In my previous blog entry I showed how רב שך learns the סוגיא in נידה page ב' and ג' in order to answer for the רמב''ם. The question was the מקוה is certain, and the חבית הוא ספק ? ר' חנינא מסורא says the case of the חבית is ר’ שמעון, and so there is no problem. The חכמים would say about the חבית that it too is certain. רב שך learns that both the חכמים and ר’ שמעון hold that both the מקוה and חבית are in doubt, but the חכמים learn from סוטה or from two חזקות are joined to make the case of the מקוה to be certain תרתי לרעיותא. However, it is hard to see this in the גמרא itself. I mean that the גמרא is one long statement of ר' חנינא. At first, he says the case of the חבית is ר’ שמעון. Then he gives an explanation why each one decided the law as he did. At no place in the discussion is there the slightest indication that the חכמים decided that is it doubtful like ר' שמעון. However, רב שך explains that the decision of the רמב''ם is based on the second approach of the גמרא related to the תנא קמא and שמעון in which we learn somewhat like the first approach except that תרתי לריעותא and learning from סוטה apply only to a case of טומאה and therefore the sages do agree with the case about the חביתJust for background. The גמרא asks from חבית on מקוה. ר' חנינא מסורא answered the חבית is ר’ שמעון, and he continues thus: Both learn from סוטה. Then he deals with the חכמים and explains that just like the תורה makes סוטה to be certain even though we do not know, so we learn to the case of the מקוה that it too is certain even though we actually do not know. But then comes the question that a סוטה is pure in a רשות הרבים, so why do we not learn from there to מקוה? Answer she is pure in a רשות הרבים because there is no privacy in a רשות הרבים. Thus, the case of מקוה will beטמא certain, even in a רשות הרבים since privacy has no relevance to the case of the מקוה. But then come the question (still all in the words of ר' חנינא] we should make the case of the מקוה pure in a רשות הרבים since it is a law to Moses from Sinai that all doubt of purity in a רשות הרבים is pure. Answer: the case of מקוה is two חזקות which are joined. {So the case of the מקוה is certain or in doubt but certainly not pure. } Then ר' חנינא explains ר’ שמעון. ר' שמעון also learns from סוטה. Just like a סוטה is pure in a public domain, so is the case of the מקוה. But in a רשות היחיד, she is certainly not pure, while the חבית is doubtful in the opinion of ר’ שמעון. Answer: she is certain because there is cause for suspicion. In all this back-and-forth discussion, there is not the slightest hint that the חכמים changed their minds about the case of the חבית. However in laws of sota chapter 1 law 3, Rav Shach explains that the decision of the Rambam is based on the second approach of the Gemara related to the sages and R Shimon in which we learn somewhat like the first approach except that it two hazakot and learning from sota apply only to a case of tuma and therefore the sages do agree with the case about the barrel. [The answer of Rav Shach in laws of truma is still based on the first approach of the Gemara in R hanina.] ______I would like to add to the explanation of רב שך in order to complete the answer to the question why did the רמב’’ם decided the law like the חבית and the מקוה הנמדד ונמצא חסר against what ר’ חנינא said. Answer: the רמב’’ם did not agree with the first part of the statement of ר’ חנינאהbecause as we see ר’ חנינאtreats the case of a סוטה as a certainty while on the opposite side the רמב’’ם has some reason to treat the סוטה as a doubt. We see this in the רמב’’ם in at least three different places. One is in laws of הל' איסורי ביאה פרק י''ח where he writes that a סוטה cannot sleep with her husband because she is a doubtful prostitute. Another place is in laws of תרומות פרק ח' where he writes סוטה who is a wife of a כהן cannot eat תרומה because she is a doubtful prostitute. He also wrote if the husband sleeps with her he does not get lashes. In all these places it is clear the רמב’’ם considers the סוטה to be a case of doubt, not certainty. So, the רמב’’ם cannot agree with ר' חנינא. However, he still learns from the approach of ר חנינא. He learns that the sages hold the case of the מקוה is unclean like the case of the סוטה, but that takes one only up until being a ספק. Then they learn from two חזקות to makes the case of the מקוה to be ודאי. And, in fact, this makes a lot of sense now that we know that in the approach of the רמב’’ם the only thing we can learn from the סוטה is that there is a ספק. [But if as רב שך points out in laws of תרומות if there is already a doubt, then the case of the סוטה can makes that into a ודאי.]------------------------------------In my previous blog entry I showed how Rav Shach learns the sugia in nida page 2 and three in order to answer for the Rambam. The question was the mikve is certain and the ? R Hanina says the case of the barrel is R Shimon, and so there is no problem. The sages would say about the barrel that it too is certain. Rav Shach learns that both the sages and r Shimon hold that both the mikve and barrel are in doubt, but the sages learn from sota or from two hazakot are joined to make the case of the mikve to be certain. However, it is hard to see this in the Gemara itself. I mean that the Gemara is one long statement of R Hanina. At first, he says the case of the barrel is R Shimon. Then he gives an explanation why each one decided the law as he did. At no place in the discussion is there the slightest indication that the sages decided that is it doubtful like R Shimon. Just for background. The Gemara asks from barrel on mikve. R Hanina from Sura answered the barrel is R Shimon, and he continues thus: Both learn from sota. Then he deals with the sages and explains that just like the Torah makes sota to be in certain even though she is in doubt, so we learn to the case of the mikvah that it too is certain even though we actually do not know. But then comes the question that a sota is pure in a public domain, so why do we not learn from there to mikve? Answer she is pure in a public domain because there is no privacy in a public domain. Thus, the case of mikve will be certain even in a public domain since privacy has no relevance to the case of the mikve. But then come the question (still all in the words of R Hanina] we should makes the case of the mikev pure in a public domain since it is a law to Moses from Sinai that all doubt of purity in a public domain is pure. Answer: the case of mikve is two hazakot which are joined. {So the case of the mikve is certain or in doubt but certainly not pure.. } Then R Hanina explains R Shimon. He also learns from sota. Just like a sota is pure in a public domain, so is the case of the mikve. But in a private domain, she is certainly not pure, while the barrel is doubtful in the opinion of r shimon.. answer she is certain because there is cause for suspicion. In all this back-and-forth discussion there is not the slightest hint that the sages changed their minds about the case of the barrel.)------I would like to add to the explanation of Rav Shach in order to complete the answer to the question why did the Rambam decided the law like the barrel and the mikve against what R Hanina said. Answer the Rambam did not agree with the first part of the statement of R Hanina because as we see R Hanina treats the case of a Sota as a certainty while on the opposite side the Rambam has some reason to treat the Sota as a doubt. We see this in the Rambam in at least three different places. One is in laws of forbidden relations chap 18 where he writes that a sota cannot sleep with her husband because she is a doubtful prostitute. Another place is in laws of Trumot chapt 8 where he writes sota who is a wife of a kohen cannot eat truma because she is a doubtful prostitute. He also wrote if the husband sleeps with her he does not get lashes. In all these places it is clear the Rambam considers the sota to be a case of doubt, not certainty. so the Rambam cannot agree with R Hanina. However, he still learns from the approach of R Hanina. He learns that the sages hold the case of the mikve is unclean like the case of the sota, but that takes one only up until being a doubt. Then they learn from two hazakot to makes the case of the mikve to be certain. And, in fact, this makes a lot of sense now that we know that in the approach of the Rambam the only thing we can learn from the Sota is that there is a doubt. [But if as Rav Shach points out in laws of trumot if there is already a doubt, then the case of the sota can makes that into a certainty.]