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14.11.15

The modern world can't confront Islam. It [Islam]does not fit into any category that people can understand. In the modern world we are used to cherishing freedom of religion. And Islam is a religion. It goes against everything the West accepts as basic fundamental rights to try to dictate to others that their religion is bad. The easiest thing is to blame Israel. That at least has the advantage of being something people can understand and relate to.

What else could the world do? Call it a political system? It is not that [though it has political goals].

The problem is not so much how to confront Islam, but rather an identity crisis of the West itself.
People don't know who they are anymore. In Christendom people knew who they were. Christians. And in the USA for about 200 years people knew who they were and what they stood for. Freedom and Democracy for all. Jews knew who they were. And Communists also.
None of this applies anymore. Americans are embarrassed of their heritage. Christendom is such an obsolete concept I can't even remember how to spell it.

I would like to deal with this problem in more depth but suffice it to say the modern world is facing problems that it can't understand and does not even have the conceptual categories to define the problem.
This is bad news. Once this happened before. The old world had passed away in World War I. The kings and old categories were gone. In that vacuum grew Nazism and Communism.

My solution to this dilemma is simple. Learn Torah. I mean the Oral and Written Law of Moses.


I can imagine that some people might not like this. It is strong medicine. But it is about the only thing I can think of that would give Western Civilization a chance to get back on its feet.

The world is shedding old categories, and entering a new phase. In  restless sea one needs a map. But not any map will do. The Law written on Two Tablets of Stone is what the world needs. [There is more to the Five Books of Moses than that but that is the essence. And the essence of Torah is what people need.



















The Musar (Ethics) movement has a connection with Kant.

The Musar (Ethics) movement has a connection with Kant.
The problem that Musar ((Ethics)) was meant to address was the disconnect between obligations between man and his fellow and and obligation between Man and God.  The idea of Israel Salanter was that by learning mediaeval books of ethics one tends to correct this disconnect.
Kant was also concerned with the problem of radical evil. He thought there are only two principles. One decides to act in accord with objective morality, and then he is totally good. Or he or she decides act only for self interest, and then he or she is totally evil. {This would mean that one decides to act only in the interest of the group he or she is a part of, that is also totally evil. This explain what is wrong with Islam--in that personal morality is not important. The spread of Islam by the sword is the major thing.} Kant in an uncharacteristic way saw a solution to this dilemma. His solution was surprisingly close to that of Israel Salanter, i.e. to be part of a community that the requirement for membership is commitment to objective morality. That is a Musar Movement.

But any movement  can be hijacked sadly. Still the basic approach of Musar I think is right, and it is important to find people of like mind. [If I had been smart, I would either have stayed in the Mir Yeshiva in NY which was a Musar Yeshiva, or even in Israel after I made aliyah, I could have gone to the Lithuanian yeshiva of Rav Fievelson the the Old City of Safed --but sadly enough I did not have to foresight to see how important Musar is.]

In Tana De'Vei Eliyahu: God said to Elijah,  the prophet, "I will let you know some of my traits. Sometimes you have people that have not a drop of Torah or good deeds in them, and yet when they turn to me and are involved very much in praying to me, then I pay attention to them, as it says in the verse 'He turns to the prayer of the empty one.'"

1.) Tana De'Vei Eliyahu  is one of the standard Midrashim. It has similar status and authority as the Midrash Raba and Tanchuma.

2.) The idea of "private conversation"is first that it is private. It is in a place where no one else is around. Also it is not from  any prayer book. It is ones own words that one says to God.

3.) I should mention that this is the only kind of prayer I feel has any  validity. The standard prayers I think are a waste of time. If one is learning Torah then he is not obligated in the standard prayers. That is a regular Halacha in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch. If one is involved in learning a vocation the time that is most important is right when he gets up in the morning. To spend that time running to shul to half heatedly say words he does not mean and then to start his studies means he will not get very far. This is why in fact people that do this can't do anything well. This is because all their efforts and energy is not going into real prayer and not going into their work either.

4.)  prepare a pack lunch and go into the forest every day all day long to talk with God. I actually tried this for  a few years in Safed. I don't this anymore. But I still feel that when things are confusing for me that there is no other address to go to but to God directly.






13.11.15

A Song for God   h55  [h55 in midi] This might need some editing. I am not sure. It seems a little short.

q64 [q64 in midi]  j100  [j100 midi]
Today in an ironic way is the yartzeit [day they died] of both my father and Reb Aaron Kotler. [Kislev 2 on the Hebrew calendar]. My father did not want me going to yeshiva. He believed in the Oral and Written Torah but that was not the issue. He thought learning Torah is a great thing. The reason he did not want me going to yeshiva was he thought all yeshivas are rabbinical schools or they use the Torah to make money.


To Reb Aaron the most important thing in the world was to make yeshivas.

The result of his efforts was the Lakewood yeshiva in NJ and several kollels in different American cities. One, for example, in Los Angeles. I was there at the beginning of the kollel of Lakewood in LA. They asked me to go to people I knew in Beverly Hills to ask for money for them. Why? Because it is a mitzvah to learn Torah. {That is they were saying since they learn Torah people ought to give them money. We will learn in short order that that is not really what they think. Rather they want people's money, and have found a way to con them to give it to them. A there are always people around to oblige them. A sucker is born every minute.}


This is a hard issue to  resolve. On one hand I never intended to use the holy Torah for money and I thought the type of yeshiva I was going to was really trying hard to learn Torah for its own sake and not for money.

On the other hand I learned the hard way that my father was right. I was for some years in Israel after learning at the Mir in NY. After a period in Israel my wife and I decided to return to California. When we got to LA the people in the Lakewood Kollel told my wife to divorce me because I was learning Torah.
Thereby giving me direct proof that my father was right all along. But not just that but since then I have seen many others proofs to my father's position.
So what we have from this is in fact it is a great thing to learn and keep Torah and the more effort one puts into this the better. But we also learn that there are people that claim to be learning Torah and claim that it is  a mitzvah to give them money. One should avoid these types as much as possible. They are extremely dangerous. And they give  a bad name to Torah. After people experience religious teachers, no wonder they are turned off from Torah. Who would not be? It is up to people that care about Torah to remedy this situation and do what ever is possible to stop this scam.

[No offence to Reb Aaron. He should not be held responsible for all the jerks that came out of his yeshiva. He was after all only intending for the sake of Heaven. But by the same token we could say why blame communism for the millions that Stalin murdered? Or why blame Nazism for what Hitler did in the name of Nazism? Maybe it was a few jerks that did not understand Nazism?]

So what I think is that we already know that kollels are against the Torah. If the Torah itself says this is forbidden and people choice not to listen and pretend that what they are doing is Torah then why blame the Holy Torah? 

 Once people think they are God's gift to mankind the trouble begins. [I should mention my critique here is not against Reform or Conservative groups whom I have generally found to be upright. Not am I criticizing people that learn Torah for its own sake as should be. And many people like that are around in Israel and in NY yeshivas. One bad batch does not spoil everyone else.

What I suggest is we can admire greatness. But we need vision to recognize greatness. In my father and mother were real greatness. The kind of greatness that lives according to Torah --not just learns it.

That is what I suggest is that my father was a more accurate representation of how the Torah wants people to live. The more so called "strict" approaches I think are not accurate and also wrong.





Not all cults are created equal. Some cults are great for keeping people out of worse cults.
And if this is all that would be good about some cult  that would be enough but sometimes a cult even has positive value.  "tzadik"s are often some delusional leader who has enough magnetism to delude others.


The best scenario I can see is not to join any of the cults. But even if one does that is not always a bad thing. I was for example a  part of Rav Shick's {Moharosh} group for about 6 years and I think I got positive benefit out of it. But if I had been smart I would have just stuck with the basic Litvak Mir Yeshiva --straight Judaism approach-- .

12.11.15

Songs of thanksto God for his Kindnesses on me and also for the things that were from his judgments.

The major concern of the Torah  is in commandments between man and his fellow man. I get this idea from a few places. The Chafetz Chaim, Rav Shalom Sharabi, and some of the disciple of Israel Salanter like the Alter of Slobadka, and Rabbainu Yerucham of the Mir.

In the Alter of Slobadka you can see this in I think the first or second chapter of the book of his collected writings.
The Chafetz Chaim said this on the verse והלכת בדרכיו ותשמור מצוותיו. First walk in his ways (which we know that means "Just like  he compassionate so too must you be compassionate.") and then keep his mitzvot.

Shalom Sharabi gives a deep explanation of this in his book the נהר שלום:  We know the Torah and mitzvot are compared to clothing and bread and wine. The Torah is drink and food of the soul. The mitzvot are the clothing of the soul. So then what is the soul? It is one character traits--the מידות. And that is the meaning of the  verse חסרון לא יוכל להמנות what is lacking can't be filled. We can do repentance on lack of Torah and miztvot. But we can't repent on the lack of a good character trait because that is like the soul is lacking a limb. It can't be replaced.

This was the idea of Israel Salanter [the Musar Movement]--that Torah has these two aspects and I think he saw that too many people sacrifice one aspect for the sake of the other.


I think that my father and mother were better at the between man and one's fellow man than anyone I have heard of. But they did not talk about it. And they did did not advertise it. Nor did they preach it. They just did it and by their actions showed me an example of human greatness that I have not seen surpassed or even heard of anyone that has done better.  Thought when it comes to other aspects of Torah I have great respect for people that were able to learn and and pray. But as far as keeping the  Torah as a whole--not just some parts and ignore the rest-I think my parents were beyond anything I have heard of or seen. 
The Rambam and Creation Ex Nihilo; I have mentioned a few times the basic characteristics of Monotheism as understood by Maimonides.See also: the son of the Rambam for more details about this. God is One to the Rambam means not a composite. Not made of parts. [Not substance and form. God is not of this world, and worldly characteristics do not apply to HIM. Also--this world is not made of his substance since he has no substance.]אלוהים אחד לרמב"ם פירושו שאינו מורכב. אינו עשוי מחלקים. [לא חומר וצורה. אלוהים אינו מהעולם הזה, ותכונות עולמיות אינן חלות עליו. כמו כן - העולם הזה אינו עשוי ממהותו מכיוון שאין לו חומר

11.11.15

Ideas in Bava Metzia-I made new corrections--in grammar etc.

Ideas in Talmud This has a new section at the end where I had a debate with my learning partner about  a Rambam
There are two aspects of Torah--the between man and his fellow man part and the between man and God. My parents excelled at the former. And I admit this is hard balance to keep. Some people - mainly Reform and conservative Jews are  mainly interested in the aspect of Torah that is between man and his fellow man. And they are right about that. That is the most essential aspect of Torah.

The problem is that part does not cancel the other part. And that is where the troubles begin. Some people notice that in fact there are plenty of things that the Torah requires of us that are strictly between man and God. E.g. the whole Temple service which takes up  a good part of the book of Leviticus, Shabat, etc.

The trouble is that when people start to notice these other parts of Torah,  the between man and his fellow man parts tend to disappear.

 I don't think there is any good solution to this problem because men are programmed to be able to concentrate of only a very small set of principles in their daily lives. 613 principles are just too much.
So people try to distill the essence of Torah and package it. And they don't usually get it right at all.
The approach that was tried by Israel Salanter seem was intended to address this problem. That is he looked at the books from the Middle Ages that addressed both of these aspects of Torah and he saw that they were in fact very effective in helping a very great tzadik, Shmuel from Salant, to reach the kind of balance that the Torah intends.

So the Musar approach I think I would have to agree with.--with one addition. That is books of השקפה also from the Middle Ages. That is the Rambam, and the other thinkers that were interested in defining the basic world view of Torah.  But if there is much today that reflects this I doubt. To some degree the Religious Zionists have this approach but only approximately. While they do try to find this balanced approach still, I am not sure if they have reached it. The Mir Yeshiva and the normal straight Lithuanian yeshivas where I learned also seemed to be close to it, but not exactly. But these last two approaches seem to be about the closest I can imagine to striking this balance.


[The Religious Zionists are right that the Torah is very interested in getting Jews to Israel. That is the reason the Red Sea was split and it also is the subject of prophecies of all the prophets. The normal Litvak yeshivas however are lot better when it comes to learning Torah. But the fact that one group emphasizes one good trait and the other emphasizes  another good trait is no reason to complain about either group.






In Kant we find  a kind of "apperception" perception that sees oneself . From this we know the unity of consciousness. It is the same faculty of synthesis by which we know universals {synthetic a priori.}  This forms the basis of the transcendental deduction. (note 1) So now we can understand the Rambam about knowing God, who is the thing in itself, the ding an sich. That is knowing God is a kind of knowing that we know things in themselves. That is why it is called knowing. It is the faculty by which we know unconditioned realities.





Let's call this apperception. It can't be the thing which recognizes universals as we know the Rambam holds God has no universals. So it is the kind of knowledge by which we know our inner self. And that implies a strong connection. We have more than an emotional connection with ourselves; we are ourselves. So this connection with God is more than an emotional connection. It means a kind of oneness with God, as if we and God were one.

[I know I am borrowing from Schopenhauer. ]

In any case what we have here is good use of the faculty that Kant says gives us direct knowledge of the existence of the ding an sich, but not its characteristics. So when Maimonides tells us we can know that God exists he can be understood in this Kantian type of way.

And this resolves a conflict about Maimonides. There are people that think the Rambam limited reason. {"Rather in the Guide and elsewhere in his ethical writings, Maimonides goes to great pains to deny that human beings have any innate metaphysical, and especially, moral intuitions." Mark R. Sunwall.} There are others who pointed out the proofs of God's existence as showing that the Rambam did not limit reason. Well as far as God's existence is concerned we can use Kant's idea of a perception to show he did think reason puts us in direct contact with the ding an sich.






When I saw in the Rambam this remarkable statement לא הצם והמתפלל הוא הנרצה אלא היודעו I was struck with it power. {It is not the one who prays and fasts who is desirable to God but rather the one that knows God.}

To understand this statement I think one needs the anonymous commentary on the first four chapters of the Rambam's משנה תורה Mishne Torah. He asks one verse says do the mizvot in order to love and fear God. Another one says love and fear God in order to do the mitzvot. This is a contradiction. Answer: There are two kinds of Love and Fear. For example there is fear of God's punishment and there is awe of God's greatness. So one verse tells us to have the  lower love and fear in order to do the mitzvot and the other verse tells us do the mitzvot in order to come to the higher love and fear.
Thu the mitzvot have a purpose. They are not the goals in themselves. And the purpose is this kind of love and fear.
So it seems to me that what we  call דביקות "devekut" [attachment with God] is at least some component of what The Torah requires of us.

(note 1) Synthesis is required to explain the mineness and togetherness of one’s mental states, and by linking synthesis to the application of the categories, Kant argues we could not have the experience of the mineness and togetherness of our mental states without applying the categories. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy



10.11.15

The problem I generally see is too much confidence in mystical knowledge.

Rationalism vs. Empiricism vs. Mysticism  

While I think that there is a kind of knowledge that is not from reason and not from empirical observation, still that does not seem to be carte blanche  permission to assume all mystic experiences are a valid source of information. And even if it was, it would only apply to ones own experience. You would not be able to depend on someone else mystical experiences as a source of information for yourself on how to live your life.
There is a kind of sneaky attempt to get people to believe in the mystic experiences of other people by calling it אמונת חכמים faith in the wise. They pick some charismatic insane teacher with mystic delusions and decide to call him wise.


We don't have prophecy anymore. And in any case prophecy seems to be a source of information separate of mystical experience.   Furthermore there is such a thing as סוף הוראה the end of the period when it is possible to make a halachic decision.
This may not seem like a big deal to most people. But from where I come from what I see a lot is people that are depending of the mystic experiences of some loving, lunatic leader deny the other areas of information. To them the only source of valid knowledge is the mystical experiences of their beloved leader.
Though they will use pragmatic reasoning in their daily lives but as for any major decision they will go only with the mystical experiences of their leader.


Why this came up is that I don't think knowledge of morality comes from mystic experience. There are some principles of morality that I think we know by reason. דרך ארץ קדמה לתורה. Others we need Torah to reveal to us. And to understand Torah we depend on the Sages of the Mishna.  We no longer have prophecy and mystic experiences can't cancel the Law of Moses, nor alter its meaning.
Sadly by means of Kabalah learning that is exactly what people do do. Yet people are looking for spiritual wholeness. Where can you find that except by mystical experience?
Though there are substitutes, they do not seem  numinous unless you endow them with numinous meaning and content.

I any case I had a few issues to bring up about this. One is the Rambam. לא הצם והמתפלל הוא הנרצה אלא היודעו. "Not he who fasts and prays is acceptable to God, but rather one who knows Him."   The kind of knowledge of God that the Rambam is talking about is explained in other places in the Guide. It is a kind of knowledge that comes by learning Torah Physics and Metaphysics. He is not talking about mystic knowledge.


The problem I generally see is too much confidence in mystical knowledge. This leads members of cults to all kinds of terrible sins.
  It is not that there is no mystical knowledge. Just that there seems to be too much confidence in other people's mystical knowledge  and that one is supposed to be convinced that they are "tzadikim" and that is supposed to overrule the basic common sense  explanation of the Torah  and common sense in other areas.

 The idea of authority is something we all use. We believe our Physics textbooks without doing every experiment and calculation ourselves. But mystic knowledge can't override the basic explanation of the Written and Oral Law.  When people think their leader has mystical knowledge that can override common sense morality that is when they get into problems.
And I think this was the problem the Gra was addressing when he signed the excommunication. I think he thought that over confidence in mystic knowledge was held to override the Oral and Written Law and he wanted to put a stop to this phenomenon (with zero success as far as I can tell).

I should write a whole new essay on this because I have not  even gotten to the issues that are bothering me which are the Rambam's idea of knowledge of God. What can this means?
Does it mean the Infinite Light? That seems unlikely. After all the Sefer Yetzira itself calls it אור נברא Created Light. This is because the Sefer Yetzira is trying as it should to preserve Divine simplicity.
Or is it Devekut? Or mystical experience of God's light? I clearly need to deal with this at some future date.





songs for God

Sex in the Five books of Moses is not symmetrical. A woman can be married to only one man. A man can be married to many women.  ניאוף  adultery is when a man has sex with a woman who is married to another man. That gets the death penalty. It is in two lists in Leviticus  that go though the עריות.
Sex outside of marriage is  not ניאוף-adultery. It comes under the category of פילגש concubinage.

There were a good number of people in the Old Testament that had concubines. One well known such person was Calev ben Yefuna (the friend of Joshua, the disciple of Moses). [כלב בן יפונה ] He was not considered a sinner because he had a few wives and few concubines. In the Five Books of Moses he is praised with a kind of praise that is not applied to anyone  else in the Torah, וימלא אחרי השם "He was filled with God." People might not think this is good but they cant call it "sin" in Biblical terms. And when pastors do so they are just displaying their lack of education.

I forget where the list of Calev's wives and  girl friends was. I think it should be in Chronicles one where it lists the people from the tribe of Yehuda that came into Israel. One of them was Calev because Moshe told him and his buddy Joshua that they would merit to enter the land of Israel.
There  are lots of sins in the Bible but typically they have nothing to do with what pastors call sin. And what pastors call commandments are often highly sinful.

If you want to know what the Bible calls a sin just open a Five Books Of Moses and take a look at when it says, "God spoke to Moses saying speak unto the children of Israel say unto them thou shalt not do such and such a thing. and if you do so this and this is the punishment." There are lots of examples. You might say that if God says not to do something that has to count as a sin. There are of course no pastors in the world which do this simple process. It is really not complicated. But instead they have to fish around for other things to call sins.

On the other hand I can see why people just don't jump to the Five Books of Moses. They are afraid of groups that claim to be following these laws. And that is justifiable.  people that claim to be teaching Torah are mainly "Torah scholars that are demons תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאים . So that leaves anyone that wants to keep the Law of Moses in a bind. There is no where to go learn how in a practical sense to keep the Torah. If the people that claim to be teaching it are demons, that limits the options.
In real life, we encounter people that are supposedly teaching Torah that are  demons. I think I have probably met quite a few of them.

In any case, what you could do is to simply learn the Five Books of Moses on your own, and then just go through the Mishna and Talmud on your own to discover how to keep the law in a practical sense. That is what I do. If there was  an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva near me I would go there but that is not an option for me now.

9.11.15

Learning Musar [works of ethics of the Middle Ages  like The Duties of the Heart helps to gain physical and mental health. That is what Isaac Blazer said. He was a disciple of Israel Salanter and we can trust that he knew what he was taking about. 
But this takes  a lot of faith in the wise to believe this. There are plenty of world views out there that claim that fear of God is not even a worthwhile goal. And among people that agree that fear of God and good character traits are worthwhile goals there are many opinions that learning Musar does not help and that there are better ways. From what I have seen all  of these alternative claims are false. {And many of the alternative approaches are negative and harmful.} That is based on my experience and observation.
So while learning Musar has limited capacity, at least it does something positive. It may not work magic but we can trust Israel Salanter and Issac Blazer that it has positive benefits. And it benefits far outweigh the benefits I have seen from alternative paths.

The difference between the Musar Movement and I is that I think people should spend an equal amount of time on Medieval books of Philosophy like The Guide for the Perplexed,  and Saadia Gaon's אמונות ודעות (Faiths and Doctrines). This is because I don't think good character is independent of a good world view. I think rather that good character depends on a good world view.

There will be noticed some areas in which the world view of Saadia Gaon and Maimonides are not in accord with the Kabalah. This speaks more to the detraction of kabalah as a source of information than the reverse. Mystics can be very helpful with their insights but can't change the world view of Torah. Knowledge gained by mystic experience remains mystic.
The major philosophers of the Middle Ages with the approach of the Talmud and Torah are Saadia Gaon, Maimonides, Maimonides's son Avraham, Ibn Gavirol, Isaac Abravenal,
Yehudah Abravenal . If one does not know at least what they say it hard to imagine that anything he says on the topic of Jewish world view could be valid or interesting. If one has done the homework then his views can be interesting but not before.
I should mention I hold from the natural law approach of Saadia Gaon and Maimonides-so I respect any system that I feel is striving for natural law. But I have no tolerance for systems that I think are tilting people towards evil.




Songs for the glory of God

Most of what people worry about I think is  just a distraction. A false flag from the Dark Side to get you distracted from what you need to be thinking about. 

You need רצון razon-- a will to do things right. People need the will to stop depending on handouts and get a real vocation. And  to learn Torah.

That is when I find myself in some difficulty I think to myself what I read in the Shaari Teshuva of Rabbainy Yona--אין יסורים בלא עוון. There are not problems without sin. Based on this idea when I have a problem I often feel that the problem is not because of what other have done or want to do but rather from myself.  I believe all my problems come from the gap between the "is" and the "ought." That is the gap between what I do and what I ought to do. 


Rambam accidental sacrifices 6:11
He eats two pieces of forbidden fat in one span of forgetting. Then he knows about the first one. Then in the same span of forgetting as the second one he eats a third piece. Since knowledge divides he will be required a sin offering for the first piece and the second will be included even if he does not know about it yet. If instead he brought for the third piece the second will also be included.

The end of that law is this: If he remembered the second piece and brings a sin offering for it then the first and third will be included and when he remembers them he will not be required a sacrifice.

 The case is when he remembers the first piece. So what does the Rambam mean at the end when he says when he remembers the first piece after the sin offering? See the entire law and you will see that the third case is just a continuation of the original set up. Rav Shach said the sin offering does not divide.  That means to Rabbi Yochanan [who stated this law ] only knowledge divides, not the sin offering. What this means is the case is the exact set up as we started with. Nothing has changed. He ate the two first pieces in one span of forgetting, and then remembered the first. Then he ate the third in the same span as the second.  Then he brings a sin offering for the second after he remembered the second. The third is included since it was eaten in the same span of forgetting as the second, and the sin offering does not divide.



 Rav Shach wrote is that Rabbi Yochanan holds knowledge alone divides, not atonement. This is an important key. Thus in the case where there are only two pieces and he eats the first and second in one span and then remembers to first and then brings a sin offering for the first he is absolved from the second. That means to Rabbi Yochanan the first knowledge does not divide--only the second and further on. That is to say if we have the same case and he remembers the first and then the second then they are automatically divided.

I thought to explain the end of halacha 11 in ch 6.  The case is similar to the beginning of the halacha but with one difference, He ate the first and second piece and then remembered the second piece and then in the same span of forgetfulness of the first piece he ate the third piece. Now he brings a sacrifice for the second piece. The first and third are atoned for because they were both in the same span as the second but not the same span as each other.


My learning partner  thought if he had remembered the second piece, and then ate the third that that is not in one העלמה.

 I was thinking is that in my way piece 1 and piece 3 are in one העלמה and that the fact that there has not been a second ידיעה that makes it all one העלמה. in this way it is not a trivial case of all being eaten in one העלמה. The sin offering will come after the third piece was eaten and then when he remembers 1 and 3 they will be included. But I highly doubt if my learning partner will budge.

The motivation for my approach is the fact that if in a case where there are only two pieces and he eats 1 and 2 in one העלמה and then remembers 1 and brings a sin offering for 1 alone still 2 is automatically included because there was no second ידיע on 2. But if he had known about 2 before the sin offering he would have to bring another because the second ידיעה does divide.

Next day: I told him my idea. That is I explained 1 and 2 are connected. And then 3 and 1 are connected. Therefore 3 is connected to 2 by means of a bridge through piece 1. he pointed out that that cant be true because then it would work for the beginning of that halacha. That is when 1 and 2 were in one span and then he remembered 1 and then ate 3 in the same span as 2. In that case only 1 and 2 are connected. And when he brings the sin offering only 1 an 2 are taken care of. SO obviously 2 can't bridge between 3 and 1. So 1 can't bridge between 3 and 2. And besides that he noted that the Gemara itself says what he says. גררא אחת אמרינן שתי גררות לא אמרינן. And furthermore it is common sense. If he ate 1 and then remembered it and then ate 2 then piece two is not in the same העלמה. So in my case also. When he remembered 2 that makes 2 and 3 in separate העלמות. So I have to leave this entire essay out of my ideas on Shas book.





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Here is the above writings with a little Hebrew.

רמב''ם שגגות ו:י''א
He eats two כזיתים of forbidden fat חלב in one span of העלמה. Then he knows about the first כזית. Then in the same העלמה as the second כזית, he eats a third כזית. Since ידיעה divides, he will be required a חטאת for the first כזית and the second will be included even if he does not know about it yet. If instead he brought for the third כזית the second will also be included.

The end of that law is this: If he remembered the second כזית and brings a sin offering for it then the first and third will be included, and when he remembers them he will not be required a sacrifice.


 "Knowledge" means his wife walked into the kitchen and asked him, "Where is the forbidden fat I left on the table? I was going to use it to grease the car wheels!"

The next day. I would like to explain רב ש''ך's answer for the רמב''ם in more detail and I would like to  answer  the problem that he raised on the רמב''ם from Chapter 8:8. I want to show how his answer helps us to understand the end of law 11 in chapter 6. רב ש''ך I am pretty sure he meant this but he did not openly say this so I think it is necessary to show what he means.

The first point רב ש''ך makes explicitly is that רבי יוחנן holds knowledge divides not atonement. This is an important key. Thus in the case where there are only two pieces and he eats the first and second in one span and then remembers to first and then brings a sin offering for the first he is absolved from the second. That means to רבי יוחנן the ידיעה ראשונה does not divide, only the second and further on. That is to say if we have the same case and he remembers the first and then the second then they are automatically divided.

******************************************************************************

I thought to explain the end of פרק ו' הלכה י''א.  The case is similar to the beginning of the הלכה but with one difference, He ate the כזית ראשון ושני and then remembered the כזית שני and then in the same העלמה of the כזית ראשון he ate the כזית השלישי. Now he brings a חטאת for the כזית השני. The ראשון and שני are מתכפרים for because they were both in the same העלמה as the שני but not the same העלמה  as each other.


 I went to my learning partner and tried to explain this. He said if he had remembered the כזית השני and then ate the כזית השלישי that that is not in one העלמה.

In my way כזית הראשון and כזית השלישיare in one העלמה and that the fact that there has not been a  ידיעה  שנייה that makes it all one העלמה. In this way it is not a trivial case of all all three כזיתים being eaten in one העלמה. The חטאת will come after the כזית השלישי was eaten and then when he remembers כזית הראשון and כזית השלישי they will be included.

The motivation for my approach is the fact that if in a case where there are only שני  כזיתים  and he eats כזית הראשון and כזית השני in one העלמה and then remembers כזית הראשון and brings a חטאת for כזית הראשון alone still כזית השני is automatically included because there was no second ידיע on כזית השני. But if he had known about כזית השני before the חטאת he would have to bring another because the second ידיעה does divide.

Next day: I told him my idea. That is I explained כזית הראשון and כזית השני are connected. And then כזית השלישי and כזית הראשון are connected. Therefore כזית השלישי is connected to כזית השני by means of a bridge through piece כזית הראשון. He pointed out that that can not be true, because then it would work for the beginning of that הלכה. That is when כזית הראשון and כזית השני were in one span and then he remembered כזית הראשון and then ate כזית השלישי in the same העלמה as כזית השני. In that case only כזית השראון and כזית השני are מחוברים And when he brings the חטאת only כזית הראשון and כזית השני are taken care of. So obviously כזית השני can't bridge between כזית השלישי and כזית הראשון. So כזית הראשון can not bridge between כזית השלישי and כזית השני. And besides that he noted that the גמרא itself says what he says. גררא אחת אמרינן, שתי גררות לא אמרינן. And furthermore it is common sense. If he ate 1 and then remembered it and then ate כזית השני, then כזית השני is not in the same העלמה. So in my case also. When he remembered כזית השני that makes כזית השני and כזית השלישי in separate העלמות.

______________________________________________________________________________

Here is the above ideas in Hebrew

הלכות שגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה ט' והלכה י''א
אני מביא כאן שאלה על רמב''ם. אבל לפני כן אני חייב לעבור את הנושא. מבוא. יש ארבעים ושלשה סוגים של חטא שצריך להביא עליהם חטאת . כלומר  עז נקבה או כבשה. חטאת ניתן להביא רק לשוגג. אז הנה יש לנו מקרה שבו הייתה כזית חלב על  התנור. ראובן נכנס ואוכל אותו. אז שמעון נכנס לאחר מכן ושואל איפה הוא כזית החלב ששמתי בתנור? ראובן צריך להביא חטאת. אם אוכל חתיכת החלב, הוא מביא חטאת. אם הוא אכל כזית ולאחר מכן ידע שאסור, ואז אכל כזית נוספת ולאחר מכן ידע שהיה אסור, שיש לו להביא אחד חטאת על כל חתיכה. לא רק זה, אלא אם היו שתי ידיעות, שהוא אכל כזית חלב, ולאחר מכן אכל עוד כזית חלב, ואז הוא ידע על כזית הראשונה ואז הוא ידע על כזית השנייה, הוא מביא שתי חטאות.  אתה לא צריך שיהיו הידיעות בין שני מעשים של אכילה. שבת דף ע''א וכן ברמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק ו': הלכה ט'. כלומר הרמב''ם החליט כמו רבי יוחנן שידיעות מחלקות, לא כמו ריש לקיש  שהקרבת הקורבן הוא מחלקת.

אם הוא אכל שני כזיתים כאחד בהעלמה אחת ולאחר מכן ידע על כזית הראשונה. לאחר מכן, באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת השניה אכל כזית שלישית. כשהוא מביא חטאת לחתיכה הראשונה, הוא פוטר את החטא  של כזית השנייה. זה משגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה י''א. הבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב תשובה. והקרית ספר, אומר תשובה אחרת. שתי התשובות נסתרות בפרק ח' הלכה ח'  ברמב''ם. הרמב''ם מביא בדיוק את אותו החוק של רבי יוחנן שהוא אומר בפרק ו' הלכה ט' חוץ מזה שזה במונחים של קרבן אשם. ושם הוא אומר אכל חמשת זיתי חלב. זה ישירות סותר את מה שהבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב שאמר שההבדל בין  פרק ו' הלכה ט' ופרק ו' הלכה י''א  שלשון "זה אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת" משמע אכילות נפרדות. היינו היה הניסיון לומר ''אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב" הוא שני מעשים שונים ולכן הם נחשבים בנפרד, ואילו בפרק ו' הלכה י''א הוא אומר שהוא אכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת (היינו שהוא אכל שתי חתיכות כאחד בהעלמה אחת). ור''י בי רב  אמר שהכוונה בפעולת אכילה אחת וכך הן ספורות יחד. זה נסתר בפרק ח' הלכה ח' שבו הוא אכל חמש חתיכות יחד ועדיין הן ספורות בנפרד. "אכל חמש כזיתים בהעלם אחת." לדברי הבית יוסף השפה מכוון שהן נספרות כאחד, ובכל זאת יש בפרק ח' הלכה ח' החוק שהן נספרות בנפרד. רב אלעזר מנחם שך מציע תשובה שלישית. מה שרב שך מציע מבוסס על שתי הנחות. אחת: הידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת.הנחה שנייה: כמו כן העלמה אחת היא חטא אחד. כך הוא אכל כשני זיתי חלב בהעלמה. והוא ידע על כזית הראשונה. אז הוא מביא חטאת על כזית הראשונה. אבל מאחר שכזית השנייה נאכלה באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת החטא  שתי הכזיתים נתכפרות. אבל מה לגבי אם הוא רק זכר שכזית השנייה הייתה אסורה?  הכל נסלח. ולמעשה זה בדיוק מה שרמב''ם אומר. מה שקשה להבין כאן הוא זו, בחלקו האחרון של זה הלכה רמב''ם אומר אם הוא יודע על חתיכה האמצעי ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת אז שני הכזיתים (הראשון ואחרון) נתכפרים. וכאשר הוא יודע על הראשון או האחרון, הוא לא צריך להביא עוד חטאת. עכשיו לתרץ את זו אני צריך להביא את ההסבר של רב שך.
) רמב''ם שגגות ו:י''א הוא אוכל שני כזיתים של חלב  בהעלמה אחת. ואז הוא יודע על כזית הראשון. לאחר מכן, באותו העלמה של כזית השני, הוא אוכל כזית שלישי.  הידיעה מחלקת הראשון מן השלישי. הוא יידרש חטאת לכזית הראשון והשני ייכלל גם אם הוא לא יודע על זה עדיין. אם במקום זאת הוא הביא לשלישי  גם השני ייכלל. סוף החוק שהוא זו: אם הוא נזכר כבזית השנייה ומביא חטאת לזה, אז הראשון ושלישי יהיו כלולים, וכשהוא זוכר אותם הוא לא יידרש להקריב עוד.  אני רוצה להסביר רב ש''ך על הרמב''ם הזה בפירוט. ואני רוצה להראות  תשובה  על סוף  החוק 11 בפרק 6.
  הנקודה הראשונה שרב ש''ך עושה במפורש היא שרבי יוחנן מחזיק ידע מחלק לא כפרה. זה מפתח חשוב. כך במקרה שבו יש רק שתי חתיכות והוא אוכל ראשון ושני בפרק אחד ולאחר מכן זוכר לראשון ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת שהוא פוטר את הראשון והשני. כלומר, לרבי יוחנן  הידיעה הראשונה לא מחלקת, רק שניה ונוסף על. כלומר, אם יש לנו את אותו מקרה והוא זוכר הראשון ולאחר מכן את השני הם מחולקים באופן אוטומטי.  בטעות חשבתי להסביר את סוף  הלכה י''א. חשבתי שהמקרה דומה לתחילת ההלכה אבל בהבדל אחד, הוא אכל כזית ראשון והשני, ואז נזכר בכזית השני, ולאחר מכן באותו העלמה של כזית הראשון אכל כזית השלישי. עכשיו הוא מביא חטאת לכזית השני. הראשון ושלישי מתכפרים לפי שהם היו  באותה העלמה כשני, אבל זה לא אותו הדבר כמו עלמה אחת על כולם.
. בדרך שלי כזית הראשונה וכזית שלישית נמצא  העלמה אחת וכי העובדה שלא חלו ידיעה שנייה שעושה את זה כל עלמה אחד. בדרך זו היא לא מקרה טריוויאלי שכל השלושה כזיתים נאכלו בהעלם אחד. החטאת באה אחרי כזית השלישי נאכל, ואז כשהוא נזכר בכזית ראשון ושלישי הם ייכללו. המוטיבציה לגישה שלי היא העובדה שאם במקרה שבו יש רק שני כזיתים, והוא אוכל כזית ראשון וכזית שני בהעלם אחד ולאחר מכן זכר כזית ראשון ומביא חטאת לכזית הראשון לבד,  כזית שני כלול באופן אוטומטי משום שלא היתה ידיע שני לכזית השני. אבל אם הוא ידע על כזית שני לפני החטאת, הוא יצטרך להביא עוד חטאת כי הידיעה השנייה עושה הפרד.

למחרת: אמרתי להחברותא שלי את הרעיון.  אמרתי שכזית הראשון וכזית השני מחוברים. ולאחר מכן כזית שלישי וכזית ראשון מחוברים. לכן כזית שלישי מחובר לכזית שני באמצעות גשר דרך כזית הראשון.
הוא ציין כי זה לא יכול להיות נכון, כי אז זה יעבוד לתחילת ההלכה. כלומר, כאשר כזית הראשון וכזית השני היו בפרק אחד, ואז הוא נזכר בכזית הראשון ולאחר מכן אכל כזית שלישי באותה העלמה של כזית השני, במקרה שרק  הראשון והשני  מחוברים, וכשהוא מביא חטאת על  הראשון, אז כזית השני מוכלל. אז ברור כזית השני לא יכול לגשר בין  השלישי וראשון. אז כזית הראשון לא יכול לגשר בין השלישי והשני. וחוץ מזה הוא ציין כי הגמרא עצמה אומרת  גררא אחת אמרינן, שתי גררות לא אמרינן. ויתר על כן זה שכל ישר. אם הוא אכל הראשון ואז נזכר בו ולאחר מכן אכל כזית שנייה, אז כזית השני הוא לא באותה העלמה. אז במקרה שלי גם. כשהוא נזכר כזית השני זה עושה כזית השני וכזית השלישי בהעלמות נפרדות.




















8.11.15

I was just wondering guards need a type of acquisition [that is to pick it up or other kinds of ways that acquisition is made] to the Rambam. Others say it is enough just to say "Put it down, and I will watch it." But the Rambam also says one can obligate himself without any act of acquisition. I imagine that is just when he writes it in a document of something like that.
I wanted just very quickly to say that the idea of the Enlightenment of education being the redemption of mankind meant secular education. Also, I wanted to add that Allen Bloom thought that the main idea of the Enlightenment was to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals. But that was because he was a political philosopher. There was an equal part of the enlightenment that was directed towards education.

But this was not in the Yeshiva or religious kind of sense of education. [The Enlightenment thinkers were thinking about secular education.]

On the opposite side of things the other side of the enlightenment was towards spiritual wholeness and a revolt against reason.This side of things received its greatest expression in the Romantic period. But it began right at the start of the Enlightenment.


Each of these areas has positive values and also can decay into negative value.
It was Allen Bloom in his Closing of the American Mind that saw these two streams colliding and creating a crisis, or maybe even an explosion that would destroy both.

In Lithuanian yeshivas there is an attempt to remedy this situation with  a return to the Middle Ages. That is what we call learning Rishonim (medieval authorities). The idea here is that the Middle ages was a time when there was tremendous human effort spent of resolving the clefts between Faith and Reason. [Besides that it is true that Rishonim are on a vastly superior level than later authorities. This is not just propaganda. You can see it almost anywhere.]

But a simple return to the Middle Ages would only reproduce the exact conditions that made the enlightenment necessary and inevitable. Thus I am not in any better place than Allen Bloom to offer any answers. However, I do think the Litvak (Lithuanian) yeshivas are definitely n the right track.

My own approach is to take the Rambam's idea Torah, Physics Metaphysics and just to go with that.
That is I try have a kind of wholeness and balance between the two poles. Balance does not mean unconnected parts. I don't separate Reason and Faith. Think of car parts all lying in a pile. That is you have every single components of a car but they are not connected. That is not a car. A car has the same components, but they are all attached properly. That is the idea of Faith and Reason that I have. For me Faith and Reason are two components that are attached, and work together.

I should mention that I have a lot of reason to think that self education is important. So when I talk about Torah, Physics, and Metaphysics I am not talking about universities but rather what you do in the privacy for your own home. I got this idea from my own father. Also I should mention this was how Abraham Lincoln got his education. He was self taught. And besides that I discovered in university anyway that most of the learning had to be done on my own. The professors were there to bring me up to a higher level of expertise than what I could do on my own. But the ground work always had to be done by myself.
 When the Rambam says  Physics and Metaphysics he is referring to the two books of Aristotle by those names. However he means the  disciplines as the ancient Greeks understood them. You can see this when he says what teh sages of the Talmud call מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית they means Physics and Metaphysics as the ancient Greeks understood them. So even though he had a chance to say he means the books of Aristotle exclusively he did not say so. So he clearly meant the disciplines themselves.













I am not sure who is the "Rashba" in the Nemukai Joseph. The Rashba from Spain? Or Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham? I had to correct my paragraph on Bava Metzia 110 because the NJ brings some idea from the Rashba that disagrees with the first part of our Tosphot there. But is that the same person who in the second part of Tosphot is disagreeing with the Ri? It occurred to me the NJ could very well be meaning the regular Rashba from Spain.

After writing this I decided it was the Rashba from Spain. --that seems clear from Bava Metzia in ch.s 6 and 7




 I might as well tell the general public what the issue is. It is חלב. That is there are certain parts of even a kosher animal that are forbidden These are the parts that would be offered in the Temple if it would be standing. They are the areas of fat that cover the stomach and that whole region. There is some verse about this somewhere in Leviticus I think but I don't know where it is off hand. This is a very serious issue and it involves כרת. That is when the Torah says "One who does such and such a thing will be cut off from his people." On every sin like that one has to bring a sin offering if it was done by accident. This issue is so serious that Reb Shmuel Berenbaum simply never ate meat at all. He would only eat chicken on Shabat. 

7.11.15

songs for the glory of God

Ideas in Shas with new ideas in Sukkah and laws of sin offerings in the Rambam

Ideas in Bava Metzia with new ideas.


I was not sure whether to put in the beginning my background. But it seems relevant. It seems unlikely to me I would be able to learn Talmud at all if I had not been in two great yeshivas. [Mir in New York and Shar Yashuv in Far Rockway, New York State] But I don't want to imply that they would agree with anything I wrote. My mistakes are my own. And I think all the roshei yeshivas [teachers] in both places would have been able to write ideas a million times better than mine. But these are my own minor contributions to Torah study.


[I should mention that my learning partner knows how to learn very well so I really can't say that these books would have been impossible unless I had gone to yeshiva. In any case I certainly would not have had any idea on how to approach Gemara without those two institutions.
I also think I did not appreciate at the time how rare these good places of learning were. It was some gift that I came to places that seriously know the value of Torah and what it means to know how to learn. The idea of knowing how to learn is hard to explain. Mainly it is the difference between  Leonardo Da Vinci and finger painting. 
I wanted to present a subject in Bava Metzia  page 110 side and then Tosphot ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that they did in Babylonia in a city called Sura. In Sura there was a custom to make  a loan and as a guarantee the lender מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה (The borrower) without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the lender has already been there three years. Rav Yehuda said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field."[After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced.] According to Rabbainu Isaac in Tosphot Ravina disagrees with Rav Yehuda and says the borrower is believed. The way Tosphot understands this is that Ravina is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה (lender) says he bought it, still the borrower is believed.

Tosphot asks on the Ri (Rabainu Isaac) from a case in  Bava Batra  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to Rabbainu Isaac is this: If the Ri is  right then in the case in Bava Batra the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a "migo." Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that, but says a weaker plea, [i.e. a plea that is not believed]. Tosphot answers: it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In Bava Metzia page 80 we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an ass to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the ass died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with "He could have said..." in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "He could have said," because there are witnesses against that migo. That is: we don't know about the river, but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in Bava Batra and Bava Metzia  page 110 in Tosphot in which there are no witnesses against the migo. Rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen, he would have said so.

I suggest that this question of mine is the reason that Rabbainu Shimshon ben Abraham disagreed with the Ri in our Tosphot.







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This is the same thing as the above paragraphs but with Hebrew additions
I wanted to present a subject in בבא מציעא דף ק''י side and then תוספות ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that that did in Babylonia in a city called סורא. In סורא there was a custom to make  a loan and as a משכון the  מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה  without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the מלווה has already been there three years. רב יהודה said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field." After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced. According to רבינו יצחק הר''י in תוספות רבינא disagrees with רב יהודה and says the borrower is believed. The way תוספות understands this is that רבינא is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה lender says he bought it still the borrower is believed.

תוספות asks on the ר''י from a case in  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to הר''י is this: If the הר''י is  right then in the case in בבא בתרא the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a מיגו. Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that but says a weaker plea.  תוספות answers it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In בבא מציעא דף פ we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an חמור to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the חמור died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with he could have said in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "he could have said" because there are witnesses against that מיגו. That is we don't know about the river but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in בבא בתרא and בבא מציעא דף ק''י in תוספות in which there are no witnesses against the מיגו. rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen he would have said so. ______________________________________________________________________


רציתי להציג נושא בבא דף ק''י  מציעא דף ק''י ולאחר מכן תוספות, ואז שאלה. אני חייב לעשות הקדמה קצרה משכנתא דסורא הוא סוג של ערבות להלוואה שנעשתה בבבל בעיר הנקראת סורא. בסורא היה מנהג לעשות הלוואה וכמשכון המלווה יקבל שדה ולהיות  ולעבוד על זה ולאכול את פירותיו למספר שנים ובסופו של אותו זמן   השדה יחזור לבעלים (לווה) ללא כל התחייבות נוספת על הלווה. זה שונה מאשר נכייתא שהוא הפחתה של ההלוואה. במקרה של נכייתא השדה חוזר אבל חלק של ההלוואה עדיין נשאר. נניח שיש לנו מלווה ולווה באחד מהמקרים לעיל והמלווה אומר ההסכם היה במשך חמש שנים והלווה אומר שלוש שנים. המסמך אבד. ומלווה כבר היה שם שלוש שנים. רב יהודה אמר המלווה הוא נאמן כי אחרי שלוש שנים הוא היה יכול לומר "לקוחה היא בידי"  היינו "קניתי את השטח". להיות שהיה שם שלוש שנים הוא יהיה נאמן, אלא אם כן ראיות בניגוד מיוצרת. לדברי רבינו יצחק (הר''י) בתוספות רבינא לא מסכים עם רב יהודה ואומר הלווה נאמן. הדרך שתוספות מבין את זה היא שרבינא חולק כל הדרך. כלומר גם אם המלווה אמר שהוא קנה אותו עדיין הלווה נאמן. תוספות שואל על ר''י ממקרה בבבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א, במקרה שיש שדה שאדם אחד היה שם לשלוש שנים או יותר והוא אומר שהוא קנה אותו ובעל דין אומר שזה נגנב. אנו מאמינים מי שהיה שם שלוש שנים, כי אנחנו אומרים שאם זה נגנב הבעלים האמיתיים היו אומרים משהו בינתיים ולא לחכות שלוש שנים. השאלה מזה להר''י היא זו: אם ההר''י נכון, אז במקרה בבבא בתרא שאחד אומר שזה נגנב הוא צריך להיות נאמן כי הוא יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה להלוואה. יש לו מיגו. מאז שהוא היה יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה ולהאמין, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו גם כשהוא לא אומר את זה, אבל אומר טיעון חלש. תוספות עונה זה מיגו במקום עדים. המקרה הוא  "הוא יכול היה לומר" כאשר יש עדים נגדו ומיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן. יש שאלה. בבבא מציעא דף פ' יש לנו המקרה של מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן שנראה שונה ממקרה זה.  יש  שתי דרכים אחת עם נהר שהיה צריך להיות חצוי ואחר בלי ואדם ששכר חמור לשאת אותו. ואמרו לו לא לקחת את זה על הכביש עם הנהר. הוא לקח את זה ככה וחמור מת והוא אומר כשהוא היה שם לא היה שם הנהר כיוון שהתייבש. אנחנו לא מאמינים לו, כי אנחנו לא הולכים עם "הוא יכול היה לומר" במקרה שבו יש עדים. אז השאלה שלי היא, שעל דף 80 אנחנו לא אומרים ", הוא יכול היה לומר" כי יש עדים נגד המיגו. זה שאנחנו לא יודעים על הנהר, אבל אנחנו יודעים שהוא לקח את  הכביש הלא נכונה. זה נראה שונה מהמקרה שלנו בבא בתרא ובבא מציעא דף ק''י בתוספות שבו אין עדים נגד המיגו. אלא שהעדים נגד הטיעון עצמו. אנן סהדי שאם זה נגנב הוא היה אומר כך.







I had a period in Yeshiva in which I read every paragraph twice. This I think helped me a lot

That is I would take one paragraph of the Talmud and read it once straight through and then the Rashi and understand nothing. Then I would read the Soncino English translation and also understand nothing. Then I would read the paragraph in the Talmud once again and gain understand nothing. But then I would read the Rashi once again and then the whole thing became clear.

This reading the words twice approach helped me for all the years I was in Yeshiva from 18 until about 25.  The idea of review I saw in the Gra and I think it is good for certain kinds of learning, but not all. There were things that even saying them over  a few time s were simply way beyond my league and I found it better just to say the words and go on. Then I would hope the ideas would get into me by osmosis--which in fact often did happen.
The idea of a crisis of the Enlightenment is not the sole product of Allen Bloom. [I think the original person that noticed it was Max Weber.]
The problem of this crisis was the main subject of Allen Bloom's book The Closing of the American Mind.

I think that book is  a major masterpiece and recommend it for everyone. In any case the basic idea was there were two opposing currents of the Enlightenment. And these two opposing currents came to collide in the USA in the lifetime of Allen Bloom. That is the idea of this book in a nutshell.
This same problem was faced by Max Weber.


One part of the Enlightenment was give everyone education (i.e. enlightenment). Teach them reason, and then Utopia will result. And make governments do this. The Enlightenment  was an attempt to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals.
The other part of the Enlightenment was the intellectual revolt against  reason, a celebration of subjective will and intuition, and a neo-Romantic longing for spiritual wholesomeness.
So far I have said nothing new. Just read Allen Bloom and Max Weber.


The Middle Ages were in spirit was very different from everything that came before or after. It is a time that is almost impossible to understand. And yet one thing stands out from that time--the attempt to combine reason with spiritual wholeness.  This same attempts still continues today in Lithuanian yeshivas. We know learning Rishonim [Mediaeval authorities] has always been the bedrock of Lithuanian yeshivas. Recently this idea has gained in force by the example of some yeshivas that expressly commit to this approach and on purpose avoid Achronim (anyone after the Middle Ages). In some places you can see a similar approach  when then spend their efforts on Thomas Aquinas.  In any case Allen Bloom certainly noticed this because he mentioned in his book that some of his relatives who were observant Jews had as much and better understanding of life and the world just based on their reading the Old Testament and Talmud as others who read the New York Times. But Allen Bloom's answer was to tell people to learn the Republic of Plato and other great books. This seems to me to  lack the numinous, and holy aspect that makes something compelling as opposed to mere intellectual exercise.

The reason Allen Bloom did not think going back to the Middle Ages was a good idea was because of the very problems themselves that had produced the conditions  and problems which made the Enlightenment necessary.  What happens in practice is ad hoc justice, ad hoc adjudication. and widespread injustice. If laws are not equal for all, then they become very unequal. 

The model I have thought best is a kind of continuation of the Rambam approach. The Rambam thought learning Torah was a necessary prerequisite for learning Physics and Metaphysics. That is he saw learning (not knowing) Physics and Metaphysics as the fulfillment of the commandments to love and fear God. But that they don't accomplish this with the proper background of the Oral and Written Law. That is the approach that I take myself even though I have never seen anyone take Rambam approach  seriously. I simply decided not to wait until others wake up. [I am not claiming expertise in any of these fields. Rather it is just my claim that it is proper and important to spend time each day in each of these three areas.]

This longing for spiritual wholeness I think explains the Baal Teshuva movement, and the widespread revolt against reason in those circles and in fact the general seeking of spirituality we see since the 1960's. I certainly have seen my share of this in different cults.










6.11.15

cults and cult leaders

 I am certainly not the only one who has noticed the profusion of cults and cult leaders that are positively insane that are at least in name following him. Certainly everyone can see when anyone gets involved in Brelsov, they stop learning Torah for its own sake, and start following any one of the lunatic leaders. self proclaimed imitators of the real thing.

There is no good answer for this. There are areas of Torah that are important: that is, "What is it all about?" What is the meaning of it all?



Some people think that because someone was in fact a very great tzadik that therefore it is a great mitzvah to spread the word about him. But I feel it is not  praiseworthy to ignore the side effects.  It seems to me to display an enormous amount of irresponsibility to not care about the possible effects of such advice. Unconcern about the human consequences of a theory is not an attractive trait.  

My own approach I should mention. I think there are two aspects of Torah that are important--the "between man and his fellow man" (בין אדם לחבירו) part, and then the "between man and God" (בין אדם למקום) part.  The best example of the first that I know of is my parents. The later part is hard to say. I think there were a few tzadikim that represented different aspects of Torah best. The Gra for learning Torah  and general strictness in keeping the mizvot as they were given. 


. But all these aspects I think are important in order to narrow the gap between what I do and what I ought to do. That is to reach objective morality.