Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
11.3.26
I would like to suggest that the גמראholds that the first Mishna in Bava Metzia is like Sumchos. This assumption of the Gemara would be based on the fact that most Stam Mishnas [Mishnas without name] in Bava Kama, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra all are like Sumchos. Yet the Gemara also tries to find a way in each case to show that the Sages (Rabanan) could also hold with the law (din) of that Mishna. The reason the Gemara would want to do this is because Shmuel said: "The law is like the Rabanan (opposed to Sumchos)" and the law is like Shmuel in dinim (monetary laws). The significance of this idea is that it answers a question on the Rambam. The Rambam wrote the law of the first mishna in Bava Metzia where they are holding the garment they divide it, and also the law about the third hundred where if they disagree, the third hundred stays with the person it was guarded by. The Gemara brings this second case as a question on the first case. Why in the first case they divide and as opposed to this in the second case they leave the garment where it was. Yet the Rambam brings both laws, and does not give the answer of the Gemara that in the case of our Mishna, "The division might be true". I would like to suggest that the Rambam [and Rabbainu Chnanel and the Ri Migash] understood that Gemara is going like Sumchos, and since that law of Sumchos is not the halacha, he therefore held that a different answer must be the right answer, that is "holding is different". And how can Rambam know that same answer would not work for Sumchos? Answer it is going like the Gemara page one hundred side A, where the Gemara asks, “Let us go and see in whose domain the animal is in,"and the Gemara answersm, “Rather, It is like Sumchos." That means to say that to Sumchos, the fact that the object is held by two people does not raise or diminish the claim each one has the object. Thus the answer to the question, ""Let's go and see" the gemara retracks from its original answer and now claims that even seeing in whose domain the animal is in would not help any side since we are going like sumchos who holds money in doubt is divided.----------------------------------I would like to suggest that the גמראholds that the first משנה in בבא מציעא is like סומכוס. This assumption of the גמרא would be based on the fact that most סתם משניות [משניות without name] in בבא קמא, בבא מציעא, and בבא בתרא all are like סומכוס. Yet the גמרא also tries to find a way in each case to show that the חכמים (רבנן) could also hold with the law (דין) of that משנה. The reason the גמרא would want to do this is because שמואל said: "The law is like the רבנן (opposed to סומכוס)" and the law is like שמואל in דיניםmonetary laws). The significance of this idea is that it answers a question on the רמב’’ם. The רמב’’ם wrote the law of the first משנה in בבא מציעא where they are holding the garment they divide it, and also the law about the third hundred where if they disagree, the third hundred stays with the person it was guarded by. The גמרא brings this second case as a question on the first case. Why in the first case they divide and as opposed to this in the second case they leave the garment where it was. Yet the רמב’’ם brings both laws, and does not give the answer of the גמרא that in the case of our משנה, "The division might be true". I would like to suggest that the רמב’’ם [and ר' חננאל and the ר''י מיגאש] understood that גמרא is going like סומכוס, and since that law of סומכוס is not the הלכה, he therefore held that a different answer must be the right answer, that is "אוחזים שונה". And how can רמב’’ם know that same answer would not work for סומכוס? Answer it is going like theק' ע''א גמרא, where the גמרא asks, “Let us go and see in whose domain the animal is in," and the גמרא answers, “Rather, It is like סומכוס." That means to say that, to סומכוס, the fact that the object is held by two people does not raise nor diminish the claim each one has in the object. Thus, the answer to the question, ""Let's go and see" the גמרא retracks from its original answer, and now claims that even seeing in whose domain the animal is in would not help any side since we are going like סומכוס who holds money in doubt is divided.
