Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. But to my opinion, it is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality

Because of Hume, Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. This came the fact that Hume was teaching Euclid. There reason is to build on axioms, and only when a contradiction between a deduction and an axiom comes about then reason says one rejects the deduction. So, to Hume reason has one function alone-to perceive contradictions. Not to bridge between the mind and reality. The problem with this is that Hume states his point as a given fact without ever proving it or even giving any arguments for it. Kant disagreed with this a and said reason has another function that through its software to perceive reality, i.e., through the principles of logic to perceive reality. That is reason is a system of rules by which reality can be perceived. the problem is that this still builds of Hume’s fallacy. Reason in my opinion goes beyond that. To Michael Huemer it perceives universals. But to my opinion it goes beyond that. It is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality.[However, there is a difference between the function of reason recognizing contradictions and universals and objective reality. This is still not to deny the importance of Kant and Leonard Nelson who recognize these differences.]][You do not need to prove that there is reality, or that reason sees reality directly. If you do not belive in reality, then you need to bring proof, and there is no proof that could satisfy the conditions needed for such a proof.]See this from bryan caplan and similar ideas from michael huemer.

With learning Physics, I found for me going forwards and backwards on every page was an amazing help. but eventually it got me bogged down. I try nowadays to combine several methods of learning. One way is to listen to lectures by experts that are now accessible on the internet. In years past, there was no access to anything like this unless one was enrolled in a university. I also hold strongly with the path of learning of Rav Nachman of saying the words and going on with no review until I have finished the whole book, and then review the whole book at least four times. {This comes from the Conversations of Rav Nachman of Breslov number 76. It is also hinted at in the LeM of Rav Nachman vol. I, chapter 11. } [The forwards and backwards approach helped me get started, and also to get through my subjects at Polytechnic Institute of N.Y.U.] [The source in the Gemara in Tractate Shabat page 63 and Tractate Avoda Zara page 19a]

za98 E Minor, a midi file za98 a nwc file

Moral Objectivism

Moral objectivism (like objectivism in general) seems to be entailed by the law of excluded middle, and the correspondence theory of truth, along with a couple of what seem equally obvious observations about morality: (1) There are moral propositions. (2) So they are each either true or false. (by law of excluded middle) (3) And it's not that they're all false. Surely it is true, rather than false, that Josef Stalin's activities were bad. (Although some communists would disagree, we needn't take their view seriously, and moreover, even they would admit some moral judgement, such as, "Stalin was good.") (4) So some moral judgements correspond to reality. (from 2,3, and the correspondence theory of truth) (5) So moral values are part of reality, (which is objectivism). But: Moral knowledge, if there is any, can't be empirical because, first, moral values are not perceptible; second, moral propositions are generally necessary, whereas empirical knowledge is generally contingent; and third, it doesn't seem possible to construct any kind of inductive arguments for moral conclusions. Moral knowledge, if there is any, can't be empirical because, first, moral values are not perceptible; second, moral propositions are generally necessary, whereas empirical knowledge is generally contingent; and third, it doesn't seem possible to construct any kind of inductive arguments for moral conclusions. Moral intuition is an exercise of reason. I note that I also believe in mathematical intuitions, metaphysical intuitions, psychological intuitions, and even physical intuitions -- and that all of these are exercises of reason in the same sense, and differ from one another and from ethical intuition simply in the subject matter to which intuition is applied. Since it will make some people feel better to reflect that moral intuition is not unusual but is just like several other uses of our intellect, I will list examples of these. As mathematical intuitions, take "1+1=2" and "the shortest path between any two points is a straight line". As a metaphysical intuition, "The number of planets in the solar system is a contingent matter." As a psychological intuition, "Other things being equal, conscious beings will want to avoid pain." As physical intuitions, try "Forces cause motion" and "Physical causes are local; there is no action at a distance." Finally, as a moral intuition, consider "Torturing people just for the fun of it is wrong."[This is from Michael Huemer. I might mention it is also based on the idea of direct awareness. German idealism assumes we are only directly aware of empirical material things, not any a priori facts. this is based on Hume but seems false. Hume never proves this point but just keeps repeating it as if it is obvious. Why think that empirical observation is so much more reliable that direct reason? What makes observation so superior to the intellect that Hume should play down the intellect as much as possible? In fact, you will notice that even Hume turns to the intellect to justify observations; for what determines what conditions of observation are "reasonable"? Surely not observation itself, for then we would have a circular argument. [This argument is from Bryan Caplan.]

מעשר ראשון חייב בתרומה במקרה שניתן ללוי מתבואה שעדיין הייתה חייבת בתרומה. אבל בדרך כלל מעשר ראשון אינו חייב בתרומה. בעיניי הגיוני לומר שמעשר ראשון שחייב בתרומה ניתן להשתמש איתו להפריש ממנו תרומה גדולה עבור תבואה אחרת שחייבת בתרומה. אבל כשאינו חייב בתרומה, אבל עדיין חייב בתרומת מעשר, אזי אפשר להשתמש בו רק להפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר לדגן אחר שחייב רק בתרומת מעשר. אני חושב שההבחנה הזו היא דעת הרמב''ם והיא עונה על הסתירה בין הרמב''ם בפרק ג' דין כ''א לפרק ה' דין י''ג. והרמב''ם בדין כ''א הוא כותב "אפשר להשתמש בו כתרומה עד שכולה תרומה". איך זה יכול להיות אפשרי אם המשמעות של "תרומה" שם פירושה תרומה גדולה? ברור שהמשמעות היא שהוא משמש עבור להפריש ממנו תרומת מעשר לתבואה אחרת עד שנותרים עשרת האחוזים האחרונים, כאשר גם הוא הופך לתרומת מעשר לחיוב שלו. גישה זו שונה מר' שמשון הסובר כי מעשר ראשון שעדיין מחויב בתרומת מעשר אך לא מחויב בתרומה, יכול לשמש כדי להפריש ממנו תרומה עבור תבואה אחרת-------הערה מאוחרת יותר. לאחר כתיבת הפסקאות לעיל שמתי לב שרב שך כותב חלק ממה שכתבתי. כלומר, הוא לוקח את המקרה שהמעשר הראשון מחויב רק בתרומת מעשר ואומר שאז רק תרומת מעשר ניתן להפריד ממנו עבור תבואה אחרת, וזו משמעותו של פרק א' דין כ''א. אני מסכים עם זה, אבל אני מוסיף שבמקרה שבו המעשר הראשון מחויב גם בתרומה גדולה וגם בתרומת מעשר, ניתן להשתמש בו עבור שתיהן עד שיישארו עשרת האחוזים האחרונים. אז בנקודה זו, צריך להפריד את האחוזים הנותרים כתרומת מעשר עבור החיוב שלו

Rambam laws of Trumah ch. 3 law 21 and ch. 5 law 13

The first tithe can be obligated in Trumah in a case where it was given to the Levite from grain that was still obligated in Trumah. Butin general, the first tithe is not obligated in Trumah. It makes sense to say that that first tithe can be used to separate from it Trumah for other grain that is obligated in Trumah. [That is from the Sifri Zuta. Rabainu Shimshon brings this in Tractate Truma chapter 1, mishna 5.] But when it is not obligated in Trumah but still obligated in Trumat Masar, then it can only be used to separate from it Trumat Masar for other grain that is obligated only in Trumat Masar. I think this distinction is the opinion of the Rambam and it answers the contradiction between the Rambam in chapter 3 law 21 and chapter 5 law 13. and the langue of the Rambam in law 21 where he writes, “It can be used as Trumah until all of it is Trumah.” How could this be possible if the meaning of Trumah there means Truma Gedola? It is clear that the meaning is it is used for Trumat Masar for other grain until the last ten percent is left when that is also made Trumat Masar for its own obligation. This approach is different from Rabbainu Shimshon who holds that Masar Rishon which is still obligated in Trumat Masar (but not obligated in Truma) can be used to separate from it Trumah for other grain. [Later note. After writing the above paragraphs I noticed that Rav Shach writes part of what I wrote. That is, he takes the case that the masar rishon is obligated only in trumat masar and says that then only trumat masar can be separated from it for other grain and that is the meaning of chapter 1 law 21. I agree with this, but I add that a case in which the masar rishon is obligated in both truma gedola and trumat masar it can be used for both until the last ten percent is left. Then at that point, one needs to separate the remaining then percent as trumat masar for its own obligation.] ------The מעשר ראשון can be obligated in תרומה in a case where it was given to the לוי from grain that was still obligated in תרומה. But, there also can be the מעשר ראשון that is not obligated in ,תרומה . The רמב''ם brings such a case in laws of תרומה chapter 1.to me it makes sense to say that that first tithe can be used to separate from it תרומה for other grain that is obligated in תרומה. but when it is not obligated in תרומה but still obligated in תרומת מעשר, then it can only be used to separate from it תרומת מעשר for other grain that is obligated only in תרומת מעשר. I think this distinction is the opinion of the רמב''ם and it answers the contradiction between the רמב''ם in chapter ג' law כ''א and chapter ה' law י''ג. and the רמב''ם in law כ''א where he writes, “It can be used as תרומה until all of it is תרומה.” How could this be possible if the meaning of תרומה there means תרומה גדולה? It is clear that the meaning is it is used for ֱ for other grain until the last ten percent is left when that is also made תרומת מעשר for its own obligation. This approach is different from ר' שמשון who holds that מעשר rishon which is still obligated in תרומת מעשר but not obligated in תרומה can be used to separate from it תרומה for other grain. [Later note. After writing the above paragraphs I noticed that רב שך writes part of what I wrote. That is, he takes the case that the מעשר ראשון is obligated only in תרומת מעשר and says that then only תרומת מעשר can be separated from it for other grain, and that is the meaning of chapter א' law כ''א. I agree with this, but I add that a case in which the מעשר ראשון is obligated in both תרומה גדולה and תרומת מעשר it can be used for both until the last ten percent is left. Then at that point, one needs to separate the remaining then percent as תרומת מעשר for its own obligation.]

freedom of the individual

The Sages interpret the verse about the Ten Commandments “they were engraved on the tablets” to imply “freedom was on the tablets.” אל תקרא חרות על הלוחות אלא חירות על הלוחות Freedom comes only with keeping the Ten Commandments. The concept of the freedom of the individual never arose in any context except in a lonely island in the north Atlantic where people believed in the Ten Commandments i.e., England. Even though it started with the Magna Carta, the real birth and guarantee of the freedom the individual began with the Provisions of Oxford. Outside of that, there had never been any country or nation which espoused the freedom of the individual.