Ketuboth page 20 side Tosphot brings the Yerushalmi. It comes out of the Yerushalmi that even if the witnesses on a doc of a loan remember nothing they ca still testify on their signatures and this is like Rav Hai Gaon brought in the Shita Mekubetzet, but not like the Rambam. I think the way to explain this difference is that Rashi, Tosphot and Ramban hold a document on a loan has validity from the Torah, and this is I think the reason of Hai Gaon. Since the doc is valid even without anyone saying anything in court, so to add extra validity to it, it is enough for witnesses to testify as to the validity of their signatures. However To the Rambam, documents of loans have no validity from the Torah, but the sages gave them validity so that the door will not be shut in front of people that want to borrow money. Let me bring here the Yerushalmi. The Mishna says R Judah Hanasi said when a document of a loan comes to court, the witnesses on it need to testify on the validity of their signatures, and also bring someone else to testify on each signature. But the sages said it is enough if each witness testifies on the validity of his own signature. the Yerushalmi says if no one remembers the loan, there is no argument between r Judah and the sages. both agree they testify on their signatures and bring another witness as for the same purpose. If both witnesses recall the loan, there is no argument. Everyone agrees that they testify as to the loan, and that is enough. The argument is when they recall the loan only after being reminded of it by the document. To the Yerushalmi the doc can be valid even if no one recalls the loan at all, and that is the opinion of Hai Gaon. To the Rambam this case is totally not valid. He bases himself on our Gemara and the fact that the doc is anyway no valid from the Torah. Our Gemara brings the Mishna and says Rav Huna said they need to recall the loan. R. Yochanan said if they recall the loan by being reminded by their own personal document, that is enough. The Rambam decided the law like R Yochanan and our Gemara.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- כתובות תוספות בדף כ' ע''ב brings the ירושלמי. It comes out of the ירושלמי that even if the witnesses on a שטר of a loan remember nothing they ca still testify on their signatures and this is like האי גאון brought in the שיטה מקובצת, but not like the רמב’’ם. I think the way to explain this difference is that רש''י תוספות ורמב''ן hold a שטר on a loan has validity from the תורה, and this is I think the reason of האי גאון. Since the שטר is valid even without anyone saying anything in court, so to add extra validity to it, it is enough for witnesses to testify as to the validity of their signatures. However To the רמב’’ם, שטרי of loans have no validity from the תורה, but the sages gave them validity so that the door will not be shut in front of people that want to borrow money. Let me bring here the ירושלמי. The משנה says ר' יהודה הנשי said when a שטר of a loan comes to court, the witnesses on it need to testify on the validity of their signatures, and also bring someone else to testify on each signature. But the sages said it is enough if each witness testifies on the validity of his own signature. The ירושלמי says if no one remembers the loan, there is no argument between r Judah and the sages. both agree they testify on their signatures and bring another witness as for the same purpose. If both witnesses recall the loan, there is no argument. Everyone agrees that they testify as to the loan, and that is enough. The argument is when they recall the loan only after being reminded of it by the שטר. To the ירושלמי the שטר can be valid even if no one recalls the loan at all, and that is the opinion of האי גאון. To the רמב’’ם this case is totally not valid. He bases himself on our גמרא and the fact that the שטר is anyway invalid from the תורה. Our גמרא brings the משנה and says רב הונא said they need to recall the loan. ר’ יוחנן said if they recall the loan by being reminded by their own personal שטר, that is enough. The רמב’’ם decided the law like ר’ יוחנן and our גמרא.

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בבא מציעא כ''ח

מי שמוצא חפץ אבוד שיתבלה עם הזמן נדרש למכור אותו, והכסף שייך לבעל החפץ (ונשמר לעתיד שיקבל את חפצו). בינתיים, המוצא יכול להשתמש בכסף. הוא נחשב כמי ששאל חפץ של מישהו אחר, ולכן אם הוא מאבד את הכסף בכל מקרה עליו להחזיר. בבא מציעא כ"ח ע"ב כ"ט ע"א וכ"ט ע''א. זה כמו רב יוסף שמחזיק במי ששומר על חפץ אבוד שאינו חייב לתת צדקה בזמן שהוא עסוק בשמירה שלו. לכן, הוא כמו שומר בשכר, ואז מכיוון שהוא גם יכול להשתמש בכסף, הוא עולה מדרגה אחת להיות שואל של הכסף שיש לו מידה גדולה יותר של אחריות לשמור על הכסף. כך קבעו ר' חננאל והר''ם את החוק (הלכות גזלה ואבדה פרק י''ג הלכה י''ז). {תוספת חולקים על כך וקובעים שהוא כמו שומר שלא מקבל שכר.} זה סותר את בבא מציעא מ''ג שבו יש לך מקרה של אדם שהפקיד צרור כסף לא קשור אצל חלפן כספים. מכיוון שהוא יכול להשתמש בכסף, יש לו את הקטגוריה של שומר בשכר שאחראי אם הכסף אבד בגניבה, אך אינו אחראי לדברים בלתי נמנעים כמו אם הסירה (שהיה עליה) טבעה. כך רב נחמן פסק את החוק והרמב"ם פסק במקרה זה כמו רב נחמן. [הבעיה היא שהיתר להשתמש בכסף במקרה אחד (מוצא) הופך אותו ללווה או שואל, ובמקרה השני לשומר בשכר.] הסיבה ניתנת על ידי רבינו אפרים והמגיד משנה ששומר הכסף של החפץ האבוד צריך לעלות ברמה שונה משומר בשכר ללווה מכיוון שהוא מקבל את היתרון של אי-הצורך לתת צדקה בזמן שהוא מעורב בשמירה ובטיפול בחפץ, ואז הוא גם מקבל אישור להשתמש בחפץ. רב שך הציע ששמירה על החפץ האבוד נדרשת על פי התורה, ולכן זה הופך אותו לאחראי יותר. עם זאת, תשובה זו נראית קשה. הסיבה היא שההבדל בין שומר בשכר ובין שואל הוא שכל התועלת הולכת לשואל, בעוד שבמקרה של שומר בתשלום, בעל החפץ מקבל תועלת מסוימת. זו, אחרי הכל, הסיבה שהוא משלם את השומר. אבל בשני המקרים שלנו כאן תועלת מסוימת הולכת לבעל הכסף ולכן בשני המקרים השומר צריך להיות שומר בתשלום, לא לווה או שואל. הסיבה היחידה שהוא יכול להפוך ללווה היא שהוא מקבל תשלום נוסף אך התועלת עדיין תגיע לבעל החפץ האבוד. מכיוון שהתורה דורשת ממנו לשמור על החפץ האבוד, זה לא אומר שאין תועלת לבעלים. אחרי הכל, הסיבה היחידה שהתורה דורשת מהמוצא לשמור על הכסף היא לטובת בעל החפץ האבוד. עם זאת, אני יכול לראות את הרעיון שמכיוון שהתורה דורשת ממנו לשמור על החפץ האבוד, זה יוצר דרגה גבוהה יותר של אחריות

A finder of a lost object that will deteriorate over time is required to sell it and the money belongs to the owner of the object (saved for later when he claims his object.) In the meantime, the finder can use the money. He is considered to be like ne who borrows someone else’s object, and so if he loses the money under any circumstances he has to repay. Bava Mezia 28b and 29 a. This is like Rav Joseph who holds one who guards a lost object is not required to give charity at the time he is involved in his guard obligation. Therefore, he is like a paid guard, and then because he also can use the money, he gets stepped up one notch to be a borrower of the money who has a greater degree of responsibility to guard the money. This is how the Rabbainu Chananel and Rambam decided the law. (laws of theft or loss chapter 13 law 17) {Tosphot disagrees holds he is like an unpaid guard like the decision of Raba.} This conflicts with Bava Metzia page 23 where you have a case of a person who deposited a untied bundle of money with a money changer. There since the money changed can use the money, he has the category of a paid guard who is liable if the money was lost by theft, but not liable for unavoidable things like if the boat it was on sank. This is how Rav Nachman decided the law and the Rambam decided in that case like Rav Nachman. [The problem is permission to use the money in one case (finder) makes him a borrower, and in the other into a paid guard.] The reason is given by Rabbainu Ephraim and the Magid Mishna that the guard of the money of the lost object has to levels stepped up from an unpaid guard to a borrower because he gets the benefit of not having to give charity while involved in guarding and taking care of the object and then also, he gets permission to use the object. Rav Shach suggested that guarding the lost object is required by Torah, and so that makes him more liable. However this answer seems difficult. The reason is that the difference between a paid guard and a borrower is that all benefit goes to the borrower while in the case of a paid guard, the owner of the object gets some benefit, That is after all why he is paying thee guard. But in both of our cases here some benefit goes to the owner of the money and so in both cases the guard should be a paid guard, not a borrower The only reason he could become a borrower is that he gets extra paid but benefit still come to the owner of the lost object. just because ethe Torah requires him to guard thee lost object that does not means that no benefit comes to the owner. after all the only reason the Torah requires the finder to guard the money of the sake of the object is for the benefit of the owner of thee lasts object. However I ca see the idea that since the torah requires him to guard the lost object tah t makes ahigher degree of responsibility. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A finder of a lost object that will deteriorate over time is required to sell it and the money belongs to the owner of the object (saved for later when he claims his object.) In the meantime, the finder can use the money. He is considered to be like ne who borrows someone else’s object, and so if he loses the money under any circumstances he has to repay. בבא מציעא כ''ח ע''ב כ''ט ע''א and 29 a. This is like רב יוסף who holds one who guards a lost object is not required to give charity at the time he is involved in his guard obligation. Therefore, he is like a paid guard, and then because he also can use the money, he gets stepped up one notch to be a borrower of the money who has a greater degree of responsibility to guard the money. This is how ר' חננאלand הר''ם decided the law. {תוספות disagrees and holds he is like an unpaid guard like the decision of.} This conflicts with בבא מציעא מ''ג where you have a case of a person who deposited a untied bundle of money with a money changer. There since the money change can use the money, he has the category of a paid guard who is liable if the money was lost by theft, but not liable for unavoidable things like if the boat )it was on( sank. This is how רב נחמן decided the law and the רמב''ם decided in that case like רב נחמן. [The problem is permission to use the money in one case (finder) makes him a borrower, and in the other into a paid guard.] The reason is given by רבינו אפרים and the מגיד משנה that the guard of the money of the lost object has to levels stepped up from an unpaid guard to a borrower because he gets the benefit of not having to give charity while involved in guarding and taking care of the object and then also, he gets permission to use the object. Rav Shach suggested that guarding the lost object is required by Torah, and so that makes him more liable. However this answer seems difficult. The reason is that the difference between a paid guard and a borrower is that all benefit goes to the borrower while in the case of a paid guard, the owner of the object gets some benefit, That is, after all, why he is paying thee guard. But in both of our cases here some benefit goes to the owner of the money and so in both cases the guard should be a paid guard, not a borrower The only reason he could become a borrower is that he gets extra paid but benefit still come to the owner of the lost object. Because the תורה requires him to guard the lost object, that does not mean that no benefit comes to the owner. After all, the only reason the תורה requires the finder to guard the money of the sake of the object is for the benefit of the owner of thee lasts object. However I can see the idea that since the תורה requires him to guard the lost object that makes a higher degree of responsibility.

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תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק שישי מביא דיון בין ר' יוחנן וריש לקיש שקשה להבין. שאלת ריש לקיש: שלפי דעת ר' יוחנן שמי שאינו כהן שגנב תרומה מאבי אמו שהוא כהן, ואחר כך יורש את הדוד, צריך לשלם לכל שבט הכהנים. ריש לקיש מחזיק שהוא מחזיר לעצמו. ריש לקיש שואל אם ר' יוחנן צודק, אז המשנה המאוחרת שאומרת מי שגנב ואכל תרומה שהוא הקדש חייב לשלם קרן אחד (סכום עיקרי) ושתי חמישיות, צריך לומר, הוא מחזיר שלוש". ר' יסא אמר בשם ר' יוחנן שהגניבה כלולה. הרידב''ז מסביר שלהראב''ד, הנקודה של ריש לקיש הייתה שהוא צריך להחזיר שלושה קרניים, אחד עבור הקדש, ושניים עבור תרומה. הסיבה לשניים היא שכל מקרי גניבה דורשים תשלום כפול. בסך הכל יהיה זה פי שלושה מהערך המקורי. אבל איך זה טוב לריש לקיש? במקרה של המשנה השנייה הגנב אינו כהן. אז למה לא להחזיר שלושה? ריש לקיש יכול לענות שתרומת הקדש אינו רכוש הכהנים. הרי המקרה הוא כזה שכהן קיבל תרומה, ואז הקדיש אותה לבית המקדש. אז הוא בוודאי אינו הבעלים שלה יותר. הבעלים היחיד הוא בית המקדש, ולכן הוא מחזיר קרן אחת להקדש. הבעיה עם התשובה הזו היא שהיא עובדת באותה מידה גם עבור ר' יוחנן. אני חושב שהתשובה היא שריש לקיש טוען שלמרות שהתרומה שייכת למקדש, היא עדיין תרומה, ולכן עליו להחזיר שלושה קרניים, אחד להקדש, ושניים לשבט אם צריך להחזיר תרומה גנובה לשבט. אבל ריש לקיש טוען כאן שתרומה גנובה אינו מוחזר לשבט אלא לבעלים הפרטי, וכאן לאחר שהכהן נתן אותו למקדש, הוא אינו שייך לאף כהן פרטי

The Talmud Yerushalmi Trumot chapter 6 brings a discussion between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish that is difficult to understand. The question of Reish Lakish is that according to the opinion of R. Yochanan that one who is not a kohen who stole trumah from the father of his wife who is a kohen, and then inherits his property, has to make payment to the whole tribe of kohanim. Riesh Lakish holds he pays back himself. Reish Lakish asks if R . Yochanan is correct, then the later mishna which says one who stole and ate truma that is hekdesh must pay one kern (main amount) and two fifths, should say, He pays back three.” R. Yesa said in the name of R Yochanan that the theft is included. The Ridvaz explains that to the Raavad the paint of Reish Lakish was he ought to pay back three kerens [main amounts] one for hekdesh and two for truma. The reason for two is that all cases of theft require double payment. All together there would be three times the original value. But how then is this good to Reish Lakish? In this later case the thief is not a kohen. So why not pay back three? To the Ridvaz, Reish Lakish can answer that the trumah of hedesh is not property of the kohanim. The case is after all such that a kohen received trumah, and then dedicated it to the temple. So he is certainly not the owner of it any more. The only owner is the temple, so he pays back one keren to hedesh. The problem with this answer is that it works just as well for R Yochanan. I think the answer is that Reish Lakish claims that even though the trumah belongs to the temple, it still is trumah, and so he should pay back three kerens, one to hekdesh, and two to the tribe if one has to pay back stolen trumah to the tribe. But Reish Lakish might claim here that stolen trumah is not paid back to the tribe but to the individual owner, and here after the kohen gave it to the temple, it belongs to no individual kohen.---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------The תלמוד ירושלמי תרומות פרק שישי brings a discussion between ר’ יוחנן and ריש לקיש that is difficult to understand. The question of ריש לקישis that according to the opinion of ר’ יוחנן that one who is not a kohen who stole תרומה from the father of his wife who is a kohen, and then inherits his property, has to make payment to the whole tribe of kohanim. ריש לקיש holds he pays back himself. ריש לקיש asks if ר’ יוחנן is correct, then the later משנה which says one who stole and ate תרומה that is הקדש must pay one kern (main amount) and two fifths, should say, He pays back three.” ר' יסא said in the name of ר’ יוחנן that the theft is included. The רידב''ז explains that to the ראב''ד the point of Reish Lakish was he ought to pay back three קרניים [main amounts] one for הקדש and two for תרומה. The reason for two is that all cases of theft require double payment. All together there would be three times the original value. But how then is this good to ריש לקיש? In this later case the thief is not a kohen. So why not pay back three? To the ridvaz, ריש לקיש can answer that the תרומה ofהקדש is not property of the kohanim. The case is after all such that a kohen received תרומה, and then dedicated it to the temple. So he is certainly not the owner of it any more. The only owner is the temple, so he pays back one קרן toהקדש . The problem with this answer is that it works just as well for ר’ יוחנן. I think the answer is that ריש לקיש claims that even though the תרומה belongs to the temple, it still is תרומה, and so he should pay back three קרניים, one to הקדש, and two to the tribe if one has to pay back stolen תרומה to the tribe. But ריש לקיש might claim here that stolen תרומה is not paid back to the tribe but to the individual owner, and here after the כהן gave it to the temple, it belongs to no individual כהן----------