i think it might make sense to mention that I had a really wonderful time in shar Yashuv and the Mir in NY. {I had however to leave on sour notes. The Rosh Yeshiva I think had noticed my wild side and so the shidduch with his daughter Penina was called off. In the meantime, my future wife Lea Finn was actively pursuing me and happily I gave in to her request of marriage. I think without her active pursuit of me and her never giving up, is the only reason that I have any children at all.} But at some point, I decided to come to Israel, and even then I could have continued in the kollel system but I was somewhat restless and had discovered Rav Nachman’s advice about talking with God as one talks with a friend and so when I got to Safed I spent most of my day in that sort of activity and neglected learning Torah except when I got home at night and my wonderful wife make dinner with spaghetti or other dishes and after the meal would sit at the table and do about one daf page gemara and one page of the major works of Rav Nahman. But I was not doing what you would call in depth learning iyun. and I really was not able to do iyun either. In spite of my years in three great yeshivot I never caught on to what it means to “learn in depth.” [I think you need talent for that, and IQ also.] It was only when I got to Uman many years later, and David Bronson accepted me a a learning partner that I lowly began to understand what it means to learn in depth. Hi path I might mention was close to shar Yashuv. The hedgehog model- close to the ground. The Mir in NY was closer to the Eagle model of looking at all of shas from a global perspective from there to the subject at hand. I agree that both paths are important. In fact, I have tried to continue in the way David showed me of electron micro-scoping tosphot but at the same time looking at rav shach. The Rav shach approach is continuation of the Brisk approach

ממה שאני זוכר במעורפל אני חושב שהשלחן ערוך אומר שאם מי שהוא מדליק אש בחצר שלו וזה גורם שם נזק לרכוש של שכנו שגר באותה חצר, אז הוא אחראי הן לנזק שנגרם לגלוי וטמון. אבל אם יש קיר והאש קפצה מעליו, האחריות היא רק לנזק באמצעות רכושות היינו רק לגלוי. בחצר האחריות תהיה גם על דברים פתוחים וגם על דברים נסתרים, אבל מחוץ לחצר, רק על דברים פתוחים. אבל זה לא יהיה כמו הגמרא ששם רבא אומר אם יש קיר אז אין אחריות לנזק מחוץ לכותל (אפילו גלוי) שכן זה לא היה רשלנות

I am not sure and I have not been by the Litvacks for a few days, so I have not looked at the Gemara on pg 23 in Bava Kama nor the Tosphot nor the Shulchan Aruch where the Gra bring his idea. But from what I vaguely recall i think the Shulchan Aruch says that if one lights a fire in his own courtyard and it caused damage there to his neighbor’s property who live in the same courtyard, then he is liable both for his arrows and his property but if there a wall and the fire jumped over it then the liability IS only for damage by mean of hi property. On the courtyard the liability would be for both open and hidden thing but outside the courtyard only for open thing. But this would not be like the gemara where Rava says if there is a wall then there is no liability for damage outside the wall since it was not negligence,---------------------------I am not sure and I have not been by the Litvacks for a few days, so I have not looked at the גמרא on pg. כ''ג in בבא קמא nor the תוספות nor the שלחן ערוך where the גר''א bring his idea. But from what I vaguely recall I think the שלחן ערוך says that if one lights a fire in his own courtyard and it caused damage there to his neighbor’s property who lives in the same courtyard, then he is liable both for damage caused by his arrows and caused by his property. But if there a wall and the fire jumped over it, then the liability IS only for damage by means of his property. In the courtyard the liability would be for both open and hidden things, but outside the courtyard, only for open things. But this would not be like the גמרא where רבא says if there is a wall then there is no liability for damage outside the wall since it was not negligence

Frankly I have no more patience with Islam, even though certainly there are individual Muslims who are decent people. But in terms of Hamas and Iran, I have no more patience. a far as I am concerned the right of Israel of self defense against these barbarians takes precedence [However, most spiritual phenomenon Is, I believe, due to the infinite human capacity to believe in anything; like the queen in Alice in Wonderland said, “I can believe in six impossible things before breakfast.” Do not expect human to behave rationally. Rather take the advice of Alexander of Macedon –to do no what need to be done now and not delay. Get rid of Iran’ nuclear facilities now.

hidden levels below apparent reality and above.

I have a belief that there are hidden levels below apparent reality and above. But that one's effort should be directed toward God alone the sole Creator. What seems like miracles are often phenomenon of dark forces. In the Middle Ages I think there were alchemists and mystics who were able to tap in to hidden realities to make changes in physical reality. That however has nothing to-do with service toward God. But what then is service toward God? I think that is best defined by my parents. For my mother service toward God mean to marry a nice Jewish girl (two separate qualifications) and to be a mensch. To my father that mean self reliance.

learning Tosphot, learning the Avi Ezri

The way that yeshivot are oriented is that the centrale feature is the lecture (shiur clalli) on Tuesday where a lesson I given to the whole yeshiva based on the global approach of Reb Chaim of Brisk. This is global and bring in sources from all over shas and the rishonim. And I admit this is important. In fact, I try to continue this a much a I can by learning the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach and later go to a Litvak beit midrah where I can try to learn the sources of his lectures. And I would like to recommend this approach to others. But I also want to mention that my learning partner David Bronson held the belief that a lot more effort must be devoted to learning Tosphot. And I think this was also the belief of Rev Friefeld of Shar Yashuv my first yeshiva}.

one has to find the objective set of moral principles to stick with

Authentic morality I think depends on finding the right set of basic principles to stick with at all cost. To go through life as the majority of people, doing whatever seems to provide the best chance of personal gain and pleasure, is not a way to get to Gan Eden. For the majority people, if one is in a politically active community, that means to adopt the principles of that community. For example, in the USA where 99 percent of women are radical leftist that means to find wife one has to adopt the most absurd radical principles. If one is in some other kind of community, that mean to adopt their insane principles in order to get ahead. But to be a n authentic moral person who has a chance of getting to Gan Eden in the next world one has to find the objective set of moral principles to stick with that will sometimes help him or her to fit in with the crowd, but most often will not. My own belief is that he main principle to stick with at all cost is to speak the truth. ------My own son held that one should learn fast, but with review. [i.e., Izhak held with Rav Nachman of Breslov who held that one should learn as fast as possible –saying the words and going on. However, my son also knew that after that, one need review]

I think the Left has gotten more radical during the year the I have not been paying attention. I was reading a leftwing newspaper [Haaretz[ and it was entirely slander against Netanyahu and the attempt to retrieve our captives. In the long distant past, for me “Left wing” meant Kennedy, not Karl Marx. But I see that that has changed, the Left in Israel is committed to hurting Netanyahu and Israeli citizens.

Rather they will do everything they can to make a bomb quickly.

The only way to win a war is not to have one. So I am definitely in favor of any kind of deal that Trump can come up with Iran. But I jut do not see how Iran can agree to dismantle their Nuclear Bomb program when from an early age in school every day they repeat the mantra about how they are dedicating their lives to the destruction of the USA and Irael. It seems to me that it would be impossible for them to reject that a hard wiring of their psyche. It is like a circuit board after the circuit board has been subjected to heat and hardened in. You cannot undo the connections unless you simply break the circuit board. So, it is here. Iran to agree would mean to break their own inner mind set and hardwired connection> To make a deal with Trump would mean to go insane. Rather they will do everything they can to make a bomb quickly.

בבא קמא דף כ''ג. אני תוהה על מה הוויכוח בין אביי לרבא? אביי שאל אם ר' יוחנן צודק (שנזק באש אחראי כי זה החצים שלו, כלומר נזק ישיר מגופו), אז למה שהוא לא יהיה אחראי לדברים נסתרים? ואביי ענה על השאלה שלו. המקרה הוא כשהיה קיר, והוא נפל, ולא היה לו הזדמנות לתקן אותו. לאחר מכן שאל רבא, "אם כן, הוא לא צריך להיות אחראי אפילו על דברים גלויים?" אז רבא אמר, "לכן, ר' יוחנן מחזיק עם ריש לקיש שהאש היא בגלל נזק באמצעות רכושו של אדם, וכל הסיבה שאמר ר' יוחנן בגלל החץ שלו היא בגלל ארבעה מיני נזקים נוספים. שאלתי היא מה המקרה? האם אביי מתכוון שאם היה קיר, והוא הדליק אש, והיא עברה על החומה, אבל למה הוא לא יהיה חייב אפילו אם הייתה חומה, והאש קפצה מעליו. ועל אחת כמה וכמה, אם היה קיר והוא נפל, והוא לא הספיק לתקן אותו, ובכל זאת הוא הדליק מדורה, וכביכול גם שם הוא לא היה אחראי לדברים הנסתרים. ורבא אמר שבמקרה הזה אפילו לדברים פתוחים הוא לא היה חייב. אם האש היא בגלל החצים שלו, אז הוא צריך להיות אחראי גם לדברים נסתרים וגם לדברים פתוחים. הדרך היחידה לדעת רבא לקבל את החובה להיות חייב על דברים פתוחים, ואי אחריות על דברים נסתרים, היא אם האש חייבת רק בגלל נזק על ידי רכושו. מכל מקום, אני יכול לראות את טעם הגר''א שאמר שהרי''ף רמב''ם וסמ''ג קבעו שר' יוחנן אינו אוחז באש הוא מחמת חיציו למעט תוספת אחריות של ארבעה מיני נזקים. הסיבה שהוא יודע זאת מהרמב''ם היא שהרמב''ם כתב לאש אין אחריות על דברים נסתרים. אם נתבונן בדיון בין אביי לרבא, נראה שאם היה חומה, הוא אינו אחראי לכלום, ואם לא היה חומה כלל, אזי הוא צריך להיות אחראי לכל נזק אלא אם כן אש אחראית רק בגלל נזק על ידי רכושוץ ------------------------------------------אציין שהדרך בה שמבין הגר"א את דברי הגמרא שונה ממה שהגמרא עשוי להיראות ממבט ראשון. הגמרא אומרת שר' יוחנן סבור שהאש אחראית גם בגלל חיציו וגם בגלל רכושו. זה נשמע כאילו זה אומר שבכל מקרה הוא אחראי לשניהם. כלומר, "ו" פירושו זה וזה, זה כמו בצומת. הגר''א מבין את המשמעות זה או זה, אבל לא שניהם. בחלק מהמקרים אש אחראית בגלל חיציו (במקרה של ארבעת סוגי הנזקים אחראים כאשר נגרם נזק על ידי הגוף), ובמקרים אחרים אש אחראית לנזק שנגרם על ידי רכוש

Bava Kama page 23. I am wondering what the argument between Abayee and Rava is about

Bava Kama page 23. I am wondering what the argument between Abayee and Rava is about? Abayee asked if R Yochanan is right (that damage by fire is liable because it is his arrows, i.e., direct damage by his body), then why would he be not liable for hidden things? And Abyee answered his own question. The case is when there was a wall, and it fell down, and he did not have a chance to repair it. Rava then asked, “If so, he should not be liable even for open things?” so Rava said, “Therefore, R Yochanan holds with Reish Lakish that fire is because of damage by means of one’s property, and the whole reason R. Yochanan said because of his arrows is because of four extra kinds of damage. My question is what is the case? Does Abaye mean that if there was a wall, and he lit a fire, and it went over the wall, that he would not be liable? But why? Supposedly he lit some kind of bonfire in his backway and there was a wall, and the fire jumped over it. Why would he be not liable? And all the more so, if there was a wall, and it fell, and he did not have time to repair it and still he lit a bonfire, and supposedly there too he would not be liable for hidden things and Rava said in that case even for open things he would not be liable. But this seems even worse. If there was no wall because it fell (even though he did not have time to fix it), if fire is because of his arrows, then he should be liable for both hidden and open things. Why was he lighting a bonfire? Maybe he was cold? But then, he should build the wall and then light the fire? The only way according to Rava to get the obligation to be on open things, and nonliability for hidden things, is if fire is obligated only because of damage by means of one’s property. ______________At any rate, I can see the point of the Gra that the Rif Rambam and Semag held that R Yochanan does not hold fire is because of his arrows except for the added liability of four kind of damage. The reason he knows this from the Rambam is that the Rambam wrote for fire one is not liable for hidden things. If we look at the discussion between Abaye and Rava, we see that if there was a wall, he is not liable for anything, and if there was no wall at all, then he should be liable for all damage unless fire is liable only because of damage by means of one’sproperty. I should mention that the way the Gra understands the statement of the Gemara is different than what the Gemara might appear at first sight. The Gemara says that R. Yochanan holds that fire is liable because of both his arrows and his property. That sounds like it means in all case it is liable for both. That is, “and” means this and that that as in intersection. The Gra understands the meaning is this or that, but not both. In some case fire is liable because of his arrows (in the case of the four types of damage one is liable for when damage is done by one body that are extra), and in other cases fire is liable for damage that would-be caused by one property. _______________________________________________________________________בבא קמא page כ''ג. I am wondering what the argument between אביי and רבא is about? אביי asked if ר’ יוחנן is right (that damage by fire is liable because it is his arrows, i.e., direct damage by his body), then why would he be not liable for hidden things? And אביי answered his own question. The case is when there was a wall, and it fell down, and he did not have a chance to repair it. רבא then asked, “If so, he should not be liable even for open things?” so רבא said, “Therefore, ר’ יוחנן holds with ריש לקיש that fire is because of damage by means of one’s property, and the whole reason ר’ יוחנן said because of his arrow is because of four extra kinds of damage. My question is what is the case? Does אביי mean that if there was a wall, and he lit a fire, and it went over the wall, that he would not be liable? But why? Supposedly he lit some kind of bonfire in his backway and there was a wall, and the fire jumped over it. Why would he be not liable? And all the more so, if there was a wall, and it fell, and he did not have time to repair it and still he lit a bonfire, and supposedly there too he would not be liable for hidden things and רבא said in that case even for open things he would not be liable. But this seems even worse. If there was no wall (even though he did not have time to fix it), if fire is because of his arrows, then he should be liable for both hidden and open things. Why was he lighting a bonfire? Maybe he was cold? But then, he should build the wall and then light the fire? The only way according to רבא to get the obligation to be on open things, and nonliability for hidden things, is if fire is obligated only because of damage by means of one’s property. At any rate, I can see the point of the גר''א that the רי''ף רמב''ם and סמ''ג held that ר’ יוחנן does not hold fire is because of his arrows except for the added liability of four kind of damage. The reason he knows this from the רמב’’ם is that the רמב’’ם wrote for fire one is not liable for hidden things. If we look at the discussion between אביי and רבא, we see that if there was a wall, he is not liable for anything, and if there was no wall at all, then he should be liable for all damage unless fire is liable only because of damage by means of one’s property. I should mention that the way the גר''א understands the statement of the גמרא is different than what the גמרא might appear at first sight. The גמרא says that ר' יוחנן holds that fire is liable because of both his arrows and his property. That sounds like it means in all case it is liable for both. That is, “and” means this and that that as in intersection. The גר''א understands the meaning is this or that, but not both. In some case fire is liable because of his arrows (in the case of the four types of damage one is liable for when damage is done by one body that are extra), and in other cases fire is liable for damage that would-be caused by one property.

Passover

My feeling about Passover is that it ought to be based on the molad [conjuntion], not on the day after the molad when the moon can become visible. My reasoning has nothing to do with the Gemara in Rosh Hashana where it is clear that the time for setting the time of the new moon is after 18 or more hours after the molad. Rather my reasoning is based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin where R Elazar said that if the lower court does not sanctify the new moon in it proper time, then the heavenly court does so. I have thought for a long time that the called Hebrew Calander is simply copy and paste of the Calander of Athens. I also think that while it is good to do spring cleaning, however to base that on chametz is disingenuous. After all, to get rid of chametz all one needs to do is to say all chametz that is in my possession is null. And that is enough [as long as one’s intention is sincere not to eat or posses chametz during Passover. However, the bill of sale that is customary I think is invalid based on the Gemara in Ketuboth where a mother signed all her possession over to her daughter without it really being sincere, and when he recovered her health the property wag oven back to the mother. A bill of sale has to be with intention to do the sale, not a trick to avoid the law.

za72 F minor midi za72 nwc format

I bet neither Rousseau nor Kant had any real experience with a ”noble savage”. Noble savage I think existed only in the minds of these two philosophers

I am thinking that Rav Nachman of Breslov was talking about Kant when he criticized some famous philosopher in his time. It probably was not Hume like I had thought at first because Kant was rapidly gaining public attention at that that time in Germany. Georg Hamann was probably right that whole Critique of Pure Reason was misguided. some tried to fix in the gaps. But I am wondering how could these really smart German philosophers miss people like John Locke or the American Revolution. Had they never heard of Locke of the Constitution of the USA ? They were all plenty impressed with the Terrible French revolution with the streets of Paris literally turned red from the blood of the guillotine. Kant had only one picture in his house that of Rousseau! The great inspiration behind of French revolution. {I bet neither Rousseau nor Kant had any real experience with a ”noble savage”. Noble savage I think existed only in the minds of these two philosophers ,In real life you just leave out the “noble” part and leave in the “savage”. } Maybe Philosophy ought to turn to more sensible people like John Locke and Thomas Reid. In the enlightenment people rightly understood the danger of religious fanaticism, but not the equal and even more serios problem of political fanaticism believing in utopia that is only if everyone would agree with them

נראה לי שרב שך לומד את הסוגיא בדף כ''ג בבא קמא באופן שדומה לגר''א כי הוא אומר בנזקי ממון פרק י''ד הלכה ט''ו שאף על פי שהאש חייבת מחמת חיציו, עדיין אין זה בדיוק כמו חיציו. הוא מביא הוכחה מדברים נסתרים. על דברים נסתרים יהיה אחראי על נזק באמצעות חיצים, אך במקרה של שריפה, אין חייבים כאשר מדובר בדברים שאין נוהגים להחביא בתוך ערימה. אז רב שך אכן לומד כמו הגר''א לפחות מבחינת התוצאה שאש אינה כחיציו לכלום חוץ מארבעת סוגי הנזק. ציינתי קודם שהגר''א כתב שדרך הרי"ף רמב''ם וסמ''ג לומדים את דף כ''ג הוא שר' יוחנן מחזיק אחרת ממה שחשבנו במקור. בהתחלה חשבנו שהוא התכוון לאש בגלל שהחיצים שלו, פירוש שזה נזק מפעולה ישירה של האדם. כעת במקום זאת, אנו חושבים שזה רק כמו נזק באמצעות רכושו של האדם כמו השור שלו, וזה כמו אש רק לגבי ארבעה סוגים נוספים של תשלום

It seems to me that Rav Shach is learning the sugia on page 23 of bava kama in away that is similar to the Gra because he says in Nizkei Mamon 14 chapter halacha 15 that even though fire is liable because of his arrows still it is not exactly like his arrows. He brings a proof from hidden things. For hidden things, one would be liable by actual damage by means of one’s arrows, but in the case of fire, one is not obligated when it is for things that are not customarily hidden inside a stack. So, Rav Shach does learn like the Gra at least in terms of the result that fire is not like his arrows for anything except the four types of damage. I have mentioned before that the Gra wrote that the way the Rif Rambam and semag learn the subject of page 23 is that R Yochanas holds differently than what we thought originally. At first, we thought he meant fire is because his arrows mean it is damage by one’s direct action. Now instead we think it is only like damage by mean of one’s property like his ox, and it is like fire only in term of four extra type of payment.

reason recognizes a lot more than contradictions,

I believe that this insight of Bryan Caplan (about the false dilemma of Hume) provided a seed for the development of the thinking of Michael Huemer about the idea that reason recognizes a lot more than contradictions, rather it recognizes universals However I am not trying to say that Kant and Hegel, Georg Hamann, and Nelson had no value. They were, rather, trying to solve the problem of how reason recognizes universals

Yet none of the German idealists saw that the entire premise of Hume was a fallacy.

I put this important paper here because it shows something amazing. The entire basis of German idealism from Kant up until Hegel was based on this one idea of Hume. It forms the basis of the idea of Kant about the limits of pure reason. Hegel accepted this except that he tried go around it by the dialectic method. Yet none of the German idealists saw that the entire premise of Hume was a fallacy. [Hume taught Euclidean geometry and from that he decided that all human reason can do is to perceive contradiction.] Here is a link to Caplan's early material. An Enquiry Concerning Hume's Misunderstanding Bryan Caplan Tu 3-4 Phil 122 Question #1 1. Introduction Remarkably, it is possible to sum up David Hume's vital assumptions about reasoning in a single proposition: Reason does NOTHING except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. This paper will attempt three tasks: first, to show the textual support for my interpretation; second, to explain how Hume's skepticism about induction depends on this assumption; and third, to briefly argue that Hume's basic assumption is wrong. 2. Textual Support Whenever Hume wants to show that reasoning cannot support something, he uses the same argument: the alternative is not a contradiction. "The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind."1 Suppose that we try to use reason to establish any matter of fact. Hume says that our effort is futile, because the alternative is conceivable. But if the alternative is conceivable, then it is not a contradiction, because contradictions are inconceivable. But reason can refute something only if it is a contradiction. Hence, reason can never establish any matter of fact. Hume liberally repeats this argument throughout his works on epistemology. When he denies that reason justifies the law of cause-and-effect, he says, "That there are no demonstrative arguments in this case, seems evident; since it implies no contradiction, that the course of nature may change."2 The argument is the same as above: An alternative is conceivable; contradictions are not conceivable; and reason can only demonstrate that something is false if it is a contradiction. Hence, reason cannot establish the law of cause-and-effect. Hume uses the same argument in A Treatise of Human Nature. "There is no object, which implies the existence of any other if we consider the objects in themselves. Such an inference wou'd amount to knowledge, and wou'd imply the absolute contradiction and impossibility of conceiving any thing different."3 Once again, Hume notes that he can conceive of one object without a second object. Since no contradictions are conceivable, this is not a contradiction. And since reason does nothing but locate the presence or absence of contradictions, reason cannot establish a connection between any two things. Later in the Treatise, Hume makes the argument still more explicit: "To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it."4 Conceivability implies the absence of a contradiction, and the absence of a contradiction implies that reason has nothing to say on the matter. To cement my interpretation, let us turn to Hume's Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, where he repeats the argument. "The mind can always conceive any effect to follow from any cause, and indeed any event to follow upon another: whatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. There is no demonstration, therefore, for any conjunction of cause and effect."5 As always, his argument flows from the conceivability of an alternative, to the absence of a contradiction, to the forced silence of reason on the question. "What is demonstratively false implies a contradiction; and what implies a contradiction cannot be conceived."6 Hume could hardly be more explicit. In all three works, he uses precisely the same argument. And this argument rests on a crucial assumption about reason and reasoning: namely, that reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. While Hume may be open to interpretation on some points, the textual support for my claim is quite solid: it spans at least three of his epistemological works, and appears repeatedly in each. The next section explains in detail why this assumption about reasoning matters. 3. The Crucial Assumption Let us formally state the argument that Hume uses above in order to see why his assumption crucially supports his view that we never have any reason to believe any matter of fact. 1. The alternative to any matter of fact is conceivable. 2. If something is conceivable, then it is not a contradiction. 3. Reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Therefore, reason has nothing to say about any matter of fact; if a proposition concerns matters of fact, reason can neither support nor refute it. It is hard to doubt premises #1 and #2. We can indeed conceive of alternatives to any matter of fact. And it seems like a basic feature of a contradiction that it is inconceivable. (Try to conceive of a circular square. Now try to conceive that gremlins exist. Notice the difference?) Premise #3 is therefore the crucial step in the argument -- and Hume's most central assumption about reasoning. How does the above argument relate to Hume's argument that we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact? I shall briefly but formally state Hume's argument against induction, then see how it relates to his central assumption about reasoning. 1. All knowledge comes either from observation or reason. 2. Knowledge of unobserved matters of fact can't come from reason, because the alternative to any matter of fact is conceivable and therefore implies no contradiction. 3. Knowledge of unobserved matters of fact can be derived from knowledge of observed matters of fact only if the law of cause-and-effect is known. 3a. Reason cannot establish the law of cause-and-effect, because the alternative is conceivable and therefore implies no contradiction. 3b. Observation alone cannot establish the law of cause-and- effect, because this is itself an unobserved matter of fact, so the argument would be circular. Therefore, we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact. Let us now cross-examine these two formal arguments, and see why Hume's assumption about reason (premise#3 in the first argument) is crucial for his second argument to work. Interestingly, it is actually used twice in the second argument - in premises#2 and 3a. Premise #2 claims that we cannot come to know about unobserved matters of fact just by reasoning about them. Why? Because the contrary to every matter of fact is conceivable, conceivable things are not contradictions, and reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Premise #3a claims that we cannot come to know the law of cause-and- effect just by reasoning about it. Why? Because the contrary of the law of cause-and-effect is conceivable, conceivable things are not contradictions, and reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. So Hume's basic assumption about reasoning is absolutely crucial at both steps. Suppose someone had a different theory of reasoning. Hume's argument would fall apart. A critic could accept everything else that Hume says, but claim that reason does more than merely locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Perhaps we use reason to directly justify our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact. Or perhaps we use reason to justify the law of cause-and-effect (major premise), coupled with our knowledge of observed matters of fact (minor premise), to justify our beliefs about unobserved matters of fact (conclusion). In either case, Hume's problem of induction dissolves. Only if reason is as weak as Hume says would his skepticism about induction follow. But Hume never proves the weakness of reason. Instead, he accepts the weakness as a basic premise, claiming that no one denies it: "[W]hatever we conceive is possible, at least in a metaphysical sense: but wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a contradiction. And this is a principle, which is generally allowed by philosophers."7 Since his conclusions differ so radically from those of earlier philosophers, Hume should have considered that they might not accept the same conception of reason. At the very least, he should have argued for his position, instead of just asserting that, "To form a clear idea of any thing, is an undeniable argument for its possibility, and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it."8 But is it? Only if we accept Hume's view of reason in the first place, according to which reason does nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. How would Hume convince someone who didn't already agree? I don't think that he could. 4. An Alternative Conception of Reason Consider the claim: Circular arguments are invalid. Think about it for a while. You can see that it is true -- but how? Even though Hume himself uses this principle in his argument, we could never justify it on his principles. The denial is not a contradiction. We can at least conceive that "Some circular arguments are valid" is true. But at the same time, this principle is not a mere matter of fact. Once we grasp the principle, we see that it is true always and everywhere; moreover, we grasp it by the mere operation of thought. Or consider the claim: The argument ad hominem is a fallacy. Again, the denial is not a contradiction; yet we grasp that it is universally true with the mere operation of thought. I think that these two claims are convincing counter- arguments to Hume's conception of reason. Reason does more than merely discover the presence of absence of contradictions. Frequently, we justify necessary truths just by thinking about them; and sometimes, the opposite of these necessary truths is still conceivable and hence not a contradiction. What is so amazing about this claim? It just turns out that Hume underestimates the power of reason when he limits it to locating the presence or absence of contradictions. I probably won't convince anyone in so brief a presentation. But at least let me raise some doubts in the minds of convinced Humeans. Hume claims that reason cannot justify the law of cause- and-effect. I think that it plainly does. We grasp that "Circular arguments are invalid" and "The argument ad hominem is false" by the pure operation of thought, even though their opposites are conceivable and hence not contradictions. I say that we justify the claim "Every effect has a cause; the same cause always produces the same effect" in exactly the same manner. Namely, we think about the claim; and if we are sufficiently intelligent, open-minded, and intellectually honest, we immediately see its truth. 5. Conclusion Hume assumes that reasoning can do nothing except locate the presence or absence of contradictions. Moreover, his argument that we never have any reason to believe any unobserved matter of fact crucially depends on this unproven assumption. For if reason could do something more than locate the presence or absence of contradictions, we could use reason to justify our claims about unobserved matters of fact. Reason might directly give us a reason to believe unobserved matters of fact; or, reason might give us a reason to believe the law of cause-and-effect, which coupled with immediate observations would give us a reason to believe unobserved matters of fact. I have not proved that this alternative conception of reason is correct. But we should at least consider it. Not only do the examples in the section four tend to support it; but it is also the most likely escape route from the long list of absurd conclusions Hume's premises imply. No one accepts Hume's conclusions in practice; it is time to question his theory as well. Notes 1: David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, pp.15-16. 2: ibid, p.22. 3: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, pp.86-87. 4: ibid, p.89. 5: David Hume, Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, pp.13- 14. 6: ibid, p.17. 7: ibid, p.14. 8: A Treatise of Human Nature, op. cit., p.89.

בבא קמא בדף כ"ג. הרמב''ם לפי הגר''א

כשחזרתי מהים עלה בדעתי מדוע הרמב''ם (לפי הגר''א) קבע שר' יוחנן שינה את דעתו, וקובע שנזק על ידי שריפה חייב בגלל נזק על ידי רכושו, לא נזק על ידי גופו. הסיבה היא השקלא וטריא של הגמרא בבא קמא בדף כ"ג. אביי שאל, אם צודק ר' יוחנן שנזק על ידי אש הוא בגלל "חיציו" {נזק ישיר על ידי גופו}, אז למה נזק לטמון (דברים נסתרים) לא יהיה אחראי? והוא ענה, היה שם חומה, והיא נפלה (לא בגלל האש), ולא הספיק לתקן אותו לפני שפרצה השריפה. אז זה מקרה של אי יכולת לעשות שום דבר כדי לעצור את הנזק הזה (אונס) . [למרות שבדרך כלל אנו אומרים שאדם תמיד עלול לגרום נזק, עדיין נזק באמצעות רכושו (או אפילו בשריפה שהיא חמורה יותר), העובדה שהמצב אינו בשליטתו גורמת לו שהוא ללא אחריות. לאחר מכן רבא שאל, אם כן, אז גם על דברים גלויים אינו צריך להיות אחראי. הגמרא עונה ר' יוחנן מחזיק נזק מאש נחשב חיציו וגם רכושו; ועניינו שהוא חייב בדברים פתוחים, אבל לא חייב בדברים נסתרים הוא במקום שהייתה התרשלות. זה יהיה דומה למה שיהיה אם הוא שכח לנעול את השור שלו בלילה, והוא יצא וגרם נזק.] אני חושב שהגמרא רואה בחומה מקרה של אי יכולת לשנות כלום (אונס) . אבל בלי חומה בינו לבין שכנו, אם זה יהיה "החצים שלו", אז הוא יהיה אחראי גם לדבר גלוי וגם נסתר. [כדי לגרום לו לא להיות אחראי לדברים נסתרים, הגמרא צריכה להמציא תרחיש שבו היה קיר. אחרי הכל, חיצים עוברים הרבה מעבר לחומות. ולכן הרמב''ם קבע שאין אנו חושבים עוד שר' יוחנן מחזיק ב"חיציו" אלא כדי להטיל עליו אחריות בכל חמשת מיני הנזק שחייב אדם בהם במקרה של נזק מגופו. מלבד זאת, הוא אחראי רק לנזק שנגרם על ידי רכושו.רק תחשוב. הגמרא אמרה כשהייתה חומה, "נגמרו החצים שלו". לכן, כדי למצוא דרך שחיציו לא יגמרו, היה על הגמרא לחלץ את החומה, ולהכניס עצלות והזנחה פשוטה. בשלב זה, מדוע שחצים יסתיימו? ברור שלא

the Gemara on page 23 in Bava Kama. Rambam according to the Gra.

As I was walking back from the sea it occurred to me why the Rambam held that Rava held that R. Yochanan holds that damage by fire is obligated because of damage by his property, not damage by his body. The reason is in the questions and answers of the Gemara on page 23 in Bava Kama. Abyee asked, if R Yochanan is right that damage by fire is because of “his arrows” {direct damage by his body}, then why would damage to hidden things not be liable? The abyee answered, there was a wall there, and it fell (not from the fire), and he did not have time to repair it before the fire broke out. So it is a case of not being able to do anything to stop that damage. [Even though we normally say a person is always liable to do damage, still damage by means of his property or (or even with fire which is more serious), the fact of the situation being totally out of one’s control makes him not liable. Rava then asks, if so, then even for open things he should be not liable. The Gemara answers R Yochanan holds damage by fire is considered “his arrows” and also his property; and our case where he liable for open things but not liable for hidden things is where there was neglect similar to what would be the case if he forgot to lock his ox up at night, and it went out and cause damage.] I think that the gemara considers a wall to be a case of not being able to change anything. but with no wall between him and his neighbor, if it would be “his arrows” then he would be liable for both open and hidden thing. [To get him to not be liable for hidden things the gemara has to come up with scenario where there was a wall. After all, arrows go far beyond walls. so the Rambam held that we no longer think that R Yochanan holds with “his arrows” except to make him liable in all the five kinds of damage that one is liable for in a case of damage by his body. Besides that, he is liable only for damage by his property. Just think. the Gemara said when there was a wall "his arrows were finished". So, to find a way that his arrows would not be finished, the Gemara had to extract the wall, and put in simple laziness and neglect. At that point, why would arrows be finished? Clearly not. I want to explain why the Gra wrote that only way to understand the subject on page 23 of Bava Kama is like the Rif and Rambam, that is that the Gemara decided that R Yochanan does no longer hold with his arrows except in so far as it makes him liable in another four types of damage. But in all other aspects, he holds like reish lakish that damage by fire is because of damage by mean of his property. The reason is this. Neither Abaye nor Rava had any problem with the idea that if one is liable because of his arrows that would extend beyond one’s own domain. The only question was it should even more liable for damage to hidden things. But then Abaye said the scenario is when there was a wall and so his arrows were finished. But Rava objected and said that then he wouldn’t be liable even for open things. So Rava decided the case is when there was no wall. But again, if there is no wall, then he should be liable for his arrows alone. There is no need to make him more liable because of damage by mean of his property. It was already perfectly fine for him to be liable for all damage done on another domain just from his arrow alone. so in short, the give and take questions and answers of Abaye and Rava make no sense unless you say that Rava held that R Yochanan hold his arrows are liable because of his money alone. His arrows would be finished if there was a wall there or if it fell and he had no time to repair it. But with no wall, there is no finishing of his arrows ------------------------------------- As I was walking back from the sea it occurred to me why the רמב''ם held that ר’ יוחנן changed his mind, and holds that damage by fire is obligated because of damage by his property, not damage by his body. The reason is in the questions and answers of the גמרא בבא קמא on page 23. אביי asked, if ר’ יוחנן is right that damage by fire is because of “his arrows” {direct damage by his body}, then why would damage to טמון hidden things not be liable? HE answers, there was a wall there, and it fell (not from the fire), and he did not have time to repair it before the fire broke out. So, it is a case of not being able to do anything to stop that damage(אונס) . [Even though we normally say a person is always liable to do damage, still damage by means of his property or (or even with fire which is more serious), the fact of the situation being totally out of one’s control makes him not liable. The רבא then asks, if so, then even for open things he should be not liable. The גמרא answers ר’ יוחנן holds damage by fire is considered “his arrows” and also his property; and our case where he liable for open things, but not liable for hidden things is where there was neglect. THAT WOULD BE similar to what would be the case if he forgot to lock his ox up at night, and it went out and caused damage.] I think that the גמרא considers a wall to be a case of not being able to change anything(אונס) . But with no wall between him and his neighbor, if it would be “his arrows”, then he would be liable for both open and hidden thing. [To get him to not be liable for hidden things the גמרא has to come up with scenario where there was a wall. After all, arrows go far beyond walls. so the רמב''ם held that we no longer think that ר’ יוחנן holds with “his arrows” except to make him liable in all the five kinds of damage that one is liable for in a case of damage by his body. Besides that, he is liable only for damage by his property. Just think. the גמרא said when there was a wall "his arrows were finished". So, to find a way that his arrows would not be finished, the גמרא had to extract the wall, and put in simple laziness and neglect. At that point, why would arrows be finished? Clearly not. I want to explain why the גר''א wrote that only way to understand the subject on page כ''ג of בבא קמא is like the רי''ף and רמב''ם , that is that the גמרא decided that ר’ יוחנן does no longer hold with his arrows except in so far as it makes him liable in another four types of damage. But in all other aspects, he holds like ריש לקיש that damage by fire is because of damage by mean of his property. The reason is this. Neither אביי nor רבא had any problem with the idea that if one is liable because of his arrows that would extend beyond one’s own domain. The only question was it should even more liable for damage to hidden things. But then אביי said the scenario is when there was a wall and so his arrows were finished. But רבא objected and said that then he wouldn’t be liable even for open things. So רבא decided the case is when there was no wall. But again, if there is no wall, then he should be liable for his arrows alone. There is no need to make him more liable because of damage by mean of his property. It was already perfectly fine for him to be liable for all damage done on another domain just from his arrow alone. so, in short, the give and take questions and answers of אביי and רבא make no sense unless you say that רבא held that ר’ יוחנן hold his arrows are liable because of his money alone. His arrows would be finished if there was a wall there or if it fell and he had no time to repair it. But with no wall, there is no finishing of his arrows

בבא קמא כ''ב וכ''ג

הייתי בחוף הים וחושב שאפילו אם נלך עם הגר"א שכתב שהרמב"ם סבור שרבא מחזיק שר' יוחנן מסכים עם השיטה של ריש לקיש שחובת תשלום נזק אש היא בגלל נזק על ידי רכושו (לא על ידי חיצים שלו) שעדיין זה לא מספר לנו כלום על המשנה עם הכלב והפחם. אתה בכל מקרה צריך לומר את הסיבה לריש לקיש שעל שאר הערימה לא חייב כי זה כוחו של כוחו. אבל זה רק זורק את השאלה צעד אחד אחורה. נניח שהכלב זרק את הפחם על הערימה. האם אין אנו אומרים שאנו הולכים בהתחלה של נזק? וכך בעצם הכריע הרמב''ם בהלכה. {זה כמו רבה שאם זורק כלי ולפני שהוא מגיע לארץ ונשבר, מישהו אחר שובר אותו בעודו באוויר. הראשון הוא חייב, לא השני.} עם זאת, אולי זה כל העניין של ריש לקיש? שנלך על תחילת הנזק, ולכן גרירת הפחם או השלכתו על הערימה תהיה אחראית כי זה הכוח הראשון. ואז שאר הערימה הוא כוח הכוח שלו. אז זה יסביר את הרמב''ם. זה גם עוזר לר' יוחנן שאמר שהוא אחראי לכל הערימה שהכלב צריך להניח עליה את הפחם. יכול להיות שהוא מסכים שאם הכלב יגרור אותו לאורך הערימה או יזרוק אותו על הערימה זה יהיה כמו ריש לקיש שהאזור הזה חייב בחצי נזק, (אבל לא נזק מלא כי זה לא דרכו הרגילה של כלב לזרוק גחלים. אבל אדם שזורק כלי יהיה אחראי מלוא נזק שלם.) אבל ר' יוחנן מחפש דרך לקבל חוק המשנה שאת החובה של חצי הערימה כולה תהיה חצי נזק. בסיכום, החליט הרמב''ם שהחוק כמו ריש לקיש. בעל הכלב חייב על הלחם נזק מלא, ועל מקום גרירת הפחם הוא חייב חצי נזק כי אנו הולכים עם תחילת הגורם נזק כמו רבה; ועל שאר הערימה, הוא אינו חייב כי זה כוחו של כוחו.-----------אני רוצה להסביר מדוע כתב הגר"א שרק הדרך להבין את הנושא בדף כ"ג בבא קמא היא כמו הרי"ף והרמב"ם, כלומר שהגמרא החליט שר' יוחנן אינו מחזיק יותר בחיציו אלא במידה שזה גורם לו להתחייב בעוד ארבעה סוגי נזק. אבל בכל ההיבטים האחרים, הוא סבור, כמו ריש לקיש, שנזק אש נובע מפגיעה על ידי רכושו. הסיבה היא זו. לא לאביי ולא לרבא הייתה שום בעיה עם הרעיון שאם אדם אחראי בגלל החיצים שלו זה ירחיק מעבר לתחום שלו. השאלה היחידה הייתה שהיא (אש) צריכה להיות אחראית אפילו יותר, היינו בנזק לדברים נסתרים. אבל אז אביי אמר שהתרחיש הוא כשהייתה חומה וכך החיצים שלו גמרו. אבל רבא התנגד ואמר שאז הוא לא יישא באחריות אפילו לדברים גלויים. אז רבא החליט שהמקרה הוא כשאין חומה. אבל שוב, אם אין חומה, אז הוא צריך להיות אחראי גם בגלל חיציו בלבד. אין צורך להטיל עליו אחריות רבה יותר בגלל נזק באמצעות רכושו. זה כבר היה בסדר גמור עבורו להיות אחראי לכל הנזק שנגרם בתחום אחר רק מהחץ שלו בלבד. אז בקיצור, השאלות והתשובות של תן וקח (שקלא וטריא) של אביי ורבא אינן הגיוניות אלא אם כן אתה אומר שרבא קבע שר' יוחנן מחזיק שאש אחראית רק בגלל הרכוש שלו. חיציו יגמרו אם היה שם חומה או אם היא נפלה ולא היה לו זמן לתקן אותה. אבל בלי חומה, אין גימור של החיצים שלו

Bava Kama page 22 and page 23.

I have been at the sea shore and thinking that even if we go with the Gra who wrote that the Rambam holds that R Yochanan changed his mind, and he goes with the idea of Reish Lakish that the obligation of paying for damage by fire is because of damage by his property (not his arrows) that still does not tell us about the Mishna with the dog and coal. You anyway have to say the reason for Reish Lakish that the rest of the stack is not liable because it is force of his force. but that just throws the question one step back. Let’s say the dog threw the coal on the stack. Don’t we say that an animal that steps on a vessel and it rolls away and get broken, that we go by the beginning? And that is in fact how the Rambam decided the law. {Thi I lie Raba that if one throws a vessel and before it reaches the ground and is broken, someone else breaks it while it is still in the air. The first one is obligated, not the second one.} However, maybe that is the whole point of Reish Lakish? that we go by the beginning of the damage and o dragging the coal or throwing it on the stack would be liable because of that is the first force. then the remainder of the stack is force of his force. so that would explain the Rambam. This also helps R Yochanan who said to be liable for the whole stack the dog needs to place the coal on it. It might be that he agrees that if the dog dragged it along the stack or threw it on the stack that would be like Reish Lakish that that area is liable half damage. But R Yochanan is looking for a way to get the obligation of half damage to be applied to the whole stack, not just the place the coal landed. In summery the Rambam decided the law like Reish Lakish. The owner of the dog is liable for the bread full damage, and for the place where the coal was dragged, he is liable half damage because we go by the beginning of the cause of damage like Raba; and for the rest of the stack, he is not liable because that is force of his force. I am thinking that this explains Reish Lakish and the Rambam, but the sugia on page 23 is still blurry to me. The nice thing about this approach is that it uses the insight of the Gra to explain the Rambam, and also the inight of the Tosphot that we still need the idea of force of his force. _____________________________________________________________________________ I have been at the sea shore and thinking that even if we go with the גר''א who wrote that the רמב’’ם holds that ר’ יוחנן changed his mind, and he goes with the idea of ריש לקיש that the obligation of paying for damage by fire is because of damage by his property (not his arrows) that still does not tell us about the משנה with the dog and coal. You anyway have to say the reason for ריש לקיש that the rest of the stack is not liable because it is force of his force. but that just throws the question one step back. Let’s say the dog threw the coal on the stack. Don’t we say that an animal that steps on a vessel and it rolls away and get broken, that we go by the beginning? And that is in fact how the רמב’’ם decided the law. {This is like רבה that if one throws a vessel and before it reaches the ground and is broken, someone else breaks it while it is still in the air. The first one is obligated, not the second one.} However, maybe that is the whole point of ריש לקיש? that we go by the beginning of the damage and so dragging the coal or throwing it on the stack would be liable because of that is the first force. Then the remainder of the stack is force of his force. so that would explain the רמב’’ם. This also helps ר’ יוחנן who said to be liable for the whole stack the dog needs to place the coal on it. It might be that he agrees that if the dog dragged it along the stack or threw it on the stack that would be like ריש לקיש that that area is liable half damage, (but not full damage because it is not the normal way of a dog to throw coals. A person throwing a vessel however would be liable full damage.) But ר’ יוחנן is looking for a way to get the obligation of half damage to be applied to the whole stack, not just the place the coal landed. In summery the רמב’’ם decided the law like ריש לקיש. The owner of the dog is liable for the bread full damage, and for the place where the coal was dragged, he is liable half damage because we go by the beginning of the cause of damage like רבה; and for the rest of the stack, he is not liable because that is force of his force.

Mathematics was for me a big challenge. It took for me a long detour to get a grip on Math and Physics. I had to go the rout of the approach in the Gemara Tractate Avoda Zara page 19 which says that the main thing in learning is to say the words in order from the start of the book until the end and then review. I found that this helped me to get started with math and physics. And from my own experience I try to recommend this approach to others who like me may not be particularly talented in these areas and yet still realize their importance. But Isaac Rosten told me that an essential part of this approach is the review part. After you finish the book or chapter, then you need to review four times. This approach does not work without the review part.

בבא קמא כ''ב וכ''ג ותירוץ יותר טוב לרמב''ם

כתב הגר''א בדף כ''ג בבבא קמא ובשלחן ערוך פרק 418 הערה 33 שהרי''ף ורמב''ם גורסים שהגמרא שינה דעתו לגבי גישתו של ר' יוחנן בגלל שאלת רבא, אם האש חייבת בגלל חיציו, אז למה טמון (נסתר) לא חייב? (כלומר שאם היו דברים חבויים בערימה, אין הוא חייב בהם.) אלא ר' יוחנן מחזיק לגמרי כדעת ריש לקיש וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא ארבעת הדברים הנוספים שחייבים עליהם כשאדם עושה נזק בגופו ולא על ידי רכושו (כשורו). ההוכחה לכך ברורה. זה בגלל שהרי''ף והרמב''ם משאירים שניהם את התשובה הראשונה של הגמרא שהתכוונה לענות על שאלת רבא, (שבגלל שהיה חומה, נגמרו החצים שלו). הגמרא דחק את התשובה ההיא כי אם גמרו חיציו, אז גמרו לגבי נכסים שאינם נסתרים. אני כותב את זה כי ברור לי שהסיבה שהרמב''ם כתב שכאשר כלב לוקח לחם עם פחם לערימה והערימה נשרפת שהמקרה הוא שהכלב נשא אותו מעל הערימה, אבל לעולם לא הניח אותו ולכן החיוב הוא חצי נזק לכל מקום שדרכו של הפחם היה, ואין חובה על שאר הערימה. הסיבה היא שהרמב''ם פשוט הכריע כרישלקיש. הגר''א כתב שהרי''ף ורמב''ם הסבירן את הגמרא בדף כ''ג שר' יוחנן מחזיק למעשה כמו ריש לקיש, והמקרה הקודם שבו הכלב שם את הפחם על הערימה יהיה נזק מלא לכל הערימה. עם זאת, אני יכול להזכיר שהגישה הקודמת שלי להסבר הרמב"ם הייתה שהוא מחזיק שכוח כוחו אינו חייב (כמו שתוספות אמרו) הייתה תשובה ברת קיימא אלא שיותר הגיוני ששאר הערימה היה אחראי על רביעית מהנזק כפי שהרב"ד למעשה ששאל. עכשיו ההסברשל המשנה ופסק הרמב''ם לא כח כוחו, אלא שאש חייבת בגלל רכושו כמו השור שלו כמו שאמר ריש לקיש והנושא הפחם על הערימה זה צרורות או קרן של שור תם. בלילה הזה ראיתי שהרדב"ז כתב את תשובתי המקורית לרמב"ם שהמקרה הוא כח כוחו. ובהמשך הערב גיליתי את הערת הגר"א. אני חושב שגישת הגר"א יותר מדויקת________ קצת רקע לנושא הזה. אמר ר' יוחנן שהנזק של אש הוא בגלל חיציו וריש לקיש אמר שזה בגלל נזק מרכושו, למשל, השור שלו. שאלה הגמרא על ר' יוחנן שאם החבות תהיה בגלל נזק ישיר מפעולה אחת, אז למה טמון יהיה פטור? כלומר, אם שרף מישהו את ערימת החטים של מישהו אחר, ובתוכו הוחבא חפץ כלשהו, חובת התשלום היא רק על ערימת חיטים. התשובה שהגמרא נותנת לר' יוחנן היא שהייתה שם חומה שנפלה, ולפני שהייתה לאדם הזדמנות לתקן אותה, פרצה השריפה והלכה לנכס של השכן. אחר כך התנגד הגמרא לתשובה זו, ואמר באותו מקרה אז גם לדברים הפתוחים כמו הערימה עצמה, אין לחייבו. אז הגמרא אמר שלמעשה ר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש, וההבדל היחיד ביניהם הוא בארבעת סוגי הנזק הנוספים שאדם אחראי להם כאשר הוא עושה נזק מפעולתו ולא מרכושו

bava kama pg 22 and 23. A better answer for the Rambam than the one I gave previously

The Gra wrote on page 23 in Bava Kama and in the Shulchan Aruch chapter 418 paragraph 33 that the Rif and Rambam hold that the Gemara changed its mind about the approach of R Yochanan because of the question of Rava, if fire is liable because of his arrows then why is hidden not obligated? (That is to say that if there were things hidden in the stack, he is not obligated for them.) Rather R Yochanan holds completely with the opinion of Reish Lakish and the only difference between them is the four extra thing that one is obligated for when one doe damage by his own body rather than by one property like hi ox. the proof of this is clear. It is because the Rif and Rambam both leave out the first answer of the Gemara that intended to answer the question of Rava, that because there was wall, his arrows are finished. The Gemara pushed out that answer because if his arrows are finished, then they would be finished in regard to possessions that are not hidden. I write this because it is clear to me that the reason the Rambam wrote that when a dog take a loaf with a coal to a stack and the stack is burnt up that the case is where the dog carried it over the stack, but never put it down and so the obligation is half damage for wherever the path of the coal was, and there is no obligation for the rest of the stack is that the Rambam simply decided the law like Reish Lakish because that is how he and the Rif explain the Gemara on page 23 that R Yochanan in fact hold like Reish Lakish and the previous case where he the dog put the coal on the stack would be full damage for the whole stack. However, I might mention that my previous approach to explain the Rambam was that he holds force of force is not obligated (like Tosphot said) was a viable answer except that it would make more sense that the rest of the stack would have been liable a fourth of the damage as the Raavad in fact ask.[and in fact the Rambam does hold that force of a force is not obligated at all.] but I think now that this case of the dog is not force of a force but simply fire is obligated because of his property like his ox like Reish Lakish said and carrying it over the stack is pebbles or horn of a tame ox. (This night I saw the Radvaz wrote my original answer for the Rambam that the case is force of his force. And later in the evening I discovered the comment of the Gra. I think the approach of the Gra is more accurate.) A little background for this subject. R Yochanan said that damage by fire is because of his arrows and Reish Lakish said it is because of damage by means of one’s property e.g., his ox. The Gemara asked on R Yochanan that if the liability would be because of direct damage by one own action, then why would hidden thing be exempt? That means, if one burnt someone else’s stack of wheat, and inside was hidden some object, the obligation to pay is only for a stack of wheat. The answer the Gemara gives for R Yochanan is that there had been a wall there which fell, and before the person had a chance to repair it, the fire broke out and went to the neighbor’s property. Then the Gemara objected to this answer and said in that case then even for the open things like the stack itself, he should not be obligated. So then the Gemara said that in fact R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish, and the only difference between them is in the four extra types of damage that one is liable for when he does damage by his own action rather than by his property _____________________________________________________________ The גר’’א wrote on page כ''ג in בבא קמא and in the שלחן ערוך חושן משפט פרק תי''ח הערה ל''ג that theרי’’ףand רמב’’ם hold that the גמרא changed its mind about the approach of ר’ יוחנן because of the question of רבא, if fire is liable because of his arrows then why is hidden טמון not obligated? (That is to say that if there were things hidden in the stack, he is not obligated for them.) Rather ר’ יוחנן holds completely with the opinion of ריש לקיש and the only difference between them is the four extra things that one is obligated for when one does damage by his own body rather than by one's property like his ox. The proof of this is clear. It is because the רי’’ף and רמב’’ם both leave out the first answer of the גמרא that intended to answer the question ofרבא , that because there was wall, his arrows are finished. The גמרא pushed out that answer because if his arrows are finished, then they would be finished in regard to possessions that are not hidden. I write this because it is clear to me that the reason the רמב’’ם wrote that when a dog take a loaf with a coal to a stack and the stack is burnt up that the case is where the dog carried it over the stack, but never put it down and so the obligation is half damage for wherever the path of the coal was, and there is no obligation for the rest of the stack is that the רמב’’ם simply decided the law like ריש לקיש because that is how he and the רי’’ף explain the גמראon page כ''ג that ר’ יוחנן in fact hold like ריש לקיש and the previous case where he the dog put the coal on the stack would be full damage for the whole stack. However, I might mention that my previous approach to explain the רמב’’ם was that he holds force of force is not obligated (like תוספות said) was a viable answer except that it would make more sense that the rest of the stack would have been liable a fourth of the damage as the ראב''ד in fact ask.[and in fact the רמב’’ם does hold that force of a force is not obligated at all.] but I think now that this case of the dog is not force of a force but simply fire is obligated because of his property like his ox like ריש לקיש said and carrying it over the stack is צרורות or horn of a tame ox. (This night I saw the Radvaz wrote my original answer for the רמב’’ם that the case is force of his force. And later in the evening I discovered the comment of the גר’’א. I think the approach of the גר’’א is more accurate.) A little background for this subject. ר’ יוחנן said that damage by אש is because of his arrows and ריש לקיש said it is because of damage by means of one’s property e.g., his ox. The גמרא asked on ר’ יוחנן that if the liability would be because of direct damage by one own action, then why would hidden thing טמון be exempt? That means, if one burnt someone else’s stack of wheat, and inside was hidden some object, the obligation to pay is only for a stack of wheat. The answer the גמרא gives for ר’ יוחנן is that there had been a wall there which fell, and before the person had a chance to repair it, the fire broke out and went to the neighbor’s property. Then the גמרא objected to this answer and said in that case then even for the open things like the stack itself, he should not be obligated. So, then the גמרא said that in fact ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש, and the only difference between them is in the four extra types of damage that one is liable for when he does damage by his own action rather than by his property

I think that how religious a girl makes no difference. What matters is how devoted to Torah she is. The idea of the sages of marrying a daughter of a Torah scholar to me means to marry a girl who is devoted to the idea that her husband and children should learn Torah at all cost. Religiosity has nothing to do with this. I can see that there are plenty of girls who are religious, but are not interested in her husband learning Torah. That does not count as a daughter of a true Torah scholar. [Sadly Torah has become a easy way to make a living. Girls with sense (but no fear of God) will marry these kinds of hypocrites. What really matters is the people who will stick with Torah at the cost of having no money

בבא קמא דף כ''ב ע''א . עלו לי שלוש שאלות. אחת על ריש לקיש. אחת על איך רש''י מסביר ריש לקיש, ואחרת על איך ר' חננאל מסביר ריש לקיש. הסוגיא הבסיסית היא זו. ריש לקיש אמר ששריפה חייבת בנזק מלא בגלל נזק שנגרם לרכוש. בעוד ר' יוחנן אוחז שאש חייבת כי זו כמו חיצים. לרי''ף ורש''י, הרעיון של ר' יוחנן הוא שהאש חייבת כאילו אחד בעצמו גרם נזק, לא רכושו) כפי שהיה קורה אם השור שלו גרם נזק. (הגמרא שואל שאלה על ריש לקיש מהמשנה. לכלב יש כיכר עם פחם בתוכו והולך וגורם לערימה להישרף. את תשלום של הלחם הוא נזק שלם, ובגלל הערימה חצי נזק. השאלה מהמשנה הזו על ריש לקיש היא שהפחם לא שייך לבעלים של הכלב. ריש לקיש עונה שהמקרה של המשנה הוא שהכלב זרק את הלחם עם הפחם בתוכו על הערימה, ומחויב או בגלל שזהו שינוי מהדרך הרגילה ובכך אחראי בחצי נזק כמו קרן התם או בגלל צרורות. (אם הכלב היה מניח אותו על הערימה, הבעלים של הכלב היה אחראי במלוא הנזק.) השאלה שיש לי כאן היא שהשאלה והתשובה אינן מתאימות זו לזו. השאלה הייתה מדוע הבעלים של הכלב צריך להיות אחראי בכלל? אחרי הכל, זה לא הפחם שלו. תשובה: בעל הכלב אחראי בגלל שינוי או צרורות? איך זה עונה על השאלה? הפחם עדיין לא שייך לו. תשובה לכך יכולה להיות שהגמרא בשלב זה חושב שבעל הפחם יישא באחריות אם לא ישמור על גחלתו. אבל כדי למצוא כיצד הבעלים של הכלב עלול להיות אחראי גם, ריש לקיש מוצא את התרחיש הזה שבו הכלב זרק אותו. כך אפשר להסביר את המשנה שהתשלום הוא חצי נזק. (מאוחר יותר, הגמרא למעשה, גורסת שבעל הפחם אכן שמר על הפחם שלו.) עכשיו, רבינו חננאל אמר שהתשובה של ריש לקיש היא שהכלב זרק את הפחם, ואז הפחם לא עזב את תחום בעל הפחם. זה בהתייחסות למסכת שבת שבה (אני חושב שאני זוכר אולי) יש דעה שנחיתה לא אותו דבר כמו להרים ולהניח. בדרך כלל צריך להרים ולהניח ארבע אמות, או מתחום אחד לשני, אבל איך זה עונה על השאלה על ריש לקיש? למה בעלים של הכלב חייב?ויש לשאול שאלה נוספת. ר' יוחנן אמר שהחובה לאש היא בגלל חיציו, וריש לקיש לא הסכים לזה כי חיציו נעים מכוח האדם, ואילו האש נעה מעצמה. מכיוון שכך, אני שואל לפי ריש לקיש מדוע הבעלים של הכלב לא יצטרך לשלם עבור כל הערימה? הרי לריש לקיש אין צורך שחובת האש תהיה נעה רק מכוחו הישיר של האדם שהדליק. מספיק שהוא הדליק אותו, והוא נע ברוח רגילה

i was at a litvak beit midrash which is different than a yeshiva. A yeshiva is built for a certain age group 18-24; while a beit midrash is for all ages -who ever wants to come and learn Torah. so I my area there is such a place and I was there thinking about Reish Lakish in Bava Kama page 22a and three questions occurred to me. One on reish lakish. one on how Rashi explains Reish Lakish, and another on how Rabbainu Chananel explains Reish Lakish, but later on the way to the seashore an answer for Rashi occurred to me. the basic idea is this Reish Lakish said that fire is obligated in full damage because of nizkei mamon damage due to one’s property. While R Yochanan holds fire is obligated because it is like one’s arrows. To the Rif and Rashi, the idea of R Yochanan is that fire is obligated as if one himself caused damage, not hi property a would be the case if hi ox caused damage. The gemara asks a question on Reish Lakish the from the mishna. A dog has a loaf with a coal in it and goes and causes a stack to get burnt up. the damage for the loaf i full damage and payment for the stack is half damage. the question from this mishna on reish lakish is that the coal does not belong to the owner of the dog. Reish Lakish answers the case of the mishna is where the dog threw the loaf with the coal inside it on the stack. Thus, the payment for the loaf is full damage, for the place the coal landed is half damage, and he is not obligated at all for the rest of the stack. Rashi explains this statement thus. If throwing the loaf and coal is obligated either because it i a change from the normal way and thus liable in half damage like horn of a tame animal or because of pebbles. If he would have put it down on the stack, the owner of the dog would be liable in full damage. the question I have here is that the question and answer to not fit together. The question was, why should the owner of the dog be liable at all? After all, it is not his coal. Answer: The owner of the dog is liable because of change or pebbles? How does that answer the question? The coal still does not belong to him. An answer to this might be that the gemara at this point is thinking that the owner of the coal would be liable if he did not guard his coal. But to find how the owner of the dog might also be liable Reish Lakish find this scenario i where the dog threw it. In that way it is possible to explain the mishna that the payment is half damage. Later the gemara in fact holds that the owner of the coal did in fact guard his coal. Now Rabbainu Chananel said the answer of Reish Lakish is that the dog threw the coal, so the coal has not left the domain of the owner of the coal. This is in reference to Tracate shabat where (I think I recall) there is an opinion (or maybe all opinions? I forget!) is that throwing and landing are not the same thing as picking up and putting down. Normally to be obligated for carrying on shabat one needs to pick up and put down four cubits away or from one domain to another by which the domain is changed. how ever how does this answer the question on Reish Lakish? The question was why is the owner of the dog liable anything and we answer that there is a reason to make the owner of the coal liable. This does not follow. A third question is this. R Yochanan said that the obligation for fire is because of his arrows. Reish Lakih disagreed with this because his arrows move from the force of the person while fire moves on its own accord. This being so, I ask according to Reish Lakish why should the owner of the dog not have to pay for the whole stack? After all, to Reish Lakis there is no need for the obligation of force to be moving only from the direct force of the person that lite it. It is enough that he lite it, and the it moves by a common wind. ___________________________________________________________________ קמא page כ''ב ע''א . three questions occurred to me. One on ריש לקיש. one on how רש''י explains ריש לקיש, and another on how ר' חננאל explains ריש לקיש _______ the basic סוגיא is this. ריש לקיש said that fire is obligated in full damage because of damage due to one’s property. While ר’ יוחנן holds fire is obligated because it is like one’s arrows. To the רי''ף and רש''י, the idea of ר’ יוחנן is that fire is obligated as if one himself caused damage, not his property) as would be the case if his ox caused damage (. The גמרא asks a question on ריש לקיש the from the משנה. A dog has a loaf with a coal in it and goes and causes a stack to get burnt up. The damage for the loaf is full damage, and payment for the stack is half damage. The question from this משנה on ריש לקיש is that the coal does not belong to the owner of the dog. ריש לקיש answers the case of the משנה is where the dog threw the loaf with the coal inside it on the stack. Thus, the payment for the loaf is full damage, for the place the coal landed is half damage, and he is not obligated at all for the rest of the stack. רש''י explains this statement thus. If throwing the loaf and coal is obligated either because it is a change from the normal way and thus liable in half damage like horn of a קרן התם or because of צרורות. If הכלב would have put it down on the stack, the owner of the dog would be liable in full damage. The question I have here is that the question and answer Do not fit together WELL. The question was, why should the owner of the dog be liable at all? After all, it is not his coal. Answer: The owner of the dog is liable because of change or צרורות? How does that answer the question? The coal still does not belong to him. An answer to this might be that the גמרא at this point is thinking that the owner of the coal would be liable if he did not guard his coal. But to find how the owner of the dog might also be liable ריש לקיש finds this scenario where the dog threw it. In that way, it is possible to explain the משנה that the payment is half damage. )Later the גמרא, in fact, holds that the owner of the coal did, in fact, guard his coal.( Now, רבינו חננאלsaid the answer of ריש לקיש is that the dog threw the coal, so the coal has not left the domain of the owner of the coal. This is in reference to מסכת שבת where (I think I recall) there is an opinion (or maybe all opinions? I forget!) is that throwing and landing are not the same thing as picking up and putting down. Normally to be obligated for carrying on שבת one needs to pick up and put down four cubits away, or from one domain to another by which the domain is changed. However how does this answer the question on ריש לקיש? The question was why is the owner of the dog liable anything? and we answer that there is a reason to make the owner of the coal liable. This does not follow. A third question is this. ר’ יוחנן said that the obligation for fire is because of his arrows. ריש לקיש disagreed with this because his arrows move from the force of the person, while fire moves on its own accord. This being so, I ask according to ריש לקיש why should the owner of the dog not have to pay for the whole stack? After all, to ריש לקישthere is no need for the obligation of force to be moving only from the direct force of the person that lit it. It is enough that he lite it, and the it moves by a common wind.

Kant, and Leonard Nelson

I have a natural inclination toward philosophy and thus it is a bias that I see it as important. But even if I am biased towards it, in Middle Ages it was also considered important in the important formulation of the Middle Ages, faith and reason. But in the period from the fall of Rome until about the time of the Rambam, it was Plato who was foremost. Then slowly, the emphasis changed toward Aristotle. That started with the fact that the Muslim world had always been more interested in Aristotle than Plato. But with the Rambam, that changed toward Aristotle and the with Aquinas that set the stage even for Europe. That of course puttered out with Bacon. Philosophy in itself began to deal with a new set of problems; the Mind body problem, and politics; until a kind of synthesis came about in Kant, and Leonard Nelson. so now, I think that if we would go with the Medieval authorities that saw philosophy as important like The Rambam, then we ought to study Kant. But clearly there are plenty of people who reject any learning of philosophy at all. still, I tend not to agree with that. evil.

za71 B Flat minor midiza71 nwc

בבא קמא דף כ'''ב הגמרא אומרת שהכלב עם הלחם והפחם גורם לשריפה של ערימה שזה "חיצי הכלב", ולכן חייב רק בחצי נזק. אבל באותו עמוד מובא מקרה אחר שבו נכנס גמל עמוס בפשתן לחנות והיה נר דולק בתוך החנות. הפשתן עלה באש, והחנות נשרפה. הגמרא קובע שחייבים בנזק מלא, אף על פי שהם גם "חיצי הגמל". מה ההבדל בין חיצי הכלב שעליהם משלם הבעלים חצי נזק, לבין חיצי הגמל שעליהם הוא משלם נזק מלא

Bava Kama pg 22

In Bava Kama pg 22 I am wondering why when the we say the dog with the loaf and coal cause a stack to get burnt up that is the “arrows of the dog” and so obligated only for half damage, but on the same page when the camel loaded with linen goes into a store, and the linen catches fire, and the store is burnt, that is obligated in full damage even though it also is the “arrows of the camel.”

"I don't need no man" school of feminism. By Dr Kelley Ross. My mom told me: “To marry a nice Jewish girl." "Nice" and "Jewish" are two separate conditions.

American men get the drift that indoctrinated women are really all but hostile, with them finding it difficult to explain why they are open to dating at all. We also get a new ideology among men that women are not worth the trouble, to date or to marry, especially with family law weighted against men in divorce and custody disputes. "I don't need no man" school of feminism. So here, in response to the question, "No kids! What are you going to do when you're old?" we see an older woman relaxing with a drink in a chair by the pool, under an umbrella, with a stack of books to read and another person, perhaps a Black gentleman, in the adjacent chair. Of course, not everyone can afford this kind of retirement; the man is liable to die before her; and she is then left alone, perhaps without any family. That is the fate of many older women, who may die, as well as live, alone. Hopefully, days will not pass before her body is discovered. We are only missing the cats to complete the picture. We do get a kind of self-satisfied, smug smile, as though this is the best kind of life. All this reinforces the sort of feminist ideology of isolation and self-sufficiency that we often get now. In response, we also get a new ideology among men that women are not worth the trouble, to date or to marry, especially with family law weighted against men in divorce and custody disputes. Indeed, organizers have been discovering that "singles" events sometimes draw few, or no, men. This is a phenomenon, not just in the West, but in China, Korea, and Japan also, where marriage and even sex seem to be declining in popularity. American men get the drift that indoctrinated women are really all but hostile, with them finding it difficult to explain why they are open to dating at all. In March, 2025, a contestant on the Netflix show “Love Is Blind” broke off her engagement at the altar beause she suddenly decided that the groom was insufficiently political, with the "right" politics. He didn't even care about the fraudulent travesty, "Black Lives Matter." Truly, he is clearly better off. Next, at right, we get a purer version of "I don't need no man." What a man likes is irrelevant because a feminist is not in the business of pleasing anyone else. In fact, I don't know how often a man is liable to offer advice like this. It is more likely he will just check out if this woman represents something that "no man wants." Indeed, the "we don't care" may be a deal breaker all on its own. The "we" in this presumably means all women -- none of them are to care what a man thinks -- although it may just be the Royal We, which fits the attitude. The key thing, however, is that the woman here doesn't care what he likes or wants. She is not in the business of pleasing anyone but herself. I think this is called being "self-centered" or "narcissistic"; and I thought that it was only Ayn Rand who advocated the "virtue of selfishness." Isn't it only Capitalism that promotes the atomization of society? Would this feminist ever be able to buy this guy a Christmas or birthday present, if she never knows what he likes? Seems like she would just buy something that she likes, which will persuade the fellow that she really doesn't care about him. So we see the autism and isolation of this ideology. The accusation is always that the "patriarchy" wants women to live entirely for others, but here this is the polar opposite, to live with no concern for anyone else at all, headed towards the solitary old age and death as noted above. Or, after all, there are convents. Then, we might consider the cartoon at left. This at least concedes that a woman might be happy and fulfilled in a marriage with children. But, of course, it is balanced, at least, with the solitary and self-satisfied representative on the right. The terminology is also interesting, with each woman labelled as "complete." But we also might wonder if the implication here is that Black women marry because they are not capable of the self-sufficiency of the white woman. Sounds like a bit of racism, even as Molnar is trying to virtue-signal by showing an interracial marriage. Of course, some people are happy being alone; and there can be communities of people without children or even marriage. Which is why I mention convents. "Retirement" communities try to create little societies where people can be happy even while family and others are dying, or senile, around them. Perhaps the woman above is not by a pool at her own home but by the common pool of such a place. They play bingo or string beads for amusement. However, retirement communities are an "end of life" provision. The woman on the right, with her pizza and coffee, doesn't look ready for retirement. Instead, she is the ideal of solitary contentment. But, for most people, this is exceptional; yet it is the ideal promoted by this kind of feminism, and by Leiney Molnar. It is the sort of thing that is contrary, not only to most religious traditions, but to the principles of Darwinian Evolution. In other words, solitary self-satisfaction is not a good survival or reproductive strategy. Indeed, with some animals, like tigers, the females mate, conceive, and raise the young on their own. This is also a provision in feminist ideology, where "single motherhood" is just as "complete" as anything else. Unfortunately, human beings are not tigers; and we know that children raised by single mothers disproportionately suffer from a multitude of social and developmental problems, not the least of which is a greater incidence of criminal activity. Also, most single mothers are not professional white women but live at much lower income levels, say, from waitressing (where the IRS taxes tips, which are gifts, as income - which Trump has promised to stop), if not no income. Darwinian survival is no small consideration. Married women are the safest people in modern society, despite the Left wishing to portray marriage as hellscapes of domestic abuse. No, lowlife boyfriends are the threat of domestic violence, including against children, and Lesbian relationships can be just as violent as heterosexual ones. The former may be more common in low income circumstances, especiallly if the boyfriends are parasitic on the women, and not the natural fathers of the children. Male lions who take over a pride, as we know, kill the cubs of the lionesses. Next, at right, we've got a woman complaining about birth control pills, while the man complains, in what we are expected to take as in a trivial and dismissive way, about condoms. Actually, the problem with condoms is that they blanket all the sexually sensitive parts of the male anatomy. This reduces sensation, which otherwise is the point of engaging is sex beyond reproductive purposes, in which condoms would be counterproductive anyway. The problem with the woman's complaint, in turn, is that she doesn't need to use the Pill for birth control. Yet the Pill was presented, and has been celebrated for years, as the easiest way to make women as casual about sex as men can be. Nevertheless, as she complains, there can be side effects, which may be serious enough that they counterindicate the use of the drug. On the other hand, some women use the Pill therapeutically, for instance to regularize their menses. Thus, the complaint here about the Pill may be valid, but it will only apply to a subset of women, while the cartoon gives us the impression that it is the general experience of all women on the Pill. So this is a misrepresentation. My first wife was suspicious of what the Pill did to her sexual libido, but she otherwise seemed to have no complaints about it. At the same time, this woman doesn't need to use the Pill. I had a girlfriend who only used a diaphram, and she seemed pleased enough with its use. There also used to be contraceptive sponges, but in 1994 these were no longer available because when the maker (Whitehall-Robins Healthcare) wanted to change factories, the FDA required that the devices be re-certified, which the maker did not want to pay for. Now I've seen that there was some contamination in the factory, and the maker didn't want to upgrade the equipment. That is not what I heard at the time. Sponges have been reintroduced, but also withdrawn again, at least three times. The loss of this device was even the subject of an episode of Seinfeld (The Sponge, S7:E9, December 7, 1995). There seemed to be little protest about the loss of the sponges from Establishment feminism. The FDA may have jerked women around, but, apparently, it is above accountability to the public. Typical for the Administrative State. The rest of the woman's complaint in the cartoon is about the horror of pregnancy. In that case, "I have to go through a traumatic abortion" (unlike Lena Dunham's infamous wish that she had had an abortion, since it sounded like a feminist sacrament), or she must tolerate destroying her life by actually having children, which, as we have seen, seems to be a fate worse than death. All this because the male is so selfish and insensitive that he doesn't want to inhibit his sexual response with a condom. Obviously, none of this will be beneficial for either of them. Finally, at left we see a celebration of divorce. But every divorce will be a failure of something, whether it is a failure of judgment, of maturity, or perhaps the moral failure of one of the partners. If the nature of the failure is not recognized, then the "new beginning" very likely will be the preparation for another failure. I know both men and women who've been through four marriages. The vibe we get from the cartoon, however, is more like that marriages are disposable and that now it is time to move on for some more fun. The moral failing in that case might well be of the woman pictured. The moral shallowness of all this is much like the advertisement we see here for a divorce lawyer: The implication is that the gentleman on the sign, unless he gets a divorce, is missing out on the busty woman standing in front of it. And perhaps she can tolerate using the Pill. This should be a clue that the problem here with feminism is part of a larger problem of which this kind of feminism is only one exemplar. The appeal about divorce is to hedonism. The dismissal of marriage and children is an expression of nihilism, whose only serious goal could be the extinction of life. None of that is possible without the rejection of the value of any religious tradition, which means that, in the West, it is fallout from atheism. The belief in ancient Greece, Rome, India, and China that reproduction is a duty to our ancestors is something that, naturally, no one believes now -- unless it is in India and China (where offerings to ancestors are still made at Ch'ing Ming). The rejection of hedonism and the diagnosis of nihilism following from atheism is, of course, characteristic of the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche's solution was to substitute the pursuit of power for any of the old features of religious belief. This did not improve matters. Those pursuing power murdered many millions of people in the 20th Century, although their program was often dressed up with a rhetoric of Marxist "liberation." Yet somehow "liberation" always involved luxury for the rulers and tyranny, slavery, and poverty for everyone else. Establishment feminism is, naturally, like all the political Left, mad for power. This is incompatible with hedonism, as we indeed see in the feminist anaesthesia and anhedonia that poison cultural discourse and even popular entertainment. Nevertheless, as examined above, there is a parallel appeal that offers pleasure and irresponsibility to vulnerable and gullible women. Blow off men, family, and children and you will be happy, like the Davos Supervillains telling people they will own nothing and will be happy, sitting in their corporate cubicles, in an office where there is no social life because the men expect that any interaction with the women beyond business necessities will result in a sexual harassment lawsuit. Unfortunately, many women may buy into this until youth and fertility are gone (called "hitting the wall") and they are left with the isolation that has been sold to them. Hedonism and nihilism take a toll, morally and physically. That is the end of the essay by Dr Ross. My own input to this is to mention that my Mom told me “To marry a nice Jewish girl" and that these are separate conditions.

קשה על דעת הרמב''ם עם הכלב עם הלחם והפחם היא שקשה לראות איך זה מתאים לגמרא. הגמרא אמנם אומר שר' יוחנן סבור שאש חייבת בגלל חיצים שלו וממונו, אבל קשה לראות איך זה עוזר לרמב''ם. אם הרמב''ם היה מחזיק ישירות ורק כריש לקיש, אז הייתה לנו תשובה, אבל הוא לא. הוא מחזיק שאש חייבת בגלל חיציו. תן לי להסביר למה אם הוא יחזיק כריש לקיש זה יעזור לו. ריש לקיש אמר אש מחויבת כאשר היא רכושו של אדם. ואז גמרא שואלת עליו מהמשנה עם הכלב, הלחם והפחם. הפחם לא שייך לבעל הכלב, אז למה הוא חייב לשלם על הערימה? ריש לקיש עונה כי הכלב זרק את הכיכר עם הפחם על הערימה. זה אומר שהוא לא אחראי לאש בכלל, אלא בגלל קרן של שור תם או בגלל צרורות. זה בוודאי כמו הגמרא בעמוד י''ח שבו גמרא מחזיקה שהאחריות היא מצרורות או קרן התם. ולריש לקיש האחריות היא רק על מקום הפחם, לא כל הערימה כי האש לא הייתה של בעל הכלב, ובעל הפחם אינו אחראי כי שמר על הגחלים שלו. אבל הראשונים כולם החליטו שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוחנן ולכן ישנה אפשרות להיות אחראי או כאשר האש שייכת לו או שזה מקרה של חיציו. אז למה הרמב''ם סבור שאין אחריות על הערימה, אלא רק הדרך שהפחם עבר כשהכלב גרר אותו. בכל מקרה, למה זה משנה לריש לקיש אם הכלב זרק את הפחם? גם אם הוא הניח אותו בעדינות, זה עדיין קרן שור תם או צרורות. יתר על כן, איך מסביר ר' יוחנן את המשנה, שהכלב הניח את הפחם בעדינות כך שבעלי הכלב אחראי לחצי נזק לכל הערימה. אבל למה? זה עדיין לא "החצים שלו" אלא חיצים של הכלב שלו, והפחם לא שייך לו_________ כדי לענות על שאלה זו על הרמב''ם אני חושב שצריך להסתכל אחורה בדף י''ח שם עולה סוגיית כוחו של כח. נוכל לראות שהגמרא שם רואה בשאלת רבא אם תלך לפי תחילת או סוף עילות הנזק כשאלה כמו צרורות (חלוקי נחל). יש גם אם העוף שלעס את החוט שהחזיק כלי שנפל ושבר כלי אחר הוא כוח כוחו. אף שהגמרא שם לא מגיע לתשובה על כוח כוחו [מפני שהתרנגולת אולי דחפה את הכלי עד שנשבר על אבן], הרמב''ם [נזקי ממון ב' הי''ז] והתוספות כאן בדף כ''ב אכן מגיעים לתשובה. העובדה שר' יוחנן דורש שהכלב יניח את הכיכר עם הפחם על הערימה כדי שיהיה חצי נזק, מלמדת שכוח כוחו אינו חייב כלל (או אולי נזק רביעי כפי ששואל הראב''ד על הרמב''ם). עם זאת, כתבתי במקום אחר שאולי הרמב"ם מהחזיק כמו הרא"ש שכוח כוח הוא חייב, אבל על סמך השאלות שיש לי כאן על הרמב"ם, והעובדה שאני לא יכול לראות לו שום תשובה חוץ מלומר שהוא מחזיק כמו תוספות, אני חושב ששם יש למצוא תשובה אחרת _____________________________________________________________ עם זאת, יש שאלה לגבי גישה זו. ייתכן שר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש אם הכלב זרק את הפחם על הערימה. איננו יודעים כי הוא לא אומר דבר על המקרה הזה. אם הוא מסכים עם ריש לקיש שמקום שהפחם נחת או נישא שחייב בחצי נזק, אין ללמוד מזה (לא התוספות ולא הרמב''ם) שכוח כוחו אינו חייב נזק. שהרי אמרנו שהכלב שזורק או נושא את הפחם הוא כוח כוחו, ולכן אומר ר' יוחנן שהכלב צריך להניחו על הערימה כדי להיות אחראי. אבל זה יחול גם על המקום של הפחם. אם נזרק, אז גם מקום הפחם לא יהיה מחויב בניגוד לריש לקיש. או אולי ר' יוחנן מסכים עם ריש לקיש שאם הכלב היה זורק את הפחם, זה יהיה אחראי לחצי נזק על המקום של הפחם מהסיבות רש'' הציע (קרן של שור תם או צרורות). (לפיכך, לא ניתן ללמוד מכאן על כוח כוחו.) האפשרות האחרונה כאן היא שאולי ר' יוחנן סבור שהזריקה היא כוח כוחו ולכן אינה אחראית על הערימה וגם לא על מקום הפחם, בעוד ריש לקיש חשב שהזריקה אינה כוח כוחו אלא צרורות או קרן של שור תם (מאולף)

The Mishna brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. so why does the Rambam hold that there is no liability for the whole stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along? One problem with the opinion of the Rambam about the dog with the loaf and coal is that it is hard to see how it corresponds to the Gemara. The Gemara does say that R Yochanan holds that fire is also obligated because of arrows or money, but it is hard to see how that helps the Rambam. If the Rambam would hold directly and only like Reish Lakish, then we would have an answer, but he does not. He holds fire is obligated because of "his arrows". Let me explain why if he would hold by Reish Lakish that would help him. Reish Lakish said fire is obligated when it is one's property. Then the Gemara asks on him from the Mishna with the dog, loaf, and coal. The coal does not belong to the owner of the dog, so why is he liable to pay for the stack? Reish Lakish answers because the dog threw the loaf with the coal onto the stack. That means it is not liable for fire at all, but rather because of horn of a tame ox (that became wild) or because of pebbles. This is certainly like the Gemara on page 18 where Gemara holds the liability is from pebbles or horn of a tame ox. And to Reish Lakish, the liability is only on the place of the coal, not the whole stack because the fire did not belong to the owner of the dog, and the owner of the coal is not liable because he guarded his coal. But the Rishonim (medieval authorities) all decided the law is like R Yochanan, and therefore there is the possibility of being liable for either when the fire belongs to one or it is a case of "his arrows". so why does the Rambam hold that there is no liability for the stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along. In any case, why does it make a difference to Reish Lakish if the dog threw the coal? Even if he put it down gently, it is still horn of an ox or pebbles. Furthermore, how does R Yochanan explain the Mishna, that the dog put the coal down gently, so the owner of the dog is liable half damage for the whole stack. But why? It still is not “his arrows” but arrows of his dog and the coal does not belong to him. In order to answer this question on the Rambam I think it is necessary to look aback on page 18 where the issue of force of a force comes up. We can see that the gemara there considers the question of Rava about if you go by the beginning or the end of the causes of damage to be the same question as pebbles. There also is the case if the chicken that chewed on the string which held a vessel that fell and broke another vessel is force of force. Though the gemara there does not arrive at an answer about force of a force [because the chicken might have pushed the vessel until it broke on a stone], the Rambam [monetary damage ch. 2 law 17] and the Tosphot here on page 22 do arrive at an answer. The fact that R. Yochanan requires that the dog place the loaf with the coal on the stack in order for there to be half damage, shows that force of a force is not obligated at all (or perhaps fourth damage as the Raavad asks on the Rambam). ______________________________________________________________________________________ However, I wrote elsewhere that the Rambam might hold like the Rosh that force of a force is obligated but based on the questions I have here on the Rambam, and the fact that I can not see any answer for him except to say that he holds like Tosphot, I think that that other place has to be answered in a different way__________________However, there is a question on this approach. It is possible that R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish if the dog threw the coal on the stack. We do not know since he says nothing about that case. If he agrees with Reish Lakish that the place the coal landed or was carried that is obligated in half damage, then neither the Tosphot nor Rambam can learn from that that force of his force is not obligated in any damage. For we were saying that the dog throwing or carrying of the coal is force of his force, and that is why R Yochanan says the dog has to put it down on the stack in order to be liable. But that would apply to the place of the coal also. If thrown, then the place of the coal also would be not obligated unlike Reish Lakish. Or perhaps R Yochanan agrees with Reish Lakish that if the dog would throw the coal, that that would be liable half damage on the place of the coal for the reasons Rashi gives (horn of a tame ox or pebble). (Thus, you can not learn from here about force of force.) The last possibility here is that perhaps R Yochanan holds that throwing is force of his force, and thus not liable on the stack nor the place of the coal, while Reish Lakish considered throwing not to be force of his force but rather pebbles or horn of a tame ox. Ho ______________________________________________________________________________________ ________________ The problem with the opinion of the רמב’’ם about the dog with the loaf and coal is hard to see how it corresponds to the גמרא. The גמרא does say that ר’ יוחנן holds that fire is also obligated because of money, but it is hard to see how that helps the רמב’’ם. If the רמב’’ם would hold directly and only like ריש לקיש, then we would have an answer, but he does not. He holds fire is obligated because of his arrows. Let me explain why if he would hold by ריש לקיש that would help him. ריש לקיש said fire is obligated when it is one's property. Then גמרא asks on him from the משנה with the dog, loaf, and coal. The coal does not belong to the owner of the dog, so why is he liable to pay for the stack? ריש לקיש answers because the dog threw the loaf with the coal onto the stack. That means it is not liable for fire at all, but rather because of horn of a tame ox or because of צרורות. This certainly like the גמרא on page י''ח where גמרא holds the liability is from צרורות or קרן התם. and to ריש לקיש the liability is only on the place of the coal, not the whole stack because the fire did not belong to the owner of the dog and the owner of the coal is not liable because he guarded his coal. But the ראשונים all decided the law is like ר’ יוחנן and therefore there is the possibility of being liable for either when the fire belongs to one or it is a case of his arrows. so why does the רמב’’ם hold that there is no liability for the stack, but only the path the coal took as the dog dragged it along. In any case, why does it make a difference to ריש לקיש if the dog threw the coal? Even if he put it down gently, it is still horn of an ox or צרורותs. Furthermore, how does ר’ יוחנן explain THE משנה, that the dog put the coal down gently so the owner of the dog is liable half damage for the whole stack. But why? It still is not “his arrows” but arrows of his dog and the coal does not belong to him. In order to answer this question on the רמב’’ם I think it is necessary to look back on page י''ח where the issue of force of a force comes up. We can see that the גמרא there considers the question of רבא about if you go by the beginning or the end of the causes of damage to be the same question as pebbles. There also is the case if the chicken that chewed on the string which held a vessel that fell and broke another vessel is force of force. Though the גמרא there does not arrive at an answer about force of a force [because the chicken might have pushed the vessel until it broke on a stone], the רמב’’ם and the תוספות here on page כ''ב do arrive at an answer. The fact that ר' יוחנןrequire that the dog place the loaf with the coal on the stack in order for there to be half damage, show that force of a force is not obligated at all (or perhaps fourth damage as the ראב'' ד asks on the רמב’’ם). However, I wrote elsewhere that the רמב’’ם might hold like the רא''ש that force of a force is obligated but based on the questions I have here on the רמב’’ם, and the fact that I can not see any answer for him except to say that he holds like תוספות, I think that that other place has to be answered in a different way ______________________________________________________________________________________ However, there is a question on this approach. It is possible that ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש if the dog threw the coal on the stack. We do not know since he says nothing about that case. If he agrees with ריש לקיש that the place the coal landed or was carried that is obligated in half damage, then neither the תוספות nor רמב''ם can learn from that that force of his force is not obligated in any damage. For we were saying that the dog throwing or carrying of the coal is force of his force, and that is why ר’ יוחנן says the dog has to put it down on the stack in order to be liable. But that would apply to the place of the coal also. if thrown, then the place of the coal also would be not obligated unlike ריש לקיש. Or perhaps ר’ יוחנן agrees with ריש לקיש that if the dog would throw the coal, that that would be liable half damage on the place of the coal for the reasons רש''יgives (horn of a שור תם or צרורות). (Thus, you can not learn from here about force of force.) The last possibility here is that perhaps ר' יוחנן holds that throwing is force of his force and thus not liable on the stack nor the place of the coal while ריש לקיש considered throwing not to be force of his force but rather pebbles or horn of a tame ox.

קושי על הרמב''ם מהגמרא בבא קמא כ''ג ע''א

הגמרא שואלת על המשנה . המשנה מביאה מקרה שכלב נשא כיכר עם פחם בוער לערימה והערימה נשרפה. התשלום עבור הכיכר הוא נזק מלא, והתשלום עבור הערימה הוא חצי נזק. הגמרא אומרת שהסיבה היא שלא מדובר בחצים של עצמו, אלא בחצים של הכלב, אז זה חצי נזק. הגמרא שואלת אז מי משלם? תשובה: הבעלים של הכלב. הוא שואל, "למה לא הבעלים של הפחם?" תשובה: הוא שמר על הפחם שלו. לכן, הגמרא קובעת שהדין הוא שהתשלום עבור הערימה הוא חצי נזק, וזה משולם על ידי בעל הכלב. אולי גם בעל הפחם ישלם אם לא ישמור על הפחם. [וכן שתוספות אומר.] אבל אנחנו לא יודעים זאת ישירות מהגמרא. כל מה שאנחנו יודעים בוודאות מהגמרא הוא שהבעלים של הכלב משלם חצי נזק עבור הערימה. אז למה הרמב''ם כותב שאין תשלום על הערימה בכלל? לאן נעלם הבעלים של הכלב? אם הרמב''ם רצה לומר שגם בעל האש משלם הוא היה יכול לכתוב את זה

A difficulty on the Rambam from the Gemara Bava kama pg 23

Furthermore, the Gemara asks on the Mishna . The Mishna brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. The Gemara says the reason is that it is not one's own arrows, but the arrows of the dog, so it is half damage. The Gemara then asks, “Who pays?” Answer: the owner of the dog. It asks “Why not the owner of the coal?” Answer: he guarded his coal. So, the Gemara holds that the law is that the payment for the stack is half damage, and that is paid by the owner of the dog. Maybe the owner of the coal would also pay if he did not guard the coal. [And that if fact what Tosphot says.] But we do not know that directly from the Gemara. All we know for sure from the Gemara is the owner of the dog pays half damage for the stack. So why does the Rambam write there is not payment for the stack at all? Where did the owner of the dog go? If the Rambam wanted to say the owner of the fire also pays well, he could have written that. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________The גמרא asks on the משנה . The משנה brings a case that a dog carried a loaf with a burning coal in it to a stack and the stack is burnt up. The payment for the loaf is full damage, and the payment for the stack is half damage. The גמרא says the reason is that it is not one's own arrows, but the arrows of the dog, so it is half damage. The גמרא then asks, “Who pays?” Answer: the owner of the dog. It asks “Why not the owner of the coal?” Answer: he guarded his coal. So, the גמרא holds that the law is that the payment for the stack is half damage, and that is paid by the owner of the dog. Maybe the owner of the coal would also pay if he did not guard the coal. [And that if fact what תוספות says.] But we do not know that directly from the גמרא. All we know for sure from the גמרא is the owner of the dog pays half damage for the stack. So why does the רמב''ם write there is not payment for the stack at all? Where did the owner of the dog go? If the רמב''ם wanted to say the owner of the fire also pays well, he could have written that.