הסתכלתי על ההוכחה של ר' שמואל רוזובסקי [ספר זיכרון שמואל דף ש' ] שגזילה נכללת במעילה [חפצי המקדש], ולכן אם יש מקרה שבו מעילה אינה חלה, עדיין ישים גזל. אבל ההוכחה באה מהירושלמי (תרומה פרק ו') ושם כתוב אם גונב תרומה של הקדש, אז הוא משלם את הערך הרגיל של החפץ, אבל מוסיף שתי חמישיות, האחת לתרומה והשנייה למעילה. אם החפץ שווה פרוטה, אבל אין לו נפח של זית, אז לר' ינאי הוא משלם חמישית וזה הולך לכהן. אם יש לו נפח של זית, אך אינו שווה פרוטה, החמישי הולך להקדש (אוצר המקדש). אם זו הגרסה הנכונה, אז ר' שמואל הגיוני. אבל הגרסה של הגר''א והרמב''ם היא הפוכה. אם יש לו ערך של פרוטה, אך חסר לו הנפח, אז הוא הולך להקדש. אם יש לו את הנפח, אך לא את הערך הכספי הנכון, הוא הולך לכהן. בגרסה זו, אין שום דבר שמצביע על כך שגזל כלול במעילה. אלא, הוא אינו אומר דבר על גזל, וגם אם גזל היה נכלל, לעולם לא היה מקרה שבו אחד (מעילה) חל והשני (הקדש) לא

I was looking at the proof of Reb Shmuel Rozovski [Zichron Shmuel page 300] that robbery is included in meila [using objects of the Temple], and therefore if there is a case where meila does not apply, robbery would still be applicable. But the proof comes from the Jerushalmi Talmud (Trumah chapter 6) and there it says if one steals trumah of hekdesh, then he pays the regular value of the object, but adds two fifths, one for truma and the other for meila. If the object has the worth of a pruta, but does not have the volume of an olive, then to R Yanai he pays only one fifth and it goes to the priest. If it has the volume of an olive but is not worth a pruta, the fifth goes to hekdesh (temple treasury). If this is the right version, then Reb Shmuel makes sense. But the version of the Gra and the Rambam is the opposite. If it has the worth of a pruta, but lacks the volume, then it goes to hedesh. If it has the volume, but not the right monetary value, it goes to the priest. In this version, there is nothing to indicate that robbery is included in meila. Rather it says nothing about robbery, and even if robbery would be included, there would never be an instance in which one applies and not the other. __________________________________________________________________________________I was looking at the proof of ר' שמואל רוזובסקי [ספר זיכרון שמואל page ש' ] that גזילה is included in מעילה [using objects of the Temple], and therefore if there is a case where מעילה does not apply, robbery would still be applicable. But the proof comes from the ירושלמי (תרומה chapter ו') and there it says if one steals תרומה of הקדש, then he pays the regular value of the object, but adds two fifths, one for תרומה and the other for מעילה. If the object has the worth of a פרוטה, but does not have the volume of an זית, then to ר' ינאי he pays only one fifth and it goes to the priest. If it has the volume of an olive but is not worth a פרוטה, the fifth goes toהקדש (temple treasury). If this is the right version, then ר' שמואל makes sense. But the version of the גר''א and the רמב''ם is the opposite. If it has the worth of a פרוטה, but lacks the volume, then it goes to הקדש. If it has the volume, but not the right monetary value, it goes to the priest. In this version, there is nothing to indicate that robbery is included in מעילה. Rather it says nothing about robbery, and even if robbery would be included, there would never be an instance in which one applies and not the other.____________________

za83 F Minor midi file za83 nwc file

היה ראש ישיבה של פונוביץ לפני רב שך. שמו היה ר' שמואל רוזובסקי. היום התבוננתי בכמה מרעיונותיו ושמתי לב שהוא סבור כדלקמן: לדעת הר"ם, אדם שגונב מהקדש [פריטים המוקדשים למקדש] צריך להחזיר את ערך הפריט, לא בגלל עבירה של שימוש בחפצי קודש אלא פשוט בגלל עבירה של גניבה. אבל למרות זאת, הוא לא משלם כפליים כי הפסוק בתורה פוסל אותו מלשלם כפליים. עבור הרבא''ד, עליו להחזיר את הסכום העיקרי שהיה שווה הפריט בגלל מעילה, לא בגלל גניבה רגילה, [ואם גנב בטעות אז עליו גם להחזיר חמישית ולהביא קרבן, קורבן אשם]. אולם רב שמואל אומר שגם הר''ם וגם הראב''ד מסכימים שאם גנב את הקדש, אז עליו להחזיר את הסכום העיקרי בגלל גזל, לא מעילה. כלומר, הראב''ד אינו חולק על הר''ם במקרה זה. בגלל זה, ניתן להבין את התוספות בקידושין נ''ה ע''א שקובע שפקיד בית דין (גזבר) שלוקח את הקדש שברשותו למשמרת ונותן אותו לאדם אחר בכוונה מוציא את החפץ מקטגוריה של הקדש והוא מאבד את קדושתו. הסיבה היא שמדובר במקרה של גזל, לא גניבה בהסתרה כמו גנב בלילה. לכן הגזבר אחראי על גזל וזה לא מקרה של מעילה. לכן, החפץ יוצא מלהיות הקדש. מה שאני מתכוון כאן הוא שאם החטא היה מעילה, אז הוא היה מוציא את החפץ מקטגוריה של מעילה רק אם היה מוסר אותו בטעות כמו ר' יהודה בקידושין נ''ה

There was a rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch before Rav Shach. His name was Reb Shmuel Rozovski. I was lookinng at some of his ideas todayת and noticed that he holds as follows: To the opinion of the Rambam, a person that steals from hedesh [items that are dedicated to the Temple] has to pay back the value of the item, not because of the transgression of using holy items, but rather simply because of the transgression of stealong. But even so, he does not pay double because the verse of the Torah excludes him from paying double. To the Raavad, he has to pay back the main amount the item was worth because of meila, not because of normal theft, [and also if he stole by mistake then he also has to pay back a fifth and bring a sacriifice, a guilt offering.] However Reb Shmuel says both the Rambam and Raavad agree if he robbed hedesh, then he has to pay back the main amount because of rebbery, not meila. i.e., the Raavad does not disagree with the Rambam in this case. Because of this, it is possible to understand Tosphot in Kidushin page 55 that holds that a officer of the court that takes hedesh that is in his possesion for safekeeping and gives it away to another person on purpse, takees the object out of the category of hedesh, and it loses its holiness. The reason is that this is a case of robbery, not stealing by consealment like a thef in the night. And so, the gizbar is liable for robbery, and this is not a speacial case of meila. Therefore the obkject goes out of being hedesh. What I mean here is that if the sin would be meila, then he would take the object out of the categotry of meia only if he gave it away by mistake like R. Judah there in kidushin page 55.===============================================There was a ראש ישיבה of פונוביץ before רב שך. His name was ר' שמואל רוזובסקי. I was looking at some of his ideas today, and noticed that he holds as follows: To the opinion of the הר’’ם, a person that steals from הקדש [items that are dedicated to the temple] has to pay back the value of the item, not because of the transgression of using holy items (meila), but rather simply because of the transgression of stealing. But even so, he does not pay double because the verse of the Torah excludes him from paying double. To the ראב''ד, he has to pay back the main amount that the item was worth because of מעילה, not because of normal theft, [and if he stole by mistake then he also has to pay back a fifth and bring a sacrifice, a guilt offering.] However, רב שמואל says both the הר’’ם and ראב''ד agree if he robbed הקדש, then he has to pay back the main amount because of robbery, not מעילה. I.e. the ראב''ד does not disagree with the הר’’ם in this case. Because of this, it is possible to understand תוספות in קידושין that holds that a officer of the court that takes הקדש that is in his possession for safekeeping and gives it away to another person on purpose takes the object out of the category of הקדש and it loses its holiness. The reason is that this is a case of robbery, not stealing by concealment like a thief in the night. So, the גזבר is liable for robbery, and this is not a special case of מעילה. Therefore, the object goes out of being הקדש. What I mean here is that if the sin would be מעילה, then he would take the object out of the category of מעילה only if he gave it away by mistake like ר' יהודה in קידושין נ''ה.

היום הסתכלתי על הגמרא בקידושין דף נ''ה, ועלה בדעתי שתוספות נראית במבט ראשון כקובעת את ההלכה כר' מאיר שאומר "הקדש {חפץ שהוקדש לבית המקדש} בכוונה יוצא לחולין, אבל בטעות הוא לא".[הקדש במזיד מתחלל] זה הפריע לי, כי הגמרא עצמה מבהירה שההלכה היא כמו ר' יהודה, שבשוגג הקדש מאבד את קדושתו, אבל במזיד הוא נשאר קדוש. אבל בדרך חזרה מהים, עלה בדעתי למה התוספות מתכוון. הוא אומר שהוויכוח בין ר' יהודה לר' מאיר מתייחס רק לשימוש בקודש. השימוש בקודש בידיעה שהוא קדוש הוא הוויכוח. לר' יהודה נשאר הקדש. אבל תוספות כאן בקידושין דף נ''ה מתייחס לגניבת הקדש. לשיטת תוספות, אם הגזבר גונב אותו בכוונה (על ידי מתן אותו ביודעין לאדם אחר), זה מוציא אותו מקטגוריית הקדש גם לר' מאיר וגם לר' יהודה

I was looking at the Gemara in Kidushin page 55 today and it occurred to me that Tosphot seems at first glance to decide the law to be like R. Meir who holds “Hedesh {an object that has been dedicated to the Temple}on purpose goes out to be secular, but accidently it does not.” This bothered me because the Gemara itself is clear that the law is like R. Judah that accidently it loses its holiness, but on purpose it stays holy. But on the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what Tosphot intends. He is saying that the argument between R. Judah and R. Meir refers only to using Hedesh. Using hedesh while knowing it is hedesh is the argument. To R. Judah it stays hedesh. But Tosphot here in Kidushin page 55 refers to stealing hedesh. To Tosphot if the gizbar intentionally steals it (by giving it knowingly to another person), that takes it out of the category of hedesh to both R. Meir and R Judah.--------------------------------------------------------------------------I was looking at the גמרא in קידושין דף נ''ה today and it occurred to me that תוספותseems at first glance to decide the law to be like ר' מאיר who holds “הקדש {an object that has been dedicated to the Temple}on purpose goes out to be חולין, but accidently it does not.” This bothered me because the גמרא itself is clear that the law is like ר' יהודה that accidently it loses its holiness, but on purpose it stays holy. But on the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what תוספותintends. He is saying that the argument between ר' יהודהand ר' מאיר refers only to using הקדש. Using הקדש while knowing it is הקדש is the argument. To ר' יהודהit stays הקדש. But תוספות here in קידושין דף נ''ה refers to stealing הקדש. To תוספותif the גזבר intentionally steals it (by giving it knowingly to another person), that takes it out of the category of הקדש to both ר' מאיר and ר' יהודה.

אני חושב שקיבלתי קצת בהירות לגבי תוספות והר''ם לגבי מעילה. מה שהייתי רוצה לומר הוא זה. יש טיעון תלת כיווני לגבי מעילה: (1) הר''י (רבינו יצחק) בתוספות בבא מציעא דף צ''ט ע''א, (2) תוספות בקידושין עמוד נ''ה ע''א, (3) ר''ם בפירושו על המשנה. אבל לכולם, אם משהו היה הקדש (קדוש על ידי הקדשה לבית המקדש) והוא יוצא מעצם היותו הקדש, ​​אז מי שמשתמש בו אינו אחראי על מעילה. (רק זה שגרם לו לצאת מקטגוריה זו חייב.) אם משהו הוא הקדש, ​​ומישהו משתמש בו, הוא חייב. השאלה היא מה יכול לגרום לחפץ לצאת מלהיות הקדש? (זה מתייחס לחפץ רגיל, אבל לא לבהמה ולא לכלים ששימשו להכנת הקורבנות.) לר''י (רבינו יצחק) עבור גזבר (פקיד בית דין) להשאיל חפץ של הקדש (שהוקדש למקדש) לא גורם לו לצאת מקטגוריה של הקדש, ​​אבל נתינתו כן גורמת לו לצאת מקטגוריה זו. [זוהי מסקנתו הסופית. אבל בהתחלה הר''י חשב שאפילו השאלה של החפץ גורמת לו לאבד את קדושתו.] נראה שעשיית זאת בכוונה, או בטעות, אינה משנה. (2) תוספת בקידושין עמוד נ''ה ע''א. אם הגזבר בטעות חושב שהחפץ שייך לו, והוא משאיל או נותן אותו, הוא נשאר קדוש. אבל אם הוא יודע שזה הקדש (של המקדש) ונותן אותו, הוא מאבד את קדושתו. כל מי שמשתמש בו לאחר מכן אינו חייב. (3) הרמב"ם מסתמך על הגמרא בקידושין עמוד נ"ה שמשווה פדיון בהמה שעתידה להיות קורבן ואין בה מום, למי שגורם לחפץ הקדש לאבד את קדושתו. (בדרך כלל, אי אפשר לפדות בהמה שהוקדשה להיות קורבן אלא אם כן יש בה מום.) לר"ם, אם הקצין (גזבר) יודע שהחפץ הוא הקדש והשתמש איתו בכל זאת, החפץ נשאר הקדש. זה כמו דעת ר' יהודה בקידושין עמוד נ"ה. אבל, אם הגזבר לא ידע או שכח שזהו הקדש והשתמש איתו בטעות, החפץ מאבד את קדושתו. זה בניגוד לדעת ר' מאיר שסובר ההפך. ר' מאיר סבור שאם והשתמש איתו ביודעין, אז הוא מאבד את קדושתו, לא אם והשתמש איתו בטעות ושכח שזהו הקדש.

Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 99a, (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a, (3) Rambam in his commentary on the Mishna מסכת מעילה

t I think I have gained some clarity about Tosphot and the Rambam about trespass. What I would like to say is this. There is a three way argument about trespass: (1) The RI (rabbainu izhak) in Tosphot in Bava Mezia page 99a, (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a, (3) Rambam in his commentary on the Mishna. But to everyone, if something was hedesh (holy by being dedicated to the Temple) and has goes out of being hedesh, then anyone that uses it is not liable for trespass. (Only the one that caused it to go out of that category is liable.) If something is hedesh, and someone uses it, he is liable. The question is what can cause an object to go out of being hedesh? (This refers to a regular object, but not an animal nor vessels used in preparing the sacrifices.) To the RI (Rabainu Izhak) for a gizbar (officer of the court) to loan out an object of hedesh (that was dedicated to the Temple) does not cause it to leave the category of hedesh, but giving it away does cause it to go out of that category. [That is his final conclusion. But at first the RI thought even loaning out the object also causes it to lose it’s holiness.] It seems doing this on purpose, or by accident makes no difference. (2) Tosphot in Kidushin page 55a. If the officer (gizbar) by mistake thinks the object belongs to him, and he loans or gives it out, it stays holy. But if he knows it is hedesh (of the Temple) and gives it out, it loses its holiness. Anyone that uses it after that is not liable. (3) Rambam bases himself on the Gemara in Kidushin page 55 that equates redeeming an animal that is to be a sacrifice and has no blemish, to one causing an object of hedesh to lose its holiness. (Normally, one cannot redeem an animal that is dedicated to be a sacrifice unless it has a blemish.) To the Rambam, if the officer (gizbar) knows the object is hedesh and gives it out anyway, the object stays hedesh. This is like the opinion of R. Judah in Kidushin page 55. But if the officer did not know or forgot it is hedesh and gave it out by mistake, the object loses its holiness. This is against the opinion of R. Meir who holds the opposite. R. Meir holds if he gave it out knowingly, then it loses it holiness, not if he gave it out by mistake forgetting that is hedesh. --------------------------------------------------------------------I think I have gained some clarity about תוספות and the ר’’ם about מעילה. What I would like to say is this. There is a three way argument about מעילה: (1) The ר''י (רבינו יצחק) in תוספות in בבא מציעא page צ''ט ע''א, (2) תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה ע''א, (3) ר’’ם in his commentary on the משנה. But to everyone, if something was הקדש (holy by being dedicated to the Temple) and has goes out of being הקדש, then anyone that uses it is not liable for מעילה. (Only the one that caused it to go out of that category is liable.) If something is הקדש, and someone uses it, he is liable. The question is what can cause an object to go out of being הקדש? (This refers to a regular object, but not an animal nor vessels used in preparing the sacrifices.) To the ר''י (רבינו יצחק) for a גזבר (officer of the court) to loan out an object of הקדש (that was dedicated to the Temple) does not cause it to leave the category of הקדש, but giving it away does cause it to go out of that category. [That is his final conclusion. But at first the ר''י thought even loaning out the object also causes it to lose its holiness.] It seems doing this on purpose, or by accident makes no difference. (2) תוספות in קידושין page נ''ה ע''א. If the גזבר by mistake thinks the object belongs to him, and he loans or gives it out, it stays holy. But if he knows it is הקדש (of the Temple) and gives it out, it loses its holiness. Anyone that uses it after that is not liable. (3) רמב''םbases himself on the גמרא in קידושין page נ''ה that equates redeeming an animal that is to be a sacrifice and has no blemish, to one causing an object of הקדש to lose its holiness. (Normally, one cannot redeem an animal that is dedicated to be a sacrifice unless it has a blemish.) To the ר’’ם, if the officer (גזבר) knows the object is הקדש and gives it out anyway, the object stays הקדש. This is like the opinion of ר' יהודה in קידושין page נ''ה. But, if the גזבר did not know or forgot it is הקדש and gave it out by mistake, the object loses its holiness. This is against the opinion of ר' מאיר who holds the opposite. ר' מאיר holds if he gave it out knowingly, then it loses it holiness, not if he gave it out by mistake forgetting that is הקדש.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ג ע''א. הגמרא אומרת אם פקיד בית דין שמונה לטפל בכסף או בחפצים המוקדשים למקדש (גזבר) נותן צרור כסף שאינו קשור לחלפן כספים, הפקיד חייב לפי דין מעילה. זהו החוק הקובע כי אסור להשתמש בחפצים המוקדשים למקדש לכל שימוש אחר מזה שלשמו נועדו. הרמב"ם כותב בהלכות מעילה פרק ז', הלכה י': אם אדם מוסר צרור כסף שאינו קשור לחלפן כספים או לבעל חנות, לא הוא ולא החלפן הכספים חייבים. זה נראה בסתירה מוחלטת לגמרא. תשובתי מבוססת על תוספת (בבא מציעא צ''ט ע''א). בתוספות, רבינו יצחק אמר שהפעם היחידה שיכולה להיות מעילה אחרי מעילה היא כאשר גזבר אחד נותן לאחר, והשני לאחר, וכן הלאה. כל אחד אחראי משום שהחפץ מעולם לא יצא מרשות המקדש למרות שכל אחד שימש לשימוש אישי. יש לציין: הרמב"ם לעולם אינו אומר שהוא מדבר על גזבר. אלא, הוא כותב שאדם (פרטי) שיש לו כסף שמוקדש למקדש בחבילה שאינה קשורה נותן אותו לאחר, אף אחד לא אחראי. הראשון משום שלא אמר לאחר להשתמש בכסף, והוא מעולם לא הוציא אותו מרשות המקדש, מכיוון שהכסף עדיין לא הגיע לידי גזבר. אני רוצה להוסיף כאן שבתוספת ישנן שתי דרכים להיות אחראי על מעילה, או הוצאה מרשות הקדש, או שימוש בחפץ אפילו כשהוא עדיין ברשות הקדש. אבל, הוצאה מרשות הקדש בכוונה תחילה או בשוגג אינה משנה דבר-----------בעיה אפשרית בתשובתי כאן היא שהרמב"ם מביא את אותה תוספתא כמו שתוספות, שאומרת שאם אדם אחד משתמש בהקדש (חפץ השייך למקדש), ואז מוסר אותו לאחר והוא משתמש בו וכן הלאה וכן הלאה, כל אחד אחראי על מעילה. כעת, התוספות אומרות שזה מתייחס לפקידי בית המשפט (גזברים), והרמב"ם כותב זאת בפשטות ללא כל אינדיקציה להבחנות כמו שתוספות עושה. אבל הרמב"ם אומר שזה מתייחס לבהמה של הקדש, ולכן אין בעיה בתשובתי שבמקרה שלנו אנחנו מדברים על כסף. בכך שאין מעילה אחרי מעילה, ואף אחד מהם לא מתכוון להוציא את החפץ מתחום המקדש.

Bava Mezia 43 side a. If an officer of the court who is appointed to take care of money or objects that are dedicated to the temple (a gizbar) gives a bundle of money that is not tied up to a money changer, the officer is liable to the law of trespassing. That is the law that states that one must not use objects dedicated to the Temple for any use other than that which they were intended for. The Rambam writes (laws of trespassing chapter 7 law 10) "If one gives over a bundle of money that is not tied to a money changer or storeowner, neither he nor the money changer are liable." This seems in direct contradiction to the Gemara. My answer is based on Tosphot (Bava Mezzia page 98 side A). In Tosphot, Rabainu Izhak said the only time there can be trespassing after trespassing is when one officer gives to another and that other to another and so on. Each is liable because the object never left to domain of the Temple even though it was used for personal use by each one of the officers. So, the Rambam never says he is talking about a officer. Rather he writes that a person that has money of that is dedicated to the Temple in a bundle that is not tied gives it to another, neither is liable. That first one because he did not tell the other to use the money, and he never took it out of the domain of the Temple, since the money has not yet gotten into the hands of a officer. [I would like to add here that in Tosphot there are two ways to be liable for trespassing, either taking out of the domain or possession of the Temple, or using the object even while it is still in the possession of the Temple. But taking out of the domain of the Temple on purpose or by accident makes no difference.]A possible problem with my answer here is that the רמב''ם brings that same תוספתאthat תוספות זbrings that says that if one person uses hekdesh (an object that belongs to the Temple), and then hands it over to another and he uses it and so on and so forth, each one is liable for trespassing. Now, תוספותsays this refers to officers of the court(גזברים) , and the רמב''ם writes this plainly with no indication of any distinctions like תוספות makes. But the rambam says it refers to an animal of hedesh and so there is no question on my answer in our case where we are talking about money. In that there is no trespass after trespass and neither intends to take the object out of the domain of the temple. --------------------------------------------בבא מציעא דף מ''ג ע''א. If an officer of the court who is appointed to take care of money or objects that are dedicated to the temple (a גיזבר) gives a bundle of money that is not tied up to a money changer, the officer is liable to the law of מעילה. That is the law that states that one must not use objects dedicated to the Temple for any use other than that which they were intended for. The רמב''ם writes laws of מעילה chapter 7 law 10. if one gives over a bundle of money that is not tied to a money changer or storeowner neither he nor the money changer are liable. This seems in direct contradiction to the Gemara. My answer is based on תוספות . In תוספות , רבינו יצחק said the only time there can be מעילה after מעילה is when one officer gives to another and that other to another and so on. Each is liable because the object never left to domain of the Temple even though it was used for personal use by each one of the officers. So, the רמב''ם never says he is talking about a officer. Rather, he writes that a person that has money of that is dedicated to the Temple in a bundle that is not tied gives it to another, neither is liable. That first one because he did not tell the other to use the money, and he never took it out of the domain of the Temple, since the money has not yet gotten into the hands of a officer. I would like to add here that in תוספות there are two ways to be liable for מעילה, either taking out of the domain or possession of the הקדש, or using the object even while it is still in the possession of the הקדש. But, taking out of the domain of the הקדש on purpose or by accident makes no difference.---------A possible problem with my answer here is that the רמב''ם brings that same תוספתאthat תוספות brings that says that if one person uses הקדש (an object that belongs to the Temple), and then hands it over to another and he uses it and so on and so forth, each one is liable for trespassing. Now, תוספותsays this refers to officers of the court(גזברים) , and the רמב''ם writes this plainly with no indication of any distinctions like תוספות makes. But the רמב''ם says it refers to an animal of הקדש ,and so there is no question on my answer in our case where we are talking about money. In that there is no מעילה after מעילה and neither intends to take the object out of the domain of the temple.

za82 midi music file. F major za82 nwc file za82 orchestra version za 82 orchestra version nwc file

בשלב מסוים הגמרא שואלת כיצד רב נחמן יסביר את המשנה בקידושין כ"ח. הסיבה לכך היא שאנו אומרים שתחילת המשנה מתייחסת למטבע, וסופה להחלפה באמצעות פירות. הגמרא עונה תשובה לפי ר' יוחנן, אבל אז מה יענה ריש לקיש? אני שואל מדוע לא לומר שריש לקיש שמחזיק מטבע אינו גורם להחלפה, בדיוק כפי שהוא אומר לגבי קניין כסף, מטבע אינו גורם לרכישה, אלא הרמה או משיכה של החפץ הנרכש. אני שואל מדוע לא לומר שריש לקיש חולק על כל ההנחה. אלא, רק הרמה או משיכה. אפילו לרכוש באמצעות החלפה---------------------------אני חושב שכדאי להוסיף כאן שרב נחמן לומד את סוף המשנה כהחלפת שור בפרה, ולא בשר שור בפרה. רק ב"אולי הייתי חושב" הגמרא צריכה לומר שהמשנה מתייחסת לבשר. ואנחנו שואלים לפי הנחה זו כיצד רב נחמן היה מסביר את המשנה. אבל, למעשה, רב נחמן לא מקיים הנחת ה"אולי חשבתי" אבל סבור שהמשנה אומרת "החלפת שור בפרה", לא בשר

bava mezia page 46 n and kidushin 28

The Gemara, at some point, asks how would Rav Nachman explain the Mishna in Kiddushin 28 . The reason is we say the beginning of the Mishna refers to coin, and the end to exchange by exchange. The gemara answers an answer that goes according to R. Yochanan, but then what would Reish Lakish answer. I ask, "Why not say that Reish Lakish holds coin does not cause exchange, just like he says by normal acquisition that coin does not cause acquisition, rather picking up or pulling the acquired object?" I ask why not say Reish Lakish disagrees with the entire assumption. Rather, only picking up or pulling causes acquisition Even by means of exchange? I think I might add here that Rav Nachman learns the end of the Mishna as exchange of ox for a cow, not meat of an ox for a cow. Only in the "I might have thought “does the Gemara have to say that the Mishna refers to meat. And we ask according to that assumption how would Rav Nachman explain the mMishna . But, in fact, Rav Nachman does not hold with that "I might have thought “ and holds the Mishna says “exchange of a ox for a cow”, not meat. -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------The גמראat some point asks how would רב נחמן explain the משנה onקידושין כ''ח . the reason is we say the beginning of the משנה refers to coin and the end to exchange by exchange. The גמרא answers an answer that gores according to ר' יוחנןbut then what would ריש לקיש answer. I ask why not say that ריש לקיש holds coin does not cause exchange just like he says by acquisition that coin does not cause acquisition, rather picking up or pulling the acquired object. I ask why not say ריש לקיש disagrees with the entire assumption. Rather, only picking up or pulling. Even to acquire by means of exchange? I think I might add here that רב נחמןlearns the end of the משנה as exchange of ox for a cow, not meat of an ox for a cow. Only in the "I might have thought “does the גמרא have to say that the משנה refers to meat. And we ask according to that assumption how would רב נחמן explain the משנה. But, in fact, רב נחמן does not hold with that "I might have thought “ and holds the משנה says “exchange of a ox for a cow”, not meat.

Robert Hana has eexposed the fallacies of the so called analytic philosophy but the his idea of forward to Kant is hard to swallow. (See his books on The Rise and Fall of Analytic Philosophy.) If I could, I would gladly claim that Kant or Hegel or Schopenhauer had the truth whole truth and nothing but the truth, but so far i can not see any way to do so. Kant had some important points but also some things that seem off to me. Schopenhauer also seems to have gotten some very important points but other points seem no so well thought out. the universal trait of all people leaning towards Kant is that they despise Hegel and I can not see their point about that either. while it is true that Hegel is obscure and seems incapable of writing any sentence less than 100 words, still the points are powerful. It might be so that just one of the German idealists had the whole truth and none of the others had anything. but i can not see that at this point. Rather, I think philosophy in order to go forwards has to take into account all the German Idealists from Kant and Fries and Hegel up until Schopenhauer.

קידושין כ''ח ע''א וע''ב. תוספות בבא מציעא מ''ז. ההבדלים הבסיסיים בין רש''י, תוספות והרמב''ם לגבי החלפה. לרש''י יש רק שתי קטגוריות: כלים או חפצים נעים [מטלטלים]. אין קטגוריה נפרדת של פירות. לפיכך, לרב נחמן רק כלים יכולים לגרום לרכישה בהחלפה או להירכש בהחלפה. לרב ששת כל המיטלטלין יכולים לגרום להחלפה, ולהירכש בהחלפה. לתוספות יש שלוש קטגוריות: כלים, מיטלטלין ופירות. כלים יכולים לגרום להחלפה ולהירכש באמצעות החלפה. ניתן לרכוש מיטלטלין בהחלפה, אך לא לגרום להחלפה. (זה דומה לאופן שבו רב שך מסביר את הראב''ד בהלכות אישות פרק א') הוא סבור שבהחלפה, אף אחד מהחפצים אינו גורם לרכישה. אלא, כאשר אדם אחד מרים את חפצו, אז הוא שלו. כאשר השני מרים את חפצו, אז הוא שלו.) עבור תוספות, פירות אינם ניתנים לרכישה וגם לא לגרום לרכישה על ידי החלפה, אולם כאשר הם מוחלפים שווים תחת שווים, אז הם יכולים להרכשה על ידי החלפה ולגרום להחלפה [תוספות בבא מציעא מ''ז]. כל זה שונה מאוד מהרמב''ם שסבור שיש שני סוגים של חליפין: שווה תחת שווה, או מטפחת. עבור הרמב''ם, אפילו פירות יכולים להרכש על ידי החלפה. כל המטלטלין יכולים לגרום להחלפה כאשר הם מוחלפים במטלטלין אחרים. אבל כלים לבדם יכולים לשמש כרכישה כבאמצעות מטפחת או נעל.

Bava Mezia 46 and 47 Kidushin 28 The basic differences between Rashi , Tosphot, and the Rambam concerning exchange. To Rashi, there are only two categories: vessels or movable objects. There is no separate category of fruit. Thus, to Rav Nachman only vessels can cause acquisition by exchange or be acquired by exchange. To Rav Sheshet all movables can cause exchange, and be acquired by exchange. To Tosphot there are three categories: vessels, movables, and fruit. Vessels can cause exchange and be acquired by exchange. Movables can be acquired by exchange, but not cause exchange. (This is similar to how Rav Shach explains the Ravad) He holds that in exchange, neither object causes the acquisition. Rather, when one person picks up his object, then that is his.) When the other picks up his object, then that is his. To Tosphot fruit cannot be acquired nor cause acquisition by exchange, however when they are exchanged equal for equal, then they can be acquired by exchange and cause exchange [Tosphot Bava Mezia 47]. This is all very different from the Rambam who hold there a re two kinds of exchange: equal for equal, or handkerchief. To the Rambam even fruit can be acquired by exchange. All movables can cause exchange when exchanged for other movables. But vessels alone can be used as acquisition by means of a handkerchief.​-------------------------------------------------------------------Bava Mezia 46 and 47 Kidushin 28 The basic differences between Rashi , Tosphot, and the Rambam concerning exchange. To Rashi, there are only two categories: vessels or movable objects. There is no separate category of fruit. Thus, to Rav Nachman only vessels can cause acquisition by exchange or be acquired by exchange. To Rav Sheshet all movables can cause exchange, and be acquired by exchange. To Tosphot there are three categories: vessels, movables, and fruit. Vessels can cause exchange and be acquired by exchange. Movables can be acquired by exchange, but not cause exchange. (This is similar to how Rav Shach explains the Ravad) He holds that in exchange, neither object causes the acquisition. Rather, when one person picks up his object, then that is his.) When the other picks up his object, then that is his. To Tosphot fruit cannot be acquired nor cause acquisition by exchange, however when they are exchanged equal for equal, then they can be acquired by exchange and cause exchange [Tosphot Bava Mezia 47]. This is all very different from the Rambam who hold there are two kinds of exchange: equal for equal, or handkerchief. To the Rambam even fruit can be acquired by exchange. All movables can cause exchange when exchanged for other movables. But vessels alone can be used as acquisition by means of a handkerchief.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ו ע''ב. תוספות - המילים הראשונות ולרב נחמן". בקיצור, רבינו תם קובע כי פירות שווים גורמים או נרכשים על ידי חליפין. תוספות שואלים על כך מן הגמרא. הגמרא אומרת שאם מטבע יכול לשמש להחלפה, וזו תהיה כוונת המשנה "כל מה שנעשה כסף עבור אחר", ברגע שאחד רוכש, גם השני רוכש. אז למה יכול להתייחס סוף המשנה, המתייחס להחלפה של שתי חיות? אחרי הכל, אין כאן מטבע. הגמרא עונה שסוף המשנה ואומרת לנו שניתן להשתמש בפירות כהחלפה. הגמרא שואלת על כך והלא רב נחמן מחזיק בפירות, שלא ניתן להשתמש בהם להחלפה. התשובה של תוספות יכולה להיות שהמשנה מתייחסת למקרה של שווה תחת שווה. תוספות עונה שהמשנה אינה מתייחסת למקרה של שווה תחת שווה. אבל תוספות מרחיק לכת ואומר שאפילו בדרך שבה רב יהודה מבין את המשנה, זה גם לא מתייחס לשווה בשביל שווה. אבל השאלה על זה היא למה בכלל להזכיר את רב יהודה? למה זה יהיה נחוץ בכלל? הרי השאלה הייתה רק על רב נחמן. הסתפקנו בתשובת רב יהודה הייתי בים ועלה בדעתי מדוע תוספות מעלה את הרעיון שאפילו אם נלמד את המשנה כ"כל הנישום", זה עדיין לא שווה תמורת שווה. אני חושב שהסיבה היא שאם חליפין עובד בעבור תמורת פירות כאשר הערך הכספי של כל אחד שווה תמורת שווה, אז אפילו רב יהודה לא היה צריך לבוא על התשובה "כל הנישום". הוא היה יכול לומר ש"כל הנעשה" יכול להתייחס לפירות ולכל החפצים הנעים כאשר זה שווה תמורת שווה. עם זאת, אני חייב לציין שיש ויכוח בין המהרש"א למהר"ם שיף לגבי מה התכוונו תוספות לומר כשהוא מעלה את תשובתו של רב יהודה. שתי התשובות נראות לי סבירות, אולם אני חושב שהתשובה שלי היא פשוטה יותר. כלומר, אם רבינו תם היה צודק והמשנה הייתה יכולה להיות שווה תחת שווה, אז רב יהודה לא היה צריך להגיע לתשובה קשה לגבי המשנה כאשר תשובה פשוטה יותר הייתה זמינה

Bava Mezia page 46b. Tosphot first words and to Rav Nachman”. In short, Rabainu Tam holds equal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. Tosphot asks on this from the Gemara. The Gemara says if coin can be used for exchange, and that would be the intension of the Mishna “all that is made money for another”, once one acquires, the other also acquires. Then what could the end of the Mishna which refers to exchange of two animals be referring to. After tall, there is no coin here. The gemara aanswers the end of the Mishna tell us fruit can be used in exchange. The Gemara asks on this from Rav Nachman who holds fruit cannot be used for exchange. The answer could be that the Mishna is referring to a case of equal for equal. Tosphot answers the Mishna is not refering to a case of equal for equal. But Tosphot goes further and says even in the way Rav Judah understands the Mishna, it is also not referring to equal for equal. But the question on this is why mention Rav Judah at all? Why would this be necessary at all? After all the question was only on Rav Nachman. We were satisfied with the answer of Rav Judah. I was at the sea and it occurred to me why tosphot brings up the idea that even if we learn the Mishna as "all that is evaluated" it still is not equal for equal. I think the reason is that if exchange works for fruit when the monetary worth of each is equal for equal then even rav judah would not have had to come onto the answer for "all that is evaluated". He could have said all that is made could refer to fruit and all movable objects when it is equal for equal. however, I must mention that there is an argument between the Maharsha and the Maharam Shif about what Tosphot means to say by bring up the answer of Rav Judah. Both answers seem reasonable to me however I think my answer is simpler. that is if Rabainu Tam would be right then Rav Judah would not have had to come onto difficult answer about the mishna when a simpler one was available.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------בבא מציעא page מ''ו ע''ב. תוספותfirst words and to רב נחמן”. I was at the sea and it occurred to me why תוספותbrings up the idea that even if we learn the משנה as "כל הנישום" it still is not equal for equal. I think the reason is that if exchange works for fruit when the monetary worth of each is equal for equalת then even רב יהודהwould not have had to come onto the answer כל הנישום . He could have said "כל הנעשה" could refer to fruit and all movable objects when it is equal for equal. However, I must mention that there is an argument between the מהרש''א and the מהר''ם שיף about what תוספות means to say by bring up the answer of רב יהודה. Both answers seem reasonable to me, however I think my answer is simpler. That is, if רבינו תם would be right and the משנה could be a case of equal for equal, then רב יהודה would not have had to come onto difficult answer about the משנה when a simpler one was available. in short rabainu tam holds qequal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. tosphot asks on this from the gemara. the gemara says if coin can be used for exchange and that would be the intension of the mishna all that is made monney for another, once one acquires the other also acquires. then what could the end of the mishna which refers to exchange of two anumals be refering to. after tall, there is no coin here. answer the end tell us fruit can be used in exchange. the gemara asks ogfn this from rav nachma who holds friuit canot be used for exchange. the answer could be that the mishna is refering to a case of equal for equal. tosphot answrs the mishna is not refer to a case of equal for equal. but tosphot goes further and says even in the way rav juda understands the mishna, it is also not refering to equal for equal. why would this be neccessary at all? after all the question was only on rav nachman. we were satisfied with the answer of rav juday.----------------- In short, רבינו תם holds equal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. תוספותasks on this from the גמרא. The גמרא says if coin can be used for exchange, and that would be the intension of the משנה “all that is made money for another”, once one acquires, the other also acquires. Then what could the end of the משנה which refers to exchange of two animals be referring to. After tall, there is no coin here. The גמרא answers the end of the משנה tell us fruit can be used in exchange. The גמרא asks on this from רב נחמן who holds fruit cannot be used for exchange. The answer could be that the משנה is referring to a case of equal for equal. תוספות answers the משנה is not referring to a case of equal for equal. But תוספות goes further and says even in the way רב יהודה understands the משנה , it is also not referring to equal for equal. But the question on this is why mention רב יהודה at all? Why would this be necessary at all? After all the question was only on רב נחמן. We were satisfied with the answer of רב יהודה.

ברמב"ם הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הוא מביא את חוק החליפין. אבל במקרה של רכישה בכסף בפרק א' הוא לא מביא את חוק החליפין. נראה מכך שהחלפת חפצים אינה רכישה בכסף. למרות שמה שיש לו ערך כספי נחשב לפעמים ככסף, עדיין ישנם מקרים שבהם זה לא כך, למשל פדיון עבד עברי צריך להיות באמצעות כסף, לא מה ששווה כסף. דוגמאות נוספות הן בדיני גניבה שבהן יש ויכוח האם אפשר לשלם במה שיש לו ערך כספי. לכן, כאשר הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לשאת אישה בהחלפה, פירוש הדבר החלפה בכלים כמו מטפחת, לא החלפה שווה תחת שווה. כאן אני רק מזכיר בקצרה את מה שאומר רב שך בתחילת חוקי אישות

In the Rambam laws of sale chapter 5 he brings the law of exchange. but in the case of acquisition by money in chapter 1 he does not bring the law of exchange. It seems clear from this that exchange of objects is not acquisition by money. Even though that which has monetary value is sometimes considered to be like money, still there are cases where it is not, for example the redemption of a Jewish slave has to be through money, not that which is worth money. Other examples are in laws of theft where there is an argument if one can pay by that which has monetary value. So when the Gemara says one cannot marry a wife by exchange that means exchange by vessels like a handkerchief, not exchange equal for equal. Here I am just mentioning in short what Rav Shach says in the beginning of laws of marriage.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the רמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק ה' 5 he brings the law of exchange. But in the case of acquisition by money in chapter א' he does not bring the law of exchange. It seems clear from this that exchange of objects is not acquisition by money. Even though that which has monetary value is sometimes considered to be like money, still there are cases where it is not, for example the redemption of a Jewish slave has to be through money, not that which is worth money. Other examples are in laws of theft where there is an argument if one can pay by that which has monetary value. So when the גמרא says one cannot marry a wife by exchange that means exchange by vessels like a handkerchief, not exchange equal for equal. Here I am just mentioning in short what רב שך says in the beginning of laws of marriage.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ו ע''א וע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "כל מה שנעשה ערך כספי באחר, ברגע שאחד רוכש אותו, השני רוכש את החליפו. כיצד זה? אם אדם מחליף שור בפרה, ברגע שאחד רוכש אחד, השני רוכש את השני." הגמרא שואלת שנראה שהמשנה מתכוונת שמטבע יכול לגרום להחלפה, (ואנחנו יודעים שזה לא המצב). אז רב יהודה אומר שזה אומר שאם אדם מעריך חפץ ברגע שהוא רוכש את הראשון, השני רוכש את השני. [כלומר, החלפה זו צריכה הערכה.] הגמרא שואלת בנקודה זו שה"הייתי חושב" היה נכון לפחות לפי לוי שחליפת מטבע יכולה לגרום לקניין. אז איך הבינה הגמרא את המשנה בנקודה זו? אחרי הכל, לדוגמה שהיא נותנת אין לה שום רלוונטיות למטבעות. (הדוגמה היא פרה תמורת שור.) תשובה. המשנה פירושה שמטבעות יכולים לגרום להחלפה, וגם פירות. (הדוגמה של שור לפרה היא דוגמה לפרי.) אבל עבור רב נחמן שמחזיק פירות לא יכולים לגרום להחלפה, מה יכולה להיות הכוונה? כאן תוספות שואל על רבינו תם שאולי המשנה קידושין דף כ"ח מדברת על החלפה שווה תחת שווה, ובמקרה כזה פירות יכולים לגרום להחלפה לפי רבינו תם. הוא עונה שזה לא יכול להיות כך, מכיוון שסוף המשנה צריך להיות כמו ההתחלה, וההתחלה בבירור אינה שווה תחת שווה. אני לא מבין מדוע זה כך. לפי הייתי חושב (הוה אמינא) אנחנו מדברים על החוק שניתן להחליף מטבע. "כל מה שהופך לערך כסף עבור משהו אחר, ברגע שאחד רוכש את החפץ, השני רוכש את החפץ המוחלף." היכן אנו רואים כאן שלא מדובר על שווה תמורת שווה?תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו של תוספות על רב נחמן היא שאולי רב יהודה אומר שהחליפין צריך להיות שווה עבור שווה, (שכן אחרת למה צריך להעריך את השווי הכספי של כל חפץ?) ולכן גישתו של רב נחמן שונה והוא חייב להחזיק "כל הנעשה דמים נאחר" פירושו כלים שאינם שווים עבור שווים. עם זאת, ברור שתוספות לא עונה כך. הוא גורס שאפילו דעתו של רב יהודה, שכאשר הוא אומר "כל הנישום דמים באחר", משתמע מכך שהם אינם שווים בערכם

Bava Mezia page 46 side a and b. The Mishna says, “All that is made monetary value in another, once one acquires it, the other acquires its exchange. How is this. if one exchanges an ox for a cow, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other.” The gemara asks that it seems the Mishna means that a coin can cause exchange, (and we know that is not the case). So Rav Juda says it means if one evaluates an object once one acquires the first the other acquires tthe second. [ie that exchange needs evaluation.] the gemara asks at this point that the hava amina (I would have thought) was at least true according to Levi or Rav that holds a coin can cause exchange. So how did the Gemara understand the Mishna at that point? After all, the example it gives has no relevance to coins. (The example is a cow and for an ox) Answer. The mishna means coins can cause exchange, and fruit also. (The example of a ox for a cow is an example of fruit.) But to Rav Nachman who holds fruit can not cause exchange, what could the Mishna mean? Here Tosphot asks on Rabainu Tam that perhaps the Mishna in Kidushin page 28 is talking about exchange equal for equal, and in that case fruit can cause exchange according to Rabbainu Tam. He answers that that can not be so, since the end of the mishna has to be like the beginning, and the beginning is clearly not equal for equal. I fail to see why this is so. according to the I would have thought (hava amina) we arre talking about the law that a coin can be exchanged. ''All that is made money value for something else, once one acquires the object, the other acquires the exchanged object. '' Where do we see here that it is not talking about equal for equal? A possible answer to this question of Tosphot on Rav Nachman is that perhaps Rav Judah means that the exchange has to be equal for equal, (since otherwise why would one have to evaluate the monetary worth of each object?) and therefore approach of Rav Nachman is different and he must hold “All that is made monetary value in other” means vessels that are not equal for equal. However, it is clear that Tosphot does not answer this. He holds that even the opinion of Rav Judah is that when he says one must evaluate the worth of each object, that implies they are not equal in value. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- בבא מציעא page מ''ו ע''א וע''ב. The משנה says, “All that is made monetary value in another, once one acquires it, the other acquires its exchange. How is this. if one exchanges an ox for a cow, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other.” The גמרא asks that it seems the משנה means that a coin can cause exchange, (and we know that is not the case). So רב יהודה says it means if one evaluates an object once one acquires the first, the other acquires the second. [ie that exchange needs evaluation.] The גמרא asks at this point that the הווה אמינא (I would have thought) was at least true according to לוי (or Rav) that holds a coin can cause exchange. So how did the גמרא understand the משנה at that point? After all, the example it gives has no relevance to coins. (The example is a cow and for an ox) Answer. The משנה means coins can cause exchange, and fruit also. (The example of a ox for a cow is an example of fruit.) But to רב נחמןwho holds fruit can not cause exchange, what could the משנה mean? Here תוספות asks on רבינו תםthat perhaps the משנה in קידושין page כ''ח is talking about exchange equal for equal, and in that case fruit can cause exchange according to רבינו תם . He answers that that can not be so, since the end of the משנה has to be like the beginning, and the beginning is clearly not equal for equal. I fail to see why this is so. according to the I would have thought (הווה אמינא) we are talking about the law that a coin can be exchanged. ''All that is made money value for something else, once one acquires the object, the other acquires the exchanged object. '' Where do we see here that it is not talking about equal for equal? A possible answer to this question of תוספות on רב נחמן is that perhaps רב יהודה means that the exchange has to be equal for equal, (since otherwise why would one have to evaluate the monetary worth of each object?) and therefore approach of רב נחמןis different and he must hold “כל הנעשה דמים נאחר” means vessels that are not equal for equal. However, it is clear that תוספות does not answer this. He holds that even the opinion of רב יהודהis that when he says "כל הנישום דמים באחר", that implies they are not equal in value.

What's Wrong with Stereotypes? Michael Huemer Aug 3

MICHAEL HUEMER AUG 3 1. Opposition to Stereotyping I keep hearing that “stereotyping” is bad, and that it’s good to undermine stereotypes. For instance, if you have a TV show with a brilliant surgeon, you should make them a woman. Or black. Or, best of all, a black woman. Because that will defy stereotypes and thereby make the world a better place. If you make a picture of some business people in a meeting, you have to make sure that it does not reflect what most business meetings actually look like; rather, you should gender balance it and make sure to have three different races represented (see above photo). If someone tells a joke that relies on stereotypes about a group, that is “offensive” and hence evil. I guess because it reinforces the stereotypes? Or maybe it’s just evil to rely on a stereotype for anything. Back when James Damore was fired from Google, it was partly because he cited research to the effect that women tend to be higher than men in the traits of “agreeableness” and “neuroticism” from the 5-factor model of personality. In doing so, he was reinforcing stereotypes, which all decent people know to be evil. If a statement sounds like a stereotype, that alone is enough to categorically reject it. Most of the people who believe this have a predictable political orientation, and so you can usually count on a certain amount of hypocrisy. Thus, certain stereotypes are fine. You can stereotype white men as privileged oppressors, you can stereotype Republicans as uneducated, etc. It’s all a matter of stereotyping the right group in the right way. As long as your stereotype reinforces your political side, it’s cool. But I digress. My question: what exactly is supposed to be wrong with stereotypes? Why not use and reinforce them? 2. Problems with Stereotypes A. What are stereotypes? First, what is a stereotype? Usually, people are talking about stereotypes about groups of people (e.g., women, black people, doctors). (I guess you could also have “stereotypes” about any class of object, but we don’t care about non-human objects.) As far as I can tell, a “stereotype” is just a widely shared belief about what a certain class of people tend to be like. Aside: Maybe there are a few other conditions, such as: it can’t be something definitional, it has to differentiate the group from other groups, and it should be a statistical generalization. Thus, it isn’t a “stereotype” that bachelors are unmarried, or that black people tend to have two legs. But let’s not worry about all the details of the definition. What is wrong with using or reinforcing such beliefs? B. Are they false? Maybe the problem with stereotypes is that they tend to be false, or to lead people to make false judgments. On the face of it, this would be surprising. In general, people tend to form beliefs about observable reality based on observations, which generally tend to reflect that reality. If most people think that the winter is colder than the summer, that’s probably because the winter is colder than the summer. If people tend to think that humans generally have two arms, that’s probably because humans generally have two arms. Etc. Could it be that, when it comes to groups of people, we have a general tendency to go wrong about everything—that when we think a group has feature F, in general, the group usually doesn’t have F? This is possible, but it would be pretty surprising. Btw, notice that I’m talking about beliefs about observable (or otherwise easily accessible) properties of observable objects. It’s not so surprising that people get things wrong about unobservable things, like God or the origin of the universe. Or maybe it’s not quite that the group doesn’t have F at all; maybe it’s just that stereotypes tend to exaggerate real differences, so the group that is stereotyped as having F will have less F than people tend to think. These are common critiques of stereotypes among educated people. One might say there is a stereotype that stereotypes are inaccurate. These critiques, however, have the character of articles of faith—almost none of these educated people who are too smart to fall for crude stereotypes has ever actually checked on whether stereotypes tend to be accurate or not. It happens that we have evidence about this. Over 50 studies have been performed on the accuracy of demographic, national, political, and other stereotypes. The results are unequivocal: Stereotypes are not generally inaccurate, nor are they generally exaggerations. The truth is the exact opposite: stereotypes are generally accurate, except that they tend to understate real differences. There is basically no evidence that stereotypes tend to lead to inaccurate judgments. Psychologist Lee Jussim describes stereotype accuracy as “one of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology”. See his paper for a general review of the evidence. (See also his blog post.) For example: A 2011 paper titled “Beliefs About Cognitive Gender Differences: Accurate for Direction, Underestimated for Size” reported results of a study in which they asked ordinary people to guess how men and women would perform on a series of cognitive tasks. The scientists then compared the ordinary people’s expectations to the reality. This is a straightforward test. It turned out that people’s guesses were correct about the direction of gender differences (which sex would perform better on which tasks) but that the actual gender differences were larger than people thought. Notice that this is the opposite of what educated, progressive, right-thinking people would presumably predict. But again, this really should not be at all surprising if you’re thinking non-ideologically. Human beings can observe each other. Most of us have had many interactions with men and women. It would be bizarre if, despite that, we kept having beliefs about gender differences that had no correlation with reality. C. Are they oppressive? Maybe the problem is that stereotypes—whether accurate or not—are oppressive. Maybe they stop individuals from attempting or succeeding in things that would defy the stereotypes, when they would otherwise have succeeded. This could be true, but it isn’t self-evident. One way this could work is that other people would judge you based on stereotypes and would refuse to take into account your own individual characteristics. This is another one of those things that educated, progressive people assume without checking the evidence. In fact, studies find individuating information (specific to individuals) has massively greater effects on people’s judgments of others than stereotypes do. Given a society of millions of people, I’m sure there are some people who are deterred from attempting something due to stereotypes, and who are thereby worse off. So that is a cost. On the other hand, there can also be costs to not having stereotypes—e.g., perhaps some people would be encouraged to do things that they would not be suited to, and they would thereby be made worse off. As a general rule, truth is good. Knowing the truth about things that are relevant to your interests can make you worse off sometimes, but in general, it makes you better off. So, given the accuracy of stereotypes, stereotypes are probably beneficial. But whether they are or not, trying to suppress them is a fool’s errand. Normal people won’t stop noticing group differences just because elites try to hide them; normal people will just conclude that the elites are dishonest propagandists. D. Stereotype threat Stereotype threat is a theory in psychology that says that the existence of stereotypes tends to cause people to act in ways conforming to those stereotypes. Particularly negative stereotypes. E.g., it is said that if you remind people of their race before giving them a scholastic aptitude test, then the black students will tend to perform worse, due to stereotypes about their race. If you remind people of their sex, then the women will supposedly perform worse on the math questions than they otherwise would. Some people claim that this effect actually explains the entire gap in test scores between blacks and whites. Of course that’s false (it derives from a simple misunderstanding of a graph in the original study—progressives then just kept passing on this misunderstanding to each other). The effect only (at most) slightly increases already-existing gaps. In Progressive Myths, I discuss several problems with the stereotype threat literature. Here is just one interesting point: There have been many studies of the stereotype threat effect. Most of them are done in the lab. Some of them use more realistic conditions than others, and four of them have been done using actual administrations of standardized tests. The more realistic the test is, the

I have been thinking about Kant and the later German idealists and I think the issues they deal with are important, and yet I do not think that any one of them alone can be taken as the right answer, Rather I think each of has some good points and yet can not be considered to have the whole picture. To take Kant himself as the right approach misses the obvious problems in his system that were noticed right away almost before the ink was dry on the first edition of the Critique. But to take of the later ones also ignores the very reason that each one in turn appeared bright for a time and then disappeared. Hegel of course did not disappear but there is at least the one lack that he never solved—that reason has to start somewhere. The best solution to that problem is Fries with the idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge, but besides that Fries is much less impressive than Hegel. [Hegel, is I think the same kind of system as Plotinus, except Plotinus starts with the One and goes down while Hegel starts at the bottom and goes back up until the Absolute Subject.] [And I also must mention that none of the German Idealists saw the importance of John Locke and the Constitution of the USA which was based on him.] The German idealists were best in dealing with philosophical problems, not political problems. [I just noticed an old few ideas I wrote about the system of the USA that I bringg here just forr added context about John Locke. A lot of the USA is based on the Magna Carta and Simon DE Montfort (Provisions of Oxford) and John Locke and the two-tiered parliament system of England. Pluss a lot of the Bill of Rights is based on issues that England had to deal with and resolve that were incorporated in the Bill of Rights of the USA. I might mention that the American Colonists never wanted to separate from England until the King refused intervene in favor of the colonies. The main grievance was toward Parliament. Besides that, there has to be a basic DNA structure in people for them to be able to accept such a system. Unless you have Anglo-Saxon DNA, it is doubtful how well this system could work elsewhere. There is something in the Anglo Saxon DNA which take the written law as absolute and binding. While in the USSR the only reason the system worked at all was the tendency to ignore the written rule and just strive toward what worked]

רב שך סבור שיש רק שני סוגים של חליפין, שווה לשווה, או רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [לרב שך החלפת מחט בשריון היא שווה בשווה מכיוון שזה רוצה מחט והשני רוצה חליפת שריון.] רב שך סבור שהחליפין חל על נישואין לאישה, ולא על רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [זה דומה לתוספות ר''יד שסבור שקידושין באמצעות מטפחת שווה יותר מפרוטה שייך לקדש אישה.] לפי זה, עלינו לומר שכאשר רב נחמן אמר בבבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב ובקידושין כ''ח ע''ב שפרי לא יכול לעשות חליפין, הוא בטח מתכוון שהוא לא יכול ליצור חליפין, אלא שהוא יכול להתקבל באמצעות חליפין. כדי להבהיר את הערתי כאן, הרשו לי להביא כמה נקודות. ראשית, רב שך מדבר רק על הגישה של הרמב''ם. ברור שתוספות ורבינו תם שונים לחלוטין. כמו כן, אנו יודעים שהחוק הוא כמו רב נחמן, שפירות אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין [פירות לא עבדי חליפין], אלא רק כלים.זה לדעת הרמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק י''ג אבל מהו כלי? עבור תוספות, כלי הוא כל דבר שניתן להשתמש בו. אבל עבור רב שך, זה חייב להתייחס למה שיכול ליצור רכישה, לא למה שניתן לרכוש, משום שהוא סבור שאישה יכולה להרכש על ידי חליפין של שווה לשווה. גישה זו של רב שך, שאני חייב להזכיר, אינה דומה לתוספות, שיש חליפין שווה לשווה, וסוג אחר שאינו שווה לשווה, אך עדיין אינו רכישה על ידי מטפחת או נעל---------- ייתכן שיעזור להבין את מה שרב שך אומר אם אזכיר את ההבהרה של שמואל רוזובסקי שהבעיה היא האם משהו גורם לרכישה כמו במקרה של רכישה באמצעות מטפחת (סודר), או שאין שום מושא שגורם למעבר בכלל. פשוט בהחלפה, אחד רוכש את מושא האדם השני, והשני רוכש את מושא של הראשון. ועדיין, אפילו עם ההבהרה הזו, מוזר שרכישה באמצעות סודר לא תעבוד כדי לקדש אישה למרות שזוהי רכישה מוחלטת באמצעות קניין סודר, בעוד שרכישה באמצעות החלפה תקנה אישה, למרות שזוהי רכישה לא על ידי כסף שטר וביאה. ולפי רב שמואל רוזובסקי חליפין אינו גורם קניין לשני כל אלא כל אחד קונה את החפץ שהוא מגביה. לפי זה אם אחד נותן חפץ לאישה ואומר זה לך ובמקומו את מקודשת לי אין בזה הגבה ומשיכה לאישה. ולהפך אפשר לראות דין של תוספות רי''ד שדווקא קהערה מאוחרת יותר. אני רואה עכשיו שרב שך לומד את רעיון החליפין בצורה שונה מרב שמואל רוזובסקי. הוא אומר שהגישה של הרמב"ם היא שהחלפה שווה בערך שווה היא כמו רכישה במשיכה או הגבהה שבה החפץ הראשון שנלקח הוא שגורם לרכישת החפץ השני, ולכן אין ספק לגבי הגישה של רב שך. הוא מסביר את כל זה בבירור בתחילת הלכות אישותניין סודר עוזר.. ------------------------------------------------לאחר שכתבתי את האמור לעיל, הבנתי שלמעשה זה פתוח ברמב"ם עצמו. בתחילת פרק חמשה בהלכות מכירה הוא טוען שניתן לרכוש פירות על ידי חליפין שווה תחת שוהז-כמו -השאלה שיש לי לגבי גישה זו של הרמב"ם היא שהיא לא נראית מתאימה לגמרא. הגמרא עצמה מדברת תמיד על רכישה באמצעות חליפין ואינה מזכירה אפילו פעם אחת את הגורם לרכישת חליפין. אז מהיכן הרמב"ם היה שואב את גישתו---- עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם מבין את כל הגמרא כמתייחסת לגרימת רכישה על ידי חליפין---------ההבדל הוא שגרימת רכישה היא תת-קבוצה של היכולת להירכש באמצעות רכישה. זה כמו העובדה שהחלפת כסף אינה גורמת לרכישה. רק משיכה או הרמה יכולים לגרום לרכישה. לכן, אנו רואים שהרמב"ם מבין את הגמרא כמתייחסת לגרימת רכישה------ ם זאת, עליי לציין שסוגיה זו היא ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם, משום שתוספות מקפיד להראות כיצד כל הנושא מתייחס ליכולת להירכש באמצעות חליפין. הוא מסביר שהמשנה, שנשמעת כאילו פירושה גרימת רכישת מטבע באמצעות חליפין של חפץ, פירושה שמטבע לעולם לא ניתן לרכוש באמצעות חליפין. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק באמצעות מכירה. אם אדם מחליף חפץ בכספו של אחר, כסף זה אינו נרכש. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק אם הוא משמש לקניית החפץם זאת, עליי לציין שסוגיה זו היא ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם, משום שתוספות מקפיד להראות כיצד כל הנושא מתייחס ליכולת להירכש באמצעות חליפין. הוא מסביר שהמשנה, שנשמעת כאילו פירושה גרימת רכישת מטבע באמצעות חליפין של חפץ, פירושה שמטבע לעולם לא ניתן לרכוש באמצעות חליפין. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק באמצעות מכירה. אם אדם מחליף חפץ בכספו של אחר, כסף זה אינו נרכש. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק אם הוא משמש לקניית החפץ---------------------יש לציין כאן שרש''י ותוספות לומדים את הוויכוח בין רב נחמן לרב ששת באופן שונה מהרמב''ם. עד כה אמרתי שלפי הרמב''ם, החוק רב נחמן הוא שפירות ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין, אך אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין; בעוד שלרב ששת הם יכולים גם לגרום לחליפין. לפי רש''י הם (רב נחמן ורב ששת) נבדלים בכך. רב ששת קובע שכל החפצים המטלטלים ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין ולגרום גם להם. עבור רב נחמן רק כלים שניתן להשתמש בהם ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין ולגרום לחליפין. עבור רש''י, שור או פרה נחשבים כנכללים בחפצים המטלטלים. רב נחמן התכוון להוציא רק פירות ממה שיכול לגרום לחליפין, אך חוץ מזה, כל החפצים המטלטלים יכולים לגרום לחליפין, או אולי רק כלים שמישים. אבל הרמב''ם כותב, "אפשר להחליף כלים בכלים, בהמה בבהמה, אפילו מחט בשריון או טלה בסוס, אבל אם הוא מחליף פרי בפרי, ניתן להחיל על כך את חוק המרמה." (אם ההחלפה הייתה יותר מחמישית מערכה, ההחלפה בטלה). האם טלה ניתן לשימוש ככלי או כמו חפצים ניידים אחרים? אני מתכוון שהוא אולי מתכוון שרק כלים יכולים לגרום להחלפה והוא אולי יטען שטלה כלול, או שאולי הוא מתכוון שכל החפצים הניידים מלבד פרי יכולים לגרום להחלפה

Bava Metzia 46

Rav Shach (laws of marriage 1:2)holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To Rav Shach exchange of a needle for a suit of armor is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of armor.] Rav Shach holds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. ([This is like the Tosphot R'id who holds acquisition by handkerchief that is worth more that a pruta can acquire a wife.])According to this, we must say that when Rav Nachman said in Bava Metzia 46 and Kidushin 28b that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First Rav Shach is only talking about the approach of the Rambam. Clearly, Tosphot and Rabbainu Tam are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like Rav Nachman that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. (Rambam laws of sale chapter 13) But what is a vessel? To Tosphot, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to Rav Shach this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of Rav Shach I must mention is not like Tosphot that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. It might help to understand what Rav Shach is saying if I mention the clarification of Shmuel Rozovski that the issue is if something causes a acquisition as in the case of acquisition by a handkerchief, or if there is no object causing the transition at all. Simply in the exchange one acquires the object of the other person, and the other acquires the object of the first person. Still even with this clarification it is odd that acquisition by handkerchief would not work to marry a wife even though it is absolutely acquisition by money while acquisition by pure exchange would acquire a woman though it is a different kind of acquisition. (Later note.) I see now that Rav Shach learns the idea of exchange different than Rav Shmuel Rosovsky. He says that the approach of the Rambam is that exchange equal value for equal value is still like an acquisition by money in which the first object tat is picked up is what causes the second object to be acquired and therefore there is no question about the approach of Rav Shach. He explains this all clearly in the beginning of laws of marriage After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the Rambam himself. In the beginning of chapter five in laws of sale he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like Rabbainu Tam. So, when he holds like Rav Nachman that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired by exchange. The question I have on this approach of the Rambam is that it does not seem to fit with the Gemara. the Gemara itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the Rambam have derived his approach?It occurred to me that the rambam understands the entire gemara as referring to causing acquisition by exchange[The difference is that causing acquisition is a subset of being able to be acquired by acquisition. This is like the fact that exchange of money does not cause acquisition. Only pulling or picking up can cause acquisition. Therefore, we see the Rambam understands the Gemara to be referring to causing acquisition.] However, I might mention that this issue is a debate between Tosphot and the Rambam because Tosphot makes a point of showing how the whole subject is referring to the ability to be acquired by exchange. He explains that the Mishna that sounds like it means causing acquisition of a coin by means of exchange of an object means that a coin can never be acquired by exchange. It can only be acquired by a sale. If one exchanges an object for the money of another, that money is not acquired. It can only be acquired if it is used to buy the object. I might mention here that Rashi and Tosphot learn the argument between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet differently than the Rambam. So far I have been saying according to the Rambam, the law of Rav Nachman is that fruit can be acquired by exchange, but can not make exchange; while to Rav Sheshet they can also cause exchange. According to Rashi, they differ in this. Rav Sheshet holds all movable objects can be acquired by exchange and cause it also. to Rav Nachman only vessels, that can be used can be acquired by exchange .and cause exchange. To Rashi, a ox or cow are considered to be included in movable objects. Rav Nachman mean to exclude only fruit in what can not cause exchange, but besides that, all movable objects can cause exchange, or maybe only usable vessels. However, the Rambam writes, ” One can exchange vessels for vessels, an animal for an animal, even a needle for a coat of armor or a sheep for a horse, but if he exchanges fruit for fruit , that can have the law of cheating applied to it.” (If the exchange was more than a fifth of its value, the exchange is nullified). Is a sheep usable like a vessel or like other movable objects? I mean to say he might mean that only vessels can cause exchange and he might hold thanot a sheep is included, or perhaps he means all movable objects besides can cause exchange but just not fruit? now i would like to add here that ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [laws of marriage 1:2] holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To רב שךexchange of a needle for a שריון is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of שריון.] רב שךholds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. According to this, we must say that when רב נחמן said in בבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב and קידושין כ''ח ע''ב that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First רב שךis only talking about the approach of the רמב''ם. Clearly, תוספות and רבינו תם are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like רב נחמן that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. But what is a vessel? To תוספות, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to רב שך this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of רב שךI must mention is not like תוספות that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the רמב''ם himself. In the beginning of chapter five in הלכות מכירה he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like ר' תם. So, when he holds like רב נחמן that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired bהThe question I have on this approach of the רמב''ם is that it does not seem to fit with the גמרא. Theגמרא itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the רמב''ם have derived his approach?y exchange. [The difference is that causing acquisition is a subset of being able to be acquired by acquisition. This is like the fact that exchange of money does not cause acquisition. Only pulling or picking up can cause acquisition. Therefore, we see the רמב''ם understands the גמרא to be referring to causing acquisition. However, I might mention that this issue is a debate between תוספות and the רמב''ם because תוספות makes a point of showing how the whole subject is referring to the ability to be acquired by exchange. He explains that the משנהthat sounds like it means causing acquisition of a coin by means of exchange of an object means that a coin can never be acquired by exchange. It can only be acquired by a sale. If one exchanges an object for the money of another, that money is not acquired. It can only be acquired if it is used to buy the object.---------I might mention here that רש''יand תוספות learn the argument between רב נחמן and רב ששתdifferently than the רמב''ם. So far I have been saying according to the רמב''ם , the law of רב נחמן is that fruit can be acquired by exchange, but can not make exchange; while to רב ששת they can also cause exchange. According to רש''י they differ in this. רב ששת holds all movable objects can be acquired by exchange and cause it also. to רב נחמן only vessels, that can be used can be acquired by exchange .and cause exchange. To רש''י , a ox or cow are considered to be included in movable objects. רב נחמן meant to exclude only fruit in what can not cause exchange, but besides that, all movable objects can cause exchange, or maybe only usable vessels. He writes, ” One can exchange vessels for vessels, an animal for an animal, even a needle for a coat of armor or a sheep for a horse, but if he exchanges fruit for fruit , that can have the law of cheating applied to it.” (If the exchange was more than a fifth of its value, the exchange is nullified). Is a sheep usable like a vessel or like other movable objects? I mean to say he might mean that only vessels can cause exchange and he might hold that a sheep is included, or perhaps he means all movable objects besides can cause exchange but just not fruit?

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I noted that a king of Mesopotamia Cdarlaomer that conquered Sodom and Gomora (along with three other kings) also smote the Chori at Mount Seir (Genisis chapter 14), but did not wipe them out. Only later, the kings of Esau destroyed the Chori, and made Mount Seir their home base. see the events when Abraham first came to the land of Canaan and later in the recounting of the descendants of Esau in Genisis. אני רוצה לציין כי מלך מסופוטמיה, כדרלעומר שכבש את סדום (יחד עם עוד שלושה מלכים) גם את היכה את החורי בהר שעיר, אך לא חיסל אותם. רק מאוחר יותר השמידו מלכי עשו את החורי והפכו את הר שעיר לבסיס הבית שלהם

אני תוהה מדוע הרמב"ם פסק דין כמו "הייתי אומר", במקום מסקנת הגמרא בקידושין דף כ''ח. התשובה שחשבתי עליה היא שאולי מסקנת הגמרא הולכת כמו רב יוסף שקובע שצריך להעריך חפץ לפני שניתן להשתמש בו כבעל ערך כספי (שווה כסף). [אני מתייחס כאן לרב יוסף בקידושין דף ח']. הוא סבור שאם מתחתן עם אישה עם בד משי, יש להעריך אותו מראש. הוא לומד זאת מברייתא שמלמדת שעבד עברי ניתן לרכוש או על ידי כסף או משהי שווה כסף, אבל לא על ידי כלים או תבואה. אבל למה לא כלים או תבואה אם אחרי הכל, גם להם יש ערך כספי? אז, רב יוסף אומר שהסיבה שכלים אינם תקפים היא שערכם עדיין לא הוערך. אבל אז הבנתי שרב יוסף מתייחס רק לשימוש במשהו שהוא שווה כסף, ולא זה שמשתמשים בו בחליפין. רק בעמוד כ''ח אומר רב יהודה שמה שמשתמשים בו בחליפין, צריך להיערך מראש. אבל מכיוון שזה לא החוק, לכן הרמב"ם החליט ללכת עם ה"יכולתי לומר" (השערה שנדחתה) לפחות באופן שבו הגמרא מבינה את המשנה לפי רב נחמן. כדי להבהיר זאת, הרשו לי להביא את המשנה והגמרא. המשנה אומרת כל הנעשה דמים באחר כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. הגמרא אומרת זה, אולי חשבתי, מתייחס למטבע. אבל אנחנו יודעים שלא ניתן להשתמש במטבעות בהחלפה. רב יהודה ענה, "זה אומר, מה שמשתמשים בו בהחלפה צריך להיבחן כמה הוא שווה." הגמרא שואלת אז מדוע ה"הייתי אומר" הייתה אפשרות בת קיימא מלכתחילה? תשובה: זה היה אומר שניתן להשתמש במטבע בהחלפה, וגם ניתן להשתמש בפירות בהחלפה. אבל רב נחמן קבע שפירות לא יכולים לשמש בהחלפה, ולכן הגמרא מסיקה שהמשמעות היא שאם מישהו מוכר שור במאה, ולאחר מכן המוכר מגלה שלקונה יש פרה בשווי אותו מחיר, המוכר יכול לומר, "תן לי את הפרה במקום מזומן." ורק על ידי אמירה זו, הרכישה הושלמה. בכל מקרה, קשה להבין את הגמרא הזו, שכן היא אומרת שהגישה האחרונה שבה מישהו שמכר את השור אומר "שמור את המאה שאתה חייב לי" ותן לי את הפרה שלך במקומם, הדין הזה הוא כמו ר' יוחנן שסובר שמהתורה כסף גורם לעסקה כספית להיות תקפה. אני לא מבין מה עצם האמירה "שמור את הכסף ותן לי את הפרה" קשורה לדין התורה שהחלפת מטבע, לא משיכת החפץ שנקנה, גורמת למכירה להיות תקפה. במקרה שלנו, אף אחד מעולם לא משך מטבע כלשהו------יתר על כן, אפשר לומר כמו תוספות שהדין שהגמרא אומר כאן הולך רק לדעה שניתן לרכוש מטבע בהחלפה כי רב נחמן לא אומר שהמשנה פירושו ''כל הנערך (נישום)'' כמו רב יהודה, אלא מותיר אותה לומר ''כל מה שנעשה דמים באחר''. איך יכלו הרי''ף והר''ם לענות על בעיה זו

I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the Gemara in Kidushin pg 28. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the Gemara is going like Rav Joseph that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to Rav Joseph in Kiddushin page 8. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a braita that teaches that a Jewish slave can be acquired either by money or what is worth money, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, Rav Joseph says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that Rav Joseph is referring only to using something that is worth money, not that which is used in an exchange. It is only on page28 that Rav Judah says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the Rambam decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the Gemara understands the mishna according to Rav Nachman. To make this clear let me bring the Mishna and Gemara. The Mishna says anything that is made money, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. R. Judah answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The Gemara then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But Rav Nachman held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the Gemara concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this Gemara is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like R. Yochanan who holds that from the torah money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying keep the money and give me the cow instead has any relevance to the law of the Torah that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever. Furthermore, it is possible to say like Tosphot does that the law the Gemara says here is going only to the opinion that coin can be acquired by exchange because Rav Nachman does not say the Mishna means ''all that is evaluated'' (like Rav Yehuda) but leaves it to say ''all that is made''. How could the Rif and Rambam answer this problem? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the גמרא in קידושין דף כ''ח. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the גמרא is going like רב יוסף that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to רב יוסף in קידושין דף ח'. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a ברייתא that teaches that a עבד can be acquired either by כסף or what is שווה כסף, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, רב יוסף says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that רב יוסף is referring only to using something that isשווה כסף not that which is used in חליפין. It is only on page כ''ח that רב יהודה says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the רמב''ם decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the גמרא understands the משנה according to רב נחמן. To make this clear let me bring the משנה and גמרא. The משנה says כל הנעשה דמים כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. רב יהודה answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The גמרא then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But רב נחמן held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the גמרא concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this גמרא is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like ר' יוחנן who holds that from the תורה, money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying "Keep the money, and give me the cow instead," has any relevance to the law of the תורה that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever.------Furthermore, it is possible to say like תוספות does that the law the גמרא says here is going only to the opinion that coin can be acquired by exchange because רב נחמן does not say the משנה means ''all that is evaluated נישום '' (like רב יהודה) but leaves it to say ''all that is נעשה דמים באחר''. How could the רי''ף and ר''ם answer this problem?

"What America used to stand for" by Michael Huemer

Here, I talk about what America used to stand for, and how we are losing it. What We Celebrate Sometimes, on the 4th of July, I think about what we’re celebrating, and I wonder how the founders who signed the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 would feel if they saw our celebrations, and our society more generally. I used to think of July 4th as celebrating American values of freedom and independence. But when you look around, it’s hard to find any evidence that the holiday means anything like that to most people. It seems to be more a celebration of our ability to make loud noises and brightly colored flashes of light and, as with all holidays, to stuff our faces. I am not sure if Americans know the Declaration anymore, or if they value what it says. Here is part of what it says, a succinct expression of Lockean libertarian philosophy: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it …. A long list of complaints against King George follows. The document concludes thus: We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. There is then a series of signatures. It is worth remembering that all of those people had reason to believe that they were signing their death warrants. They had just declared war against the world’s most powerful nation; the most likely outcome was that they would lose that war and all be killed—either during the conflict, or by execution afterwards. Why did they do it? Narrow self-interest fails. The only satisfying explanation is that they believed in what they were saying— That the purpose of government is to protect the rights of the governed, that the British government was not doing that, and that the appropriate remedy for such a situation was to cast off that government. People in those days had a lot more courage and a lot more capacity for sacrifice than we do today. I suspect that the poetical bit about pledging their sacred honor was also sincere: people at that time actually thought in those terms.

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היכן הייתה ארץ אדום? זהו ויכוח בין הגר"א לרש"י. עבור הגר"א, היא נמצאת בדרום ובמזרח של ארץ כנען. אבל עבור רש"י היא נמצאת רק בדרום. מדוע אין חקירות על מיקומו של אדום? ככל הנראה, לא הייתה אימפריית אדום, בעוד שהייתה אימפריית חיתי ואימפריות מתחרות אחרות באותה תקופה. אך ישנן עדויות לכך שאדום לא היה רק במזרח, אלא אף השתרע עד לגבול הצפוני של כנען, שכן יש פסוק במדבר שישראל בשלב מסוים הייתה על גבול ארץ אדום בהור ההר ומשם שלח משה הודעה למלך שהיה מצפון לשם. הור ההר הוא גבולה הצפוני של ישראל כפי שמוגדר בבמדבר ל''ד". אך קשה לראות כיצד אדום יכלה להשתרע לאורך כל הגבול המזרחי של כנען, מכיוון שהם לא אפשרו לישראל לעבור דרך גבולם (אלא אם כן לאדום היו רק יישובים בודדים במזרח). במקום זאת, ישראל נכנסו לארץ כנען דרך המרכז יריחו. מלבד כל זאת, נראה ברור שאדום היה במזרח, משום שכאשר יעקב חזר מחרן, הוא אמר לעשיו שהוא יבוא אליו להר שעיר. אך ברור שהוא היה בדרכו חזרה לארץ כנען. משמעות הדבר היא שהוא היה צריך לעבור דרך הר שעיר כדי להגיע לארץ כנען

Where was the land of Edom? This is an argument between the Gra and Rashi. To the Gra, it is on the south and east of the land of Canaan. To Rashi it is only on the south. Why are there are no investigations on the location of Edom? Apparently, there was no Edomite empire, while there was a Hittite empire and other competing empires at the time. But there is evidence that Edom was not just on the east, but even extended to the north border of Israel since there is a verse in Numbers that Israel at some point was on the edge of the land of Edom at Hor ha’Har and from there Moses sent a message to a king that was north of there. Now Hor Har is the north border of Israel as defined in Numbers 24. But it is hard to see how Edom might have extended through the entire eastern border of Canaan since they did not allow Israel to go through their border (unless Edom had just individual settlements of the East). Instead, Israel entered the land of Canaan though the middle around Jericho. Besides all this, it seems clear that Edom was on the east because when Jacob was coming back from Charan he told Esau that he will come to him at Har Seir. But clearly, he was on his way back to the land of Canaan. So that means he had to pass through the mountain of Seir to get to the land of Canaan.------------------------------------ Where was the land ofאדום ? This is an argument between the גר''א and רש''י. To the גר''א, it is on the south and east of the land of כנען. BUT To רש''י it is only on the south. Why are there are no investigations on the location of אדום? Apparently, there was no אדום empire, while there was a חיתי empire and other competing empires at the time. But there is evidence that אדום was not just on the east, but even extended to the north border of כנען since there is a verse in במדבר that ישראלat some point was on the edge of the land of אדום at הור ההר and from there משה sent a message to a king that was north of there. Now הור ההרis the north border of ישראל as defined inבמדבר ל''ד . But it is hard to see how אדום might have extended through the entire eastern border of כנען since they did not allow Israel to go through their border (unless אדום had just individual settlements of the East). Instead, Israel entered the land of Canaan though the middle around Jericho. Besides all this, it seems clear that אדום was on the east because when Jacob was coming back from חרןhe told עשיו that he will come to him at הר שעיר. But clearly, he was on his way back to the land of Canaan. So that means he had to pass through the mountain of שעיר to get to the land of Canaan.

חוק ברמב''ם. גבר יכול להתחתן עם אישה בכך שהוא נותן לה חפץ שהוא גנב

כמה שאלות התרחשו בי על תשובת רב שך אודות החוק ברמב''ם. גבר יכול להתחתן עם אישה בכך שהוא נותן לה חפץ שהוא גנב. [אישות פרק ה' הלכה ז'] הרשה לי להסביר מה אומר ר' שך על מנת לענות על הבעיה. הבעיה היא שהגנב אינו הבעלים של האובייקט שהוא גנב. אבל אם הוא מוכר את זה או נותן את זה למישהו אחר, והבעלים ייאשו על התקווה להשיג את האובייקט שוב, אז האדם השלישי קנה אותו לחלוטין. הבעיה בשימוש בחפץ להתחתן עם אישה היא שלמרות שהיא בבעלותה על ידי ממוצע של שינוי תחום ונטישה, אך האובייקט לא היה שייך לגנב. לא היה שום שינוי בתחום עד שהוא נכנס לידה של האישה. אתה צריך להתחתן עם אישה בכסף שלך, לא כסף שהופך לה לאחר שקיבלה אותו. התשובה של רב שך היא שלגנב יש זכויות מסוימות באובייקט, וזכויות אלה הוא נותן לה. .....הזכויות אליהן מתייחס רב שך הן אם הבהמה שגזל המליטה, או אם הייתה כבשה והוא גזז אותה, או אם הוא חורש עם שור שהוא גזל .השיפורים לגזלן. אולם, כאשר אדם קונה שדה מאדם שגזל אותו והשקיע זמן, כסף ומאמץ בשיפורה, כאשר השדה חוזר לבעלים, הקונה מקבל החזר מהגזלן עבור השיפור [רמב"ם הלכות גזלה פרק ט', חוק ו']. אך נראה לי שאלו אינן זכויות, אלא סתם עובדות הנובעות מהחוק לפיו גזלן מחזיר רק את הדבר שגזל כפי שהיה בזמן שגזל אותו. לכן, באופן אוטומטי, כל שיפור מאוחר יותר עובר לגזלן. קשה לתפוס זאת כזכות ......מלבד כל האמור לעיל, אני יכול להזכיר שלמרות שהצד השלישי לא צריך לשלם עבור החפץ על פי ראב''ד, אבל לפי הר''ם , האדם השלישי שקנה משהו מגנב אכן צריך לשלם עבורו. ואפילו במקרה של קנייה מגנב שלא היה ידוע, רק על ידי צו של החכמים, זה שקנה אותו לא צריך לשלם, אלא מחוק תורה הוא יצטרך לשלם. כך שלמרות שהאישה קנה האובייקט הגנוב, העובדה היא שמן התורה, היא תצטרך לשלם על כך, ולכן היא נשואה רק מהרבנן, לא מהתורה

I was at the sea again and a few questions entered into my mind about the answer of Rav Shach about the law in the Rambam laws of marriage 5 law 7 that says a man can marry a woman by an object he stole. Just to be clear let me explain what Rav Shach says in order to answer the problem in the Rambam. The problem is that the thief does not own the obsject that he stole. But if he sells ,it or gives it to someone else, and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again, then the third person can keep it. The problem with using the object to marry a woman is that, even though she owns it by means of change of domain and abandonment, but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it got into the hand of the woman. As the Ketzot Hachohen writes, you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that become her's after receiving it. The answer of Rav Shach and R. Shmuel Rozovski is that the thief has certain rights in the object and theso he gives to her. ///The rights that Rav Shach is referring to are if the animal he stole gave birth or if it was sheep an'sd he sheared it or if he plows with an ox that he stole it. however, when one buys a field from a person that stole it and put inh time money and effort to improve it. When the field goes back to, the buyer gets repaid from the thief for the improvement [Rambam laws of robbery chapter 9 law 6]. but it seems to me that these are not rights, but rather just facts that result from the law that a robber pays back only the thing he stole as it was at the time he stole it. Therefore, automatically, any later improvements go to the thief. It is hard to conceive of this as a right./////Besides all the above, I might mention that even though the third party does not have to pay for the object according to the Raavad, but according to the Rambam, the third person that bought something from a thief does have to pay for it even though he keeps it. And even in the case of buying from a thief that was not well known, it is only by a decree of the sages that the one that bought it does not have to pay, but from the law of the torah he would have to pay. So even though the woman can keep the stolen object, the fact is that from the law of the torah, she would have to pay for it, and therefore she should be married only by the words of the sages, not from the torah. --------------------------------------------------A few questions occurred to me about the answer of רב שך about the law in the רמב''ם. a man can marry a woman by giving to her an object he stole. Let me explain what רב שך says in order to answer the problem in the רמב''ם. The problem is that the thief does not own the object that he stole. But if he sells it or gives it to someone else, and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again, then the third person can keep it. The problem with using the object to marry a woman is that even though she owns it by mean of change of domain and abandonment, but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it gets into the hand of the woman. As the קצוות החושן writes, you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that becomes her after receiving it. The answer of ר' שך is that the thief has certain rights in the object, and these rights he gives to her. ...The rights that רב שך is referring to are about are if the animal he stole gave birth or if it was sheep and he sheared it, or if he plows with an ox that he stole it. However, when one buys a field from a person that stole it and put in time money and effort to improve it. When the field goes back to the owner, the buyer gets repaid from the thief for the improvement [רמב''ם laws of גזלה chapter 9 law 6]. But it seems to me that these are not rights, but rather just facts that result from the law that a robber pays back only the thing he stole as it was at the time he stole it. Therefore, automatically, any later improvements go to the thief. It is hard to conceive of this as a right. ///Just to be clear let me explain what רב שך say in order to answer the problem in the רמב''ם. the problem is that the thief does not own the object that he stole. but if he sells it or gives it to someone else and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again then the third person can keep it. the problem with using the object to marry a woman is that even though he owns it by mean of change of domain and abandonment but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it gets into the hand of the woman. As the קצוות החושן writes חושן משפט שנ''ג , you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that become her after receiving it. the answer of ר' שך is that the thief has certain rights in the object, and these rights he gives to her./// The problem I see in this answer is even from the place that רב שך brings, I see no answer. The third person there, the one that bought the stolen ox, and plowed with it does not have to pay for it use, but that does not mean that the thief had any rights. Besides all the above, I might mention that even though the third party does not have to pay for the object according to the ראב''ד , but according to the רמב''ם, the third person that bought something from a thief does have to pay for it even though he keeps it. And even in the case of buying from a thief that was not well known, it is only by a decree of the חכמים that the one that bought it does not have to pay but from the law of the תורה he would have to pay. so even though the woman can keep the stolen object, the fact is that from the law of the תורה, she would have to pay for it, and therefore he should be married only by the words of the חכמים, not from the תורה.

בבבא קמא עמוד קי''א אנו רואים שאם שודד נותן חפץ שגזל למישהו אחר, והבעלים ייאושו על קבלת החפץ, אזי אותו אדם שלישי הוא הבעלים של החפץ, והבעלים המקורי יכול לדרוש תשלום מהשודד בלבד, ולא מהאדם השלישי. בהתבסס על כך, גם רב שך וגם רב שמואל רוזובסקי מציעים הסבר בחוק בדיני הר''ם בנוגע לנישואין ה' חוק ז'. עם זאת, ברצוני להציע גישה חלופית המבוססת על התוספת בבבא קמא עמוד ס''ז ע''א מילה ראשונה מעיקרא. הדין בר''ם הוא זה. אם אדם נושא אישה על ידי חפץ שגנב או שדד, וידוע שהוא השיג אותו בכך שהבעלים ייאושו לקבל אותו, היא נשואה. אני חושב שהמקרה כאן הוא שנתינת החפץ לאישה היא שינוי התחום. כלומר, שינוי התחום התרחש בו זמנית עם מתן החפץ לה. זה משהו שרב שך ורב שמואל רוזובסקי מוצאים בעייתי והם מציעים שלגנב כבר הייתה זכות מסוימת בחפץ לפני שנתן אותו לאישה ולכן הוא נותן לה משהו בעל ערך שכבר היה בבעלותו. עם זאת, בעיניי זה בעייתי מכיוון שייתכן שהוא בעל זכויות מסוימות בחפץ, אבל גם כך צריך ייאוש ושינוי תחום כדי להיות בעל חפץ גניבה, ועד שהוא נותן לה אותו, אין שינוי תחום. אז במקום זאת אני מציע את הגישה של תוספת בעמוד ס''ז ע''א. שם הגמרא אומרת שאם גנב או שודד מקדיש בהמה, זה תקף. הגמרא אומרת שהסיבה היא בגלל שהיה שינוי שם. קודם השם היה חולין ועכשיו השם קדוש. תוספות שואל מדוע צריך את התשובה של שינוי שם. האם אין שינוי רשות, וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך את פעולת ההקדש לתקפה. תוספות עונה שהגמרא זקוקה לתשובת שינוי השם במקרה בו אין שינוי רשות, לדוגמה הוא הקדיש בהמה כדי שתהיה חטאת שלו או אשמו. במקרה כזה, הוא נשאר אחראי על הבהמה והיא עדיין שלו עד שהיא מוקרבת. אתה רואה בתוספות שפעולת ההקדש תקפה למרות שהגנב אינו הבעלים של הבהמה. אז איך יכול להיות שפעולת ההקדש תקפה? תוספות קובעת שהעובדה שהיא משנה רשות בו זמנית עם פעולת ההקדש הופכת את ההקדש לתקף. אז במקרה שלנו גם פעולת נישואי האישה ושינוי רשות החפץ הגנוב מתרחשים בו זמנית. עם זאת, אני מודה שהגישה שלי לרמב"ם הזה אינה מתאימה בדיוק, משום שהרמב"ם כתב "ונודע שהוא קנה את החפץ על ידי ייאוש". נראה שהוא היה צריך לכתוב "על ידי ייאוש ושינוי רשות". {כי ייאוש אינו גורם לבעלות בפני עצמו.} השמטת המילה האחרונה היא מה שמקשה על רמב"ם בכל פרשנות שהיא ---אני רוצה גם להציע שפדן ארם פירושו מדינת ארם, לא עיר בשם פדן ארם. הסיבה שאני אומר זאת היא שאליעזר הלך לארם נהרים כדי למצוא בת זוג ליצחק, ובאופן ספציפי לעיר נחור, לא לחרן. מאוחר יותר, כשיעקב הלך למצוא אישה, הוא הלך לחרן. עכשיו חרן הייתה העיר שבה התיישב תרח לאחר שעזב את מסופוטמיה בדרכו לארץ כנען. לכן חרן לא היה במסופוטמיה. אבל חרן היה בפדן ארם כפי שכתוב בכמה פסוקים; למשל, שם מוזכר שבני לאה נולדו בפדן ארם. אז כאשר הפסוקים אומרים שיצחק התחתן עם רבקה שהייתה מפדן ארם, הכוונה היא למדינה, לא לעיר. זה בדיוק כמו העובדה שיש מדינה, ניו יורק, ויש עיר, ניו יורק

In Bava Kama page 111 we ee that if a robber gives and object that he stole to someone else and the owner gave up retrieving the object then tat third person own the object and the original owner can demand payment from the robber alone, not the third person. Based on this both Rav Shach and Rav Shmuel Rozovki suggest an explanation in a law in the Rambam law of marriage 5 law 7. However, I would like to suggest an alternative approach based on Tosfot in Bava Kama page 67a first words “at first it was secular”. The law in the Rambam is this. If one marries a woman by an object that he stole or robbed, and it is known that he had acquired it by the owner giving up hope of retrieving it, she is married. I think the case here is that there was giving up and the giving the object to the woman is the change of domain. That is, the change of domain occurred simultaneously with giving her the object. This is something that rav Rozovski and Rav Shach find problematic and they suggest the thief already had certain right in the object before he gave it to the woman and so he is giving her something of value that he already own. However, to me this is problematic since because he might own certain rights in the object, but even so you need abandonment and change of domain to own an object of theft, and until he gives it to her, there no change of domain. so instead I suggest the approach of Tosphot on page 67. There the Gemara says if a thief or robber sanctify an animal, it is valid. The Gemara say the reason is because there was change of name. first the name was secular and now the name is holy. Tosphot asks why do you need the answer of change of name. is it not so that there is change of domain, and that should be enough to make the act of sanctification valid. Tosphot answers the Gemara needs the answer of change name for case in which there is no change of domain for example he sanctified an animal to be his sin offering or his guilt offering. In that case, he remains responsible for the animal even and it is still his until it is sacrificed, you see in Tosphot that the act of sanctification is valid even though the thief does not own the animal. so how can it be that the act of sanctification is valid. Tosphot holds the fact that it changes domain simultaneously with the act of sanctification makes the sanctification valid. So in our case also the act of marrying the woman and the change of domain of the stolen object occur simultaneously.However, I admit that my approach to this Rambam does not fit exactly because the Rambam wrote, “It is known that he acquired the object by abandonment.” It seems he should have written, “by abandonment and change of domain.” {For abandonment does not cause ownership by itself.} Leaving out that last word Is what makes that Rambam difficult under any interpretation I would also like to suggest that Padam Aram mean the state of Aram, not a city by the name Padan Aram. The reason I say this is that Eliezer went to Aram Naharaim to find a marriage partner for Isaac and specifically to the city of Nachor, not Charan . Later, when Jacob went to find a wife, he went to Charan. Charan was the city that Terach settled in after he left Mesopotamia on his way to the land of Canaan. so Charan in not Mesopotamia. But Charan was in Padan Aram as it say in several verses; for example where it mentions that the children of Leah were born in Padan Aram. so when the verses say that Isaac married Rivka who was from Padan Aram that must mean the state, not the city. This is just like the fact that there I a state New York and there is a city, New York. _______________________________________________________ In בבא קמא page קי''א we see that if a robber gives an object that he stole to someone else, and the owner gave up retrieving the object then that third person owns the object, and the original owner can demand payment from the robber alone, not the third person. Based on this, both רב שך and רב שמואל רוזובסקי suggest an explanation in a law in the ר''ם laws of marriage. However, I would like to suggest an alternative approach based on תוספות in בבא קמא page ס''ז ע''א. The law in ר''ם is this. If one marries a woman by an object that he stole or robbed, and it is known that he had acquired it by the owner giving up hope of retrieving it, she is married. I think the case here is that there was ייאוש and the giving the object to the woman is the change of domain. That is, the change of domain occurred simultaneously with giving her the object. This is something that רב שך and רב שמואל רוזובסקי find problematic and they suggest the thief already had certain right in the object before he gave it to the woman and so he is giving her something of value that he already own. However, to me this is problematic since because he might own certain rights in the object, but even so you need ייאוש and change of domain to own an object of theft, and until he gives it to her, there no change of domain. so instead I suggest the approach of תוספות on page ס''ז. There the גמרא says if a thief or robber sanctify an animal, it is valid. The גמראsay the reason is because there was change of name. first the name was secular and now the name is holy. תוספות asks why do you need the answer of change of name. is it not so that there is change of domain, and that should be enough to make the act of sanctification valid. תוספות answers the גמרא needs the answer of שינוי השם for case in which there is no change of domain, for example he sanctified an animal to be his חטאת or his אשם. In that case, he remains responsible for the animal even and it is still his until it is sacrificed, you see in תוספות that the act of sanctification is valid even though the thief does not own the animal. so how can it be that the act of sanctification is valid. תוספות holds the fact that it changes domain simultaneously with the act of sanctification makes the sanctification valid. So in our case also the act of marrying the woman and the change of domain of the stolen object occur simultaneously. However, I admit that my approach to this רמב''ם does not fit exactly because the רמב''ם wrote, “It is known that he acquired the object by ייאוש.” It seems he should have written, “by ייאוש and change of רשות.” {For ייאוש does not cause ownership by itself.} Leaving out that last word Is what makes that רמב''ם difficult under any interpretation ---------------------------------I would also like to suggest that פדן ארם mean the state of ארם, not a city by the name פדן ארם The reason I say this is that Eliezer went to ארם נהריים to find a marriage partner for Isaac and specifically to the city of נחור, not חרן . Later, when Jacob went to find a wife, he went to חרן . NOW חרן was the city that תרח settled in after he left Mesopotamia on his way to the land of כנען. so חרן in not Mesopotamia. But Charan was in פדן ארם as it say in several verses; for example where it mentions that the children of Leah were born in פדן ארם. so when the verses say that Isaac married Rivka who was from פדן ארם that must mean the state, not the city. This is just like the fact that there I a state New York and there is a city, New York.