמאיים. יכול להיות דבר שאינו מתכווין אבל הוא עדיין צריך לגופה. אז מה הוא שיש לנו שלושה רעיונות בסיסיים של מה היא מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה. בשבת יש לנו רבינו יצחק, תוספות בכריתות, ותוספות בתחילת בבא קמא. אני רוצה להזכיר שאלות על תוספות זה בגמרא הכריתות יש לנו המקרה של הפיכה של גחלים
האם זה אפשרי שמשהו יהיה דבר שאינו מתכווין ועדיין להיות מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
אני מציע שזה יכול להיות. תן לי להסביר. אפשר שמלאכה שצריכה לגופה אין שום קשר עם כוונה. אחרי הכל אין שום דבר האמור בזה על כוונה. הדבר היחיד שחשוב הוא האם נצרך או לא. אבל בתוספות ביומא ל''ד וכריתות נראה כי תוספות חושבים שלא מדובר במשתנים בלתי תלויים. יכול להיות מתכווין ועדיין מלאכה שאינה צריך לגופה, אבל לא להפך. הדוגמא הקלסית היא לחפור בור למטרה אחרת מאשר למטרת שלשם חפירה שנעשתה במשכן. כלומר הוא צריך העפר, לא בור. אבל כפי שניתן לראות בתוספות בכריתות, תוספות שם מחזיק אלה הם עצמאיים. יכול להיות דבר שאינו מתכווין אבל הוא עדיין צריך לגופה. אז מה הוא שיש לנו שלושה רעיונות בסיסיים של מה היא מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה. בשבת יש לנו רבינו יצחק, תוספות בכריתות, ותוספות בתחילת בבא קמא. אני רוצה להזכיר שאלות על תוספות זה בגמרא הכריתות יש לנו המקרה של הפיכה של גחלים
Is it possible for something to be דבר שאינו מתכווין and still be a מלאכה שצריכה לגופה?
But I suggest there can be. Let us say we understand a מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה has nothing to do with כוונה. After all there is nothing mentioned in it about כוונה. Rather the only thing that matters is whether it is נצרך or not.
In the תוספות in יומא ל''ד and כריתות it seems that תוספות thinking that these are not independent variables. Rather something can be מתכווין and yet מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. But not להפך. The classical example is digging a hole for a purpose other than the purpose for which digging was done in the משכן. That is he needs the עפר, not the בור.
But as we can see in the תוספות in כריתות, the תוספות there holds these are independent. One can have a דבר שאינו מתכווין but it is still צריכה לגופה
So what we have in is three basic ideas of what is a מלאכה שאינה מריכה לגופה. In שבת we have רבינו יצחק, the תוספות in כריתות that I am dealing with in this next essay, and the תוספות in the beginning of בבא קמא
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I wanted to mention questions on this תוספות
In גמרא כריתות we have the case of turning over coals. For turning over the bottom coals רבי שמעון says he is not obligated. תוספות says there are three reasons to say he is ought to be obligated in a sin offering. It is מלאכת מחשבת and it is damaging by fire which רבי שמעון says is obligated, and it is a case of דבר שאינו מתכווין שהוא פסיק רישא. So why is he not obligated ? Answer תוספות. A מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה.
Then why, תוספות asks, does not the גמרא say this? Why does it say the case is דבר שינו מתכווין? Answer to show the strength of רבי יהודה who says even though it is דבר שינו מתכווין, he is still obligated in a sin offering.
תוספות then approaches the גמרא in גמרא שבת דף ק''ג ע''א. There he is picking עולשים that can be eaten. If he does it to eat, then to רבי שמעון he is obligated only once and not for the additional obligation of making his field look nicer. But we ask is it not דבר שאינו מתכווין אינו מכווין בפסיק רישא?
Answer: It is someone else's field.
That is just the straight גמרא.
The two questions on תוספות concerns the way he treats this later גמרא.
Question one: תוספות is satisfied with his being not obligated in someone else's field since it is אינו מכווין בפסיק רישא . This is in direct contradiction to what he said in כריתות concerning the parallel case of coals.
Think about it. The Gemara said R Shimon should have said it is liable and then answered it פסיק רישא ודבר שאינו מתכווין. But back in Kritut we said some thing can be that exact case and be liable. In fact it was listed by Tosphot as a reason to be liable!!!! The only reason in Kritut it is not is because מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה
Actually I just looked at my notes in Hebrew and I saw that I wrote there that this is in fact the intention of Tosphot--that is to ask on the previous idea in Kritut.
Question Two. In his own field, we should also make a distinction if it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה or not.
The second question is really just a note, but not really a קושיה.
תוספות says the reason in כריתות that the גמרא said it is a case of דבר שאינו מתכווין שאינו פסיק רישא is because it wanted to show the strength of רבי יהודה. So why, תוספות asks, then in a later on case when he draws the coals closer to himself, the גמרא does not say the same thing? Why does it say it is a case of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה?
Answer: In drawing coals it could be that he does not mind if they get hotter. So the גמרא can't say it is not intended. Only in the case of turning over coals in which case he is against the idea of the bottom coals getting hotter. He would rather they would not . But he simply has no choice since he has to get the top ones to the bottom of the pile where they will cool down and become usable coals. My point here is that תוספות says that even so, רבי שמעון would say he is obligated to bring a sin offering except for the fact that it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה .
So why then in גמרא שבת is תוספות satisfied with the fact that it being דבר שאינו מתכווין שאינו פסיק רישא makes him not obligated even thought it is simply a case of his not caring whether the field gets improvement in value.
I probably should mention here that I do not mind if he is not obligated in שבת ק''ג because it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה. I only wish that that would be the reason that the גמרא or תוספות would use over there.
My learning partner made a suggestion that perhaps תוספות meant for the original three means of being obligated to רבי שמעון were meant to work together. I.e. that the idea דבר שאינו מתכווין שהוא פסיק רישא with the idea of מקלקל by fire. Maybe תוספות meant for those three original means to be obligated to work together. But if you look at the actual language of תוספות you can see that is not what he says. But at least it might save תוספות in a conceptual manner, even if it is not exactly what he said.
[1] Work done not for its own sake. Classical example. Digging a pit for the dirt, not for the hole to plant in.
Work not intended: Classical example. He does something permitted but something forbidden might result.
פסיק רישא is he does something permitted, but something forbidden must result.
[3] There is a third question also on the same תוספות. It concerns the issue of how תוספות treats the גמרא in כריתות. In that גמרא there is a case where someone pulls burning coals closer to himself. the גמרא itself says it is not obligated in a sin offering because it is מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה
Now to some degree we can accept this. We already are understanding that the only time lighting a fire is חייב is when he needs the coals. I might like to argue about this here but I am anxious to get to a much more glaring difficulty. Before תוספות says one of the three reasons רבי שמעון would say tuning over the bottom coals is חייב is that even though it is אינו מתכווין it would be חייב for even מקלקל by אש is obligated. I mean to say that תוספות. That is, you do not need intention to be חייב for lighting a fire. So even if he thinks he is pulling apples closer to him, he would be obligated in a קרבן חטאת. how then do we say he is not obligated because of מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה? That is for רבי שמעון you do not need מלאכת מחשבת for fire.
I saw a small booklet with a picture of Yaakov Abuchatzeira on it. [You know the one. It is all over the place.] I have to admit whenever I see a picture of Yaakov Abuchatzeira or his grandson Bava Sali I get the shivers. The Fear of God gets into me. You might ask well then why not go for it? Find some descendant of that family? The reason for my hesitation is several fold.
First of all I am trying to combine for myself several aspects of the service of God. That is I try to divide my day into small sessions so that I can accomplish a small amount in every field that I feel is important. That means learning Torah and prayer and also involvement in the natural sciences.
In any case the Abuchatzaira thing I should say is for Sephardi people mainly. There is a great deal of tension when an Ashkenazic Jew shows up in a Sephardi neighborhood. Inevitably there is some hot head who makes it his business to get rid of the Ashkenazic guy no matter how nice he tries to be.
But the actual family of Abuchatzaira tend to be pretty holy people. So to go to them for a blessing certainly makes sense.
In fact if you are near Netivot I recommend going to Shimon Buso for a blessing. He is a grandson of Bava Sali from the side of one of Bava Sali's daughters.
Also I have to say the basic path of Bava Sali was straight forward. What he did and what he recommended to others was nothing more that learn and keep Torah in the most basic and simple fashion possible with no side dishes.
Each group of Sephardi and Ashkenazim seems to have its pluses and minuses. But for an Ashkenazi fellow to meander into a Sephardi areas is a guaranteed invitation for disaster. On the other hand whenever there is some Ashkenazic Rav that wants a following around him, and lacks the right amount of talent for that, he goes to some Sephardic community and recruits them and he gets his own cult of followers.
In fact, almost every well known Ashkenazic group you can think of was made in exactly this way.
First of all I am trying to combine for myself several aspects of the service of God. That is I try to divide my day into small sessions so that I can accomplish a small amount in every field that I feel is important. That means learning Torah and prayer and also involvement in the natural sciences.
In any case the Abuchatzaira thing I should say is for Sephardi people mainly. There is a great deal of tension when an Ashkenazic Jew shows up in a Sephardi neighborhood. Inevitably there is some hot head who makes it his business to get rid of the Ashkenazic guy no matter how nice he tries to be.
But the actual family of Abuchatzaira tend to be pretty holy people. So to go to them for a blessing certainly makes sense.
In fact if you are near Netivot I recommend going to Shimon Buso for a blessing. He is a grandson of Bava Sali from the side of one of Bava Sali's daughters.
Also I have to say the basic path of Bava Sali was straight forward. What he did and what he recommended to others was nothing more that learn and keep Torah in the most basic and simple fashion possible with no side dishes.
Each group of Sephardi and Ashkenazim seems to have its pluses and minuses. But for an Ashkenazi fellow to meander into a Sephardi areas is a guaranteed invitation for disaster. On the other hand whenever there is some Ashkenazic Rav that wants a following around him, and lacks the right amount of talent for that, he goes to some Sephardic community and recruits them and he gets his own cult of followers.
In fact, almost every well known Ashkenazic group you can think of was made in exactly this way.
16.9.15
insane religious "frum" world.
How to improve one's character? Musar.
It might not be the best way to work on ones character. It might not even be that effective. But Israel Salanter thought learning books that were written to instill good character is the best type of way of going about thus that he saw. I mean you could ask what good does it do to learn about good character? Still compared to whatever else he saw this was the most effective means. You could say the Boy Scouts of the USA had the same purpose in mind. But you see where they have fallen to.
From what I can tell Musar has very limited effectiveness.
Musar can lead to fanaticism. And today it seems to have in fact become associated with being extra frum. That seems like an aberration from its intended purpose.
The main problem I think there is with the way Musar is practiced today is the idea of social norms. People assume the message of Musar is to be frum (religious) as defined by the generally insane religious "frum" world. Musar after all does say to keep all the commandments of the Oral and Written Law. But where they are wrong is they think Musar says to keep the social norms of the religious world. I should say I am completely against being frum and against trying to get people to be frum. Being frum (religious) and keeping Torah are two exact opposites.
In what way can you see this? In the area of social norms. Torah itself has no concern or interest in any one's opinions or conventions.
Let me see if I can make this clear. The religious world is accustomed to going off in certain directions crusading for one cause or the other. These are most often against the Torah. But they present their crusade as being a part and parcel of keeping Torah.
That is the most obvious area. But there are many others --more subtle things. How it comes out in the end is if you want to keep Torah, stay away from the frum as far as you can possibly get. However Lithuanian yeshivas do make an effort in keeping the Torah like it says in the most basic and simple way. So even if they may seem frum their center of attention is in fact the Torah so that makes them OK. [But the kelipa of frumkeit does seems to have infiltrated them to some degree.]
In almost every major Torah principle that I can think of the frum are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Examples.
Learning Torah is one area for example. Their major concern is to make money off of the Torah.
Honor of one's parents.
Settling in Israel or at least support for Israel.
Monotheism.
Kindness for its own sake. I.e where do you go in a time of emergency? Who will help you in a time of emergency. Not the frum. If you find yourself out of luck they will do their best to push you down further.
Conservative or Reform are good places but the frum are a trap.
Though I can't compare myself to Rav Shach in any way, but I should mention that he was not afraid to voice criticisms in public. And when he was asked about it he quoted a Mishna: "Any argument that is for the sake of Heaven will be established."
Of course he did not exact win any popularity contests. But he certainly wrote the most important Torah book to come out in the last hundred years.
It might not be the best way to work on ones character. It might not even be that effective. But Israel Salanter thought learning books that were written to instill good character is the best type of way of going about thus that he saw. I mean you could ask what good does it do to learn about good character? Still compared to whatever else he saw this was the most effective means. You could say the Boy Scouts of the USA had the same purpose in mind. But you see where they have fallen to.
From what I can tell Musar has very limited effectiveness.
Musar can lead to fanaticism. And today it seems to have in fact become associated with being extra frum. That seems like an aberration from its intended purpose.
The main problem I think there is with the way Musar is practiced today is the idea of social norms. People assume the message of Musar is to be frum (religious) as defined by the generally insane religious "frum" world. Musar after all does say to keep all the commandments of the Oral and Written Law. But where they are wrong is they think Musar says to keep the social norms of the religious world. I should say I am completely against being frum and against trying to get people to be frum. Being frum (religious) and keeping Torah are two exact opposites.
In what way can you see this? In the area of social norms. Torah itself has no concern or interest in any one's opinions or conventions.
Let me see if I can make this clear. The religious world is accustomed to going off in certain directions crusading for one cause or the other. These are most often against the Torah. But they present their crusade as being a part and parcel of keeping Torah.
That is the most obvious area. But there are many others --more subtle things. How it comes out in the end is if you want to keep Torah, stay away from the frum as far as you can possibly get. However Lithuanian yeshivas do make an effort in keeping the Torah like it says in the most basic and simple way. So even if they may seem frum their center of attention is in fact the Torah so that makes them OK. [But the kelipa of frumkeit does seems to have infiltrated them to some degree.]
In almost every major Torah principle that I can think of the frum are at the opposite ends of the spectrum. Examples.
Learning Torah is one area for example. Their major concern is to make money off of the Torah.
Honor of one's parents.
Settling in Israel or at least support for Israel.
Monotheism.
Kindness for its own sake. I.e where do you go in a time of emergency? Who will help you in a time of emergency. Not the frum. If you find yourself out of luck they will do their best to push you down further.
Conservative or Reform are good places but the frum are a trap.
Though I can't compare myself to Rav Shach in any way, but I should mention that he was not afraid to voice criticisms in public. And when he was asked about it he quoted a Mishna: "Any argument that is for the sake of Heaven will be established."
Of course he did not exact win any popularity contests. But he certainly wrote the most important Torah book to come out in the last hundred years.
Bava Metzia page 14
A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the improvements. Rav said the buyer gets the amount of the improvements from the thief along with the money he paid for it. Shmuel said he does not get the improvements.
Tosphot says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page 101 where someone goes into a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.
I wanted today to say what is bothering Tosphot. I did not put that in my essay yesterday since I thought it was enough that at least I said what Tosphot was thinking. But today I wanted to say why he is thinking what he is thinking. He is bothered by several questions. Lets say the case is the improvement is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the improvement directly to Rav? And it seems strange that on page 101 a someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on pg 14 gets nothing to Samuel. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering Tosphot. Thus Tosphot comes up with an elegant solution.--He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did--but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.
__________________________________________________________________
A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the שבח. The law is this. רב said the buyer gets the amount of the שבח from the thief along with the money he paid for it. שמואל said he does not get the שבח.
On page 14 תוספות says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page ק''א where someone goes into a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.
I wanted today to say what is bothering תוספות. He is bothered by several questions. Let us say the case is the שבח is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the שבח directly in the opinion of רב? And it seems strange that on page ק''א a someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on page י''ד gets nothing to שמואל. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering תוספות. Thus תוספות comes up with an elegant solution. He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did, but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.
פה אני מסביר למה תוספות אומר מה שהוא אומר. שדה נגנב. הגנב מכר אותו והקונה עבד עליו. אז השדה חוזר לבעלים עם השבח. החוק הוא זה. רב אמר הקונה מקבל את סכום השבח מהגנב יחד עם הכסף שהוא שילם על זה. שמואל אמר שהוא אינו מקבל את השבח. בעמוד י''ד תוספות אומר שזה אותו העיקרון שחל כמוחל על דף ק''א שבו מישהו נכנס לשדה של מי שהוא ונטע עצי שדה וצמחים. שם הבעלים משלמים או השבח או ההוצאה לפי הנמוך מביניהם. אני רוצה לומר היום מה מטריד את התוספות. תן לי לומר המקרה הוא השבח הוא פחות. אז מדוע הבעלים לא נותנים לקונה את סכום השבח ישירות בדעתו של רב? עוד שאלה: זה נראה מוזר שעל דף ק''א מישהו שהולך ישירות לתוך שדה מישהו שהוא מקבל תשלום הסכום שהוא שיפר את השדה בעוד הקונה על י''ד הדף אינו מקבל שום דבר לשמואל. זה אולי הדבר העיקרי שמטריד את תוספות. כך תוספות מגיע עם פתרון אלגנטי. הוא אומר שזה אותו העיקרון בשני המקומות. כלומר הוא חושב שהקונה מהגנב גם מקבל תשלום עבור העבודה שהוא עשה, אלא שהוא מקבל את הסכום ישירות מהבעלים.
A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the improvements. Rav said the buyer gets the amount of the improvements from the thief along with the money he paid for it. Shmuel said he does not get the improvements.
Tosphot says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page 101 where someone goes into a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.
I wanted today to say what is bothering Tosphot. I did not put that in my essay yesterday since I thought it was enough that at least I said what Tosphot was thinking. But today I wanted to say why he is thinking what he is thinking. He is bothered by several questions. Lets say the case is the improvement is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the improvement directly to Rav? And it seems strange that on page 101 a someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on pg 14 gets nothing to Samuel. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering Tosphot. Thus Tosphot comes up with an elegant solution.--He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did--but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.
__________________________________________________________________
A field was stolen. The thief sold it and the buyer worked on it. Then the field goes back to the owner with the שבח. The law is this. רב said the buyer gets the amount of the שבח from the thief along with the money he paid for it. שמואל said he does not get the שבח.
On page 14 תוספות says this is the same principle being applies as is applied on page ק''א where someone goes into a field and plants trees. There the owner pays either the improvement or the expense whichever is less.
I wanted today to say what is bothering תוספות. He is bothered by several questions. Let us say the case is the שבח is less. Then why does the owner not give the buyer the amount of the שבח directly in the opinion of רב? And it seems strange that on page ק''א a someone who directly walks into someone else field gets paid the amount he improved the field while the buyer on page י''ד gets nothing to שמואל. This I think is perhaps the main thing that is bothering תוספות. Thus תוספות comes up with an elegant solution. He says it is the same principle at work in both places. I.e. he is thinking that the buyer from the thief also gets paid for the work he did, but that he gets the amount directly from the owner.
פה אני מסביר למה תוספות אומר מה שהוא אומר. שדה נגנב. הגנב מכר אותו והקונה עבד עליו. אז השדה חוזר לבעלים עם השבח. החוק הוא זה. רב אמר הקונה מקבל את סכום השבח מהגנב יחד עם הכסף שהוא שילם על זה. שמואל אמר שהוא אינו מקבל את השבח. בעמוד י''ד תוספות אומר שזה אותו העיקרון שחל כמוחל על דף ק''א שבו מישהו נכנס לשדה של מי שהוא ונטע עצי שדה וצמחים. שם הבעלים משלמים או השבח או ההוצאה לפי הנמוך מביניהם. אני רוצה לומר היום מה מטריד את התוספות. תן לי לומר המקרה הוא השבח הוא פחות. אז מדוע הבעלים לא נותנים לקונה את סכום השבח ישירות בדעתו של רב? עוד שאלה: זה נראה מוזר שעל דף ק''א מישהו שהולך ישירות לתוך שדה מישהו שהוא מקבל תשלום הסכום שהוא שיפר את השדה בעוד הקונה על י''ד הדף אינו מקבל שום דבר לשמואל. זה אולי הדבר העיקרי שמטריד את תוספות. כך תוספות מגיע עם פתרון אלגנטי. הוא אומר שזה אותו העיקרון בשני המקומות. כלומר הוא חושב שהקונה מהגנב גם מקבל תשלום עבור העבודה שהוא עשה, אלא שהוא מקבל את הסכום ישירות מהבעלים.
15.9.15
Music for the glory of the God of Israel.
I should mention that Mozart sometimes takes a motif into 5 or three measures instead of what you would usually expect. I am not sure why he does this but I feel that if he thinks it is OK to do so --well that is good enough for me also. Go and check and you will see that Mozart does this more often than people are aware of.
Bava Metzia 14b 101a
I wanted to preface my remarks with thanks to God for granting me even a little bit of learning Torah. I wish I could do it like it is supposed to be done but I don't have the merit for that. My sins block my way to Torah. But when God grants me to see the light from the deep dark places I have fallen to I am enormously grateful.
The case here is you have a thief. He took a field and he sold it. The field goes back to it original owner. The thief has to give back the money he took. But what happens if the buyer spend money and time planting trees? Or maybe he did other kinds of improvement? Now the field goes back to the original owner with the improvement who pays the buyer? Rav said logically enough the thief pays for the improvement. That makes abundant sense. So here is my essay on this
You have a thief and the owner and the buyer of a field. Rav said מעות יש לו שבח יש לו.(lit he gets money and improvement.) I.e. The buyer gets the price of the field and שבח (improvement) from the thief. On page 101 you have a person that went into the field of his friend without permission and planted trees. The owner there has to pay either the improvement or the expense which ever was less (ידי על התחתונה). Tosphot says this is the same case and the same law.
[note: the Rambam and Rashi have a different approach. I am only trying to deal with Tosphot here.]
It occurred to me what this Tosphot means. The question you have to think about to make this all clear is who pays whom?
To Rav the owner pays the thief for the improvement, and then the thief pays the buyer. But to Shmuel the thief does not pay the buyer for the improvement. But to Samuel the buyer goes to the owner and gets back the same amount that was fixed on page 101.
בבא מציעא יד: קא.
אני רוצה לפתוח את דבריי בתודה לאלוהים על שהעניק לי אפילו קצת לימוד תורה. הלוואי שהייתי יכול לעשות את זה כמו שהוא אמור לעשות, אבל אין לי את הזכות לזה. החטאים שלי חוסמים את הדרך לתורה. אבל כאשר אלוהים מעניק לי לראות את האור מהמקומות העמוקים והאפלים שנפלתי אני מאוד אסירת תודה.
יש לך גנב ובעל הבית ולוקח שדה. בעמוד יד: רב אמר קרן יש לו שבח יש לו. לוקח מקבל שבח מהגנב. בעמוד קא. יש לך אדם שנכנס לשדה של חברו ללא רשות ונטע עצים. הבעלים שם יש להם לשלם וידי הנוטע על התחתונה. בעמוד יד: תוספות אומר שזה אותו המקרה ואותו החוק. לרב הבעלים משלמים לגנב השבח (או היציאה איזה שהוא פחות), ולאחר מכן הגנב משלם הקונה את כל השבח. (אם הבעלים נתנו לו רק היציאה בגלל שזה פחות אז הגנב צריך לשלם את היתר להגיע לסכום של כל השבח). אבל לשמואל הגנב אינו משלם הקונה לשיפור. אבל לשמואל הקונה הולך לבעלים ומקבל בחזרה את אותה כמות שהיה קבועה בעמוד קא., או השבח או היציאה
The case here is you have a thief. He took a field and he sold it. The field goes back to it original owner. The thief has to give back the money he took. But what happens if the buyer spend money and time planting trees? Or maybe he did other kinds of improvement? Now the field goes back to the original owner with the improvement who pays the buyer? Rav said logically enough the thief pays for the improvement. That makes abundant sense. So here is my essay on this
You have a thief and the owner and the buyer of a field. Rav said מעות יש לו שבח יש לו.(lit he gets money and improvement.) I.e. The buyer gets the price of the field and שבח (improvement) from the thief. On page 101 you have a person that went into the field of his friend without permission and planted trees. The owner there has to pay either the improvement or the expense which ever was less (ידי על התחתונה). Tosphot says this is the same case and the same law.
[note: the Rambam and Rashi have a different approach. I am only trying to deal with Tosphot here.]
It occurred to me what this Tosphot means. The question you have to think about to make this all clear is who pays whom?
To Rav the owner pays the thief for the improvement, and then the thief pays the buyer. But to Shmuel the thief does not pay the buyer for the improvement. But to Samuel the buyer goes to the owner and gets back the same amount that was fixed on page 101.
בבא מציעא יד: קא.
אני רוצה לפתוח את דבריי בתודה לאלוהים על שהעניק לי אפילו קצת לימוד תורה. הלוואי שהייתי יכול לעשות את זה כמו שהוא אמור לעשות, אבל אין לי את הזכות לזה. החטאים שלי חוסמים את הדרך לתורה. אבל כאשר אלוהים מעניק לי לראות את האור מהמקומות העמוקים והאפלים שנפלתי אני מאוד אסירת תודה.
יש לך גנב ובעל הבית ולוקח שדה. בעמוד יד: רב אמר קרן יש לו שבח יש לו. לוקח מקבל שבח מהגנב. בעמוד קא. יש לך אדם שנכנס לשדה של חברו ללא רשות ונטע עצים. הבעלים שם יש להם לשלם וידי הנוטע על התחתונה. בעמוד יד: תוספות אומר שזה אותו המקרה ואותו החוק. לרב הבעלים משלמים לגנב השבח (או היציאה איזה שהוא פחות), ולאחר מכן הגנב משלם הקונה את כל השבח. (אם הבעלים נתנו לו רק היציאה בגלל שזה פחות אז הגנב צריך לשלם את היתר להגיע לסכום של כל השבח). אבל לשמואל הגנב אינו משלם הקונה לשיפור. אבל לשמואל הקונה הולך לבעלים ומקבל בחזרה את אותה כמות שהיה קבועה בעמוד קא., או השבח או היציאה
Ideas in Talmud
\Idea in Bava Metzia version C
The reason these are here again is I had to do editing and God granted to me an answer I had to a question on Tosphot on Bava Metzia page 14
\Idea in Bava Metzia version C
The reason these are here again is I had to do editing and God granted to me an answer I had to a question on Tosphot on Bava Metzia page 14
14.9.15
See the "letter of ethics" אגרת המוסר of Reb Israel Salanter
There is what one could call a physical evil inclination. That is what you might say is the desires and bad character traits that are just a part of being human. This evil inclination has aspects of hatred, anger, desires, greed, etc. There is also a spiritual evil inclination that is cunning. It excels in getting a person to fall into traps, it is what we usually call the Satan. It hates good because it is good. And it affects mainly people that have been freed from the first level of evil inclination. So you usually find the greatest evil in people that you would normally consider to be saints. They in fact are saints since they have been freed from hatred and anger and greed etc, but that instead of making them better, it just exposes them to the more subtle level of evil inclination the actual Satan.
What irony it is that when a person wants to find a true saint for guidance, that he finds instead a person who has in fact killed his lower evil inclination, but is subject to the higher evil inclination.
and you can SEE THIS ALL THE TIME. You have perfectly normal well adjusted kids that find some so called tzadik and then they become disaster zones.
And this tzadik because he has killed his passions and separated himself from the pleasures of this world has in fact spiritual powers. But since he is subject to the Satan the powers are used in the wrong ways.
In a practical sense this is all too simple. Don't go to tzadikim.
Rather learn and keep Torah just like it says.
As far as Kabalah is concerned it is usually very damaging. Not that it is bad. But people in general just are not properly prepared. Mainly the problem is because of pseudo Kabalah. Some try to make a buck off of it by presenting their own messed up versions. So if you can manage to get through the Talmud a few times then it is time to plow into the writings of Isaac Luria.
13.9.15
It seems many people have some kind of problems that they find unsolvable.
Sometimes people have been labeled schizo or some pseudo scientific label.
My advice is
First of all stop trying to be normal, The more you try, the worse things are. Try to just be yourself. Don't try to fit into any mold that others have labeled normal. Maybe you are normal and they are crazy? In fact I am sure all the people that label others with psychological labels, certainly are insane. That is 100% certain. But still even after all that you do have problems.But that is just being human. You just have to do your best every day to be good and learn Musar [Classical and medieval Ethics] and Torah. That means a very specific set of classical ethics. חובות לבבות אורחות צדיקים מסילת ישרים נפש החיים המספיק לעובד השם שערי תשובה ספר הישר של רבינו תם
For a more general audience I would recommend Shimshon Refael Hirsh's Horev.
I should mention that the Musar movement itself produced some very good books. The direct disciples of Israel Salanter wrote some excellent stuff, like the מדגרת האדם. That is a very powerful character changing book that really gets the idea about trust in God into you.
Recently Musar has seemed to gone off in some tangents. Some seem to be "frumaks" that is people that make being frum [religious] into a business. But that is because every good thing can be used for bad also.
Some people find in Musar reason to cease working and depend on charity or to be against Israel or weird kinds of pantheism. This is lamentable. Musar is simply a tool for character improvement and fear of God. It is not meant to advance any political agenda.
Isaac Luria's major book the Eitz Chaim was called a great Musar book
And this in fact is true. But it is also a dangerous tool. What I think is to learn Isaac Luria's book in the context of regular Torah study and not to "make a thing" out of it. People that "make a thing" of kabalah tend to ריבוי אור--too much bright light that breaks the vessels. It is best to work on the Ari after finishing Shas a few times.
The best approach to Musar and Kabalah is to do both in the context of a straight Lithuanian yeshiva in which most of the day the Gemara is learned in depth. That context provides a protective shield against the dark side which tries to take hold of a person when it sees him involved in such things.
For a more general audience I would recommend Shimshon Refael Hirsh's Horev.
I should mention that the Musar movement itself produced some very good books. The direct disciples of Israel Salanter wrote some excellent stuff, like the מדגרת האדם. That is a very powerful character changing book that really gets the idea about trust in God into you.
Recently Musar has seemed to gone off in some tangents. Some seem to be "frumaks" that is people that make being frum [religious] into a business. But that is because every good thing can be used for bad also.
Some people find in Musar reason to cease working and depend on charity or to be against Israel or weird kinds of pantheism. This is lamentable. Musar is simply a tool for character improvement and fear of God. It is not meant to advance any political agenda.
Isaac Luria's major book the Eitz Chaim was called a great Musar book
And this in fact is true. But it is also a dangerous tool. What I think is to learn Isaac Luria's book in the context of regular Torah study and not to "make a thing" out of it. People that "make a thing" of kabalah tend to ריבוי אור--too much bright light that breaks the vessels. It is best to work on the Ari after finishing Shas a few times.
The best approach to Musar and Kabalah is to do both in the context of a straight Lithuanian yeshiva in which most of the day the Gemara is learned in depth. That context provides a protective shield against the dark side which tries to take hold of a person when it sees him involved in such things.
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