In the Bible we have the incident of Abraham fighting some kings in the Jordan valley because they had taken Lot [son of his brother, Haran]. Two of those kings were the king of Babylon, and another was the king of Persia. The basic event was that they wanted to expand their empires into the Jordan valley, so they took prisoner the kings that ruled there. Abraham heard about this in Chevron, and went to rescue Lot. I would like to suggest that none of these kings were Canaanites. Rather I think that after that war, and after the destruction of Sodom, then the Canaanites moved into that area. It says that Lot stayed in the Jordan valley and Abraham stayed in the land of Canaan. So clearly these are two separate areas.

Wandering of Abraham in the land of Israel. I think Beer Sheva was an oasis, not owned by anyone at the time; not the Philistines nor the Canaanites.

My thought on the wandering of Abraham in the land of Israel. Abraham first got to the land of Canaan through Schem and then stayed at that latitude for a while and then made his way down south. Then he was in Egypt for a few months and then came back into the south of Israel and then went back up to that same middle area of Israel around Schem. {You can see this because he was between Ai and Beit El- Beit El on the West and Ai on the East; and we know that Ai was near Jericho also in the middle of Israel} Then Lot went to the Jordan valley. At that point I think the Jordan valley was not part of the land of Canaan, but rather was ruled by four kings who were not Canaanites. [Later the Canaanites took over that area after that those kings were defeated by Abraham and his men, and also that area was largely destroyed when God rained down on it salt and sulfur and some kind of fire that caused that whole area to up in smoke so high up that it could be seen from Hevron –way down South ] But Abraham then stayed in Canaan. Then he fought those kings and returned to live in Hevron. (He was in Hebron even before that war with the kings.) Then there was the incident with the destruction of Sodom, and then Abraham went to the land of the Philistines around present day Netivot. But then Abimelech took Sara, but returned her, and she gave birth to Isaac, and then Hagar [Abraham’s concubine] was thrown out and wandered in the desert of Beer Sheva. So, Abraham was no longer in Gerar [Netivot], but somewhere closer to Beer Sheva. Then Abimelech came to Abraham and they made a peace deal and called that place Beer Sheva and then Abimelech returned to the land of the Philistines (Plishtim). Then it say, "Abraham dwelt in the land of the Philistines many days." If Abimelech returned to the land of the Philistines, then Beer Sheva was not in the land of the Philistines. But then, if Abraham was in Beer Sheva, how was he in the land of the Philistines (plishtim) many days? I think Abraham was wandering between Beer Sheva and Netivot. I think Beer Sheva was an oasis, not owned by anyone at the time. Not the Philistines, nor the Canaanites. Later during the time of Isaac, I think the Canaanites settled that oasis and made it into a city

הרמב''ן על בבא קמא דף כ''ט ע''א. כשעיינתי ברמב''ן, עלה בדעתי שאולי תוספות והרמב''ן אומרים את אותה גישה בסיסית לאמירה של אביי שר' מאיר ור' יהודה חלוקים בשני דברים. אם כן, אז גישה זו לתוספות אינה דומה למהרש''א, ולא דומה למהרש''ל. למהרש''א אומרים התוספות שלר' יהודה ישנן שתי דרכים שלא להתחייב כשנושא חבית והיא נופלת וגורמת נזק. דרך אחת לא להיות אחראי היא אם הוא נוטש אותה, והדרך השנייה היא אם המעידה הייתה במקרה (אונס). עבור ר' מאיר ישנן שתי דרכים להיות אחראי. דרך אחת היא לא לנטוש את החבית, והשנייה היא אם המעידה הייתה ברשלנות. עבור המהרש''ל, משמעות התוספת היא שבזמן הנפילה המשתנה היחיד שחשוב הוא הטיעון הרגיל האם המעידה היא באונס (ר' יהודה) או ברשלנות (ר' מאיר). לאחר הנפילה, המשתנה היחיד שמשפיע הוא אם הוא נוטש את החפץ. אבל לרמב''ן יש גישה שונה ואני חושב שזו משמעות התוספת. עבור הרמב''ן, הגישה של ר' יהודה היא שאם הנפילה הייתה באונס, אז אם הוא נוטש את החפץ, הוא לא אחראי. אבל אם הוא לא נוטש אותו, אז הוא אחראי (כמו ר' מאיר). גם התוספות וגם הרמב"ן מביאים הוכחה לרעיון זה ממקרה של שור שנכנס לחצר של אדם וחופר בור, שבעל החצר אחראי למרות שלא חפר את הבור וגם לא רצה בו. לכן ר' יהודה ור' מאיר חלוקים בדעותיהם רק לגבי המקרה ההפוך, כאשר הנפילה הייתה ברשלנות והוא נטש את החפץ. לר' מאיר הוא אחראי, ור' יהודה חולק על דעתו. בכך מסתיימת אמירתי על התוספות כרגע. עם זאת, אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שהרי"ף נוקט בגישה הפוכה. הוא אומר שר' יהודה מסכים עם ר' מאיר כאשר הנפילה הייתה ברשלנות, והוא נטש את החפץ. במקרה זה, גם ר' יהודה וגם ר' מאיר מסכימים שהוא אחראי,(מפקיר נזקיו אחר נפילת פשיעה) וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא אם הנפילה היית האונס, ועדיין הוא לא נטש את החפץ____ברצוני להוסיף כאן שבגמרא דף כ"ט ע"ב ר' יוחנן אמר שמי שנוטש את חפצו (שיכול לגרום נזק) אחראי ור' אושעיה אמר שאינו אחראי. אם נלמד כמו המהרש''ל, דברי אביי קשורים ישירות לטענה זו. מצד שהחפץ כבר נמצא על הקרקע, הדבר היחיד שחשוב הוא הטענה בין ר' יוחנן לר' אושעיה, כלומר, כאשר הוא נוטש אותו, האם הוא אחראי או לא? אבל אם נלמד כמו המהרש''א, דברי אביי אינם קשורים כלל לטענות אלו. אפשר לקבוע שנטישה לאחר נפילה באונס אינה אחראית, אבל באופן כללי נטישה תהיה אחראית מכיוון שיש רק גורם אחד שיפוטר אותו. אפשר לקבוע שנטישת חפץ לאחר נפילה ברשלנות היא אחראית, אך באופן כללי נטישת חפץ אינה אחראית

Ramban on Bava Kama page 29 a

I was at the local Lithuanian Beit Midrash at night and had a chance to look at the Ramban on Bava Kama page 29 a. As I was looking at the Ramban, it occurred to me that perhaps Tosphot and the Ramban are saying the same basic approach to the statement of Abaye that "R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about two things." If so, then this approach to Tosphot is not like the Maharsha, nor like the Maharhal. To the Maharsha, the Tosphot is saying that to R. Judah there are two ways of being not liable (when one is carrying a barrel and it drops and causes damage). One way to be not liable is if he abandons it, and the other way is if the stumbling was by accident. To R Meir there are two ways of being liable. One way is to not abandon the barrel, and the other is if the stumbling was by negligence. To the Maharshal, the meaning of Tosphot is that at the time of the fall, the only variable that matters is the regular argument of if stumbling is by accident (R. Judah) or by negligence (R. Meir). After the fall, the only variable that makes a difference is if he abandons the object. But the Ramban has a different approach, and I think this is what Tosphot means. To the Ramban, the approach of R. Judah is if the fall was by accident, then if he abandons the object, he is not liable. But if he does not abandon it, then he is liable. Both Tosphot and the Ramban bring a proof to this idea from the case of an ox entering one’s courtyard and dig a hole the owner of the courtyard is liable even though he did not dig the hole nor want it. Therefore R. Judah and R. Meir disagree only about the opposite case of when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. To R. Meir he is liable and R. Judah disagree. That is the end of what I have to say about Tosphot at the present time[A proof that Tosphot holds the same as the Ramban is that the Rosh brings a statement from Rabainu Izhak that if the fall was by accident and yet he did not abandon the object, he is liable and Tosphot in general is Rabainu Izhakk ] However, I want to add here that the Rif has the opposite approach to R. Judah. He says that R. Judah agrees with R. Meir when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. In this case, both R. Judah and R. Meir agree he is liable, and the only difference between them is if the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object. I would like to add here that later in the Gemara page 29 b R Yochanan said one who abandons his object (that can cause damage) is liable and R Oshiya said he is not liable. If we learn like the Maharshal, the statement of Abaye is directly related to this argument. On the side that the object is already on the ground, the only thing that matters is this argument between R Yochanan and R Oshiya, i.e., when he abandons it, if is he liable or not? But if we learn like the Maharsha, the statement of Abaye is not connected with this other argument at all. One could hold abandoning after a fall by accident is not liable, but in general abandoning would be liable since there is only one factor that would absolve him. One could hold abandoning one’s object after a fall by negligence is liable, but that in general abandoning some object would be not liable. ------------------------------------------------the רמב’’ן on בבא קמא כ''ט ע''א page. As I was looking at the רמב’’ן, it occurred to me that perhaps תוספות and the רמב’’ן are saying the same basic approach to the statement of אביי that ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. If so, then this approach to תוספות is not like the מהרש’’א, nor like the מהרש’’ל. To the מהרש’’א, the תוספות is saying that to ר' יהודה there are two ways of being not liable when one is carrying a barrel and it drops and causes damage. One way to be not liable is if he abandons it, and the other way is if the stumbling was by accident. To ר’ מאיר there are two ways of being liable. One way is to not abandon the barrel, and the other is if the stumbling was by negligence. To the מהרש’ל, the meaning of תוספות is that at the time of the fall the only variable that matters is the regular argument of if stumbling is by accident (ר’ יהודה) or by negligence (ר’ מאיר). After the fall, the only variable that makes a difference is if he abandons the object. But the רמב’’ן has a different approach and I think this is what תוספות means. To the רמב’’ן, the approach of ר’ יהודה is if the fall was by accident, then if he abandons the object, he is not liable. But if he does not abandon it, then he is liable. Both תוספות and the רמב’’ן bring a proof to this idea from the case of an ox entering one’s courtyard and dig a hole the owner of the courtyard is liable even though he did not dig the hole, nor want it. Therefore ר’ יהודה and ר’ מאיר disagree only about the opposite case of when the fall was by negligence and yet he abandoned the object. To ר’ מאיר he is liable and ר’ יהודה disagree. That is the end of what I have to say about תוספות at the present time.([A proof that תוספות holds the same as the רמב''ן is that the רא''ש brings a statement from רבינו יצחק (הר''י) that if the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, he is liable and תוספות in general is רבינו יצחק) However, I want to add here that the רי''ף has the opposite approach. He says that ר’ יהודה agrees with ר’ מאיר when the fall was by negligence, and yet he abandoned the object. In this case, both ר’ יהודה and ר’ מאיר agree he is liable, and the only difference between them is if the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object.------- I would like to add here that later in the גמרא page כ''ט ע''ב ר' יוחנן said one who abandons his object (that can cause damage) is liable and ר' אושעיה said he is not liable. If we learn like the מהרש''ל, the statement of אביי is directly related to this argument. On the side that the object is already on the ground, the only thing that matters is this argument between ר' יוחנן and ר' אושעיה, i.e., when he abandons it, if is he liable or not? But if we learn like the מהרש''א, the statement of אביי is not connected with this other argument at all. One could hold abandoning after a fall by accident is not liable, but in general abandoning would be liable since there is only one factor that would absolve him. One could hold abandoning one’s object after a fall by negligence is liable, but that in general abandoning some object would be not liable.

realize that there is a problem with worship people. if you look at the general gist of the Old Testament you will see that there is a specific emphasis on worship of God alone and depending on God alone. There are on occasion hint of some kind of mediator when you have moses prying for the people but that is more of a factor that does not come into the main scheme of things where the emphasis is on the importance of approaching God alone. You ee this pretty clearly with Elijah the prophet on mount Carmel where he told the people if the Lord is God, then worship him. If the Baal is god, then worship him. Make up your minds. After the fire came down from heaven, the people exclaimed the Lord is God the Lord is God

ברצוני לענות על השאלה ששאלתי בתוספות לפני מספר ימים בבבא קמא דף כ''ט ע''ב. הסיבה שתוספות מניחה שתחילת הברייתא מדברת על מקרה שבו הנפילה לא הייתה באשמתו היא שזו ההנחה בנקודה זו של הטיעון. [(שברייתה אומר שאם הכד שלו נשבר והוא לא הרים אותה, ר' מאיר אמר שהוא אחראי ור' יהודה אמר שלא)] ר' יוחנן אמר שהם חלוקים בדעותיהם לאחר זמן הנפילה. בנקודה זו הגמרא מציעה שבמהלך זמן הנפילה שניהם מסכימים שהוא אינו אחראי. זו הסיבה שתוספות גורסת בנקודה זו של הטיעון שהגמרא מניחה שהוא לא היה באשמתו. לאחר מכן שואלת התוספות שאם אכן תחילת הברייתא מדברת על מקרה של תאונה טהורה [אונס], אז תהיה סתירה בר' מאיר. כי כאן הוא אומר שאחרי נפילה בתאונה [אונס] הוא אחראי, בעוד שבסוף אותה בריאתה הוא אומר שאחרי נפילה בתאונה (וכלי שלו גרם נזק) הוא לא יהיה אחראי. לכן, בחלק הבא של הגמרא, שבו הגמרא מציעה שבמהלך הנפילה שניהם מסכימים שהוא אחראי, בנקודה זו נניח שתחילת הברייתא מדברת על מקרה של נפילה עקב רשלנות ושר' יהודה יסכים שהוא אחראי

I would like to answer the question I asked on Tophot a few days ago in Bava Kama page 29b. The reason Tosphot assumes the beginning of the braita is talking about a case in which the fall was not his fault is that that is the assumption at this point in the argument. [(That braita says if his jar broken and he did not pick it up, R Meir said he is liable and R Judah said no)] R Yochanan said they disagree after the time of the fall. At this point the Gemara suggests that during the time of the fall both agree that he is not liable. That is why Tosphot holds at this point in the argument that the Gemara assumes he fall was not because of his fault. Then the Tosphot asks that if in fact that beginning of the braita would be talking about a case of pure accident, then there would be a contradiction in R Meir. For here he would be saying after a fall by accident he is liable, while in the end of this same braita he says that after a fall by accident (and his vessels caused damage) that he would not be liable. So, in the next part of the Gemara where the Gemara suggests that during the fall both agree he is liable, at that point we would assume the beginning of the braita is talking about a case of a fall because of negligence and that there R Judah would agree he is liable

Gaza in the time of Abraham the patriarch was the land of the Phoenicians

Gaza in the time of Abraham the patriarch was the land of the Phoenicians [not Canaan]. But there is a promise to give to Abraham, “these lands”—not just the land of Canaan. And there is another promise to give him the land of Canaan. And there is another promise to give to him all the land from the Nile until the Euphrates. But, in any case, the actual land that is defined in the Book of Numbers chapter 34 includes Gaza. And in fact, Gaza was a part of Israel after the tribe of Judah conquered it after the time of Joshua [as brought in the first chapter of the Book of Judges.] [But that might mean only Gaza and Ashkelon. There were a few other cities that perhaps they did not conquer.] Also, incidentally, Jerusalem was also settled by the tribe of Simon who lived there with the Jebusi [one of the Canaanite nations] who were already there. This raises the question: in dividing the land of Israel. Gaza was not conquered yet [in the time of Joshua]. So, to which tribe should it belong? And furthermore, if an area needs to be conquered before it can be designated to belong to any one tribe, who could Jerusalem belong to? Benjamin and Judah? But no one had it during the time of Joshua; and later only, Simon settled it. Oddly enough, Sidon was the city of the first born of Canaan, and yet is not included in the seven Canaanite nations that Israel was commanded to destroy. [Deuteronomy chapter 7] It eventually became the major center of the Phoenicians. After that, the major center of the Phoenician became Carthage. They were the pirates of the Mediterranean Sea until Rome wiped them of the map. Abraham the Patriarch first entered Israel in the middle around Schem. And after he was forced to go to Egypt (because of a famine), he returned to that same area as it says, “he dwelt between Ai and Beit El. Beit El was on the West [by the sea] and Ai was on the East. We know where Ai was because that was the second city conquered by Joshua. so it was right in the middle of Israel. and it say that Abraham was right between these two cities one on the West and the other on the East. That sounds like it means they are in a horizontal line. -----Abraham eventually got to Hevron as it says, “He was sitting in the area of the oak trees of Mamre,” and later in Genisis it identifies the area of Mamre with Hevron. --- But Abraham made his way down south and eventually was in the land of the Philistines. Then the king of the Philistines (Avimeleh) kidnapped Sarah, and after a dream he gave her back to Abraham. You can see right after that Abraham left that area [around Gerar which is a drop north of Netivot ] and went directly to Beer Sheba. You know this because right after the event with the taking and giving back of Sara, Sarah gave birth to Isaac and immediately after that sara saw Hagar with her on and told Abraham to get rid of her, and she was sent out and wandered in the desert of Beer Sheva. So, Abraham in Beer Sheva at that time. ---When Abraham was in Beer Sheva, Lot went to the Jordan Valley because it was lush and fruitful and that was where Sodom was. So, when God destroyed Sodom, it says that Abraham got up in the morning and looked toward that area and the smoke was rising from it like an oven. That means he was looking north from Hevron. The only way he could have seen the smoke rising from Sodom was if the cloud cover was rising about 15 km high or more (I think). I was also thinking that perhaps Beer Sheva was an oasis in a desert when Abraham first got there, because the first time Abraham and Avimelech (king of the Philistines) made a covenant with each other it never says that they went to Abraham [like it says later with Isaac]. Rather it just says they spoke with him to make a covenant and they called that place Beer Sheva. So, Beer Sheva was not a city yet. It was just a place where there was spring and trees. it was not yet Canaan nor Philistines. And right there it says Abraham wandered in the land of the Philistines many days. probably, later the Canaanites took over Beer Sheva and settled it and made it a city. So, by the time of Isaac, when Isaac decided he had had enough trouble in the land of the Philistines, he left and went to Beer Sheva. So, by that time, it was Canaan, and then Avimelech went to him out of the land of the Philistines into the land of Canaan to come to an agreement with Isaac. --- At any rate, now that we know that Beit El is right up in the middle of Israel [not down South] around Jericho therefore when Isaac told Jacob to Laban in Padan Aram he first went up to Beit El, not directly East. I think the kings that fought with Abraham were not Canaanites because Lot went there and Abraham stayed in Canaan. ____________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________ עזה בתקופת אברהם הייתה ארץ פלישתים [לא כנען]. אבל יש הבטחה לתת לאברהם, "הארצות האלה" - לא רק ארץ כנען. ויש הבטחה נוספת לתת לו את ארץ כנען. ויש הבטחה נוספת לתת לו את כל הארץ מהנילוס ועד הפרת. אבל, בכל מקרה, הארץ עצמה שמוגדרת בפרק ל"ד במדבר כוללת את עזה. ולמעשה, עזה הייתה חלק מישראל לאחר ששבט יהודה כבש אותה לאחר ימי יהושע [כפי שמובא בפרק הראשון של ספר שופטים] [אבל זה יכול להיות רק עזה ואשקלון]. היו עוד כמה ערים שאולי הם לא כבשו.] כמו כן, אגב, ירושלים גם הייתא מיושב על ידי שבט שמעון שחי שם עם היבוסים [אחד מעמי הכנען] שכבר היו שם. זה מעלה את השאלה: בחלוקת ארץ ישראל, עזה עדיין לא נכבשה [בימי יהושע]. אז, לאיזה שבט היא צריכה להשתייך? ויתרה מכך, אם יש צורך לכבוש אזור לפני שניתן יהיה להגדירו כשייך לשבט אחד, למי ירושלים יכולה להשתייך? לבנימין וליהודה? אבל לאף אחד לא היה את זה בימי יהושע; ורק מאוחר יותר ששמעון יישב אותה. --- למרבה הפלא, צידון הייתה עיר בכור כנען, אך היא אינה כלולה בין שבע עמי הכנען שישראל נצטווה להשמיד. [דברים פרק ז'] בסופו של דבר היא הפכה למרכז העיקרי של פלישתים. --- אברהם נכנס לראשונה לישראל באמצע, בסביבות שכם. ואחרי שנאלץ ללכת למצרים (בגלל רעב), הוא חזר לאותו אזור כפי שכתוב, "וישב בין עי ובין בית אל. ובית אל הייתה במערב [על יד הים] ועי במזרח." אנו יודעים היכן הייתה עי כי זו הייתה העיר השנייה שנכבשה על ידי יהושע. כך שהיא הייתה באמצע ישראל. ונאמר שאברהם ישב בין שתי הערים הללו, אחת במערב והשנייה במזרח. זה נשמע כאילו זה אומר שהן בקו אופקי. -----אברהם הגיע בסופו של דבר לחברון כפי שכתוב, "והיה יושב באלוני ממרא", ומאוחר יותר בבראשית מזהה את אזור ממרא עם חברון. --- אבל אברהם עשה את דרכו דרומה ובסופו של דבר היה בארץ הפלשתים. אז מלך הפלשתים (אבימלך) חטף את שרה ואלוהים ענה אותו, ולכן החזיר אותה לאברהם. אתם יכולים לראות שמיד לאחר מכן אברהם עזב את האזור הזה [סביב גרר, שנמצאת טיפה צפונית לנתיבות] והלך ישירות לבאר שבע. אתם יודעים זאת כי מיד לאחר האירוע עם לקיחתה והחזרתה של שרה, שרה ילדה את יצחק ומיד לאחר מכן שרה ראתה את הגר ואמרה לאברהם להיפטר ממנה, והיא נשלחה ונדדה במדבר באר שבע. אז, אברהם היה בבאר שבע באותה תקופה. ---כאשר אברהם היה בבאר שבע, לוט הלך לבקעת הירדן כי היא הייתה שופעת ופורייה ושם הייתה סדום. אז, כאשר אלוהים השמיד את סדום, כתוב שאברהם קם בבוקר והביט לעבר האזור הזה והעשן עלה ממנו כמו תנור. משמעות הדבר היא שהוא הביט צפונה מבאר שבע או אולי מחברון (אני לא זוכר). הדרך היחידה שהוא היה יכול לראות את העשן עולה מסדום הייתה אם ענני העננים היו מתנשאים לגובה של כ-80 קילומטרים. או יותר (אני חושב). חשבתי גם שאולי באר שבע הייתה בארץ הפלשתים כשאברהם הגיע לשם לראשונה, כי בפעם הראשונה שאברהם ואבימלך (מלך הפלשתים) כרתו ברית זה עם זה, לא נאמר שהם הלכו אל אברהם [כמו שכתוב מאוחר יותר עם יצחק]. אלא נאמר שהם דיברו איתו כדי לכרות ברית וקראו למקום הזה באר שבע. אז באר שבע עדיין לא הייתה עיר. זה היה רק מקום שבו היה באר. ושם נאמר שאברהם ישב בארץ הפלשתים ימים רבים. אז, כנראה, מאוחר יותר הכנענים השתלטו על באר שבע והתיישבו בה והפכו אותה לעיר. אז, בימי יצחק, כשיצחק החליט שהיו לו מספיק צרות בארץ הפלשתים, הוא עזב והלך לבאר שבע. אז, באותה תקופה, זה היה בארץ כנען, ואז אבימלך הלך אליו מארץ הפלישתים לארץ כנען כדי להגיע להסכם עם יצחק. --- בכל מקרה, עכשיו כשאנחנו יודעים שבית אל נמצאת באמצע ישראל [לא בדרום] סביב יריחו, לכן כאשר יצחק אמר ליעקב ללכת ללבן בפדן ארם הוא עלה תחילה לבית אל, לא ישירות מזרחה

אני רוצה לשאול כמה שאלות בתוספות בדף כ"ט ע"ב בבבא קמא. הברייתא אמרה שאם אדם הולך בדרך ונשברה כדתו או שנפל גמלו ולא הרים אותם לפני שגרמו נזק, ר' מאיר אמר שהוא חייב, ור' יהודה אמר שהוא לא חייב. אבל אם הניח את סכינו על גג, ונפלה בגלל רוח רגילה, הוא חייב כדברי כולם. אבל אם הניח כדונים קטנים על גג, ונפלו ברוח חריגה, הוא לא חייב. ר' יוחנן אמר שהם חלוקים רק על הזמן שאחרי הנפילה. הגמרא שואלת, "אז מה היו אומרים בזמן הנפילה? אולי שהוא לא יהיה אחראי? אבל זה יסתור את מה שאמר ר' יוחנן על משנה מאוחרת יותר על אנשים שנושאים כדים והראשון החליק וגרם לשני להחליק, והוא בתורו גרם לשלישי להחליק. הראשון אחראי. ר' יוחנן אמר שהמשנה היא גם לפי ר' מאיר וגם לפי ר' יהודה. עכשיו התוספות שואלת מדוע הגמרא לא שאלה מהברייתא עצמה. הרי הברייתא אמרה שהכדים שנפלו מגג ברוח חריגה אינם אחראים. זה סותר את מה שאמר ר' יוחנן כאן שאם אדם נופל ושובר את כדו, הוא אחראי. זו בבירור נפילה במקרה (באונס), ובכל זאת ר' מאיר אמר שהוא אחראי. הקושי שאני רואה בתוספת זו הוא שהיא מביאה סתירה בר יוחנן, אך אינה עונה על שאלתנו מה היו אומרים ר' מאיר ור' יהודה על זמן הנפילה. מקרה הכד שנפל מהגג מספר לנו רק על הזמן שאחרי הנפילה. אבל אם הוא היה מספר לנו גם על זמן הנפילה, זו אינה קושי, אלא תומך בטענתנו שבזמן הנפילה כולם מסכימים שהוא אינו אחראי. והשאלה הקשה ביותר שיש לי על תוספות היא שאולי הגמרא לא רצתה להביא שאלה שיש לה תשובה ברורה. הכדים שנפלו מהגג נשברו, ולכן הוא נטש אותם ואינו אחראי. אבל אם הוא הולך בדרך, וכד שלו נשבר או גמלו נפל, אין סיבה לחשוב שהוא נטש אותם

I would like to ask a question on Tosphot page 29 side b in Bava Kama. The Braita said if one is walking by the road and his jar is broken or his camel fell and he did not pick them up before they did damage, R. Meir said he is liable, and R. Judah said he is not liable. But if he put his knife on a roof top, and it fell because of a normal wind, he is liable according to everyone. But if he put small jars on a rooftop, and they fell in an unusual wind, he is not liable. R Jochanan said they disagree only about the time after the fall. The Gemara asks, “Then what would they say at the time of the fall? Perhaps that he would not be liable? But that would go against what R. Jochanan said about a later Mishna about people carrying jars and the first one slipped and caused the second one to slip, and he in turn caused the third one to slip. The first one is liable. R. Jochanan said that Mishna is according to both R. Meir and R. Judah. Now Tosphot asks why did the Gemara not ask from the Braita itself. For, after all, the Braita said the jars that fell from a rooftop in an unusual wind are not liable. That goes against what R. Jochanan said here that if one falls and breaks his jar, that he is liable. That clearly is a fall by accident, and yet R. Meir said he is liable. The difficulty I see in this Tosphot is that it brings a contradiction in R. Jochanan, but does not answer our question what would R Meir and R. Judah say about the time of the fall. The case of the jar falling from the roof tells us only about the time after the fall. But if it would tell us also about the time of the fall, it is not a difficulty, but rather it supports our contention that at the time of the fall everyone agrees he is not liable. And the most difficult of all questions that I have on Tosphot is that perhaps the Gemara did not want to bring a question that has an obvious answer. The jar falling from the roof broke and so he abandons them and is not liable. But if he is walking on the road and his jar broke or his camel fell, there is no reason to think he abandoned them.---------------------------------------------I would like to ask some questions on תוספות page כ''ט ע''ב in בבא קמא. The ברייתא said if one is walking by the road and his jar is broken or his camel fell and he did not pick them up before they did damage, ר’ מאיר said he is liable, and ר’ יהודה said he is not liable. But if he put his knife on a roof top, and it fell because of a normal wind, he is liable according to everyone. But if he put small jars on a rooftop, and they fell in an unusual wind, he is not liable. R Jochanan said they disagree only about the time after the fall. The גמרא asks, “Then what would they say at the time of the fall? Perhaps that he would not be liable? But that would go against what ר’ יוחנן said about a later משנה about people carrying jars and the first one slipped and caused the second one to slip, and he in turn caused the third one to slip. The first one is liable. ר’ יוחנן said that משנה is according to both ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה. Now תוספות asks why did the גמרא not ask from the ברייתא itself. For, after all, the ברייתא said the jars that fell from a rooftop in an unusual wind are not liable. That goes against what ר’ יוחנן said here that if one falls and breaks his jar, that he is liable. That clearly is a fall by accident, and yet ר’ מאיר said he is liable. The difficulty I see in this תוספות is that it brings a contradiction in ר’ יוחנן, but does not answer our question what would ר’ מאיר and ר' יהודהsay about the time of the fall. The case of the jar falling from the roof tells us only about the time after the fall. But if it would tell us also about the time of the fall, it is not a difficulty, but rather it supports our contention that at the time of the fall everyone agrees he is not liable. And the most difficult of all questions that I have on תוספות is that perhaps the גמרא did not want to bring a question that has an obvious answer. The jar falling from the roof broke and so he abandons them and is not liable. But if he is walking on the road and his jar broke or his camel fell, there is no reason to think he abandoned them.

za76 B Minor Midi File za76 nwc file

balance between the rights of the people and the elite.

In the USA that things have been difficult. Dating has become a money game. Not to mention the other recent and not so recent insanities with woke agendas. Yet the Constitution of the USA (based on John Locke) is a system that is about as workable as one could hope for. Perhaps I might suggest, that the was something that Rome saw that has never been achieved since then: the need for a balance between the rights of the people and the patricians. After all a ruling senate was not unique to Rome. Carthage had the same thing. On the other hand, full democratic Athens turned out to be short lived aggressive and became the murderer of Socrates. What happened in Rome that was different was the patricians had all the power until one day the people of Rome left, literally left.. But instead of the senate declaring war, instead they sent a messenger to the people proposing a balance. The people would have a protector [tribune] whose person was inviolable they would have their own legislative body. and last but not least --no one would hold any public position in Rome without the vote of the people -patrician and plebian. There would be two people at the top, not one; two consuls who would hold office for one year only. There was a time all the top scientists and engineers were Jewish and German. Now they are Russian

הרמב"ן על בבא קמא דף כ"ט. אני חושב שאני יכול לתת תשובה לשאלה ששאלתי על הרמב''ן לפני מספר ימים. השאלה היא שהוא תמיד מחזיק אדם כאחראי לגרימת נזק. מבחינתו, לא משנה אם זה נזק שנגרם על ידי גופו או על ידי רכושו. השאלה היא מאביי בדף כ"ח ע"ב. שם אביי אומר בגלוי שנזק שהוא גורם באונס אינו חייב. הרי"ף כתב שבמקרה של נפילה ברשלנות והוא מחליט לנטוש את רכושו לפני שהוא גורם נזק, שר' יהודה מסכים עם ר' מאיר שהוא אחראי. הרמב"ן מוסיף לכך ואומר שגם ר' יהודה וגם ר' מאיר מסכימים שבמקרה של נפילה בשוגג [לא באשמתו] והוא לא נוטש את רכושו שהוא אחראי. זוהי בבירור תשובה לרמב"ן שקובע שאדם תמיד אחראי לגרום נזק, בין אם בכוונה ובין אם בשוגג, בין אם על ידי גופו ובין אם באמצעות רכושו. כי כאן אנו רואים שגרימת נזק בשוגג אינה פוטרת אותו מאחריות. עם זאת, הם יסכימו גם במקרה של נפילה בשוגג והוא נוטש את רכושו, שהוא אינו אחראי. אז אפשר לשאול, "אם כך באילו דרכים ר' יהודה ור' מאיר חלוקים ביניהם?" תשובה, הם חלוקים ביניהם לגבי מקרה רגיל של מעידה. ר' מאיר סבור שזה נחשב כרשלנות (נתקל פושע) ור' יהודה סבור שזה נחשב כתאונה (אונס). אבל עדיין יכולים להיות מקרים אחרים שבהם ר' מאיר מסכים שהנפילה הייתה בטעות (אונס), ור' יהודה מסכים במקרים אחרים שנפילה עשויה להיות ברשלנות, ובמקרים אלה ר' יהודה ור' מאיר מסכימים יש תמיכה לגישה זו בגמרא שגם התוספת וגם הרמב"ן מביאים, שאומרת שאם שור פורץ לחצר וחופר בור, בעל החצר צריך למלא אותו למרות שהוא לא אחראי לחפירתו. הרעיון המרכזי של המשנה והגמרא הוא שאם אדם נושא חבית. והוא מועד והחבית נשברת וגורמת נזק. ר' מאיר אומר שהוא אחראי, והר' יהודה סבור שהוא אחראי אם זה היה בכוונה. אביי מביא ברייתא שאומר שאם אדם מועד ומה שהוא נושא גורם נזק, יש מחלוקת בין ר' מאיר שמחזיק שהוא אחראי לבין החכמים שאומרים שלא. אבל אם שם אבן, צרור או סכין על גג, ונפלו ברוח רגילה, וגרמו נזק, הוא אחראי. אפילו החכמים מסכימים על כך. אבל אם שם את כדיו על גג, ונפלו בגלל רוח שאינה רגילה, כולם מסכימים שהוא אינו אחראי. אביי אמר שהם חלוקים בשני דברים, גם במהלך הנפילה וגם אחרי הנפילה. לפי איך שהמהרש"א מסביר את התוספות, כוונת אביי היא שר' יהודה קובע כי נפילה בשוגג או נטישת חפצו פוטרים אותו מחובת התשלום, ור' מאיר קובע כי מקרה של מעידה ברשלנות או אי נטישת חפצו יגרום לו להיות מחויב לשלם, [אבל כפי שאמרתי קודם, הר''ף קובע שר' יהודה מסכים עם ר' מאיר במקרה של נפילה בשוגג ואי נטישת חפצו]. התפארת שמואל קובע אחרת, והוא אומר שבמהלך הנפילה המשתנה היחיד שחשוב הוא אם הנפילה הייתה ברשלנות או לא. לאחר הנפילה, המשתנה היחיד שמשפיע הוא אם הוא נטש את רכושו לפני שגרם נזק

There is a Litvak beit midrah in this area and I was able to get over to there and look at the Ramban on Bava Kama pg 29 and I think I can share what I think is an answer to the question that I asked on him a few days ago. The question is that he holds a man always liable to cause damage. To him, it does not matter if it is damage caused by his own body or by his property. The question is from Abaye on page 28 b where he says openly that damage that he causes by accident is not liable. The Rif wrote that in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he decides to abandon his property before it causes damage that R. Judah agree with R. Meir that he is liable. The Ramban [Moshe ben Nachman] add to this and say that both R. Judah and R. Meir agree in a case of a fall by accident [not by his own fault] and he does not abandon his property that he is liable. This clearly is an answer for the Ramban that holds man is always liable to cause damage whether on purpose or by accident whether by his body or by means of his property. For here we see causing damage by accident does not relive him of liability. However, they would also agree in case of a fall by accident and he abandons his property, that he is not liable. Then you might ask, “Then in what ways do R Judah and R. Meir disagree?” Answer, they disagree about a normal case of tripping or stumbling. R. Meir holds that it is considered to be by negligence and R. Judah holds it is considered to be by accident. But in you can still have other kinds of cases where R Meir agrees that a fall was by accident and R Judah agrees in other kinds of cases that a fall might be by negligence and it is in these cases that R. Judah and R. Meir agree. There is support for this approach in a Gemara that both Tosphot and the Ramban bring that says if an ox brakes into a courtyard and digs a hole, the owner of the courtyard has to fill it up even though he is not responsible for digging it. The main idea of the Mishna and Gemara is that if one is carrying a barrel and he trips and the barrel broken and causes damage R. Meir says he is liable and the R. Judah holds he is liable if it was with intention. Abaye brings a braita that says if one trips and what he is carrying causes damage there is the argument between R. Meir who holds him accountable and the sages who do not. But if he put his stone, bundle, or knife on a roof, and they fall in a common wind, and they cause damage, he is liable. Even the sages agrees with that. But if he put his jars on a roof, and they fell due to an uncommon wind, everyone agrees he is not liable. Abaye said they disagree in two things. both during the fall and after the fall. According to how the Maharsha explains Tosphot, this means that R Judah holds either falling by accident or abandoning hi object with relieve him of the obligation to pay and R. Meir holds either a case of tripping by negligence or not abandoning one’s object will cause him to be required to pay, [but as I said before, according to the Rif, R Judah agrees with R. Meir in a case of falling by accident and not abandoning one’s object.] The Tiferet Shmuel holds differently he says that during the fall the only variable that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not. After the fall, the only variable that makes difference is if he abandons his property before it caused damage. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________The רמב’’ן on Bava Kama pg כ''ט and I think I can share what I think is an answer to the question that I asked on him a few days ago. The question is that he holds a man always liable to cause damage. To him, it does not matter if it is damage caused by his own body or by his property. The question is from אבייon page כ''ח ע''ב where he says openly that damage that he causes by accident is not liable. The רי''ף wrote that in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he decides to abandon his property before it causes damage that ר' יהודה agrees with ר' מאיר that he is liable. The רמב''ן add to this and says that both ר' יהודה and ר' מאיר agree in a case of a fall by accident [not by his own fault] and he does not abandon his property that he is liable. This clearly is an answer for the רמב''ן that holds man is always liable to cause damage whether on purpose or by accident whether by his body or by means of his property. For here we see causing damage by accident does not relive him of liability. However, they would also agree in case of a fall by accident and he abandons his property, that he is not liable. Then you might ask, “Then in what ways do ר' יהודה and ר' מאיר disagree?” Answer, they disagree about a normal case of tripping or stumbling. ר' מאיר holds that it is considered to be by negligence and ר' יהודה holds it is considered to be by accident. But in you can still have other kinds of cases where ר' מאיר agrees that a fall was by accident and ר' יהודה agrees in other kinds of cases that a fall might be by negligence and it is in these cases that ר' יהודה and ר' מאיר agree. There is support for this approach in a גמרא that both תוספות and the רמב’’ן bring that says if an ox brakes into a courtyard and digs a hole, the owner of the courtyard has to fill it up even though he is not responsible for digging it. The main idea of the משנה and גמרא is that if one is carrying a barrel. and he trips and the barrel broken and causes damage ר' מאיר says he is liable and the ר’ יהודה holds he is liable if it was with intention.אביי brings a ברייתא that says if one trips and what he is carrying causes damage there is the argument between ר' מאיר who holds him accountable and the sages who do not. But if he put his stone, bundle, or knife on a roof, and they fall in a common wind, and they cause damage, he is liable. Even the חכמין agree with that. But if he put his jars on a roof, and they fell due to an uncommon wind, everyone agrees he is not liable. אביי said they disagree in two things. both during the fall and after the fall. According to how the מהרש''א explains תוספות, this means that ר' יהודה holds either falling by accident or abandoning his object with relieve him of the obligation to pay and לר' מאיר holds either a case of tripping by negligence or not abandoning one’s object will cause him to be required to pay, [but as I said before, the רי''ף holds ר' יהודה agrees with ר' מאיר in a case of falling by accident and not abandoning one’s object.] The תפארת שמואל holds differently, he says that during the fall the only variable that matters is if the fall was by negligence or not. After the fall, the only variable that makes difference is if he abandons his property before it caused damage.

יש סתירה לכאורה בטור (סימן ש''צ וסימן תי''ב). במקרה של אדם שנשכר לשאת חבית, והיא נופלת ונשברת, שאם הדרך הייתה בשיפוע, הוא אינו חייב בפיצויים, אך אם היא ישרה הוא כן. אבל במקרה של אנשים רגילים ההולכים ונושאים צרור שנפל וגורם נזק לאדם שמאחור, שם הדין הוא כמו ר' יהודה שמעידה נחשבת לתאונה, כלומר, תאונה בלתי נמנעת, והוא אינו אחראי. אין הבדל אם הדרך הייתה בקו ישרה או בשיפוע. רב שך מציע שיש דרגה גבוהה יותר של אחריות אם אדם נשכר לשאת צרור בניגוד לנשיאת הצרור שלו בלבד.(הלכות שכירות פרק ג' הלכה ב') אבל הרמב"ן מביא שהחוק שאדם אחראי בכל דרך לגרום נזק נראה כאילו אינו תואם לכך. הוא אומר שהפעם היחידה שאנחנו לא אומרים שאדם אחראי תמיד היא כאשר מדובר באדם העוסק בעבודתו שלו. זהו אדם שנשכר לעבוד על חפץ כלשהו. בזה אנו אומרים שאם מתרחשת תאונה, הוא אינו אחראי. אבל בדרך חשיבה זו לא צריכה להיות אחריות אפילו במקרה של תאונה. וזה בגלוי לא דומה למה שאנו אומרים בבבא קמא דף כ''ט שמעידה היא תאונה, ואם יש גם נטישת החפץ, אז האדם אינו חייב כלל

There is an apparent contradiction in the Tur ch. 390 and ch. 412. In the case of one who is carrying a barrel and it falls and is broken that if the path was at an incline, he is not obligated in damages, but if it is level he is. But in a case of just regular people walking and carrying some bundle that is dropped and causes damage to the person in back, there the law is like R Judah that tripping is considered to be an accident i.e., an unavoidable accident, and he is not liable. there is no difference if it was path was at an incline or level. Rav Shach [law of renting ch. 3 law 2] suggests that there is a higher degree of responsibility if one is hired to carry some bundle as opposed to just carrying one’s own bundle. But the Ramban brings that the law man is always liable to cause damage seems to not correlate to this. He says that the only time we do not say "a man is liable always" is when it is a case of a person that is involved in his own work, (that is a person that is hired to work on some object). Then we say that if an accident occurs, he is not liable. But in this way of thinking there should be no liability even in a case of accident, and that is openly not like what we are saying in Bava Kama page 29 that tripping is an accident and if there is also abandoning the object then one is not obligated at all. [later I saw the ramban himself answers this in two way on bava kama pg. 29 and so far i only saw his first answer] ___________________________________________________________________________________________________ There is an apparent contradiction in the טור. In the case of one who is hired to carry a barrel, and it falls and is broken, that if the path was at an incline, he is not obligated in damages, but if it is level he is. But in a case of just regular people walking and carrying some bundle that is dropped and causes damage to the person in back, there the law is like ר' יהודה that tripping is considered to be an accident i.e., an unavoidable accident, and he is not liable. There is no difference if it was path was at an inline or level. רב שך suggests that there is a higher degree of responsibility if one is hired to carry some bundle as opposed to just carrying one’s own bundle. But the רמב''ן brings that the law man is all ways liable to cause damage seem to not correlate to this. he says that the only time we do not say a man is liable always is when it is a case of a person that is involved in his own work. That is a person that is hired to work on some object Then we say that if an accident occurs, he is not liable. But in this way of thinking there should be no liability even in a case of accident. and that is openly not like what we are saying in בבא קמא page כ''ט that tripping is an accident, and if there is also abandoning the object, then one is not obligated at all.

za75 in G minor a midi file za75 in nwc format

יש וויכוח בין ר' מאיר לר' יהודה בב"א מציעא פ"ב ובבא קמא כ''ט ע''א. לפי אביי, הם חלוקים ביניהם על שני דברים. ראשית, האם מעידה היא תאונה או רשלנות. שנית, כאשר אדם נוטש את רכושו לאחר שנפל ארצה, האם זה עדיין נחשב שלו על מנת להיות אחראי לנזק שהוא עלול לגרום, או לא. הדרך שבה המהרש"א מבין את התוספות בכ"ט ע''א היא שר' יהודה שוקל לנטוש או אם הנפילה היא מקרה של תאונה, אז כל אחד מהם יכול לשחרר אותו מחובת הנזק. עבור ר' מאיר, מעידה ברשלנות או נטישת רכושו לאחר שנפל ברשלנות יכולות לגרום לו להיות אחראי. עבור התפארת שמואל, הגישה הנכונה לתוספת זו היא שבמהלך הנפילה, רק אם הנפילה נחשבת ברשלנות או לא משנה. לכן, לפי גישה זו, גם אם הוא נוטש את רכושו במהלך הנפילה, זה לא יפטור אותו. ועבור ר' מאיר, גם אם הנפילה הייתה בבירור מקרית, עדיין אם הוא לא נוטש את רכושו, הוא עדיין אחראי. להבהיר העניין: המקרה הרגיל של מעידה הוא כאשר אדם נושא חבית עבור מישהו, והוא מועד והחבית נשברת. עבור ר' מאיר זה נחשב ברשלנות; עבור ר' יהודה זה במקרה. אבל אפילו ר' יהודה מסכים שיכול להיות מקרה של נפילה ברשלנות, למשל אם אדם מניח אבן, סכין או צרור על גג, והם נופלים ברוח רגילה. כמו כן, עבור ר' מאיר, יכול להיות מקרה של נפילה מקרית, למשל כאשר אדם מניח קנקנים על הגג, והם נופלים ברוח רגילה.

I have been thinking about the argument between R. Meir and R Judah in Bava Mezia 82 and Bava Kama 29. According to Abaye, they disagree about two things. One, if tripping is an accident or negligence. Two, when one abandons his property after it has fallen to the ground, if that is still considered to be his in order to be liable for damage that it might cause, or not. The way the Maharccsha understands Tosphot on pg 29a is that R Judah considers either letting go (abandoning) or if the fall is a case of accident, then either one can release him from obligation for damage. To R. Meir, either tripping by negligence or abandoning one’s property after it has fallen by negligence can make him liable. To the Tiferet Shmuel (Rav Aaron Shmuel from Kaidan) the proper approach to this Tosphot is that at during the fall, only if the fall is considered by negligence or not matters. So, to this approach, even if he abandons his property during the fall, that would not excuse him. and to R Meir even if a fall was clearly by accident, still if he does not abandon his property, he is still liable. The normal case of tripping is when one is carrying a barrel for someone, and he trips and the barrel is broken. To R. Meir that is by negligence; to R. Judah that is by accident. But even R. Judah agrees at there can be a case of falling by negligence, for example if one places a stone, knife, or bundle on a roof, and they fall by a common wind. Also, to R Meir, there can be a case of a falling by accident, for example of one places jars on the roof, and they fall during an uncommon wind._________________________ I have been thinking about the argument between ר’ מאירand ר' יהודה in בבא מציעא 82 and בבא קמא 29. According to אביי, they disagree about two things. One, if tripping is an accident or negligence. Two, when one abandons his property after it has fallen to the ground, if that is still considered to be his in order to be liable for damage that it might cause, or not. The way the מהרש''א understands תוספות on 29a is that ר' יהודה considers either letting go (abandoning) or if the fall is a case of accident, then either one can release him from obligation for damage. To ר' מאיר, either tripping by negligence or abandoning one’s property after it has fallen by negligence can make him liable. To the תפארת שמואל the proper approach to this תוספות is that at during the fall, only if the fall is considered by negligence or not matters. So, to this approach, even if he abandons his property during the fall, that would not excuse him. And to ר' מאיר even if a fall was clearly by accident, still if he does not abandon his property, he is still liable. The normal case of tripping is when one is carrying a barrel for someone, and he trips and the barrel is broken. To ר’ מאיר that is by negligence; to ר' יהודה that is by accident. But even ר' יהודה agrees at there can be a case of falling by negligence, for example if one places a stone, knife, or bundle on a roof, and they fall by a common wind. Also, to R Meir, there can be a case of a falling by accident, for example of one places jars on the roof, and they fall during an uncommon wind.

The cure for all kinds of modern insanity

The cure for all kinds of modern insanity is faith and reason. I am a fan of faith and reason -the formula of the Middle Ages but with a modern twist. While in the Middle Ages, reason meant Aristotle and faith meant the catholic church. But I think that even starting at 1350 A.D. with the plague and later with wars against protestants that the approach to faith has to be rethought. And Reason I think is not really exactly reading Aristotle, but I would include Plato Plotinus and Kant, Hegel; also, John Locke and the founding papers of the USA, i.e. the Constitution, the Federalist Papers and the letters of the founding fathers. The line of division between philosophy and politics is blurred and so I think including John Locke and James Madison is important, Dr. Kelley Ross has some important improvements on the Friesian school started by Leonard Nelson, mainly the idea of Karl Popper about propositions that may not be able to be proven true, but can be proven false. At any rate, I think that philosophers tend to overextend themselves into politics. Though professors of philosophy tend to have high I.Q.s, but when they venture into politics, things seem to go haywire.Orientation matters you can not revere everything and expect the same result a we see in Discrete Differential Geometry. so, Mari x thinking he could revere Hegel mean that he came up with a system that does not work.

The irony about communism is that it can not exist without capitalism.

The problem with China is, that they depend on the USA for their economy and yet do everything they can to destroy the USA. The irony about communism is that it can not exist without capitalism. This is already a problem besides the odd fact that they steal American designs and then manufacture them cheaper and then try to sell them to the USA. My dad encountered this problem at TRW when he was inventing the laser communication used in Elon Musk's satellite system. There was a whole motion picture on the episode that the KBG had managed to steal the design. [snow man and the falcon]

za74 F minor in midi format za74 in nwc format

עכשיו הסתכלתי ברב שך בהלכות ניזקי ממון י''ג הלכה י''ט והוא מצביע על הגמרא בבא קמא דף ו' ע''א. משם מצאתי תשובה לשאלה שהרב שך מביא על הרמב''ם. שם רואים פעמיים שיכולה להיות סיבה לחשוב שאם עדיין יש ברשותו אבן, סכין או חבילה או עץ או קיר שנפלו לרשות הרבים וגרמו לנזק, שיש יותר סיבה לעשותו פטור. וחוץ מזה אני יכול לראות את הסיבה מאחורי זה. אם בכל זאת יש את הסכין או אבן, אזי הוא מתכוון לאסוף, ואם הם גורמים נזק לפני שהספיק לאסוף אותם, אזי אין הוא חייב באחריות שכן אין זו אשמתו. הסיבה הזו אנו מוצאים בדף כ''ב בבא קמא שם היה קיר שנפל ונמלט אש וגרם נזק, ולבעל האש לא היה אפשרות עדיין לתקן את הקיר. הוא אינו אחראי כי זו לא אשמתו (שכן לא הייתה לו הזדמנות לתקן זאת עדיין). אבל אם הפקיר את הרסיסים ברשות הרבים יש יותר סיבה להטיל עליו אחריות שכן הוא מתכוון להשאיר שם את החפצים המזיקים, ולעולם אין בדעתו להסירם. בְּסֵדֶר. עכשיו אחרי שאמרתי את זה תן לי להביא את הגמרא. כתוב שאביי אמר שהמשנה בוא לכלול את האבן, הסכין או החבילה שלו שהוא שם על הגג, והם נפלו בגלל רוח רגילה. ביקשה הגמרא על זה שאם הפקיר אותם ברשות הרבים, זה מקרה רגיל של חפירת בור ברשות הרבים. אז במקום זאת הגמרא מציעה שמכיוון שזה ברור מדי, אז זה חייב להיות שהמשנה באה לכלול כאשר הוא לא נטש אותם. בשלב זה בגמרא, אנו רואים שיש יותר סיבה להפוך אותו לפטור כאשר הוא עדיין בעל האבן או הסכין כי אנו צריכים לכלול אותם. אותו רעיון חוזר בעמוד ו' ע''א שרבינא אמר שהמשנה באה לספר לנו על קיר או עץ שנפלו לרשות הרבים, שהם חייבים. אם הוא נטש אותם, אז זה ברור, ואין שום סיבה שהמשנה תגיד לנו את זה. אז דווקא המקרה הוא כאשר הוא לא נטש אותם, ושם נוכל לחשוב שהוא לא חייב. אז אנחנו צריכים שהמשנה תגיד לנו שהוא אחראי. לכן, גם כאן אנו רואים שיש יותר סיבה לגרום לו להיות פטור כאשר הוא עדיין בעל העץ והחומה. לכן אתה צריך שהמשנה תבוא ותכלול אותה. כל זה בא לענות על השאלה הזו. ר''מ כותב שאם נפל קיר או עץ לרשות הרבים, אין הוא חייב באחריות למרות שנטש אותם. בדרך כלל, אתה אומר שככה זה המצב למרות שיש סיבה כזו או אחרת שמתנגדת לזה. אז הנה ר''מ אומר שהוא לא אחראי למרות שיש סיבה זו שמתנגדת לזה. הסיבה היא שהוא נטש אותם. אבל אם הוא נטש אותם, זה נראה יותר סיבה לגרום לו לא להיות אחראי. אז התשובה היא מה שכתבתי למעלה. אם נטש אותם, הוא צריך להיות ______________________________ עם זאת, אני רוצה להביא כאן כיצד רב שך עונה על שאלה זו על ר''מ. הוא אומר שהכוונה היא שבעל הבור נטש את תחום הבור שלו, וכך השטח הזה הופך לרשות הרבים וכבר אנו יודעים שבור חייב רק ברשות הרבים, ולכן למרות שנטש את הבור ואת השטח ההוא, עדיין אינו חייב אלא אם כן הייתה אזהרה מטעם בית הדין. אם הייתה אזהרה של בית המשפט להסיר את החומה והעץ וחלפו יותר משלושים יום, אזי הוא חייב. התשובה הזו ברורה. אולם, עדיין יש לי שאלה בסוף הפרק ההוא ברב שך שם הוא אומר שהסיבה שהר''מ לא הביא את דין אביי שאם הביא את אבנו, סכינו או חבילתו לגג ונפלו ברוח רגילה, הוא חייב באחריות כי זה על אחת כמה וכמה שניתן בקלות להסיק ממקרה הקיר והעץ שנפלו. לי זה נראה קשה להבין כי הר"מ אומר שהחומה והעץ אינם אחראים. לכן, אינך יכול ללמוד מהם אחריות למצב אחר, אלא אם כן במקרה האחר הזהיר אותו בית המשפט ועברו יותר משלושים יום. אבל מעולם לא שמענו על התנאים הללו במקרה של אבייאחראי שכן בכוונתו להשאירם ברשות הרבים. אך למרות זאת, הוא אינו אחראי. --יתר על כן, יש לי שאלה נוספת על התשובה הזו של רב שך. {תשובתו היא שברגע שנדע את הדין על החומה והעץ שנפלו, אז נוכל לדעת על האבן שעל הגג. השאלה שיש לי היא זו. אביי אומר שאנחנו לומדים את האחריות של האבן על הגג מהמכנה המשותף בין בור ואש. כי אולי הייתם אומרים שאין אחריות על סכין האבן והאריזה שעל הגג כי יש כוח אחר שפועל עליהם מלבד כוח הבעלים, זה הרוח. ובכן, אנחנו יכולים לענות על ההתנגדות הזאת מאש. כי כשם שהאש חייבת למרות שכוח אחר פועל עליה, כך גם האבן והסכין שעל הגג אחראים. עכשיו, איך נוכל לדעת את זה מהמקרה של החומה והעץ שנפלו? כי במקרה זה אמר רבינא שאנו יודעים שהם חייבים בגלל בור ושור. שהרי אולי היית אומר שאולי אין הם צריכים להיות אחראים כי לא נעשו מלכתחילה לעשות נזק, ובכן נוכל לענות כי גם שור לא נעשה מלכתחילה לעשות נזק, ובכל זאת הוא אחראי. כך גם העץ והחומה שנפלו צריכים להיות אחראים. אבל אם היינו יודעים את כל זה, איך נוכל ללמוד למקרה שבו כוח אחר פועל על הדבר הגורם לנזק? אולי זה לא יהיה אחראי עד שנלמד את זה מאיפשהו. אז אני מתקשה להבין את התשובה הזו של רב שך

Rav Shach in laws of damage 13 law 19 ,Gemara Bava Kama page 6a.

Now I have been looking at Rav Shach in laws of damage 13 law 19 and he points to the Gemara Bava Kama page 6a. From there I found an answer to the question that many achronim including Rav Shach bring on the Rambam. There we see twice that there can be a reason to think that if he still owns the stone, knife or package or the tree or wall that fell into a public domain, there is more of a reason to make him not obligated. And beside that I can see the reason behind it. If he still owns it, then he intends to pick it up, and if it causes damage before he got a chance to pick it up, then he should be not liable since it is not his fault. This exact reason we find on page 22 Bava Kama where there was a wall that fell down and fire escaped and did damage, and the owner of the fire did not have a chance yet to repair the wall. He is not liable because it is not his fault (since he did not have a chance to repair it yet). But if he abandoned the piece or hard in the public domain there is more of a reason to make him liable since he intends to leave the damaging objects there, and he never intends to remove them. Okay. Now that I have said this let me bring the gemara. It says abaye said the mishna come include his stone, knife or package that he put on a roof, and they fell due to a common wind. The Gemara asked on this that if he abandoned them in the public domain that is a regular case of digging a pit in a public domain. so instead the gemara suggests that since that is too obvious, then it must be that the mishna is coming to include when he did not abandon them. At this point, in the Gemara we see that there is more of a reason to a make him not liable when still own the stone or knife because we need to mishna to include them. This same idea is repeated on page 6b where Ravina said the mishna is coming to tell us about a wall or tree that fell into a public domain, that they are liable. if he abandoned them, then it is obvious, and there is no reason for the mishna to tell us that. so rather the case is when he did not abandon them, and there we might think he is not obligated. so, we need the mishna to tell us that he is liable. Therefore, here also we see there is a more of a reason to make him not liable when he still owns the tree and wall. That is why you need to Mishna to come and include it. This is all coming to answer this question. The Rambam writes that if a wall or tree fell into a public domain, he is not liable even though he abandoned them. Usually, you say such and such is the case even though there is such and such a reason that militates against it. so here the Rambam is saying that he is not liable even though there is this reason that militates against it. That reason is he abandoned them. But if he abandoned them that would seem to be more of reason to make him not liable. So, the answer is what I wrote up above. If he abandoned them, he should be liable since he intends to leave them in the public domain. But even so, he is not liable. However, I want to bring here how Rav Shach answers this question on the Rambam. He says that the meaning is that the owner of the pit abandoned his domain where the pit is located, and thus that area becomes a public domain and we already know that a pit is liable only in a public domain, so even though he abandoned the pit and that area still he is not liable unless there was warning by the court. If there was warning by the court to remove the wall and tree and more than 30 days have passed, then he is liable. This answer is clear. However, I still have a question on the end of that chapter in Rav Shach H say at the end that the reason the Rambam did not bring the law of Abaye that if he brought his tone knife or package to a roof top and they fell, that he is liable because it is a “all the more so” that can easily be derived from the case of the wall and tree that fell. To me this seems hard to understand because the Rambam say that the wall and tree are not liable. So, you can not learn liability to another case from them unless that other case would also have the court warning him and there were more than thirty days have passed. But we never heard of these conditions in the case of Abaye Furthermore, there is another question I have on this answer of Rav Shach. {His answer is that once we know the law about the wall and tree that fell, then we can know about the stone on the rooftop. The question I have is this. Abaye says we learn liability of the stone on the rooftop from the common denominator between pit and fire. For you might have said that the stone knife and package on the roof should not be liable because there is another force acting on them beside the owner’s force, that is the wind. Well, we can answer that objection from fire. For just like fire is obligated even though another force is acting on it, so the stone and knife on the roof also are liable. Now ho could we know this from the case of the wall and tree that fell? For in that case, Ravina said we know they are liable because of pit and ox. For you might have said that maybe they should not be liable because they were not made from the beginning to do damage, well we can answer that because ox also was not made from the beginning to do damage, and yet it is liable. so too should the tree and wall that fell be liable. But if we would know all this, how could we learn to a case where another force is acting on the thing that causes damage? maybe that would be not liable until we learn it from somewhere. so, I have a hard time understanding this answer of Rav Shach ______________________________________________________________Now I have been looking at רב שך in הלכות ניזקי ממון י''ג הלכה י''טand he points to the גמרא בבא קמא page ו' ע''א. From there I found an answer to the question that רב שך bring on the רמב''ם. There we see twice that there can be a reason to think that if he still owns the stone, knife or package or the tree or wall that fell into a public domain AND CAUED DAMAGE, there is more of a reason to make him not obligated. And beside that I can see the reason behind it. If he still owns it, then he intends to pick it up, and if it causes damage before he got a chance to pick it up, then he should be not liable since it is not his fault. This exact reason we find on page כ''ב בבא קמא where there was a wall that fell down and fire escaped and did damage, and the owner of the fire did not have a chance yet to repair the wall. He is not liable because it is not his fault (since he did not have a chance to repair it yet). But if he abandoned the shards in the public domain there is more of a reason to make him liable since he intends to leave the damaging objects there, and he never intends to remove them. Okay. Now that I have said this let me bring the גמרא. It says אביי said theמשנה come include his stone, knife or package that he put on a roof, and they fell due to a common wind. The גמרא asked on this that if he abandoned them in the public domain that is a regular case of digging a pit in a public domain. so instead the גמרא suggests that since that is too obvious, then it must be that theמשנה is coming to include when he did not abandon them. At this point, in the גמרא we see that there is more of a reason to a make him not liable when still own the stone or knife because we need toמשנה to include them. This same idea is repeated on page ו' ע''א where רבינא said theמשנה is coming to tell us about a wall or tree that fell into a public domain, that they are liable. if he abandoned them, then it is obvious, and there is no reason for theמשנה to tell us that. so rather the case is when he did not abandon them, and there we might think he is not obligated. so, we need theמשנה to tell us that he is liable. Therefore, here also we see there is a more of a reason to make him not liable when he still owns the tree and wall. That is why you need toמשנה to come and include it. This is all coming to answer this question. ר''מ writes that if a wall or tree fell into a public domain, he is not liable even though he abandoned them. Usually, you say such and such is the case even though there is such and such a reason that militates against it. so here ר''מ is saying that he is not liable even though there is this reason that militates against it. That reason is he abandoned them. But if he abandoned them that would seem to be more of reason to make him not liable. So, the answer is what I wrote up above. If he abandoned them, he should be liable since he intends to leave them in the public domain. But even so, he is not liable________________________ However, I want to bring here how רב שך answers this question on the ר’’מ. He says that the meaning is that the owner of the pit abandoned his domain where the pit is located, and thus that area becomes a public domain and we already know that a pit is liable only in a public domain, so even though he abandoned the pit and that area still he is not liable unless there was warning by the court. If there was warning by the court to remove the wall and tree and more than thirty days have passed, then he is liable. This answer is clear. However, I still have a question on the end of that chapter in רב שךTHERE HE say that the reason the ר’’מ did not bring the law of אביי that if he brought his stone, knife or package to a roof top and they fell by a common wind, that he is liable because it is a “all the more so” that can easily be derived from the case of the wall and tree that fell. To me this seems hard to understand because the ר’’מ say that the wall and tree are not liable. So, you can not learn liability to another case from them unless that other case would also have the court warning him and there were more than thirty days have passed. But we never heard of these conditions in the case of אביי Furthermore, there is another question I have on this answer of רב שך . {His answer is that once we know the law about the wall and tree that fell, then we can know about the stone on the rooftop. The question I have is this. אביי says we learn liability of the stone on the rooftop from the common denominator between pit and fire. For you might have said that the stone knife and package on the roof should not be liable because there is another force acting on them beside the owner’s force, that is the wind. Well, we can answer that objection from fire. For just like fire is obligated even though another force is acting on it, so the stone and knife on the roof also are liable. Now ho could we know this from the case of the wall and tree that fell? For in that case, רבינא said we know they are liable because of pit and ox. For you might have said that maybe they should not be liable because they were not made from the beginning to do damage, well we can answer that because ox also was not made from the beginning to do damage, and yet it is liable. so too should the tree and wall that fell be liable. But if we would know all this, how could we learn to a case where another force is acting on the thing that causes damage? maybe that would be not liable until we learn it from somewhere. so, I have a hard time understanding this answer of רב שך

This is the age of disappointment; the time when almost everyone experiences the same thing: the ideology or system that they point all their faith and might and energy into turned out to be a farce A good example of this I the book by Emma Goldman who had been a outspoken proponent of the Russian revolution until she came and saw it up close. But the same rule applies in all aspect of politic and belief systems. People jut don’t talk about it because their means of making money depend on that system continuing.

Destiny takes us only half way. The rest we have to do on our own. And that part is where we usually go wrong

Divine decree and free will are not compatible. By looking back on my life, I can see areas where there simply was divine decree that such and such had to happen, -- regardless of anyone’s free will. I think a good example, is my wife’s intense desire to get me to marry her in spite of my trying to get her off my tail for years. I think I can see this in the children that I eventually had with her that had to come into the world with this set of two parents. I would personally have given anything in the world instead to have been able to marry a daughter of a true Torah scholar so that I could continue to learn Torah. That option was not in the cards. Eventually when the Divine Decree was fulfilled, that when I was left to the fate of free will. Then my own free will got me off track. I am not the only one who gets distracted by free will. All of us go haywire left to our own devices. We all do better when God decrees things (or that in moment of divine grace, we manage to depend on Divine Grace in spite of our own free will pointing us elsewhere). Destiny takes us only half way. The rest we have to do on our own. And that part is where we usually go wrong

A lot of the USA is based on the Magna Carta and Simon De Montfort (Provisions of Oxford) and John Locke and the two-tiered parliament system of England. Pluss a lot of the Bill of Right is based on issues that England had to deal with and resolve that were incorporated in the Bill of Rights. and I might mention that they never wanted to separate from England until the King refused intervene in favor of the colonies. The main grievance was toward Parliament. Besides that, there has to be a basic DNA structure in people for them to be able to accept such a system. Unless you have Anglo-Saxon DNA it is doubtful how well this system could work elsewhere. There is something in the Anglo saxon DNA which takes the written law as absolute and binding. While in the ussr, the only reason the ridiculous system worked at all was the tendency to ignore the written rule and just strive toward what worked

Abraham Isaac and Jacob were promised the land of Canaan

When Abraham Isaac and Jacob were promised the land of Canaan that actual name does not come up much. They were after all spending time in the land of the Philistines –mainly in Gerar which I think is drop above Netivot. But I might be wrong and in might be right at Netivot. But you also get a promise to Jacob that all these lands which you have been dwelling in will be an everlasting inheritance to your decedents. But interestingly enough the covenant between the Parts where Abraham was promised the ten nations, the philistines were not included. The main reason that the land of the philistines is included in Israel I that it is within the borders defined in Numbers 34. That area however was never conquered by Irael. The Philistines in fact were never conquered until Rome sent Scipio Africanus to finish them off at Carthage. (The Philistines were part of the same nation with the capitol at Carthage)

the land of the Philistines is Gaza

Before you get to the song on the Red sea the Book of Exodus explains that the reason God did not take Israel directly through the land of the Philistines is because there was a worry that Irael might see war and decide to return to Egypt. The reason I believe is that in fact, the Philistines were so powerful. Rome took them out in the last of the Punic Wars. [Rashi says that the Canaanites were weak, and that is why they had to have strong fortified walled cities. But the Phlistines were strong.] The reason I say this is that if you look in the Book of Numbers chapter 34 you will see where the people of Israel were commanded to conquer. That is where the borders of Israel were defined. The southern border goes from the salt sea until kadesh barnea and from there to the stream of Egypt and then towards the Mediterranean Sea. All that land is the state of israel today. And in fact, in the covenant between the pieces of Abraham the patriarch there was a promise to give to his descendants all the land from the Euphrates until the river of Egypt the Nile. {That is not the same as the stream of Egypt which is right below Gaza. so, this land was promised that in the end of days this would be part of Israel. But even in the time of Joshua, that land was not conquered. Even when the tribes dived up the land, they did not divid the land of the Philistines since they had not yet conquered it. [the tribe of Judah conquered that area in the time of the judges. see the book of Judges chapter 1.] Scipio Africanus (Rome) destroyed the entire nation of the Philistines [Phoenicians]in the last Punic war. [Philistines were all along the coast from the south of Israel until Carthage. Carthage was the capital city. Philistines were in general pirates. While Rome tried to do business in the Mediterranean Sea, and the Philistines kept getting in the way until war after war occurred. Rome was almost destroyed. Then Scipio Africanus decided to take the fight directly to the home base of the Philistines, Carthage. And that was that.] It occurred to me that even the patriarchs had trouble in Gaza. Abraham lived there many years until he had much trouble until left that land to go live in the land of Canaan in Beer sheva. Isaac I think I recall wanted to go live there until he was told by God to stay in the land of Canaan. The only reason this land is part of Israel is because it is within the borders that were defined by God to conquer even though Joshua and David and Solomon never in fact got around to finishing the business. I also think that Sidon (Zidon in Hebrew ) was originally a Canaanite city, but that at some point it was taken by the Phoenicians. [The Phoenician were not Canaanites]. Zidon [Sidon was the name of the first born of Canaan as it says in Genisis] I might mention that there were Canaanite that were outside the borders of the land designated by God for the children of Israel-as we see with sichon the king of the emori who ruled in the area beyond the Jordan river. Also the land of the plishtim was included, yet they were not Canaanites

i think it might make sense to mention that I had a really wonderful time in shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY. {I had however to leave on sour notes. The Rosh Yeshiva I think had noticed my wild side and so the shidduch with his daughter Penina was called off. In the meantime, my future wife Lea Finn was actively pursuing me and happily I gave in to her request of marriage. I think without her active pursuit of me and her never giving up, is the only reason that I have any children at all.} But at some point, I decided to come to Israel, and even then I could have continued in the kollel system but I was somewhat restless and had discovered Rav Nachman’s advice about talking with God as one talks with a friend and so when I got to Safed I spent most of my day in that sort of activity and neglected learning Torah except when I got home at night and my wonderful wife make dinner with spaghetti or other dishes and after the meal would sit at the table and do about one daf page gemara and one page of the major works of Rav Nahman. But I was not doing what you would call in depth learning iyun. and I really was not able to do iyun either. In spite of my years in three great yeshivot I never caught on to what it means to “learn in depth.” [I think you need talent for that, and IQ also.] It was only when I got to Uman many years later, and David Bronson accepted me a a learning partner that I lowly began to understand what it means to learn in depth. Hi path I might mention was close to shar Yashuv. The hedgehog model- close to the ground. The Mir in NY was closer to the Eagle model of looking at all of shas from a global perspective from there to the subject at hand. I agree that both paths are important. In fact, I have tried to continue in the way David showed me of electron micro-scoping tosphot but at the same time looking at rav shach. The Rav shach approach is continuation of the Brisk approach

ממה שאני זוכר במעורפל אני חושב שהשלחן ערוך אומר שאם מי שהוא מדליק אש בחצר שלו וזה גורם שם נזק לרכוש של שכנו שגר באותה חצר, אז הוא אחראי הן לנזק שנגרם לגלוי וטמון. אבל אם יש קיר והאש קפצה מעליו, האחריות היא רק לנזק באמצעות רכושות היינו רק לגלוי. בחצר האחריות תהיה גם על דברים פתוחים וגם על דברים נסתרים, אבל מחוץ לחצר, רק על דברים פתוחים. אבל זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא ששם רבא אומר אם יש קיר אז אין אחריות לנזק מחוץ לכותל (אפילו גלוי) שכן זה לא היה רשלנות

I am not sure and I have not been by the Litvacks for a few days, so I have not looked at the Gemara on pg 23 in Bava Kama nor the Tosphot nor the Shulchan Aruch where the Gra bring his idea. But from what I vaguely recall i think the Shulchan Aruch says that if one lights a fire in his own courtyard and it caused damage there to his neighbor’s property who live in the same courtyard, then he is liable both for his arrows and his property but if there a wall and the fire jumped over it then the liability IS only for damage by mean of hi property. On the courtyard the liability would be for both open and hidden thing but outside the courtyard only for open thing. But this would not be like the gemara where Rava says if there is a wall then there is no liability for damage outside the wall since it was not negligence,---------------------------I am not sure and I have not been by the Litvacks for a few days, so I have not looked at the גמרא on pg. כ''ג in בבא קמא nor the תוספות nor the שלחן ערוך where the גר''א bring his idea. But from what I vaguely recall I think the שלחן ערוך says that if one lights a fire in his own courtyard and it caused damage there to his neighbor’s property who lives in the same courtyard, then he is liable both for damage caused by his arrows and caused by his property. But if there a wall and the fire jumped over it, then the liability IS only for damage by means of his property. In the courtyard the liability would be for both open and hidden things, but outside the courtyard, only for open things. But this would not be like the גמרא where רבא says if there is a wall then there is no liability for damage outside the wall since it was not negligence

Frankly I have no more patience with Islam, even though certainly there are individual Muslims who are decent people. But in terms of Hamas and Iran, I have no more patience. a far as I am concerned the right of Israel of self defense against these barbarians takes precedence [However, most spiritual phenomenon Is, I believe, due to the infinite human capacity to believe in anything; like the queen in Alice in Wonderland said, “I can believe in six impossible things before breakfast.” Do not expect human to behave rationally. Rather take the advice of Alexander of Macedon –to do no what need to be done now and not delay. Get rid of Iran’ nuclear facilities now.

hidden levels below apparent reality and above.

I have a belief that there are hidden levels below apparent reality and above. But that one's effort should be directed toward God alone the sole Creator. What seems like miracles are often phenomenon of dark forces. In the Middle Ages I think there were alchemists and mystics who were able to tap in to hidden realities to make changes in physical reality. That however has nothing to-do with service toward God. But what then is service toward God? I think that is best defined by my parents. For my mother service toward God mean to marry a nice Jewish girl (two separate qualifications) and to be a mensch. To my father that mean self reliance.

learning Tosphot, learning the Avi Ezri

The way that yeshivot are oriented is that the centrale feature is the lecture (shiur clalli) on Tuesday where a lesson I given to the whole yeshiva based on the global approach of Reb Chaim of Brisk. This is global and bring in sources from all over shas and the rishonim. And I admit this is important. In fact, I try to continue this a much a I can by learning the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and later go to a Litvak beit midrah where I can try to learn the sources of his lectures. And I would like to recommend this approach to others. But I also want to mention that my learning partner David Bronson held the belief that a lot more effort must be devoted to learning Tosphot. And I think this was also the belief of Rev Friefeld of Shar Yashuv my first yeshiva}.

one has to find the objective set of moral principles to stick with

Authentic morality I think depends on finding the right set of basic principles to stick with at all cost. To go through life as the majority of people, doing whatever seems to provide the best chance of personal gain and pleasure, is not a way to get to Gan Eden. For the majority people, if one is in a politically active community, that means to adopt the principles of that community. For example, in the USA where 99 percent of women are radical leftist that means to find wife one has to adopt the most absurd radical principles. If one is in some other kind of community, that mean to adopt their insane principles in order to get ahead. But to be a n authentic moral person who has a chance of getting to Gan Eden in the next world one has to find the objective set of moral principles to stick with that will sometimes help him or her to fit in with the crowd, but most often will not. My own belief is that he main principle to stick with at all cost is to speak the truth. ------My own son held that one should learn fast, but with review. [i.e., Izhak held with Rav Nachman of Breslov who held that one should learn as fast as possible –saying the words and going on. However, my son also knew that after that, one need review]

I think the Left has gotten more radical during the year the I have not been paying attention. I was reading a leftwing newspaper [Haaretz[ and it was entirely slander against Netanyahu and the attempt to retrieve our captives. In the long distant past, for me “Left wing” meant Kennedy, not Karl Marx. But I see that that has changed, the Left in Israel is committed to hurting Netanyahu and Israeli citizens.

Rather they will do everything they can to make a bomb quickly.

The only way to win a war is not to have one. So I am definitely in favor of any kind of deal that Trump can come up with Iran. But I jut do not see how Iran can agree to dismantle their Nuclear Bomb program when from an early age in school every day they repeat the mantra about how they are dedicating their lives to the destruction of the USA and Irael. It seems to me that it would be impossible for them to reject that a hard wiring of their psyche. It is like a circuit board after the circuit board has been subjected to heat and hardened in. You cannot undo the connections unless you simply break the circuit board. So, it is here. Iran to agree would mean to break their own inner mind set and hardwired connection> To make a deal with Trump would mean to go insane. Rather they will do everything they can to make a bomb quickly.

בבא קמא דף כ''ג. אני תוהה על מה הוויכוח בין אביי לרבא? אביי שאל אם ר' יוחנן צודק (שנזק באש אחראי כי זה החצים שלו, כלומר נזק ישיר מגופו), אז למה שהוא לא יהיה אחראי לדברים נסתרים? ואביי ענה על השאלה שלו. המקרה הוא כשהיה קיר, והוא נפל, ולא היה לו הזדמנות לתקן אותו. לאחר מכן שאל רבא, "אם כן, הוא לא צריך להיות אחראי אפילו על דברים גלויים?" אז רבא אמר, "לכן, ר' יוחנן מחזיק עם ריש לקיש שהאש היא בגלל נזק באמצעות רכושו של אדם, וכל הסיבה שאמר ר' יוחנן בגלל החץ שלו היא בגלל ארבעה מיני נזקים נוספים. שאלתי היא מה המקרה? האם אביי מתכוון שאם היה קיר, והוא הדליק אש, והיא עברה על החומה, אבל למה הוא לא יהיה חייב אפילו אם הייתה חומה, והאש קפצה מעליו. ועל אחת כמה וכמה, אם היה קיר והוא נפל, והוא לא הספיק לתקן אותו, ובכל זאת הוא הדליק מדורה, וכביכול גם שם הוא לא היה אחראי לדברים הנסתרים. ורבא אמר שבמקרה הזה אפילו לדברים פתוחים הוא לא היה חייב. אם האש היא בגלל החצים שלו, אז הוא צריך להיות אחראי גם לדברים נסתרים וגם לדברים פתוחים. הדרך היחידה לדעת רבא לקבל את החובה להיות חייב על דברים פתוחים, ואי אחריות על דברים נסתרים, היא אם האש חייבת רק בגלל נזק על ידי רכושו. מכל מקום, אני יכול לראות את טעם הגר''א שאמר שהרי''ף רמב''ם וסמ''ג קבעו שר' יוחנן אינו אוחז באש הוא מחמת חיציו למעט תוספת אחריות של ארבעה מיני נזקים. הסיבה שהוא יודע זאת מהרמב''ם היא שהרמב''ם כתב לאש אין אחריות על דברים נסתרים. אם נתבונן בדיון בין אביי לרבא, נראה שאם היה חומה, הוא אינו אחראי לכלום, ואם לא היה חומה כלל, אזי הוא צריך להיות אחראי לכל נזק אלא אם כן אש אחראית רק בגלל נזק על ידי רכושוץ ------------------------------------------אציין שהדרך בה שמבין הגר"א את דברי הגמרא שונה ממה שהגמרא עשוי להיראות ממבט ראשון. הגמרא אומרת שר' יוחנן סבור שהאש אחראית גם בגלל חיציו וגם בגלל רכושו. זה נשמע כאילו זה אומר שבכל מקרה הוא אחראי לשניהם. כלומר, "ו" פירושו זה וזה, זה כמו בצומת. הגר''א מבין את המשמעות זה או זה, אבל לא שניהם. בחלק מהמקרים אש אחראית בגלל חיציו (במקרה של ארבעת סוגי הנזקים אחראים כאשר נגרם נזק על ידי הגוף), ובמקרים אחרים אש אחראית לנזק שנגרם על ידי רכוש

Bava Kama page 23. I am wondering what the argument between Abayee and Rava is about

Bava Kama page 23. I am wondering what the argument between Abayee and Rava is about? Abayee asked if R Yochanan is right (that damage by fire is liable because it is his arrows, i.e., direct damage by his body), then why would he be not liable for hidden things? And Abyee answered his own question. The case is when there was a wall, and it fell down, and he did not have a chance to repair it. Rava then asked, “If so, he should not be liable even for open things?” so Rava said, “Therefore, R Yochanan holds with Reish Lakish that fire is because of damage by means of one’s property, and the whole reason R. Yochanan said because of his arrows is because of four extra kinds of damage. My question is what is the case? Does Abaye mean that if there was a wall, and he lit a fire, and it went over the wall, that he would not be liable? But why? Supposedly he lit some kind of bonfire in his backway and there was a wall, and the fire jumped over it. Why would he be not liable? And all the more so, if there was a wall, and it fell, and he did not have time to repair it and still he lit a bonfire, and supposedly there too he would not be liable for hidden things and Rava said in that case even for open things he would not be liable. But this seems even worse. If there was no wall because it fell (even though he did not have time to fix it), if fire is because of his arrows, then he should be liable for both hidden and open things. Why was he lighting a bonfire? Maybe he was cold? But then, he should build the wall and then light the fire? The only way according to Rava to get the obligation to be on open things, and nonliability for hidden things, is if fire is obligated only because of damage by means of one’s property. ______________At any rate, I can see the point of the Gra that the Rif Rambam and Semag held that R Yochanan does not hold fire is because of his arrows except for the added liability of four kind of damage. The reason he knows this from the Rambam is that the Rambam wrote for fire one is not liable for hidden things. If we look at the discussion between Abaye and Rava, we see that if there was a wall, he is not liable for anything, and if there was no wall at all, then he should be liable for all damage unless fire is liable only because of damage by means of one’sproperty. I should mention that the way the Gra understands the statement of the Gemara is different than what the Gemara might appear at first sight. The Gemara says that R. Yochanan holds that fire is liable because of both his arrows and his property. That sounds like it means in all case it is liable for both. That is, “and” means this and that that as in intersection. The Gra understands the meaning is this or that, but not both. In some case fire is liable because of his arrows (in the case of the four types of damage one is liable for when damage is done by one body that are extra), and in other cases fire is liable for damage that would-be caused by one property. _______________________________________________________________________בבא קמא page כ''ג. I am wondering what the argument between אביי and רבא is about? אביי asked if ר’ יוחנן is right (that damage by fire is liable because it is his arrows, i.e., direct damage by his body), then why would he be not liable for hidden things? And אביי answered his own question. The case is when there was a wall, and it fell down, and he did not have a chance to repair it. רבא then asked, “If so, he should not be liable even for open things?” so רבא said, “Therefore, ר’ יוחנן holds with ריש לקיש that fire is because of damage by means of one’s property, and the whole reason ר’ יוחנן said because of his arrow is because of four extra kinds of damage. My question is what is the case? Does אביי mean that if there was a wall, and he lit a fire, and it went over the wall, that he would not be liable? But why? Supposedly he lit some kind of bonfire in his backway and there was a wall, and the fire jumped over it. Why would he be not liable? And all the more so, if there was a wall, and it fell, and he did not have time to repair it and still he lit a bonfire, and supposedly there too he would not be liable for hidden things and רבא said in that case even for open things he would not be liable. But this seems even worse. If there was no wall (even though he did not have time to fix it), if fire is because of his arrows, then he should be liable for both hidden and open things. Why was he lighting a bonfire? Maybe he was cold? But then, he should build the wall and then light the fire? The only way according to רבא to get the obligation to be on open things, and nonliability for hidden things, is if fire is obligated only because of damage by means of one’s property. At any rate, I can see the point of the גר''א that the רי''ף רמב''ם and סמ''ג held that ר’ יוחנן does not hold fire is because of his arrows except for the added liability of four kind of damage. The reason he knows this from the רמב’’ם is that the רמב’’ם wrote for fire one is not liable for hidden things. If we look at the discussion between אביי and רבא, we see that if there was a wall, he is not liable for anything, and if there was no wall at all, then he should be liable for all damage unless fire is liable only because of damage by means of one’s property. I should mention that the way the גר''א understands the statement of the גמרא is different than what the גמרא might appear at first sight. The גמרא says that ר' יוחנן holds that fire is liable because of both his arrows and his property. That sounds like it means in all case it is liable for both. That is, “and” means this and that that as in intersection. The גר''א understands the meaning is this or that, but not both. In some case fire is liable because of his arrows (in the case of the four types of damage one is liable for when damage is done by one body that are extra), and in other cases fire is liable for damage that would-be caused by one property.

Passover

My feeling about Passover is that it ought to be based on the molad [conjuntion], not on the day after the molad when the moon can become visible. My reasoning has nothing to do with the Gemara in Rosh Hashana where it is clear that the time for setting the time of the new moon is after 18 or more hours after the molad. Rather my reasoning is based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin where R Elazar said that if the lower court does not sanctify the new moon in it proper time, then the heavenly court does so. I have thought for a long time that the called Hebrew Calander is simply copy and paste of the Calander of Athens. I also think that while it is good to do spring cleaning, however to base that on chametz is disingenuous. After all, to get rid of chametz all one needs to do is to say all chametz that is in my possession is null. And that is enough [as long as one’s intention is sincere not to eat or posses chametz during Passover. However, the bill of sale that is customary I think is invalid based on the Gemara in Ketuboth where a mother signed all her possession over to her daughter without it really being sincere, and when he recovered her health the property wag oven back to the mother. A bill of sale has to be with intention to do the sale, not a trick to avoid the law.

za72 F minor midi za72 nwc format

I bet neither Rousseau nor Kant had any real experience with a ”noble savage”. Noble savage I think existed only in the minds of these two philosophers

I am thinking that Rav Nachman of Breslov was talking about Kant when he criticized some famous philosopher in his time. It probably was not Hume like I had thought at first because Kant was rapidly gaining public attention at that that time in Germany. Georg Hamann was probably right that whole Critique of Pure Reason was misguided. some tried to fix in the gaps. But I am wondering how could these really smart German philosophers miss people like John Locke or the American Revolution. Had they never heard of Locke of the Constitution of the USA ? They were all plenty impressed with the Terrible French revolution with the streets of Paris literally turned red from the blood of the guillotine. Kant had only one picture in his house that of Rousseau! The great inspiration behind of French revolution. {I bet neither Rousseau nor Kant had any real experience with a ”noble savage”. Noble savage I think existed only in the minds of these two philosophers ,In real life you just leave out the “noble” part and leave in the “savage”. } Maybe Philosophy ought to turn to more sensible people like John Locke and Thomas Reid. In the enlightenment people rightly understood the danger of religious fanaticism, but not the equal and even more serios problem of political fanaticism believing in utopia that is only if everyone would agree with them

נראה לי שרב שך לומד את הסוגיא בדף כ''ג בבא קמא באופן שדומה לגר''א כי הוא אומר בנזקי ממון פרק י''ד הלכה ט''ו שאף על פי שהאש חייבת מחמת חיציו, עדיין אין זה בדיוק כמו חיציו. הוא מביא הוכחה מדברים נסתרים. על דברים נסתרים יהיה אחראי על נזק באמצעות חיצים, אך במקרה של שריפה, אין חייבים כאשר מדובר בדברים שאין נוהגים להחביא בתוך ערימה. אז רב שך אכן לומד כמו הגר''א לפחות מבחינת התוצאה שאש אינה כחיציו לכלום חוץ מארבעת סוגי הנזק. ציינתי קודם שהגר''א כתב שדרך הרי"ף רמב''ם וסמ''ג לומדים את דף כ''ג הוא שר' יוחנן מחזיק אחרת ממה שחשבנו במקור. בהתחלה חשבנו שהוא התכוון לאש בגלל שהחיצים שלו, פירוש שזה נזק מפעולה ישירה של האדם. כעת במקום זאת, אנו חושבים שזה רק כמו נזק באמצעות רכושו של האדם כמו השור שלו, וזה כמו אש רק לגבי ארבעה סוגים נוספים של תשלום

It seems to me that Rav Shach is learning the sugia on page 23 of bava kama in away that is similar to the Gra because he says in Nizkei Mamon 14 chapter halacha 15 that even though fire is liable because of his arrows still it is not exactly like his arrows. He brings a proof from hidden things. For hidden things, one would be liable by actual damage by means of one’s arrows, but in the case of fire, one is not obligated when it is for things that are not customarily hidden inside a stack. So, Rav Shach does learn like the Gra at least in terms of the result that fire is not like his arrows for anything except the four types of damage. I have mentioned before that the Gra wrote that the way the Rif Rambam and semag learn the subject of page 23 is that R Yochanas holds differently than what we thought originally. At first, we thought he meant fire is because his arrows mean it is damage by one’s direct action. Now instead we think it is only like damage by mean of one’s property like his ox, and it is like fire only in term of four extra type of payment.

reason recognizes a lot more than contradictions,

I believe that this insight of Bryan Caplan (about the false dilemma of Hume) provided a seed for the development of the thinking of Michael Huemer about the idea that reason recognizes a lot more than contradictions, rather it recognizes universals However I am not trying to say that Kant and Hegel, Georg Hamann, and Nelson had no value. They were, rather, trying to solve the problem of how reason recognizes universals

Yet none of the German idealists saw that the entire premise of Hume was a fallacy.

I put this important paper here because it shows something amazing. The entire basis of German idealism from Kant up until Hegel was based on this one idea of Hume. It forms the basis of the idea of Kant about the limits of pure reason. Hegel accepted this except that he tried go around it by the dialectic method. Yet none of the German idealists saw that the entire premise of Hume was a fallacy. [Hume taught Euclidean geometry and from that he decided that all human reason can do is to perceive contradiction.] Here is a link to Caplan's early material. An Enquiry Concerning Hume's Misunderstanding Bryan Caplan Tu 3-4 Phil 122 Question #1 1. Introduction Remarkably, it is possible to sum up David Hume's vital assumptions about reasoning in a single proposition: Reason does NOTHING except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. This paper will attempt three tasks: first, to show the textual support for my interpretation; second, to explain how Hume's skepticism about induction depends on this assumption; and third, to briefly argue that Hume's basic assumption is wrong. 2. Textual Support Whenever Hume wants to show that reasoning cannot support something, he uses the same argument: the alternative is not a contradiction. "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind."1 Suppose that we try to use reason to establish any matter of fact. Hume says that our effort is futile, because the alternative is conceivable. But if the alternative is conceivable, then it is not a contradiction, because contradictions are inconceivable. But reason can refute something only if it is a contradiction. Hence, reason can never establish any matter of fact. Hume liberally repeats this argument throughout his works on epistemology. When he denies that reason justifies the law of cause-and-effect, he says, "That there are no demonstrative arguments in this case, seems evident; since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change."2 The argument is the same as above: An alternative is conceivable; contradictions are not conceivable; and reason can only demonstrate that something is false if it is a contradiction. Hence, reason cannot establish the law of cause-and-effect. Hume uses the same argument in A Treatise of Human Nature. "There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider the objects in themselves. Such an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different."3 Once again, Hume notes that he can conceive of one object without a second object. Since no contradictions are conceivable, this is not a contradiction. And since reason does nothing but locate the presence or absence of contradictions, reason cannot establish a connection between any two things. Later in the Treatise, Hume makes the argument still more explicit: "To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it."4 Conceivability implies the absence of a contradiction, and the absence of a contradiction implies that reason has nothing to say on the matter. To cement my interpretation, let us turn to Hume's Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, where he repeats the argument. "The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event to follow upon another: whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. There is no demonstration, therefore, for any conjunction of cause and effect."5 As always, his argument flows from the conceivability of an alternative, to the absence of a contradiction, to the forced silence of reason on the question. "What is demonstratively false implies a contradiction; and what implies a contradiction cannot be conceived."6 Hume could hardly be more explicit. In all three works, he uses precisely the same argument. And this argument rests on a crucial assumption about reason and reasoning: namely, that reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. While Hume may be open to interpretation on some points, the textual support for my claim is quite solid: it spans at least three of his epistemological works, and appears repeatedly in each. The next section explains in detail why this assumption about reasoning matters. 3. The Crucial Assumption Let us formally state the argument that Hume uses above in order to see why his assumption crucially supports his view that we never have any reason to believe any matter of fact. 1. The alternative to any matter of fact is conceivable. 2. If something is conceivable, then it is not a contradiction. 3. Reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Therefore, reason has nothing to say about any matter of fact; if a proposition concerns matters of fact, reason can neither support nor refute it. It is hard to doubt premises #1 and #2. We can indeed conceive of alternatives to any matter of fact. And it seems like a basic feature of a contradiction that it is inconceivable. (Try to conceive of a circular square. Now try to conceive that gremlins exist. Notice the difference?) Premise #3 is therefore the crucial step in the argument -- and Hume's most central assumption about reasoning. How does the above argument relate to Hume's argument that we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact? I shall briefly but formally state Hume's argument against induction, then see how it relates to his central assumption about reasoning. 1. All knowledge comes either from observation or reason. 2. Knowledge of unobserved matters of fact can't come from reason, because the alternative to any matter of fact is conceivable and therefore implies no contradiction. 3. Knowledge of unobserved matters of fact can be derived from knowledge of observed matters of fact only if the law of cause-and-effect is known. 3a. Reason cannot establish the law of cause-and-effect, because the alternative is conceivable and therefore implies no contradiction. 3b. Observation alone cannot establish the law of cause-and- effect, because this is itself an unobserved matter of fact, so the argument would be circular. Therefore, we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact. Let us now cross-examine these two formal arguments, and see why Hume's assumption about reason (premise#3 in the first argument) is crucial for his second argument to work. Interestingly, it is actually used twice in the second argument - in premises#2 and 3a. Premise #2 claims that we cannot come to know about unobserved matters of fact just by reasoning about them. Why? Because the contrary to every matter of fact is conceivable, conceivable things are not contradictions, and reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Premise #3a claims that we cannot come to know the law of cause-and- effect just by reasoning about it. Why? Because the contrary of the law of cause-and-effect is conceivable, conceivable things are not contradictions, and reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. So Hume's basic assumption about reasoning is absolutely crucial at both steps. Suppose someone had a different theory of reasoning. Hume's argument would fall apart. A critic could accept everything else that Hume says, but claim that reason does more than merely locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Perhaps we use reason to directly justify our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact. Or perhaps we use reason to justify the law of cause-and-effect (major premise), coupled with our knowledge of observed matters of fact (minor premise), to justify our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact (conclusion). In either case, Hume's problem of induction dissolves. Only if reason is as weak as Hume says would his skepticism about induction follow. But Hume never proves the weakness of reason. Instead, he accepts the weakness as a basic premise, claiming that no one denies it: "[W]hatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. And this is a principle, which is generally allowed by philosophers."7 Since his conclusions differ so radically from those of earlier philosophers, Hume should have considered that they might not accept the same conception of reason. At the very least, he should have argued for his position, instead of just asserting that, "To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it."8 But is it? Only if we accept Hume's view of reason in the first place, according to which reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. How would Hume convince someone who didn't already agree? I don't think that he could. 4. An Alternative Conception of Reason Consider the claim: Circular arguments are invalid. Think about it for a while. You can see that it is true -- but how? Even though Hume himself uses this principle in his argument, we could never justify it on his principles. The denial is not a contradiction. We can at least conceive that "Some circular arguments are valid" is true. But at the same time, this principle is not a mere matter of fact. Once we grasp the principle, we see that it is true always and everywhere; moreover, we grasp it by the mere operation of thought. Or consider the claim: The argument ad hominem is a fallacy. Again, the denial is not a contradiction; yet we grasp that it is universally true with the mere operation of thought. I think that these two claims are convincing counter- arguments to Hume's conception of reason. Reason does more than merely discover the presence of absence of contradictions. Frequently, we justify necessary truths just by thinking about them; and sometimes, the opposite of these necessary truths is still conceivable and hence not a contradiction. What is so amazing about this claim? It just turns out that Hume underestimates the power of reason when he limits it to locating the presence or absence of contradictions. I probably won't convince anyone in so brief a presentation. But at least let me raise some doubts in the minds of convinced Humeans. Hume claims that reason cannot justify the law of cause- and-effect. I think that it plainly does. We grasp that "Circular arguments are invalid" and "The argument ad hominem is false" by the pure operation of thought, even though their opposites are conceivable and hence not contradictions. I say that we justify the claim "Every effect has a cause; the same cause always produces the same effect" in exactly the same manner. Namely, we think about the claim; and if we are sufficiently intelligent, open-minded, and intellectually honest, we immediately see its truth. 5. Conclusion Hume assumes that reasoning can do nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Moreover, his argument that we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact crucially depends on this unproven assumption. For if reason could do something more than locate the presence or absence of contradictions, we could use reason to justify our claims about unobserved matters of fact. Reason might directly give us a reason to believe unobserved matters of fact; or, reason might give us a reason to believe the law of cause-and-effect, which coupled with immediate observations would give us a reason to believe unobserved matters of fact. I have not proved that this alternative conception of reason is correct. But we should at least consider it. Not only do the examples in the section four tend to support it; but it is also the most likely escape route from the long list of absurd conclusions Hume's premises imply. No one accepts Hume's conclusions in practice; it is time to question his theory as well. Notes 1: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, pp.15-16. 2: ibid, p.22. 3: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp.86-87. 4: ibid, p.89. 5: David Hume, Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, pp.13- 14. 6: ibid, p.17. 7: ibid, p.14. 8: A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., p.89.