613 commandments (mitzvot)

In some perfect world each of the 613 commandments of the Torah might not interfere one with the other. [This would be in the world of the dinge an sich or the platonic realms] But in this world they do interfere. Even if you know how much weight to give to each one [as in a weighted function] there would still be conflict. [And these conflicts  have to exist in the real world as I explained else concerning Ontological Un-decidablity.]

The way I explained this was based on the idea of computer modeling.That is the way it was done originally was by tree diagrams. If you are at step A, then you ask some question. If the answer is "Yes" then go to B, and if the answer is "No" then go instead to C. This way turned out to be inefficient. [This is still how Halacha is written. And that is not a bad thing. One does need to know the basic principles of Torah.]

Instead, what programmers discovered was swarming techniques. [This based on birds and bees.] That is you look for the basic pattern of what you want. That is the reason the Rambam {Maimonides} explains the reasons for the Mitzvot. This is to give an idea of where you want to go. That is what kind of pattern you want to get to in the  end. Then you know how far to take each mitzvah. You know what limit each mitzvah has, and you know that it is not meant to be taken to infinity but has a context with the other mitzvot and the result is supposed to be something like the basic ideas the Rambam gives there in the Guide for the Perplexed.


This is related to the sugia in Bava Metzia at the end of chapter 9. There we have the argument between R. Yehuda and R. Shimon. In that sugia we see that the Sages thought the reasons for the mitzvot were known. the question was whether to go by the reason or by the actual words in the Torah. In that sugia the Rambam decides like R Yehuda that we go by what the verse says and not by the reason for the law. In Yevamot the Rambam decided the opposite way. That is in the argument about whom it is forbidden to marry. The seven Canaanite nations or all nations. The Magid Mishna goes into the question of how the Rambam can hold the rope at both ends--i.e. decide by one opinion in one place and the opposite opinion in another. [I had hoped to do this subject with my learning partner so I could understand it better, but I ran off to Israel right before we got there. Perhaps Rav Shach deals with this? There are two places where Rav Shach might deal with this. One is the sugia in Bava Metzia, and the other is that sugia in Yevamot. But in my session with my learning partner we have not gotten to either area yet.]

In a practical sense these areas of moral conflict provide the area where free will operates.  That is there are two kinds of free will. One is to choose good or evil. The other is when there is a conflict between two goods, which one do you follow? And what is your criteria? Your criteria might be the evil inclination and you might not be aware of it. You might think you are just going according to halacha but you might not be aware you desire to go by halacha stems from a desire to fit in with a certain social group. That is not necessarily and bad thing but it is a simple function of our animal nature. There is no mitzvah involved with it.

This is relevant to many questions. For example, we find people that try to undermine Christian society. They tend to side with Muslims and Blacks and anyone else that is against Christian values.
But if we look at the Rambam's reason for the Mitzvot, we can see they boil down to a bare minimum of a few simple principles. One is "peace of the country." In what kind society do you want to live? I would imagine not in the Sudan or Saadia Arabia. Why not? Because in Christian society you have "peace of the country." So trying to undermine this, goes against one of the most important and fundamental teachings of the Torah. Besides all of that, this attempt to undermine Christian society has been noticed. And it might has already led to bad consequences, and still does.
[Living in Israel we find we can no longer blame the problems on living among the nations. The conflicts among ourselves are multiplied many times over more than what was common when we were living in exile.]




Another obvious area of conflict is "Honor your father and mother." Naphtali Troup [one of the Torh giants in the time of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik has a nice essay on this in the Chidushei HaGarnat].
I tend to this is mitzvah is not given as much weight as it deserves. At least in my own case, my parents obviously had a much better idea of what it means to keep Torah than I did.


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In a perfect world each of the תרי''ג commandments of the תורה might not interfere one with the other.  But in this world they do interfere. Even if you know how much weight to give to each one [as in a weighted function] there would still be conflict.

The way I explained this  was based on the idea of מודלים מחשבים. That is the way it was done originally was by tree diagrams. If you are at  step 'א, then you ask a question. If the answer is yes, then go to step 'ב, and if the answer is no then go instead to ג'. This way turned out to be inefficient. This is still how הלכה is written. And that is not a bad thing. One does need to know the basic principles of Torah.

Instead, what programmers discovered was swarming techniques. This based on birds and bees. That is you look for the basic pattern of what you want. That is the reason the רמב''ם explains the reasons for the מצוות. This is to give an idea of where you want to go. That is what kind of pattern you want to get to in the  end. Then you know how far to take each מצווה. You know what limit each מצווה has. and you know that it is not meant to be taken to infinity but has a context with the other מצוות and the result is supposed to be something like the basic ideas the רמב''ם gives there in the מורה נבוכים.


This is related to the סוגיה in בבא מציעא at the end of chapter ט. There we have the argument between רבי יהודה and רבי שמעון. In that סוגיא we see that the חכמים thought the reasons for the מצוות were known. the question was whether to go by the reason or by the actual words in the Torah. In that סוגיא the רמב''ם decides like רבי יהודה that we go by what the verse says and not by the reason for the law. In יבמות the רמב''ם decided the opposite way. That is in the argument about whom it is forbidden to marry. The שבעה עממים or all גויים. The מגיד משנה goes into the question of how the רמב''ם can hold the rope at both ends i.e. decide by one opinion in one place and the opposite opinion in another.


In a practical sense these areas of moral conflict provide the area where free will operates.  That is there are two kinds of free will. One is to choose good or evil. The other is when there is a conflict between two goods, which one do you follow? And what is your criteria? Your criteria might be the evil inclination and you might not be aware of it. You might think you are just going according to halacha but you might not be aware you desire to go by halacha stems from a desire to fit in with a certain social group. That is not necessarily and bad thing but it is a simple function of our animal nature. There is no mitzvah involved with it.



But if we look at the רמב''ם reason for the מצוות, we can see they boil down to a bare minimum of a few simple principles. One is "peace of the country." In what kind society do you want to live? I would imagine not in the Sudan or Saadia Arabia. Why not? Because in Christian society you have "peace of the country." So trying to undermine this, goes against one of the most important and fundamental teachings of the Torah. Besides all of that, this attempt to undermine Christian society has been noticed. And it might has already led to bad consequences, and still does.





Another obvious area of conflict is   כבד את אביך ואת אמך

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בעולם מושלם כל אחת מתרי''ג מצוות התורה לא יכולות להפריע אחת עם השני. אבל בעולם הזה הן מפריעות. גם אם אתה יודע כמה משקל לתת לכל אחת מהן [כמו בפונקציה משוקללת] עדיין יהיה קונפליקט. הדרך שהסברתי זאת הייתה מבוססת על הרעיון של מודלי מחשבים.  הדרך שזה נעשה  היתה בדיאגרמות עץ. אם אתה נמצא בשלב 'א, אז אתה שואל  שאלה. אם התשובה היא כן, לאחר מכן עבור לשלב ב', ואם התשובה היא לא אז ללכת לג'. הדרך הזו התבררה להיות לא יעילה. זה עדיין איך הלכה כתובה. וזה לא דבר רע.  צריכים לדעת את העקרונות הבסיסיים של תורה. במקום זאת, מה שמתכנתים גילו שרצויות טכניקות  מבוססות על ציפורים ודבורים. זה אתה מחפש את התבנית הבסיסית של מה שאתה רוצה. זו הסיבה שהרמב''ם מסביר את הסיבות המצוות. זה הוא לתת מושג שבאיזה כיוון אתה רוצה ללכת. זה איזה סוג של דפוס שאתה רוצה להגיע בסוף. אז אתה יודע כמה רחוק לקחת כל מצווה. אתה יודע מה הגבול לכל מצווה. ואתה יודע שזה לא אמור לקחת עד אינסוף אבל יש הקשר עם מצוות האחרים והתוצאה אמורה להיות משהו כמו הרעיונות הבסיסיים רמב''ם נותן שם במורה הנבוכים. זה קשור להסוגיה בבא מציעא בסוף הפרק ט'. יש לנו הוויכוח בין רבי יהודה ורבי שמעון. בסוגיא אנו רואים שחכמים חשבו סיבות מצוות  ידועות. השאלה הייתה האם ללכת על פי הסיבה או על יפי המילים בפועל כתובות בתורה. בסוגיא הרמב''ם מחליט כמו רבי יהודה שנלך לפי מה שאומר הפסוק ולא על פי הסיבה לחוק. ביבמות הרמב''ם החליט בכיוון ההפוך. זה בגיון עם מי אסור להתחתן. שבעת עמים או כל גויים. המגיד משנה נכנס לשאלה כיצד הרמב''ם יכול להחזיק את החבל בשני קצותיו, כלומר להחליט על  דעה אחת במקום אחד, והדעה ההפוכה באחר. במובן מעשי אזורי עימות המוסרי אלה מספקים האזור שבו חופשי רצון פועל. כלומר יש שני סוגים של רצון חופשי. אחת הוא לבחור בטוב או לרע. האחר הוא כאשר יש סכסוך בין שני ערכים. ומה הוא הקריטריונים? הקריטריונים  עשויים להיות היצר הרע ובן אדם לא יכול להיות מודע לכך. אתה חושב שאולי אתה פשוט הולך על פי הלכה, אבל אתה לא יכול להיות מודע שהרצון ללכת על פי ההלכה נובעת מרצון להשתלב עם קבוצה חברתית מסוימת. זה לא בהכרח דבר רע ואבל זה פונקציה פשוטה של הטבע החייתי שלנו. אין מצווה מעורבת עם זה. זה רלוונטי לשאלות רבות. לדוגמא,  אנו מוצאים אנשים שמנסים לחתור תחת חברה נוצרית. הם נוטים לצדד במוסלמים ושחורים וכל אחד אחר שהוא נגד ערכים נוצריים. אבל אם אנחנו מסתכלים על הסיבות של הרמב''ם למצוות, אנו יכולים לראות שהם מסתכמים במינימום של כמה עקרונות פשוטים. אחת מהן הוא "שלום של המדינה." באיזה סוג החברה אתה רוצה לחיות? אני מתאר לעצמי שלא בסודאן או סעדיה הסעודית. למה לא? כי בחברה נוצרית שיש לך "שלום של המדינה." אז לנסות לערער את זה, הולך נגד  התורה. מלבד כל זה, הניסיון לפגוע בחברה נוצרית כבר הבחינה. וזה אולי כבר הביא לתוצאות רעות, ועדיין עושה. תחום נוסף ברור של סכסוך הוא כבד את האב ואת אימך

Music for the glory of the God of Israel

q1 q3 q30 q31 q36  q37  q38 b100 b101 orchestra piece b105 q40 q41 e39 e36  q89   j93
e71 e72 e69  q43 q45 q44 6/8 time b36
j1 j2 j6 j7 n51 edited n52 n53 p120
I edited q89 a little. It probably needs more. n52 also seems to need edting

This is on Google drive because the way these files sound on Midi is not very great.

here is q36 in mp4 I would put it on utube but that seems to be hard for me to accomplish. I seem to need to put some pictures with it.

The Left's position is that all people are equal and by nature good [noble savage] =(contrary to Darwin)

The Left's position is that all people are equal and by nature good [noble savage] (contrary to Darwin) and any differences in material goods come from exploitation, and ought to be eliminated. Combine this with the idea that it is the right of every person to have the same amount of goods as you have and you get the situation in the USA today. Though this is supposed to be scientific, it is at odds with Darwin. With Darwin we have the idea that one species can divide into different species. The way that begins is by race. The two groups are separated for some time and develop along different lines. At some point what began as a separation of race becomes a separation of species. And fighting this process is fighting nature. And in this case I think Nature will win. And that fighting nature is going to be destructive to those who fight. Nature will win and she will take revenge on those who thought they could out-wit her.

This has implications for Jewish people. We tend to do well in Christian society. And we do not like being kicked out of Christian society. But we don't want to be Christian. But among ourselves we can find the problems that we faced in Christian society become multiplied many times over in Jewish society. An American Jew in Israel is sure to find a Sephardi Jew that will stop at nothing to get him thrown out of the city or area he lives in. By and large Sephardi people in an Ashekenzic environment will be cold and polite, but nothing beyond that. But in a Sephardi environment, there will always be at least one that will make it his life's mission to get rid of an Ashkenazic Jew.
So we ought to admit Christian society is not as bad as we like to paint it. And we certainly ought not to be supporting the Black and Muslim forces that try to undermine it. Unless we would actually prefer to live in the Sudan or Syria, why would we think it a good thing to undermine Christian society? (There is an inherent contradiction between Darwin and the assumption that people are good)

The idea of keeping Muslims and blacks out of the USA has some justification as expressed in this comment I saw on a blog

"The fact is that some animals are territorial, and they typically do not let other species or subpecies of animal that consume the same resources into their territory. For this reason, different species of squirrel will often fight, wildcats will fight, lions and cheetas will kill hyenas, all kinds of animals fight for survival. Evolution is competitive. Deal with it.

I am xenophobic because I want my great-great-great-great-great grandchildren to look like me and carry my genes."

Gemara Learning

The basic Lithuanian yeshiva approach I think is good even in small measure..
I mean what really is the essence of a Litvak yeshiva? Learning Gemara in depth and Musar {Ethics}. It could not be more simple. (The only other thing there is no tolerance odd balls. This particular  aspect I am not very happy with.)  But in a practical sense could not you do this on your own?   Not just that but looking at the state of the world today it seems to me that you almost have to do this on your own. You can't really depend on others setting up a Beit Midrash where you could walk in and learn.

So how would one do this on his own? A hour of in depth learning I think to do like this: take one page of Gemara Rashi Tosphot Maharsha and the basic achronim like Rav Shach, R Akiva Eiger, etc and do that one page as thoroughly as you can in one hour. Then the next day do the same material again. And keep this up every day for a few weeks. That is the one in depth session.

Then there is a fast session that is to  have a separate session--also about one hour to go though the whole Oral Law--i.e. Gemara, Rashi, Tosphot, Maharsha, Maharam from Lublin, then after the Talmud Bavli the Talmud Yerushalmi, then the Tosphta etc. until you have gone through the Midrashei Halacha and Midrashei Agada.

If this seems a bit above your level then you could start with something more like an introduction like Shimshon Refael Hirsh's Horev. The books of  Musar  give I think a very good introduction to what Torah is all about. [Musar means the books of ethics from the middle ages plus the disciples of Rav Israel Salanter who were able to bring  don those teachings in a digestible way.   MOST books from the middle ages tend tobe hard to digest in modern times, so there does exist a need to bring them down to a practical level.    ]


One advantage of this is when  the rest of the world is going crazy at least you have some sanity to hold onto. And the problem of the world going crazy is not just in your imagination. It is real.  The evil inclination today is כח הדמיון --delusion.

As  the polices and values of Europe were shaped by revulsion about WWII. While people ought to learn from their mistakes. Still learning from mistakes is a kind of negative learning. For positive values it is still important to go to the Old Testament. But since the basic values of the Old Testament are  not not stated openly it is important to learn Musar--books of Ethics written in the Middle ages whose stated purpose was to find the basic values of the Old Testament and the Talmud and put them in simple form so everyone can understand them.

[Not all of Musar I am very happy with. Almost everyone after the Shatz got a good dose of that poison that went into him and his false prophet. That includes the Ramchal. The way I see it most of everything that came after the Shatz is problemtic exception the people that wrote straight of the Talmud with no connection to  Hashkafa [world view issues]

In yeshiva, world view issues were not emphasized. You really had to piece it together on your own.
The Guide of Maimonides was around in its English edition but most people were not looking at it. Yeshiva was really about Gemara, Rashi, and Tosphot.  World view issues were  ignored.
The Guide for the Perplexed and most of Jewish Philosophy from the medieval period  in any case was addressing issue that most people including myself did not have. I never asked "How can the Torah say such and such? Did not Aristotle prove otherwise?"
All Medieval Jewish Philosophy assumes Aristotelian science to be correct.


As for the Rambam himself in the Guide I also have no problem because I simply understand it like Rav Avarham Abulafia [the most important mystic from the Medieval period] explained it.

In any case for world view issues I have to piece together my own approach based on the Ari [Isaac Luria] and  the Guide of the Rambam and the other Medieval books of Jewish Musar [books on ethics].

Mainly I go with the idea that this world is a world of shadows. It is just the shadows that you see on the cave wall. The real world is the world that is the dinge an sich-things in themselves. And beyond that there is the Ding An Sich, the first cause. And I think the dinge an sich are hidden from pure reason. Over the years I have changed my mind about free will. My mother in law once asked my wife about WWII and Germany. And my wife answered free will. And I was surprised at the time a because I had in my own mind confined free will towards every persons' owns decisions. Now I think she was right that one person's free will can affect other people for good or bad.




In any case, Musar addressed world view issues to some degree. But to do more that that might be impossible. The problem is this: If you would want to deal with these kinds of issues in yeshiva you would have to spend a lot more time on it that is available. Let's say for example you would want to learn the Guide of the Rambam. To do that and have any idea of what he was dealing with you would also have to learn Aristotle and t get an accurate picture you would have to learn the commentaries on him  and the later books of Joseph Albo and Abravenal going back towards the traditional Neo Plato view.

The drawback however of not learning this material is people get drawn to phony mystics and pseudo Torah.

One possible way to address this issue would be at night seder [session] to work on Jewish Philosophy. That is at least to plow through the basic material quickly. The Guide, Saadia Gaon's Emunot VeVeot, Joseph Albo,  Isaac Abravenel, and Yehuda Abravenel.

Introduction: The Torah  allows slavery, and slavery has laws attached to it. One can't do with a slave girl anything he wants. America made a terrible mistake in freeing its slaves and now they are ruling over  everyone else. Americans thought the Torah is bad because it allows slavery. Instead of thinking they were superior to the Torah, they ought to have learned its lessons.]

First of all in the Torah we have five kinds of Guilt offerings.  That is let us say there is a slave woman who has two owners and one of the owners lets her go. So she is half slave and half free. Now if she would be free, one could marry her. But a  Jew can't have sex with a slave woman. So what happens if a Jew has sex with this half free and half slave woman? That is the case of one of the guilt offerings. [The half free slave girl offering in Leviticus.]

The other guilt offerings are for armed robbery, and for using an object that was sanctified for the Temple and few other things. You can look them up at the beginning of Leviticus.

The law concerning a  half freed slave girl is in order for the law of the Torah to apply she needs to do it on purpose but he can do it by accident or on purpose.  That is he depends on her. If she did it by accident, then not only does she not get lashes, but he brings no guilt offering.
Thus if she is underage, neither she nor he is obligated in  anything. But if she is older than 12, and he is under age, she gets lashes if she did it on purpose, and he brings a sacrifice.


[In other words: In Kritut we learn he depends on her. If she is not obligated in makot [lashes] then he does not bring  a guilt offering. So if he is over 13 and she is younger neither is obligated.]

 But if he is less than 13 and she is older, the Rambam says she gets lashes and he brings the guilt offering. The Raavad disagrees and says since he is less than 13 both are not obligated in anything;



 The Rambam is hard to understand How can he be liable, when he is underage?

Rav Elazar Menachem Shach has an idea that might help us to understand the Rambam..

Rav Elazar Menachem Shach says when we say as a rule that and accident is not liable in punishment the reason is there is something lacking in the act--not just the person. So now we can understand the Rambam. Since she is doing the deed on purpose, and he is underage there is nothing lacking in the deed. [The reason is because slave girl needs to do it on purpose for there to be a punishment, but he does not need to be on purpose.]
This idea of Rav Shach is something that I and my learning partner have been puzzling about. What would be the difference if doing an act by accident would be a lack in the person, not in the deed? What would change in our case? Rav Shach is giving a reason for the Rambam that when he is under 13 and she is above 12 there is  an obligation.That is his being under age does not present a lack in the deed. But that just seems like a different way of saying the same thing. How does this help us?


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One kind of אשם is for having sex with a שפחה חר.
The law concerning a  half freed slave girl is in order for the law of the Torah to apply she needs to do it on purpose but he can do it by שוגג or on purpose.  That is he depends on her. If she did it by accident then not only does she not get lashes but he brings no guilt offering.
Thus if she is underage neither she nor he is obligated in  anything. But if she is older than 12 an he is under age she gets lashes if she did it on purpose and he brings a sacrifice.





רב אלעזר מנחם שך has an idea that might help us to understand the רמב''ם..
But before I can present his idea let me say over briefly the רמב''ם he is talking about.

First of all in the Torah we have five kinds of אשמות. One of them is for a שפחה חרופה. That is let us say you have a slave woman who has two owners and one of the owner lets he go. So she is half slave and half free. Now if she would be free, one could marry her. But a regular Jew can't have sex with a שפחה. So what happens if a Jew has sex with this half free and half slave woman? That is the case of one of the אשמות.

The other guilt offerings are for גזלה,that is  אשם גזלות, and for using an object that was sanctified for the Temple אשם מעילות and few other things. You can look them up at the beginning of ויקרא.

In כריתות we learn he depends on her. If she is not obligated in מכות then he does not bring  a אשם offering. So if he is over שלש עשרה שנים and she is פחות משתים עשרה neither is obligated. But if he is less than שלש עשרה and she is older the רמב''ם says she gets מלקות and he brings the אשם. The ראב''ד disagrees and says since he is less than שלש עשרה both are not obligated in anything;

 The רמב''ם is hard to understand. How can he be liable when he is underage? רב שך says when we say as a rule that an שוגג is not liable in punishment the reason is there is something lacking in the act, not just the person. So now we can understand the רמב''ם. Since she is doing the deed on purpose and he is underage there is nothing lacking in the deed. The reason is because שפחה חרופה needs to do it on purpose for there to be a punishment but he does not need to be on purpose.

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  קודם כל בתורה יש לנו חמישה סוגים של אשם. אחד מהם הוא לשפחה חרופה, היינו שיש שפחה שיש לה שני קונים, ואחד מהקונים מאפשר לה ללכת. אז היא חצי שפחה וחצי בת חורין. עכשיו, אם היא תהיה חופשית, אפשר להתחתן איתה. אבל יהודי רגיל לא יכול לקיים יחסי מין עם שפחה. אז מה קורה אם יהודי מקיים יחסי מין עם אישה הזאת  חצי שפחה  וחצי חפשית? זה המקרה אחד  של אשם

סוג אחד של אשם הוא לקיום יחסי מין עם שפחה חרופה (חצי משוחררת). את החוק הנוגע  לשפחה חרופה הוא  שהיא צריכה לעשות את זה בכוונה, אבל הוא יכול לעשות את זה על ידי שוגג או בכוונה. כלומר הוא תלוי בה. אם היא עשתה את זה בטעות, אז לא רק שהיא לא תקבל עונש אלא גם הוא  לא מביא אשם. לכן, אם היא קטינה לא היא ולא הוא מחויבים בכל דבר. אבל אם היא  יותר מי''ב והוא מתחת לגיל י''ג היא מקבלת מלקות אם היא עשתה את זה בכוונה, והוא מביא קרבן.



 בכריתות אנו לומדים שהוא תלוי בה. אם היא אינה מחויבת במכות, אז הוא לא מביא קרבן אשם. אז אם הוא יותר משלש עשר שנים והיא פחות משתים עשרה,  היא לא מחויבת. אבל אם הוא פחות משלש עשרה והיא מבוגרת לרמב''ם  שהיא מקבלת מלקות והוא מביא אשם. הראב''ד אינו מסכים, ואומר שאם הוא פחות משלש עשרה שניהם אינם מחויבים בשום דבר.  הרמב''ם קשה להבין. איך הוא יכול להיות אחראי כשהוא קטן?
לרב אלעזר מנחם שך יש רעיון שיכול לעזור לנו להבין את הרמב''ם.

 רב שך אומר כשאנחנו אומרים ככלל כי שוגג אינו אחראי בעונש הסיבה לכך היא שיש משהו חסר במעשה, לא רק את האדם. אז עכשיו אנחנו יכולים להבין את הרמב''ם. מאז היא עושה מעשה במזיד והוא קטן אין שום דבר חסר במעשה. הסיבה לכך היא משום שפחה חרופה צריכה לעשות את זה בכוונה כדי להיות עונש, אבל הוא לא צריך להיות בכוונה.

A song of praise to God q89 Edited  e33 mathematics mmog j1  js1 b104

kabalah center

People think the kabalah center is a problem because it does not emphasize the aspect of doing mitzvot but in fact that is a good thing. It is when you combine kabalah with mitzvot that delusions about being the messiah begin. So the Kabalah center is the best place for learning authentic Jewish Mysticism. All other places teach the mysticism of Shabatai Tzvi  along with the energies of the Sitra Achra.
 People may not talk about it but this is definitely what they are thinking.
The smart people are able to hide their delusions from the general public and present a spiffy public image.
 If you would take the teachings of Natan, the false prophet, out of the religious world, it would collapse. That is-- all but the Litvak yeshivas. But the rest of it depends highly for its spiritual energy and teachings of Natan. It is not that this was done on purpose. It was basically innocent. You had people going to the wide spread groups the Shatz that were in every town in the Ukraine. Later these same people were the same one that got involved with the Ball Shem Tov. They just brought their understandings of the Ari along with them.

So for people that are interested in the more mystic side of Torah what I recommend is not learning anything later than the Ari and Reb Chaim Vital themselves. You can be guaranteed that everything that came later is, without knowing, using the ideas and energies of the Dark Side that Natan Haazati was sucked into.

I think personally that a better way to get attached with God is by learning Gemara and Musar [basic books of Jewish ethics written during the Middle Ages]. This more "yeshivish" kind of approach I think is a lot more effective in terms of getting to "Devkut."--attachment with God. I can see that some people do this later approach, and still do not seem to get to where you would hope, but still this is an approach which I found worked for me some time ago. Sadly I was not able to keep it up. But if true spirituality is what you are looking for then my impression is nothing beats learning Gemara along with Musar. [I don't do a fast session because of various excuses. But if possible I think one fast session and one slow (in depth) one in Gemara is a good approach.]
[But I admit I can't answer for people that this does not work for. I can only tell over my own experience.]
I terms of Musar I also recommend the books of Israel Salanter's disciples. I find them to be  a great help for me to set me straight.

The Ari, Isaac Luria

There are few that really know the writings of Isaac Luria well. But even among the few that know Kabalah well there is a tendency to go into pretty bad stuff. I have no idea why this is.

It is almost for sure that if you see someone learning Kabalah that they think they are the messiah, or if they have some famous person they follow they are thinking of this famous person as the messiah.

But it rarely stops there. It is amazing to see the worlds of delusion they get into.

This in itself would be a good reason to critical of the Ari's writings except that it seems to me most of the problems come from the teachings of people that came after the Ari and were unknowingly influenced by the Shatz. It is astounding to me to discover most of the most basic teachings that got into the religious world have their origin in Nathan the false prophet of the Shatz. The truth be told, this is not well known because most people have not learned the writings of Natan. If they would and then look at the religious world today, they would see what I mean. It is not subtle but in your face in a way that you can't ignore.

I do not like to dwell on this, but just to conclude I want to say that there is good reason  Lithuanian yeshivas discourage any and all mystic practices and rather concentrate of the Talmud, Musar and learning a kosher vocation.

A nice list of good points I saw on someone's blog.

Liberty

1. I am a Caucasian of Irish and Italian descent, whose parents were immigrants from those lands.
2. My loyalties are to my family and the United States of America. I would defend either or both to the death. Apart from a mortgage and a car loan, I owe nothing else to anyone.
3. What matters most to me about others is their character: their willingness to respect the rights of others and to discharge their proper responsibilities, without whining about any of it.
4. I believe that there is an American culture, and that it is infinitely superior to all the other cultures of the world, past or present. More, I believe that Americans are the finest people in the world -- that no other land produces anything remotely comparable to our general standard of decency, justice, generosity, or good humor.
5. I believe that the races, as conventionally defined, differ in various ways. The importance of those differences is topical and contextual.
6. I believe that the sexes differ in various ways. As with racial differences, the importance of those differences is topical and contextual.
7. I believe that homosexual sodomy is self-destructive, but that, at least in certain cases, sexual orientation can be changed.
8. I believe that there is such a thing as general intelligence, that it is at least partly inherited, and that it varies widely.
9. I believe that the handicapped should receive our sympathy and compassion as individuals to other individuals, but that they are not entitled to more as a matter of right.
10. I believe that laws that mandate preferred treatment for the members of any group, however defined, are both unConstitutional and destructive.
11. I hold these convictions not because anyone else holds them, but because the evidence of my senses and my own powers of reasoning have led me to them.

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I have to add that I am in agreement with all the above except for the first sentence. My ancestors were all Polish Jews. But outside of that everything else I am in agreement with. My parents were born in the USA and my father served the USA honorably as captain in the U.S. Air Force and afterwards also. 


I looked at that person's blog a few times and he has some very good points and I recommend looking at it. It seems to me to be one of the very best on the Internet.

I am a little unhappy with "tzadik worship."

I am a little unhappy with "tzadik worship." While I can see that following  a true tzadik  has benefits,-- still this tends to change from worship of God to worship of the tzadik.  There is a separate problem also of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. That is something the Gra said was the problem with the whole  movement that he put into excommunication. That is it is a mixture of good and negative energies.  You can actually see when people get absorbed into the negative energies. Still, it seems clear that I myself and others need an example of human perfection to follow. If we don't follow a true tzadik, we often tend to follow some phony tzadik.

I sometimes open up the Chayai Moharan and find things that indicate that Reb Natan really meant to turn the whole thing into a kind of tzadik centered thing. This does not seem to be to be along the lines of the world view of the Torah [Old Testament and the Talmud] which to me seem to be more centered on worship of God. It may seem to some people to be a subtle shift in focus,- but to me it seems to be  a major change in world view.

But I admit, worship of  almost any true tzadik does not bother me as much as when people worship a false tzadik. A false tzadik is someone with great powers and what seems like Ruach HaKodesh [רוח הקודש] but it come from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil [the kelipa that is an  admixture of good and evil]. Or from the Dark Side itself. We can find examples of that easily. Just check the history of the Shatz movement. Professor Gershom Sholem wrote a few very important books about that movement that contain valuable information. For example people think when someone does something that is  miracle  that automatically qualifies them as a true tzadik. However we find that people did miracles in the name of Shabati Tzvi that surpassed anything reported about  Israel Baal Shem.
People that had never even seen Shabatai Tzvi revived the dead just by saying, "In the name of Shabatai Zvi, I command you to get up". So miracles mean a lot. They mean someone is getting powers from the side of Good -or from the Dark Side,- or from the kelipa that is a mixture--the Intermediate Zone.

[Because of the above mentioned considerations, I think the best thing is to learn and keep straight Torah--as you can find being done in Lithuanian kinds of yeshivas.]

There is really a lot to discuss here.  Israel Baal Shem was a great tzadik. However in every town in Ukraine was a group of Shatzniks and there were the people that he tried to bring back in teshuva. So there is no great thing in being a "disciple of the Baal Shem Tov". These were the people that went on Friday night to where the action was--to the Shatz group, --not to the local rosh yeshiva. The result is easy to see. Go to HU and xerox the three books of Natan, the false prophet of the Shatz, and you will see what you are being taught as something kosher is really from the Dark Side.

All the above shows you why Litvaks stick with Gemara.

sin

I am pretty sure about some sins. I did things based on what I thought at the time were good reasons, but turned out to have disastrous consequences for myself and family. Those were about 4 major sins. All of them involved leaving some area of value. But besides that I figured that I had not just left some area of value but as a result I ended up joining some area of negative value.
But besides all this I also figure that when I suffer from some evil person, that there must be something of that same kind of evil in me,-- I mean as a kind of mirror effect.

All this is based on אין יסוריים בלי עוון there are no suffering that does not have a sin. But also on a statement of Rabbi Ishmael: One who has transgresses a positive command and repents does not move unless he has been forgiven.
If a negative  command then repentance covers and Yom Kippur cleanses.
If a negative command that has Karet or the death penalty then repentance covers but suffering cleanses. If it is חילול השם then only death brings forgiveness.

The things however that I think I need to repent on are not exactly in these categories. Leaving Israel is one thing. That was based on my thinking of Israel as a bad thing as is common among strictly religious people. The other sins are like that. They would not normally be considered things that there is a specific command against. They were just more subtle kinds of mistakes but with large repercussions.

Of course there are lots of things I have been accused of by very wicked people which are all lies. But though people do lie about me often, still they are only accusing me of things they can understand. My real sins are not things anyone can understand. They are more subtle. But also infinitely more serious.

In any case that leaves me with the rest of humanity in a dilemma.  How to pick ourselves up from the pit we have fallen into? It is in answer to this kind of question that I write on my blog about the importance of learning Torah in a Lithuanian kind of Yeshiva. It may not be a perfect solution but from what I can tell it is the best thing out there. At least in this way I can find out what I have done wrong and maybe even begin to correct things. But without learning straight, unadulterated Torah how can I or anyone find out what we have done wrong? Without that we are as likely as not to find some evil path that appeals to us and to claim it is good. With straight Torah, that possibility is less likely.

Bava Metzia 104

Ideas in Talmud
Ideas in Bava Metzia



I should admit that my previous ideas on Bava Metzia 104 I think were mistaken based on the fact I was going with the approach of the Maharshal and I think now that approach is impossible to defend.

But at any rate, we now have to figure out Tosphot and the Rif.

I already dealt with the Rif in a previous note. But the Rif could also say the Gemara in Bava Metzia is simply like R Yehoshua Ben Karcha and that is not the law. Or like I said before he could say the cases are different.

But what about Tosphot? To Tosphot the law is like Shmuel and the Gemara in Shavuot says that is only when he explained the pledge is against the whole loan. This does not look like the Gemara in BM. There here gets the whole pledge whether he said it is for the whole loan or not. The only difference is the amount the pledge went down in value.  Changing to Rashi's version in BM would help except for the continuation of the Gemara that says "טעמא דכתב ליה."


Tosphot might say that Rabbi Yochanan meant to lender can get the pledge from the orphans but only according to the amount of the loan if it was not said openly that the pledge is for the whole loan. Or that he meant he gets it from the orphans until the loan is paid. But no matter what Tosphot would do with R Yochanan it would not be how the gemara understands R Yochanan. So it could be I will have to revert to the same answers I gave for the Rif. [The two places  don't agree. Or maybe we could say the Gemara in Bava Metzia is just going according to R Yehoshu Ben Karcha. The reason I did not want to answer this is they ask from Rabbi Yochanan. But maybe that is not a problem. The Gemara might want to get R Yehoshua as close to the halacha as possible but that does not mean they think that he is the Halacha.]

The two places  don't agree. Or maybe we could say the גמרא in בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א is just going according to רבי יהושע בן קרחה. The reason I did not want to answer this is גמרא ask from רבי יוחנן. But maybe that is not a problem. The גמרא might want to get רבי יהושע בן קרחה as close to the הלכה as possible but that does not mean they think that he is the הלכה.



שני מקומות לא מסכימים. או שאולי נוכל לומר הגמרא בבבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א היא רק הולכת לפי רבי יהושע בן קרחה. הסיבה שאני לא רציתי לענות את זה מקודם היא שהגמרא שואלת מרבי יוחנן. אבל אולי זה לא בעיה. הגמרא ייתכן שהיא תרצה לקרב רבי יהושע בן קרחה  להלכה ככל האפשר אבל זה לא אומר שהם חושבים שהוא כן לפי הלכה





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I already dealt with the רי''ף in a previous note. But the רי''ף could also say the גמרא in ב''מ is simply like רבי יהושע בן קרחה and that is not the law. Or like I said before he could say the cases are different.

But what about תוספות? To תוספות the law is like שמואל and the גמרא in שבועות says that is only when he explained the משכון is against the whole הלוואה. This does not look like the גמרא in ב''מ. There here gets the whole משכון whether he said it is for the whole הלוואה or not. The only difference is the amount the משכון went down in value.  Changing to רש''י version in ב''מ would help except for the continuation of the גמרא that says "טעמא דכתב ליה."


תוספות might say that רבי יוחנן meant to lender can get the משכון from the orphans but only according to the monetary amount of the משכון if it was not said openly that the משכון is for the whole הלוואה. Or that he meant he gets it from the orphans until the הלוואה is paid. But no matter what תוספות would do with רבי יוחנן it would not be how the גמרא understands רבי יוחנן. So it could be I will have to revert to the same answers i gave for the רי''ף.

אני כבר עסקתי ברי''ף בהערה קודמת. אבל רי''ף יכול גם לומר הגמרא בב''מ היא פשוט כמו רבי יהושע בן קרחה וזה לא החוק. או כמו שאמרתי לפני כן שהן מדברות על מקרים שונים. אבל מה עם תוספות? לתוספות החוק היא כמו שמואל והגמרא בשבועות אומרת שרק כאשר הוא הסביר המשכון הוא נגד כל ההלוואה. זה לא נראה כמו הגמרא בב''מ.  כאן בב''מ המלווה מקבל את כל המשכון בין אם הוא אמר  שהוא עבור כל ההלוואה או לא. ההבדל היחיד הוא אם המשכון ירד בערך. ולענות לפי גרסת רש''י בשבועות לא יעזור בגלל המשך הגמרא בב''מ שאומרת "טעמא דכתב ליה." לתוספות אפשר לומר שרבי יוחנן התכוון שהמלווה יכול לקבל המשכון מהיתומים  רק בהתאם לסכום כספי של החוב אם זה לא נאמר בגלוי שהמשכון הוא לכל ההלוואה. או שהוא התכוון שהוא מקבל אותו מהיתומים עד ההלוואה משולמת. אבל לא משנה איך  שתוספות יפרשו רבי יוחנן, שזה לא יהיה איך שהגמרא מבינה רבי יוחנן. אז יכול להיות שאני אצטרך לחזור לאותן תשובות שנתתי לרי''ף ולומר שגם הן לתוספות

Bava Metzia

These are the two גמרות that my previous note was meant to be applied to.
Here I am taking the approach of תוספות according to the מהרש''א. I am giving up explaining these גמרות according to the מהרש''ל in בבא מציעא because even if I could get him to work in ב''מ I would still have to face the fact that is approach is absolutely contrary to the גמרא in שבועות point blank. That is because the מהרש''ל is saying we continue the approach of saying דורשיין לשון הדיוט even when it is not written.  How much more opposite to the גמרא in שבועות could you get? There the גמרא says שמואל is only when he explains openly the משכון is for the הלוואה. Or change it to רש''י if you want that שמואל is only when he did not explain it openly. One way of the other, there is a difference.




 The גמרא in שבועות מ''ד ע''א. The משנה says the משכון is against the הלוואה only according to its own monetary worth. The גמרא asks this seems not like שמואל who says the pledge is considered equal to the whole הלוואה. The גמרא answers  שמואל is when he said so explicitly and the משנה is when he did not. Let's say the opinion of שמואל is the subject of an argument between two תנאים.  The ברייתא  says רבי אליעזר says if the מלווה lost the משכון he takes an oath that it was by accident and he collects the whole הלוואה. Then רבי עקיבא says: "The borrower can say 'Why did I give  a משכון in the first place but to be for the הלוואה? You lost the משכון, you lost the הלוואה.'"
The גמרא says that neither רבי אליעזר nor רבי עקיבא hold from שמואל and rather they disagree about the law of רבי יצחק. The גמרא says רבי יצחק said the מלווה owns the משכון. Then the גמרא pushes that off and says רבי יצחק was talking about a case when the משכון was taken not at the time of the הלוואה and in that case everyone agrees with רבי יצחק. Rather their argument is when the משכון was taken at the time of the הלוואה and it is parallel to the argument between רבה and רב יוסף. The argument is this. רבה said a the finder of a אבידה has the category of a שומר חינם. Then רב יוסף said a שומר שכר. The גמרא says even then if the מלווה does not need the משכון there is no disagreement. Rather the case is when the מלווה needs to use the משכון.

The גמרא in בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א says רבי יהושע בן קרחה holds  דורשין לשון הדיוט. That means that we look at the exact language of the document. So when he writes כל תשלומתא  דאית לך כל קבל דיכי that means the משכון is considered to be for the whole הלוואה even if the משכון is not worth much. The גמרא asks but what if he did not write that? Then he would not own the whole משכון? But that contradicts רבי יוחנן who said the מלווה can take the whole משכון from the orphans. So he owns it even when he did not write anything. Rather רבי יהושע בן קרחה meant that if the משכון goes down in value and the loan is defaulted on, then we go after other property in order that the whole הלוואה should be paid back.

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אלה הם שתי גמרות שההערה הקודמת שלי הייתה אמורה להיות מיושמת
כאן אני לוקח את הגישה של תוספות בהתאם למהרש''א. אני לא נותן את הסבר  הגמרות על פי מהרש''ל בבבא מציעא, כי גם אם אני יכול לקבל אותו  בב''מ, אני עדיין אצטרך להתמודד עם העובדה שהגישה שלו מנוגדת לחלוטין לגמרא בשבועות, טווח אפס. זאת משום שהמהרש''ל אומר שאנו ממשיכים את גישתו של  "דורשיין לשון ההדיוט" גם כאשר זה לא כתוב. זה לההפך  לגמרא בשבועות . שם הגמרא אומרת שמואל הוא רק כאשר הוא מסביר בגלוי שהמשכון הוא להלוואה. או לשנות אותו לרש''י אם אתה רוצה ששמואל הוא רק כאשר הוא לא הסביר את זה בגלוי.  דרך אחת או האחרות, יש הבדל.

גמרא בשבועות מ''ד ע''א. המשנה אומרת המשכון הוא נגד ההלוואה רק על פי השווי הכספי שלו. הגמרא שואלת זה לא נראה כמו שמואל שאומר המשכון נחשב שווה לכל ההלוואה. הגמרא עונה שמואל הוא כשאמר זאת במפורש והמשנה היא כאשר הוא לא עשה זאת. הגמרא שאולת אולי דעתו של שמואל היא הנושא לוויכוח בין שני תנאים.  רבי אליעזר אומר, אם מלווה איבד משכון הוא לוקח שבועה שזה היה באונס והוא אוסף את כל ההלוואה. אז רבי עקיבא אומר: "הלווה יכול לומר, 'מדוע אני נתתי משכון, אבל כדי להיות להלוואה? איבדת המשכון, איבדת את ההלוואה." הגמרא אומרת לא רבי אליעזר ולא רבי עקיבא מחזיקים משמואל. אבל אולי הם מתווכחים על החוק הרב יצחק.  רבי יצחק אמר משכון בבעלות המלווה. אז הגמרא דוחפת את זה ואומרת שאם נלקח המשכון לא בזמן ההלוואה  כולם מסכימים עם רבי יצחק. במקום זאת הטענה שלהם היא כאשר המשכון נלקח בעת ההלוואה וזה במקביל לוויכוח בין רבה ורב יוסף. הטיעון זה. רבה אמר למאתר של אבדה יש הקטגוריה של שומר חינם. אז רב יוסף אמר שומר שכר. הגמרא אומרת גם אז אם מלווה לא צריך את המשכון אין מחלוקת, אלא המקרה הוא כאשר המלווה צריך להשתמש במשכון.
הגמרא בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א אומרת רבי יהושע בן קרחה מחזיק דורשין לשון הדיוט. זה אומר שאנחנו מסתכלים על השפה של המסמך המדויקת. אז כשהוא כותב, "כל תשלומתא דאית לך כל קבל דיכי" זה אומר המשכון נחשב לכל ההלוואה גם אם המשכון הוא לא שווה הרבה. הגמרא שואלת אבל מה אם הוא לא כתב את זה? ואז הוא לא היה בבעלות השלמה של המלווה? אבל זה סותר את רבי יוחנן שאמר מלווה יכול לקחת את כל המשכון מהיתומים. אז הוא מחזיק אותו גם כשהוא לא כתב שום דבר. אלא רבי יהושע בן קרחה מחזיק בשיטה שאם המשכון ירד בערך ואינו שווה לחוב, אז אנחנו הולכים אחרי רכוש אחר של הלווה כדי שכל ההלוואה תהיה משולמת בחזרה.

Shavuot and Bava Metzia

That whole essay on the difficulties between Shavuot 43b 44a and Bava Metzia 104a I think I need to rethink. The whole thing is only valid if we go by the Maharshal. The Maharshal assumes that Tosphot continues in his normal way of explaining דורשין לשון הדיוט that even if it is not written it is considered as if it is written.
But if we go by the Maharsha that Tosphot changed his explanation then the two sugiot seem to fit.
That is it needs to be spelled out that the pledge is for the whole loan and if not then it is against only the monetary value of the pledge.

So the sugia in BM comes out just like it sounds. The lender gets the whole pledge if he spelled it out in the document. The only problem would be then the next part of the Gemara that seems to be saying he would still get the whole thing even if he did not write it and that is against the Gemara in Shavuot.

And still the main problem remains. The Gemara in Shavuot is clear that the pledge is only for its monetary worth, and that is how the Rif says also. And that means if it is lost the rest of the loan must be paid. The Gemara in BM is clear if the loan is not paid he the lender gets the whole pledge even if it is more than the amount of the loan, even if it is not written as such. And the only reason it is written is if the pledge goes down in value that the lender can collect more property of the borrower. Perhaps one could answer in one case the pledge was lost and in the other the loan is not paid. But why would that make  a difference?
So what we seem to have here is that with the Rif these two gemaras do not argue. Rather in the case of the pledge being lost then it is only against its monetary worth. But if the loan is not paid the lender gets the whole pledge. But to Tosphot the law is like Shmuel that in both cases the pledge is against the whole loan.







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I need to rethink  the difficulties between שבועות  מ''ד ע''אand בבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א. The whole thing is only problematic if we go by the מהרש''ל. The מהרש''ל assumes that תוספות continues in his normal way of explaining דורשין לשון הדיוט that even if it is not written it is considered as if it is written.
But if we go by the מהרש''א that תוספות changed his explanation, then the two סוגיות seem to fit.
That is it needs to be spelled out that the משכון is for the whole הלוואה, and if not then it is against only the monetary value of the משכון.

So the סוגיא in בבא מציעא comes out just like it sounds. The מלווה gets the whole משכון if he spelled it out in the document. The only problem would be then the next part of the גמרא that seems to be saying he would still get the whole thing even if he did not write it and that is against the גמרא in שבועות.


So the סוגיא in ב''מ comes out just like it sounds. The מלווה gets the whole משכון if he spelled it out in the document. The only problem would be then the next part of the גמרא that seems to be saying he would still get the whole thing even if he did not write it and that is against the גמרא in שבועות.

And still the main problem remains. The גמרא in שבועות is clear that the משכון is only for its monetary worth, and that is how the רי''ף says also. And that means if it is lost the rest of the חוב must be paid. The גמרא in ב''מ is clear if the חוב is not paid  the מלווה gets the whole משכון even if it is more than the amount of the חוב, even if it is not written as such. And the only reason it is written is if the pledge goes down in value that the lender can collect more property of the borrower. Perhaps one could answer in one case the pledge was lost and in the other the loan is not paid.

So what we seem to have here is that with the רי''ף these two גמרות do not argue. Rather in the case of the משכון being lost then it is only against its monetary worth. But if the loan is not paid the lender gets the whole pledge. But to תוספות the law is like שמואל that in both cases the משכון is against the whole הלוואה.

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 יש קשיים בין השבועות מ''ד ע''א ובבא מציעא ק''ד ע''א. כל העניין הוא רק בעייתי אם נלך לפי המהרש''ל. המהרש''ל מניח שתוספות ממשיך בדרך הרגילה שלו להסביר "דורשין לשון ההדיוט" שגם אם זה לא כתוב שזה נחשב כאילו הוא נכתב. אבל אם נלך לפי המהרש''א שתוספות שינו את ההסבר שלו, אז שתי הסוגיות שתתאמנה. כלומר זה צריך להיות מפורט שהמשכון הוא לכל ההלוואה, ואם לא אז הוא נגד רק את הערך הכספי של המשכון. אז סוגיא בבא מציעא יוצאת בדיוק כמו זה נשמע. מלווה מקבל כל המשכון אם הוא פירט את זה במסמך. הבעיה היחידה תהיה אז החלק הבא של הגמרא שנראית  שהמלווה עדיין מקבל את כל המשכון, גם אם הוא לא כתב את זה וזה נגד הגמרא בשבועות. אז סוגיא ב''מ יוצאת בדיוק כמו שזה נשמע. מלווה מקבל כל המשכון אם הוא פירט את זה במסמך.
 ועדיין הבעיה העיקרית נותרה. הגמרא בשבועות ברורה שהמשכון הוא רק לשווי הכספי שלו, וכך גם רי''ף אומר. וזה אומר שאם הוא איבד את המשכון, שארית החוב חייבת להיות משולמת. הגמרא ב''מ ברורה אם החוב לא ישולם המלווה מקבל כל המשכון גם אם הוא יותר מהסכום של החוב, גם אם לא כתוב כזה. והסיבה היחידה שכתוב היא אם המשכון יורד בערך אז המלווה יכול לאסוף יותר רכוש של הלווה. אולי אפשר לענות שמקרה אחד הוא שהמשכון אבד, והשני הוא שההלוואה לא שולמה. אז מה נראה הוא  שעם הרי''ף שתי גמרות אלה לא מתווכחות. במקרה שהמשכון הלך לאיבוד אז הוא רק נגד השוויות מוניטרית. אבל אם ההלוואה לא שולמה, המלווה מקבל את כל המשכון. אבל לתוספות החוק הוא כמו שמואל כי בשני המקרים המשכון הוא נגד כל ההלוואה.

here is a link to the book on bava metzia

Ideas in Bava Metzia

Isaac Luria

The legitimate mystics after the  Ari  האריז''ל does expand the Ari. We have the Reshash שלום שערבי having the שבירת הכלים in all the עולמות. That is fine because that is just going along with the regular expansion that the Ari himself does in the second part of the עץ חיים.

 The צמצום [contraction] refers to all ten sepherot.

The reason I bring this up is because this corresponds to something that Kant was doing.  Kant also limited reason. He said that when pure reason {not just human reason} ventures into areas where it does not belong it produces self contradictions.

The movement that the Gra put into Cherem. This would be a problem from the standpoint of Halachah even if we did not understand the motivations of the Gra. All the more so when we do understand. The trouble is certainly because of idolatry. But that would not be as bad as idolatry coupled with real evil. There is after all is said and done very good reasons that Gra signed the Cherem and it is a real failure of judgement for people to ignore it.  And recently we have Rav Shach saying the same thing as the Gra and predictably he too was ignored.

what motivates Muslims

I wanted to say that people that have  a secular orientation have no basis to comprehend what motivates Muslims. If they are economists they try to frame the problem in terms of economic relationships. If they are politicians they try to frame the problem in terms of political elements. The only people that can comprehend what motivates Muslims are religious people. And in a secular society religious people are ignored--even though they are the only ones that actually realize what is going on.
Muslims are motivated by Islam.  And Islam is big problem. Not that I like to knock other people, but I think the Rambam was wrong in this case. He saw the Islam of Ibn Rushd and the people that rationalized it.  I suggest starting with a thesis that Islam is evil and working back from that. That is we might very well find good people that are good in spite of being Muslim. That is they simply do not take their religion seriously.

Two complaints about Christianity

Two complaints about Christianity that Saadia Gaon and the Rambam had. 1. nullification of the commandments.  2. Divine simplicity.



[I have a drop more to say about this whole subject, but all I would be doing would be repeating the opinion of a Medieval mystic Rav Avraham Abulafia.  Professor Moshe Idel at Hebrew University has already written his PhD thesis and many more books on the subject of  A. Abulafia so I have nothing more I could possibly add to the discussion.] [However it is of interest to note that the person that actually printed up all of  Abulfia's books was a fellow from Geulah or Mea Shearim. For some odd reason with all the research they were doing at HU no one thought to actually come out with an academic version of Rav Abulfia's books. I find that odd.] 

I had been out of the States for a few years and when I returned it had deteriorated. I was alarmed and dismayed but did not wait around to see if things could get worst. From what I could tell on later visits, it had become so bad that wholesome normal people are under siege. But I still have confidence in the USA Constitution, and that things can get back on track.

Concerning the steady decline.  I have confidence the trend can be reversed. In fact, you could look on the last 8 years as being a lesson. Many good hearted people did not realize to where the democrats could lead to.  Now I think many people have seen the evidence and realize the problems.

When a certain tzadik comes into the world  and has joined with a certain divine trait completely then it is impossible to get to that same divine trait except through that tzadik.I think this explains why it is only in Lithuanian yeshivas that you can find Torah. Once the Gra came into the world I think one can come to Torah only through the path that he opened.

I know it is good business to pretend to know Torah and make what looks like a yeshiva. Sadly there are too many frauds and charlatans. Instead of naming names I stick with one simple truth: if you want to learn and understand and keep Torah you need to get to a Litvak Yeshiva. You don't need to be in it all day. Part of the day you might work or go to university or go to the beach. I am not talking about how much time you spend. I mean that simply to comprehend what Torah is about seems to me to be impossible without that proper context.

I think my parents got a hold of the "good parents" archetype. Though I forgot most of it, growing up with them was an amazing experience. There was just some numinous aspect of their lives and their relationships that just shone out with the light of a thousand suns. There was just some kind of wholesomeness and amazing love that it was all about. 

Talmud Bava Metzia Shavuot

I wanted to suggest that there needs to be some work to iron out the two subjects in Bava Metzia page 104a and in Shavuot 44a.
I am not saying these two Gemaras agree. But we need to find out if they do and if they don't then in what exact areas do they disagree?

This essay would be valid if we go like the Maharshal who considered Tosphot to continue in his normal vein that דורשין לשון הדיוט means we considered it written even if it is not written. But I think we have to drop this assumption.





I mean in Shavuot the Gemara says Shmuel only said his law in a case where he stated explicitly that the pledge is for the whole loan. [To the girsa (version) of Rabbainu Tam and Rabainu Chananel which Tosphot defends.] [We could switch this around but I am not sure this would help us.] In Bava Metzia the Gemara says one can't take a pledge more than the amount of the loan because דורשין לשון הדיוט that whether he says so or not the pledge is owned even if it is more than the loan. [That is a small pledge will still be taken as the equivalent of a large loan.] [That is we do not have a contradiction. All Shmuel says is a small pledge is equal to a large loan and all the Gemara says in Bava Metzia is the whole pledge is owed even if it is more than the loan.]

There are still many details to work out. But even before I can get to the details, I need to get the idea. Is what we are saying is the pledge is owned completely even if more than the loan and that even if it is small it is equal to the whole loan. If so these two concepts do seem contradictory prima facie.

Then the Gemara concludes not like Shmuel in Shavuot. In Shavuot the Gemara says the pledge is only equal to its own monetary value and that is the amount that it is considered to be against the loan. That is the conclusion of the Gemara--whether he says so explicitly or not  and whether the pledge was taken at the time of the loan or not. [See the Rif.] So this Gemara in Shavuot seems not like the one in Bava Metzia.

 The Gemara in BM says we consider what has been out of the document of the loan as if it was written. [That is how Tosphot explains the sugia there.] (So the Gemara there certainly makes no difference if something was written and explained openly or not. This is already entirely against the Gemara in Shavuot where the Gemara resolves the contradiction between the Mishna and Shmuel  by says one is where it was said openly the pledge is against the loan and the other is where this was not stated. And the Gemara never goes against this there. It just says no one holds from Shmuel but they do not ever modify the opinion of Shmuel. Tosphot however says if fact the law is like Shmuel but this would not make any difference in our sugia because our sugia is just the opposite case of Shmuel. If Shmuel is when he explained his meaning openly then our sugia is when he did not]


What I am thinking of doing is to say the pledge is owned even more than the loan and when the loan is payed back the amount the pledge is more than the loan has to be paid for by the borrower if he wants his pledge back. And I suggest this is what the Gemara means in BM when it  says "אלא לגירעון."  And that I think we have to say this Gemara in BM does hold by Shmuel. Furthermore the Gemara in BM is only saying this is the opinion of R Yehoshua Ben Karcha.

It is also possible that Shmuel means the pledge is considered equal to the loan even when the monetary value of the pledge is more than the loan, [not just when it is less]. In fact this might be best because then the two Gemaras might be  holding that we do not hold by Shmuel in this case and that we always look only at the monetary value of the pledge.



Appendix: That is about as far as I can think right now. The problems never seems to let up on me for me to be able to concentrate anymore. But just for the convenience of the reader I will just say over quickly the Gemara in Shavuot. The Mishna says the pledge is against the loan only according to its own monetary worth. The Gemara asks this seems not like Shmuel who says the pledge is considered equal to the whole loan. The Gemara answers  Shmuel is when he said so explicitly and the mishna is when he did not. Let's say the opinion of Shmuel is the subject of an argument between two Tenaim. R Eliezer says if the lender lost the pledge he takes an oath that it was by accident and he collects the whole loan. R Akiva says: "The borrower can say 'Why did I give  a pledge in the first place but to be for the loan? You lost the pledge, you lost the loan.'"
The Gemara says that neither R Eliezer nor R Akiva hold from Shmuel and rather they disagree about the law of R. Isaac. R. Isaac said the lender owns the pledge. Then the Gemara pushes that off and says R Isaac was talking about a case when the pledge was taken not at the time of the loan and in that case everyone agrees with R Isaac. Rather their argument is when the pledge was taken at the time of the loan and it is parallel to the argument between Raba and Rav Joseph. Raba said a the finder of a lost object has the category of a unpaid guard. Rav Joseph said a paid guard. The gemara says even then if the lender does not need the pledge there is no disagreement. Rather the case is when the lender needs to use the pledge.

The gemara in Bava Metzia says R. Yehoshua Ben Karcha  דורש לשון הדיוט. That means that we look at the exact language of the document. So when he writes כל תשלומתא  דאית לך כל קבל דיכי that means the pledge is considered to be for the whole loan even if the pledge is not worth much. The Gemara asks but what if he did not write that? Then he would not own the whole pledge? But that contradicts Rabbi Yochanan who said the lender can take the whole pledge from the orphans. So he owns it even when he did not write anything. Rather yehoshua Ben Karcha meant that if the pledge goes down in value and the loan is defaulted on then we go after other property in order that teh whole loan should be paid back.




In any case one difficulty i forgot to mention is the basic contradiction: In Shavuot the whole difference between Shmuel and Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Elizer is whether he explained openly that the pledge is considered equal to the loan or not. And in Bava Metzia this difference is completely erased by the idea we considered it written even if it has not been written. The answer might be that explaining the difference is not the same as writing a document. And in fact the Gemara says in Shavuot that there is no argument between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Eliezer when he has written a document. That means Rabbi Eliezer then agrees with Rabbi Akiva but not Shmuel. So we still seem to have  a problem.

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I wanted to suggest that there needs to be some work to iron out the two subjects in בבא מציעא page ק''ד ע''א and in שבועות מ''ד ע''א
I am not saying these two גמרות agree. But we need to find out if they do and if they don't then in what exact areas do they disagree?







I mean in שבועות the גמרא says שמואל only said his law in a case where he stated explicitly that the משכון is for the whole הלוואה. To the גרסה of רבינו תם  and רבינו חננאל which תוספות defends. We could switch this around but I am not sure this would help us. In בבא מציעא the גמרא says one can't take a משכון more than the amount of the הלוואה because דורשין לשון הדיוט that whether he says so or not the משכון is owned even if it is more than the הלוואה. That is a small משכון will still be taken as the equivalent of a large הלוואה. That is,  we do not have a contradiction. All שמואל says is a small משכון is equal to a large הלוואה and all the גמרא says in בבא מציעא is the whole משכון is owned even if it is more than the הלוואה.

There are still many details to work out. But even before I can get to the details, I need to get the idea. Is what we are saying is the משכון is owned completely even if more than the הלוואה and that even if it is small it is equal to the whole הלוואה. If so these two concepts do seem contradictory prima facie.

Then the גמרא concludes not like שמואל in שבועות.  However תוספות says the law is like  שמואל. In שבועות the גמרא says the משכון is only equal to its own monetary value and that is the amount that it is considered to be against the הלוואה. That is the conclusion of the גמרא, whether he says so explicitly or not,  and whether the משכון was taken at the time of the הלוואה or not. See the רי''ף. So this גמרא in שבועות seems not like the one in בבא מציעא.

 The גמרא in בבא מציעא says we consider what has been out of the document of the הלוואה as if it was written. That is how תוספות explains the סוגיא there. So the גמרא there certainly makes no difference if something was written and explained openly or not. This is already entirely against the גמרא in Shavuot where the גמרא resolves the contradiction between the משנה and שמואל  by says one is where it was said openly the משכון is against the loan and the other is where this was not stated. And the גמרא never goes against this there. It just says no one holds from שמואל but they do not ever modify the opinion of שמואל.  In fact, תוספות however says in fact the law is like שמואל but this would not make any difference in our סוגיא because our סוגיא is just the opposite case of שמואל. If שמואל is when he explained his meaning openly then our סוגיא is when he did not.
The מהרש''א answers this question because he explains this סוגיא in בבא מציעא to mean that it in fact has to be written.




It is also possible that שמואל means the משכון is considered equal to the loan even when the monetary value of the משכון is more than the הלוואה, not just when it is less. In fact this might be best because then the two גמרות might be  holding that we do not hold by שמואל in this case and that we always look only at the monetary value of the משכון.

Another answer might be that that law is like שמואל and that שמואל said his law only when פרושי מפרש. Then these two גמרות in שבועות and בבא מציעא would come out equal. that is like תוספות in fact says in שבועות and this would be if we go like the גרסה of רבינו חננאל and we understand the גמרא in בבא מציעא like the מהרש''א.





Appendix: The גמרא in שבועות. The משנה says the משכון is against the הלוואה only according to its own monetary worth. The גמרא asks this seems not like שמואל who says the pledge is considered equal to the whole הלוואה. The גמרא answers  שמואל is when he said so explicitly and the משנה is when he did not. Let's say the opinion of שמואל is the subject of an argument between two תנאים.  The ברייתא  says רבי אליעזר says if the lender lost the pledge he takes an oath that it was by accident and he collects the whole הלוואה. Then רבי עקיבא says: "The borrower can say 'Why did I give  a משכון in the first place but to be for the הלוואה? You lost the משכון, you lost the הלוואה.'"
The גמרא says that neither רבי אליעזר nor רבי עקיבא hold from שמואל and rather they disagree about the law of רבי יצחק. The גמרא says רבי יצחק said the מלווה owns the משכון. Then the גמרא pushes that off and says רבי יצחק was talking about a case when the משכון was taken not at the time of the הלוואה and in that case everyone agrees with רבי יצחק. Rather their argument is when the משכון was taken at the time of the הלוואה and it is parallel to the argument between רבה and רב יוסף. The argument is this. רבה said a the finder of a אבידה has the category of a שומר חינם. Then רב יוסף said a שומר שכר. The גמרא says even then if the מלווה does not need the משכון there is no disagreement. Rather the case is when the מלווה needs to use the משכון.

The גמרא in בבא מציעא says רבי יהושע בן קרחה holds  דורשין לשון הדיוט. That means that we look at the exact language of the document. So when he writes כל תשלומתא  דאית לך כל קבל דיכי that means the משכון is considered to be for the whole הלוואה even if the משכון is not worth much. The גמרא asks but what if he did not write that? Then he would not own the whole משכון? But that contradicts רבי יוחנן who said the מלווה can take the whole משכון from the orphans. So he owns it even when he did not write anything. Rather רבי יהושע בן קרחה meant that if the משכון goes down in value and the loan is defaulted on, then we go after other property in order that the whole הלוואה should be paid back.




In any case one difficulty I forgot to mention is the basic contradiction: In שבועות the whole difference between שמואל and רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר is whether he explained openly that the pledge is considered equal to the loan or not. And in בבא מציעא this difference is completely erased by the idea we considered it written even if it has not been written. The answer might be that explaining the difference is not the same as writing a document. And in fact the Gemara says in Shavuot that there is no argument between רבי עקיבא and Rabbi Eliezer when he has written a document. That means רבי אליעזר then agrees with רבי עקיבא but not שמואל. So we still seem to have  a problem. This question in fact answered by the Maharsha who says that for our סוגיא in בבא מציעא תוספות is understanding דורש לשון הדיוט differently than he did before hand. In the סוגיא of רבי יהושע בן קרחה he explains it to mean we are exacting in saying the words mean exactly what their simple explanation is an if it is not written then we say it is not written.

I wanted to suggest the importance of learning in a Lithuanian kind of yeshiva. The main reason is that Torah is something that one needs to learn from people that know it well. It is kind of like in Middle Ages when you had apprentices  that needed to learn the ins and outs of some kind of skill over a very long period before they could be accepted as members of the guild or "Masters."  Torah is very much like that. The difference is it has its own kind of rules. Just like in the Middle Ages the rules of one guild did not apply to another. So in Torah there is no reason for the arena to be a free for all in which anyone who puts on the right kind of clothing is considered learned. My suggestion is to accept at legitimate only those who have put in the work; and the frauds that present themselves as experts to dispose of.

I think there are a few good yeshivas around especially in NY. Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, Mir. In Israel it is harder to spot a real yeshiva and tell the difference between it and the phonies. The reason is money got mixed into the system. No you can't tell in Israel who is learning because they love Torah and who is doing it because it is good business. It is not just hard to tell. It is nearly impossible.
The ones that you can be sure of are Ponovitch, and Brisk.

Songs to the God of Israel in mp3 and midi.

n30 [n30 in midi] k16 [k16 in midi] n31  [n31 in midi] n33 [n33 in midi] n35  [n35 in midi] n36 [n36 in midi]  n38  [n38 in midi] n39 [n39 in midi] n40 [n40 in midi] n41 [n41 in midi] [I think n31 and n33 are different even though they start with the same theme] n44 [n44 in midi] n47 [n47 in midi] n5 [n5 in midi] n51[n51 in midi] n52 [n52 in midi] n53 [edited][n53 in midi]  g2 [g2 in midi] q91 [q91in midi] p129 [p129 in midi]  p120 in mp3[p120 in midi]

People that are called tzadikim have powers from the Sitra Achra

The tzadik (righteous person) is a theme that is mentioned by the Gra  on the verse "and a river came out of Eden [Genesis 2] and was divided into four main rivers" the Gra says just two words '' זו הצדיק'' ''this is the tzadik'' The the Gra is simply drawing on the Ari. The basic idea is what we normally call the sepherah of foundation he is calling the tzadik since it is the sepherah that Joseph ben Yaakov became connected with.

Closeness to a true tzadik is important. The problem is this gets mixed up with the point of the Torah which is to serve God.

There is positive benefit one can gain by being connected with a true tzadik.
The opposite side of this is the damage one can incur by being close to a phony tzadik or one who seems to be righteous, but gets his powers from the sitra achra (the dark side).


 The two major problems with the concept of the tzadik is when people have a true tzadik, they can go overboard and cross the line into making him an object of worship. The other problem is when people have imagined they have found the real thing, but are not aware they have found a person who knows how to play the part.
The problems are so great in this area that I recommend not going to people that are called tzadikim. They have powers from the Sitra Achra {the Dark Side}. The Gra certainly saw this. 

The world of strict Judaism seems to have a problem with false messiahs. The way this works is they use consciousness traps.

The world of strict Judaism seems to have a problem with false messiahs. Sometimes they admit to following some false messiah and sometimes they do not admit that that is what they believe. This started mainly at the time of the Shatz (Shabatai Tzvi).  After he converted to Islam  his followers continued believing in him but they would deny this publicly. They would even print books against the Shatz and in private be holding meetings in his name.. This goes on today also except the name of the false messiah is changed.  This usually goes way beyond believing in some false messiah. It is almost always a form of worship towards that false messiah. And it would not be so bad except that the there is usually some kind of deeper hidden uncleanliness inside these false messiahs. This is frustrating for me to see this and be powerless to stop it. Rav Shach tried and failed. The Gra tried and failed.  What can I do?

My basic approach to this is simply to try to learn and keep Torah, but when I see this evil spreading rapidly throughout Judaism I am getting worried.

The way this works is they use consciousness traps. That it they have nice slogans and present some kind of polished public picture that makes one think they are all about good and worthy goals. Or the false messiah is given miracles from the Dark Side so he seems to be from the side of holiness. He gives good advice a few times. And  once one has decided  follow this powerful figure, then he is given some kind of directive that he ought to know is from the Dark Side. He still has free will but he chooses the darkness because of the miracles he has already seen from the false messiah.


The best way I think to avoid these problems is by avoiding cults around false messiahs. I may not be the one to organize this, but it would be  a good idea to start an anti false messiah movement.

An idea in Quantum Field Theory

It is probably just a ridiculous suggestion but here goes anyway. I am wondering if we start with Emmy Noether's theorem and put groups of fractional symmetry in the Lagrangian of QFT (Quantum Field Theory). I mean to say I have been fascinated by the idea of fractional derivatives and higher order symmetries for  awhile. So we have from Noether that for every symmetry you can put into the Lagrangian a conservation law why not just postulate symmetries and thus higher conservation laws up to any order?  What I am thinking of is not the same as translational symmetry or fractional charges like quarks.

This might sound like a ridiculous suggestion but sometimes this kind of idea gives results. Originally it was Leibniz himself who thought of fractional derivatives but he did not think the results would interesting so he did not pursue the idea. It turned out there are some interesting results. The same goes for higher orders of acceleration. The third order came up in [I forget where maybe Lorenz Abraham's theorem. I can't recall off hand.]

Further I would like to suggest the order of symmetry will have some proportionality constant  with the number of dimensions.


I really would not say anything but it is that sometimes some idea pops into my head that even to me sounds silly and then after a few years I find out that it really was a good idea.

Dr. Warren Siegel answered this:

"I'm not sure what symmetries you're thinking of, but in general if you impose too much symmetry you find that only a free theory can satisfy it."

And as for the fractional derivative he answered this:

"If by fractional derivative you mean some arbitrary noninteger power of the differential operator, the result is nonlocal (does not depend on just infinitesimally nearby points).  Locality is a basic physical property that field theory requires.  It follows from special relativity & causality."


What I am thinking is that according to the number of dimensions you have got, you have the same number of conservation laws. So for our little world we have conservation of energy and mass, electric charge, etc. In string theory we get some crumbled up dimensions for the normal 26. So what I would like to find are groups to put into the Lagrangian that will correspond to each conservation law for a different quantity. I still need to think about what kinds of groups I am looking for. But the most obvious would be those 26 simple groups I was reading about when I was studying group theory, [i.e., sporadic groups].

Dr Siegel answered to me:

"If you compactify some dimensions into a symmetric space, you'll get the symmetry of that space.

E.g., if you compactify some extra N dimensions into a submicroscopic sphere, you'll get the rotational group for those N dimensions, i.e., the orthogonal group O(N+1).

It will appear as an "internal" symmetry with respect to the uncompactified dimensions (i.e., not affecting them directly)."

So clearly I need to do some more learning and thinking. What Dr Siegel was saying I think was that all I had gotten to was the regular Orthogonal groups.

[What I am trying to do here is to put any (or all) of the sporadic groups into the Lagrangian. That is all. Nothing more. But by doing so I am hoping to get a new conservation law for each group. Then I am hoping that each law will show up in one of the crunched up dimensions of String Theory.]

Dr Siegel is in at SUNY (State University of NY) at Stony Brook,  and at the time  I wrote this I was trying to learn his book Fields.

Terrorism is in general a method of political control. It started with the Reign of Terror in France. It was used by the Bolsheviks  as a means to establish their authority. The basic idea was explained by Trotsky: if there is a reason for the arrests in the middle of the night and the sending of millions to die in the Gulags, then it is not terror. No one is scared if there are reasons. Thus we have Stalin using this idea to control the USSR. He would send orders to many cities in the USSR ordering the local KGB to arrest a certain number of people, to execute another number of people, to jail such and such a number and to send to the Gulag such and such a sum. So there was no reason for the arrests except simply to fill a quota.
Another example is in Israel where Muslims are blowing up shooting and murdering Jews pretty much on a random basis. There is never any particular reason for it except as a means of political protest. I used walk down Jaffa street every day to go the the Western Wall and one day I changed by usually routine  and it just so happened that the day I changed my route and the very time I usually was on Jaffa some Arab had gotten hold of  a sub-machine Gun and mowed down the Jews walking on the opposite side-of the street.[That was the right hand side of the street when you are walking to the Western Wall.]

That is different than taking over an empty Federal building until some grievances are solved.

Talking with God as one talks with his or her's closest friend

Talking with God as one talks with his or her's closest friend. I am sure a lot of people do this without being told. Once they hear from their parents about God being the creator of everything and that he is compassionate and he desires our being moral human beings it seems natural to automatically go to him directly to ask for guidance and help.

the best time I found for this is before going to sleep at night. but there were people that emphasized doing this more often.  We see King David clearly did this when he was in trouble and also he spent time thanking God. There was a Brother Lawrence in France who did this and wrote a bit about it also in a book called The Presence of God.

The best  idea is to go on a hike for an entire day and spend the whole day talking with God. This idea got to me and I tried doing this for some time when I first got to Israel. But sadly I did not keep up the practice. Still it seems like  a great idea and when on occasion I do this I feel I get answers.

When I was growing up in Beverly Hills we lived on the north side and there was a kind of forest in the area. And I used to do this kind of thing from time to time. There was a kind of  opening in a small groups of trees right near the main street that went up Coldwater Canyon where we lived and I used to go there and say prayers from the Jewish Prayer book and also talk to God in my own way. It is hard to do this in a big city but even at the Mir in NY I managed to find a spot where I could go and say prayers privately to God.  It is best to find a authentic Litvak Yeshiva like Ponovitch or Brisk. Private prayer should be private.

Idea in Talmud concerning the sugia in bava metzia page 104

 In בבא מציעא דף ק''ד we have this idea of דורשין לשון הדיוט. What does that mean there? The גמרא there understands this to mean we can't take a  משכון that has a larger value than the הלוואה itself. Why not? It seems to me the reason is we take the משכון out of the category of being a משכון to being bought. But that does not seem to fit the גמרא in שבועות in which the משכון if taken not at the time of הלוואה is automatically bought and owned. It is rather the משכון taken at the time of the הלוואה that רבי אליעזר and רבי עקיבא disagree about and we go by רבי עקיבא that he is considered a שומר שכר. And the רי''ף says in all cases he is a שומר שכר. So דורשין לשון הדיוט  seems to be ambiguous. You could say it means we take even the הלוואה taken at the time of the הלוואה and consider it owned and not just as a משכון. I mean that even רבי עקיבא and רבי אליעזר would agree that because of דורשין that it too would be considered bought and owned until the לווה pays back the חוב. The other way to understand this is to say that דורשין לשון הדיוט tells us to take what was a normal משכון which is already  considered bought and owned and make it into a משכון that the מלווה is just a שומר שכר for. This last way  fits the רי''ף in שבועות. But it does not fit the גמרא in בבא מציעא

oregon You can read this whole article to get the whole picture, but as far as I can see there is nothing the federal government in Washington DC touches that it does not ruin. I am 100% behind the ranchers.

The terrible ways the government has treated the ranchers is not news to me. I am all too well familiar with the corrupt hevy hand of government agencies.

There are plenty of abuses of power to see here. You can see that federal government had no problem taking over private land by destroying it by criminal actions against the bill of rights. And of course the attorney general's office will nor prosecute  the  FWS because it is  just as much a criminal organization.

I have zero sympathy for the Federal government in this case. They are point blank wrong about sentencing men to prison for a grass fire, for their criminal takeover of ranchers property against the Bill of Rights. Half of Oregon was taken over by the Fedral government by "Zakaz communist decree" methods. They simply declared that "we own it." and what every ranchers did not want to sell the government redirected rivers to flood the property of the ranchers.

Ideas in Bava Metzia

Ideas in Talmud Updated  Ideas in Bava Metzia Updated

I added some ideas in the first one and changed some things in the second.

I wish I could learn Torah but these two little booklets are about the best I can come up with. I hope you enjoy them. If you can you should find Rav Shach's Avi Ezri which is the best book on Talmud to be published in last hundred years. It is easy to understand and has amazing depth and has a tremendous feeling to it.

The area  I tried to deal with anew is in Bava Metzia page 104 and in Shavuot 44.


I updated the Ideas in Bava Metzia for  a spelling error: I hate to admit it but I wrote שני פעמים which needed to be changed to פעמיים.