Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
16.3.26
I was coming back from the sea shore and it occurred to me the basic approach of Rav Shach concerning Bava Metzia page 3. The main question is this. The Rambam brings both the first Mishna in Bava Metzia and the Mishna about the third hundred with no further explanation and leaves out the fact that the Gemara finds these two Mishnayot to be in contradiction one with the other and leaves out the answer of the Gemara. I think that the main point of Rav Shach is that the mishna about two are holding a garment is a case of certainty, and that in any case of certainty the law would be to divide. So, what then is the difference between this and the third hundred? It is that two are holding and they are certain, while the other is that one is holding for them and there is a doubt. The difference is that when two are holding, it is certain which half belongs to whom, but with the third hundred it is uncertain. There is a doubt, and therefore the third hundred stays in its place. But then the question is from the boat in Bava Batra page 34 where we say who ever us stronger, gets it. There also there is a doubt to whom it belongs. But there no one is holding it for them. This is different from the answer to the same question of Rav Nachum of the Mir who holds the answer to this problem in the Rambam is this. The Gemara is asking in Bava Metzia what is the difference between the two mishnayot because it holds like Rav Papa in Bava Batra who holds if we hold, we do let go even in the case of a doubt. Thus, the Gemara in Bava Metzia had no way of answering that the third party is holding the third hundred for them because he would have had to let it go anyway. It had to be because the division would not have been according to objective reality. But the law is if we hold, we do not let go. Thus, the Rambam had no reason to bring the answer of the Gemara in Bava Metzia.---------------------I know that rav Isar meltzer (the father in law of Rav Shach and Rav Ahron Kotler )held that the case when two people are holding a garment and each one claims it is his that the law is that there is a doubt if each half belongs to each one. This is from doubt, not from certainty. I think the reason is because in the mishna the law is each one takes an oath. That is a oath of the Mishna not the oath that as instituted later in the time of the amoraim that one swears without a sefer Torah in order to be absolved from a claim. Eg lets say a person is holding a garment and someone else comes up to him and claims it is his. the first one takes this later oath called shvuat heset. The reason is the garment definitely belongs to the first one. What is in a person’s domain we assume belongs to him. But that is not the claim of our mishna. in our mishna the oath is shvuat hamishna which is for a case when there is doubt.-----However, Rav Shach holds that the case of two holding a garment is that where each one is a certainty. and there is a way to understand this. That is based on the gemara on page three where the gemara asks on the case of two holding a garment that divide it from the case of the third hundred where it stays in its place. The gemara says the difference is where they divide the division might be correct because they might have picked up the lost object together. There also R. Jose said no one gets anything because if the only result of the doubt was that the third hundred stays in its place, “Then what would the liar lose?” Then gemara then asks but what would Sumchos say about the case of our Mishna? (For Sumchos holds, “Money in doubt is divided with no oath.” So, why is there an oath in our Mishna I it is going like Sumchos? The gemara answer that R. Yochanan already explained that the oath in our Mishna is a decree of the sages so that we do not end up in a situation where anyone can go and grab a garment of his fellow man and we would say to divide. Thus, if R Yochanan is applicable to the opinion of the sages also (who disagree with Sumchos and hold one who takes out of the domain of someone else needs a proof, then our mishna is also talking about a case where we assume each person holding the garment owns that half by a certainty, not by doubt. That is to say, this oath was instituted before the oath instituted by the Amoraim (shvuat heset) even on a case of certainty.------------------------------------------[[[[[I was coming back from the sea shore and it occurred to me the basic approach of רב שך concerning בבא מציעא page ג'. The main question is this. The רמב’’ם brings both the first משנה in בבא מציעא and the משנה about the third hundred with no further explanation and leaves out the fact that the גמרא finds these two משניות to be in contradiction one with the other and leaves out the answer of the גמרא. I think that the main point of רב שך is that the משנה about two are holding a garment is a case of certainty and that in any case of certainty the law would be to divide. So, what then is the difference between this and the third hundred? It is that two are holding and certain, while the other is that one is holding for them. The difference is that when two are holding it is certain which half belongs to whom, but with the third hundred it is uncertain. There is a doubt and they are not holding it, and therefore the third hundred stays in its place. But then the question is from the boat in בבא בתרא page ל''ד where we say who ever us stronger, gets it. There also there is a doubt to who it belongs. But there no one is holding it for them. This is different from the answer to the same question of רב נחום of the מיר who holds the answer to this problem in the רמב’’ם is this. The גמרא is asking in בבא מציעא what is the difference between the two משניות because it holds like רב פפא in בבא בתרא who holds if we hold, we do let go even in the case of a doubt אי תפסינן מפקינן. Thus, the גמרא in בבא מציעא had no way of answering that the third party is holding the third hundred for them because he would have had to let it go anyway. It had to be because the division would not have been according to objective reality. But the law is if we hold, we do not let go אי תפסינן לא מפקינן. Thus, the רמב’’ם had no reason to bring the answer of the גמרא in Bava Metzia. Background information. If two people ae holding a garment, they divide it. If one person holds a hundred for one person and two hundred for the other, the third hundred and forgotten whom is what, the law is the third hundred stays in its place. But to the Rambam, both cases are considered as if both people are holding the sum total the third case is that of a boat that two people hold is theirs alone. whoever is stronger gets it. The court offers no opinion about what it cannot determine---------------------------------
I know that רב איסר מלצר held that the case when two people are holding a garment and each one claims it is his that the law is that there is a doubt if each half belongs to each one. This is from doubt, not from certainty. I think the reason is because in the משנה the law is each one takes an oath. That is an oath of the משנה ,not the oath that as instituted later in the time of the אמורים that one swears without a ספר תורה in order to be absolved from a claim. E.g., let’s say a person is holding a garment and someone else comes up to him and claims it is his. the first one takes this later oath called שבועת היסת. The reason is the garment definitely belongs to the first one. What is in a person’s domain we assume belongs to him. But that is not the claim of our משנה. In our משנה, the oath is שבועת המשנהwhich is for a case when there is doubt.---------
However, רב שך holds that the case of two holding a garment is that where each one is a certainty. and there is a way to understand this. That is based on the גמרא on page three where the גמרא asks on the case of two holding a ferment that divide it from the case of the third hundred where it stays in its place. The גמרא says the difference is where they divide the division might be correct because they might have picked up the lost object together. There also ר' יוסי said no one gets anything because if the only result of the doubt was that the third hundred stays in its place, “Then what would the liar lose?” Then גמרא then asks but what would סומכוס say about the case of our משנה? (For סומכוס holds, “Money in doubt is divided with no oath.” So, why is there an oath in our משנה I it is going like סומכוס? The גמרא answer that ר’ יוחנן already explained that the oath in our משנה is a decree of the sages so that we do not end up in a situation where anyone can go and grab a garment of his fellow man and we would say to divide. Thus, if ר’ יוחנן is applicable to the opinion of the חכמים also (who disagree with סומכוס and hold one who takes out of the domain of someone else needs a proof, then our משנה is also talking about a case where we assume each person holding the garment owns that half by a certainty, not by doubt. That is to say, this oath was instituted before the oath instituted by the אמוראים (שבועת היסת) even on a case of certainty.
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