The Kant-Fries school is important because it shows and corrects many of the flaws in Neo-Kantian thinkers. A side benefit i that it shows a connection between faith and reason.

 I see in Germany there are large efforts to go mining and digging into Kant and some of his major commentators: Hermann Cohen [in Germany] Allison, Strawson, Sellars in the USA.

I asked Dr Kelley Ross  [of The Kant-Fries School ] and this was his answer:

I wrote: Let me  say she [Bauman] is saying that the categories of Kant are not a ''thing in itself''' but rather the structures that make thinking possible.

Dr Ross: "The categories do apply to things in themselves, but we don't know how.  Once they are "schematized" with space and time, they make phenomenal objects possible.  But then causality, in particular, can mean free will among things in themselves; but the evidence for that only comes with morality.""

I wrote : ""She [Charlotte Bauman] shows there is a difference between the early Hermann Cohen which was like this and the later Cohen that Nelson was disagreeing with."

KR: "As soon as Cohen rejects things in themselves, then really nothing is left of Kantian philosophy.  Whether that is "early" or "late" doesn't make much difference to me."

I wrote : "That is as well as I can understand her point of view right now. Why this is relevant to the Friesian school is that in this way the categories are not derived, but given and thus similar to non intuitive immediate knowledge."

Kelley Ross: "Kant thought that the categories are somehow derived directly from the forms of logic, which is what people call the "metaphysical deduction" of the First Critique.  This is nonsense.  His move is a leap of imagination, not inference, and his epistemology has nothing to explain it.  Before Fries, one could only appeal to Platonism for a more sensible explanation.

If the "early" Cohen was more like Kant, he is still stuck with Kant's problems and improbabilities.  I doubt that Bauman fixes that up. "

The Kant-Fries school is important because it shows and corrects many of the flaws in Neo-Kantian thinkers. A side benefit  i that it shows a connection between faith and reason.

One benefit about the combination of faith a reason is that one can have faith that is false. [just like when reason can be flawed.] When one combines faith reason it is more likely to hit the truth.

One can see what happens in Philosophy by means of the mathematical notion of flabby sheaves. There is loss of exactness in a case where one wants to go from a smaller domain into the whole space. There is then loss of exactness. And this is what happen in philosophy when  people do not look at the big picture-or refuse to acknowledge the role that faith plays in coming to truth. [This is hinted at in Torah:אנחנו מאלמים אלומים בשדה ] We were gathering sheaves in the field. For to correct the problem of loss of exactness one must go to the stalks that make the sheaves,--but you do not worry about gluing the stalks together.

 The new drone attack inside Russia is no surprise since Ukrainians freely went to work in Russia with no visa until this year. I knew Ukrainian people in Uman that  went to work in Russia. The border was open in both direction until recently..   I even knew of a sad case where someone  in Uman [Ukraine] was a travel agent and arranged trips for a large gathering and then simply took all the money and disappeared into Russia. Or so he thought, until some of the people he had cheated tracked him down. I forget how that ended, but for sure the cheater was not served tea and cookies  

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Gemara Nida2. The Mishna says a person went into a mikve [pool] and it was found lacking the full volume, all the pure things which were handled [based on the  assumption that that mikve was okay] are impure. R Shimon says in a private domain they are in doubt. In a public domain they are pure. The Gemara asks from this braita: ''a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for separating truma, and was found to be sour. For three days, the wine that was fixed is ok. After that it is a doubt.'' R Hanina from Sura says the teaching about barrel is R Shimon. And both learn from sota. What is the case with Sota? Even though she is in doubt, she is considered to be definitely not ok until she drinks. So all the pure things are impure. But then just like sota they should be considered pure in a public domain? No, because for in a public domain there is no privacy. That is why the sota is ok there. But for a mikve what difference is there in a public domain if it was found lacking? But even so since we learn from sota they should be pure in a public domain? No because here there are two status's  to make impure. R Shimon also learns from sota. Just like sota in a public domain is pure, so are the pure things. But then in a private domain they should be impure. No, because there  is valid suspicion on her in  private domain.

The question that Rav Shach asks here [in Laws of Truma 5:24 ] is that once you come on two status's, you do not need the answer of sota. Also, I ask that the Gemara asks on the first Tana that since we learn from sota, the law should be like sota  in all cases. I think they mean that if we learn by a Gezera shava. אין גזירה שווה לחצאים. So why do they not ask the same question on R Shimon? Since he learns from Sota. the law of the pure things should be like sota in all cases. And also, I would like to ask that if we are learning from a gezera shava or הקיש,  then what type of answer could it be that sotaa is different because of such and such a reason. Is that not the whole point of a gezera shava,- to put the law of one case into another case even though they are different?

Also I would like to ask that in any case, the teaching about the barrel is not like R Shimon. The braita says for three days it is ok, and after that a doubt. But if it would be R Shimon  it should be a doubt right away in a private domain and ok in a public domain.

[What I am getting at is that in fact Rav Shach is right that even though the gemara puts this together, it seems clear that these are two separate answers, ]

I know there i a lot here that might be unclear but I am really tired from being at the sea the whole day. But just tp help a little bit let me say:

A sota is a woman who was  warned by her husband not to be in a private place with a certain man, and she did so anyway. She is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the waters in the Temple--or she can refuse and admit her guilt, and is divorced.  

The "two status's" means the fellow that went into the mikva was impure, and the mikve is now not okay. That is two against one status that we know in the past it was ok That is sstatus of impure, plus status now against status of the past. You might have run into this subject in Ketuboth page 9

I might add that the  whole comparison of the barrel used for truma with sota or the mikve is difficult to understand. What we learn from sota is  a doubt about purity in a private domain is impure, and in a public domain it is pure. This does not seem to have any relation to separation of truma. Also the difference in  reasoning is hard to understand because  certainly R  Shimon agrees there is not privacy in a public domain. so why does he disagree with the firt tana [as the Gemara itself usually asks in similar type of arguments]. And certainly the first tana agrees that the  reason for suspicion in a private domain for the sota. And also, if that is the reason for suspicion in a private domain for the sota, perhaps any other case should be totally pure? Why does that reasoning only result in having the case of mikve just a doubt?   

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גמרא נידה ב ע''ב The משנה says a person went into a מקווה and it was found lacking the full volume all the טהרות which were handled based on the  assumption that that מקווה was okay are impure. ר' שמעון says in a רשות היחיד they are in doubt. In a רשות הרבים they are pure. The גמרא asks from this ברייתא a barrel of wine was separated in order to use it for תרומה and was found to be sour. For three days the תרומה is ok. After that it is a doubt. ר' חנינא from סורא says the teaching about barrel is ר' שמעון. And both learn from סוטה. What is the case with סוטה? Even though she is in doubt she is considered to be definitely not ok until she drinks. So all the טהרות are impure. But then just like סוטה they should be considered pure in a  רשות הרבים? No, because for in a רשות הרבים there is no privacy. That is why the סוטה is ok there. But for a מקווה what difference is there in a רשות הרבים if it was found lacking? But even so since we learn from סוטה they should be pure in a רשות הרבים? No because here there are two חזקות  to make impure. ר' שמעון also learn from סוטה. Just like סוטה in a רשות הרבים is pure So are the טהרות. But then in a  רשות היחיד they should be impure. No because there  is valid suspicion on her in  ברשות היחיד. The question that רב שך asks here is that once you come on two חזקות you do not need the answer of סוטה. Also I ask that the גמרא asks on the first תנא that since we learn from סוטה, The law should be like סוטה  in all cases. I think they mean that if we learn by a גזירה שווה ולכן אין גזירה שווה לחצאים. So why do they not ask the same question on ר' שמעון? Since he learns from סוטה. the law of the  טהרות should be like סוטה in all cases. And also I would like to ask that if we are learning from a גזירה שווה or הקיש  then what type of answer could it be that סוטה is different because of such and such a reason? Is that not the whole point of a גזירה שווה to put the law of one case into another case even though they are different?

Also I would like to ask that in any case, the teaching about the barrel is not like ר' שמעון. The ברייתא says for three days it is ok and after that a doubt. But if it would be ר' שמעון  it should be a doubt right away in a רשות היחיד and ok in a רשות הרבים.

I might add that the  whole comparison of the barrel used for truma with sota or the mikve is difficult to understand. What we learn from סוטה is  a doubt about טהרה in a private domain is טמא and in a רשות הרבים it is טהור. This does not seem to have any relation to separation of תרומה. Also the difference in  reasoning is hard to understand because  certainly ר' שמעון agrees there is not יחוד in a רשות הרבים so why does he disagree with the תנא קמא  as the גמרא itself usually asks in similar type of arguments. And certainly the תנא קמא  agrees that the is reason for suspicion in a רשות היחיד for the סוטה. And also if the is reason for suspicion in a  רשות היחיד for the סוטה perhaps any other case should be totally pure? Why does that reasoning only result in having the case of מקוה just a doubt.   

תוצאות התרגום

גמרא נידה ב' ע''ב המשנה אומרת שאדם נכנס למקווה ונמצא חסר נפח, כל הטהרות שטופלו על סמך ההנחה שהמקווה היה בסדר טמאות. ר' שמעון אומר ברשות היחיד הם בספק. ברשות הרבים הם טהורים. שואלת הגמרא מברייתא שזו שונה מחבית יין כדי להשתמש בה לתרומה ונמצאה חמוצה. במשך שלושה ימים התרומה בסדר. אחרי זה יש ספק. ר' חנינא מסורא אומר שההוראה על חבית היא ר' שמעון. ושניהם לומדים מסוטה. מה המקרה עם סוטה? למרות שהיא בספק היא נחשבת בהחלט לא בסדר עד שהיא שותה. אז כל הטהרות טמאות. אבל אז בדיוק כמו סוטה הם צריכים להיחשב טהורים ברשות הרבים? לא, כי ברשות הרבים אין פרטיות. לכן הסוטה בסדר שם. אבל בשביל מקווה מה הבדל יש ברשות הרבים אם נמצא חסר? אבל למרות זאת כיוון שאנו למדים מסוטה הם צריכים להיות טהורים ברשות הרבים? לא כי כאן יש שתי חזקות לעשות הטהרות טמאות. גם ר' שמעון לומד מסוטה. בדיוק כמו שסוטה ברשות הרבים היא טהורה כך גם הטהרות. אבל אז ברשות היחיד הם צריכים להיות טמאים ודאי. לא כי יש עליה חשד תקף ברשות היחיד. השאלה שרב שך שואל כאן היא שברגע שאתה בא על שתי חזקות אתה לא צריך את התשובה של סוטה. וכן אני שואל שהגמרא ששואלת על תנא הראשון שכיוון שאנו למדים מסוטה, הדין צריך להיות כמו סוטה בכל המקרים. (אני חושב שהם מתכוונים שאם נלמד על ידי גזירה שווה אין גזירה שווה לחצאים.) אז למה הם לא שואלים את אותה שאלה על ר' שמעון? מאז הוא לומד מסוטה. חוק הטהרות צריך להיות כמו סוטה בכל המקרים. וגם אני רוצה לשאול שאם אנחנו לומדים מגזירה שווה או הקיש אז איזה סוג תשובה יכול להיות שסוטה שונה בגלל סיבה כזו ואחרת? האם זה לא כל העניין של גזירה שווה להכניס את הדין של מקרה אחד לתיק אחר למרות שהם שונים? כמו כן ברצוני לשאול שבכל מקרה, ההוראה על החבית אינה כמו ר' שמעון. הברייתא אומרת שלשה ימים זה בסדר ואחרי זה ספק. אבל אם זה יהיה ר' שמעון זה צריך להיות ספק מיד ברשות היחיד ובסדר ברשות הרבים.

אני רוצה להוסיף שכל ההשוואה של החבית המשמשת לתרומה עם סוטה או המקווה קשה להבנה. מה שאנו למדים מסוטה הוא שספק לגבי טהרה בתחום הפרטי הוא טמא וברשות הרבים זה טהור. נראה שאין לזה קשר להפרשת תרומה. גם את ההבדל בנימוק קשה להבין כי בהחלט ר' שמעון מסכים שאין יחוד ברשות הרבים אז למה הוא חולק על התנא קמא כמו שהגמרא עצמו שואל בדרך כלל בסוג דומה של טיעונים. ובהחלט תנא קמא מסכים שיש סיבה לחשד ברשות היחיד לסוטה. לכן אם יש סיבה לחשד ברשות היחיד לסוטה אולי כל מקרה אחר צריך להיות טהור לחלוטין? מדוע ההיגיון הזה רק גורם לכך שהמקרה של מקוה הוא רק ספק

Ukraine is filled with these Soviet built apartment buildings.

 Ukrainian cities having to deal with winter now is a frightful thought. I was in one unheated place for winter there, but I had electricity, so I could sit by a small fan heater, and then later I could turn it off and crawl under a ton of blankets. But that was a ground wooden structure which naturally preserves heat]. But Ukraine is filled with these Soviet built apartment buildings. [The minority are Stalin built buildings which are easy to see since they have less stories than the larger Krutchev and Breshnev built buildings which are the very tall buildings that you see all over the place there.] These without heating in winter would be like walking into a freezer of a refrigerator.

I think it is time for a negotiated peace. 

The Soviets had built a sort of central heating system for whole cities. They wrote whole textbooks on the Physics of super heated water that had a totally different sort of nature than regular heated water. [I actually used to learn one of these textbooks as part of my Physics studies.] And this system was used to heat all these apartment buildings throughout whole cities. But the down side of this is it is easy to "take out/" 

My dad was a captain in the United States Air Force

Dec 7 Pearl Harbor. My dad was a captain in the United States Air Force and I recall seeing his uniform had lots of medals but he never told what sorts of operations they were for except one. That was the onehe got for setting up a   US  air force base in France where damaged planes could come in and get repaired in short order. Other than that he never talked about what other missions the other medals were for.

 After a day at the beach I am tired. But I would like to mention a important point. The Gemara in Nida pg 2b says if one goes into a natural body of water [like a mikve] and it was found lacking the proper volume is not clean. [R Shimon said the pure things made after that are in doubt if in a private domain and pure in a public domain.] The Gemara asks from the teaching about a barrel.  One puts aside a barrel of wine to use for truma and later was found to have soured. For the first three days the truma is truma. After that is a doubt. Rav Hanina from Sura said the teaching on the barrel is R. .Shimon.

The Gemara then explains why. While at the sea it occurred to me that even before the explanation of the gemara the teaching of R Shimon in the Mishna and the braita do not seem to correspond. Another point that Rav Shach brings is the explanation of the Gemara is a bit disjointed

The gemara says both the sages and R Shimon learn from sota, and in the middle of this explanation they insert that the sages are learning from two status's opposed to one, The man was not clean and the mikve is now not okay, while one status is that originally the mikve was ok,

This explanation has no need to learn from sota. 

Rav Shach thus say that these are two separate explanations and it was  Rav Hanina that said one [תרתי לרעיותא] while and according to that one, the barrel teaching is R Shimon. But to the explanation from sota the barrel can be also the sages, This answers why the Rambam decides the law like the sages and also barrel.  

So reason can help understand Torah, but not override it.

 What is authoritative? Sola Scriptura. So reason can help understand Torah but not override it. It is the major theme of the Middle Ages to find the right balance between Reason and Revelation. But when it come down to a direct conflict, the actual words of God in the Five Books of Moses and the Prophets must take precedent over the faulty and fallible reason of man. And what are prophets is not open. The word of God has not become irrelevant as time ha gone on. Nor have we advanced beyond God.

We need the Gemara to derive and understand the words of Torah, but not override them.

  

 There is the thesis anti thesis synthesis of Hegel which is one way to get to the truth of things. He gets it from Socrates [as Dr Kelley Ross pointed out] who for some reason was always able to ask the right question to get to the opposite principle than the one that was suggested.   In some of the shorter dialogs this gets to just that--contradiction. In some however progress is made.

And from what I saw in the Logic of the Encyclopedia this is the foundation of his whole system. But he also said there is not just one method of gaining ground in Philosophy. [That is why some have claimed he never had this method.]  

Mainly Hegel wants from this method to get to the conclusion that logic and reason permeates everything, There is no where beyond reason. --For in plain terms God made everything through his wisdom and reason. [That is not how Hegel would put it.] [Hegel also wants that reason can get to absolute truth by itself, not needing empirical evidence]

The reason I bring this up is that the only two areas I have done any study in science are math and physics and in fact progress is never made by the same method that the previous bit of progress was made.

Well obviously areas out from the possibility of experience [not possible experience]: areas that do not come under where when how why the categories. But the categories are not known by the categories- but they are known, Immediately after the Critique was published this was more or less along the lines of the original critics like Schultz.   So what Fries did was to postulate non immediate intuitive knowledge, Though Hegel and Fries were not saying the same thing, but I see this non intuitive knowledge as one more means of getting to the absolute truth in a different way than the dialectic. Just like Hegel had said: there is not just one way.

[fries disagreed  with kant on the transcendental deduction. fries felt that perception can not tell us anything about a priori principles.]  

I need to mention here that I totally agree with sola scriptura --only the word of God is the one true standard of truth and moral authority. I consider the validity of the Talmud to go only so far as to be an accurate understanding of how to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. And I think the Talmud hold the same view.

 I have noticed that when Christians defend their faith, they sometimes are unaware of the background that Jesus lived in. One instance is ''netilat yadaim'' [ washing before bread, or fruit that has been washed and is now wet, or before the three prayers]. It has nothing to do with coming from the market back home. The last two requirements are not generally observed except for before the morning  prayer. [There is however no good reason why these are not observed.] The first one has two reasons, one in Hulin chapter 8  מים ראשונים מצווה מים אמצעים רשות מים אחרונים חובה ("The first washing is a good deed, the middle washing is allowed, the last washing after the meal is an obligation."). Since it is clear the disciples were  not washing before bread, so it must be that Jesus held with this opinion: the first washing is a good deed,-not an obligation. 

Plus i should add here that just  because the religious fanatics (Pharisees) yelled at Jesus means nothing. Just as when religious fanatics yell at people nowadays it means nothing. They yell when they have no source in the Law  to defend their insane restrictions.  Have you ever been in Mea Shearim? Do you really think women have to walk on the opposite side of the street according to the Law? That is just the nature of religious fanatics- to make up their own restriction and yell at everyone else that is not following them. It has nothing to do with Torah.

סרך תרומה [[to cause priests to be used to washing for truma] is the other reason given for washing hands, That is the reason many consider it as an obligation. But if one holds the first reason from the Talmud in Hulin chapter 8, then it is only a good thing to do, not an obligation.  

Washing of cups however is different and that is in tractate Kelim. Some vessels [made from clay] can receive impurity from inside only. That is relevant to when the Temple was standing, but now with no temple, it make no difference.

See Mark 7 verse 1.

But Jesus also held with the authority of the scribes as in Mathew he said, "The Scribes and Pharisees sit in the seat of Moses, so all that they say to do that you must do.... " [but there are many hypocrites among them etc.]

I need to mention here that I totally agree with sola scriptura --only the word of God is the one true standard of truth and moral authority. I consider the validity of the Talmud to go only so far as to be an accurate understanding of how to fulfill the commandments of the Torah. And I think the Talmud holds the same view. I do not think the sages thought they could override the commandments except in time of emergency like Eliyahu on Mount Carmel where he brought sacrifices outside of the Temple. or in a case of, "Do not do" שב ואל תעשה for the sake of some other overriding reason. In any case, in Avot Derav Natan on Pirkei Avot we see this amora [Rav Natan] says on the Mishna openly that the decrees of the scribes can not override the Torah. This is however clear only in the correction of the Gra there on the girsa.[language.]

At any rate, see R Shimon ben Yochai in Bava Metzia 119 that we go by the reason for a verse, not the literal meaning. [so one can take a guarantee of a loan from a rich widow.]

As for ''it is a karban that which you derive benefit from me.'' can be said to anyone and is valid. If one say it to one' father, that is the complaint of Jesus. However it is Biblical. One can forbid one's property to another, That is from Parshat Nedarim [vows] in the Book of Numbers, and at any rate if you have to give money toyour parents, then the neder [vow] does not apply anyway. see. tractate nedarim   

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crisis of faith

 I was going through a crisis of faith for a few days about ten years ago. I had realized that there were problems in understanding Torah. In many places it seems wrong, And in other places, it seems immoral, In some places, I could find answers. For an exemplar: Noah's flood  can be explained by the Ari- Isaac Luria as referring to the female waters. But at some point, it seemed I was making too many excuses. Plus, my experience in the religious world left a lot to be desired. It seems the more religious people are, the less moral they are. But at that point, I discovered the web site of Kelley Ross which bring the view of Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson about non intuitive immediate knowledge which in many ways can be understood as faith or knowledge which is beyond reason. That is to say,  that reason has a limit. It can only tell us things within the area of possibility of experience. That was Kant's new idea, Kant  reasoned thus: that reason can only be sure of contradictions that arises from definitions and axioms. Experience or induction can only tell us things by induction . But Kant reasoned that there is knowledge beyond that, that is there is apriori knowledge.- knowledge that is beyond definition and experience  but even that has to be within the realm of possibility of possible experience. Fries saw the flaw in Kant that Kant had tried to mend by his Copernican revolution that knowledge can be known only by the categories of the mind. Fries saw that any knowledge to be true had to be based on knowing axioms which are not depended on the mind, but can be known by inner looking. introspection. I.E. Non intuitive immediate knowledge. Now Hegel saw the same flaw in Kant, and tried to answer this by his gothic structure of all reality, but this did not work for me since  Hegel held there is nothing beyond reason. But I felt that reason itself has to start from axioms which are not based on reason, but rather that all reason must start with axioms known beyond reason that reason can not prove.

My questions about the Torah and the religious world were deep. After all, Torah itself is monotheism and good midot character traits  But if the religious had neither, there were serious problem. But this went deeper since reason by itself when it goes into the realm beyond the possibility of experience comes up with self contradictions  and even makes self contradictions in people that attempt to go beyond the bound of experience. So the problem with the religious world seem a natural flow from the nature of their assuming they know that which they don't know. 

 Even though I agree with anyone who can put their trust in God and sit and learn Torah as is the basic approach of the Gra and the Litvak yeshivot which go by him, still I feel that a more balanced approach suits me in which I go by the medieval authorities like Ibn Pakuda that see learning Physics and Metaphysics as a part of learning Torah. But in order to fulfill this approach, I really can not be sitting in any yeshiva, and I have to do this on my own. [In any case, I was only really part of the Yeshiva world as long as I was socially acceptable .... a young  student right out of high school with rich parents. What is not to like? But after my wife left me, I was thought to be undesirable, and never found anywhere that would allow me to sit and learn Torah. So with little choice, I went to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. At least, they were looking at my grades and abilities, not my social status. At any rate, I learned from that experience that the religious world does keep some rituals, not the moral obligations of the Torah. 

 In Israel it looks like Degel HaTorah [which is the party of the Litvaks that go by the Gra] will be part of the new government. On one hand this makes me happy because I agree with those people who it and learn Torah for its own sake and believe they deserve support. [From what I understand the stipend for a person sitting in kollel and learning Torah was about $200 per month and now will go up to about $300 (1500 shekels)]. But I also feel a twitch of regret that I had tasted the joy of Torah and the light in the Litvak world but did not manage to stick it out, and went into the more secular way of doing Physics at Polytechnic of NYU. 

Is accepting a stipend for learning Torah Ok? I know it is not to the Rambam, but you can see in the responsa of the Geonim that the great yeshivot in Iraq [Babylon] did receive stipend from the community.

Even in the Gemara itself you see this in the page in Hulin right before Reshit Hagez where there was a sack of gold dinars placed at the steps of the yeshiva of Rav Ami and he grabbed it for the yeshiva. Also the story about two amoraim walking in some city  and one noticed the beautiful synagogue, and the other rebuked him saying, "Were there no students of the yeshivot to support that they spent the money on buildings?"

But I can see the point of the Rambam also when Torah becomes  a business it is a disaster.

So if possible I would suggest that the money for yeshivot ought to go only to the Litvaks who learn Torah for its own sake. I can not see how this could be implemented but that is what I think would be the bet policy.

a Levite who has his own produce

  There are lots of questions about a Levite who has his own produce [grain from his own field]. I mean to say that the regular way of taking tithes is one takes ''truma'' [1/50], then the first tithe [1/10] [maaser] and gives that to a Levite, Then the Levite takes a tenth and gives that to a priest. And even after that, there is maaser sheni [the second tithe], and takes that to Jerusalem and gives a basket of that to the Temple and the rest he eats himself with his family. But does a Levite also separate the first tithe of his own produce? And even though the normal order is that truma is first taken, what happens if it was not? Does the Levite take truma of what was given to him? Or even of his own produce? These are all questions that Rabbainu Shimshon [one of the first authors of Tosphot] and the Rambam deal with, but the Rambam's approach seems hard to understand.

I would like to bring the Mishna and Sifri Zuta and the R. Shimshon  and then the three places where the Rambam deals with these questions.

המשנה בתרומה פרק א' משנה ה

אין תורמים ממעשר ראשון שניטלה תרומתו

a person can not take truma from the first tithe from which it's truma was taken. 

 R. Shimshon (the Rash) brings on that mishna the Small Sirfi [Sifri Zuta] that says מנין לבן לוי שרצה לעשות ממעשר ראשון תרומה גדולה שעושה תלמוד לומר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' מכאן שאם רצה לעשותו תרומה לאחרים עושה יכול אף שניטלה תרומתו יהא עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים תלמוד לומר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשו בתוכו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשו בתוכו אינו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים 

"How do we know that a Levite that wants to take the great truma [large truma] from his first tithe that he can? the verse says '...for the tithe of the children of Israel, that which they lift up [bring] to the Lord.' [The word that the Torah uses there is they lift up which always refers to truma, not the tithe]] from here if one wants to make it truma for others he can. You might say even if it's truma was already taken one might make it truma for others [therefore] the verse says 'it's holiness in it' as long as it's holiness is in it one can make it truma for others- but when it's holiness is not in it one can not make it truma for others."

R. Shimshon explains the meaning of the mishna thus, if one has maaser rishon from which it's trumat maaer [tithe of the tithe] was taken but this first maaser was separated before the truma was taken, and thus i not obligated in truma, even so its tithe of the tithe was separated so it can not be made trumafor other grain. but as long as the tithe from the tithe was not yet taken, it can be made truma for other grain.

This is to be plain enough.

But the Rambam's approach is hard to understand.  he writes in laws of trumot 3 laws 21 and 22  בן לוי שהיה לו מע''ר שא ניטלה ממנו תרומתו והניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך הוא בטבלו מה שעשה עשוי שנאמר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' תרומה מלמד שהוא עושה את כולו תרומה לאחר 

הפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר תחלה ואחר כך הניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר ויתנו לכהן לר עשה כלום שנאמר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשיו בתוכו עושה אותו תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשיו בתוכו אינו עושה אותו תרומה לאחרים

This seems very different from R. Shimshon because of these words: עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר

This seems clearly as Rav Shach and the Chazon Ish explain that he mean he can make it trumat maaser for other grain, not truma.

 And this has to be the true explanation of the Rambam because later he writes that if one takes truma from maaser rishon from which the tithe of the tithe was not separated yet, his truma is not truma. I do not know how this could have been made more clear. [Clearly the Rambam did not have the same version of the Sifri as the Chazon Ish in fact deletes the word the "great" from "the great truma" ]

This is clear. [Up until here is all what Rav hach writes himelf. Now is my small addition] But the commentary of the Rambam on that Mishna in Trumot seems hard to understand

I was at the sea and thinking about that commentary of the Rambam, and I think he means this. if a levi has his own ground and grows grain on it, that grain is obligated in truma without a doubt and also in trumat maaser. Let us say someone gives to this Levi maasser rishon. He can not take truma  from the maaser rishon that was given to him for the sake of hiss own produce. He first gives the trumat maaser from what was given to him, and then takes truma and trumat maaser from his own produce [after he of course had called a name of maaer rishon on some part of his own produce.]  This is the language of the Rambam on that mihna, ואמרם ממעשר ראשון שלא ניטלה תרומתו כשיהיה לו ללוי זרע מאדמתו הוא חייב בתרומה בלי ספק וגם ישו מעשר שלקחו מישראל אין ראוי לו להוציא ממנו שיעור התרומה החייבת לזרעו ושיתננה לכהן לפי שיש לכהן באותו מעשר חוק וזכות והיא תרומת מעשר אבל יוציא תרומת מעשר ואחר כך יוציא ממנו התרומה החייבת לזרעו

There is a point here that the Rambam seems to make: that one can not take  truma from the maaer that was given him not just because it is not obligated in truma but also because it would lessen the amount of the trumat maaser and would be taking truma from what is actually obligated in trumat maaser 

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ש המון שאלות על לוי שיש לו תוצרת משלו [תבואה מהשדה שלו]. אני מתכוון לומר שהדרך הקבועה של נטילת מעשר היא שלוקח תרומה, ואז מעשר ראשון ונותן את זה ללוי, ואז הלוי לוקח עשירית ונותן לכהן. וגם אחר כך יש מעשר שני ולוקח את זה לירושלים ונותן סל מזה לבית המקדש ואת השאר הוא אוכל בעצמו עם משפחתו. אבל האם לוי מפריד גם את מעשר ראשון מתוצרתו? ולמרות שהסדר הרגיל הוא שלוקחים תרומה קודם, מה קורה אם לא? האם הלוי לוקח תרומה ממה שניתן לו? או אפילו מתוצרתו שלו? כל אלו שאלות שרבינו שמשון והרמב''ם עוסקים בהן. אני רוצה להביא את המשנה וספרי זוטא והר''ש ואחר כך את שלושת המקומות שבהם עוסק הרמב''ם בשאלות האלה.\המשנה בתרומות פרק א' משנה ה. אין תורמים ממעשר ראשון שניטלה תרומתו. הר''ש מביא על המשנה ההיא ואת ספרי זוטא שאומר מנין לבן לוי שרצה לעשות מעשר ראשון תרומה גדולה שעושה תלמוד לומר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' מכאן שאם רוצה לעשות תרומה עושה יכול אף  שניטלה תרומתו יהא עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים. תלמוד לומר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשו בתוכו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשו בתוכו אינו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים. ואז רבינו שמשון מסביר את משמעות המשנה כך, אם יש מעשר ראשון שממנו נלקחה תרומת מעשר אבל מעשר ראשון זה הופרד לפני שנלקחה התרומה מן התבואה, ולפיכך אינו חייב בתרומה, גם כך הופרדו התרומת מעשר שלו. אז לא ניתן לעשות את זה תרומה עבור דגנים אחרים. אבל כל עוד לא נלקחה התרומת מעשר, אפשר לעשותה תרומה לתבואה אחרת. זה כדי להיות ברור מספיק.אבל גישת הרמב''ם קשה להבנה. הוא כותב בהלכות תרומות פרק ג הלכה כ''א וכ''ב בן לוי שהיה לו מע''ר שלא ניטלה תרומתו והניחו בטבלו להיות מפריש עליו והולך   מה שעשה עשוי שנאמר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' תרומה. מלמד שהוא עושה את כלו תרומה לאחר. הפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר תחלה ואחר כך הניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר ויתנו לכהן לא עשה כלום שנאמר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקשיו בתוכו עושה אותו תרומה תרומה לאחרים אין קדשיו בתוכו אינו עושה אותו תרומה אחרים. זה נראה מאוד שונה מרבינו שמשון בגלל המילים האלה: עד שיעשה כלו תרומת מעשר. זה נראה בבירור כפי שרב שך והחזון איש מסבירים שהוא מתכוון שהוא יכול לעשות את זה תרומת מעשר לתבואה אחרת, לא תרומה. וזה צריך להיות ההסבר האמיתי של הרמב''ם כי אחר כך הוא כותב שאם לוקחים תרומה ממעשר ראשון שעדיין לא נפרדה ממנו התרומת מעשר, התרומה שלו אינה תרומה. אני לא יודע איך אפשר היה להבהיר את זה יותר. אבל פירוש הרמב''ם על אותה משנה בתרומות נראה קשה להבנה. אני חושב שהוא מתכוון לזה. אם יש ללוי קרקע משלו ומגדל עליה תבואה, התבואה ההיא חייבת בתרומה בלא ספק וכן בתרומת מעשר. בוא נגיד שמישהו נותן לו מעשר ראשון. הוא לא יכול לקחת תרומה מהמעשר ראשון שניתן לו למען תוצרתו שלו. תחילה הוא נותן את התרומת מעשר ממה שניתן לו, ואחר כך לוקח את תרומה ותרומת מעשר מהתוצרת שלו [אחרי שהוא כמובן קרא בשם מעשר ראשון על חלק מהתוצרת שלו.] זו השפה של רמב''ם על המשנה ההוא, ואמרם ממעשר ראשון שלא ניטלה תרומתו כשיהיה לו ללוי זרע מאדמתו הוא חייב בתרומה בלי ספק וגם כן יש לו מעשר שלקחו מישראל. אין ראוי לו להוציא ממנו שיעור התרומה החייבת לזרעו ושיתננה לכהן לפי שיש לכהן באותו מעשר חוק וזכותה תרומת מעשר. אבל יוציא תרומת מעשר ואחר כך יוציא ממנו התרומה חייבת לזרעו

יש כאן נקודה שנראה שהרמב''ם עושה: שאי אפשר לקחת תרומה מהמעשר שניתן לו לא רק משום שאינו חייב בתרומה אלא גם משום שהדבר יפחית את כמות התרומת מעשר. היה נוטל תרומה ממה שחייב בפועל בתרומת מעשר.

A Levite and the tithes. See the Sifri Zuta and the Mishna.

 There are lots of questions about a לוי who has his own produce [grain from his own field]. I mean to say that the regular way of taking מעשר is one takes תרומה , then the מעשר ראשון and gives that to a לוי, Then the לוי takes a tenth and gives that to a כהן. And even after that, there is מעשר שני  and takes that to Jerusalem and gives a basket of that to the בית המקדש and the rest he eats himself with his family. But does a לוי also separate the מעשר ראשון of his own produce? And even though the normal order is that תרומה is first taken, what happens if it was not? Does the לוי take רומה of what was given to him? Or even of his own produce? These are all questions that רבינו שמשון and the רמב''ם deal with.

I would like to bring the משנה and ספרי זוטא and the ר''ש  and then the three places where the רמב''ם deals with these questions.

המשנה בתרומות פרק א' משנה ה. אין תורמים ממעשר ראשון שניטלה תרומתו 

 הר''ש  brings on that משנה the ספרי זוטא that says מנין לבן לוי שרצה לעשות ממעשר ראשון תרומה גדולה שעושה תלמוד לומר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' מכאן שאם רצה לעשותו תרומה לאחרים עושה יכול אף שניטלה תרומתו יהא עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים תלמוד לומר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשו בתוכו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשו בתוכו אינו עושה אותן תרומה לאחרים.  Then רבינו שמשון explains the meaning of the משנה thus, If one has מעשר ראשון from which it's תרומת מעשר  was taken but this מעשר ראשון was separated before the תרומה was taken, and thus is not obligated in תרומה, even so its תרומת מעשר was separated so it can not be made תרומה for other grain. But as long as the תרומת מעשר was not yet taken, it can be made תרומה for other grain.

This is to be plain enough.

But the רמב''ם approach is hard to understand.  He writes in laws of תרומות פרק ג הלכה כ''א וכ''ב    בן לוי שהיה לו מע''ר שא ניטלה ממנו תרומתו והניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך הוא בטבלו מה שעשה עשוי שנאמר כי את מעשר בני ישראל אשר ירימו לה' תרומה מלמד שהוא עושה את כולו תרומה לאחר 

הפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר תחלה ואחר כך הניחו להיות מפריש עליו והולך עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר ויתנו לכהן לא עשה כלום שנאמר את מקדשו ממנו בזמן שקדשיו בתוכו עושה אותו תרומה לאחרים אין מקדשיו בתוכו אינו עושה אותו תרומה לאחרים. This seems very different from רבינו שמשון because of these words: עד שיעשה כולו תרומת מעשר.  This seems clearly as רב שך and the חזון איש explain that he means he can make it תרומת מעשר for other grain, not תרומה.

 And this has to be the true explanation of the רמב''ם because later he writes that if one takes תרומה from מעשר ראשון from which the תרומת מעשר was not separated yet, his תרומה is not truma. I do not know how this could have been made more clear. 

 But the commentary of the רמב''ם on that משנה in תרומות seems hard to understand

I think he means this. If a לוי has his own ground and grows grain on it, That grain is obligated in תרומה without a doubt and also in תרומת מעשר. Let us say someone gives to HIM  מעשר ראשון. He can not tak תרומה  from the מעשר ראשון that was given to him for the sake of his own produce. He first gives the תרומת מעשר from what was given to him, and then takes תרומה and תרומת מעשר from his own produce [after he of course had called a name of מעשר ראשוןon some part of his own produce.]  thiS iS the language of the רמב''ם on that משנה, ואמרם ממעשר ראשון שלא ניטלה תרומתו כשיהיה לו ללוי זרע מאדמתו הוא חייב בתרומה בלי ספק וגם ישו מעשר שלקחו מישראל אין ראוי לו להוציא ממנו שיעור התרומה החייבת לזרעו ושיתננה לכהן לפי שיש לכהן באותו מעשר חוק וזכות והיא תרומת מעשר אבל יוציא תרומת מעשר ואחר כך יוציא ממנו התרומה החייבת לזרעו

There is a point here that the רמב''ם seems to make: that one can not take תרומה from the מעשר that was given him, not just because it is not obligated in תרומה but also because it would lessen the amount of the תרומת מעשר, and would be taking תרומה from what is actually obligated in תרומת מעשר. 

 Benjamin was one of the twelve tribes of Israel and his portion was right next to Judah where is the city of Jerusalem. There is there today a lot of Jewish settlements, and collectivity the whole area is called ''Benjamin''  [very aptly named  I must say.]. Yesterday a Palestinian ran over a young woman soldier  in a parking lot there. The Palestinian had a working permit. [Israel hands out about 150,000 working permits every year to allow Palestians to come into Israel to work.] 

To me this juss]t go to show what Aristotle wrote 2300 years ago: "When two peoples  do not get along together there is no choice but to separate them.

The Riemann hypothesis

 The Riemann hypothesis [+1/(n^ s)as n goes to infinity ] has to do with if you have a function zeta of a prime number if the zeros of that function [besides negative 2.-4, -6 ...] all are on a vertical line x=1/2/ and that is all part of number theory. my question is how would that same question apply to prime ideals? prime ideals are groups, not numbers and their main trait is anything in     the larger group [that they are a part of] that is multiplied by that prime ideal stays inside it --and it is prime [no two smaller ideals multiplied together make it up] 

I mean to say that much has been done with prime ideals but has anyone thought to look at them from the aspect of Riemann? After all there is a lot in common with algebraic ideals and numbers. 

So maybe here too is  connection?[Maybe even some answer about the Riemann hypothesis?]

[To see the connection between the zeta function and algebraic groups let me just mention that the only way that you evaluate the Riemann function is by extending it into the imaginary plane by means of the "i" and the "i" acts like a unitary matrix that rotates the vector, but leaves it's length untouched.]   

[i would surprized if some mathematician had no thought of this since to me it seems so obvious. After all, a main idea of Riemann was to show the the zeta function with a complex "s" [i.e. + n^s as n goes to infinity] equals a product of primes. That is exactly the same construction you use for prime ideals.

Rambam In Laws of Truma chapter 1 halacha 11).

I was noticing in the Rambam that grain that grew in the possession of an idolater in Israel and was bought by a Israeli and it's finishing work was done in the hand of the Israeli is obligated in truma and tithe from the Torah. (In Laws of Truma chapter 1 halacha 11). And yet in chapter 1 halacha 22 grain that grew outside of Israel and was brought to Israel and it finishing work was done in the hand of a Israeli is obligated in truma and tithe only from the words of the scribes.

And Rav Haim of Brisk explains there that the reason is you need two things for grain to be obligated in truma and tithe, First, that when it grew to a third of its full growth (ripe stage), it was in the possession of a Israeli. Second,  it's finishing work was done by the hand of  Israeli. 

 I realize that this is in no contradiction to the first halacha since the law is that possession of a idolater does not cause the obligation of truma and maaser to disappear. [Otherwise you could  that when it grew in the possession of an idolater and only the finishing work was done in the possession of a Israeli then it should be obligated only from the word of the Scribe. ]

[the subject  that possession of a idolater does not cause the obligation of truma and maaser to disappear i brought in a few places but mainly I remember it from Bava Metzia.]

no one really care what I write o I think there i ni much of a point to clarify thing>still for anyone who i interested I will ay a few words. There is an argument in the Gemara i a idolater buys land in Israel if the produce is obligated in the presents to the priests and levites. that i how address the question on the above law that even if it grew in the possession of an idolater still if the finishing work was done by a Jew, the produce i obligated.

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I was noticing in the רמב''ם that grain that grew in the possession of anssss idolater in Israel and was bought by a Israeli and it מירוח was done in the hand of the Israeli is obligated in תרומה and מעשר from the תורה [דאורייתא]. (In הלכות תרומה פרק א'  הלכה י''א ). And yet in פרק א' הלכה כ''ב grain that grew outside of Israel and was brought to Israel and it's מירוח (smoothing of the stack of grain, it' finishing work) was done in the hand of a Israeli is obligated in תרומה and מעשר only from the words of the scribes [דרבנן].

And רב חיים מבריסק explains there that the reason is you need two things for grain to be obligated in תרומה and מעשר, First, that when it grew to a third of its full growth (ripe stage) it was in the possession of a Israeli. Second,  it's finishing work was done by the hand of  Israeli. 

 I realize that this is in no contradiction to the first halacha since the law is אין קניין לעכו''ם בישראל להפקיע מיי רומה ומעשר  [Otherwise you could  that when it grew in the possession of an idolater and only the finishing work was done in the possession of a Israeli, then it should be obligated only from the words of the Scribes. ]

שמתי לב ברמב''ם שתבואה שגדלה ברשותו של עובד אלילים בישראל ונקנה על ידי ישראלי והמירוח נעשה ביד הישראלי חייבת בתרומה ומעשר מהתורה [דאורייתא] . (בהלכות תרומה פרק א' הלכה י''א ). ובכל זאת בפרק א' הלכה כ''ב תבואה שגדלה מחוץ לישראל והובאה לישראל והמירוח (החלקת ערימת התבואה, זה עבודת גמר) נעשה ביד ישראלי חייבת בתרומה ומעשר רק מדברי סופרים [דרבנן]. ומבאר שם רב חיים מבריסק שהטעם הוא שצריך שני דברים כדי שתבואה תתחייב בתרומה ומעשר. ראשית, שכאשר גדלה לשליש מלוא גידולה (שלב בשל) הייתה ברשותו של ישראלי. שנית, עבודת הגמר שלה נעשתה ביד ישראלי. אני מבין שזה לא עומד בסתירה להלכה הראשונה שכן ההלכה היא אין קניין לעכו''ם בישראל להפקיע מידי תרומה ומעשר [אחרת אפשר לשאול שכאשר זה גדל ברשותו של עובד אלילים ורק עבודת הגמר נעשתה בהחזקה של ישראלי, אזי יש לחייבה רק מדברי הסופרים. ]

 People are not thinking of idolatry as a problem but to me it is the most serious problem. see Deuteronomy 17. But I suppose that if it is Jewish idolatry that makes it ok. so the cult that the Gra signed the letter of excommunication on is just a much idolatry as if they were worshipping some Hindu god.

the way of learning fast --amazing pieces of advice the Gemara is the way of learning fast [which is actually stated openly in the Gemara Shabat page 63. לעולם לגרס אנש אף על גב משכח ואף על גב דא ידע מאי קאמר שנאמר גרסה נפשי לתאווה כי תורך אהבתי

 One of the most amazing pieces of advice the Gemara is the way of learning fast [which is actually stated openly in the Gemara Shabat page 63. לעולם לגרס אנש אף על גב משכח ואף על גב דא ידע מאי קאמר שנאמר גרסה נפשי לתאווה כי תורך אהבתי "One should always learn fast, even though he forgets, and even though he does not even know what he  saying"][And this is brought at length in the Musar book Ways of the Righteous.]]And this came in very helpful to me while I was in two great Litvak Yeshivot the Mir in NY and Shar Yahuv. Both emphasize in depth learning --which on one hand is great. But on the other hand I was not  making much progress. The way  is just to say the words in order and go on, and I found that this with trust in God that I would eventually understand did help me a lot.  I know it does not take the place of the deep sort of learning of the Litvak Yeshivot, still this fact kind of learning did help me a lot and even came in useful when I went to the Polytechnic Institute of NYU. After  all I had not been in Physics for a long time and had even forgotten high school math, so this  way of learning did help me catch up.[ In fact even in high school I hardly did any math at all, So even just to get into the physics program in the first place I had a ton of work just to catch up.] and even now a few years later I still do this fast kind of learning.

Before I went to prepare, I did not even recall how to divide fractions. I did that fast sort of learning that  and got through Trig and Calculus. When classes started, I was up to speed. But then I needed to the in depth sort of learning of the Litvak world that goes by the Gra. And so I still hold one needs some sessions to learn fast,, and other sessions for in depth.    

 There were amazing experiences in Uman, Ukraine for me. The best was I had a learning partner by the ziun of Rav Nacham who had that way of learning that had almost been forgotten. And it might already be lost. It is a sort of learning that gets into the hidden layers of depth in the Tophot and Gemara. Maybe one just needs the right sort of head for it. This is very different from the sort of in deep learning which is done today which is based on Rav Chaim of Brisk. That usually sees the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam and tries to find the reason for the Rambam. While this is also important, still it misses the depths of Tosphot. Eventually I decided to return to Israel, but I still feel a great debt of gratitude to all the wonderful people there that helped me in so many way. 

 The basic approach of the Gra and the Litvak yeshivot is learning Torah  and trust in God. These two reinforce each other. So when one is spending all day and night in the yeshiva learning Torah one is not thinking about parnasa [making a living]. One tries to walk in this path for his yeshiva years and then  gets married and goes with that same idea that as long as one learns Torah and serves God, God will take care of the needs of his family. So in essence, trust in God is at the very centre of the Learning Torah idea.

On a large scale this is not in practice. but on the individual scale it is. one can still trust and God and God does take care of one.

 For really hard core Litvaks, there is almost no value in learning unless it is learning in depth. This I saw in Shar Yashuv in particular, But at the Mir and many other Litvak yeshivot, the afternoon is devoted to learning bekiut [fast learning].  So as a compromise, I learned every paragraph twice and went on. After all, I had not the intellectual tools to go in depth.  But eventually, I found myself learning with David Bronson in Uman, and his natural ability to see into the depths of Tosphot and the Gemara opened up for me the whole concept of learning in depth. But my learning with him came to an end. 

 For many people like me, I think the best thing is the combination of having some session in depth [review ten times of every thing, and learning the rishonim/early authorities and achronim/later authorities on the sugia (subject)] and another for fast learning. 

Also I would like to add here an idea that the real learning comes by listening to an expert. Rav Nahman brings this idea based on a Midrash that says this: Klal Israel [the House of Israel] at Sinai when offered the commandments said, "We will listen and do." But later they made the Golden Calf. Then God now says to us :"You have lost the we will do. So now at least hold onto we will listen."  Now Rav Nahman explain that saying the words yourself is "doing." But  we have lost that. That means learning yourself is not very effective.  Effective learning happens only by listening.

 Z92

The Rambam writes [Laws of Shkalim 1:2] הרמב''ם כותב [הלכות 'שקלים א הלכה ב]

הרמב''ם כותב [הלכות שקלים א' הלכה ב'] שלש מאות ועשרים שעורה משקל תבואה [לא נפח] שווה שקל אחד. זה היה לפני שהוסיפו לשקל כדי שיהיה שווה לסלע. בבכורות רב אשי שלח שש עשרה זוז של פדיון הבן. אז חמש כפול שלש מאות עשרים שווה שש עשרה זוז. אז זוז אחד הוא מאה שעורה גרגר. אבל החכמים של בית שני הוסיפו לשקל לעשות אותו שלש מאות שמונים וארבע. אז שלש מאות שמונים וארבע כפול חמש שווה עשרים זוז. אז רב אחא שלח הודעה לרב אשי להוסיף שלושה זוז לעשות זאת עשרים זוז. אז זוז זה תשעים ושש שעורה גרגר. איך זה מתאם לרמב''ם מסכת דמאי ב' משנה ה שהזוז הוא שש עשרה גרגרי שעורה

 The  Rambam writes [Laws of Shkalim 1:2] 320 barley grain weight [not volume] i one shekel. before they added to the shekel to make it equal to the sela. Rav Ashi sent 16 zuz to pay the 5 shekels of pidion haben. so 5 times 320=16 zuz. So one zuz is 100 barley grain. but the sages of the second temple added to the shekel to make it 384 grain. so 384 times 5 = 20 zuz. So Rav Acha sent word to Rav Ashi to add three zuz to make it 20 zuz. So a zuz is 96 grain. How does that correlate  with Rambam Tractate Demai chapter 2 mishna 5 that the zuz is 16 barley grain? 

 The רמב''ם writes [Laws of  'שקלים א הלכה ב] שלש מאות ועשרים שעורה grain weight [not volume] שווה one שקל. That was before they added to the שקל to make it equal to the סלע. In בכורות רב אשי sent שש עשרה זוז to pay the מש שקל  of פדיון הבן. So חמש multiplied by שלש מאות  עשרים שווה שש עשרה זוז. So one זוז is מאה barley grain. But the חכמים of the בית שני added to the שקל to make it שלש מאות שמונים וארבה grain. So שלש מאות שמונים וארבה multiplied by חמש שווה עשרים זוז. So רב אחא sent word to רב אשי to add three זוז to make it עשרים זוז. So a זוז is תשעים ושש grain. How does that correlate  with  רמב''ם מסכת דמאי ב' משנה ה that the זוז is שש עשרה barley grain? 

 i am still confused about the ketuba. in the Mishna in Demai chapter 2 mishna 5 the commentary of the rambam says a dinar is 6 zuz. and the dinar during the time of the mishna was the roman danarius. which was about $8,75 so a zuz is about $1.50. so that is about $300. [each zuz was in weight 16 grain of barley. so this works out ok. ] but what to do with the Rambam in Laws of Shekalim where  one shekel is 284grains of barley weight in silver? [and 20 zuz is five shekels in the gemara in bekorot. Rav Ahi sen17 zuz for pidion haben and Rav Acha told him to raise it to 20]

There is a "zona" in Hebrew which is a prostitute. However the legal definition of the word when it comes to the prohibition of a priest to marry a zona is that she is a woman who had sexual relations with someone who was forbidden to her. To R. Meir the first maaser [tithe] is forbidden to someone who is not a Levi. To Tosphot [yevamot page 91 side one] that does not include a zona. To the Rambam [in laws of maaser chapter one law 2] that includes a zona. 

The question comes from the fact that  a non cohen can not eat truma and that prohibition includes a zona and a halala. Rav Shach suggested that the reason of the rambam i that there is a parallel between truma and maaser. It is not just that a zona is excluded from laws relevant to  cohenim, but something about the holiness of the truma itself. But there is a difference. a zona can not be married to  cohen while she can be married to a levi

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There is a "זונה" in Hebrew which is a prostitute. However the legal definition of the word when it comes to the prohibition of a כהן to marry a זונה is that she is a woman who had sexual relations with someone who was forbidden to her. To ר' מאיר, the first מעשר  is forbidden to someone who is not a לוי. To תוספות [יבמות page צ''א ע''א] that does not include a זונה. To the רמב''ם in הלכות מעשר פרק א' הלכה ב  that includes a זונה. The question comes from the fact that  a non כהן can not eat תרומה and that prohibition includes a זונה and a חללה. AND רב שך suggested that the reason of the רמב''ם iS that there is a parallel between תרומה and מעשר. It is not just that a זונה is excluded from laws relevant to  כהנים, but something about the holiness of the תרומה  itself. But there is a difference. a זונה can not be married to כהן while she can be married to a לוי

יש "זונה" בעברית שהיא זונה. אולם ההגדרה המשפטית של המילה בכל הנוגע לאיסור של כהן להתחתן עם זונה היא שהיא אישה שקיימה יחסי מין עם מי שהיה אסור לה. לר' מאיר, המעשר הראשון אסור למי שאינו לוי. לתוספות [יבמות דף צ''א ע''א] שאינה כוללת זונה. לרמב''ם בהלכות מעשר פרק א' הלכה ב הכולל זונה. השאלה נובעת מכך שמי שאינו כהן אינו יכול לאכול תרומה והאיסור כולל זונה וחללה. ורב שך הציע שטעם הרמב''ם הוא שיש הקבלה בין תרומה למעשר. לא סתם זונה מוחרגת מהחוקים הרלוונטיים לכוהנים, אלא משהו בקדושת התרומה עצמה. אבל יש הבדל. זונה לא יכולה להיות נשואה לכהן בעוד שהיא יכולה להיות נשואה ללוי

written around 2002 [music for orchestra]

[b100 midi] b100 mp3

 

music file

 z97