Bava Kama page 29a. Abaye said R Meir and R Judah disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, R Meir holds tripping is by negligence, and R Judah holds it is by accident. After the fall, R Meir holds abandoning the object does not absolve him from liability, and R Judah holds it does. But what is he abandons the object in the middle of a fall? Even if tripping is by negligence, what if there is case of a fall by accident like a strong wind. Or what if there is a fall by accident and he does not abandon the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon his property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he abandoned the property immediately. But I saw the Beit Yoseph [in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat 412, law 4, and in the note of the Gra note 8.] that neither of these are possible. So, I think the argument is that since to R Meir tripping is by negligence then even abandoning the property after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to R. Judah since the tripping is by accident then abandoning the property after the fall would not be liable. Also I realized that to R Meir even a case of a fall that was by accident e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked the things down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the public domain might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the Tiferet Shmuel [printed in the back of the Gemara ] and he says that to R Judah to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that I saw this stated openly in the Shulchan Aruch and the Gra on that halacha. I then thought perhaps the argument is when the fall was by accident and yet he did not abandon the object, but the Shulchan Aruch (there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. so I though perhaps the disagreement is in a case where even R Meir agrees it is a fall by accident like a strong unusual wind and he did not abandon the object by then I saw there too the Shulchan Aruch says he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by accident and he did abandon the object. R Meir says he still is liable to remove it even though he abandoned it and R Judah says there is not liable since you have both that the fall was by accident and he did abandon the object. ---------------------------------------------------------------------בבא קמא page 29. אביי said ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, ר’ מאיר holds נתקל פושע, and ר’ יהודה holds it is by אונס. After the fall, ר’ מאיר holds מפקיר the object does not absolve him from liability, and ר’ יהודה holds it does. But what is he מיאש the object in the middle of a fall? Even if נתקל פושע, what if there is case of a fall by אונס like a strong wind. Or what if there is a fall by אונס and he does not מיאש the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by אונס, and yet he did not מפקירhis property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he הפקיר the property immediately. But I saw the בית יוסף [in שלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, law ד', and in the note of the גר''א note ח'.] that neither of these are possible. So, I think the argument is that since to ר’ מאיר ,נתקל פושע then even מפקיר נזקיו after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to ר' יהודה since the tripping is by ,אונס then מפקיר נזקיו after the fall would not be חייב. Also I realized that to ר’ מאיר even a case of a fall that was by אונס e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked things מן הגג down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the רשות הרים I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the תפארת שמואל [printed in the back of the גמרא ] and he says that to ר’ יהודה to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that I saw this stated openly in the שלחן ערוךand the Gra on that דין. I then thought perhaps the argument is when the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, but the שלחן ערוך(there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the מחלוקת is in a case where even ר’ מאיר agrees it is a fall by אונס like a strong unusual wind and he did not abandon the object by then I saw there too the שלחן ערוךsays he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by אונס and he did abandon the object. ר’ מאיר says he still is liable to remove it even though he הפקיר it and ר’ יהודה says there is not liable since you have both that the fall was by אונס and he did abandon the object.

Bava Mezia 96.

A borrower of an object or animal is liable more than a paid guard because all the benefit goes to him. The Gemara in Bava Mezia 96 side a has a case where there are two borrowers of an animal, and yet the owner was with only one of the borrowers. [When the owner of the animal is with a borrower at the time the deal was agreed upon, and the animal dies, the borrower is not liable.] So, if the animal dies, then the only borrower who could be liable for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the Ramban and the Ran this might be a source for the law of the Rambam that when there are two borrowers of money on one document each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole loan just like in the case of guarantors] thus the Ramban comes to tell us the Rambam learned this from the case of the borrowers on page 96. Rav Shach (lender and borrower chapter 25, halacha 10) asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the borrowers of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other borrowers and so the first borrowers can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other borrower. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the borrowers of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each borrower is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “all the more so”. If the one borrower of the animal is liable only for his half, all the more so a borrower money is responsible only for his half even f both are signed on the loan.-------------------------------------------A שואל of an object is liable more than a שומר שכר because all theכל הנאה שלו . The גמרא in בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א has a case where there are two שואלים of an animalת and yet the owner was with only one of the שואלים. So, if the animal dies, then the only שואל who could be חייב for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the רמב''ן and the ר''ן this might be a source for the law of the רמב''ם that when there are two לווים of money on one שטר, each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole הלוואה just like in the case of guarantors]. Thus, the רמב''ן comes to tell us the רמב''ם learned this from the case of the borrowers on page צ''ו. ON THIS רב שך asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the שואלים of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other שואל and so the first שואל can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other שואל. While לווים of כסף might be liable for the whole amount. Why should we learn from שואלים of an animal to לווים of money? There is a specific reason the שואל of the animal can only be חייב for his half. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the שואלים of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each שואל is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “קו וחומר”. If the one שואל of the animal is חייב only for his half, all the more so a לווה OF money is responsible only for his half even If both are signed on the loan.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- עיין ברב שך מלוה ולווה כ''ה ה''י. שואל של חפץ אחראי יותר משומר שכר כי כל ההנאה שלו. לגמרא בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א יש מקרה שיש שני שואלים של בהמה, ובכל זאת הבעלים היה רק עם אחד מהשואלים. (כאשר בעל הבהמה נמצא עם שואל בזמן סיום העסקה, והבהמה מתה, השואל אינו חייב.) אז אם בהמה מתה, אז השואל היחיד שיכול להיות חייב על החצי שלו הוא זה שהיה לבד בלי הבעלים. לרמב''ן ולר''ן זה יכול להיות מקור לדין הרמב''ם שכאשר יש שני לווים של כסף על שטר אחד, כל אחד חייב רק בחצי. השאלה היא שאולי כל אחד צריך להיות אחראי לכל הלוואה בדיוק כמו במקרה של ערבים]. לפיכך, הרמב"ן בא לומר לנו שהרמב"ם למד זאת ממקרה השואלים בעמוד צ"ו. על כך שואל רב שך שזו לא נראית כהוכחה טובה מכיוון שהשואלים של הבהמה חייבים להיות אחראים רק לחלק אחד (כל אחד רק חצי). הסיבה לכך היא שהחלק השני של הבהמה הושאל לשואל השני, ולכן השואל הראשון אינו יכול להיות אחראי למחצית השנייה מכיוון שההנאה של מחצית זו לא הלכה אליו, אלא הלכה לשואל השני. בעוד שלווים של כסף יכולים להיות אחראים לכל הסכום. מדוע עלינו ללמוד משואלים של בהמה ללווים של כסף? יש סיבה ספציפית לכך שהשואל של הבהמה יכול להיות חייב רק למחציתו. התשובה הזמנית שלי לכך היא שבמקרה של השואלים של הבהמה, הבהמה היא חלק אחד שלם, ולכן אינה מחולקת, ובכל זאת אנו עדיין אומרים שכל שואל אחראי רק על מחציתו. אבל כשמדובר בהלוואת כסף, אין סיבה לא להתייחס לכל הסכום כמתחלק. לכן, יש לנו "קו וחומר". אם השואל האחד של הבהמה חייב רק על מחציתו, קל וחומר שלווה של כסף אחראית רק על מחציתו גם אם שניהם חתומים על ההלוואה

Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. But to my opinion, it is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality

Because of Hume, Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. This came the fact that Hume was teaching Euclid. There reason is to build on axioms, and only when a contradiction between a deduction and an axiom comes about then reason says one rejects the deduction. So, to Hume reason has one function alone-to perceive contradictions. Not to bridge between the mind and reality. The problem with this is that Hume states his point as a given fact without ever proving it or even giving any arguments for it. Kant disagreed with this a and said reason has another function that through its software to perceive reality, i.e., through the principles of logic to perceive reality. That is reason is a system of rules by which reality can be perceived. the problem is that this still builds of Hume’s fallacy. Reason in my opinion goes beyond that. To Michael Huemer it perceives universals. But to my opinion it goes beyond that. It is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality.[However, there is a difference between the function of reason recognizing contradictions and universals and objective reality. This is still not to deny the importance of Kant and Leonard Nelson who recognize these differences.]][You do not need to prove that there is reality, or that reason sees reality directly. If you do not belive in reality, then you need to bring proof, and there is no proof that could satisfy the conditions needed for such a proof.]See this from bryan caplan and similar ideas from michael huemer.

With learning Physics, I found for me going forwards and backwards on every page was an amazing help. but eventually it got me bogged down. I try nowadays to combine several methods of learning. One way is to listen to lectures by experts that are now accessible on the internet. In years past, there was no access to anything like this unless one was enrolled in a university. I also hold strongly with the path of learning of Rav Nachman of saying the words and going on with no review until I have finished the whole book, and then review the whole book at least four times. {This comes from the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov number 76. It is also hinted at in the LeM of Rav Nachman vol. I, chapter 11. } [The forwards and backwards approach helped me get started, and also to get through my subjects at Polytechnic Institute of NYU.] [The source in the Gemara in Tractate Shabat page 63 and Tractate Avoda Aara page 19a]

za98 E Minor, a midi file za98 a nwc file

Moral Objectivism

Moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle, and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality: (1) There are moral propositions. (2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.") (4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth) (5) So moral values are part of reality, (which is objectivism). But: Moral knowledge, if there is any, can't be empirical because, first, moral values are not perceptible; second, moral propositions are generally necessary, whereas empirical knowledge is generally contingent; and third, it doesn't seem possible to construct any kind of inductive arguments for moral conclusions. Moral knowledge, if there is any, can't be empirical because, first, moral values are not perceptible; second, moral propositions are generally necessary, whereas empirical knowledge is generally contingent; and third, it doesn't seem possible to construct any kind of inductive arguments for moral conclusions. Moral intuition is an exercise of reason. I note that I also believe in mathematical intuitions, metaphysical intuitions, psychological intuitions, and even physical intuitions -- and that all of these are exercises of reason in the same sense, and differ from one another and from ethical intuition simply in the subject matter to which intuition is applied. Since it will make some people feel better to reflect that moral intuition is not unusual but is just like several other uses of our intellect, I will list examples of these. As mathematical intuitions, take "1+1=2" and "the shortest path between any two points is a straight line". As a metaphysical intuition, "The number of planets in the solar system is a contingent matter." As a psychological intuition, "Other things being equal, conscious beings will want to avoid pain." As physical intuitions, try "Forces cause motion" and "Physical causes are local; there is no action at a distance." Finally, as a moral intuition, consider "Torturing people just for the fun of it is wrong."[This is from Michael Huemer. I might mention it is also based on the idea of direct awareness. German idealism assumes we are only directly aware of empirical material things, not any a priori facts. this is based on Hume but seems false. Hume never proves this point but just keeps repeating it as if it is obvious. Why think that empirical observation is so much more reliable that direct reason? What makes observation so superior to the intellect that Hume should play down the intellect as much as possible? In fact, you will notice that even Hume turns to the intellect to justify observations; for what determines what conditions of observation are "reasonable"? Surely not observation itself, for then we would have a circular argument. [This argument is from Bryan Caplan.]

מעשר ראשון חייב בתרומה במקרה שניתן ללוי מתבואה שעדיין הייתה חייבת בתרומה. אבל בדרך כלל מעשר ראשון אינו חייב בתרומה. בעיניי הגיוני לומר שמעשר ראשון שחייב בתרומה ניתן להשתמש איתו להפריש ממנו תרומה גדולה עבור תבואה אחרת שחייבת בתרומה. אבל כשאינו חייב בתרומה, אבל עדיין חייב בתרומת מעשר, אזי אפשר להשתמש בו רק להפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר לדגן אחר שחייב רק בתרומת מעשר. אני חושב שההבחנה הזו היא דעת הרמב''ם והיא עונה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם בפרק ג' דין כ''א לפרק ה' דין י''ג. והרמב''ם בדין כ''א הוא כותב "אפשר להשתמש בו כתרומה עד שכולה תרומה". איך זה יכול להיות אפשרי אם המשמעות של "תרומה" שם פירושה תרומה גדולה? ברור שהמשמעות היא שהוא משמש עבור להפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר לתבואה אחרת עד שנותרים עשרת האחוזים האחרונים, כאשר גם הוא הופך לתרומת מעשר לחיוב שלו. גישה זו שונה מר' שמשון הסובר כי מעשר ראשון שעדיין מחויב בתרומת מעשר אך לא מחויב בתרומה, יכול לשמש כדי להפריש ממנו תרומה עבור תבואה אחרת-------הערה מאוחרת יותר. לאחר כתיבת הפסקאות לעיל שמתי לב שרב שך כותב חלק ממה שכתבתי. כלומר, הוא לוקח את המקרה שהמעשר הראשון מחויב רק בתרומת מעשר ואומר שאז רק תרומת מעשר ניתן להפריד ממנו עבור תבואה אחרת, וזו משמעותו של פרק א' דין כ''א. אני מסכים עם זה, אבל אני מוסיף שבמקרה שבו המעשר הראשון מחויב גם בתרומה גדולה וגם בתרומת מעשר, ניתן להשתמש בו עבור שתיהן עד שיישארו עשרת האחוזים האחרונים. אז בנקודה זו, צריך להפריד את האחוזים הנותרים כתרומת מעשר עבור החיוב שלו