Rambam (Invalid Sacrifices chapter 15)

The Rambam (Invalid Sacrifices chapter 15) says that if one slaughters a burnt offering for the sake of one who is not obligated in bringing a burnt offering, the sacrifice is valid but is not accounted as fulfilling the obligation of he who brought it because the person he brought it for had certainly transgressed a positive command at one time of another. Rav Shach answer this by brining the case of one who brings a sin offering of fat for a sin offering of blood. The connection and answer of Rav Shach was not clear to me at first. But now I would like to explain what Rav Shach intends. there is an argument between Rava and Rav Acha [Menachot page 3 and Zevachim page 9 ] about this last case. to Rava it is valid and not to Rav Acha. Rav Shach derives from this that something can be in a middle state in which change of name does not apply but neither does change of owner. For in this case the name was sin offering and still it is. and it is not a change in owner. So Rava says it is valid. Rav Acha says change of owner does not mean change of owner, but rather it means a change in the question for who or for what is this sacrifice is brought. That is not change of holiness which means change in name of the sacrifice. So what is left? Change of owner which does not mean literally change for one person to another, but also includes change in purpose. But this Rav Shach answers the question on the Rambam. The Rambam seems to imply if one brought a burnt offering for one who was never transgressed positive command that would fulfill his obligation. Why? Is it not change of owner? Rav Shach answers change of owner does not infer this in a narrow sense, but rather change in purpose. The purpose of the sacrifice might be for different reasons. It might be for the sake of someone else. It might be for a different sin than the one the animal was meant to atone for. After all, in this later case there is not change of name from one kind of sacrifice to another [e.g., from a burnt offering to a Passover offering] and there is no change in owner. So why would Rav Acha says it not valid. This has to be from the verse about change of owner. This a burnt offering brought for one who was never obligated in a burnt offering is not a change in purpose because it has no purpose at all. Thus it would be valid if not for the fact that everyone transgressed a positive command at one time or anther.it is like slaughtering a sin offering for the sake of chulin [not a sacrifice]. There is no name that can be applied therefore it is valid. the problem I see in this is the case of the sin offering is different. There the name of the sacrifice is the same and the only difference is it is coming for a different sin which is a different purpose. but in out case with the burnt offering the anima is being brought for some who is not the owner and so it should because it is a clear case of change of owner even if the name of the sacrifice remains.--------------------the רמב’’ם says that if one slaughters a קרבן עולה for the sake of one who is not obligated in bringing a קרבן עולה, the sacrifice is valid but is not accounted as fulfilling the obligation of he who brought it because the person he brought it for had certainly transgressed a positive command at one time of another. רב שך answer this by bringing the case of one who brings a קרבן חטאת of חלב for aעל דם קרבן חטאת . The connection and answer of רב שך was not clear to me at first. But now I would like to explain what רב שך intends. There is an argument between רבא and רב אחא about this last case היינוone who brings a קרבן חטאת of חלב for aעל דם קרבן חטאת. To רבא it is valid and not to רב אחא. רב שך derives from this that something can be in a middle state in which change of name does not apply but neither does שינוי בעלים. For in this case the name was קרבן חטאת and still it is. and it is not a change in owner. So רבא says it is valid. רב אחא says שינוי בעלים does not mean שינוי בעליםship but rather it means a change in the question for who or for what is this sacrifice is brought. That is not שינוי קודש which means change in name of thesacrifice, So what is left שינוי בעלים which does not mean literally change for one person to another but also includes change in purpose. but this רב שך answers the question of the רמב’’ם. the רמב’’ם seems to imply if one bright a קרבן עולה for one who was never transgressed positive command would fulfill his obligation רמב''ם answers שינוי בעלים does not infer this in a narrow sense, but rather change in purpose. The purpose of the sacrifice might be for different reasons. It might be for the sake of someone else. It might be for a different sin than the one the animal was meant to atone for. After all, in this later case there is no change of name from one kind of sacrifice to another [e.g. from a קרבן עולה to a פסח] and there is no change in owner. So why would רב אחא says it not valid It has to be from the verse about שינוי בעלים. Therefore a קרבן עולה brought for one who was never obligated in a קרבן עולה is not a change in purpose because it has no purpose at all. Thus it would be valid if not for the fact that everyone transgressed a positive command at one time or another. It is like slaughtering a קרבן חטאת for the sake of chulin [not a sacrifice]. There is no name that can be applied therefore it is valid. the problem I see in this is the case of the קרבן חטאת is different. There the name of the sacrifice is the same and the only difference is it is coming for a different sin which is a different purpose. but in out case with the קרבן עולה the animal is being brought for some who is not the owner and so it should because it is a clear case of שינוי בעלים even if the name of the sacrifice remains.