בבא בתרא י''ח שיטת רבינו יצחק

אם הולכים עם רבינו יצחק, אז צריך לומר שהדין לפי ר' יוסי הוא במקרה של מכירה, וזה יחול גם לגבי הדבורים והחרדל, וגם לגבי העץ והבור. הטעם הוא שכאן בדף י''ח כל השאלה על רבא מר' יוסי הייתה שרבא צריך להחזיק בדינו אם לפי החכמים ואם לר' יוסי. וכך, שאלתנו על רבא הייתה מר' יוסי כיון שכבר ענינו לו לפי החכמים. עתה אמר רב פפא התשובה היא שר' יוסי אמר דינו רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל אז אנחנו שואלים על זה. כי אם כן, מה יכולה להיות הסיבה של החכמים במקרה של המשרה או אפילו במקרה זה של החרדל? במילים אחרות, כאשר ר' יוסי חולק על החכמים, הם צריכים לדבר על אותו מקרה. אחרת, ר' יוסי היה אומר "אני לא מסכים איתם רק במקרה של מכירה". ועתה תשובתנו היא שאמר ר' יוסי דינו במקרה של מכירה, ואחרת היה אומר כרבא שכל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק יש להרחיק מגבול חברו שלשה טפחים, אפילו כשעדיין אין דבר מעברו השני של הגבול. ואז מגיעה הנקודה המרכזית של רבינו יצחק. כלומר, שרבינא הוא רק המשך של תשובת רב פפא. ואמר שהחכמים אמרו גורם נזק יש להרחיק מהגבול, ואמר ר' יוסי שיש להוציא מהגבול את הדבר שיכול להינזק. וכיון שזו המשך תשובת רב פפא, משמע שאמר זאת ר' יוסי רק במקרה של מכירה. אבל במקרה שבו יש רק שני שכנים, כל אחד חייב להרחיק את החפץ שלו שיכול לגרום נזק מהגבול. משמע שאם הדין יהיה כמו רבינו יצחק, אז למרות שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי, זה רק במקרה של מכירה, אבל אחרת יש להרחיק מהגבול כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק. וכיון שכל ענין הדיון הזה הוא כדי שלא תהיה סתירה בין ר' יוסי לרבא, אותו נימוק חל בדף כ''ה עם העץ והבור. שם אמרו החכמים יש לכרות את העץ אם הוא תוך כ''ה אמות הבור אלא אם כן היה שם קודם. ואמר ר' יוסי אין צריך לקצץ כיון שכל אחד בתחומו. וגם כאן הדין הוא של מכירה שהיא המקרה היחיד שר' יוסי מחזיק בדינו, ואמרו החכמים דינם גם במקרה של מכירה. עתה לא ייתכן שמה שאמרו אם היה העץ קודם הוא יכול להישאר במצב בלי מכירה, כי זה יסתור את דין רבא שכל מה שיכול לגרום נזק יש להרחיק מהגבול גם כשבצד השני של הגבול אין דבר שיכול להינזק. כל העניין בדיון שלנו הוא שלא תהיה סתירה מין החכמים או מר' יוסי על דין רבא

Bava batra page 18b.The approach of Rabainu Izhak.

if you go with Rabainu Izhak, then you have to say that the only allowance according to r Jose is in a case of a sale and this would apply both in the case of the bees and mustard and in the case of the tree and pit. the reason is that here on page 18 the whole question on Rava from R. Jose was that Rava has to hold with his law whether according to the sages or to r Jose. and so, our question on Rava was from r Jose since we already answered him according to the sages. now Rav Papa said the answer is that R. Jose said his law only in a case of a sale. But then we ask on that. For then, what could be the reason of the sages in the case of the tub of linen or even this case of the mustard? In other words, when R. Jose disagrees with the sages, they have to be talking about the same case. Otherwise, R. Jose would have said "I disagree with you only in a case of a sale." And now our answer is that R. Jose said his law in the case of a sale, and otherwise he would say like Rava that anything that can cause damage must be removed away from the border of one's neighbor three handbreadths even when there is nothing yet on the other side of the border. Then comes the major point of Rabbainu Izhak. That is that Ravina is just a continuance of the answer of Rav Papa. And he said that the sages said one that causes damage must be removed from the border, and that R. Jose said that the thing that can be damaged must be removed from the border. And since this is a continuance of the answer of Rava Papa, this means that R. Jose said this only in the case of sale. But in a case where there are just two neighbors, each one must keep his object that can cause damage away from the border. This means that if the law would be like Rabbainu Izhak, then even though the law is like R. Jose, that is only in a case of a sale, but otherwise anything that can cause damage must be kept away from the border. And since the whole point of this discussion is so that there should be no disagreement between R. Jose and Rava, this same reasoning applies on page 25 with the tree and pit. There the sages said the tree must be cut down if it is with 25 cubits of the pit unless it was there first. And R. Jose said it does not need to be cut down since each is in his own domain. And here also the case is that of a sale which is the only case that R Jose holds his law, and the sages said their law in the case of a sale also. Now it is not possible that what they said if the tree was there first it can stay, because that would contradict the law of Rava that whatever can cause damage has to be kept way from the border even when there is nothing on the other side of the border that could be damaged. _____________________________________________________________________________ if you go with רבינו יצחק, then you have to say that the only allowance according to ר' יוסי is in a case of a sale and this would apply both in the case of the bees and mustard and in the case of the tree and pit. The reason is that here on page י''ח the whole question on רבא from ר' יוסי was that רבא has to hold with his law whether according to the חכמים or to ר' יוסי. and so, our question on רבא was from ר' יוסי since we already answered him according to the חכמים. Now רב פפא said the answer is that ר' יוסי said his law only in a case of a sale. But then we ask on that. For then, what could be the reason of the חכמים in the case of theמישרה or even this case of the mustard? In other words, when ר' יוסי disagrees with the חכמים, they have to be talking about the same case. Otherwise, ר' יוסי would have said "I disagree with you only in a case of a sale." And now our answer is that ר' יוסי said his law in the case of a sale, and otherwise he would say like רבא that anything that can cause damage must be removed away from the border of one's neighbor three handbreadths, even when there is nothing yet on the other side of the border. Then comes the major point of רבינו יצחק. That is, that רבינא is just a continuance of the answer of רב פפא. And he said that the חכמים said one that causes damage must be removed from the border, and that ר' יוסי said that the thing that can be damaged must be removed from the border. And since this is a continuance of the answer of רב פפא, this means that ר' יוסי said this only in the case of sale. But in a case where there are just two neighbors, each one must keep his object that can cause damage away from the border. This means that if the law would be like רבינו יצחק, then even though the law is like ר' יוסי, that is only in a case of a sale, but otherwise anything that can cause damage must be kept away from the border. And since the whole point of this discussion is so that there should be no disagreement between ר' יוסי and רבא, this same reasoning applies on page כ''ה with the tree and pit. There the חכמיםsaid the tree must be cut down if it is with כ''ה cubits of the pit unless it was there first. And ר' יוסי said it does not need to be cut down since each is in his own domain. And here also the case is that of a sale which is the only case that ר' יוסי holds his law, and the חכמים said their law in the case of a sale also. Now it is not possible that what they said if the tree was there first, it can stay, because that would contradict the law of רבא that whatever can cause damage has to be kept away from the border even when there is nothing on the other side of the border that could be damaged. The whole point of our discussion is that there should be no contradiction from the חכמים or from ר' יוסי on the law of רבא

בבא בתרא דף י''ח רבינו תם ורבינו חננאל

עלה בדעתי שדעתם של רבינו תם ורבינו חננאל הגיונית מאוד, כי הם שמים לב לכך שר' יוסי מסכים שבמקרה של "חיציו" (שהגורם הנזק חייב להרחיק כמו שאומר הגמרא בבא בתרא דף כ'ב ע''א); וכי הדין כר' יוסי, ושהדין תמיד כרבא כנגד אביי חוץ ביע''ל כג''ם. בהתחשב בכל זה, יש טעם להסביר את הגמרא בבא בתרא דף י''ח באופן שהם עושים. אנחנו שואלים על רבא, אם צריך להסיר את ההיזק שלו מהגבול, אז איך מוצאים מקרה שבו ר' יוסי אומר "למה תגיד לי להזיז את החרדל שלי? ראשית, עליך להסיר את הדבורים שלך." מה הדבורים עושות שם מלכתחילה? תשובה, זה מקרה של מכירה. אבל אם כן, מדוע אין ר' יוסי חולק על המשרה ואומר שגם היא מותרת, ומדוע אומרים החכמים שיש להסירה? אלא אמר רבינא אמרו החכמים להסיר כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק. משמע, שרבא מסכים עם ר' יוסי ורק אמר דינו במקרה של הוצאת בור אחד מהגבול ששם יכול להיות בור אחר, או אפילו אם אין בור אחר, כי זה מחליש את הקרקע. ור' יוסי מסכים בכל המקרים של חיציו כמו המשרה, אבל אומר על הדבורים שהן מקרה של חיציו, והחכמים אומרים דווקא החרדל הוא הגורם העיקרי לנזק לדבורים, ולא להיפך

Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel in Bava Batra page 18

It occurred to me that the opinion of Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel makes a lot of sense, because they are taking notice of the fact that R. Jose agrees that in a case of "his arrows" (that the one who causes damage must keep away as the gemara says in Bava Batra page 22a); and that the law is like R. Jose, and that the law is always like Rava against Abyee except in yal kegam. Taking all this into account, it makes sense to explain the gemara in Bava Batra page 18 in the way that they do. We ask from R. Jose on Rava. "If one has to remove his thing that causes damage away from the border, then how do we find a case were R. Jose is saying 'Why tell me to move my mustard? First, you should remove your bees'" What are the bees doing there in the first place? Answer: it is a case of a sale. But then, if so, why does R. Jose not disagree about the tub of linen and say it also is permitted, and why do the sages say it should be removed? Rather Ravina said the sages said to remove anything that can cause damage. This means, that Rava agrees with R. Jose, and only said his law in a case of removing one pit away from the border where there can be another pit, or even if there is no other pit, because it weakens the ground. And R. Jose agrees in all cases of "his arrows" like the tub of linen, but is saying about the bees that they are a case of "his arrows" and the sages say the mustard is the main cause of damage to the bees, not vice versa __________________________________________________________________________ It occurred to me that the opinion of רבינו תם and רבינו חננאל makes a lot of sense, because they are taking notice of the fact that ר'יוסי agrees that in a case of with "his arrows" (that the one who causes damage must keep away as the גמרא says in בבא בתרא page כ''ב ע''א); and that the law is like ר' יוסי, and that the law is always like רבא against אביי except in יע''ל כג''ם. Taking all this into account, it makes sense to explain the גמרא in בבא בתרא page י''ח in the way that they do. We ask from ר' יוסי a question on .רבא If one has to remove his היזק away from the border, then how do we find a case were ר' יוסי is saying "why tell me to move my mustard? First, you should remove your bees." What are the bees doing there in the first place? Answer, it is a case of a sale. But then, if so, why does ר' יוסי not disagree about the מישרה and say it also is permitted, and why do the חכמים say it should be removed? Rather רבינאsaid the חכמים said to remove anything that can cause damage. This means, that רבא agrees with ר' יוסי and only said his law in a case of removing one pit away from the border where there can be another pit, or even if there is no other pit, because it weakens the ground. And ר' יוסי agree in all cases of his arrows like the משרה, but is saying about the bees that they are a case of his arrows and the חכמים say rather the mustard is the main cause of damage to the bees, not vice versa

za67 C Minor midiza67 nwc music files go from "a..." until "z..." with a hundred files (or more) with each letter. [Then you can see they start again with "za.." ]i.e. ,there is an "z1" file and a "z2" until "z100"; and the same for each letter. But most were never put on the internet, and tons were lost, and I think the x series were just rough drafts. There were also pieces with names [e.g., "Orchestra" or "Mathematics" etc.] before it made sense to just give letters, intead of trying to figure out new names for every piece. {I write mainly for the sake of keeping sane, but I also have hoped that others will benefit. My own thinking about music that Bach is the most fun to play, while Mozart is the greatest of all (to listen to and to play in an orchestra). Beethoven, I think is one step down from Mozart. I think also there were greats in the Renaissance and Middle Ages. In more modern times, I think Sebelius and Brahms were great.} {I ought not forget Vivaldi and Handel. I used to play Vivaldi and Mozart scores on the violin. I mean that I would try to track the important line, and play it on the violin on the street. I had hoped to get through all Mozart in that way, but never managed that. I think I might have noticed that some of Mozart could not be condensed in a single music line.} I must add here that my father had a profound feeling in music, even though he went into inventing things for satellite communication at TRW and other aerospace inventions for the Usa. And I had a great music teacher, Mr. smart, and a great violin teacher, Mr. Chassman.} I think my dad might have gone into playing the violin as a profession, but instead went into science at Caltech.

בעיה בהבנת ההלכה היא שהגמרא לא עוסקת בזה הרבה. לפעמים הוא אומר לך את החלטת הפסק הסופי. אבל זה לא האינטרס העיקרי שלה (שזה להבין את המשנה). בכל הנוגע למשפטים, הגמרא נותנת עקרונות שונים במקומות שונים. והמקומות האלה הם שמספקים לרשויות המאוחרות (אחרונים) חומר מקור שיכול לתת רמז מדוע ספרי ההלכה של ראשונים החליטו בצורה מסוימת. עם זאת, אין היררכיה בעקרונות הידועים. אם אתה מביא הוכחה לרמב''ם שהדין הוא כמו החכמים נגד סומכוס, אתה יכול באותה מידה להביא הוכחה שהדין הוא כמו סומכוס כי ההלכה היא כמו סתם משנה. כשאתה מביא הוכחה למוקצה ממקום אחד, אתה יכול באותה מידה להביא הוכחה שהחוק הוא כמו ר' שמעון שאין דבר כזה מוקצה אלא במקרה נדיר שמשהו מופרש כדי לא להשתמש בו. העיקרון של סדר התנאים יכול לשמש כדי לבטל את העיקרון של האמורא האחרונה, וזה יכול לשמש כדי להחליט נגד סתם פשט של הסוגייה [משמעות פשוטה של הנושא]

A problem with understanding halacha is that the gemara does not deal with it much. sometimes it actually tells you the final pesak decision. But this is not its main interest (which is to figure out the mishna). When it comes to law, the Gemara gives different principles in different places. And it is these places that provide the later (achronim) authorities source material that can give a hint as to why the halacha books of the Rishonim decided in a certain way. However, there is no hierarchy in the principles that is known. If you bring a proof to the Rambam that the law is like the sages against sumchos, you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like sumchos because halacha is like a plain mishna. When you bring a proof to muktze from one place, you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like R. shimon that there is no such thing a mutkze except in a rare case that something Is set aside not to be used. The principle of the order of tenaim could be used to overturn the principle of the latest amora, and that can be used to decide against the stama desugia [plain meaning of the subject] _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ A problem with understanding הלכה is that the gemara does not deal with it much. sometimes it actually tells you the final pesak decision . But this is not its main interest (which is to figure out the משנה). When it comes to law, the גמרא gives different principles in different places. And it is these places that provide the later (אחרונים) authorities source material that can give a hint as to why theהלכה books of the ראשונים decided in a certain way. However, there is no hierarchy in the principles that is known. If you bring a proof to the רמב''ם that the law is like the חכמים against סומכוס you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like סומכוס because הלכה is like a plain משנה. When you bring a proof to מוקצה from one place you could just as easily bring a proof that the law is like ר' שמעון that there Is no such thing a מוקצה except in a rare case that something Is set aside not to be used. The principle of the order of תנאים could be used to overturn the principle of the latest אמורא , and that can be used to decide against the סתם פשט של הסוגיה [plain meaning of the subject]

אני מבין שהמטרה העיקרית של שותפי ללמידה דיוויד ברונסון הייתה להבין את הגמרא. ולמעשה, הוא מצא שרבינו יצחק (נכדו של רש''י) החזיק לרוב במפתח לכך. [תוספות מבוססות בעיקר על ר' יצחק] ודוד אמר לי הרבה פעמים תוספות תמיד צודק. אני מתכוון לומר שהבנת כל הגישות השונות לגמרא לא הייתה הגיונית בעיניו. אלא מה שחשוב, זה להבין את הגמרא עצמו. ולמעשה, זוהי החובה העיקרית להבין את התורה שבכתב ותורה שבעל פה. אבל להבין מדוע החליט הבית יוסף על החוק מסוים, נראה לי חסר חשיבות. הסיבה שאני מרגיש כך היא שאין הכרעה ממשית בדין אחרי הגמרא. זה פתוח בגמרא עצמה: רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה. הם סוף האפשרות להכריע את הדין. אז כל מה שאנחנו יכולים לעשות, זה לראות איך התלמוד עצמו החליט. וכאן הדבר מתבלבל. העקרונות הקובעים את החוק אינם מפורטים במדויק. יש לנו בערובין את סדר התנאים – עם מי הולך הדין. קודם ר' יוסי, אחר כך ר' יהודה וכו'. ואז יש לנו עיקרון אחר, החוק הוא תמיד כמו סתם משנה שזה כמו ר' מאיר שבתחתית הרשימה של איך החוק הולך. אז יש לנו את החוק שאן הלכה כתלמיד במקום הרב. עם זאת, החוק הוא לפעמים כמו ריש לקיש במקום ר' יוחנן המורה שלו. יש לנו את דעת רוב שהיא כמו בית הלל חוץ מכל מסכת הוריות שכלה היא כמו בית שמאי (דעת המיעוט). יכולתי להמשיך עוד ועוד, אבל בעצם לגמרא עצמה, לא היה מעניין במיוחד לומר בגלוי איך החוק צריך להתנהל מלבד במקומות המעטים שבהם הגמרא עצמה אומרת בגלוי את ההחלטה הסופית. במקום זאת, נראה לי שהגישה הטובה ביותר היא כמו רב נחמן מברסלב, "אם אתה יכול למצוא דעה לסמוך עליה, אז אתה יכול לסמוך עליה". רב נחמן לא החזיק בריצה אחרי הגבלות נוספות (חומרות יתירות). אז יש לנו הדין הוא תמיד כמו הסמכות המאוחרת בסדר האמוראים לאחר נקודה מסוימת(בתרא), ובכל זאת יש יוצאים מן הכלל כמו העובדה שהדין הוא כמו רבא נגד אביי חוץ מיע''ל כג''ם למרות שאמוראים מאוחרים יותר חלקו. אף על פי שר' יוסף קרו החליט על החוק בשלחן ערוך, זה לא היה בגלל שהוא חשב שזוהי אובייקטיביות החוק. אלא כתב זאת כפשרה בין הספרדים שהולכים עם הרי''ף והרמב''ם והאשכנזים שהולכים עם הרא''ש. [וחוץ מזה, החוק שהוא החליט לא נמצא בשלחן ערוך (שאמור להיות סקירה מהירה), אלא בספר הבית יוסף על הטור]. הוא כתב בהקדמה לטור שהדרך בה הכריע את הדין בכתב אינה משום שחשב שזה מדויק, אלא משום שזאת הייתה דעת הרוב בין שלושת הגדולים הרי''ף רמב''ם ורא''ש. [אפשר להוסיף שהיעב''ץ (רב יעקב עמדן) כתב בתשובות שהוא שנא את כל החומרות המיותרות שהאשכנזים תמיד מוסיפים.]

best approach is like Rav Nahman of Breslov, “If you can find an opinion to depend on, then you can depend on it.”

I realize that the main objective of my learning partner, David Bronson, was to understand the Gemara. And, in fact, he found that Rabbainu Izhak (grandson of Rachi) most often held the key to this. [Tosphot is mostly based on Rabbainu Izhak.] David told me many times: Tosphot is always right. I mean to say that understanding all the different approaches to the Gemara made no sense to him. Rather what is important is to understand the Gemara itself. And, in fact, this is the main obligation of understand the Oral and Written Law. But to understand why the Beit Joseph decided the law in a certain way seems to me to be of little importance. The reason I feel this way is that there is no actual deciding of law after the Gemara. Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of the possibility of decided the law. רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה So, all we can do is to see how the Talmud itself decided. And here is where things get confusing. The principles deciding the law are not spelled out exactly. We have in Eruvin, the order of Tenaim –with whom the law goes. First R. Jose, then R. Yehuda etc. Then we have a different principle the law is always like stam (plain) Mishna which ןs like R. Meir who is at the bottom of the list of how the law goes. [An example of what I am saying here is that the rule that the law is like stam mishna, however most mishnas in Bava Metzia and Bava Kama and Bava Batra are like sumchos even though the law is like the sages against him except to the Rashbam.] Then, we have the law is not like a disciple instead of the teacher. However, the law is sometimes like Reish Lakish instead of R. Yochanan, his teacher. We have the majority opinion which is always like Beit Hillel except an entire tractate (Horayot) which every single law there is like Beit shamai (the minority opinion). I could go on and on, but in fact, to the Gemara itself, it was not very interesting to state openly how the law should go except in the few places where the Gemara itself says openly the final decision. Rather, it seems to me the best approach is like Rav Nahman of Breslov, “If you can find an opinion to depend on, then you can depend on it.” Rav Nachman did not hold with running after extra restrictions. Then we have the law is always like the later authority in the order of the Amoraim after a certain point, and yet there are exceptions like the fact the law is like Rava against Abyee except in yal kegam even though later Amoraim disagreed. Even though Rabbainu Yoseph Karo decided the law in the shulchan aruch, it was not because he thought that was objectivity the law. Rather he wrote it as a compromise between the sepharadim who were going with the Rif and Rambam and the Ashkenazim who were going with the Rif. [ Besides that, the law he decided was not in the shulchan aruch (which is supposed to be quick review), but in the beit yoseph on the Tur]. He wrote in the introduction to the Tur: the way he decided the law in writing is not because he thought that was accurate, but because that was the majority opinion between the three greats the Rif, Rambam, and Rosh. [I might add that Rav Yaakov Emden wrote in the teshuvot that he hated all the superfluous extra restrictions that the Ashkenazim are always adding in a continual progression. ] __________________________________________________________________________________________I realize that the main objective of my learning partner David Bronson was to understand the גמרא. And in fact, he found that רבינו יצחק (grandson of רש''י) most often held the key to this. [תוספות is mostly based on ר' יצחק] and David told me many times” (תוספות is always right). I mean to say that understanding all the different approaches to the גמרא made no sense to him. Rather what is important is to understand the גמראitself. And in fact, this is the main obligation of understand the תורה שבכתב ותורה שבעל פה. But to understand why the בית יוסף decided the law in a certain way seems to me to be of little importance. The reason I feel this way is that there is no actual deciding of law after the גמרא. This is open in the גמרא itself: רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה are the end of the possibility of decided the law. רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה So, all we can do is to see how the תלמו itself decided. And here is where thing get confusing. The principles deciding the law are not spelled out exactly. we have in ערובין the order of תנאים –with who the law goes. First ר' יוסי , then ר' יהודה etc. Then we have a different principle the law is always like סתם משנה which ןs like ר' מאיר who at the bottom of the list of how the law goes. Then we have the law I not like a disciple instead of the teacher. However, the law is sometime like ריש לקיש instead of ר' יוחנן his teacher. We have the רוב opinion which Is always like בית הלל except and entire מסכת הוריות which every single there is like בית שמאי (the minority opinion). I could go on and on, but in fact to the גמרא itself, it was not very interesting to state openly how the law should go except in the few places where the גמרא itself says openly the final decision. Rather, it seems to me the best approach Is like רב נחמן of ברסלב, “If you can find an opinion to depend on, then you can depend on it.” רב נחמןdid not hold with running after extra restrictions. Then we have the law is always like the later authority in the order of the אמוראים after a certain point, and yet there are exceptions like the fact the law is like רבא againstאביי except in יע''ל כג''ם even though later אמוראים disagreed. Even though ר' יוסף קרו decided the law in the שלחן ערוך, it was not because he thought that was objectivity the law. Rather he wrote it as a compromise between the ספרדים who were going with the רי''ף and רמב''ם and the אשכנזים who were going with the רא''ש. [and besides that, the law he decided was not in the שלחן ערוך (which is supposed to be quick review), but in the בית יוסף on the טור]. He wrote in the introduction to the Tur that the way he decided the law in writing is not because he thought that was accurate, but because that was the majority opinion between the three greats the רי''ף רמב''ם ורא''ש. [I might add thatיעב''ץ רב יעקב עמדן wrote in the תשובות that he hated all the superfluous חומרות יתירות that the אשכנזים are always adding in a continual progression. ]

I have noticed that few people pay much attention to the herem of the Gra. [that is the second letter of excommunication that bears the signature of the Gra on the top of the page]. I have thought that the reason is that people do not think it was valid. But the odd thing about this is that whether the person that has a letter of excommunication pronounced on him by a legitimate authority, can claim it is illegitimate without grounds. After all, time has shown that the Gra knew a lot more about this than people thought at the time. [However, I do feel that Rav Nahman of Breslov was a true Tzadik, and that in strict legal terms would not have been included in the herem] The significance of the herem of the Gra is great. It means that what people think are good deeds are not, because they violate the herem. For example, learning torah is a mitzvah. However, a person in herem is not allowed in this—neither learning nor teaching. Thus the very value of the mitzvah is nullified and instead becomes a wrong.} And I think here i might mention that Rav Nahman himself did not hold with learning science or philosophy, but in this particular instance I think to go with the Gra, Ibn Pakuda (author of the Obligations of the hearts) and Rambam. This is an old argument and I quote a famous statement of the Talmud about arguments between the sages:"These and these are the words of the living God".[And I admit the flaws today-if I had been able to just sit and learn Torah I would have done so happily but somehow the obstacles got to be too great for me to handle. so, I went into Physics for the sake of making a living, but still, I try to learn Torah as much as I can]

שמתי לב למשהו קשה להבנה בגמרא בבא בתרא י''ח ע''ב . כלומר בואו נסתכל על ההתחלה. רבא אמר אתה צריך להסיר משהו שיכול לגרום נזק הרחק מהגבול. אחר כך שואלת הגמרא מהרבנן של המשנה שאומרים שצריך להרחיק חרדל מדבורים. מכאן ברור שאם אין שם דבורים, אז אפשר לשים שם את החרדל. זו שאלה על רבא. תְשׁוּבָה. לא. כל דבר שגורם נזק צריך להסיר מהגבול, אבל המשנה הזאת באה לספר לנו שהחרדל פוגע בדבורים שבאות ואוכלות את זה ואז זה הורס להן את הדבש. אז עכשיו אנחנו מבינים שהדבורים לא בגבול, ואז הגמרא שואלת מר' יוסי שאמר "לפני שתגיד לי להסיר את החרדל שלי, למה אתה לא תסיר את הדבורים שבאות ואוכלות אותו?" השאלה ברורה. אם רבא צודק, אז אין סיבה לר' יוסי להתלונן. הדבורים הן שלושה טפחים מהגבול, ואנו אומרים לבעל החרדל לשמור מרחק גם על החרדל שלו שלושה טפחים מהגבול. (כלומר, מה שר יוסי אמר לא מתאים לרבא.) רב פפא ענה שזה מקרה של מכירה. ר' יצחק [תוספות] אומר שבשלב זה ההנחה היא שהחרדל נמצא בגבול. אבל מה שקשה להבין כאן הוא האמירה של ר' יוסי, להרחיק את הדבורים. בגישתו של ר' יוסי כל אחד גורם נזק לשני. אז למה הוא יגיד להרחיק את הדבורים? הוא צריך לומר להרחיק את מה שהגיע אי פעם לגבול שנית אחרי שהראשון כבר היה שם; דבורים או חרדל. הייתי מתפתה להציע שר' יוסי מחזיק שהחרדל לא עושה נזק לדבורים, אבל אז אתה יכול לשאול למה לא כתוב במשנה שר' יוסי אמר להרחיק את הדבורים במקום "ר' יוסי מאפשר חרדל (להיות ליד הדבורים)". אלא אני חושב שהגמרא כבר צופה את העובדה שבסופו של דבר אנחנו מסיקים שר' יוסי מחזיק שצריך להסיר את מה שיכול להינזק, לא את זה שגורם נזק, וזו הסיבה שר' יוסי מתיר את החרדל ליד הדבורים. אם בעל הדבורים רוצה, הוא יכול להסיר את הדבורים. ומכל סיבה שתהיה אפשר לדעת שהגמרא סובר שאפילו ר' יוסי מחזיק שחרדל גורם נזק מסוים לא רק החכמים (אך פחות מזה של הדבורים), כי אחרת לא הייתה לגמרא סיבה לבוא על תשובת מכירה. הוא יכול היה לענות שהסיבה לר' יוסי שאנחנו מוצאים מקרה של בעל החרדל שאומר לדבורים להרחיק הוא שהחרדל לא גורם נזק. לרבא אין סיבה להרחיק משהו שלא גורם נזק מהגבול

I noticed something hard to understand in the gemara Bava Batra 18b. I mean let’s look at the beginning. Rava said you have to remove something that can cause damage away from the border. The gemara then asks from the rabanan [sages] of the Mishna that say you have to remove mustard from bees. From this it is clear that if there are no bees there, then the mustard can be put there. That is a question on Rava. Answer. No. Anything that causes damage has to be removed from the border, but this Mishna is coming to tell us that mustard damages bees; they come and eat it and then it ruins their honey. so now we understand that the bees are not at the border. Then, the gemara asks from R. Jose who said, "Before you tell me to remove my mustard, why don’t you remove your bees which come and eat it?" The question is clear. If Rava would be right, then there is no reason for R. Jose to complain. The bees are three handbreadths from the border and we tell the owner of mustard to also keep his mustard three handbreadths from the border. (I.e., What R Jose said does not fit with Rava.) Rav Papa answered, "It is a case of a sale." R. Izhak says at this point the assumption is that the mustard is at the border, but what is hard to understand here is the statement of R. Jose: To keep the bees away. In the approach of R. Jose each one causes damage to the another, so why would he say to keep the bees away? He should say to keep away which ever came to the border secondly after the first one was already there; bees or mustard. I would be tempted to suggest that R. Jose holds the mustard does no damage to the bees, but then you might ask why does he not say in the Mishna to keep the bees away instead of saying "R. Jose allows to mustard (to be next to the bees)". Rather, I think that the gemara is already anticipating the fact that we eventually conclude that R Jose holds one must remove that which can be damaged, not that which causes damage, and that is the reason R. Jose is allowing the mustard to be near the bees. If the owner of the bees want to, he can remove the bees. And for whatever reason there might be you can know that the gemara holds that even r Jose holds the mustard cause some degree of damage, (but less that the bees), because otherwise the gemara had no reason to come onto the answer of aa sale. It could have answered imply the reason to r joe we find a case of the owner of the mustard telling the bees to keep away is that the mustard causes no damage. To rava there is no reason to keep something that causes no damage away from the border. jo___________________________________________________________________________________________ I would be tempted to suggest that ר' יוסי hold the mustard does no damage to the bees, but then you might ask why does it not say in the משנה that ר' יוסי said to keep the bees away instead of, " ר' יוסי allows to mustard (to be next to the bees)". Rather I think that the גמרא is already anticipating the fact that we eventually conclude that ר' יוסי holds one must remove that which can be damaged, not that which causes damage and that is the reason ר' יוסי is allowing the mustard to be near the bees. If the owner of the bees wants to, he can remove the bees. And for whatever reason there might be you can know that the גמרא holds that even ר' יוסי holds the mustard causes some degree of damage, (but less that the bees), because otherwise the גמרא had no reason to come onto the answer of aa sale. It could have answered imply the reason to ר' יוסי we find a case of the owner of the mustard telling the bees to keep away is that the mustard causes no damage. To רבא there is no reason to keep something that causes no damage away from the border.

religious fanatics are not moral people

I have wondered a long time why religious fanatics are not moral people. I mean this in terms of what you might say is common human decency. The answer I think is that every area of value has an opposite area of value. The way to understand this is I think by means of the system of Leonard Nelson and Kelley Ross. You start with the insight of Kant that there are much of what we see as objective reality (but not all) has subjective aspects. And objective morality also has subjective aspects—but not all. There still is a core bedrock of right and wrong that does not depend on what people think, but on what is truly right and wrong. People often get mixed up by thinking that their personal goals and feeling equal objective morality. And this happens most often among religious and political fanatics. I do not agree with fanatics, unless they are fanatic about "midot tovot"--good clean character

Even though understanding is the point of learning, but people do not pay enough attention to the fact that learning is always a collection of small impressions on the mind. You never learn anything until the small impressions accumulate. Thus, we find in tractate Avoda Zara page 19a that one should always be ‘’ saying the words and going, even though he does not remember,and even though he does not understand what he is saying. This approach found helped me in physics and math and certainly all the more so in learning gemara with tosphot

הוכחה חזקה לגישתו של רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח ע''ב של בבא בתרא

ברצוני להביא הוכחה חזקה לגישתו של רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח ע''ב של בבא בתרא. זאת היא. רבינא עונה "החכמים גורסים שיש להסיר את הדבר הגורם לנזק". ובכן זה כַּמוּבָן. אחרת למה היו אומרים להרחיק את הגיגית של הפשתן מהירקות ובור מבור אחר? ברור שרבינא בא לענות על שאלה מסוימת. והשאלה הזו היא בבירור השאלה שנשאלה זה עתה על החכמים: אם אנחנו מדברים על לוקח, למה אומרים החכמים להרחיק את גיגית הפשתן מהירקות? תשובה: כי גם במקרה של מכירה, הם מחזיקים שחייבים להרחיק את הגורם לנזק מזה שיכול להינזק. אבל אם אתה מחזיק כמו רבינו תם, התשובה הזו כנראה לא עונה על השאלה. השאלה שרבינא אמור לענות עליה בגישתו של רבינו תם היא זו. ר' יוסי אמר להרחיק את הדבורים מהחרדל. אם רבא צודק שחייבים להרחיק מהגבול כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק, איך אפשר למצוא מצב שכזה בו מגיע המקרה של ר' יוסי? התשובה לשאלה זו אמורה להיות ""החכמים מחזיקים חייבים להסיר כל דבר שיכול לגרום נזק". עם זאת, אני עדיין יכול לראות את גישה של רבינו תם. הוא אמנם קורא בתשובת רבינא קצת יותר ממה שכתוב בה, אבל רק טיפה יותר שאתה צריך לקרוא בה בכל מקרה. לרבינו יצחק צריך לקרוא לתוכו שרבא מסכים עם הרבנן לבדם ולא עם ר' יוסי. לר''ת אתה צריך לקרוא את זה לתוך האמירה ההיא, אבל להוסיף גם שרבא אמר את החוק שלו רק במקרה אחד. העובדה שהרי''ף ור''י מיגש גורסים שהדין כמו ר' יוסי ור' יוסי אמר את דינו רק במקרה של "חיציו" ושהם יכולים על ידי זה לבצע משימה חשובה. זה לא תקלה, אבל דבר טוב. שהרי הכלל שהדין כרבא בכל המקרים חוץ מיע''ל כג''ם והלן הגמרא אומר הדין כר' יוסי. בגירסה של ר''ת הרי''ף יכול לקבוע שזהו עִקבִי; החוק הוא גם כר' יוסי וגם כרבא

I would like to bring a strong proof for the approach of Rabbainu Izhak on page 18b of Bava Batra. It is this. Raviva answers "The sages hold that the thing that causes damage must be removed." Well Yes. Of course. Why else would they have said to keep the tub soaking the linen away from the vegetables and a pit from another pit? Clearly, Ravina is coming to answer a certain question. And that question is clearly the one just asked on the sages: "If we are talking about a sale, they why do the sages say to keep the tub of linen away from the vegetables?" Answer: because even in the case of a sale, they hold one must keep that which causes damage away from that which can be damaged. But if you hold like Rabbainu Tam this answer does not answer the question. The question that this is supposed to answer in the approach of Rabainu Tam is this. R Jose said to keep the bees away from the mustard. If Rava would be right [that one must keep anything that can cause damage away from the border], how can you find such a situation in which the case of R. Jose comes up? The answer to this question is according to R. Tam to be ""The sages hold one must remove anything that can cause damage." Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chananel have to read into this answer that Rava changed his mind and agrees with Abyee about everything except the pit next to a border. All this is a very strong proof to the approach of Rabbainu Izhak._ However, I can still see the point of R. Tam. He does read into the answer of Ravina a little more than what it says, but only a drop more that you have to read into it anyway. To R. Izhak you have to read into it that Rava agrees with the sages alone, and not with R. Jose. To R. Tam you have to read that into that statement, but add also that Rava said his law only in one case. The fact that the Rif and Ri Migash hold that the law is like R. Yose and that R. Jose only said his law in a case of "his arrows", and that they can by this accomplish an important task is not a fault but a good thing. For the rule in the law is like Rava in all cases (except yal kegam) and later the gemara says the law is like R. Jose, In the girsa (approach) of R. Tam, the Rif can hold that this is consistent; the law is both like R. Jose and Rava,

למרות שאני יכול לראות את חשיבות גישתו של רבינו יצחק דף י''ח ע''ב בבא בתרא, אני לא יכול להבין למה להניח שר' יוסי מסכים שהחרדל גורם נזק כלשהו. אני מתכוון לומר, שאם אתה מניח את זה כעובדה, אז רבינו יצחק צריך לצאת ממה שנראה כקשיים מיותרים. למה לשנות את ההנחה המקורית מהיות הדבורים ליד הגבול לחרדל שנמצא שם? ועוד, אם אתה מחליף שהחרדל יהיה ליד הגבול, אז למה אתה צריך בכלל לטעון שמדובר במכירה? רק תגיד שהחרדל היה שם קודם, ולכן יש להסיר את הדבורים. אם היית אומר שר' יוסי מחזיק שהדבורים עושות את כל הנזק והחרדל לא עושה כלום, אז הכל יהיה בסדר. ר' יוסי אומר שאפשר לשים את החרדל ליד הגבול גם כשהדבורים היו שם קודם כי החרדל לא גורם נזק. אם בעל החרדל לא מוטרד, אז הוא יכול לשים שם את החרדל אם ירצה. מדוע יטען ר' יוסי שלא ירשה לשים שם את החרדל שמה. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שרב שך מסתכל על השאלה מדוע השלחן ערוך אומר שיש חשש לפתוח חלון לבניין נטוש כי בעל הבניין יכול לטעון שהוא רוצה לבנות, ומתי שהוא עושה זאת ,הוא לא רוצה לפנות לבית המשפט כדי שבעל החלון יסגור את החלון כדי לא לגרום ל"נזק בראייה". הוא הולך עם הפוסקים הגדולים בנושא, אבל אני תוהה מדוע הדאגה מפנייה לבית המשפט חלה על החלון לבניין הנטוש, ולא במקרים אחרים של גורמים לנזק? אבל לדעתי החוק הוא תמיד כמו רבא ותמיד יש דאגה כזו

Even though I can see the importance of the approach of Rabainu Izhak on page 18b of Bava Batra, I cannot understand why assume that R Yose agrees that the mustard does any damage what so ever? I mean to saט that if you assume that as a fact, then Rabbainu Izhak has to get out of what seems to be unnecessary difficulties. Why change the original assumption from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there? And furthermore, if you change to the mustard being next to the border, then why do you need to claim it is a case of a sale at all? Just say the mustard was there first, and so the bees have to be removed. If you would say that R. Yose holds the bees do all the damage, and the mustard does none, then everything would be fine. R. Yose says the mustard can be put next to the border even when the bees were there first because the mustard does no damage. If the owner of the mustard is not bothered, then he can put the mustard there if he wants. Why would R. Yose claim that he would not allow the mustard to be put there? I might mention here that Rav shach mainly is looking at the question of why the shulchan Aruch says there is a worry about opening up a window into a deserted building because the owner of the building can claim that he wants to build, and when he does so he does not want to go to court to have the owner of the window to shut the window so as not to cause “damage of seeing.” He goes with the major poskim [legal authorities] on the issue, but I am puzzled why the worry about going to court applies to the window into the deserted building, and not in other cases of causes of damage? But in my opinion the law is always like Ravaת and there is always such a worry. __________________________________________________________________________________________ Even though I can see the importance of the approach of רבינו יצחק page י''ח ע''ב of בבא בתרא, I cannot understand why assume that ר' יוסי agrees that the mustard does any damage what so ever. I mean to say, that if you assume that as A fact, then רבינו יצחק has to get out of what seems to be unnecessary difficulties. Why change the original assumption from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there? And furthermore, if you change to the mustard being next to the border, then why do you need to claim it is a case of a sale at all? Just say the mustard was there first, and so the bees have to be removed. If you would say that ר' יוסי holds the bees do all the damage and the mustard does none, then everything would be fine. ר' יוסי says the mustard can be put next to the border even when the bees were there first because the mustard does no damage. If the owner of the mustard is not bothered, then he can put the mustard there if he wants. Why would ר' יוסי claim that he would not allow the mustard to be put there. I might mention here that רב שך is looking at the question of why the שלחן ערוך says there is a worry about opening up a window into a deserted building because the owner of the building can claim that he wants to build, and when he does so he does not want to go to court to have the owner of the window to shut the window so a not to cause “damage of seeing.” He goes with the major פוסקים [legal authorities] on the issue, but I am puzzled why the worry about going to court applies to the window into the deserted building, and not in other cases of causes of damage? But in my opinion the law is always like רבא and there is always such a worry.

Abraham the patriarch lived in Gerar (an ancient city of the Pleshtim) for some period. Also, Isaac for a few years. [The land at that time was mostly Canaan, but those southern areas were settled by the Pleshtim. [[It coincides almost exactly with Gaza.] If you look on a map at where the archeologists discovered the site of that ancient city, it comes out at modern day Netivot. This explains the statement of Bava sali that Netivot is the "city of the Patriarchs." [Isaac was there for a few years, but had trouble with the shepherds of the Pleshtim, and eventually had to move (or wanted to move) to Beersheva. (He was okay with the king of the pleshtim, but decided at some point that that staying there was more trouble than what it was worth.)

I have been hoping to understand the approach of Rav shach in removal of objects that can cause damage, but (outside of some basic ideas) I have not gotten far. I have a local beit midrash within walking distance, so I have been able to look at the gemara Bava batra page 18 and one of Rav shmuel Rozovski's books on bava Batra. [[I think one volume of his is missing] I think I need to continue in this subject, but I have to say that the small pamphlet on this subject in Rav shach's avi ezri is still a mystery to me.

someone using Torah to make money to me seems completely wrong

There is a pretty straight forward law that one is not allowed to make money by learning or teaching Torah. But as for shechita I can see the point of having a rav to check the knife and signs of possible traif. I can also see the point of a Kollel where people accept charity in order to continue learning Torah. That is to say, that I can see in positive light the yeshivot and kollels where people really want to learn Torah, and accept a stipend in order to be able to continue to learn. But the position of someone using Torah to make money to me seems completely wrong. Rav Naftali Troup was one of a few great Torah sage in Lithuania before WWII, and there were problems in Europe with the Litvak Torah World. Somone wrote a letter to Naftali Troup why asking, "Why he did not come to America?" And he answering a letter all rabanim in the USA use Torah to make money. In his words, “In America, Torah is a business.” And he added, “They are all trying to sell their brand.” The problem in the USA in the religious world is that religious people think that they are righteous.

אם אתה מסתכל על רבינו יצחק בעמוד י''ח של בבא בתרא אז הנושא נראה ברור. רבא הולך כמו החכמים שמחייבים את הגורם לנזק להוציא את חפצו מהמקום. ואף על פי שכל הפוסקים מחזיקים בדין כר' יוסי שגורס שמי שיכול להינזק צריך להוציא את חפצו מהמקום, וכמעט אוניברסליים המחזיקים בדעת שרבא חזר בו, וחל רק במקרה של חפירת בור ליד גבול, עדיין אני חושב שהפוסקים נמשכו לשני כיוונים מנוגדים. מצד אחד הגמרא אומרת אחר כך שהדין הוא כמו ר' יוסי. מאידך, הדין תמיד כרבא חוץ ביע''ל כג''ם. הדרך היחידה להחזיק בשני הניגודים הללו היא ללכת עם רבינו תם ולקבוע שר' יוסי מסכים כאשר מדובר ב"החצים שלו גורמים נזק ישיר" ולומר שלזה רבא מתכוון. ולי נראה שהכי טוב ללכת עם רבינו יצחק שמסביר את הנושא בצורה פשוטה יותר. לפיכך, הנושא יהיה כזה. "אם רבא צודק, אז איך נמצא מקרה של הדבורים ליד הגבול כפי ר' יוסי? עונה רב פפא "מדובר במכירה", [והדבורים אינן גורמות נזק לדעת החכמים, אבל לר' יוסי כן והדבורים באו אחר החרדל. ובנקודה זו, כיון שר' יוסי סובר שהדבורים גורמות נזק, היה אומר גם אם היו שם קודם, יש להרחיקן]. אז למה שהחכמים יקבעו שיש להרחיק את פשתן(משרה) מהירקות? תשובה: על כל מה שגורם לנזק שיילקח מהמקום. ורבא הוא כמו החכמים. אם היית הולך עם רבינו תם, קשה לראות מדוע, ובאיזה נקודה בגמרא שהוא אמור לחזור בו מגישתו, זה מלבד שאר השאלות שהרמב''ן מביא נגד הדרך של רוב ראשונים מבינים ר' תם ור' חננאל. איך לענות על הסתירה בהלכה? הייתי אומר סוגיות חלוקות

If you look at Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the sages that hold it Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra

If you look at Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the sages that hold it Rabbainu Izhak in page 18 of Bava Batra the obligation of the one who causes damage to remove his object from the scene. And even though all the poskim hold the law is like R. Yose who holds that the one who can be damaged should remove his object from the scene, and they almost universally that hold the opinion of Rava was retracted and only applies in the case of the of digging a pit near a border, still I think that the poskim were being pulled in two opposite directions. On one hand, the Gemara says later that the law is like R. Yose. On the other hand, the law is always like Rava except in yal kegam. The only way to hold onto these two opposites is to go with Rabbanu Tam, and to hold that R Yose agrees when it is a case of "his arrows are causing direct damage" and to say that that is what Rava means. And to me it seems best to go with Rabainu Izhak who explains the subject more simply. Thus, the subject would be like this:(the gemara would be read thus): "If Rava is right, then how would we find a case of the bees next to the border like R Yose implies? Answers Rav Papa, “It is a case of a sale,” [and the bees are thought to not cause damage to the opinion of the sages, but to R. Yose they do and the bees came after the mustard. And at this point since R Yose thinks the bees cause damage, he would say even if they were there first, they should be moved away].Then why would the sages hold that the tub of linen must be moved away from the vegetables? Answer: it is upon whatever causes damage to be taken away from the scene." And Rava is like the sages. If you would go with Rabbainu Tam, it is hard to see why and at what point in the gemara that rava is supposed to have retracted his approach, This is besides the other questions that the Ramban brings against the way most rishonim understand rabainu Tam and rabbainu chananel. How to answer the contradiction in halacha? I would say the two sugiot are not the same. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________ If you look at רבינו יצחק in page י''ח of בבא בתרא then the subject looks clear. Rava is going like the חכמים that hold it the obligation of the one who causes damage to remove his object from the scene. And even though all the פוסקים hold the law is like ר' יוסי who holds that the one who can be damaged should remove his object from the scene, and they almost universally that hold the opinion of רבא was retracted, and only applies in the case of of digging a pit near a border, still I think that the פוסקים were being pulled in two opposite directions. On one hand the גמרא says later that the law is like ר' יוסי. On the other hand, the law is always like רבא except in יע''ל כג''ם. The only way to hold onto these two opposites is to go with רבינו תם and to hold that ר' יוסי agrees when it is a case of "his arrows are causing direct damage" and to say that that is what רבא means. And to me it seems best to go with רבינו יצחק who explains the subject more simply. Thus, the subject would be like this. If רבא is right, then how would we find a case of the bees next to the border like ר' יוסי implies? Answers רב פפא, “It is a case of a sale,” [and the bees are thought to not cause damage to the opinion of the חכמים, but to ר' יוסי they do and the bees came after the mustard. And at this point, since ר' יוסי thinks the bees cause damage, he would say even if they were there first, they should be moved away]. Then why would the חכמים hold that the משרה linen must be moved away from the vegetables? Answer: it is upon whatever causes damage to be taken away from the scene. And רבא is like the חכמים. If you would go with רבינו תם, it is hard to see why, and at what point in the גמרא that he is supposed to have retracted his approach, This is besides the other questions that the רמב''ן brings against the way most ראשונים understand ר' תם and ר' חננאל. How to answer the contradiction in הלכה? I would say סוגיות חלוקות

General Grant in his book on the Civil War

General Grant in his book on the Civil War wrote that the Constitution does not forbid succession, nor allows it. From that fact, I would say that the Federal Government can not go against it because the Federal Government has only enumerated powers. But Grant himself did not draw that conclusion, but rather wrote that since the idea of succession was not stated in the Constitution, therefore the country founded on the Constitution has the right of self-defense. What I think this brings forth is the question of how different politics is different from civil law between individuals. In mean in individuals, what I written in a contract is exactly what I there, nothing more or less—unless things are unclear. And if that would be applied to the Constitution then this issue is not ambiguous, it clearly stated that the government has only enumerated powers. How however politics in terms of nation states is different from civil law between individuals. How much so and why is unclear to me. In the tradition of England [upon which the American concept of government is based] a written document of the government is absolutely binding. But if you look at countries like the ussr, contracts are approximate indication of intention, but what matters is the individuals in power.

Rav shach does not usually state a halacha, but in his pamphlet of keeping damages away, he does actually bring the idea that most first authorities hold with the law of Tophot on page 22 of Bava Batra that the kind of damages that are brought in chapter 2 of Bava Batra are only considered to cause damage if on the other side of the border, there is already placed there something that could cause damage. And also, that if that is the case (that one has placed there something that can cause damage), then it can stay there even after the other person has placed his object there. And example would be like a tub used to soak linen that can cause vegetables on the other side of the border to absorb the noxious fumes. so, if that tub was already there, then even if the neighbor plants vegetables on the other side of the border, the tub can stay there [within three handbreaths of the border].

za66 C Minor Midi File za66 nwc

I have been thinking about politics and it occurred to me that it is a significant subject that deserves study. One thing I learned when very young is the approach taken by the hard sciences that even if one has the most logical consistent system, and most developed with rigor and painstaking logic, if that theory predictes a result that turns but to be false, then that theory is wrong. And this fact is what always seemed to me to be wrong with communism. It is a powerful logical system based on great thinkers like Adam smith in economics [who came up with the Labor Theory of Value which is an essential building block of communism, and on Hegel. And like any respectable scientific theory, it makes specific predictions. The problem is all its predictions turned out to be false. And this was obvious even to Lenin himself when he established the first communist state, and therefore tried to patch up the system by claiming certain outside forces were propping up Capitalism. But even since then, there has never been a communist state with prosperity as claimed in the communist manifesto. But if you try to find logical rigor in capitalism, you will have a hard time trying. The kind of system that results in prosperity and human flourishing wherever it is tried is based on the Constitution of the USA and the Bill of Rights. And these were not created by any kind of abstract theory, but came about as a result of a cruel King, John I who was so overbearing that the lords of the land decided to force him to sign a document—the Magna Carta. And later, a religious crusader (Simon DE Monfort) forced a king to sign an even more extensive document, the Provisions of Oxford. And the English system as developed was taken over almost in its entirety by the American Colonies who kept the system. The idea of the America Revolution was in order to keep on living under the same kind of system that they had been already. The objection to England was that the Parliament was treating the colonies not as Englishmen with the same rights as all other Englishmen. The reason that "Reason" fails that the important task of figuring out a decent system of government is that there is a limit to pure reason, and that when it attempts to go beyond its limits, it begins to come up with aburdities.

za65 B Minor in midiza65 nwc format

I want to mention that my learning partner, David Bronson would not have left that 2nd Tosphot on page 18B of Bava Batra unless he understood it fully. And yet I tend to go along with the approach of Rav Nachman of Breslov in learning “to say the words in order and then to go on” in learning Torah and Math and Physics. (And then later to review and Izhak Rosten once told me. I.e. even with this approach of “just saying the words”, it Is very important to later to do review until you get the idea thoroughly) .. That was definitely not the approach of David Bronson. However, it could be that if I can try understand the great Rav Shach and Reb Aaron Kotler on this subject, perhaps I can answer that later question I was asking on that Tosphot, (i.e., “why he changes the original assumption) .Obviously Tosphot himself was worried about this difficulty and tried to answer it, but I still cannot see how their answer helps. It possible that because of this problem that Tosphot himself in the third Tosphot on that page decided to start looking at the approach of Rabbainu Tam and Rabbainu Chanaanel. {I think at least for me, I will not be able to understand rabbainu Tamuntil I get that second Tosphot approach of Rabbainu Izhak}

za64 F minor midi ditto in nwc format

יש משהוא קשה בתוספות השנייה בבבא בתרא י''ח ע''ב. רבינו יצחק אומר שהשאלה המקורית על רבא מר' יוסי היא שהדבורים גם מזיקים ושרבא חייב להגיד את דינו גם אליבא דר' יוסי. ולכן הגמרא שואלת "היכי משכחת לה?" (איך אנחנו מוציאים את זה?) איך אנחנו מוציאים דבורים ליד הגבול לכתחילה באופן שבעלים של החרדל יכולים לומר לו "מאחר שהדבורים שלך שם (אף על פי שהם גורמים היזק), לכן גם אני אשים את החרדל שלי שמה, אע"ג שגם הם גורמים היזק." זה אי אפשר לדעת רבא האומר שכל דבר שיכול להזיק צריך להרחיק מו המיצר שלשה טפחים. אז רב פפא מתרץ, "זה מצב של לוקח." זאת אומרת לפי רבינו וצחק שהחרדל הוא ליד הגבול, ושהיה שם אפילו קודם שצד השני של החצר נמכר לשכנו. ועכשיו בעלים של החרדל אומרים לבעלים של שדבורים להרחיק את הדבורים שלו שישה טפחים מן הגבול. זה טוב לרבא שהחרדל ליד הגבול בגלל המכירה של צד השני, ורבא בעצמו מדבר במצב אחר שלא הייתה מכירה ויש רק שני שכנים בחצר שיש קו מפריד וכל אחד צריך להרחיק את ההזיק שלו שלשה טפחים מן המצר. מה שקשה בשבילי להבין הוא שרבינו יצחק משנה את המצב של השאלה להיות שהדבורים ליד הגבול למצב של התירוץ שהחרדל ליד הגבול. למה לא להגיד שזה מצב של לוקח והחרדל ליד הגבול והבעלים של החרדל אומר "הרחק את הדבורים שלך שלשה טפחים מן המצר וגם אני אשים את החרדל שלשה טפחים מן המצר." אני חושב שהתשובה לשאלה זו עשויה להיות כזו: השאלה הבאה של הגמרא היא "אם מדובר בקונה, אז מדוע חולקים החכמים? עכשיו אם גם הדבורים עושות נזק, אז פשוט שחכמים יאמרו ברגע שהדבורים כבר שם, אז יש להרחיק את החרדל (שתיהן גורמות נזק זו לזו). רק עכשיו השתנתה ההנחה המקורית, והדבורים אינן נחשבות כגורמות נזק לפי החכמים, ולכן יש להרחיק את החרדל מהן ששה טפחים מאידך, אולי יתכן שהחכמים יאמרו לבעל החרדל להרחיק את החרדל מהדבורים כיון שהדבורים היו שם קודם והן בגבול כי החצר נמכרה לחצי. אז שוב, אני שואל למה זה כל כך פשוט שחכמים לא יאמרו לבעל החרדל להרחיק אותו גם במקרה זה. ולכן אני שואל שוב מדוע תוספות משנים את ההנחה מדבורים על הגבול לחרדל על הגבול מאוחר יותר ראיתי שתוספות שואלים את השאלה הזו בדיוק. למה לא להשאיר את הכל בהנחה המקורית ("הוה אמינא'") במקומו ופשוט לשנות למקרה של לוקח? תוספות עונה שאם הדבורים היו שם בגבול ברשות, אז ר' יוסי לא היה מאפשר החרדל להתקרב. אבל על התשובה הזו, יש לי שאלה. אם תוספות אומר ששניהם צריכים להיות שלושה טפחים מהגבול, אז זה בדיוק מה שרבא אומר (שכל אחד צריך להתרחק מהגבול שלוש טפחים) ותשובת הלוקח בסדר, ואין סיבה לשנות את ה"הוה אמינא". אבל אם תוספות אומר שר' יוסי לא היה אומר שהחרדל יהיה בדיוק ליד לגבול, אז תוספות חוזרת למשנה שאמרה "ר' יוסי מתיר את זה" (הכוונה היא להיות ליד הגבול, אבל שאלת הגמרא הגיעה מהברייתא שלא אמר "ר' יוסי מרשה את זה", אלא "ר' יוסי אמר שבעל החרדל יכול להגיד לבעל הדבורים להרחיק אותן." זה מכוון להיות שלושה טפחים מהגבול. יש כאן גם שאלה קטנה, שהסיבה העיקרית לשנות את ההנחה המקורית הוא בגלל התנא קמא (בשאלה הבאה) שקובעים שהדבורים לא גורמות נזק. אבל זה דילוג קדימה בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי מה מתכוון רבינו יצחק. תשובת רב פפא היא שר' יוסי הוא מקרה של לוקח והחרדל צמוד לגבול, ולמרות שרבינו יצחק משנה את ההנחה המקורית של התנא קמא, גם כך בגישה זו של רב פפא, ר' יוסי סבור שהדבורים גורמות נזק מסוים ולכן על הדבורים להתרחק מהגבול שלושה טפחים. הוא לא אומר שצריך להרחיק כל אחד, גם חרדל וגם דבורים, שלושה טפחים (המרחק יהיה שישה טפחים), אלא רק הדבורים. הסיבה היא שלמעשה אנו שומרים על ההנחה המקורית ש"כל הקודם זוכה". שמכיוון שהחרדל היה שם קודם, הוא יכול להישאר שם. השאלה השנייה של תוספות היא אם אנחנו כבר משנים את ההנחה המקורית שהדבורים עושות נזק לזה את ההנחה שהן לא גורמות נזק, אז למה אנחנו צריכים את התשובה של קונה? זה אומר שתוספות אומר שהחכמים משנים את ההנחה המקורית שלהם, אבל ר' יוסי ישמור על שלו. אז עכשיו אנחנו יכולים לענות על השאלה איך אנחנו מוצאים מצב כזה שבו הדבורים נמצאות ליד הגבול? התשובה היא שאנו מוצאים לפי החכמים שבעל הדבורים שם אותן שם כי הן לא גורמות נזק, ואז ר' יוסי מתנגד שצריך לקחת אותן. ואז תוספות עונה שאם זה היה המצב, אז ר' יוסי לא היה נותן שהחרדל יהיה ליד הגבול. זאת אומרת שאף על פי שהשאלה מתחילה בברייתא, עדיין תוספות מחזיקים שאין הבדל בין המשנה לברייתא. בשניהם, ר' יוסי מחזיק את החרדל יכול להיות ליד הגבול ושהוא יכול להגיד לבעל הדבורים להרחיק אותן בדרך חזרה מהים עלה בדעתי לשאול על השאלה והתשובה המקורית של תוספות. אנחנו משנים את המצב לזה שהחרדל צמוד לגבול ותוספות שואלים למה לא לשמור על ההנחה המקורית שהדבורים צמודות לגבול ושהן גורמות נזק ולמרות זאת מאחר ומדובר במכירה, החרדל יכול להיות גם ליד הגבול? תוספות עונה שר' יוסי לא היה אומר במקרה כזה שהחרדל יכול להיות גם בגבול. תהיתי למה לא? אם מדובר במכירה למה החרדל צריך להיות רחוק? למה לא להגיד שמכיוון שמדובר במכירה אז החרדל יכול להיות גם ליד הגבול? התשובה שלדעתי היא שההרשאה שאנו מקבלים ממכירה היא שלפיכך אנו יכולים למצוא משהו שגורם נזק ליד הגבול, אבל זה לא מכוון שלכן דבר שגורם נזק יכול לשים ליד חפץ שהוא בצד השני של הגבול -ברגע שחפץ הזה כבר נמצא שם

The second Tosphot (R. Izhak) in Bava Batra page 18b

The second Tosphot (R. Izhak) in Bava Batra page 18b says that the original question on Rava from R. Yose holds that the bees also cause damage, and hold that Rava has to say his law also according to R. Yose. so, the gemara asks, "How can we find bees next to the border in the first place in such a way that the owner of the mustard can tell him 'since your bees are next to the border even though they cause damage, I will also put my mustard there even though they also cause damage.'" This cannot be according to Rava who says anything that causes damage has to be three handbreadths away from the border. Then Rav Papa answers, "It is a case of a buyer." That means (to Rabainu Izhak) that the mustard is next to the border and it was there when the other side of the property was sold, and now the owner of the mustard is telling the owner of the bees to go 6 handbreadths away from the border. This is now good to Rava that the mustard is next to the border because of the sale of the property on the other side, but Rava himself is talking about a case where there was no sale and there are just two people in a courtyard that has a division line and each one has to be three handbreadths away from the border. What is unclear to me is why Rabbainu Izhak changes the arrangement from the bees being next to the border to the mustard being there. Why not say that it is a case of a sale, and the owner of the mustard says, "Put your bees three cubits from the border, and I will put my mustard three cubits from the border." I think the maharam from lublin explains this in his clear explanation of this tophot, however i have not yet been able to understand him. i hope to get to the litvak beit midrash where there is a Bava Batra and Reb Aaron Kotler' ''Chidushei Reb Aaron'' to help me understand this Rabbainu Izhak [who is in fact explaining the approach of his grandfather, Rashi, who is short in his explanation of this subject.] I might mention here that Reb Aaron Kotler actually says that Rashi and Ri Migash are almost, but not quite identical in this approach. That being the case, this means that this approach of Rabbanu Izhak in our Tosphot is very close to the actual halacha in the shulchan aruch of rabbainu Yosef Karo who follows the Rambam who follows his rav, the Ri Migash. I think the answer to this question might be this: the next question of the gemara is, “If it is a case of a buyer, then why do the sages disagree? Now if the bees also do damage, then it is simple that the sages would say once the bees are there already, then the mustard must be kept away (they both cause damage to each other). Only now the original assumption has changed, and the bees are not considered to cause damage according the sages, and so it makes sense that the mustard should be kept away from them 6 handbreaths On the other hand, it is perhaps possible that the sages might say to the owner of the mustard to keep the mustard away from the bees since the bees were there first and are at the border because the yard was sold at the diving line. so again, I ask, why is it so simple that the sages might not say to the owner of the mustard to keep it away even in this case? And so, I ask again why does Tosphot change the arraignment? Later I saw that Tosphot asks this exact question. Why not leave everything in the original assumption ("hava amina'”) in its place, and just change to a case of a sale [buyer]? He answers that if the bees were there at the border by permission, then R Yose would not have allowed the mustard to come close. But on this answer, I have a question. If Tosphot means that R. Yose would have said that both need to be three handbreadths from the border, but then that is exactly what Rava says (that each one should move away from the border three handbreadths) and the answer of the buyer is fine, and there is no reason to change the "hava amina". But if Tosphot means that R. Yose would not have said the mustard would be right next to the border, then Tosphot is going back to the Mishna that said “R. Yose allows it” (meaning to be next to the border). But the question of the Gemara came from the braita that did not say, “R. Yose allows it”, but rather R Yose said that the owner of the mustard can tell the owner of the bees to move them away. There is also a slight question on Tosphot here that the main reason to change the original assumption is because of the sages that change in the next question to hold that the bees do no damage. But that is kipping ahead. _________________________________________________________________________________________ (Later I saw that תוספות asks this exact question. Why not leave everything in the original assumption ("הוה אמינא'”) in its place and just change to a case of a לוקח? He answers that if the bees were there at the border by permission, then ר' יוסי would not have allowed the mustard to come close. But on this answer, I have a question. If תוספות means that ר' יוסי would have said that both need to be three טפחים from the border, but then that is exactly what Rava says (that each one should move away from the border three טפחים) and the answer of the buyer is fine, and there is no reason to change the "הוה אמינא". But if תוספות means that ר' יוסי would not have said the mustard would be exactly next to the border, then תוספות is going back to the משנה that said “R. Yose allows it” (meaning to be next to the border). But the question of theגמרא came from the ברייתאthat did not say, “R. Yose allows it”, but rather R Yose said that the owner of the mustard can tell the owner of the bees to move them away. That can mean three .טפחים There is also a slight question on תוספות here that the main reason to change the original assumption is because of the תנא קמא that change in the next question to hold that the bees do no damage. But that is skipping ahead.) On the way back from the sea, it occurred to me what Rabbainu Izhak means. The answer of Rav Papa is that R Yose is a case of a buyer and the mustard is next to the border, and even though rabbainu izhak is changing the original assumption of the sages, even so in this approach of Rav Papa, R. Yose holds that the bees do some damage and so the bees should kept away from the border three handbreadths. He is not saying that each one, both mustard and bees should be kept three handbreadths away (the distance would be six handbreadths). Rather only the bees. The reason is that in fact we are keeping with the original assumption that “first come first served.” That since the mustard was there first, it can stay there. The second question of tosphot is if we are already changing the original assumption that the bees do damage to that the assumption that they do no damage, then why do we need the answer of a buyer? That means that Tosphot is saying the sages are changing their original assumption, but that R. Yose keeps his. so now we can answer the question how do we find such a situation where the bees are next to the border? The answer is we find it according to the sages that the owner of the bees put them there because they do no damage, and then R Yose objects that they ought to be taken away. Then tosphot anwers that if this was the case then R Yose would not have allowed the mustard to be next to the border. That means that even though the question begins with the braita, still Tosphot holds there is no difference between the mishna and the braita, R Yose holds the mustard can be nest to the border and that he can tell the owner of the bees to take them away (the second question of תוספות is if we are already changing the original assumption that the bees do damage to that the assumption that they do no damage, then why do we need the answer of a buyer? That means that תוספות is saying the חכמים are changing their original assumption but that ר' יוסי keep his. so now we can answer the question how do we find such a situation where the bees are next to the border? the answer is we find it according to the חכמים that the owner of the bees put them there because they do no damage, and then ר' יוסי objects that they ought to be taken away. Then תוספות answers that if this was the case then ר' יוסי would not have allowed the mustard to be next to the border. That means that even though the question begins with the ברייתא, still תוספות holds there is no difference between the משנה and the ברייתא. In both, ר' יוסי holds the mustard can be nest to the border and that he can tell the owner of the bees to take them away ) On the way back from the sea it occurred to me to ask about the original question and answer of Tosphot. We change the situation to that the mustard is next to the border and Tophot asks why not keep the original assumption that the bees are next to the border and that they cause damage and even so since it is a case of a sale, the mustard can be also next to the border? Tophot answers that R Yose would not have said in that case that the mustard can be also at the border. I wondered why not? If it is a case of a sale why should the mustard have to be far away? Why not say that since it is a case of a sale, then the mustard can also be next to the border? The answer I think is that the permission we get from a sale is that therefore we can find something that causes damage next to the border, but it does not imply that therefore some that causes damage can but put next to an object on the other side of the border once that object is already there.

I have been looking at the subject of the mustard and the bees in Bava Batra 18b. My learning partner David Bronson would have spent at least a month on each Tosphot there. But I see there are a few other approaches that make the subject to require at least a year. R. Akiva Eiger, Rav shach and Reb Aaron Kotler each have a whole booklet on the subject because of the difficulty in the subject. See also Rav sharira Gaon. And the RiMigash

I have been looking some interesting writing of Rav Jacob Emden. It is true that he allows a girlfriend type of relationship but not exactly in the way you might think, Rather the idea is that he comes and lives with her man in his home. It is not to be casual. [see Chronicles I chapter 2 verses from 45 46 and onward. He thinks that there is good reason for a zava to need to be tovel in a natural spring as Rashi and some geonim say. I might mention that this is not stated in Leviticus. In Leviticus a natural spring is only mentioned with a zav. However there is a hekish between zav and zava in the Gemara that would seem to mean that a zava needs a natural spring. If you count like the Rambam all women will be zavot. [No one sees blood exactly from day 19 to 25 every single month. But if you count like the Ramban, almost no women will ever be zavot. They do not usually see seven days and then again three more ] And where could you find a natural spring anyway? The sea does not count as a natural spring

Rasputin has gotten a terrible reputation for no reason. When nothing else could cure the son of the tzar, Rasputin did help. He rightly told the tzar not to get involved in WWI and not persecute the Jews. [The pogroms had started long before Nichols II.] And it was true what he told the tzar what if his death would be by him or anyone in extended family, that the tzar himself and his family would not survive after that more than one year

za63 midi B flat majorditto in nwc format

za61 F Major midi za61 nwc

I would like to suggest that the first mishna in Bava Batra is like sumchos and that this is in fact what the Gemara itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? And the Gemara answers "It is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them." That means: I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof, so now the mishna comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. I might mention that to have a stam mishna like sumchos is not unusual like the mishna in bava kama about an ox that gores a cow and the mishna in Bava Mezia page 100, and others that I do not recall this minute I might mention here that the tosphot understands the question of the gemara to be like sumchos, but say that the sages would agree to his approach here where no one has any more claim than the other and that it is a case of "he grabbed it after the doubt had arisen" in which case the sages would agree with sumchos". But then I think tosphot must mean that obviously the answer of the gemara is going like sumchos. Then Tosphot finds a way that the answer of the gemara would go also with the sages. and thus, they explain that when the gemara says the wall fell into the yard of just one of them, it means it stayed there for a long time. and thus, the one in whose domain it is has a migo, he could have said I bought it and he would be believed since it was so long in his domain and therefore both sumchos and the sages would say it would belong to that one except for the fact that both are required to build the wall and so the migo disappears and the wall is divided equally between them. Tosphot also mentions that Rashi holds a similar view that the question of the Gemara is like sumchos. However, Rashi is still different from Tosphot. Tosphot holds sumchus would say to divide because it is a case of deraraa demomona. But Rashi says they divide because the courtyard belongs to both of them, and so it is like the case in the beginning of Bava Metzia where both are holding onto the object. And this approach of Rashi explains the Rambam who says in the case that the wall falls they divide equally. The reason is since the place belongs to both of them, therefore they divide the stones equally. () And this is like the Gemara in Bava Batra page 3 that says the case of the Mishna Is a courtyard that is too small to divide. In this Rashi it Is clear that even though they built the wall but that does not mean they divided ownership the courtyard. They both still own it jointly and so if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. This however is only to Rashi and the Rambam. To Tosphot, they divide equally even if they divided ownership of the courtyard Now that we see the mishna is like sumchos , one can ask "Then why is it they divide only because of 'therefore'?" (The mishna says they build the wall whether because they have to or because they agree to do so) therefore if the wall falls the stones are divided equally between them. It is possible to answer this thus. If they would not have to build the wall jointly, there would be no doubt to the court whose property the wall is. The court could assume just one built it on his own. Therefore, it would not be derara demomona and sumhos says to divide only in a case of derara demomona _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ I would like to suggest that the first משנה in בבא בתרא is like סומכוס and that this is in fact what the גמרא itself suggests when it asks if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. Is not that obvious? and the גמרא answers it is coming to tell us that this is the law even when the stones fall into the side of the courtyard of just one of them. That means I might have thought the law is like the wise men that he who takes out of the domain of his friend has to bring proof. so now the משנה comes to tell us money that is in doubt they divide. I might mention that to have a סתם משנה like סומכוס is not unusual like the משנה in בבא קמא מ''ו ע''א about an ox that gores a cow and the משנה in בבא מציעא page ק', and others that I do not recall this minute I might mention here that the תוספותunderstands the question of the גמרא to be like סומכוס, but say that the חכמים would agree to his approach here where no one has any more claim than the other and that it is a case of "תפיסה אחר שנולד הספק" in which case the חכמים would agree with סומכוס ". But then I think תוספות must mean that obviously the answer of the גמרא is going like סומכוס. Then תוספות finds a way that the answer of the גמרא would go also with the חכמים. and thus, they explain that when the גמרא says the wall fell into the yard of just one of them, it means it stayed there for a long time. And thus, the one in whose domain it is has a מיגו, he could have said I bought it and he would be believed since it was so long in his domain. And therefore both סומכוס and the חכמים would say it would belong to that one except for the fact that both are required to build the wall and so the מיגו disappears and the wall is divided equally between them. ד תוספות also mentions that רש''י holds a similar view that the question of the גמרא is like סומכוס. However, רש''י is still different from תוספות. The reason is תוספות holds סומכוס would say to divide because it is a case of דררא דממונא. But רש''י says they divide because the courtyard belongs to both of them, and so it is like the case in the beginning of בבא מציעא where both are holding onto the object. And this approach of רש''י explains the רמב''ם who says in the case that the wall falls they divide equally. The reason is since the place belongs to both of them, therefore they divide the stones equally. And this is like the גמרא in בבא בתרא דף ג' ע''א that says the case of the משנה Is a courtyard that is too small to divide. In this רש''י it Is clear that even though they built the wall, but that does not mean they divided ownership the courtyard. They both still own it jointly, and so if the wall falls, they divide the stones equally. This however is only to רש''י and theרמב''ם . To תוספות, they divide equally even if they divided ownership of the courtyard.Now that we see the משנה is like סומכוס , one can ask "Then why is it they divide only because of 'therefore'?" (The משנה says they build the wall whether because they have to or because they agree to do so) therefore if the wall falls the stones are divided equally between them. It is possible to answer this thus. If they would not have to build the wall jointly, there would be no doubt to the court whose property the wall is. The court could assume just one built it on his own. Therefore, it would not be דררא דממונא and סומכוס says to divide only in a case of דררא דממונא ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ אני רוצה להציע שהמשנה הראשונה בבא בתרא היא כמו סומכוס וזה בעצם מה שהגמרא עצמה מציעה כשהיא שואלת אם החומה נופלת, מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. זה לא ברור מאליו? והגמרא עונה זה בא לומר לנו שזה הדין גם כשהאבנים נופלות לצד החצר של רק אחד מהם. כלומר אולי חשבת שהדין הוא כמו החכמים שמי שמוציא מתחום חברו צריך להביא הוכחה. אז עכשיו המשנה באה להגיד לנו כסף שיש בו ספק מחלקים. אני יכול להזכיר שיש סתם משניות כמו סומכוס. זה לא יוצא דופן כמו המשנה בבא קמא מ''ו ע''א על שור שנגח פרה והמשנה בבא מציעא עמוד ק'. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שהתוספות מבינים את שאלת הגמרא כמו סומכוס, אבל אומרים שהחכמים יסכימו לגישתו כאן במקום שאין לאף אחד טענה יותר מהשני ושמדובר ב"תפיסה אחר שנולד הספק". "במקרה זה החכמים יסכימו עם סומכוס". התשובה של הגמרא הייתה הולכת גם עם החכמים וכך, הם מסבירים שכאשר הגמרא אומר שהקיר נפל לחצר של רק אחד מהם, זה אומר שהוא נשאר שם זמן רב בתחום שלו הוא בעל מיגו, הוא היה יכול לומר שקניתי אותו והוא יאמין כי זה היה כל כך ארוך בתחום שלו ולכן גם סומכוס וגם החכמים היו אומרים שזה יהיה שייך לזה חוץ מהעובדה שנדרשים שניהם לבנות את החומה ולכן המיגו נעלם והקיר מתחלק שווה בשווה ביניהם. תוספות מזכירה גם שרש''י מחזיק בדעה דומה ששאלת הגמרא היא כמו סומכוס. אולם רש''י עדיין שונה מתוספות. הטעם שתוספות מחזיק הוא שסומכוס היה אומר לחלק כי מדובר בדרא דממונא. אבל רש''י אומר שהם מחלקים כי החצר שייכת לשניהם, וכך דומה הדבר בתחילת בבא מציעא ששניהם אוחזים בחפץ. וגישה זו של רש''י מסבירה את הרמב''ם שאומר במקרה שהכותל נופל מחלקים בשווה "הויאל שמקום הכותל משל שניהם". הסיבה היא בגלל שהמקום שייך לשניהם, ולכן הם מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. וזהו כגמרא בבא בתרא דף ג' ע''א שאומר המשנה היא בחצר קטנה מדי לחלוקה. ברש''י זה מכוון שאף שבנו את החומה, אבל אין זה אומר שחילקו בעלות בחצר. שניהם עדיין מחזיקים בו במשותף, ולכן אם החומה נופלת, הם מחלקים את האבנים שווה בשווה. אולם זה רק לרש''י ותרמב''ם. לתוספות מחלקים שווה גם אם חילקו בעלות החצר עכשיו כשאנחנו רואים שהמשנה הוא כמו סומכוס, אפשר לשאול "אז למה הם מתחלקים רק בגלל 'לכן'?" (המשנה אומר שהם בונים את החומה אם בגלל שהם חייבים או בגלל שהם מסכימים לעשות את זה) לכן אם החומה נופלת, האבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה. אפשר לענות על זה כך. אם לא יצטרכו לבנות את החומה במשותף, לא היה ספק לבית המשפט של מי החומה? בית המשפט יכול היה להניח שרק אחד בנה אותו בעצמו. ולכן לא יהיה דררא דממונא, וסומכוס אומר לחלק רק במקרה של דררא דממונא

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Tractate Bava Batra page 2A and page four

Rambam laws of Neighbors chapter 2 law 18, he says "since the place of the wall belongs to both, if the wall fell, the place and the stones belong to both." And in chapter 3 law 3 he says "If a neighbor surrounds another neighbor, and put puts up a fence around his property in such a way that the land of his neighbor is automatically also fenced in, then that other neighbor has to pay half the expense. However, this applies only if that fence is partly on the land of the other neighbor." You see the Rambam holds the possession of the land is what determines the ownership. The case of the first law is that if two people share a courtyard and put up a wall, if it falls, the stones are divided equally between them. What I am getting at here is this is surprising. The Gemara in Bava Batra has a few approaches to the Mishna about one neighbor that surrounds another. The question is "Who has to pay for the fence?," and "How much?," but the question of "On who's land is the fence?" is never mentioned in Bava Batra nor in Bava Kama page 20 {There is a book of lectures of Rav Nachum of the Mir and a book by Rav shach that try to understand what the approach of the Rambam is. The reason the Rambam requires the wall to be partially on the land of the surrounded neighbor is I think because he holds this law to be from the law of one who goes into his neighbor’s field and plants trees. This is how the Ramban and Tosphot bava kama page 58 hold If the wall would not be on the neighbor’s land, then this law would not be relevant at all. But even if it comes from that law in Bava Mezia, it would still be not exactly parallel, for to the Rambam holds (according to the Kesef Mishna laws of theft and loss chapter 10, law 5) the neighbor can say take your trees away and I will not pay for them. But here if the wall I already on his property we assume it was ok to him for the other neighbor to put it there. And therefore it I a case where it is okay to him and so he has to okay a full half. Like the case in bava mezia page 101 where he pays the full amount, [ If he really does not want the trees there but still is not willing to force the other to take them away, then he pays the least amount __________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י' , he says since the place of the wall belongs to both, if the wall fell, the place and the stones belong to both. And in פרק ג' הלכה ג'he says if a neighbor surrounds another neighbor and put puts up a fence around his property in such a way that the land of his neighbor is automatically also fenced in then that other neighbor צריך to pay half the expense. However, this applies only if that fence Is partly on the land of the other neighbor. You see the רמב''ם hold the possession of the land what determines the ownership. the case of the first law is that if two people share a courtyard and put up a wall, if it falls the stones are divided equally between them/ what I am getting at here is this is surprising. The גמרא in בבא שתרא has a few approaches to the משנה about one neighbor that surrounds another. The question is who has to pay for the fence, and how much, but the question of on who's land is the fence is never mentioned in בבא בתרא nor in בבא קמא The reason the רמב''ם requires the wall to be partially on the land of the surrounded neighbor (ניקף) is I think because he holds this law to be from the law of one who goes into his neighbor’s field and plants trees. This is how the רמב''ן and תוספות בבא קמא page נ''ח hold If the wall would not be on the neighbor’s land, then this law would not be relevant at all. But even if it comes from that law in בבא מציעא ק''א, it would still be not exactly parallel, for to the רמב''ם holds (according to the כסף משנה laws of גזילה and אבידה chapter י', law ה') holds the neighbor can say "Take your trees away and I will not pay for them." But here if the wall already on his property, we assume it was ok to him for the other neighbor to put it there. And therefore it is a case where it is okay to him and so he has to okay a full half. Like the case in בבא מציעא ק''א page 101 where he pays the full amount, [ If he really does not want the trees there but still is not willing to force the other to take them away, then he pays the least amount ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ רמב''ם הלכות שכנים פרק ב' הלכה י' , הוא אומר כיון שמקום החומה שייך לשניהם, אם נפל החומה, המקום והאבנים שייכים לשניהם. בפרק ג' הלכה ג' הוא אומר אם שכן מקיף שכן אחר ומציב גדר מסביב לקרקע שלו כך שגם הקרקע של שכנו מגודרת אוטומטית, אז השכן השני צריך לשלם חצי מההוצאה. עם זאת, זה חל רק אם גדר זו נמצאת בחלקה על הקרקע של השכן השני. אתה רואה שהרמב''ם מחזיק שחזקה בקרקע היא מה שקובעת את הבעלות. המקרה של החוק הראשון הוא שאם שני אנשים חולקים חצר ומעמידים חומה, אם היא נופלת, האבנים מחולקות ביניהם שווה בשווה מה שאני מתכוון כאן זה שזה מפתיע. בגמרא בבא בתרא יש כמה גישות למשנה לגבי שכן אחד שמקיף אחר. השאלה היא מי צריך לשלם על הגדר, וכמה, אבל השאלה על אדמת מי נמצאת הגדר לא מוזכרת בבא בתרא ולא בבא קמא הסיבה שהרמב''ם מחייב שהחומה תהיה בחלקה על אדמת השכן המוקף (ניקף) היא לדעתי משום שהוא מחזיק בדין זה מדין מי שנכנס לשדה של חברו ונוטע עצים. כך מחזיקים הרמב''ן ותוספות בבא קמא דף נ''ח. אם החומה לא תהיה על אדמת השכן, אזי דין זה לא היה רלוונטי כלל. אבל גם אם זה בא מהחוק הזה בבא מציעא ק''א, זה עדיין לא יהיה מקביל בדיוק, כי הרמב''ם מחזיק (לפי הכסף משנה גזלה ואבדה פרק י', חוק ה') יכול השכן לומר "קח את העצים שלך ואני לא אשלם עליהם". אבל כאן אם הקיר כבר על הנכס שלו, אנחנו מניחים שזה בסדר מבחינתו שהשכן השני שם אותו שם. ולכן זה מקרה שזה בסדר מבחינתו (ניחא ליה) ולכן הוא צריך לשלם חצי הסכום. כמו המקרה בבא מציעא ק''א עמוד ק''א שבו הוא משלם את מלוא הסכום, [אבל אם הוא באמת לא רוצה את העצים שם, אבל עדיין לא מוכן להכריח את השני לקחת אותם, אז הוא משלם את הסכום הכי נמוך.

za59 F Major midi za59 in nwc format

Bava Mezia page 2 side B. the last Tosphot on the page

Let me present the Gemara Bava Mezia page 2 side B and the last Tosphot on the page. Our mishna says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The gemara asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox, or not. The gemara asked, “Then perhaps our Mishna is not like sumchos, because our mishna says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox, sumchos says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is derara demomona (so they divide without an oath). {Derara demomona means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The gemara asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is derara demomona, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the mishna is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." Tosphot says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that sumchos says to divide without an oath is that is a case of derara demomona. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about rav Nahman said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, derara demomona only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of derara demomona, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to-do with derara demomona. The question I have here I that the gemara say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of derara demomona, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of derara demomona. We see the gemara wants to say that in our case, the lack of derara demomona means we should divide without an oath The gemara is not asking here that we should divide like the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of derara demomna is what the gerama says should cause dividing without an oath—not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of derara demomona should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this mut be the reason of Rabbainu Tam who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment. However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have till found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the gemara says there is a "all the more so from derara demmona to lack of derara demomona".This is different from the way rabbainu tam is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it i a different kind of case of holding the object It occurred to me that this must be the reason of rabbainu Tam to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their pleas instead of the other opinion of the Rashbaam and Rabbaainu Jona that it means relevance of money. For if there is no doubt to the court then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind of holding onto the object, then stll it would be sensible to have each take an oath and all the more so if each has no relavance to the object. so the Gemara wouldmaake sence in either way _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב and the last תוספות on the page. Our משנה says two people holding a garment divide with an oath. The גמרא asks from a case of an ox goring a cow, and its calf was found next to it, and we do not know of it gave premature birth because of the ox או not. The גמרא asked, “Then perhaps our משנה is not like סומבוס, because our משנה says to divide the value of the garment with an oath, while in case of the ox סומכוס says to divide without an oath.” Answer: the case of the goring ox is דררא דממונא (so they divide without an oath). { דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court even without their statments.} The גמרא asks “Is not this a case of “all the more so”? If they divide without an oath when there is דררא דממונא, all the more so when there is not? Answer: “The case of the משנה is that of an oath that was decreed by the scribes." תוספות says the reason for the case of two people holding a garment that they divide with an oath is because they are holding it. The case of an ox that gores a cow and its unborn calf was found next to it that סומכוס says to divide without an oath is that is a case of דררא דממונא. The case of a boat that two people are arguing about רב נחמן said "Who ever is stronger gets it," because there no one is holding onto the boat. That is to say, דררא דממונא only tells us to divide without an oath. If it is not a case of דררא דממונא, then the law depends on if the two people are holding onto the object or not, and it has nothing to do with דררא דממונא. The question I have here I that the גמרא say if they divide without an oath when it is a case of דררא דממונא, then all the more so they should divide without an oath when it is not a case of דררא דממונא. We see the גמרא wants to say that in our case, the lack of דררא דממונא means we should divide without an oath The גמרא is not asking here that we should divide ץlike the case of the goring ox because here in fact we do divide. The only difference is the oath. so the lack of דררא דממונא is what the גמרא says should cause dividing without an oath; not the fact that they are holding it. You might answer that lack of דררא דממונא should not be in itself a reason to divide. I think this be the reason of רבינו תם who says the reason for dividing is that they are holding the garment However, I believe that my learning partner david bronson would have found this answer to be unsatisfactory. The reason is that the גמרא says there is a "all the more so from דררא דממונא to lack of דררא דממונא ".This is different from the way ר''ת is learning that the reason you divide the garment is not an ‘’all the more so’’ kind of logic, but because it is a different kind of case of holding the object. Also if דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות then lack of דררא דממונא meaans there i a doubt only becaue of their טענות and so thee ought to be an a oath. It occurred to me that this must be the reason of רבינו תם to hold דררא דממונא means there is a doubt to the court without their טענות instead of the other opinion of the רשב''ם and רבינו יונה that it means שייכות of money. For if there is no doubt to the court, then there is no reason to make anyone take an oath. However, even if it would mean that each has a kind ofשייכות onto the object, then stll it would be sensible that neither takes an oath and all the more so if each has no שייכות to the object. so the גמרא would make sence in either way ______________________________________________________________________________________________ גמרא בבא מציעא דף ב' ע''ב ותוספות אחרון בדף. המשנה שלנו אומרת ששני אנשים אוחזים בבגד מתחלקים עם שבועה. שואלת הגמרא ממקרה של שור דופק פרה, ונמצא עוברה בסמוך לה, ואין אנו יודעים אם היא הולידה מוקדם בגלל השור או לא. שאלה הגמרא "אז אולי המשנה שלנו לא כמו סומבוס, כי המשנה שלנו אומרת לחלק את ערך הבגד בשבועה, ואילו במקרה של השור סומכוס אומר לחלק בלי שבועה". תשובה: המקרה של השור הוא דררא דממונא (ולכן מחלקים בלא שבועה). { דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק לבית הדין גם בלי הטענות שלהם.} הגמרא שואלת "האם אין זה "על אחת כמה וכמה"? אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשיש דררא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה כשאין? תשובה: המשנה היא מצב של שבועה שנגזרה על ידי הסופרים. תוספות אומר שהטעם למקרה של שני אנשים אוחזים בבגד שהם מחלקים בשבועה הוא בגלל שהם מחזיקים בו. פרשת שור שנגח פרה ונמצא סמוך לה העגל שטרם נולד ושסומכוס אומר לחלק בלא שבועה הוא בגלל הדין של דררא דממונא. במקרה של סירה ששני אנשים מתווכחים עליה רב נחמן אמר "מי שחזק מקבל אותה", כי שם אף אחד לא אוחז בסירה. כלומר דררא דממונא רק אומר לנו לחלק בלא שבועה. אם לא מדובר בדרא דממונא, הרי שהדין תלוי אם שני האנשים אוחזים בחפץ או לא, ואין לזה קשר לדררא דממונא. השאלה שיש לי כאן אני שהגמרא אומר אם יחלקו בלא שבועה כשמדובר בדרא דממונא, על אחת כמה וכמה שיחלקו בלא שבועה כשאין זה דררא דממונא. רואים שהגמרא רוצה לומר שבמקרה שלנו חסרון דררא דממונא אומר שצריך לחלק בלי שבועה. הגמרא לא שואל כאן שנחלק כמו במקרה של שור שנגח כי בעצם כן מחלקים. ההבדל היחיד הוא השבועה. ולכן חסרון דררא דממונא הוא מה שהגמרא אומר צריך לגרום לחלוקה בלא שבועה; לא העובדה שהם מחזיקים את הבגד אולי תשיב שחוסר דררא דממונא לא צריך להיות כשלעצמו סיבה לחלוקה. אני חושב שזו הסיבה של רבינו תם שאומר שהסיבה לחלוקה היא שהם מחזיקים את הבגד עם זאת, אני מאמין ששותפי ללמידה היה מוצא את התשובה הזו כלא מספקת. הסיבה היא שהגמרא אומרת שיש "על אחת כמה וכמה מדררא דממונא לחסרון דררא דממונא". זה שונה מהדרך שבה ר''ת לומד שהסיבה שמחלקים את הבגד אינה ''על אחת כמה וכמה" סוג של היגיון, אבל בגלל שזה סוג אחר של מקרה של החזקת האובייקט כמו כן אם דררא דממונא משמע שיש ספק לבית הדין בלא טענותיהם אזי חסר דררא דממונא הוא שיש ספק רק בגלל טענותיהם, ולכן צריך להיות שבועה עלה בדעתי שזו חייבת להיות הטעם של רבינו תם להחזיק דררא דממונא משמע יש ספק לבית הדין בלא מחלוקתם במקום דעתו האחרת של הרשב''ם ורבינו יונה שמשמעותה כמות גדולה של כסף. שהרי אם אין ספק לבית הדין, אז אין סיבה לגרום לאיש להישבע, עם זאת, אפילו אם זה אומר שלכל אחד יש סוג של שייכות על החפץ, אז עדיין יהיה הגיוני שאין צריכים להישבע שבועה, ועל אחת כמה וכמה אם לכל אחד אין זכות לחפץ. אז הגמרא יהיה הגיוני בכל דרך

za58 A minor in midi za58 in nwc format Music has been numbered from 1 to 100 in each series A to Z. Then started again from "za". However many files are missing or lost. Most were never put on line. There are however older files with names like black hole or anything I could think of at the time. There is a file by the name of mathematics and another by name "orchetra"--for that it was written for

misuse of a philosophy. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs

If every misuse of a philosophy can be attributed to that philosophy is doubtful. But there is a point to it when the empirical evidence is overwhelming. For Communism, Hegel was used by Marx to provide the intellectual backbone of communist economic theory, but if that misuse can be attributed to Hegel is doubtful. I rather would like to see that Kant saw an important limitation of reason. It cannot go into the dinge an sich. Things in themselves. That idea flows from John Locke who saw a difference between primary characteristics of things that belong to the things in themselves and secondary characteristics that in part come from the observer. Kant held that all characteristics in part come from the observer. Even essential things like color still need to be observed. Thus, if you disregard all secondary and primary characteristics, what is left?-The thing in itself. Rav Nahman also noticed the limit of even pure reason. However, Hegel did notice that reason progress. It is not stuck in what it used to know, but can even progress to what is not yet known. But that does not mean that there is always some limit. Just that the limit itself in not steady. It can go forwards or backwards. [My opinion is that philosophy would benefit with a return to Kant, Fries, Hegel, Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross ; and ignore all subsequent twentieth century pseudo philosophies.] There is an implied philosophy in Musar. In particular, the Chovot Levavot, however there is value in understanding metaphysics and physics in themselves as was the opinion of the Rambam. The Gra held slightly differently, and held that one need to learn the Organum of Aristotle (known by the name of the seven wisdoms). It is odd that this opinion of the Gra and Rambam are ignored. Proper use of philosophy is to use Reason to evaluate one's beliefs. To be clear, I prefer the distilled approach of Kelley Ross who combines Kant with Leonard Nelson and Schopenhauer. But, I still see great value in Hegel and a more modern great thinker, Michael Huemer of the Intuitionist approach. still I think the Kelley Ross approach is the best.{friesian.com.} Reichenbach had more sense than the Friesian school when it came to Relativity, so to be able to create a consistent system, the Friesian school did not have much to work with until Kelley Ross who managed to put together the various strands of thought into a consistent system. [However he is ignored in Germany, which is sad. For that approach needs modification.] Rav Nachman of Breslov dismissed learning philosophy completely, and there is a good point to that as we can see nowadays how crazy it can get. But still, I see great values in a few of them, e.g. the minor dialogoes of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Fries, Hegel,Leonard Nelson, Kelley Ross.