I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the Gemara in Kidushin pg 28. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the Gemara is going like Rav Joseph that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to Rav Joseph in Kiddushin page 8. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a braita that teaches that a Jewish slave can be acquired either by money or what is worth money, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, Rav Joseph says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that Rav Joseph is referring only to using something that is worth money, not that which is used in an exchange. It is only on page28 that Rav Judah says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the Rambam decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the Gemara understands the mishna according to Rav Nachman. To make this clear let me bring the Mishna and Gemara. The Mishna says anything that is made money, once one acquires one, the other acquires the other. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. R. Judah answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The Gemara then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But Rav Nachman held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the Gemara concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this Gemara is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like R. Yochanan who holds that from the torah money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying keep the money and give me the cow instead has any relevance to the law of the Torah that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever. Furthermore, it is possible to say like Tosphot does that the law the Gemara says here is going only to the opinion that coin can be acquired by exchange because Rav Nachman does not say the Mishna means ''all that is evaluated'' (like Rav Yehuda) but leaves it to say ''all that is made''. How could the Rif and Rambam answer this problem? --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- I wondering why the Rambam decided a law like the ''I would have said,” instead of the conclusion of the גמרא in קידושין דף כ''ח. The answer I had thought is that perhaps the conclusion of the גמרא is going like רב יוסף that holds that one need to evaluate an object before it can used as having monetary value. [I am referring here to רב יוסף in קידושין דף ח'. He holds if one marries a woman with silk cloth, it has to be evaluated beforehand. He learns this from a ברייתא that teaches that a עבד can be acquired either by כסף or what is שווה כסף, but not with vessels or grain. But why not vessels or grain if after all, they also have monetary value? So, רב יוסף says that the reason vessels or grain are not valid is that their value was not estimated yet.] But then I realized that רב יוסף is referring only to using something that isשווה כסף not that which is used in חליפין. It is only on page כ''ח that רב יהודה says that which is used in an exchange has to be evaluated beforehand. But since that is not the law, therefore the רמב''ם decided to go with the “I might have said (hypothesis that was rejected) at least in the way the גמרא understands the משנה according to רב נחמן. To make this clear let me bring the משנה and גמרא. The משנה says כל הנעשה דמים כיון שזכה זה נתחייב זה בחליפיו. This, I might have thought, refers to coin. But we know that coins cannot be use in an exchange. רב יהודה answered, "It means, what is used in an exchange has to be evaluated." The גמרא then asks why was the “I would have said” a viable possibility in the first place? Answer: It would have meant coin can be used in an exchange, and also fruit can be used in an exchange. But רב נחמן held fruit cannot in an exchange, so the גמרא concludes the meaning is that if one sells an ox for a hundred, and after that the seller finds out that the buyer has a cow worth that same price, the seller can say, “Give me the cow instead of cash.” And just by saying this, the acquisition is complete. At any rate this גמרא is hard to understand anyway since it says that this last approach where one that sold the ox says keep the hundred you owe me and give me your cow instead, that law is going like ר' יוחנן who holds that from the תורה, money cause a monetary transaction to be valid. I do not understand what just saying "Keep the money, and give me the cow instead," has any relevance to the law of the תורה that exchange of coin, not picking up the bought object causes the sale to be valid. In our case here no one ever picked up any coin what so ever.------Furthermore, it is possible to say like תוספות does that the law the גמרא says here is going only to the opinion that coin can be acquired by exchange because רב נחמן does not say the משנה means ''all that is evaluated נישום '' (like רב יהודה) but leaves it to say ''all that is נעשה דמים באחר''. How could the רי''ף and ר''ם answer this problem?

"What America used to stand for" by Michael Huemer

Here, I talk about what America used to stand for, and how we are losing it. What We Celebrate Sometimes, on the 4th of July, I think about what we’re celebrating, and I wonder how the founders who signed the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 would feel if they saw our celebrations, and our society more generally. I used to think of July 4th as celebrating American values of freedom and independence. But when you look around, it’s hard to find any evidence that the holiday means anything like that to most people. It seems to be more a celebration of our ability to make loud noises and brightly colored flashes of light and, as with all holidays, to stuff our faces. I am not sure if Americans know the Declaration anymore, or if they value what it says. Here is part of what it says, a succinct expression of Lockean libertarian philosophy: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, --That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it …. A long list of complaints against King George follows. The document concludes thus: We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor. There is then a series of signatures. It is worth remembering that all of those people had reason to believe that they were signing their death warrants. They had just declared war against the world’s most powerful nation; the most likely outcome was that they would lose that war and all be killed—either during the conflict, or by execution afterwards. Why did they do it? Narrow self-interest fails. The only satisfying explanation is that they believed in what they were saying— That the purpose of government is to protect the rights of the governed, that the British government was not doing that, and that the appropriate remedy for such a situation was to cast off that government. People in those days had a lot more courage and a lot more capacity for sacrifice than we do today. I suspect that the poetical bit about pledging their sacred honor was also sincere: people at that time actually thought in those terms.

za80 g minor in midi formatza80 in nwc format

היכן הייתה ארץ אדום? זהו ויכוח בין הגר"א לרש"י. עבור הגר"א, היא נמצאת בדרום ובמזרח של ארץ כנען. אבל עבור רש"י היא נמצאת רק בדרום. מדוע אין חקירות על מיקומו של אדום? ככל הנראה, לא הייתה אימפריית אדום, בעוד שהייתה אימפריית חיתי ואימפריות מתחרות אחרות באותה תקופה. אך ישנן עדויות לכך שאדום לא היה רק במזרח, אלא אף השתרע עד לגבול הצפוני של כנען, שכן יש פסוק במדבר שישראל בשלב מסוים הייתה על גבול ארץ אדום בהור ההר ומשם שלח משה הודעה למלך שהיה מצפון לשם. הור ההר הוא גבולה הצפוני של ישראל כפי שמוגדר בבמדבר ל''ד". אך קשה לראות כיצד אדום יכלה להשתרע לאורך כל הגבול המזרחי של כנען, מכיוון שהם לא אפשרו לישראל לעבור דרך גבולם (אלא אם כן לאדום היו רק יישובים בודדים במזרח). במקום זאת, ישראל נכנסו לארץ כנען דרך המרכז יריחו. מלבד כל זאת, נראה ברור שאדום היה במזרח, משום שכאשר יעקב חזר מחרן, הוא אמר לעשיו שהוא יבוא אליו להר שעיר. אך ברור שהוא היה בדרכו חזרה לארץ כנען. משמעות הדבר היא שהוא היה צריך לעבור דרך הר שעיר כדי להגיע לארץ כנען

Where was the land of Edom? This is an argument between the Gra and Rashi. To the Gra, it is on the south and east of the land of Canaan. To Rashi it is only on the south. Why are there are no investigations on the location of Edom? Apparently, there was no Edomite empire, while there was a Hittite empire and other competing empires at the time. But there is evidence that Edom was not just on the east, but even extended to the north border of Israel since there is a verse in Numbers that Israel at some point was on the edge of the land of Edom at Hor ha’Har and from there Moses sent a message to a king that was north of there. Now Hor Har is the north border of Israel as defined in Numbers 24. But it is hard to see how Edom might have extended through the entire eastern border of Canaan since they did not allow Israel to go through their border (unless Edom had just individual settlements of the East). Instead, Israel entered the land of Canaan though the middle around Jericho. Besides all this, it seems clear that Edom was on the east because when Jacob was coming back from Charan he told Esau that he will come to him at Har Seir. But clearly, he was on his way back to the land of Canaan. So that means he had to pass through the mountain of Seir to get to the land of Canaan.------------------------------------ Where was the land ofאדום ? This is an argument between the גר''א and רש''י. To the גר''א, it is on the south and east of the land of כנען. BUT To רש''י it is only on the south. Why are there are no investigations on the location of אדום? Apparently, there was no אדום empire, while there was a חיתי empire and other competing empires at the time. But there is evidence that אדום was not just on the east, but even extended to the north border of כנען since there is a verse in במדבר that ישראלat some point was on the edge of the land of אדום at הור ההר and from there משה sent a message to a king that was north of there. Now הור ההרis the north border of ישראל as defined inבמדבר ל''ד . But it is hard to see how אדום might have extended through the entire eastern border of כנען since they did not allow Israel to go through their border (unless אדום had just individual settlements of the East). Instead, Israel entered the land of Canaan though the middle around Jericho. Besides all this, it seems clear that אדום was on the east because when Jacob was coming back from חרןhe told עשיו that he will come to him at הר שעיר. But clearly, he was on his way back to the land of Canaan. So that means he had to pass through the mountain of שעיר to get to the land of Canaan.

חוק ברמב''ם. גבר יכול להתחתן עם אישה בכך שהוא נותן לה חפץ שהוא גנב

כמה שאלות התרחשו בי על תשובת רב שך אודות החוק ברמב''ם. גבר יכול להתחתן עם אישה בכך שהוא נותן לה חפץ שהוא גנב. [אישות פרק ה' הלכה ז'] הרשה לי להסביר מה אומר ר' שך על מנת לענות על הבעיה. הבעיה היא שהגנב אינו הבעלים של האובייקט שהוא גנב. אבל אם הוא מוכר את זה או נותן את זה למישהו אחר, והבעלים ייאשו על התקווה להשיג את האובייקט שוב, אז האדם השלישי קנה אותו לחלוטין. הבעיה בשימוש בחפץ להתחתן עם אישה היא שלמרות שהיא בבעלותה על ידי ממוצע של שינוי תחום ונטישה, אך האובייקט לא היה שייך לגנב. לא היה שום שינוי בתחום עד שהוא נכנס לידה של האישה. אתה צריך להתחתן עם אישה בכסף שלך, לא כסף שהופך לה לאחר שקיבלה אותו. התשובה של רב שך היא שלגנב יש זכויות מסוימות באובייקט, וזכויות אלה הוא נותן לה. .....הזכויות אליהן מתייחס רב שך הן אם הבהמה שגזל המליטה, או אם הייתה כבשה והוא גזז אותה, או אם הוא חורש עם שור שהוא גזל .השיפורים לגזלן. אולם, כאשר אדם קונה שדה מאדם שגזל אותו והשקיע זמן, כסף ומאמץ בשיפורה, כאשר השדה חוזר לבעלים, הקונה מקבל החזר מהגזלן עבור השיפור [רמב"ם הלכות גזלה פרק ט', חוק ו']. אך נראה לי שאלו אינן זכויות, אלא סתם עובדות הנובעות מהחוק לפיו גזלן מחזיר רק את הדבר שגזל כפי שהיה בזמן שגזל אותו. לכן, באופן אוטומטי, כל שיפור מאוחר יותר עובר לגזלן. קשה לתפוס זאת כזכות ......מלבד כל האמור לעיל, אני יכול להזכיר שלמרות שהצד השלישי לא צריך לשלם עבור החפץ על פי ראב''ד, אבל לפי הר''ם , האדם השלישי שקנה משהו מגנב אכן צריך לשלם עבורו. ואפילו במקרה של קנייה מגנב שלא היה ידוע, רק על ידי צו של החכמים, זה שקנה אותו לא צריך לשלם, אלא מחוק תורה הוא יצטרך לשלם. כך שלמרות שהאישה קנה האובייקט הגנוב, העובדה היא שמן התורה, היא תצטרך לשלם על כך, ולכן היא נשואה רק מהרבנן, לא מהתורה

I was at the sea again and a few questions entered into my mind about the answer of Rav Shach about the law in the Rambam laws of marriage 5 law 7 that says a man can marry a woman by an object he stole. Just to be clear let me explain what Rav Shach says in order to answer the problem in the Rambam. The problem is that the thief does not own the obsject that he stole. But if he sells ,it or gives it to someone else, and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again, then the third person can keep it. The problem with using the object to marry a woman is that, even though she owns it by means of change of domain and abandonment, but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it got into the hand of the woman. As the Ketzot Hachohen writes, you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that become her's after receiving it. The answer of Rav Shach and R. Shmuel Rozovski is that the thief has certain rights in the object and theso he gives to her. ///The rights that Rav Shach is referring to are if the animal he stole gave birth or if it was sheep an'sd he sheared it or if he plows with an ox that he stole it. however, when one buys a field from a person that stole it and put inh time money and effort to improve it. When the field goes back to, the buyer gets repaid from the thief for the improvement [Rambam laws of robbery chapter 9 law 6]. but it seems to me that these are not rights, but rather just facts that result from the law that a robber pays back only the thing he stole as it was at the time he stole it. Therefore, automatically, any later improvements go to the thief. It is hard to conceive of this as a right./////Besides all the above, I might mention that even though the third party does not have to pay for the object according to the Raavad, but according to the Rambam, the third person that bought something from a thief does have to pay for it even though he keeps it. And even in the case of buying from a thief that was not well known, it is only by a decree of the sages that the one that bought it does not have to pay, but from the law of the torah he would have to pay. So even though the woman can keep the stolen object, the fact is that from the law of the torah, she would have to pay for it, and therefore she should be married only by the words of the sages, not from the torah. --------------------------------------------------A few questions occurred to me about the answer of רב שך about the law in the רמב''ם. a man can marry a woman by giving to her an object he stole. Let me explain what רב שך says in order to answer the problem in the רמב''ם. The problem is that the thief does not own the object that he stole. But if he sells it or gives it to someone else, and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again, then the third person can keep it. The problem with using the object to marry a woman is that even though she owns it by mean of change of domain and abandonment, but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it gets into the hand of the woman. As the קצוות החושן writes, you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that becomes her after receiving it. The answer of ר' שך is that the thief has certain rights in the object, and these rights he gives to her. ...The rights that רב שך is referring to are about are if the animal he stole gave birth or if it was sheep and he sheared it, or if he plows with an ox that he stole it. However, when one buys a field from a person that stole it and put in time money and effort to improve it. When the field goes back to the owner, the buyer gets repaid from the thief for the improvement [רמב''ם laws of גזלה chapter 9 law 6]. But it seems to me that these are not rights, but rather just facts that result from the law that a robber pays back only the thing he stole as it was at the time he stole it. Therefore, automatically, any later improvements go to the thief. It is hard to conceive of this as a right. ///Just to be clear let me explain what רב שך say in order to answer the problem in the רמב''ם. the problem is that the thief does not own the object that he stole. but if he sells it or gives it to someone else and the owner has given up hope of getting the object again then the third person can keep it. the problem with using the object to marry a woman is that even though he owns it by mean of change of domain and abandonment but the object did not belong to the thief. There was` no change of domain until it gets into the hand of the woman. As the קצוות החושן writes חושן משפט שנ''ג , you need to marry a woman by your own money, not money that become her after receiving it. the answer of ר' שך is that the thief has certain rights in the object, and these rights he gives to her./// The problem I see in this answer is even from the place that רב שך brings, I see no answer. The third person there, the one that bought the stolen ox, and plowed with it does not have to pay for it use, but that does not mean that the thief had any rights. Besides all the above, I might mention that even though the third party does not have to pay for the object according to the ראב''ד , but according to the רמב''ם, the third person that bought something from a thief does have to pay for it even though he keeps it. And even in the case of buying from a thief that was not well known, it is only by a decree of the חכמים that the one that bought it does not have to pay but from the law of the תורה he would have to pay. so even though the woman can keep the stolen object, the fact is that from the law of the תורה, she would have to pay for it, and therefore he should be married only by the words of the חכמים, not from the תורה.