It is not IQ. It is (IQ) *(capacity for work).

What makes for success? It is not IQ. It is (IQ) *(capacity for work). I saw this in my own life many times.

This is my guess based on Bryan Caplan.

I mean my own IQ is small. But I also saw that with lots of work, I could get father than people with genius IQ's. But I also have a very low  ceiling of how far work can get me. And I have very high respect for smart people. My learning partner in Talmud  finds things that I would never see even I would learn the page a thousand times. What happens in Lithuanian yeshivas is there is a kind or appreciation for these two factors coupled: (a) זיצ פלעש the ability to work--in yeshiva jargon that is called the ability to sit and concentrate for many hours and (b)  smartness.

But what we learn from this is simple. For someone like me that is not smart, the main thing is to concentrate on one thing-- if you want to get anywhere. I mean the "smartness thing" there is not much I can do anything about.

And this idea of concentrating on one thing at a time has been a great help for me. For example in understanding Tosphot I have found it useful to stay on one Tosphot for a long time, since it seems to me impossible to penetrate the deeper meaning of Tosphot without doing this. and even very smart people have a disadvantage in this because they are so smart they think they understand Tosphot right away when they have completely missed what is going on. Smartness I have seen can be  terrible disadvantage.

Sing to God all the earth

q66  l98 great title black hole mathematics  [q66 in midi] [l98 in midi]  black hole in midi  mathematics in midi

 Mathematics and Physics are the natural laws by which God made the world and embedded into the world and told the world these are my laws --obey them. He told light to obey the laws of relativity. He told electrons to obey quantum mechanics. He told the planets to obey General Relativity. So these laws are the laws of God.So they definitely have Torah inside of them. But we do not know the Torah inside of them. So they are the secrets of Torah.

But furthermore I hold the Zohar is not the secrets of Torah.  I have respect for the great tzadikim like the Ari and the Remak and the Gra ,


In any case I think the Zohar got everything off track. And I think it would make a good deal of common sense to get back to the kind of rational Judaism that the Rambam and Saadia Gaon had in mind. Not that we have to take everything they said at face value. Nor do we have to ignore the great tzadikim like the Ari who did have great insights into Torah. Rather we simply have to switch tracks back to the Rambam and away from the Zohar.

 The Islamic 'way of war' was based on pin prick, ultra violent raids (Razzias) meant not Just to kill people, but to intimidate and demoralize the infidel by, among, other things making population terrorized, fearful More often than not, the tactics succeeded in 'softening up' the local population and paralyzing their will so that they became 'like deer in the headlights' during the next, and then the next, and then the next raid by the 'Ghazis.' 'Terrorism' was not a tactic, it was a long-term strategy. (See invasions and conquests of N.Africa and Byzantium and India.) Physical damage was less the immediate point than psychological warfare. Our contemporary jihadis have already succeeded in nullifying our First Amendment to the degree that his newspaper dares not reprint 'blasphemous' cartoons or other criticisms of 'The Prophet.' You 'get away from the fear' by Submitting (which is what Islam actually means). 

Comment by Lawrence Frank in http://www.econlib.org/


The effects of submission are severe.  The tendency is to partake less than noble characteristics of Muslims. There is a point where you have to stand up for your own identity.

That is in plain English is you don't invite someone into your home that means you harm. And Muslims mean harm. 

Now to some degree I realize that all this has happened because of a weakening and rupture of Christendom. I mean to say that before the Reformation, there was a kind of difficult union between Faith and Reason. Afterwards each went it merry way. But in that there was a weakening of each.
And this same event occurred in the Jewish world also.


Therefore the best solution is to rekindle the essence of Judaic-Christian civilization. That is by learning Torah, i.e. the Oral and Written Law. In particular I have in mind Israel Salanter's ideas of learning the basic books of ethics from the Middle ages before the rupture between faith and reason began.

The reason the Muslim invasion of Europe was stopped 500 years ago was because the Christians fought back and stopped them at Vienna. Now they are being invited back.

And that was not the first time Muslim needed to be stopped by force. The Crusades were a direct result of Muslim attacks on the Eastern Roman Empire centered in Constantinople and also their attacks on Europe. Spain had been a Christian nation until Muslims conquered it piece by piece until driven out by force. But until today Spain shows the effects of Muslim rule. It is like a 3rd world country that just happens to be in Europe.

The modern world has lost the meaning of life. And also there is no guide to life. No example to follow. No wise teacher. Just frauds and charlatans. Faceless labor and domination of the elite is what characterizes the modern age. What I suggest is to find the moments of rupture. To find the original meaning of the Torah. But moments of rupture are many in the Torah tradition, so it is not easy to define exactly what we are looking for. Prophecy as in the age of the prophets? The wisdom of the sages?

Without beating around the bush, let me say the best of Lithuanian  yeshivas
have in fact been able to redeem from the past those treasures worth preserving, that is the Rishonim. Medieval authorities. And wisely avoided most of what came later as being misguided delusions.
The main criterion should be authenticity.




The Christan world also encountered moments of rupture. Mainly the Reformation.
[I don't intend to address Christians. This is however not just a side comment. It does show a kind of parallel to our own situation. Also the problem with rupture is you can't return to the pre-rupture state. In the Reformation, both sides lost many good aspects by reason of the break.]

There are traditions that it is good to break away from. Sadly terrorists have managed to link up with their true origins. But that kind of authenticity is not what I am after here. I am more interested in authenticity from the Side of Good and Light. Not from darkness and evil and death as in Islam.


So what we need is not traditionalism, or religious fanaticism but authenticity.
To find the breaks in the past and mend them.

This might sound like I have a solution for this problem. But I don't. I have been in a couple of authentic yeshivas like the Chaim Berlin, Torah VeDaat, and the Mir  in NY and Shar Yashuv in Far Rockaway. But these authentic kinds of places are few and far between, and most attempts to recreate such things are futile.

It is hard to find someone who can teach Torah for its own sake and students that want to learn Torah for its own sake.

My suggestion is then since most people like myself are not close to authentic yeshivas is to have a hour a day of learning fast to get through the Old Testament,  and the entire Talmud with every single word of the Gemara, Tosphot, Mahrasha, and Maharam from Lublin. And then another hour of learning in depth that is to stay on one Tosphot for a couple of months until the shell starts cracking and you can see the depths and light inside. {But don't get paid for this. Getting money for learning ruins the effect. It is the same as if you would get paid for praying.}

Two hours is not a lot. You then  have the rest of the day to go to university (for a vocation or natural sciences--no pseudo sciences please.) and then go surfing.

Continued from yesterday about the Talmud in Shabat 68b and 69a

My learning partner  said that  on the other hand it could be that these are the actual opinions of Rabbi Yochanan  and Reish Lakish.  After all there is no reason for them to tie together תינוק שנשבה along with this different issue about if lack of knowledge of punishment makes it accidental. These might well be independent variables. And what happened on page 68B was Rabbi Akiva was using
 the slippery slope argument. That is, "If you hold that way well let's take it to the utmost limit. And that is usually considered informal fallacy." But it does not have to be  a fallacy. If I say to  a communist "You type of system would logically lead to such and such bad consequences (like the murder of between 20 and 50 millions )", he would have to show why these would would not logically  follow. So in the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Munbaz all Munbaz had to do was to say to Rabbi Akiva I don't hold that your taking my opinion to the outer most limit is valid--because it does not logically follow. Munbaz did not do that but it could be Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish would do that.

The trouble here is that Munbaz learns his law from a verse and and Rashi says he means it as a gezera shava גזרה שווה which means you take all the laws from one place and place them in the other place and visa verse. So in fact Rabbi Akiva would have a good reason to say his objection to Munbaz. But Rashi also says Munbaz means it as a בניין אב. That would not make any difference in our case but we are in general looking at this like a היקש In which case Munbaz would be right. The question is what is Rashi doing? Is it a gezra shava or a binyan av and why not saying it is a simple hekesh?
_______________________________________________________________________





My learning partner  said that  on the other hand it could be that these are the actual opinions of רבי יוחנן  and ריש לקיש.  After all there is no reason for them to tie together תינוק שנשבה along with this different issue about if lack of knowledge of עונש makes it שוגג. These might well be independent variables. And what happened on page ס''ח ע''ב was רבי עקיבא was using
 the טיעון מדרון חלקלק. That is, "If you hold that way well let's take it to the utmost limit. And that is usually considered כשל לוגי בלתי פורמלי." But it does not have to be  a כשל לוגי. If I say to  a communist "You type of system would logically lead to such and such bad consequences like the murder of between 20 and 50 millions", he would have to show why these would would not logically  follow. So in the debate between רבי עקיבא and מונבז all מונבז had to do was to say to רבי עקיבא "I don't hold that your taking my opinion to the outer most limit is valid because it does not logically follow. מונבז did not do that but it could be רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש would do that.

The trouble here is that מונבז learns his law from a פסוק and and רש''י says he means it as a גזרה שווה which means you take all the laws from one place and place them in the other place and visa verse. So in fact רבי עקיבא would have a good reason to say his objection to מונבז. But רש''י also says מונבז means it as a בניין אב. That would not make any difference in our case but we are in general looking at this like a היקש in which case מונבז would be right. The question is what is רש''י doing? Is it a גזרה שווה or a בניין אב. And why not say it is a simple היקש?



 השותף למידה שלי אמר שמצד שני זה יכול להיות שמדובר בחוות הדעת האמיתית של רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש. אחרי הכל אין שום סיבה להם לקשור התינוק שנשבה יחד עם נושא האם חוסר הידע של עונש עושה את זה שוגג. אלה עשויים  להיות משתנים בלתי תלויים. ומה קרה בדף ס''ח ע''ב היה שרבי עקיבא היה באמצעות טיעון מדרון החלקלק. כלומר, "אם אתה מחזיק ככה גם בוא לקחת אותו לגבול עליון." וזה בדרך כלל נחשב כשל לוגי בלתי פורמאלית. אבל זה לא צריך להיות כשל לוגי. אם אני אומר לקומוניסט "הסוג של מערכת החשיבה שלך היה מוביל לתוצאות רעות כמו הרצח של בין עשרים ל חמישים מיליון", הוא יצטרך להראות מדוע אלה לא היו עקב המערכת הפוליטית. אז בוויכוח בין רבי עקיבא ומונבז, כל מה שמונבז היה צריך לעשות הוא להגיד לרבי עקיבא "אני לא מחזיק כי  צריכים לקחת את דעתי על עד סוף הגבול החיצוני. מונבז לא עשה את זה אבל  יכול להיות שרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש היו עונים את זה. הבעיה כאן היא שמונבז לומד המשפט מפסוקים, ורש''י אומר שהוא אומר את זה כגזרה שווה שאומר שאתה לוקח את כל החוקים ממקום אחד למקם השני ואותם  במקום השני למקום הראשון. כך שלמעשה לרבי עקיבא הייתה סיבה טובה לומר הטיעון כנגד מונבז. אבל גם רש''י אומר מונבז אומר שזה כמו בניין האב. זה לא היה עושה  הבדל גדול  אבל אנחנו בכלל מסתכלים על זה כמו היקש ובמקרה כזה מונבז יהיה תקין. השאלה היא מה רש''י עושה? האם זה גזרה שווה או בניין האב. ולמה לא אומר שזה פשוט היקש?

I had two things to discuss. One in in Shabat page 69. There we have the regular argument between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish about what one brings a sin offering for. To Reish Lakish he has to not know it is a sin and he needs to not know about the punishment. If he knows it is a sin but does not know the punishment that is considered he did it on purpose and he can't bring a sin offering. Rabbi Yochanan disagrees and says he brings a sin offering in either case. What my learning partner brought up is it seems that both Reish Lakish and Rabbi Yochanan don't hold from this (either opinion) and they are only giving a justification for Rabbi Akiva. For on page 68b they openly hold from Munbaz. This seems like an area that needs to be investigated. On page 69 all that happened was the Talmud asked what is considered "accidental" to the Sages [and Rabbi Akiva] and they both answered as above. That is,- they were saying what Rabbi Akiva would hold. They were not saying  they hold . [This is not to say we don't hold by this. It is still curious. The Rambam does say that ignorance of the punishment is also considered accidental but that is because that is how Rabbi Yochanan understood Rabbi Akiva. That is not necessarily the actual opinion of Rabbi Yochanan.]


My learning partner also said that  on the other hand it could be that these are the actual opinions of Rabbi Yochanan  and Reish Lakish.  After all there is no reason for them to tie together תינוק שנשבה along with this different issue about if lack of knowledge of punishment makes it accidental. These might well be independent variables. And what happened on page 68B was Rabbi Akiva was using
 the slippery slope argument. That is, "If you hold that way well let's take it to the utmost limit. And that is usually considered informal fallacy." But it does not have to be  a fallacy. If I say to  a communist "You type of system would logically lead to such and such bad consequences (like the murder of between 20 and 50 millions )", he would have to show why these would would not logically  follow. So in the debate between Rabbi Akiva and Munbaz all Munbaz had to do was to say to Rabbi Akiva I don't hold that your taking my opinion to the outer most limit is valid--because it does not logically follow. Munbaz did not do that but it could be Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish would do that.

The trouble here is that Munbaz learns his law from a verse and and Rashi says he means it as a gezera shava גזרה שווה which means you take all the laws from one place and place them in the other place and visa verse. So in fact Rabbi Akiva would have a good reason to say his objection to Munbaz. But Rashi also says Munbaz means it as a בניין אב. That would not make any difference in our case but we are in general looking at this like a היקש In which case Munbaz would be right. The question is what is Rashi doing? Is it a gezra shava or a binyan av and why not saying it is a simple hekesh?







The other thing is in Bava Metzia, On page 104 we have the Mishna saying if it is not מכת מדינה (a strike on the country) the owner of the field does not reduce the amount owed by the serf (who pays a %) or the renter (who pays a fixed amount). On page 106 the Mishna says if it is a מכת מדינה (a strike on the country) then the amount owed is reduced.  Rav Papa says the first two mishnas in that chapter are talking about both a serf and  renter. The later mishnas are talking about one or the other -not both. First I don't understand Rav Papa. The later mishna is  a mirror image of the second one. He must mean then that you don't lower the sum if it is not a strike on the country for both. And if it is, then only one is exempt.
The Rambam chap 8 of laws of rent.says both are exempt in a strike on the county and all the other rishonim disagree and say it is only the renter who is exempt.
I should mention the language of the Mishna in both places is not clear, The mishna talks about מקבל a serf in both places and then talks about him not owing his rent money? A serf pays a %, not rent.

What I wish to ask here is page 106 when there is a case that it is not  רובא דבאגה [most of the fields in the valley have been struck] which Rav Yehuda says is considered a strike on the country. Rather all the fields of the owner have been struck. The person working the land wants a reduction. We don't give it to him.
Who is asking? The renter or the serf? To the Rambam it could be both. To the other rishonim at first glance it seems it has to be the renter because only he is the one where if there is  a strike on the country that gets  a reduction. But I think even then the Gemara might be asking about the serf. Maybe he wants a reduction because of the bad luck of the owner even if he would not get one because of a strike on the country.

That is all I have to say today. Also I wonder why my essay about my parents did not evoke more attention. I thought heroic deeds require remembrance. I thought people would like to know about my parents who were amazing role models. Here we are in a generation where they are no role models. I though telling the truth about my parents would evoke lots of attention.


______________________________________________________________________________

I had two things to discuss. One in in שבת ס''ט. There we have the מחלוקת between רבי יוחנן and ריש לקיש about what one brings a sin offering for. To ריש לקיש he has to not know it is a sin and he needs to not know about the עונש. If he knows it is a sin but does not know the punishment that is considered he did it במזיד and he can't bring a sin offering. רבי יוחנן disagrees and says he brings a sin offering in either case. What my learning partner brought up is it seems that both ריש לקיש and רבי יוחנן don't hold from this  שיטה and they are only giving a justification for רבי עקיבא. For on page :סח they openly hold from מונבז. This seems like an area that needs to be investigated. On page ס''ט all that happened was the תלמוד asked what is considered שוגג to the רבנן ורבי עקיבא and they both answered as above. That is they were saying what רבי עקיבא would hold. They were not saying that they hold of this.

The other thing is in בבא מציעא, On page ק''ד ע''ב we have the משנה saying if it is not מכת מדינה the owner of the field does not reduce the amount owed by the serf who pays a אחוז or the שוכר who pays a סכום קבוע. On page ק''ו the משנה says if it is a מכת מדינה then the amount owed is reduced.  רב פפא says the first two משניות in that chapter are talking about both a מקבל and  שוכר. The later משניות are talking about one or the other,  not both. First I don't understand רב פפא. The later משנה is  a mirror image of the second one. He must mean then that you don't lower the sum if it is not a מכת מדינה for both. And if it is, then only one is exempt.
The רמב''ם הלכות שכירות פרק ח says מנכים לשניהם in a מכת מדינה and all the other ראשונים disagree and say it is only the שוכר  who is מקבל ניכוי.
I should mention the language of the משנה in both places is not clear, The משנה talks about מקבל a serf in both places and then talks about him not owing his שכירות? A מקבל pays a אחוז, not שכירות.

What I wish to ask here is ק''ו ע''א when there is a case that it is not  רובא דבאגה which רב יבודה says is considered a מכת מדינה. Rather all the fields of the owner have been struck. The person working the land wants a reduction. We don't give it to him.
Who is asking? The שוכר or the מקבל? To the רמב''ם it could be both. To the other ראשונים at first glance it seems it has to be the שוכר because only he is the one where if there is  a מכת מדינה that gets  a ניכוי. But I think even then the גמרא might be asking about the מקבל. Maybe he wants a ניכוי because of the bad luck of the בעל השדה even if he would not get one because of a מכת מדינה.

 בשבת ס''ט. יש לנו מחלוקת בין רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש על מה שמביאים חטאת. לריש לקיש צריך להיות שהוא לא יודע שמה שעושה  הוא חטא והוא צריך לא לדעת על עונש. אם הוא יודע שזה הוא חטא, אבל לא יודע את העונש שזה נחשב שהוא עשה את זה במזיד ושהוא לא יכול להביא חטאת. רבי יוחנן אינו מסכים, ואומר שהוא מביא חטאת בכל מקרה. מה השותף הלמידה שלי אמר שנראה כי שניהם (ריש לקיש ורבי יוחנן) לא מחזיקים מהשיטה הזאת, והם נותנים רק הצטדקות לרבי עקיבא. בעמוד סח: הם מחזיקים בגלוי כמונבז. זה נראה כמו אזור שצריך להיחקר. בעמוד ס''ט כל מה שקרה היה שהתלמוד שאל מה נחשב "שוגג" לרבנן ולרבי עקיבא, ושניהם ענו כאמור לעיל. זה מה שהם אומרים שרבי עקיבא היה מחויב להחזיק, הם לא אומרים שהם מחזיקים בזה

 בבא מציעא, בדף ק''ד ע''ב יש משנה שאומרת אם זה לא מכת מדינת בעל השדה אינו מפחית את הסכום המגיע לו מן הצמית (מה שבלשון התלמוד נקרא מקבל שנותן אחוז מן העבודה שלו לבעל השדה בתור שכירות). בעמוד ק''ו המשנה אומרת אם הוא מכת מדינה בעל השדה מנכה את הסכום המגיע. רב פפא אומר שני  משניות הראשונות בפרק שמדברות על שוכר ומקבל (צמית). משניות מאוחרות  מדברות על זה או זה, לא את שניהם. ראשית אני לא מבין רב פפא. המשנה המאוחרת יותר היא תמונת ראי של הראשונה. הוא בטח אומר אז שלא להפחית את הסכום אם הוא לא מכת מדינה לשניהם. ואם כן היא מכת מדינה, אז רק אחד הוא פטור. הרמב''ם הלכות השכירה פרק ח' אומר מנכים לשניהם במכת מדינה, וכל שאר הראשונים לא מסכימים ואומרים שרק שוכר מקבל ניכוי. אני צריך להזכיר את השפה של משנה בשני המקומות לא ברור, משנה מדבר על מקבל (צמית) בשני מקומות ולאחר מכן מדברת על ניכוי שכירות? מקבל (צמית) משלם אחוז, לא שכיר. מה שאני רוצה לשאול כאן הוא ק''ו ע''א כאשר יש מקרה שזה לא "רובא דבאגה". (רב יבודה אומר "רובא דבאגה" נחשב מכת מדינה). אלא  כל השדות של בעל השדה נפגעו. האדם עובד את האדמה רוצה הפחתה. אנחנו לא מעבירים אותו אליו. מי שואל את הניכוי? שוכר או מקבל? לרמב''ם זה יכול להיות שניהם. לראשונים האחרים במבט ראשון זה נראה שזה צריך להיות השוכר כי רק הוא זה שאם יש מכת מדינה שמקבל ניכוי. אבל אני חושב שגם אז הגמרא בטח שואלת על מקבל. אולי הוא רוצה ניכוי בשל המזל הרע של בעל השדה, גם אם הוא לא יקבל ניכוי בגלל מכת מדינה.

 השותף למידה שלי אמר שמצד שני זה יכול להיות שמדובר בחוות הדעת האמיתית של רבי יוחנן וריש לקיש. אחרי הכל אין שום סיבה להם לקשור התינוק שנשבה יחד עם נושא האם חוסר הידע של עונש עושה את זה שוגג. אלה עשויים  להיות משתנים בלתי תלויים. ומה קרה בדף ס''ח ע''ב היה שרבי עקיבא היה באמצעות טיעון מדרון החלקלק. כלומר, "אם אתה מחזיק ככה גם בוא לקחת אותו לגבול עליון." וזה בדרך כלל נחשב כשל לוגי בלתי פורמאלית. אבל זה לא צריך להיות כשל לוגי. אם אני אומר לקומוניסט "הסוג של מערכת החשיבה שלך היה מוביל לתוצאות רעות כמו הרצח של בין עשרים ל חמישים מיליון", הוא יצטרך להראות מדוע אלה לא היו עקב המערכת הפוליטית. אז בוויכוח בין רבי עקיבא ומונבז, כל מה שמונבז היה צריך לעשות הוא להגיד לרבי עקיבא "אני לא מחזיק כי  צריכים לקחת את דעתי על עד סוף הגבול החיצוני. מונבז לא עשה את זה אבל  יכול להיות שרבי יוחנן וריש לקיש היו עונים את זה. הבעיה כאן היא שמונבז לומד המשפט מפסוקים, ורש''י אומר שהוא אומר את זה כגזרה שווה שאומר שאתה לוקח את כל החוקים ממקום אחד למקם השני ואותם  במקום השני למקום הראשון. כך שלמעשה לרבי עקיבא הייתה סיבה טובה לומר הטיעון כנגד מונבז. אבל גם רש''י אומר מונבז אומר שזה כמו בניין האב. זה לא היה עושה  הבדל גדול  אבל אנחנו בכלל מסתכלים על זה כמו היקש ובמקרה כזה מונבז יהיה תקין. השאלה היא מה רש''י עושה? האם זה גזרה שווה או בניין האב. ולמה לא אומר שזה פשוט היקש?