קידושין כ''ח ע''א וע''ב. תוספות בבא מציעא מ''ז. ההבדלים הבסיסיים בין רש''י, תוספות והרמב''ם לגבי החלפה. לרש''י יש רק שתי קטגוריות: כלים או חפצים נעים [מטלטלים]. אין קטגוריה נפרדת של פירות. לפיכך, לרב נחמן רק כלים יכולים לגרום לרכישה בהחלפה או להירכש בהחלפה. לרב ששת כל המיטלטלין יכולים לגרום להחלפה, ולהירכש בהחלפה. לתוספות יש שלוש קטגוריות: כלים, מיטלטלין ופירות. כלים יכולים לגרום להחלפה ולהירכש באמצעות החלפה. ניתן לרכוש מיטלטלין בהחלפה, אך לא לגרום להחלפה. (זה דומה לאופן שבו רב שך מסביר את הראב''ד בהלכות אישות פרק א') הוא סבור שבהחלפה, אף אחד מהחפצים אינו גורם לרכישה. אלא, כאשר אדם אחד מרים את חפצו, אז הוא שלו. כאשר השני מרים את חפצו, אז הוא שלו.) עבור תוספות, פירות אינם ניתנים לרכישה וגם לא לגרום לרכישה על ידי החלפה, אולם כאשר הם מוחלפים שווים תחת שווים, אז הם יכולים להרכשה על ידי החלפה ולגרום להחלפה [תוספות בבא מציעא מ''ז]. כל זה שונה מאוד מהרמב''ם שסבור שיש שני סוגים של חליפין: שווה תחת שווה, או מטפחת. עבור הרמב''ם, אפילו פירות יכולים להרכש על ידי החלפה. כל המטלטלין יכולים לגרום להחלפה כאשר הם מוחלפים במטלטלין אחרים. אבל כלים לבדם יכולים לשמש כרכישה כבאמצעות מטפחת או נעל.

Bava Mezia 46 and 47 Kidushin 28 The basic differences between Rashi , Tosphot, and the Rambam concerning exchange. To Rashi, there are only two categories: vessels or movable objects. There is no separate category of fruit. Thus, to Rav Nachman only vessels can cause acquisition by exchange or be acquired by exchange. To Rav Sheshet all movables can cause exchange, and be acquired by exchange. To Tosphot there are three categories: vessels, movables, and fruit. Vessels can cause exchange and be acquired by exchange. Movables can be acquired by exchange, but not cause exchange. (This is similar to how Rav Shach explains the Ravad) He holds that in exchange, neither object causes the acquisition. Rather, when one person picks up his object, then that is his.) When the other picks up his object, then that is his. To Tosphot fruit cannot be acquired nor cause acquisition by exchange, however when they are exchanged equal for equal, then they can be acquired by exchange and cause exchange [Tosphot Bava Mezia 47]. This is all very different from the Rambam who hold there are two kinds of exchange: equal for equal, or handkerchief. To the Rambam even fruit can be acquired by exchange. All movables can cause exchange when exchanged for other movables. But vessels alone can be used as acquisition by means of a handkerchief.​-------------------------------------------------------------------Bava Mezia 46 and 47 Kidushin 28 The basic differences between Rashi , Tosphot, and the Rambam concerning exchange. To Rashi, there are only two categories: vessels or movable objects. There is no separate category of fruit. Thus, to Rav Nachman only vessels can cause acquisition by exchange or be acquired by exchange. To Rav Sheshet all movables can cause exchange, and be acquired by exchange. To Tosphot there are three categories: vessels, movables, and fruit. Vessels can cause exchange and be acquired by exchange. Movables can be acquired by exchange, but not cause exchange. (This is similar to how Rav Shach explains the Ravad) He holds that in exchange, neither object causes the acquisition. Rather, when one person picks up his object, then that is his.) When the other picks up his object, then that is his. To Tosphot fruit cannot be acquired nor cause acquisition by exchange, however when they are exchanged equal for equal, then they can be acquired by exchange and cause exchange [Tosphot Bava Mezia 47]. This is all very different from the Rambam who hold there are two kinds of exchange: equal for equal, or handkerchief. To the Rambam even fruit can be acquired by exchange. All movables can cause exchange when exchanged for other movables. But vessels alone can be used as acquisition by means of a handkerchief.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ו ע''ב. תוספות - המילים הראשונות ולרב נחמן". בקיצור, רבינו תם קובע כי פירות שווים גורמים או נרכשים על ידי חליפין. תוספות שואלים על כך מן הגמרא. הגמרא אומרת שאם מטבע יכול לשמש להחלפה, וזו תהיה כוונת המשנה "כל מה שנעשה כסף עבור אחר", ברגע שאחד רוכש, גם השני רוכש. אז למה יכול להתייחס סוף המשנה, המתייחס להחלפה של שתי חיות? אחרי הכל, אין כאן מטבע. הגמרא עונה שסוף המשנה ואומרת לנו שניתן להשתמש בפירות כהחלפה. הגמרא שואלת על כך והלא רב נחמן מחזיק בפירות, שלא ניתן להשתמש בהם להחלפה. התשובה של תוספות יכולה להיות שהמשנה מתייחסת למקרה של שווה תחת שווה. תוספות עונה שהמשנה אינה מתייחסת למקרה של שווה תחת שווה. אבל תוספות מרחיק לכת ואומר שאפילו בדרך שבה רב יהודה מבין את המשנה, זה גם לא מתייחס לשווה בשביל שווה. אבל השאלה על זה היא למה בכלל להזכיר את רב יהודה? למה זה יהיה נחוץ בכלל? הרי השאלה הייתה רק על רב נחמן. הסתפקנו בתשובת רב יהודה הייתי בים ועלה בדעתי מדוע תוספות מעלה את הרעיון שאפילו אם נלמד את המשנה כ"כל הנישום", זה עדיין לא שווה תמורת שווה. אני חושב שהסיבה היא שאם חליפין עובד בעבור תמורת פירות כאשר הערך הכספי של כל אחד שווה תמורת שווה, אז אפילו רב יהודה לא היה צריך לבוא על התשובה "כל הנישום". הוא היה יכול לומר ש"כל הנעשה" יכול להתייחס לפירות ולכל החפצים הנעים כאשר זה שווה תמורת שווה. עם זאת, אני חייב לציין שיש ויכוח בין המהרש"א למהר"ם שיף לגבי מה התכוונו תוספות לומר כשהוא מעלה את תשובתו של רב יהודה. שתי התשובות נראות לי סבירות, אולם אני חושב שהתשובה שלי היא פשוטה יותר. כלומר, אם רבינו תם היה צודק והמשנה הייתה יכולה להיות שווה תחת שווה, אז רב יהודה לא היה צריך להגיע לתשובה קשה לגבי המשנה כאשר תשובה פשוטה יותר הייתה זמינה

Bava Mezia page 46b. Tosphot first words and to Rav Nachman”. In short, Rabainu Tam holds equal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. Tosphot asks on this from the Gemara. The Gemara says if coin can be used for exchange, and that would be the intension of the Mishna “all that is made money for another”, once one acquires, the other also acquires. Then what could the end of the Mishna which refers to exchange of two animals be referring to. After tall, there is no coin here. The gemara aanswers the end of the Mishna tell us fruit can be used in exchange. The Gemara asks on this from Rav Nachman who holds fruit cannot be used for exchange. The answer could be that the Mishna is referring to a case of equal for equal. Tosphot answers the Mishna is not refering to a case of equal for equal. But Tosphot goes further and says even in the way Rav Judah understands the Mishna, it is also not referring to equal for equal. But the question on this is why mention Rav Judah at all? Why would this be necessary at all? After all the question was only on Rav Nachman. We were satisfied with the answer of Rav Judah. I was at the sea and it occurred to me why tosphot brings up the idea that even if we learn the Mishna as "all that is evaluated" it still is not equal for equal. I think the reason is that if exchange works for fruit when the monetary worth of each is equal for equal then even rav judah would not have had to come onto the answer for "all that is evaluated". He could have said all that is made could refer to fruit and all movable objects when it is equal for equal. however, I must mention that there is an argument between the Maharsha and the Maharam Shif about what Tosphot means to say by bring up the answer of Rav Judah. Both answers seem reasonable to me however I think my answer is simpler. that is if Rabainu Tam would be right then Rav Judah would not have had to come onto difficult answer about the mishna when a simpler one was available.-----------------------------------------------------------------------------בבא מציעא page מ''ו ע''ב. תוספותfirst words and to רב נחמן”. I was at the sea and it occurred to me why תוספותbrings up the idea that even if we learn the משנה as "כל הנישום" it still is not equal for equal. I think the reason is that if exchange works for fruit when the monetary worth of each is equal for equalת then even רב יהודהwould not have had to come onto the answer כל הנישום . He could have said "כל הנעשה" could refer to fruit and all movable objects when it is equal for equal. However, I must mention that there is an argument between the מהרש''א and the מהר''ם שיף about what תוספות means to say by bring up the answer of רב יהודה. Both answers seem reasonable to me, however I think my answer is simpler. That is, if רבינו תם would be right and the משנה could be a case of equal for equal, then רב יהודה would not have had to come onto difficult answer about the משנה when a simpler one was available. in short rabainu tam holds qequal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. tosphot asks on this from the gemara. the gemara says if coin can be used for exchange and that would be the intension of the mishna all that is made monney for another, once one acquires the other also acquires. then what could the end of the mishna which refers to exchange of two anumals be refering to. after tall, there is no coin here. answer the end tell us fruit can be used in exchange. the gemara asks ogfn this from rav nachma who holds friuit canot be used for exchange. the answer could be that the mishna is refering to a case of equal for equal. tosphot answrs the mishna is not refer to a case of equal for equal. but tosphot goes further and says even in the way rav juda understands the mishna, it is also not refering to equal for equal. why would this be neccessary at all? after all the question was only on rav nachman. we were satisfied with the answer of rav juday.----------------- In short, רבינו תם holds equal for equal works to cause or to be acquired by exchange even for fruit. תוספותasks on this from the גמרא. The גמרא says if coin can be used for exchange, and that would be the intension of the משנה “all that is made money for another”, once one acquires, the other also acquires. Then what could the end of the משנה which refers to exchange of two animals be referring to. After tall, there is no coin here. The גמרא answers the end of the משנה tell us fruit can be used in exchange. The גמרא asks on this from רב נחמן who holds fruit cannot be used for exchange. The answer could be that the משנה is referring to a case of equal for equal. תוספות answers the משנה is not referring to a case of equal for equal. But תוספות goes further and says even in the way רב יהודה understands the משנה , it is also not referring to equal for equal. But the question on this is why mention רב יהודה at all? Why would this be necessary at all? After all the question was only on רב נחמן. We were satisfied with the answer of רב יהודה.

ברמב"ם הלכות מכירה פרק ה' הוא מביא את חוק החליפין. אבל במקרה של רכישה בכסף בפרק א' הוא לא מביא את חוק החליפין. נראה מכך שהחלפת חפצים אינה רכישה בכסף. למרות שמה שיש לו ערך כספי נחשב לפעמים ככסף, עדיין ישנם מקרים שבהם זה לא כך, למשל פדיון עבד עברי צריך להיות באמצעות כסף, לא מה ששווה כסף. דוגמאות נוספות הן בדיני גניבה שבהן יש ויכוח האם אפשר לשלם במה שיש לו ערך כספי. לכן, כאשר הגמרא אומרת שאי אפשר לשאת אישה בהחלפה, פירוש הדבר החלפה בכלים כמו מטפחת, לא החלפה שווה תחת שווה. כאן אני רק מזכיר בקצרה את מה שאומר רב שך בתחילת חוקי אישות

In the Rambam laws of sale chapter 5 he brings the law of exchange. but in the case of acquisition by money in chapter 1 he does not bring the law of exchange. It seems clear from this that exchange of objects is not acquisition by money. Even though that which has monetary value is sometimes considered to be like money, still there are cases where it is not, for example the redemption of a Jewish slave has to be through money, not that which is worth money. Other examples are in laws of theft where there is an argument if one can pay by that which has monetary value. So when the Gemara says one cannot marry a wife by exchange that means exchange by vessels like a handkerchief, not exchange equal for equal. Here I am just mentioning in short what Rav Shach says in the beginning of laws of marriage.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- In the רמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק ה' 5 he brings the law of exchange. But in the case of acquisition by money in chapter א' he does not bring the law of exchange. It seems clear from this that exchange of objects is not acquisition by money. Even though that which has monetary value is sometimes considered to be like money, still there are cases where it is not, for example the redemption of a Jewish slave has to be through money, not that which is worth money. Other examples are in laws of theft where there is an argument if one can pay by that which has monetary value. So when the גמרא says one cannot marry a wife by exchange that means exchange by vessels like a handkerchief, not exchange equal for equal. Here I am just mentioning in short what רב שך says in the beginning of laws of marriage.

בבא מציעא דף מ''ו ע''א וע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "כל מה שנעשה ערך כספי באחר, ברגע שאחד רוכש אותו, השני רוכש את החליפו. כיצד זה? אם אדם מחליף שור בפרה, ברגע שאחד רוכש אחד, השני רוכש את השני." הגמרא שואלת שנראה שהמשנה מתכוונת שמטבע יכול לגרום להחלפה, (ואנחנו יודעים שזה לא המצב). אז רב יהודה אומר שזה אומר שאם אדם מעריך חפץ ברגע שהוא רוכש את הראשון, השני רוכש את השני. [כלומר, החלפה זו צריכה הערכה.] הגמרא שואלת בנקודה זו שה"הייתי חושב" היה נכון לפחות לפי לוי שחליפת מטבע יכולה לגרום לקניין. אז איך הבינה הגמרא את המשנה בנקודה זו? אחרי הכל, לדוגמה שהיא נותנת אין לה שום רלוונטיות למטבעות. (הדוגמה היא פרה תמורת שור.) תשובה. המשנה פירושה שמטבעות יכולים לגרום להחלפה, וגם פירות. (הדוגמה של שור לפרה היא דוגמה לפרי.) אבל עבור רב נחמן שמחזיק פירות לא יכולים לגרום להחלפה, מה יכולה להיות הכוונה? כאן תוספות שואל על רבינו תם שאולי המשנה קידושין דף כ"ח מדברת על החלפה שווה תחת שווה, ובמקרה כזה פירות יכולים לגרום להחלפה לפי רבינו תם. הוא עונה שזה לא יכול להיות כך, מכיוון שסוף המשנה צריך להיות כמו ההתחלה, וההתחלה בבירור אינה שווה תחת שווה. אני לא מבין מדוע זה כך. לפי הייתי חושב (הוה אמינא) אנחנו מדברים על החוק שניתן להחליף מטבע. "כל מה שהופך לערך כסף עבור משהו אחר, ברגע שאחד רוכש את החפץ, השני רוכש את החפץ המוחלף." היכן אנו רואים כאן שלא מדובר על שווה תמורת שווה?תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו של תוספות על רב נחמן היא שאולי רב יהודה אומר שהחליפין צריך להיות שווה עבור שווה, (שכן אחרת למה צריך להעריך את השווי הכספי של כל חפץ?) ולכן גישתו של רב נחמן שונה והוא חייב להחזיק "כל הנעשה דמים נאחר" פירושו כלים שאינם שווים עבור שווים. עם זאת, ברור שתוספות לא עונה כך. הוא גורס שאפילו דעתו של רב יהודה, שכאשר הוא אומר "כל הנישום דמים באחר", משתמע מכך שהם אינם שווים בערכם

Bava Mezia page 46 side a and b. The Mishna says, “All that is made monetary value in another, once one acquires it, the other acquires its exchange. How is this. if one exchanges an ox for a cow, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other.” The gemara asks that it seems the Mishna means that a coin can cause exchange, (and we know that is not the case). So Rav Juda says it means if one evaluates an object once one acquires the first the other acquires tthe second. [ie that exchange needs evaluation.] the gemara asks at this point that the hava amina (I would have thought) was at least true according to Levi or Rav that holds a coin can cause exchange. So how did the Gemara understand the Mishna at that point? After all, the example it gives has no relevance to coins. (The example is a cow and for an ox) Answer. The mishna means coins can cause exchange, and fruit also. (The example of a ox for a cow is an example of fruit.) But to Rav Nachman who holds fruit can not cause exchange, what could the Mishna mean? Here Tosphot asks on Rabainu Tam that perhaps the Mishna in Kidushin page 28 is talking about exchange equal for equal, and in that case fruit can cause exchange according to Rabbainu Tam. He answers that that can not be so, since the end of the mishna has to be like the beginning, and the beginning is clearly not equal for equal. I fail to see why this is so. according to the I would have thought (hava amina) we arre talking about the law that a coin can be exchanged. ''All that is made money value for something else, once one acquires the object, the other acquires the exchanged object. '' Where do we see here that it is not talking about equal for equal? A possible answer to this question of Tosphot on Rav Nachman is that perhaps Rav Judah means that the exchange has to be equal for equal, (since otherwise why would one have to evaluate the monetary worth of each object?) and therefore approach of Rav Nachman is different and he must hold “All that is made monetary value in other” means vessels that are not equal for equal. However, it is clear that Tosphot does not answer this. He holds that even the opinion of Rav Judah is that when he says one must evaluate the worth of each object, that implies they are not equal in value. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---- בבא מציעא page מ''ו ע''א וע''ב. The משנה says, “All that is made monetary value in another, once one acquires it, the other acquires its exchange. How is this. if one exchanges an ox for a cow, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other.” The גמרא asks that it seems the משנה means that a coin can cause exchange, (and we know that is not the case). So רב יהודה says it means if one evaluates an object once one acquires the first, the other acquires the second. [ie that exchange needs evaluation.] The גמרא asks at this point that the הווה אמינא (I would have thought) was at least true according to לוי (or Rav) that holds a coin can cause exchange. So how did the גמרא understand the משנה at that point? After all, the example it gives has no relevance to coins. (The example is a cow and for an ox) Answer. The משנה means coins can cause exchange, and fruit also. (The example of a ox for a cow is an example of fruit.) But to רב נחמןwho holds fruit can not cause exchange, what could the משנה mean? Here תוספות asks on רבינו תםthat perhaps the משנה in קידושין page כ''ח is talking about exchange equal for equal, and in that case fruit can cause exchange according to רבינו תם . He answers that that can not be so, since the end of the משנה has to be like the beginning, and the beginning is clearly not equal for equal. I fail to see why this is so. according to the I would have thought (הווה אמינא) we are talking about the law that a coin can be exchanged. ''All that is made money value for something else, once one acquires the object, the other acquires the exchanged object. '' Where do we see here that it is not talking about equal for equal? A possible answer to this question of תוספות on רב נחמן is that perhaps רב יהודה means that the exchange has to be equal for equal, (since otherwise why would one have to evaluate the monetary worth of each object?) and therefore approach of רב נחמןis different and he must hold “כל הנעשה דמים נאחר” means vessels that are not equal for equal. However, it is clear that תוספות does not answer this. He holds that even the opinion of רב יהודהis that when he says "כל הנישום דמים באחר", that implies they are not equal in value.

What's Wrong with Stereotypes? Michael Huemer Aug 3

MICHAEL HUEMER AUG 3 1. Opposition to Stereotyping I keep hearing that “stereotyping” is bad, and that it’s good to undermine stereotypes. For instance, if you have a TV show with a brilliant surgeon, you should make them a woman. Or black. Or, best of all, a black woman. Because that will defy stereotypes and thereby make the world a better place. If you make a picture of some business people in a meeting, you have to make sure that it does not reflect what most business meetings actually look like; rather, you should gender balance it and make sure to have three different races represented (see above photo). If someone tells a joke that relies on stereotypes about a group, that is “offensive” and hence evil. I guess because it reinforces the stereotypes? Or maybe it’s just evil to rely on a stereotype for anything. Back when James Damore was fired from Google, it was partly because he cited research to the effect that women tend to be higher than men in the traits of “agreeableness” and “neuroticism” from the 5-factor model of personality. In doing so, he was reinforcing stereotypes, which all decent people know to be evil. If a statement sounds like a stereotype, that alone is enough to categorically reject it. Most of the people who believe this have a predictable political orientation, and so you can usually count on a certain amount of hypocrisy. Thus, certain stereotypes are fine. You can stereotype white men as privileged oppressors, you can stereotype Republicans as uneducated, etc. It’s all a matter of stereotyping the right group in the right way. As long as your stereotype reinforces your political side, it’s cool. But I digress. My question: what exactly is supposed to be wrong with stereotypes? Why not use and reinforce them? 2. Problems with Stereotypes A. What are stereotypes? First, what is a stereotype? Usually, people are talking about stereotypes about groups of people (e.g., women, black people, doctors). (I guess you could also have “stereotypes” about any class of object, but we don’t care about non-human objects.) As far as I can tell, a “stereotype” is just a widely shared belief about what a certain class of people tend to be like. Aside: Maybe there are a few other conditions, such as: it can’t be something definitional, it has to differentiate the group from other groups, and it should be a statistical generalization. Thus, it isn’t a “stereotype” that bachelors are unmarried, or that black people tend to have two legs. But let’s not worry about all the details of the definition. What is wrong with using or reinforcing such beliefs? B. Are they false? Maybe the problem with stereotypes is that they tend to be false, or to lead people to make false judgments. On the face of it, this would be surprising. In general, people tend to form beliefs about observable reality based on observations, which generally tend to reflect that reality. If most people think that the winter is colder than the summer, that’s probably because the winter is colder than the summer. If people tend to think that humans generally have two arms, that’s probably because humans generally have two arms. Etc. Could it be that, when it comes to groups of people, we have a general tendency to go wrong about everything—that when we think a group has feature F, in general, the group usually doesn’t have F? This is possible, but it would be pretty surprising. Btw, notice that I’m talking about beliefs about observable (or otherwise easily accessible) properties of observable objects. It’s not so surprising that people get things wrong about unobservable things, like God or the origin of the universe. Or maybe it’s not quite that the group doesn’t have F at all; maybe it’s just that stereotypes tend to exaggerate real differences, so the group that is stereotyped as having F will have less F than people tend to think. These are common critiques of stereotypes among educated people. One might say there is a stereotype that stereotypes are inaccurate. These critiques, however, have the character of articles of faith—almost none of these educated people who are too smart to fall for crude stereotypes has ever actually checked on whether stereotypes tend to be accurate or not. It happens that we have evidence about this. Over 50 studies have been performed on the accuracy of demographic, national, political, and other stereotypes. The results are unequivocal: Stereotypes are not generally inaccurate, nor are they generally exaggerations. The truth is the exact opposite: stereotypes are generally accurate, except that they tend to understate real differences. There is basically no evidence that stereotypes tend to lead to inaccurate judgments. Psychologist Lee Jussim describes stereotype accuracy as “one of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology”. See his paper for a general review of the evidence. (See also his blog post.) For example: A 2011 paper titled “Beliefs About Cognitive Gender Differences: Accurate for Direction, Underestimated for Size” reported results of a study in which they asked ordinary people to guess how men and women would perform on a series of cognitive tasks. The scientists then compared the ordinary people’s expectations to the reality. This is a straightforward test. It turned out that people’s guesses were correct about the direction of gender differences (which sex would perform better on which tasks) but that the actual gender differences were larger than people thought. Notice that this is the opposite of what educated, progressive, right-thinking people would presumably predict. But again, this really should not be at all surprising if you’re thinking non-ideologically. Human beings can observe each other. Most of us have had many interactions with men and women. It would be bizarre if, despite that, we kept having beliefs about gender differences that had no correlation with reality. C. Are they oppressive? Maybe the problem is that stereotypes—whether accurate or not—are oppressive. Maybe they stop individuals from attempting or succeeding in things that would defy the stereotypes, when they would otherwise have succeeded. This could be true, but it isn’t self-evident. One way this could work is that other people would judge you based on stereotypes and would refuse to take into account your own individual characteristics. This is another one of those things that educated, progressive people assume without checking the evidence. In fact, studies find individuating information (specific to individuals) has massively greater effects on people’s judgments of others than stereotypes do. Given a society of millions of people, I’m sure there are some people who are deterred from attempting something due to stereotypes, and who are thereby worse off. So that is a cost. On the other hand, there can also be costs to not having stereotypes—e.g., perhaps some people would be encouraged to do things that they would not be suited to, and they would thereby be made worse off. As a general rule, truth is good. Knowing the truth about things that are relevant to your interests can make you worse off sometimes, but in general, it makes you better off. So, given the accuracy of stereotypes, stereotypes are probably beneficial. But whether they are or not, trying to suppress them is a fool’s errand. Normal people won’t stop noticing group differences just because elites try to hide them; normal people will just conclude that the elites are dishonest propagandists. D. Stereotype threat Stereotype threat is a theory in psychology that says that the existence of stereotypes tends to cause people to act in ways conforming to those stereotypes. Particularly negative stereotypes. E.g., it is said that if you remind people of their race before giving them a scholastic aptitude test, then the black students will tend to perform worse, due to stereotypes about their race. If you remind people of their sex, then the women will supposedly perform worse on the math questions than they otherwise would. Some people claim that this effect actually explains the entire gap in test scores between blacks and whites. Of course that’s false (it derives from a simple misunderstanding of a graph in the original study—progressives then just kept passing on this misunderstanding to each other). The effect only (at most) slightly increases already-existing gaps. In Progressive Myths, I discuss several problems with the stereotype threat literature. Here is just one interesting point: There have been many studies of the stereotype threat effect. Most of them are done in the lab. Some of them use more realistic conditions than others, and four of them have been done using actual administrations of standardized tests. The more realistic the test is, the

I have been thinking about Kant and the later German idealists and I think the issues they deal with are important, and yet I do not think that any one of them alone can be taken as the right answer, Rather I think each of has some good points and yet can not be considered to have the whole picture. To take Kant himself as the right approach misses the obvious problems in his system that were noticed right away almost before the ink was dry on the first edition of the Critique. But to take of the later ones also ignores the very reason that each one in turn appeared bright for a time and then disappeared. Hegel of course did not disappear but there is at least the one lack that he never solved—that reason has to start somewhere. The best solution to that problem is Fries with the idea of immediate non intuitive knowledge, but besides that Fries is much less impressive than Hegel. [Hegel, is I think the same kind of system as Plotinus, except Plotinus starts with the One and goes down while Hegel starts at the bottom and goes back up until the Absolute Subject.] [And I also must mention that none of the German Idealists saw the importance of John Locke and the Constitution of the USA which was based on him.] The German idealists were best in dealing with philosophical problems, not political problems. [I just noticed an old few ideas I wrote about the system of the USA that I bringg here just forr added context about John Locke. A lot of the USA is based on the Magna Carta and Simon DE Montfort (Provisions of Oxford) and John Locke and the two-tiered parliament system of England. Pluss a lot of the Bill of Rights is based on issues that England had to deal with and resolve that were incorporated in the Bill of Rights of the USA. I might mention that the American Colonists never wanted to separate from England until the King refused intervene in favor of the colonies. The main grievance was toward Parliament. Besides that, there has to be a basic DNA structure in people for them to be able to accept such a system. Unless you have Anglo-Saxon DNA, it is doubtful how well this system could work elsewhere. There is something in the Anglo Saxon DNA which take the written law as absolute and binding. While in the USSR the only reason the system worked at all was the tendency to ignore the written rule and just strive toward what worked]

רב שך סבור שיש רק שני סוגים של חליפין, שווה לשווה, או רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [לרב שך החלפת מחט בשריון היא שווה בשווה מכיוון שזה רוצה מחט והשני רוצה חליפת שריון.] רב שך סבור שהחליפין חל על נישואין לאישה, ולא על רכישה באמצעות מטפחת. [זה דומה לתוספות ר''יד שסבור שקידושין באמצעות מטפחת שווה יותר מפרוטה שייך לקדש אישה.] לפי זה, עלינו לומר שכאשר רב נחמן אמר בבבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב ובקידושין כ''ח ע''ב שפרי לא יכול לעשות חליפין, הוא בטח מתכוון שהוא לא יכול ליצור חליפין, אלא שהוא יכול להתקבל באמצעות חליפין. כדי להבהיר את הערתי כאן, הרשו לי להביא כמה נקודות. ראשית, רב שך מדבר רק על הגישה של הרמב''ם. ברור שתוספות ורבינו תם שונים לחלוטין. כמו כן, אנו יודעים שהחוק הוא כמו רב נחמן, שפירות אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין [פירות לא עבדי חליפין], אלא רק כלים.זה לדעת הרמב''ם הלכות מכירה פרק י''ג אבל מהו כלי? עבור תוספות, כלי הוא כל דבר שניתן להשתמש בו. אבל עבור רב שך, זה חייב להתייחס למה שיכול ליצור רכישה, לא למה שניתן לרכוש, משום שהוא סבור שאישה יכולה להרכש על ידי חליפין של שווה לשווה. גישה זו של רב שך, שאני חייב להזכיר, אינה דומה לתוספות, שיש חליפין שווה לשווה, וסוג אחר שאינו שווה לשווה, אך עדיין אינו רכישה על ידי מטפחת או נעל---------- ייתכן שיעזור להבין את מה שרב שך אומר אם אזכיר את ההבהרה של שמואל רוזובסקי שהבעיה היא האם משהו גורם לרכישה כמו במקרה של רכישה באמצעות מטפחת (סודר), או שאין שום מושא שגורם למעבר בכלל. פשוט בהחלפה, אחד רוכש את מושא האדם השני, והשני רוכש את מושא של הראשון. ועדיין, אפילו עם ההבהרה הזו, מוזר שרכישה באמצעות סודר לא תעבוד כדי לקדש אישה למרות שזוהי רכישה מוחלטת באמצעות קניין סודר, בעוד שרכישה באמצעות החלפה תקנה אישה, למרות שזוהי רכישה לא על ידי כסף שטר וביאה. ולפי רב שמואל רוזובסקי חליפין אינו גורם קניין לשני כל אלא כל אחד קונה את החפץ שהוא מגביה. לפי זה אם אחד נותן חפץ לאישה ואומר זה לך ובמקומו את מקודשת לי אין בזה הגבה ומשיכה לאישה. ולהפך אפשר לראות דין של תוספות רי''ד שדווקא קהערה מאוחרת יותר. אני רואה עכשיו שרב שך לומד את רעיון החליפין בצורה שונה מרב שמואל רוזובסקי. הוא אומר שהגישה של הרמב"ם היא שהחלפה שווה בערך שווה היא כמו רכישה במשיכה או הגבהה שבה החפץ הראשון שנלקח הוא שגורם לרכישת החפץ השני, ולכן אין ספק לגבי הגישה של רב שך. הוא מסביר את כל זה בבירור בתחילת הלכות אישותניין סודר עוזר.. ------------------------------------------------לאחר שכתבתי את האמור לעיל, הבנתי שלמעשה זה פתוח ברמב"ם עצמו. בתחילת פרק חמשה בהלכות מכירה הוא טוען שניתן לרכוש פירות על ידי חליפין שווה תחת שוהז-כמו -השאלה שיש לי לגבי גישה זו של הרמב"ם היא שהיא לא נראית מתאימה לגמרא. הגמרא עצמה מדברת תמיד על רכישה באמצעות חליפין ואינה מזכירה אפילו פעם אחת את הגורם לרכישת חליפין. אז מהיכן הרמב"ם היה שואב את גישתו---- עלה בדעתי שהרמב"ם מבין את כל הגמרא כמתייחסת לגרימת רכישה על ידי חליפין---------ההבדל הוא שגרימת רכישה היא תת-קבוצה של היכולת להירכש באמצעות רכישה. זה כמו העובדה שהחלפת כסף אינה גורמת לרכישה. רק משיכה או הרמה יכולים לגרום לרכישה. לכן, אנו רואים שהרמב"ם מבין את הגמרא כמתייחסת לגרימת רכישה------ ם זאת, עליי לציין שסוגיה זו היא ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם, משום שתוספות מקפיד להראות כיצד כל הנושא מתייחס ליכולת להירכש באמצעות חליפין. הוא מסביר שהמשנה, שנשמעת כאילו פירושה גרימת רכישת מטבע באמצעות חליפין של חפץ, פירושה שמטבע לעולם לא ניתן לרכוש באמצעות חליפין. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק באמצעות מכירה. אם אדם מחליף חפץ בכספו של אחר, כסף זה אינו נרכש. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק אם הוא משמש לקניית החפץם זאת, עליי לציין שסוגיה זו היא ויכוח בין תוספות לרמב"ם, משום שתוספות מקפיד להראות כיצד כל הנושא מתייחס ליכולת להירכש באמצעות חליפין. הוא מסביר שהמשנה, שנשמעת כאילו פירושה גרימת רכישת מטבע באמצעות חליפין של חפץ, פירושה שמטבע לעולם לא ניתן לרכוש באמצעות חליפין. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק באמצעות מכירה. אם אדם מחליף חפץ בכספו של אחר, כסף זה אינו נרכש. ניתן לרכוש אותו רק אם הוא משמש לקניית החפץ---------------------יש לציין כאן שרש''י ותוספות לומדים את הוויכוח בין רב נחמן לרב ששת באופן שונה מהרמב''ם. עד כה אמרתי שלפי הרמב''ם, החוק רב נחמן הוא שפירות ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין, אך אינם יכולים לבצע חליפין; בעוד שלרב ששת הם יכולים גם לגרום לחליפין. לפי רש''י הם (רב נחמן ורב ששת) נבדלים בכך. רב ששת קובע שכל החפצים המטלטלים ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין ולגרום גם להם. עבור רב נחמן רק כלים שניתן להשתמש בהם ניתנים לרכישה על ידי חליפין ולגרום לחליפין. עבור רש''י, שור או פרה נחשבים כנכללים בחפצים המטלטלים. רב נחמן התכוון להוציא רק פירות ממה שיכול לגרום לחליפין, אך חוץ מזה, כל החפצים המטלטלים יכולים לגרום לחליפין, או אולי רק כלים שמישים. אבל הרמב''ם כותב, "אפשר להחליף כלים בכלים, בהמה בבהמה, אפילו מחט בשריון או טלה בסוס, אבל אם הוא מחליף פרי בפרי, ניתן להחיל על כך את חוק המרמה." (אם ההחלפה הייתה יותר מחמישית מערכה, ההחלפה בטלה). האם טלה ניתן לשימוש ככלי או כמו חפצים ניידים אחרים? אני מתכוון שהוא אולי מתכוון שרק כלים יכולים לגרום להחלפה והוא אולי יטען שטלה כלול, או שאולי הוא מתכוון שכל החפצים הניידים מלבד פרי יכולים לגרום להחלפה

Bava Metzia 46

Rav Shach (laws of marriage 1:2)holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To Rav Shach exchange of a needle for a suit of armor is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of armor.] Rav Shach holds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. ([This is like the Tosphot R'id who holds acquisition by handkerchief that is worth more that a pruta can acquire a wife.])According to this, we must say that when Rav Nachman said in Bava Metzia 46 and Kidushin 28b that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First Rav Shach is only talking about the approach of the Rambam. Clearly, Tosphot and Rabbainu Tam are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like Rav Nachman that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. (Rambam laws of sale chapter 13) But what is a vessel? To Tosphot, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to Rav Shach this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of Rav Shach I must mention is not like Tosphot that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. It might help to understand what Rav Shach is saying if I mention the clarification of Shmuel Rozovski that the issue is if something causes a acquisition as in the case of acquisition by a handkerchief, or if there is no object causing the transition at all. Simply in the exchange one acquires the object of the other person, and the other acquires the object of the first person. Still even with this clarification it is odd that acquisition by handkerchief would not work to marry a wife even though it is absolutely acquisition by money while acquisition by pure exchange would acquire a woman though it is a different kind of acquisition. (Later note.) I see now that Rav Shach learns the idea of exchange different than Rav Shmuel Rosovsky. He says that the approach of the Rambam is that exchange equal value for equal value is still like an acquisition by money in which the first object tat is picked up is what causes the second object to be acquired and therefore there is no question about the approach of Rav Shach. He explains this all clearly in the beginning of laws of marriage After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the Rambam himself. In the beginning of chapter five in laws of sale he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like Rabbainu Tam. So, when he holds like Rav Nachman that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired by exchange. The question I have on this approach of the Rambam is that it does not seem to fit with the Gemara. the Gemara itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the Rambam have derived his approach?It occurred to me that the rambam understands the entire gemara as referring to causing acquisition by exchange[The difference is that causing acquisition is a subset of being able to be acquired by acquisition. This is like the fact that exchange of money does not cause acquisition. Only pulling or picking up can cause acquisition. Therefore, we see the Rambam understands the Gemara to be referring to causing acquisition.] However, I might mention that this issue is a debate between Tosphot and the Rambam because Tosphot makes a point of showing how the whole subject is referring to the ability to be acquired by exchange. He explains that the Mishna that sounds like it means causing acquisition of a coin by means of exchange of an object means that a coin can never be acquired by exchange. It can only be acquired by a sale. If one exchanges an object for the money of another, that money is not acquired. It can only be acquired if it is used to buy the object. I might mention here that Rashi and Tosphot learn the argument between Rav Nachman and Rav Sheshet differently than the Rambam. So far I have been saying according to the Rambam, the law of Rav Nachman is that fruit can be acquired by exchange, but can not make exchange; while to Rav Sheshet they can also cause exchange. According to Rashi, they differ in this. Rav Sheshet holds all movable objects can be acquired by exchange and cause it also. to Rav Nachman only vessels, that can be used can be acquired by exchange .and cause exchange. To Rashi, a ox or cow are considered to be included in movable objects. Rav Nachman mean to exclude only fruit in what can not cause exchange, but besides that, all movable objects can cause exchange, or maybe only usable vessels. However, the Rambam writes, ” One can exchange vessels for vessels, an animal for an animal, even a needle for a coat of armor or a sheep for a horse, but if he exchanges fruit for fruit , that can have the law of cheating applied to it.” (If the exchange was more than a fifth of its value, the exchange is nullified). Is a sheep usable like a vessel or like other movable objects? I mean to say he might mean that only vessels can cause exchange and he might hold thanot a sheep is included, or perhaps he means all movable objects besides can cause exchange but just not fruit? now i would like to add here that ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- [laws of marriage 1:2] holds that there are only two types of exchange, equal to equal, or acquisition by a handkerchief. [To רב שךexchange of a needle for a שריון is equal to equal since this one wants a needle and the other wants a suit of שריון.] רב שךholds the exchange is applicable to marrying a woman, not the acquisition by a handkerchief. According to this, we must say that when רב נחמן said in בבא מציעא מ''ו ע''ב and קידושין כ''ח ע''ב that fruit can not make an exchange, he must mean it cannot create an exchange but that it can be acquired by exchange. To make my comment here clear let me bring a few points. First רב שךis only talking about the approach of the רמב''ם. Clearly, תוספות and רבינו תם are utterly different. Also, we know the law is like רב נחמן that fruit can not make an exchange, but rather only vessels. But what is a vessel? To תוספות, a vessel is anything that can be used. But to רב שך this must mean that which can create an acquisition, not that which can be acquired because he holds a woman can be acquired by exchange of equal to equal. This approach of רב שךI must mention is not like תוספות that there is exchange equal to equal, and a different kind that is not equal to equal, but is still not acquisition by handkerchief nor shoe. After writing the above, it occurred to me that in fact this is open in the רמב''ם himself. In the beginning of chapter five in הלכות מכירה he holds that fruit can be acquired by exchange equal for equal just like ר' תם. So, when he holds like רב נחמן that “fruit cannot make exchange,” that has to mean it cannot cause an acquisition of exchange, but they can be acquired bהThe question I have on this approach of the רמב''ם is that it does not seem to fit with the גמרא. Theגמרא itself is talking always about being acquired by exchange and never once mentions causing an acquisition of exchange. So, from where would the רמב''ם have derived his approach?y exchange. [The difference is that causing acquisition is a subset of being able to be acquired by acquisition. This is like the fact that exchange of money does not cause acquisition. Only pulling or picking up can cause acquisition. Therefore, we see the רמב''ם understands the גמרא to be referring to causing acquisition. However, I might mention that this issue is a debate between תוספות and the רמב''ם because תוספות makes a point of showing how the whole subject is referring to the ability to be acquired by exchange. He explains that the משנהthat sounds like it means causing acquisition of a coin by means of exchange of an object means that a coin can never be acquired by exchange. It can only be acquired by a sale. If one exchanges an object for the money of another, that money is not acquired. It can only be acquired if it is used to buy the object.---------I might mention here that רש''יand תוספות learn the argument between רב נחמן and רב ששתdifferently than the רמב''ם. So far I have been saying according to the רמב''ם , the law of רב נחמן is that fruit can be acquired by exchange, but can not make exchange; while to רב ששת they can also cause exchange. According to רש''י they differ in this. רב ששת holds all movable objects can be acquired by exchange and cause it also. to רב נחמן only vessels, that can be used can be acquired by exchange .and cause exchange. To רש''י , a ox or cow are considered to be included in movable objects. רב נחמן meant to exclude only fruit in what can not cause exchange, but besides that, all movable objects can cause exchange, or maybe only usable vessels. He writes, ” One can exchange vessels for vessels, an animal for an animal, even a needle for a coat of armor or a sheep for a horse, but if he exchanges fruit for fruit , that can have the law of cheating applied to it.” (If the exchange was more than a fifth of its value, the exchange is nullified). Is a sheep usable like a vessel or like other movable objects? I mean to say he might mean that only vessels can cause exchange and he might hold that a sheep is included, or perhaps he means all movable objects besides can cause exchange but just not fruit?

za81 midi file za81 nwc file

I noted that a king of Mesopotamia Cdarlaomer that conquered Sodom and Gomora (along with three other kings) also smote the Chori at Mount Seir (Genisis chapter 14), but did not wipe them out. Only later, the kings of Esau destroyed the Chori, and made Mount Seir their home base. see the events when Abraham first came to the land of Canaan and later in the recounting of the descendants of Esau in Genisis. אני רוצה לציין כי מלך מסופוטמיה, כדרלעומר שכבש את סדום (יחד עם עוד שלושה מלכים) גם את היכה את החורי בהר שעיר, אך לא חיסל אותם. רק מאוחר יותר השמידו מלכי עשו את החורי והפכו את הר שעיר לבסיס הבית שלהם

אני תוהה מדוע הרמב"ם פסק דין כמו "הייתי אומר", במקום מסקנת הגמרא בקידושין דף כ''ח. התשובה שחשבתי עליה היא שאולי מסקנת הגמרא הולכת כמו רב יוסף שקובע שצריך להעריך חפץ לפני שניתן להשתמש בו כבעל ערך כספי (שווה כסף). [אני מתייחס כאן לרב יוסף בקידושין דף ח']. הוא סבור שאם מתחתן עם אישה עם בד משי, יש להעריך אותו מראש. הוא לומד זאת מברייתא שמלמדת שעבד עברי ניתן לרכוש או על ידי כסף או משהי שווה כסף, אבל לא על ידי כלים או תבואה. אבל למה לא כלים או תבואה אם אחרי הכל, גם להם יש ערך כספי? אז, רב יוסף אומר שהסיבה שכלים אינם תקפים היא שערכם עדיין לא הוערך. אבל אז הבנתי שרב יוסף מתייחס רק לשימוש במשהו שהוא שווה כסף, ולא זה שמשתמשים בו בחליפין. רק בעמוד כ''ח אומר רב יהודה שמה שמשתמשים בו בחליפין, צריך להיערך מראש. אבל מכיוון שזה לא החוק, לכן הרמב"ם החליט ללכת עם ה"יכולתי לומר" (השערה שנדחתה) לפחות באופן שבו הגמרא מבינה את המשנה לפי רב נחמן. כדי להבהיר זאת, הרשו לי להביא את המשנה והגמרא. המשנה אומרת כל הנעשה דמים באחר כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. הגמרא אומרת זה, אולי חשבתי, מתייחס למטבע. אבל אנחנו יודעים שלא ניתן להשתמש במטבעות בהחלפה. רב יהודה ענה, "זה אומר, מה שמשתמשים בו בהחלפה צריך להיבחן כמה הוא שווה." הגמרא שואלת אז מדוע ה"הייתי אומר" הייתה אפשרות בת קיימא מלכתחילה? תשובה: זה היה אומר שניתן להשתמש במטבע בהחלפה, וגם ניתן להשתמש בפירות בהחלפה. אבל רב נחמן קבע שפירות לא יכולים לשמש בהחלפה, ולכן הגמרא מסיקה שהמשמעות היא שאם מישהו מוכר שור במאה, ולאחר מכן המוכר מגלה שלקונה יש פרה בשווי אותו מחיר, המוכר יכול לומר, "תן לי את הפרה במקום מזומן." ורק על ידי אמירה זו, הרכישה הושלמה. בכל מקרה, קשה להבין את הגמרא הזו, שכן היא אומרת שהגישה האחרונה שבה מישהו שמכר את השור אומר "שמור את המאה שאתה חייב לי" ותן לי את הפרה שלך במקומם, הדין הזה הוא כמו ר' יוחנן שסובר שמהתורה כסף גורם לעסקה כספית להיות תקפה. אני לא מבין מה עצם האמירה "שמור את הכסף ותן לי את הפרה" קשורה לדין התורה שהחלפת מטבע, לא משיכת החפץ שנקנה, גורמת למכירה להיות תקפה. במקרה שלנו, אף אחד מעולם לא משך מטבע כלשהו------יתר על כן, אפשר לומר כמו תוספות שהדין שהגמרא אומר כאן הולך רק לדעה שניתן לרכוש מטבע בהחלפה כי רב נחמן לא אומר שהמשנה פירושו ''כל הנערך (נישום)'' כמו רב יהודה, אלא מותיר אותה לומר ''כל מה שנעשה דמים באחר''. איך יכלו הרי''ף והר''ם לענות על בעיה זו

I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the Gemara in Kidushin pg 28. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the Gemara is going like Rav Joseph that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to Rav Joseph in Kiddushin page 8. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a braita that teaches that a Jewish slave can be acquired either by money or what is worth money, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, Rav Joseph says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that Rav Joseph is referring only to using something that is worth money, not that which is used in an exchange. It is only on page28 that Rav Judah says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the Rambam decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the Gemara understands the mishna according to Rav Nachman. To make this clear let me bring the Mishna and Gemara. The Mishna says anything that is made money, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. R. Judah answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The Gemara then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But Rav Nachman held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the Gemara concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this Gemara is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like R. Yochanan who holds that from the torah money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying keep the money and give me the cow instead has any relevance to the law of the Torah that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever. Furthermore, it is possible to say like Tosphot does that the law the Gemara says here is going only to the opinion that coin can be acquired by exchange because Rav Nachman does not say the Mishna means ''all that is evaluated'' (like Rav Yehuda) but leaves it to say ''all that is made''. How could the Rif and Rambam answer this problem? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the גמרא in קידושין דף כ''ח. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the גמרא is going like רב יוסף that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to רב יוסף in קידושין דף ח'. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a ברייתא that teaches that a עבד can be acquired either by כסף or what is שווה כסף, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, רב יוסף says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that רב יוסף is referring only to using something that isשווה כסף not that which is used in חליפין. It is only on page כ''ח that רב יהודה says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the רמב''ם decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the גמרא understands the משנה according to רב נחמן. To make this clear let me bring the משנה and גמרא. The משנה says כל הנעשה דמים כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. רב יהודה answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The גמרא then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But רב נחמן held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the גמרא concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this גמרא is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like ר' יוחנן who holds that from the תורה, money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying "Keep the money, and give me the cow instead," has any relevance to the law of the תורה that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever.------Furthermore, it is possible to say like תוספות does that the law the גמרא says here is going only to the opinion that coin can be acquired by exchange because רב נחמן does not say the משנה means ''all that is evaluated נישום '' (like רב יהודה) but leaves it to say ''all that is נעשה דמים באחר''. How could the רי''ף and ר''ם answer this problem?

"What America used to stand for" by Michael Huemer

Here, I talk about what America used to stand for, and how we are losing it. What We Celebrate Sometimes, on the 4th of July, I think about what we’re celebrating, and I wonder how the founders who signed the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 would feel if they saw our celebrations, and our society more generally. I used to think of July 4th as celebrating American values of freedom and independence. But when you look around, it’s hard to find any evidence that the holiday means anything like that to most people. It seems to be more a celebration of our ability to make loud noises and brightly colored flashes of light and, as with all holidays, to stuff our faces. I am not sure if Americans know the Declaration anymore, or if they value what it says. Here is part of what it says, a succinct expression of Lockean libertarian philosophy: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it …. A long list of complaints against King George follows. The document concludes thus: We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. There is then a series of signatures. It is worth remembering that all of those people had reason to believe that they were signing their death warrants. They had just declared war against the world’s most powerful nation; the most likely outcome was that they would lose that war and all be killed—either during the conflict, or by execution afterwards. Why did they do it? Narrow self-interest fails. The only satisfying explanation is that they believed in what they were saying— That the purpose of government is to protect the rights of the governed, that the British government was not doing that, and that the appropriate remedy for such a situation was to cast off that government. People in those days had a lot more courage and a lot more capacity for sacrifice than we do today. I suspect that the poetical bit about pledging their sacred honor was also sincere: people at that time actually thought in those terms.

za80 g minor in midi formatza80 in nwc format

היכן הייתה ארץ אדום? זהו ויכוח בין הגר"א לרש"י. עבור הגר"א, היא נמצאת בדרום ובמזרח של ארץ כנען. אבל עבור רש"י היא נמצאת רק בדרום. מדוע אין חקירות על מיקומו של אדום? ככל הנראה, לא הייתה אימפריית אדום, בעוד שהייתה אימפריית חיתי ואימפריות מתחרות אחרות באותה תקופה. אך ישנן עדויות לכך שאדום לא היה רק במזרח, אלא אף השתרע עד לגבול הצפוני של כנען, שכן יש פסוק במדבר שישראל בשלב מסוים הייתה על גבול ארץ אדום בהור ההר ומשם שלח משה הודעה למלך שהיה מצפון לשם. הור ההר הוא גבולה הצפוני של ישראל כפי שמוגדר בבמדבר ל''ד". אך קשה לראות כיצד אדום יכלה להשתרע לאורך כל הגבול המזרחי של כנען, מכיוון שהם לא אפשרו לישראל לעבור דרך גבולם (אלא אם כן לאדום היו רק יישובים בודדים במזרח). במקום זאת, ישראל נכנסו לארץ כנען דרך המרכז יריחו. מלבד כל זאת, נראה ברור שאדום היה במזרח, משום שכאשר יעקב חזר מחרן, הוא אמר לעשיו שהוא יבוא אליו להר שעיר. אך ברור שהוא היה בדרכו חזרה לארץ כנען. משמעות הדבר היא שהוא היה צריך לעבור דרך הר שעיר כדי להגיע לארץ כנען

Where was the land of Edom? This is an argument between the Gra and Rashi. To the Gra, it is on the south and east of the land of Canaan. To Rashi it is only on the south. Why are there are no investigations on the location of Edom? Apparently, there was no Edomite empire, while there was a Hittite empire and other competing empires at the time. But there is evidence that Edom was not just on the east, but even extended to the north border of Israel since there is a verse in Numbers that Israel at some point was on the edge of the land of Edom at Hor ha’Har and from there Moses sent a message to a king that was north of there. Now Hor Har is the north border of Israel as defined in Numbers 24. But it is hard to see how Edom might have extended through the entire eastern border of Canaan since they did not allow Israel to go through their border (unless Edom had just individual settlements of the East). Instead, Israel entered the land of Canaan though the middle around Jericho. Besides all this, it seems clear that Edom was on the east because when Jacob was coming back from Charan he told Esau that he will come to him at Har Seir. But clearly, he was on his way back to the land of Canaan. So that means he had to pass through the mountain of Seir to get to the land of Canaan.------------------------------------ Where was the land ofאדום ? This is an argument between the גר''א and רש''י. To the גר''א, it is on the south and east of the land of כנען. BUT To רש''י it is only on the south. Why are there are no investigations on the location of אדום? Apparently, there was no אדום empire, while there was a חיתי empire and other competing empires at the time. But there is evidence that אדום was not just on the east, but even extended to the north border of כנען since there is a verse in במדבר that ישראלat some point was on the edge of the land of אדום at הור ההר and from there משה sent a message to a king that was north of there. Now הור ההרis the north border of ישראל as defined inבמדבר ל''ד . But it is hard to see how אדום might have extended through the entire eastern border of כנען since they did not allow Israel to go through their border (unless אדום had just individual settlements of the East). Instead, Israel entered the land of Canaan though the middle around Jericho. Besides all this, it seems clear that אדום was on the east because when Jacob was coming back from חרןhe told עשיו that he will come to him at הר שעיר. But clearly, he was on his way back to the land of Canaan. So that means he had to pass through the mountain of שעיר to get to the land of Canaan.

חוק ברמב''ם. גבר יכול להתחתן עם אישה בכך שהוא נותן לה חפץ שהוא גנב

כמה שאלות התרחשו בי על תשובת רב שך אודות החוק ברמב''ם. גבר יכול להתחתן עם אישה בכך שהוא נותן לה חפץ שהוא גנב. [אישות פרק ה' הלכה ז'] הרשה לי להסביר מה אומר ר' שך על מנת לענות על הבעיה. הבעיה היא שהגנב אינו הבעלים של האובייקט שהוא גנב. אבל אם הוא מוכר את זה או נותן את זה למישהו אחר, והבעלים ייאשו על התקווה להשיג את האובייקט שוב, אז האדם השלישי קנה אותו לחלוטין. הבעיה בשימוש בחפץ להתחתן עם אישה היא שלמרות שהיא בבעלותה על ידי ממוצע של שינוי תחום ונטישה, אך האובייקט לא היה שייך לגנב. לא היה שום שינוי בתחום עד שהוא נכנס לידה של האישה. אתה צריך להתחתן עם אישה בכסף שלך, לא כסף שהופך לה לאחר שקיבלה אותו. התשובה של רב שך היא שלגנב יש זכויות מסוימות באובייקט, וזכויות אלה הוא נותן לה. .....הזכויות אליהן מתייחס רב שך הן אם הבהמה שגזל המליטה, או אם הייתה כבשה והוא גזז אותה, או אם הוא חורש עם שור שהוא גזל .השיפורים לגזלן. אולם, כאשר אדם קונה שדה מאדם שגזל אותו והשקיע זמן, כסף ומאמץ בשיפורה, כאשר השדה חוזר לבעלים, הקונה מקבל החזר מהגזלן עבור השיפור [רמב"ם הלכות גזלה פרק ט', חוק ו']. אך נראה לי שאלו אינן זכויות, אלא סתם עובדות הנובעות מהחוק לפיו גזלן מחזיר רק את הדבר שגזל כפי שהיה בזמן שגזל אותו. לכן, באופן אוטומטי, כל שיפור מאוחר יותר עובר לגזלן. קשה לתפוס זאת כזכות ......מלבד כל האמור לעיל, אני יכול להזכיר שלמרות שהצד השלישי לא צריך לשלם עבור החפץ על פי ראב''ד, אבל לפי הר''ם , האדם השלישי שקנה משהו מגנב אכן צריך לשלם עבורו. ואפילו במקרה של קנייה מגנב שלא היה ידוע, רק על ידי צו של החכמים, זה שקנה אותו לא צריך לשלם, אלא מחוק תורה הוא יצטרך לשלם. כך שלמרות שהאישה קנה האובייקט הגנוב, העובדה היא שמן התורה, היא תצטרך לשלם על כך, ולכן היא נשואה רק מהרבנן, לא מהתורה

I was at the sea again and a few questions entered into my mind about the answer of Rav Shach about the law in the Rambam laws of marriage 5 law 7 that says a man can marry a woman by an object he stole. Just to be clear let me explain what Rav Shach says in order to answer the problem in the Rambam. The problem is that the thief does not own the obsject that he stole. But if he sells ,it or gives it to someone else, and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again, then the third person can keep it. The problem with using the object to marry a woman is that, even though she owns it by means of change of domain and abandonment, but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it got into the hand of the woman. As the Ketzot Hachohen writes, you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that become her's after receiving it. The answer of Rav Shach and R. Shmuel Rozovski is that the thief has certain rights in the object and theso he gives to her. ///The rights that Rav Shach is referring to are if the animal he stole gave birth or if it was sheep an'sd he sheared it or if he plows with an ox that he stole it. however, when one buys a field from a person that stole it and put inh time money and effort to improve it. When the field goes back to, the buyer gets repaid from the thief for the improvement [Rambam laws of robbery chapter 9 law 6]. but it seems to me that these are not rights, but rather just facts that result from the law that a robber pays back only the thing he stole as it was at the time he stole it. Therefore, automatically, any later improvements go to the thief. It is hard to conceive of this as a right./////Besides all the above, I might mention that even though the third party does not have to pay for the object according to the Raavad, but according to the Rambam, the third person that bought something from a thief does have to pay for it even though he keeps it. And even in the case of buying from a thief that was not well known, it is only by a decree of the sages that the one that bought it does not have to pay, but from the law of the torah he would have to pay. So even though the woman can keep the stolen object, the fact is that from the law of the torah, she would have to pay for it, and therefore she should be married only by the words of the sages, not from the torah. --------------------------------------------------A few questions occurred to me about the answer of רב שך about the law in the רמב''ם. a man can marry a woman by giving to her an object he stole. Let me explain what רב שך says in order to answer the problem in the רמב''ם. The problem is that the thief does not own the object that he stole. But if he sells it or gives it to someone else, and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again, then the third person can keep it. The problem with using the object to marry a woman is that even though she owns it by mean of change of domain and abandonment, but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it gets into the hand of the woman. As the קצוות החושן writes, you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that becomes her after receiving it. The answer of ר' שך is that the thief has certain rights in the object, and these rights he gives to her. ...The rights that רב שך is referring to are about are if the animal he stole gave birth or if it was sheep and he sheared it, or if he plows with an ox that he stole it. However, when one buys a field from a person that stole it and put in time money and effort to improve it. When the field goes back to the owner, the buyer gets repaid from the thief for the improvement [רמב''ם laws of גזלה chapter 9 law 6]. But it seems to me that these are not rights, but rather just facts that result from the law that a robber pays back only the thing he stole as it was at the time he stole it. Therefore, automatically, any later improvements go to the thief. It is hard to conceive of this as a right. ///Just to be clear let me explain what רב שך say in order to answer the problem in the רמב''ם. the problem is that the thief does not own the object that he stole. but if he sells it or gives it to someone else and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again then the third person can keep it. the problem with using the object to marry a woman is that even though he owns it by mean of change of domain and abandonment but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it gets into the hand of the woman. As the קצוות החושן writes חושן משפט שנ''ג , you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that become her after receiving it. the answer of ר' שך is that the thief has certain rights in the object, and these rights he gives to her./// The problem I see in this answer is even from the place that רב שך brings, I see no answer. The third person there, the one that bought the stolen ox, and plowed with it does not have to pay for it use, but that does not mean that the thief had any rights. Besides all the above, I might mention that even though the third party does not have to pay for the object according to the ראב''ד , but according to the רמב''ם, the third person that bought something from a thief does have to pay for it even though he keeps it. And even in the case of buying from a thief that was not well known, it is only by a decree of the חכמים that the one that bought it does not have to pay but from the law of the תורה he would have to pay. so even though the woman can keep the stolen object, the fact is that from the law of the תורה, she would have to pay for it, and therefore he should be married only by the words of the חכמים, not from the תורה.

בבבא קמא עמוד קי''א אנו רואים שאם שודד נותן חפץ שגזל למישהו אחר, והבעלים ייאושו על קבלת החפץ, אזי אותו אדם שלישי הוא הבעלים של החפץ, והבעלים המקורי יכול לדרוש תשלום מהשודד בלבד, ולא מהאדם השלישי. בהתבסס על כך, גם רב שך וגם רב שמואל רוזובסקי מציעים הסבר בחוק בדיני הר''ם בנוגע לנישואין ה' חוק ז'. עם זאת, ברצוני להציע גישה חלופית המבוססת על התוספת בבבא קמא עמוד ס''ז ע''א מילה ראשונה מעיקרא. הדין בר''ם הוא זה. אם אדם נושא אישה על ידי חפץ שגנב או שדד, וידוע שהוא השיג אותו בכך שהבעלים ייאושו לקבל אותו, היא נשואה. אני חושב שהמקרה כאן הוא שנתינת החפץ לאישה היא שינוי התחום. כלומר, שינוי התחום התרחש בו זמנית עם מתן החפץ לה. זה משהו שרב שך ורב שמואל רוזובסקי מוצאים בעייתי והם מציעים שלגנב כבר הייתה זכות מסוימת בחפץ לפני שנתן אותו לאישה ולכן הוא נותן לה משהו בעל ערך שכבר היה בבעלותו. עם זאת, בעיניי זה בעייתי מכיוון שייתכן שהוא בעל זכויות מסוימות בחפץ, אבל גם כך צריך ייאוש ושינוי תחום כדי להיות בעל חפץ גניבה, ועד שהוא נותן לה אותו, אין שינוי תחום. אז במקום זאת אני מציע את הגישה של תוספת בעמוד ס''ז ע''א. שם הגמרא אומרת שאם גנב או שודד מקדיש בהמה, זה תקף. הגמרא אומרת שהסיבה היא בגלל שהיה שינוי שם. קודם השם היה חולין ועכשיו השם קדוש. תוספות שואל מדוע צריך את התשובה של שינוי שם. האם אין שינוי רשות, וזה אמור להספיק כדי להפוך את פעולת ההקדש לתקפה. תוספות עונה שהגמרא זקוקה לתשובת שינוי השם במקרה בו אין שינוי רשות, לדוגמה הוא הקדיש בהמה כדי שתהיה חטאת שלו או אשמו. במקרה כזה, הוא נשאר אחראי על הבהמה והיא עדיין שלו עד שהיא מוקרבת. אתה רואה בתוספות שפעולת ההקדש תקפה למרות שהגנב אינו הבעלים של הבהמה. אז איך יכול להיות שפעולת ההקדש תקפה? תוספות קובעת שהעובדה שהיא משנה רשות בו זמנית עם פעולת ההקדש הופכת את ההקדש לתקף. אז במקרה שלנו גם פעולת נישואי האישה ושינוי רשות החפץ הגנוב מתרחשים בו זמנית. עם זאת, אני מודה שהגישה שלי לרמב"ם הזה אינה מתאימה בדיוק, משום שהרמב"ם כתב "ונודע שהוא קנה את החפץ על ידי ייאוש". נראה שהוא היה צריך לכתוב "על ידי ייאוש ושינוי רשות". {כי ייאוש אינו גורם לבעלות בפני עצמו.} השמטת המילה האחרונה היא מה שמקשה על רמב"ם בכל פרשנות שהיא ---אני רוצה גם להציע שפדן ארם פירושו מדינת ארם, לא עיר בשם פדן ארם. הסיבה שאני אומר זאת היא שאליעזר הלך לארם נהרים כדי למצוא בת זוג ליצחק, ובאופן ספציפי לעיר נחור, לא לחרן. מאוחר יותר, כשיעקב הלך למצוא אישה, הוא הלך לחרן. עכשיו חרן הייתה העיר שבה התיישב תרח לאחר שעזב את מסופוטמיה בדרכו לארץ כנען. לכן חרן לא היה במסופוטמיה. אבל חרן היה בפדן ארם כפי שכתוב בכמה פסוקים; למשל, שם מוזכר שבני לאה נולדו בפדן ארם. אז כאשר הפסוקים אומרים שיצחק התחתן עם רבקה שהייתה מפדן ארם, הכוונה היא למדינה, לא לעיר. זה בדיוק כמו העובדה שיש מדינה, ניו יורק, ויש עיר, ניו יורק

In Bava Kama page 111 we ee that if a robber gives and object that he stole to someone else and the owner gave up retrieving the object then tat third person own the object and the original owner can demand payment from the robber alone, not the third person. Based on this both Rav Shach and Rav Shmuel Rozovki suggest an explanation in a law in the Rambam law of marriage 5 law 7. However, I would like to suggest an alternative approach based on Tosfot in Bava Kama page 67a first words “at first it was secular”. The law in the Rambam is this. If one marries a woman by an object that he stole or robbed, and it is known that he had acquired it by the owner giving up hope of retrieving it, she is married. I think the case here is that there was giving up and the giving the object to the woman is the change of domain. That is, the change of domain occurred simultaneously with giving her the object. This is something that rav Rozovski and Rav Shach find problematic and they suggest the thief already had certain right in the object before he gave it to the woman and so he is giving her something of value that he already own. However, to me this is problematic since because he might own certain rights in the object, but even so you need abandonment and change of domain to own an object of theft, and until he gives it to her, there no change of domain. so instead I suggest the approach of Tosphot on page 67. There the Gemara says if a thief or robber sanctify an animal, it is valid. The Gemara say the reason is because there was change of name. first the name was secular and now the name is holy. Tosphot asks why do you need the answer of change of name. is it not so that there is change of domain, and that should be enough to make the act of sanctification valid. Tosphot answers the Gemara needs the answer of change name for case in which there is no change of domain for example he sanctified an animal to be his sin offering or his guilt offering. In that case, he remains responsible for the animal even and it is still his until it is sacrificed, you see in Tosphot that the act of sanctification is valid even though the thief does not own the animal. so how can it be that the act of sanctification is valid. Tosphot holds the fact that it changes domain simultaneously with the act of sanctification makes the sanctification valid. So in our case also the act of marrying the woman and the change of domain of the stolen object occur simultaneously.However, I admit that my approach to this Rambam does not fit exactly because the Rambam wrote, “It is known that he acquired the object by abandonment.” It seems he should have written, “by abandonment and change of domain.” {For abandonment does not cause ownership by itself.} Leaving out that last word Is what makes that Rambam difficult under any interpretation I would also like to suggest that Padam Aram mean the state of Aram, not a city by the name Padan Aram. The reason I say this is that Eliezer went to Aram Naharaim to find a marriage partner for Isaac and specifically to the city of Nachor, not Charan . Later, when Jacob went to find a wife, he went to Charan. Charan was the city that Terach settled in after he left Mesopotamia on his way to the land of Canaan. so Charan in not Mesopotamia. But Charan was in Padan Aram as it say in several verses; for example where it mentions that the children of Leah were born in Padan Aram. so when the verses say that Isaac married Rivka who was from Padan Aram that must mean the state, not the city. This is just like the fact that there I a state New York and there is a city, New York. _______________________________________________________ In בבא קמא page קי''א we see that if a robber gives an object that he stole to someone else, and the owner gave up retrieving the object then that third person owns the object, and the original owner can demand payment from the robber alone, not the third person. Based on this, both רב שך and רב שמואל רוזובסקי suggest an explanation in a law in the ר''ם laws of marriage. However, I would like to suggest an alternative approach based on תוספות in בבא קמא page ס''ז ע''א. The law in ר''ם is this. If one marries a woman by an object that he stole or robbed, and it is known that he had acquired it by the owner giving up hope of retrieving it, she is married. I think the case here is that there was ייאוש and the giving the object to the woman is the change of domain. That is, the change of domain occurred simultaneously with giving her the object. This is something that רב שך and רב שמואל רוזובסקי find problematic and they suggest the thief already had certain right in the object before he gave it to the woman and so he is giving her something of value that he already own. However, to me this is problematic since because he might own certain rights in the object, but even so you need ייאוש and change of domain to own an object of theft, and until he gives it to her, there no change of domain. so instead I suggest the approach of תוספות on page ס''ז. There the גמרא says if a thief or robber sanctify an animal, it is valid. The גמראsay the reason is because there was change of name. first the name was secular and now the name is holy. תוספות asks why do you need the answer of change of name. is it not so that there is change of domain, and that should be enough to make the act of sanctification valid. תוספות answers the גמרא needs the answer of שינוי השם for case in which there is no change of domain, for example he sanctified an animal to be his חטאת or his אשם. In that case, he remains responsible for the animal even and it is still his until it is sacrificed, you see in תוספות that the act of sanctification is valid even though the thief does not own the animal. so how can it be that the act of sanctification is valid. תוספות holds the fact that it changes domain simultaneously with the act of sanctification makes the sanctification valid. So in our case also the act of marrying the woman and the change of domain of the stolen object occur simultaneously. However, I admit that my approach to this רמב''ם does not fit exactly because the רמב''ם wrote, “It is known that he acquired the object by ייאוש.” It seems he should have written, “by ייאוש and change of רשות.” {For ייאוש does not cause ownership by itself.} Leaving out that last word Is what makes that רמב''ם difficult under any interpretation ---------------------------------I would also like to suggest that פדן ארם mean the state of ארם, not a city by the name פדן ארם The reason I say this is that Eliezer went to ארם נהריים to find a marriage partner for Isaac and specifically to the city of נחור, not חרן . Later, when Jacob went to find a wife, he went to חרן . NOW חרן was the city that תרח settled in after he left Mesopotamia on his way to the land of כנען. so חרן in not Mesopotamia. But Charan was in פדן ארם as it say in several verses; for example where it mentions that the children of Leah were born in פדן ארם. so when the verses say that Isaac married Rivka who was from פדן ארם that must mean the state, not the city. This is just like the fact that there I a state New York and there is a city, New York.

בבא קמא דף קי''א. זהו נושא שרב שך ורב שמואל רוזובסקי עוסקים בו שניהם בפרק ה' בדיני הר''ם של גניבה, דין ז'. שאלה אחת היא שאם אדם נישא אישה בגניבה או בשוד [כלומר, גנב חפץ ונתן אותו לאישה ואומר בכך את נשואה לי] וידוע שכבר הייתה ייאוש מצד הבעלים, אז הנישואין תקפים. אולם, ראה בזכרון שמואל פרק נ''ח שם הוא מביא את המקרה של חפץ מקודש שאם המצב הוא כזה שהקדש יצטרך לשלם עבור החפץ, אז לא ניתן דבר למעשה. אז, במקרה שלנו עם גניבה, אפילו עם ייאוש ושינוי תחום, הגנב צריך להחזיר לבעלים אם הגנב היה גנב ידוע, וגם אם הוא לא היה ידוע, האדם שרכש את החפץ מהגנב היה צריך לשלם עבורו למעט תיקון השוק. אז, גם אם אנחנו עוסקים במקרה שבו האישה לא צריכה להחזיר את החפץ, עדיין היא צריכה לשלם עבורו, או לפחות מדין התורה היא הייתה צריכה לשלם עבורו אלא בגלל תיקון השוק. [איש לא היה קונה כלום אם כל קנייה ניתנת לביטול.] לכן, היא לא קיבלה כלום, והנישואין לא צריכים להיות תקפים. הבעיה השנייה היא, למה היא נשואה? לרב רוזובסקי ולרב שך, זה בגלל שהייתה ייאוש יחד עם שינוי תחום. איזה שינוי תחום? האחריות והזכויות שיש לגנב לפני שהוא מחזיר אותו. לגר''א לעומת זאת, זה אומר שהייתה שינוי תחום נוסף לפני שהחפץ ניתן לאישה. ובמונח של שוד, הגר"א בהחלט צודק, שכן ייאוש אינה חל על שוד. שינוי התחום היה צריך להתרחש לפני מתן החפץ לאישה אבל כאשר השאלה היא על גניבה מדוע היא נשואה? אני חושב שזכויות הגנב ולא הייאוש היו עובדים מכיוון שכל אחת מהן חלשה. אבל יחד הם יכולים להיחשב ככאלה שהגנב נתן לה משהו בעל ערך כספי רק כדי להבהיר. אם הייתה גניבה, והגנב מכר את החפץ, והייתה ייאוש על ידי הבעלים, אז האדם קנה אותו. עם זאת, אם הגנב היה ידוע, הקונה צריך לשלם עבורו. אם לא הגנב מפורסם, אז הלוקח לא צריך לשלם והבעלים צריך לרדוף אחר הגנב לבדו כדי לקבל פיצויים. כמו כן, אנו מתייחסים כאן לעובדה שאישה יכולה להינשא על ידי מתן חפץ בעל ערך כספי. אז, במקרה שלנו כאן, שבו גבר נתן חפץ ששדד או גנב לאישה ואומר "הנה את נשואה לי על ידי החפץ הזה", אז אם כבר הייתה ייאוש על ידי הבעלים, אז היא נשואה. אבל ייאוש על ידי הבעלים לבדה לא גורמת לבעלות. רק ייאוש עם שינוי תחום גורמת לבעלות. אבל כאן שינוי התחום התרחש בו זמנית עם מתן החפץ לאישה. אלא אם כן הולכים עם רב שך ששינוי התחום מתייחס לזכות שהייתה לגנב לפני שהחזיר אותו. מה זה אתם עשויים לשאול. אחד מהם הוא מה שאתם רואים ברשב"א בבבא קמא ל"ג דף 33 שם הוא אומר שאם במקרה שם הקונה חרש עם השור לפני שהיה צריך להחזירו, הוא לא צריך לשלם עבור השימוש בשור

Bava Kama page 111.

Bava Kama page 111. This is a subject that Rav Shach and Rav Shmuel Rozovski both deal with in the Rambam laws of theft chapter 5 law 7. [R. Rozovski was the rosh yeshiva of Ponovitch for about 35 years before Rav Shach.] One question is that if one marries a woman by theft or robbery [i.e., he stole an object and give it to a woman and say by this you are married to me] and it is known that there was already giving up abandonment by the owner, then the marriage is valid. However, see in Zichron Shmuel chapter 58 where he brings the case of sanctified object that if the situation is such that the Temple would have to pay for the object, then nothing was given in fact. So, in our case with theft even with abandonment and change of domain, the thief has to pay back the owner if the thief was a well-known thief, and even if he was not well known, the person that acquired the object from the thief would have to pay for it except for fixing of the market place. So, even if we are dealing with a case in which the woman does not have to give back the object, still she has to pay for it, or at least from the law of the torah she would have to pay for it except because of fixing of the market placve. [No one would buy anything if any buy can be cancelled.] Therefore, she received nothing, and the marriage should not be valid. The other problem is, why is she married? To Rav Rozovski and Rav Shach it is because there was abandonment along with change of domain. What change of domain? The responsibilities and privileges that the thief had before he gives it back. To the Gra however, it means that there was another change of domain before the object was given to the woman. And in terms of robbery, the Gra is certainly right for abandonment does not apply to robbery. The change of domain had to have occurred before giving the object to the woman. When the question is about theft why is she married? I think that privileges of the thief nor abandonment would work along since each Is weak. But together they can be considered a such that the thief gave her something of monetary value. just to be clear. If there was theft and the thief sold the object, and there was abandonment by the owner, then the person that bought it keep it. However, if the thief was well-known, the buyer has to pay for it. If not, then he does not have to pay and the owner must go after the thief alone to get repaid. Also, we are referring here to the fact that a woman can be married by giving her an object with monetary value. So, in our case here where a man gave an object that he robbed or stole to a woman and says behold you are married me by this object, then if there was already was abandonment by the owner, then she is married. But abandonment by the owner alone does not cause ownership. Only abandonment with change of domain causes ownership. But here the change of domain occurred simultaneously with the given of the object to the woman; that is unless you say like rav shach that the change of domain refers to privileges the thief had before giving it back. what are these? you might ask. one is what you see in the rashba [R. Shmuel ben Aderet. Not the Rashba of Tosphot who is R Shimshon ben avraham] in Bava Kama page 33 where he says in the case where a e buyer plowed with stolen ox before it had to be given back, he does not have to pay for the use of the ox.

za79 A minor midiza79 nwc format

תוספות בבא קמא קי''א ע''ב. אם יש מצב שנגזל חפץ והבעלים ייאשו אבל החפץ עדיין בשליטתו זה נחשב להיות חסרון בבעלות. זו קשה להבין. להיות ברור אני רוצה להביא תוספות. אם יש שני תנאים, יש ייאוש ושנוי רשות, וחפץ של אדם השלישי. אם אין ייאוש ולא שינוי רשות אז זה של הבעלים והם יכולים לתבוע הגזלן או אדם השלישי. אבל יכול להיות מצב ביניים. יש ייאוש בלי שינוי רשות או שינוי רשות בלי ייאוש. [המצב ביניים שיש חיסרון בבעלות גורם שאם החפץ קיים, יש להחזירו, ואם החפץ אינו קיים, אז אדם השלישי פטור לגמרי]. זה המצב האחרון ברור. החפץ שלו ואינו בשליטתו, ולכן אם הקדיש אותו אינו מוקדש. אבל אם יש ייאוש בלי שינוי רשות זה נראה להיות שלו לגמרי. אז למה אינו נחשב להיות שלו לגמרי-------יתר על כן, ברצוני לשאול זאת. תוספות גורסת שכאשר יש נטישה אך אין שינוי תחום, או שינוי תחום ללא נטישה, שאם החפץ בסביבה, עליו להחזירו. אך אם החפץ אינו בסביבה, אז הבעלים יכול לרדוף רק אחר הגזל המקורי כדי לקבל פיצויים. אך תוספות שואלות על כך שאם כאשר החפץ בסביבה, האדם השלישי חייב להחזירו, אז גם אם הוא אינו בסביבה, הוא צריך להיות אחראי. מדוע הוא אינו אחראי? תוספות משיבה שזה פסוק. אם החפץ שנגנב נמצא בצורתו המקורית (כעין שגנב), יש להחזירו. אך אם הוא השתנה, אז הבעלים יכול לרדוף אחר הגזל לבדו. ברצוני לשאול על כך שאותו נימוק צריך לחול כאשר לא הייתה נטישה ולא שינוי תחום. אך שם אנו אומרים שהבעלים יכול לרדוף אחר הגזל המקורי או אחר זה שתפס אותו מאותו גזל ואכל אותו. גם הוא לא צריך להיות אחראי על פי פסוק זה

I was coming back from the sea and it occurred to me something that is hard to understand in the second Tosphot on page 111 in Bava Kama. it is this. If you have a case where the owner has given up, but it is still in his domain, that is considered to be not his completely. But that is what is difficult to understand. The stolen object is considered to be totally in his domain, and yet the abandonment creates a lack or deficiency in his ownership. To be a bit clearer about what I am asking, let me bring Tosphpot. To Tosphot if the owner has given up and it has changed domain from the robber to another person, then that third person own the object completely and the owner can go after the robber alone to get repaid, not to that third person. but if there was no abandonment nor change of domain from the robber to a third person, then there is no question that the owner can go after the robber or the third person to get repaid. it is the middle case that Tosphot is saying creates in-between rate in which there can be a difference. if the object is still around, then it mut be given back to the owner. but if the stolen object is not around e.g. it was eaten, then the third party is not obligated in anything. the owner can go after the robber alone. But there are two ways, a middle state can be created. One way is there was abandonment, but no change in domain. Another is there was change in domain, but no abandonment. This last case is clear. If there was change in domain, then the owner owns the object, but it is not under his control, so if he would sanctify it, it would not be sanctified. It is that other case that I find difficult to understand. he gave up but it is still in his domain in ownership and under his control. why should that be considered a lack in ownership? Furthermore, I would like to ask this. Tosphot holds that when there is abandonment but no change of domain, or change domain with no abandonment, that if the object is around then he must give it back. But if the object is not around, then the owner can go only after the original robber to get repaid. But Tosphot then ask on this that if when the object Is around the third person must give it back, then even if it is not around, he ought to be liable. Why is he not liable? Tosphot answers it is a verse. If the object that was stolen is in its original form, it must be given back. But if it has changed, then the owner can go after the robber alone. I would like to ask on this that this same reasoning ought to appply when there was neither abandonment nor change in domain. But there we say the owner can go after the original robber or the one that grabbed it from that robber and ate it. He should also be not liable according to that verse. ]\-----------THERE Is something that is hard to understand in the second תוספות on page קי'א in בבא קמא. it is this. If you have a case where the owner has given up, but it is still in his domain, that is considered to be not his completely. But that is what is difficult to understand. The stolen object is considered to be totally in his domain, and yet the יאוש creates a lack or deficiency in his ownership. To be a bit clearer about what I am asking, let me bring תוספות. To תוספות if the owner has given up, and it has changed domain from the robber to another person, then that third person owns the object completely, and the owner can go after the robber alone to get repaid, not to that third person. But if there was no יאוש, nor change of domain from the robber to a third person, then there is no question that the owner can go after the robber or the third person to get repaid. it is the middle case that תוספות is saying creates in between מצבin which there can be a difference. If the object is still around, then it must be given back to the owner. But if the גזול object is not around )it was eaten(, then the third party is not obligated in anything. The owner can go after the גזלן alone. There are two ways a middle state can be created. One way is there was ייאוש, but no שינוי רשות. Another is there was שינוי רשות, but no ייאוש. This last case is clear. If there was שינוי רשות, then the owner owns the object, but it is not under his control. If he would sanctify it, it would not be sanctified. It is that other case that I find difficult to understand. יש ייאוש but it is still in his בבעלות של הבעלים המקוריים and under his control. why should that be considered a lack in ownership?

Bava Kama 111 A'B I want to explain what I think the Tosfot intends in Bava Kama 111. But first, let me bring the Mishnah and the Gemara. The Mishna says that if a thief gives what he stole to his children, they are not responsible, only the thief is responsible. Rav Chisda said that if someone stole and the owner did not give up and someone else takes the object and eats it, the owner can collect from each of them because the object was still in the owner's possession. The Gemara asks about this from the Mishna, which says that he can collect only from the thief, not from the children. Rav Chisda answers that the Mishna is talking about a case in which the owner gave up. The Tosfot holds that abandonment after a change of ownership does not confer ownership, and according to this assumption they are correct that Rav Chisda ruled and granted that if there is despair, one can only collect from the thief, not from the other. It does not matter whether the despair preceded the change of ownership or not. Even if there was a no change of ownership and the object was still in the owner's possession, it is still the same as the law of “his and not in his control”, which he cannot dedicate because he lacks ownership. Therefore, the owner can only collect from the thief. If it was owned totally by the owner, then the owner can collect from the robber or the second one that ate it

בבא קמא קי''א ע''ב אני רוצה להסביר מה לדעתי כוונת התוספות בבא קמא קי''א ע''ב. אבל ראשית, הרשו לי להביא את המשנה והגמרא. המשנה אומרת שאם גזלן נותן את מה שגזל לילדיו, הם אינם אחראים, רק הגזלן אחראי. רב חיסדא אמר שאם מישהו גזל והבעלים לא ויתר ומישהו אחר לוקח את החפץ ואוכל אותו, הבעלים יכול לגבות מכל אחד מהם מכיוון שהחפץ עדיין היה ברשות הבעלים. הגמרא שואלת על כך מהמשנה שאומרת שהוא יכול לגבות רק מהגזלן, לא מהילדים. רב חיסדא עונה שהמשנה מדברת על מקרה שבו היה ייאוש. תוספות אוחז שיאוש אחר שנוי רשות אינו מקנה ולפי ההנחה הזאת הם מדייקים שרב חסדה קפסק ותני שאם יש יאוש אפשר לגבות רק מן הגזלן לא מן השני. לא משנה אם היאוש היה קודם שינוי רשות או לא. היינו אפילו כשיאוש היה אחר שינוי רשות ועדיין החפץ בבעלותו של הבעלים, אף על פי כן זה כמו הדין של שלו ואינו ברשותו שאינו יכול להקדיש משום שחסר בבעלות. ולכן הבעלים יכול לגבות רק מן הגזלן

When Abraham was born and raised the area between the river was controlled by the Kasdim, but by the time that Abraham sent Eliezer, hi slave, to find a wife for Isaac, it was ruled by Aram. Aram is a totally different empire than the Kasdim. A we know this from the name of the area that Eliezer arrived at, Aram Naharaim, (that is the area ruled by Aram between the two rivers). now here it is proper to mention that later when Isaac and Rebeka sent Yaakov to find a wife they sent him to Charan, not Mesopotamia. that means that they had heard already the Laban the son of Nachor had already moved away from Mesopotamia to some midpoint between Mesopotamia and the land of Canaan, i.e., Charan ----------------------------------------------When אברהם was born and raised the area between the river was controlled by the כשדיים , but by the time that אברהם sent אליעזר, hi slave, to find a wife for יצחק, it was ruled by ארם. NOW ארם is a totally different empire than the כשדיים. A we know this from the name of the area that אליעזר arrived at, ארם נהריים, (that is the area ruled by Aram between the two rivers). now here it is proper to mention that later when יצחק and רבקה sent יעקב to find a wife they sent him to חרן, not Mesopotamia. that means that they had heard already the לבן the son of נחור had already moved away from Mesopotamia to some midpoint between Mesopotamia and the land of כנען, i.e., חרן

כאשר אברהם שלח את אליעזר (עבדו) למצוא כלה ליצחק (בנו), הוא אמר לו ללכת אל "ארץ מולדתי", ולמעשה שם הגיע אליעזר לעיר נחור, אחיו של אברהם (באזור ארם נהריים), כלומר האזור שהיה פעם בבל. אך כאשר יעקב הלך למצוא כלה ממשפחת אברהם, הוא הגיע לחרן, העיר שאליה הגיע תרח (אביו של אברהם) כשעזב את האזור שבין שני הנהרות באמצע הדרך לארץ כנען. זה אולי נראה מבלבל עד שתשימו לב שנחור (אחיו של אברהם) לא הגיע עם תרח, אברהם ולוט. במקום זאת, נחור נשאר מאחור, ושם התגורר בתואל בעיר נחור, ושם גדלה רבקה. אבל שאר משפחת תרח הגיעה עם תרח לנקודת אמצע בין בבל לארץ כנען ושם התגוררה בעיר בשם חרן, ושם התגורר אבי לאה ורחל, ושם הגיע יעקב ונישא להם

When Abraham sent Eliezer (his slave) to find a bride for Isaac (his son), he told him to go to the “land of my birth,” and in fact that is where Eliezer came to the city of Nachor, the brother of Abraham (in the area of Aram Naharaim, the Aram between the rivers), i.e. the area that was once Babylonia. But when Jacob went to find a bride from the family of Abraham, he came to Charan, the city that Terach (the father of Abraham) came to when he left the area between the two rivers on half way to the land of Canaan}. This might seem confusing until you notice that Nachor, (the brother of Abraham) did not come with Terach, Abraham and Lot. Nachor stayed back, and that is where Betuel lived--in the city of Nachor, and that is where Rebeka grew up. But the rest of the family of Terach came with Terach to some halfway point between Babylonia and the land of Canaan and there lived in a city called Charan, and that is where the father of Leah and Rachel lived, and that is where Jacob came to and married them. -----------------------------------------When אברהם sent אליעזר (his slave) to find a bride for יצחק (his son), he told him to go to the “land of my birth,” and in fact that is where אליעזר came to the city of נחור, the brother of אברהם (in the area of ארם נהריים, the Aram between the rivers), i.e. the area that was once Babylonia. But when יעקב went to find a bride from the family of אברהם, he came to Charan, the city that תרח (the father of אברהם) came to when he left the area between the two rivers on half way to the land of כנען}. This might seem confusing until you notice that נחור, (the brother of אברהם) did not come with תרח, אברהם and לוט. Rather, נחור stayed back, and that is where בתואל lived in the city of נחור, and that is where Rebeka grew up. But the rest of the family of תר came with Terach to some halfway point between Babylonia and the land of כנען and there lived in a city called חרן, and that is where the father of לאה and רחל lived, and that is where Jacob came to and married them.

za78 A major midi za78 in nwc format

כשהגר [אמא של ישמאל] ברחה משרה, אני חושב שהיא הגיעה לסביבת נתיבות כי היא מצאה מעיין וקראה לו, "באר לחי ראי", וזה היה בין קדש לברד, (והתרגום אונקלס אומר שהעיירות האלה נקראו רקם וחגר). מאוחר יותר כשאברהם הלך לארץ הפלשתים הוא גם היה בין קדש לשור אשר אונקלס מתרגם גם למשמעות בין רקם לחגר.[ אז זה אותו מקום] ומשם אברהם הלך לעיר הבירה של הפלשתים שהייתה גרר באותה תקופה. [זה היה נתיבות של היום. אך באותו זמן שהגר ברח, אברהם היה בחברון. לפני שהגר ברח היא הייתה צריכה להכין ציוד, ובנוסף היא בטח ציינה את המקומות שבהם היו נחלים או מעיינות, כי היא לא יכלה להגיע מחברון למה שהוא היום האזור סביב נתיבות ברגל בשמש החמה בלי להיות מוכנה היטב. [תנסו את זה ותבינו למה אני מתכוון.] כמו כן, אני רוצה לציין שאותו אזור הוא המקום שבו יצחק פגש את רבקה ושם הוא התגורר זמן מה לאחר שחזר מהעקידה. [כאשר אברהם ויצחק חזרו מהעקידה, הם היו בבאר שבע. אך מאוחר יותר יצחק התגורר באותו מקום שבו הגר מצא את "באר לחי ראי". זה היה ליד או בארץ הפלשתים. ואז יצחק הלך לגרר כמו אביו ואחר כך חזר לבאר שבע לאחר שהתקשה עם הפלישתים כפי שקרה עם אברהם

When Hagar [mother of Ishmael] ran away from Sarah I think she got to around Netivot because she found a spring and called it, “The spring of the God who appeared to me,” and that was between kedesh and bared, (and the Targum Onklus says those towns were called Rekem and Chagar). Later when Abraham went to the land of the Philistines he was also between Kedeh and Shur which Onklus also translates to mean between rekem and chagar.[ So that is the same place] and from there Abraham went to the capital city of the philistines which was Gerar at that time. [That was at present day Netivot. Yet at the time Hagar ran away, Abraham was in Hebron. o before Hagar ran way she had to have prepared hiking gear plus she must have noted down the places where there were streams or springs because she could not have made it from Hebron to what is today the area around Netivot on foot in the hot sun without being well prepared. [I dare you to try it and you will see what I mean] Also I would like to mention that that same area is where Isaac met Rebeka and where he lived for some time after he returned from the akedah. [When Abraham and Isaac returned from the akedah, they were in beer sheva. but later Isaac lived at that same place where Hagar found “The well of the God who appeared to me.” That was near or in the land of the Philistines. Then Isaac went to Gerar like his father and then later went back to beer sheva after having trouble with the Philistines as had happened with Abraham. -----------------------------------When הגר [mother of ישמאל] ran away from שרה I think she got to around נתיבות because she found a spring and called it, “באר לחי ראי,” and that was between קדשand ברד, (and the תרגום אונקלסsays those towns were called רקם and חגר). Later when אברהם went to the land of the פלישתים he was also between קדש and שור which אונקלס also translates to mean between רקםand חגר.[ So that is the same place] and from there אברהם went to the capital city of the פלישתים which was גרר at that time. [That was at present day נתיבות. Yet at the time הגר ran away, אברהם was in חברון. o before הגר ran way she had to have prepared hiking gear plus she must have noted down the places where there were streams or springs because she could not have made it from חברון to what is today the area around נתיבות on foot in the hot sun without being well prepared. [I dare you to try it and you will see what I mean.] Also, I would like to mention that that same area is where יצחקmet רבקה and where he lived for some time after he returned from the עקידה. [When אברהם and יצחקreturned from the עקידה, they were in beer sheva. but later יצחקlived at that same place where הגר found “באר לחי ראי.” That was near or in the land of the פלישתים. Then יצחקwent to גרר like his father and then later went back to באר שבע after having trouble with the פלישתים as had happened with אברהם.---------------------------