There are a few questions I would like to bring up about the subject in Bava Kama page 18 and 22 with the dog, loaf and coal. One thing is that that Gemara goes back and forth as to why the obligation for the burning of the stack is 1/2 to the tana of the Mishna and full payment according to R. Elazar. It starts out that it is because of pebbles, then goes the horn of a tame ox (that goes wild), and goes back to pebbles. But then because of Rava having a question about warning on pebbles, the Gemara has to conclude that the case is in fact that of a tame ox. So then why later on page 22, the Gemara assumes the obligation is because of fire? You might want to answer that the obligation ought not be because of fire because it is the dog that is doing it, not a person. But then, why later say it is because of fire? Maybe you might say it is because of Reish Lakish who holds the obligation of fire is on the person that owns the fire. So perhaps the solution to our problem here is that the owner of the dog is obligated because of horn of a tame ox on the path of the coal (when the dog dragged the coal over the stack), and for the burning of the stack that will be paid by the owner of the coal? And then it makes sense to say that the owner of the dog is not obligated for the burning of the stack, only the path of the coal, . This I think is close to Tosphot that the obligation is shared by the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal. ______________________________________________________________________________________ There are a few questions I would like to bring up about the subject inבבא קמא page י''ח and כ''ב with the dog, loaf and coal. One thing is that that Gemara goes back and forth as to why the obligation for the burning of the stack is 1/2 to the תנא of the משנה and full payment according to ר’ אלעזר. It starts out that it is because of צרורות, then goes the horn of a tame ox (that goes wild) קרן התם ברשות הניזק, and goes back to צרורות. But then because of רבא having a question about warning on צרורות (אבנים קטנות), the גמרא has to conclude that the case is that of a קרן התם ברשות הניזק. So then why later on page כ''ב, the גמרא assumes the obligation is because of fire? You might want to answer that the obligation ought not be because of fire because it is the dog that is doing it, not a person. But then, why later say it is because of fire? Maybe you might say it is because of ריש לקיש who holds the obligation of fire is on the person that owns the fire. So perhaps the solution to our problem here is that the owner of the dog is obligated because of horn of a שור תם on the path of the coal (when the dog dragged the coal over the stack), and for the burning of the stack that will be paid by the owner of the coal? And then it makes sense to say that the owner of the dog is not obligated for the burning of the stack, only the path of the coal. This I think is close to תוספות that the obligation is shared by the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal.