Belief in God is rational. Everything has a cause. So unless there is a first cause, then you would have an infinite regress. And then nothing could exist. Therefore there must be a first cause. Therefore God, the first cause, exists. QED.
4.11.25
בודת זרה דף נ''ג וראש השנה דף י''ג. העצים שנשתלו ונעבדו לאחר שניתנה ארץ כנען לאברהם היו אלילים של גויים שצריכים רק ביטול, לא שריפה. לכן, כאשר התורה אומרת לשרוף את האשרות, זה מהתייחס לעצים שנשתלו לפני שהארץ ניתנה לאברהם. אבל אפילו אלה עדיין היו אשרות של גויים. לכן התוספות מסבירים שהעצים שישראל נצטוו לשרוף בוודאי נשתלו סתם ולא להיות נעבדים, ואז הארץ ניתנה לאברהם יחד עם העצים. לאחר מכן ישראל עבדו את עגל הזהב, ובכך הראו שעבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מנקודת מבטם. אז, כאשר לאחר מכן, הגויים עבדו את העצים הללו, העצים הללו הפכו להיות אשרות של ישראל שצריך לשרוף אותם, לא רק ביטול. אבל אז עולה השאלה האם עץ שנשתל כרגיל, אך מאוחר יותר סגדו לו, אינו הופך להיות לעבודת אלילים. התשובה היא שתוספות גורסים כמו ר' יוסי הגלילי בעבודה זרה דף מ''ה, אשר סבור שעצים שנשתלו ולאחר מכן סגדו להם נהפכו לעבודת אלילים. השאלה היא אז כיצד יסבירו החכמים שחולקים על ר' יוסי את הבעיה מדוע עצים מסוימים היו צריכים להישרף
Avoda Zara page 53. Rosh Hashana page 13.The trees that were planted and worshipped after the land of Canaan was given to Avraham were idols of gentiles which only need nullification, not burning. So, when the Torah says to burn the asherot, it has to refer to trees that were planted before the land was given to Avraham. But even those were still asherot of gentiles. So tosphot explains the trees that Israel were commanded to burn must have been planted and not worshiped, and then the land was given to Avraham along with the trees. Then Israel served the golden calf, and by that showed that serving idols was ok from their point of view. So, when after that, the gentiles worshipped those trees, those trees became ashorot of Israel which need to be burnt, not just nullified. But then the question comes up that a tree that was planted normally, but later was worshipped does not become an idol. Answer Tosphot holds like R. Jose HaGalili who holds that trees that were planted and later were worshipped become idols. The only question is then how would the sages that disagree with R. Jose explain the problem of why certain trees had to be burnt.
[An idol that is owned by a gentile needs only nullification. But an idol owned by a Israel needs to be burnt, Therefore why were Israel commanded to burn the asherot (trees that were worshipped) when they entered into the land of Canaan. This above paragraph comes to answer this question. Another important factor here is that a gentile that planted a tree (after the land of Canaan was given to Avraham) owned the tree. So, the only tree that were owned by Israel when they entered the land of Israel were those that had been planted before the land was given to Avraham. There the only possible answers for the sages to answer are that they held that even trees that were planted to be worship before the land was given to Avraham were in fact owned by Avraham after the whole land was given to him. and this I think is the best answer for the sages. However, the gemara has to be referring to trees that were planted in order to be worshipped before the land was given to Avraham, but not worshipped until afterwards. Those trees did not become idols even after they were worshiped because a person can not cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him until Israel served the golden calf. Then, if those trees were worshiped after that, they became forbidden and became idols of Israel and had to be burnt.
]
-----------------------------------------עבודה זרה דף נ''ג וראש השנה דף י''ג. The trees that were planted and worshipped after the land of Canaan was given to אברהם were idols of gentiles which only need ביטול, not burning. So, when the תורה says to burn the אשרות, it has to refer to trees that were planted before the land was given to אברהם. But even those were still אשרות of gentiles. So תוספות explains the trees that Israel were commanded to burn must have been planted and not worshiped, and then the land was given to אברהם along with the trees. Then Israel served the golden calf, and by that showed that serving idols was ok from their point of view. So, when after that, the gentiles worshipped those trees, those trees became אשרות of Israel which need to be burnt, not just ביטול. But then the question comes up that a tree that was planted normally, but later was worshipped does not become an idol. Answer תוספות holds like ר' יוסי הגלילי בעבודה זרה דף מ''הwho holds that trees that were planted and later were worshipped become idols. The only question is then how would the sages that disagree with ר' יוסי explain the problem of why certain trees had to be burnt.[[
[An idol that is owned by a gentile needs only nullification. But an idol owned by a Israel needs to be burnt, Therefore why were Israel commanded to burn the אשרות (trees that were worshipped) when they entered into the land of Canaan. This above paragraph comes to answer this question. Another important factor here is that a gentile that planted a tree (after the land of Canaan was given to אברהם) owned the tree. So, the only trees that were owned by Israel when they entered the land of Israel were those that had been planted before the land was given to אברהם. There the only possible answers for the חכמים to answer are that they held that even trees that were planted to be worship before the land was given to אברהם were in fact owned by אברהם after the whole land was given to him. and this I think is the best answer for the חכמים. However, the גמרא has to be referring to trees that were planted in order to be worshipped before the land was given to אברהם, but not worshipped until afterwards. Those trees did not become idols even after they were worshiped because a person can not cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him until Israel served the golden calf. Then, if those trees were worshiped after that, they became forbidden and became idols of ישראל and had to be burnt.
]]
2.11.25
What is a woman? Anyone who identifies as a woman. But then what is it exactly that they are identifying as?
Most people in the USA will tell you a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman. But then I ask, "What is it exactly that they are identifying as?" The answer must surely be they identify as someone who identifies as a woman. After all that is the definition of a woman. And this is in fact accurate. They identify as someone who identifies as a woman. And now we have an infinite regression.
So, we still do not know who to believe anything and everything they say because we ae supposed to believe all women.
Hume and Kant divided between Reason and Reality and this crack in opened the door for this kind of fallacy
Because of Hume, Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. This came the fact that Hume was teaching Euclid. There reason is to build on axioms, and only when a contradiction between a deduction and an axiom comes about then reason says one rejects the deduction. So, to Hume reason has one function alone-to perceive contradictions. Not to bridge between the mind and reality. The problem with this is that Hume states his point as a given fact without ever proving it or even giving any arguments for it. Kant disagreed with this a and said reason has another function that through its software to perceive reality, i.e., through the principles of logic to perceive reality. That is reason is a system of rules by which reality can be perceived. the problem is that this still builds of Hume’s fallacy. Reason in my opinion goes beyond that. To Michael Huemer it perceives universals. But to my opinion it goes beyond that. It is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality
31.10.25
בבא קמא ו' ע''א ארצה כאן להסביר שאלה שרב שך בניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' שואל על הרא''ש. הגמרא אומר אבנו סכינו או משאו שמי שהוא משאיר על הגג ונפלו ברוח מצויה חייב משום בור ואש. הרא'ש מביא יש מפרשים שאדם אחראי רק למה שאחראי אם הנזק היה משהו שיהיה אחראי אם הוא נגרם על ידי שניהם, אש וגם בור, לא זה או זה. הרא"ש חולק ואומר שעיקר לימוד היא מבור. רב שך שואל על כך מהעובדה שאבנו סכינו או משאו אחראים אם הם שוברים כלים. (בור פטור על כלים.) בהתחלה נראה לי שרב שך, ניסה להביא הוכחה להיש המפרשים. אבל אז עלה בדעתי שרב שך מציע דעה שלישית. דעה זו של רב שך היא אדם אחראי במקרה של אבנו סכינו או משאו (או בכל המקרים) הנלמדים משני גורמים שאדם אחראי לכל החובות שעלולות להיגרם לאחד או לשני או לשניהם. כלומר, אדם אחראי במקרה של איחוד, לא רק במקרה של הצטלבות. ואדם אחראי לא רק על מה שהוא היה אחראי עבור בור, אלא גם על מה שחייב גם בגלל אש לחוד כמו כלים. וגם הוא חייב על טמון שפטור משום אש אבל חייב משום בור
Bava Kama page 6A
I would like here to explain a question that Rav Shach [in laws of damages chapter 1 halacha 8] asks on the Rosh. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The Gemara says a burden or stone one leaves on a roof and they fall in a common wind is liable because of pit and fire. The Rosh brings “some explain” that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both fire and pit, not one or the other. the Rosh disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. Rav Shach asks on this from the fact that the stone knife or burden are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that Rav Shach by asking on the Rosh was by that trying to bring a proof to the other opinion brought in the Rosh. But then it occurred to me that Rav Shach is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the “some say” nor like the Rosh. This opinion of Rav Shach is that one is liable in this case of stone knife or burden or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. that is one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for pit. ---------------------------------------------------- בבא קמא ו' ע''אI would like here to explain a question that רב שך in ניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' asks on the רא’’ש. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The גמרא says a אבנו סכינו או משאו leaves on a roof and they fall in a רוח מצויה is liable because of pit and fire. The רא’’ש brings יש מפרשים that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both אש and בור, not one or the other. The רא’’ש disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. רב שך asks on this from the fact that the אבנו סכינו או משאו are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that רב שך by asking on the רא’’ש was by that trying to bring a proof to the יש מפרשים brought in the רא’’ש. But then it occurred to me that רב שך is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the יש מפרשים nor like the רא’’ש. This opinion of רב שך is that one is liable in this case of אבנו סכינו או משאו or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. That is, one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for בור.
24.10.25
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