Laws of Robbery or Loss, chapter 14, law 6. Rav Shach asks a question on Tosphot in Bava Kama page 69a. According to Tosphot, a person that steals from a robber (after the owner has already given up on getting the object back), is liable to repay four or five. (A thief that steals a sheep is required to repay four sheep and if he stole an ox, he is required to repay 5 oxen). Rav Shach asks on this how is this possible. it has already gone out of the possession of the owner what Rav Shach intends to ask here is in a case where a robber has taken an animal and the owner has given up on getting it back. then a thief steals it from the robber. At that point there has been giving up and change of possession, and therefore the thief owns the animal. So, if he sells or slaughters the animal, he ought not be liable for 4 or 5. According to the Gemara on page 68 a, there the gemara holds that even though a thief is usually liable for four or five, however if he already owns the animal, he is not liable for that amount. After all, he is selling what already belongs to him or slaughtering what already belongs to him. The answer to this question I believe is found on page 68b in the second approach of the Gemara. There is an argument between R. Yochanan and Reish Lakish if a thief sells an animal after the owner has given up. Reish Lakish said he is not liable because he is selling what already belongs to him. R Yochanan disagrees with this logic and states that he is liable. So, we see that R. Yochanan does not hold with the reasoning of “he is selling what already belongs to him,” and therefore is not liable. So, we can answer the question of Rav Shach on Tosphot. Here, Tosphot is going like R. Yochanan and therefore even a thief of a robber after the owner has given up the thief is still liable to repay four or five. HOWEVER, ONE might ask on this because R Yochanan might disagree with Reish Lakish in the question of whether giving up alone causes acquisition. The way it seems at this point, is that he holds giving up alone causes acquisition, but even so, he does not think that is a preventative from bringing four or five. That is, he agrees he is selling his own property, but even so is required to bring four or five because he did steal the animal. But it is also possible to say that R Yochanan disagrees with Reish Lakish in this question, does giving up alone causes acquisition? Perhaps only giving up along with change of domain causes acquisition. In that case, the reason R. Yochanan holds him to be liable is that he is not selling an animal that belongs to him, but rather which belongs to the one stolen from. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD here as a side note that R Yochanan also holds that if the thief sells the animal before the owner has given up, he is also liable in four or five. At first, I thought the reason is that even though the sale is not valid, still the act o going through with the sale makes him liable. Later I saw that Rav Shach in laws of theft chapter 1 law 14 brings that a robber has certain rights in the object he stole before he gives it back, for example if he plows with the ox he stole he does not have to pay what profits he made from that. He only gives back the ox or pays back the value of the ox as it was worth at the time of the sale. So, in our case here R Yochanan holds the reason the thief pays four or five that the sale is valid to some degree even though he did not own the animal. (I am assuming here that a thief is like a robber in this aspect of also having certain rights in the object before it is given back.) It is valid to the degree that the buyer still ahs certain rights in the animal until it is given back to the rightful owner. ------------------------הלכות גזלה או אבדה פרק י''ד הלכה ו'. רב שך asks a question on תוספות in בבא קמא דף ס''ט ע''א. According to תוספות, a person that steals from a robber (after the owner has already given up on getting the object back), is liable to repay four or five. (A thief that steals a sheep is required to repay four sheep and if he stole an ox, he is required to repay 5 oxen). רב שך asks on this how is this possible. it has already gone out of the רשות of the owner. What רב שך intends to ask here is in a case where a גזלן has גזל an animal, and the owner has given up on getting it back. Then a גנב steals it from the גזלן. At that point there has been giving up and change of possession, and therefore the גנב owns the animal. So, if he sells or slaughters the animal, he ought not be liable for four or five. According to the גמרא on page ס''ח ע''א, that even though a גנב is usually liable for four or five, however if he already owns the animal, he is not liable for that amount. After all, he is selling what already belongs to him, or slaughtering what already belongs to him. The answer to this question I believe is found on page ס''ח ע''ב in the second approach of the גמרא. There is an argument between ר' יוחנן and ריש לקיש if a thief sells an animal after the owner has given up. ריש לקיש said he is not liable because he is selling what already belongs to him. ר' יוחנן disagrees with this logic, and states that he is liable. So, we see that ר' יוחנן does not hold with the reasoning of “he is selling what already belongs to him,” and therefore is not liable. So, we can answer the question of רב שך on תוספות. Here, תוספות is going like ר' יוחנן and therefore even a גנב of a גזלן after the owner has given up the thief is still liable to repay four or five. HOWEVER, ONE might ask on this because ר’ יוחנן might disagree with ריש לקיש in the question of whether יאוש כדי יאוש לבד בלי שינוי רשותcauses acquisition. The way it seems at this point, is that he holds יאוש כדי causes acquisition, but even so, he does not think that is a preventative from bringing four or five. That is, he agrees he is selling his own property, but even so is required to bring four or five because he did steal the animal. But it is also possible to say that ר’ יוחנן disagrees with ריש לקיש in this question, does יאוש כדי causes acquisition? Perhaps only ייאוש עם שינוי רשות causes acquisition. In that case, the reason ר’ יוחנן holds him to be liable is that he is not selling an animal that belongs to him, but rather which belongs to the one stolen from. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD here as a side note that ר' יוחנן also holds that if the thief sells the animal before the owner has given up, he is also liable in four or five. At first, I thought the reason is that even though the sale is not valid, still the act o going through with the sale makes him liable. Later I saw that רב שך in בהלכות גנבה פרק א' הלכה י''דbrings that a גזלן has certain rights in the object he stole before he gives it back, for example if he plows with the ox he stole he does not have to pay what profits he made from that. He only gives back the ox or pays back the value of the ox as it was worth at the time of the sale. So, in our case here ר' יוחנן holds the reason the thief pays four or five that the sale is valid to some degree even though he did not own the animal. (I am assuming here that a גנב is like a גזלן in this aspect of also having certain rights in the object before it is given back.) It is valid to the degree that the buyer still has certain rights in the animal until it is given back to the rightful owner.

בודת זרה דף נ''ג וראש השנה דף י''ג. העצים שנשתלו ונעבדו לאחר שניתנה ארץ כנען לאברהם היו אלילים של גויים שצריכים רק ביטול, לא שריפה. לכן, כאשר התורה אומרת לשרוף את האשרות, זה מהתייחס לעצים שנשתלו לפני שהארץ ניתנה לאברהם. אבל אפילו אלה עדיין היו אשרות של גויים. לכן התוספות מסבירים שהעצים שישראל נצטוו לשרוף בוודאי נשתלו סתם ולא להיות נעבדים, ואז הארץ ניתנה לאברהם יחד עם העצים. לאחר מכן ישראל עבדו את עגל הזהב, ובכך הראו שעבודת אלילים הייתה בסדר מנקודת מבטם. אז, כאשר לאחר מכן, הגויים עבדו את העצים הללו, העצים הללו הפכו להיות אשרות של ישראל שצריך לשרוף אותם, לא רק ביטול. אבל אז עולה השאלה האם עץ שנשתל כרגיל, אך מאוחר יותר סגדו לו, אינו הופך להיות לעבודת אלילים. התשובה היא שתוספות גורסים כמו ר' יוסי הגלילי בעבודה זרה דף מ''ה, אשר סבור שעצים שנשתלו ולאחר מכן סגדו להם נהפכו לעבודת אלילים. השאלה היא אז כיצד יסבירו החכמים שחולקים על ר' יוסי את הבעיה מדוע עצים מסוימים היו צריכים להישרף

Avoda Zara page 53. Rosh Hashana page 13.The trees that were planted and worshipped after the land of Canaan was given to Avraham were idols of gentiles which only need nullification, not burning. So, when the Torah says to burn the asherot, it has to refer to trees that were planted before the land was given to Avraham. But even those were still asherot of gentiles. So tosphot explains the trees that Israel were commanded to burn must have been planted and not worshiped, and then the land was given to Avraham along with the trees. Then Israel served the golden calf, and by that showed that serving idols was ok from their point of view. So, when after that, the gentiles worshipped those trees, those trees became ashorot of Israel which need to be burnt, not just nullified. But then the question comes up that a tree that was planted normally, but later was worshipped does not become an idol. Answer Tosphot holds like R. Jose HaGalili who holds that trees that were planted and later were worshipped become idols. The only question is then how would the sages that disagree with R. Jose explain the problem of why certain trees had to be burnt. [An idol that is owned by a gentile needs only nullification. But an idol owned by a Israel needs to be burnt, Therefore why were Israel commanded to burn the asherot (trees that were worshipped) when they entered into the land of Canaan. This above paragraph comes to answer this question. Another important factor here is that a gentile that planted a tree (after the land of Canaan was given to Avraham) owned the tree. So, the only tree that were owned by Israel when they entered the land of Israel were those that had been planted before the land was given to Avraham. There the only possible answers for the sages to answer are that they held that even trees that were planted to be worship before the land was given to Avraham were in fact owned by Avraham after the whole land was given to him. and this I think is the best answer for the sages. However, the gemara has to be referring to trees that were planted in order to be worshipped before the land was given to Avraham, but not worshipped until afterwards. Those trees did not become idols even after they were worshiped because a person can not cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him until Israel served the golden calf. Then, if those trees were worshiped after that, they became forbidden and became idols of Israel and had to be burnt. ] -----------------------------------------עבודה זרה דף נ''ג וראש השנה דף י''ג. The trees that were planted and worshipped after the land of Canaan was given to אברהם were idols of gentiles which only need ביטול, not burning. So, when the תורה says to burn the אשרות, it has to refer to trees that were planted before the land was given to אברהם. But even those were still אשרות of gentiles. So תוספות explains the trees that Israel were commanded to burn must have been planted and not worshiped, and then the land was given to אברהם along with the trees. Then Israel served the golden calf, and by that showed that serving idols was ok from their point of view. So, when after that, the gentiles worshipped those trees, those trees became אשרות of Israel which need to be burnt, not just ביטול. But then the question comes up that a tree that was planted normally, but later was worshipped does not become an idol. Answer תוספות holds like ר' יוסי הגלילי בעבודה זרה דף מ''הwho holds that trees that were planted and later were worshipped become idols. The only question is then how would the sages that disagree with ר' יוסי explain the problem of why certain trees had to be burnt.[[ [An idol that is owned by a gentile needs only nullification. But an idol owned by a Israel needs to be burnt, Therefore why were Israel commanded to burn the אשרות (trees that were worshipped) when they entered into the land of Canaan. This above paragraph comes to answer this question. Another important factor here is that a gentile that planted a tree (after the land of Canaan was given to אברהם) owned the tree. So, the only trees that were owned by Israel when they entered the land of Israel were those that had been planted before the land was given to אברהם. There the only possible answers for the חכמים to answer are that they held that even trees that were planted to be worship before the land was given to אברהם were in fact owned by אברהם after the whole land was given to him. and this I think is the best answer for the חכמים. However, the גמרא has to be referring to trees that were planted in order to be worshipped before the land was given to אברהם, but not worshipped until afterwards. Those trees did not become idols even after they were worshiped because a person can not cause to be forbidden that which does not belong to him until Israel served the golden calf. Then, if those trees were worshiped after that, they became forbidden and became idols of ישראל and had to be burnt. ]]

What is a woman? Anyone who identifies as a woman. But then what is it exactly that they are identifying as?

Most people in the USA will tell you a woman is anyone who identifies as a woman. But then I ask, "What is it exactly that they are identifying as?" The answer must surely be they identify as someone who identifies as a woman. After all that is the definition of a woman. And this is in fact accurate. They identify as someone who identifies as a woman. And now we have an infinite regression. So, we still do not know who to believe anything and everything they say because we ae supposed to believe all women. Hume and Kant divided between Reason and Reality and this crack in opened the door for this kind of fallacy Because of Hume, Kant redefined reason to be a system of rules. This came the fact that Hume was teaching Euclid. There reason is to build on axioms, and only when a contradiction between a deduction and an axiom comes about then reason says one rejects the deduction. So, to Hume reason has one function alone-to perceive contradictions. Not to bridge between the mind and reality. The problem with this is that Hume states his point as a given fact without ever proving it or even giving any arguments for it. Kant disagreed with this a and said reason has another function that through its software to perceive reality, i.e., through the principles of logic to perceive reality. That is reason is a system of rules by which reality can be perceived. the problem is that this still builds of Hume’s fallacy. Reason in my opinion goes beyond that. To Michael Huemer it perceives universals. But to my opinion it goes beyond that. It is a bridge between Mind and Objective Reality

za95 A Minor midi file za95 A minor nwc file

בבא קמא ו' ע''א ארצה כאן להסביר שאלה שרב שך בניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' שואל על הרא''ש. הגמרא אומר אבנו סכינו או משאו שמי שהוא משאיר על הגג ונפלו ברוח מצויה חייב משום בור ואש. הרא'ש מביא יש מפרשים שאדם אחראי רק למה שאחראי אם הנזק היה משהו שיהיה אחראי אם הוא נגרם על ידי שניהם, אש וגם בור, לא זה או זה. הרא"ש חולק ואומר שעיקר לימוד היא מבור. רב שך שואל על כך מהעובדה שאבנו סכינו או משאו אחראים אם הם שוברים כלים. (בור פטור על כלים.) בהתחלה נראה לי שרב שך, ניסה להביא הוכחה להיש המפרשים. אבל אז עלה בדעתי שרב שך מציע דעה שלישית. דעה זו של רב שך היא אדם אחראי במקרה של אבנו סכינו או משאו (או בכל המקרים) הנלמדים משני גורמים שאדם אחראי לכל החובות שעלולות להיגרם לאחד או לשני או לשניהם. כלומר, אדם אחראי במקרה של איחוד, לא רק במקרה של הצטלבות. ואדם אחראי לא רק על מה שהוא היה אחראי עבור בור, אלא גם על מה שחייב גם בגלל אש לחוד כמו כלים. וגם הוא חייב על טמון שפטור משום אש אבל חייב משום בור

Bava Kama page 6A I would like here to explain a question that Rav Shach [in laws of damages chapter 1 halacha 8] asks on the Rosh. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The Gemara says a burden or stone one leaves on a roof and they fall in a common wind is liable because of pit and fire. The Rosh brings “some explain” that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both fire and pit, not one or the other. the Rosh disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. Rav Shach asks on this from the fact that the stone knife or burden are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that Rav Shach by asking on the Rosh was by that trying to bring a proof to the other opinion brought in the Rosh. But then it occurred to me that Rav Shach is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the “some say” nor like the Rosh. This opinion of Rav Shach is that one is liable in this case of stone knife or burden or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. that is one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for pit. ---------------------------------------------------- בבא קמא ו' ע''אI would like here to explain a question that רב שך in ניזקי ממון פרק א' הלכה ח' asks on the רא’’ש. This question bothered me for a few weeks until I understood what the point if the question is. The גמרא says a אבנו סכינו או משאו leaves on a roof and they fall in a רוח מצויה is liable because of pit and fire. The רא’’ש brings יש מפרשים that one is only liable for what one would be liable if the damage was something that would be liable if caused by both אש and בור, not one or the other. The רא’’ש disagrees and says that the main derivation is from pit. רב שך asks on this from the fact that the אבנו סכינו או משאו are liable because if they break vessels. At first it seemed to me that רב שך by asking on the רא’’ש was by that trying to bring a proof to the יש מפרשים brought in the רא’’ש. But then it occurred to me that רב שך is suggesting a third opinion. One that is not like the יש מפרשים nor like the רא’’ש. This opinion of רב שך is that one is liable in this case of אבנו סכינו או משאו or all cases learned from two things that one is liable for all obligations that could be incurred by one or the other or both. That is, one is liable in a case of union, not just intersection. And one is liable not just what one would be liable for בור.