Tosphot bava metzia 14 bava batra 157

What I wanted to discuss today was Tosphot. Also to draw a diagram about the situation. And then to discuss something that is hard to understand--that is to ask a question.We have a lender a borrower who is also the seller and a the first buyer and the second buyer. Also two fields. The first field was bought by the first buyer and the second by the second buyer. The lender collects from the first buyer because the borrower did not have any money. And the first buyer collects from the second buyer.
Tosphot in Bava Metzia says let us prove from this that "What I will buy" is not obligated.
This proves that nothing else will account for the existence of the second field to this Tosphot until he comes up with a different reason אפותיקי. This shows that since we know what I will buy is obligated then the lender would have had to gone to the second field. There are many possible reasons why there might be a second field. (1) The lender had to go to the first field. (2) The lender had a choice. (3) The second field was bought after the loan was collected. It is this last one which I want to concentrate on. Tosphot holds none of these reasons are valid. So neither is the last one. This shows Tosphot in Bava Metzia must hold that the lender must always go after which ever field was sold last.
This all is what the Maharshal says. The reason I think that Tosphot holds this is because of Tractate Ketubot in which the regular way  a Ketubah is collected is that we go after what was sold last.

What is bothering me here is we are assuming the first field was owned by the borrower at the time of the loan and the second was bought by the borrower after the loan. The reason for this seems clear. The second one is only collected because of what is written in the document so its obligation is weaker. But this seems to contradict what we just said that the normal way of collected  a loan is to go after what was sold last.

Or you could say the entire braita means the opposite. That is, that the lender goes after the second field and the second buyer goes after the first field. You could answer that perhaps the first was collected before the second buyer bought his field. But what if it was owned at the time the second buyer bought his field? Maybe it would not change anything?
But this last two paragraphs are a side issue for the moment. I think they are important issues but I don't know how to deal with them. And they are at any rate not the reason for this essay.


What I wanted to mention which I think is important is that in Bava Batra Tosphot clearly says that even if the "what I will buy is obligated" still there is a reason why there could be  a second field. That is the second one was bought after the original loan was collected. This is the idea of the Maharsha about what Tosphot says there and it seems to me to be implicit in Tosphot. But this is directly opposed to Tosphot in Bava Metza where we just got done saying that even if the loan had been collected and then the second field was bought still the lender would have had to have gone after the second field for any more debt.
The Maharshal I think wants to say that the Tosphot in Bava Batra agrees with the Tosphot in Bava Metzia but the Mahrasha says that was only because his version of Tosphot was not accurate.
In plain English I want to say this is an argument between the two Tosphot and not just between the Maharsha and the Maharshal.
 I mean no matter what you think is going on in Bava Batra but for sure the Maharshal is right about what Tospot is saying in Bava Metzia.

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What I wanted to discuss today was תוספות. Also to draw a ציור about the situation. And then to discuss something that is hard to understand, that is to ask a question. יש מלווה and a לווה who is also the מוכר and  the first לוקח and the second לוקח. Also two שדות. The first שדה was bought by the first לוקח and the second by the second לוקח. The מלווה collects from the first buyer because the borrower did not have any money. And the first buyer collects from the second buyer.
תוספות in בבא מציעא says let us prove from this that מה שאקנה אינו משועבד.
This proves that nothing else will account why the lender did not collect from the second field  in the opinion this תוספות until he comes up with a different reason אפותיקי. This shows that since we know what מה שאקנה is משועבד then the lender would have had to gone to the שדה השני. There are many possible reasons why there might be a second שדה. Maybe the מלווה had to go to the first שדה.  The lender had a choice of which field to go to.  Maybe the שדה השני was bought after the גביית החוב. It is this last one which I want to concentrate on. תוספות holds none of these reasons are valid. So neither is the last one. This shows תוספות in בבא מציעא must hold that the מלווה must always go after whichever field was sold last.
This all is what the מהרש''ל says. The reason I think that תוספות holds this is because of מסכת כתובות in which the regular way  a כתובה is collected is that we go after what was sold last.

What is bothering me here is we are assuming the שדה הראשון was owned by the לווה at the time of the loan and the שדה השני was bought by the לווה after the הלוואה. The reason for this seems clear. The second one is only נגבה because of what is written in the document so its שיעבוד is weaker. But this seems to contradict what we just said that the normal way of גביית חוב is to go after what was sold last.

Or you could say the entire ברייתא means the opposite. That is, that the מלווה goes after the second field and the second buyer goes after the first field. You could answer that perhaps the first was collected before the second לוקח bought his field. But what if it was owned at the time the second buyer bought his שדה? Maybe it would not change anything?
But this last two paragraphs are a side issue for the moment. What I wanted to mention which I think is important is that in תוספות בבא בתרא clearly says that even if the מה שאקנה משועבד still there is a reason why there could be  a second field. That is the second one was bought after the original loan was collected. This is the idea of the מהרש''א  about what תוספות says there and it seems to me to be implicit in תוספות. But this is directly opposed to תוספות in בבא מציעא where we just got done saying that even if the loan had been collected and then the second field was bought still the lender would have had to have gone after the second שדה for any more debt.
The מהרש''ל I think wants to say that the תוספות in בבא בתרא agrees with the תוספות in בבא מציעא but the מהרש''א  says that was only because his version of תוספות was not accurate.
In plain English I want to say this is an argument between the two תוספות and not just between the מהרש''א and the מהרש''ל.

 יש מלווה ולווה שהוא גם מוכר ולוקח הראשון ולוקח השני. גם שני שדות. השדה הראשון נקנה על ידי לוקח הראשון  והשני על ידי לוקח השני. המלווה גובה מקונה הראשון, כי ללווה לא היה כסף. והקונה הראשון גובה מהקונה השני.
תוספות בבא מציעא אומר תנו לנו להוכיח מזה שמה שהאקנה אינו משועבד
זה מוכיח ששום דבר אחר לא יהווה סיבה מדוע המלווה לא יגבה מהשדה השני לדעת זו של תוספות עד שהוא מגיע לסיבה שונה, היינו אפותיקי. זה מראה כי מאחר שאנו יודעים מה שאקנה הוא משועבד, אז המלווה היה צריך ללכת לשדה השני. יש הרבה סיבות אפשריות שאולי יש שדה שני. אולי המלווה היה צריך ללכת לשדה הראשון. אולי היה למלווה בחירת לאיזה השדה ללכת . אולי השדה השני נקנה לאחר גביית החוב. זו האחרון שאני רוצה להתרכז בה. תוספות מחזיקה לא  אף אחת מהסיבות הללו תקפים. אז גם לא האחרון. זה מראה תוספות בבא מציעא חייב להחזיק שמלווה חייב תמיד ללכת אחרי  השדה שנמכר אחרון.
זה כל מה שאומר מהרש''ל. הסיבה שאני חושב שתוספות מחזיק זה בגלל מסכת הכתובות שבו הדרך הרגילה שכתובה נגבה היא שאנחנו הולכים אחרי מה  שנמכר אחרון. מה שמטריד אותי כאן אנו מניחים שהשדה הראשון היה בבעלות של הלווה בו בזמן של ההלוואה והשדה השני נרכש על ידי הלווה לאחר ההלוואה. הסיבה לכך נראית ברורה. השני הוא רק נגבה בגלל מה שכתוב במסמך כך שהשיעבוד שלו הוא חלש יותר. אבל זה נראה סותר את מה שאנחנו אמרנו שהדרך הרגילה של גביית החוב היא ללכת אחרי מה שנמכר אחרון. או שאתה יכול לומר כל ברייתא אומרת את ההפך. כלומר, שמלווה הולך אחרי השדה השני והקונה השני הולך אחרי השדה הראשון. אתה יכול לענות על זה אולי הראשון נאסף לפני לוקח השני קנה שדהו. אבל מה אם זה היה בבעלות של לוקח בראשון בזמן הקונה השני קנה השדה שלו? אולי זה לא היה משנה משהו? אבל שתי הפסקאות האחרונות זה הן בעיה בצד לרגע. מה אני רוצה להזכיר שאני חושב שחשוב הוא שבתוספות בבא בתרא אומר בבירור שגם אם מה שאקנה משועבד עדיין יש סיבה למה יכול להיות שיש שדה שני. זה השני נקנה לאחר ההלוואה המקורית נגבה. זהו הרעיון של מהרש''א על מה תוספות אומרים שם.  אבל זה עומד בסתירה ישירה לתוספות בבא מציעא שבו  אמרו כי גם אם ההלוואה שנאסף ולאחר מכן בשדה השני נקנה עדיין המלווה היה צריך ללכת אחרי השדה השני בשביל מה שנשאר מן החוב . מהרש''ל רוצה לומר שהתוספות בבא בתרא חולקים עם תוספות בבא מציעא אבל מהרש''א אומר שהיה רק בגלל הגרסה של תוספות שלו לא הייתה מדויקת. בעברית פשוטה שאני רוצה להגיד זה ויכוח בין שני תוספות ולא רק בין מהרש''א ומהרש''ל

Rav Elazar Menachem Shach gives an answer to the Rambam in Shabat that I think I must have considered at some point on my own but  for some reason I did not pursue the idea to the end.
I have known that some kinds of work on Shabat have intention as part of their definition. That you see in writing and erasing. [Writing does not depend on intention, but erasing does.] Also in tearing. So when I saw in a mishna in Tractate Shabat that catching animals requires intention as part of the definition of the work, I thought I had an easy "ready to go" answer for the Rambam in Laws of Shabat 10:17. But I forgot about it because I got sidetracked by other issues.

And in fact I did! But I did not know that I did. I was just today that my learning partner opened up the book of Rav Shach [the Avi Ezri]and told me how Rav Shach answers that Rambam that I realized that I had [past tense] a great answer for the Rambam but was too dumb to realize it at the time.

To some degree I have an excuse. I was interested in Tosphot and I am still trying to figure out what Tosphot is thinking about this whole thing. Also I was looking at Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and trying to figure out how he answers the Rambam and it is definitely not what Rav Shach says.[The Chazon Ish wrote that  question the answer of Reb Chaim in his emendations at the end of the Chidushei HaRambam that my learning partner was also wondering about..]

In any case  I might as well just tell you the bare facts of the situation.
Tracate Shabat 107 on side a has the statement of Shmuel that pressing a boil to get out the pus and catching a snake so that it does not bite are permitted on Shabat.  It is that famous statement of his that everywhere where the mishna says not liable it means not liable but still forbidden except in three cases where it means permitted.

That is side a. On side b we have three different versions of some statement by Rav Yehuda in the name of Rav. One is pressing a boil is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon and Rabbi Yehuda would say it is liable because of work done not for its own sake.

Shmuel goes like Rabbi Yehuda and still says pressing a boil is permitted. And so is the case to the Rambam. This seems like a direct contraction. Tosphot {Shabat 103} says Shmuel was reporting the opinion of Rabbi Shimon but he himself did not hold that way. The Rambam however says work done not for its own sake is liable and pressing a boil and catching a snake so it does not bite are allowed on Shabat.

Rav Shach brings the statement of Raba in Shabat page 146 that making an opening is liable only if it is to bring in and take out. So we have a simple answer for the Rambam. Certain kinds of work have intention as part of their definition. Making an opening is one and catching an animal is another. Without that intention you don't have work at all. Doing them without that intention is not the same as other kinds of work that intention is not part of the definition. So pressing the boil without intention of bring in and out and catching a snake so it does not bite are not work at all.They are not simply work with an alternative intention but nothing at all.
And that means even Rabbi Yehuda would say they are permitted. And this explains why on page 107 b in Shabat that there are different versions of what Rav Yehuda said in the name of Rav--that is because each version does not agree with the other one.

However the version that says pressing a boil is only the opinion of Rabbi Shimon obviously holds that intention is not a part of that particular kind of work.

The Rambam's statement itself is this: piercing a boil in the way of doctors is forbidden and liable. But not in that way is permitted. 10:17 Laws of Shabat.

I have to say that I am impressed with Rav Shach. And though it was Reb Chaim Soloveitchik who started the revolution in understanding of the Rambam, I think Rav Shach was the tip of the sword.

In any case I can't claim credit for this idea. I had all the pieces and I definitely had the answer when it came to piercing the boil. And I also suspected the capturing of the snake so it should not bite is not a work at all. But to put the pieces together to answer the Rambam, Rav Shach  gets the credit.

Music For the Glory of the God Of Israel

q37 [q37 in midi]  [I  can not find q37in a  nwc format]

q42 [q42 in midi]  [q42 in nwc]  Q41 [q41 in midi] [q41 in nwc] q40 [q40 in midi] [q40 nwc] q43 [q43 in midi]  [q43 nwc]  q44 [q44 midi] [q44 nwc]


n87 [n87 midi] [n87 nwc ]

Exodus 4 [Exodus 4 in midi] [Exodus 4 nwc]

Black Hole  [Black Hole midi] [Black Hole nwc]
Mathematics [Mathematics midi]  [Mathematics nwc]
n96 [n96 in midi]  [n96 nwc]

b32 [b32 midi]  [b32 nwc]


b100 b100 midi b100 nwc

b98 [b98 midi] [b98 in nwc]
CHS [chs in midi]  chs in nwc
For Orchestra orchestra midi  orchestra in nwc

Divine Simplicity. I thought to give a brief account of this, along with Creation ex Nihilo.

The שכליים העליונים [the higher intellects]  came up in conversation with my learning partner and so I thought to repeat here some of the ideas. He had seen this in the Ramban [Nachmanides]. Of course this is common in the Middle Ages. That is a medieval adaption of Plato's higher ideas that is referring to angels.
Mainly the Ramban [Nachmanides] and most medieval thought  is Neo Platonic. That is until the Rambam [Maimonides] and then Aquinas.  The reason for the switch was I think a lot due to Divine Simplicity. Medieval thought could deal with higher intellects, but not intellect in God. Plotinus himself  had no problem with this, but from Jewish and Christian perspective this introduced a plurality in God that was unacceptable.
And the neo Platonic perspective also easily slipped into Pantheism.

What happened was people got tired of trying to account for the Torah based on Plotinus. Finally the Rambam [Maimonides] simply made a break for it and went straight to Aristotle. Aquinas followed.

Along with this Creation something from nothing had been a problem from a Neo-Platonic perspective also. Again the Rambam held it was best accounted for by Aristotle's' First Cause. The Ari side steps the issue by starting everything from the אור אין סוף Infinite Light. I noticed this right at the beginning of my study of the Eitz Chaim. [The light is a creation. Then everything emanates from the light. That is what the verse refers to in "Let there be light." That according to Saadia Gaon and the Rambam is creation from nothing.]

 The Guide itself is kind of a codification of the faith of the Torah --monotheism. And I think it is impressive because it presents the Faith of the Torah as one coherent compact structure. Nothing  compares with the Guide in giving a rigorous and logically sound structure for the Torah world view.

So just to recap. The faith of the Torah is that God is one. There is no plurality in Him. He is not a composite. He has no ingredients. And He made the world from nothing.

Now Creation something from nothing was always an important aspect of Torah. The first to state it in this way was Augustine. But the Rambam [Maimonides] said it was the foundation of the entire Torah. And he devoted Vol II of the Guide to showing this.

[The Guide itself I have to admit is a hard read. In a practical sense what I do and recommend to others is the books of Medieval Ethics, Musar which give the best account I know of about how to live as a decent human being.] Musar has an advantage of being understandable more so than the Guide, and also it does not have the sort of modernist, feel-good, psychologized versions of Torah that are so common today.
In the morning prayers we have a section describing the  Incense in the Temple in Jerusalem. It says if they had put a certain ingredient in it it would have been irresistible. But they did not put it is because the Torah said not to. Attempts to make the Torah more attractive only bastardize it.
The way people bastardize the Torah is by adding ingredients that the Torah says not to add.
It is a true principle that Achronim [authorities after the Shulchan Aruch] are lightweights compared to the Rishonim [Mediaeval Authorities]. But even among the Rishonim there are few that compare with the Rambam.  Maybe none. In any case, to dismiss the Guide as misguided requires a good degree of incompetence and stupidity. But that is not as bad as ignoring, it as if it is irrelevant to Torah thought. That takes more than stupidity. That takes downright intentional deception.]

Music for the Glory of God

q43   q43 in midi

My parents knew how to be parents. That is something I can't say about parents today. And even back then it was very rare. I can't claim to this special kind of knowledge. My brothers stayed longer with my father after my mother's death so they learned at lot more about being a mensch than me.

The main ideal that they strove for and wanted for us kids was "to be a mensch."
That translated from the Yiddish means to be a decent human being. To act always right. And to act right was always crystal clear. You did not need any philosophy to make issues muddy. But today acting right is to most people a very muddy issue. To  make it clear let me say the best expression of being a mensch is contained in the Ten Commandments.
That is to say the Torah has two areas of obligation. One is between Man and God and the other between Man and his fellow Man. The peak of human perfection is fulfilling both areas.
My parents were the closest I ever saw anyone come to fulfill this balanced approach.

[In a practical sense, Reform Judaism is right for the emphasis on obligations between man and his fellow Man. That is clear in all books of Musar. And see the Nahar Shalom by the Yemenite Mystic Shalom Sharabi who gives a deep explanation for this. In any case however obligation between Man and God are also obligations. But there is no reason to be searching for extra things to be strict about that the Torah does not require. It is a fact that there are people who just can't get enough strictness. That however is not the approach of the Torah. One can serve God though anything.  Hillel went to a bathhouse and his disciples asked him what he was doing. He explained he was doing a mitzvah. Similarly with others things he was doing.

The danger of ריבוי אור. Too much light.  Too much excitement in the service of God can  be from the evil inclination. As it says in the Torah that God told Moses to warn the people not to go up on Mount Sinai.

גם בעבודת השם יש יצר הרע גדול דהיינו התלהבות יותר מדאי וזה בחינת מה שהשם אמר למשה הזהרתה את העם מלעלות על הר סיני

There is another way in which Reform and Conservative Judasim are admirable. They don't do idolatry. That is they don't worship people nor try to get others to worship people.

I should mention that the way I learned Torah was mainly influenced by the two yeshivas I went to in NY. One place was for in depth learning that was mainly interested in what was going on on that page. The next place--the Mir in N.Y. was  more about how what was going on on the page fit in with the rest of the Talmud. I benefited from both approaches and I think that both approaches are implicit in what God has granted to me to write in these two booklets.

My background in California was Temple Israel in Hollywood. I had learned some Torah in Newport Beach before we moved to Beverly Hills, but I don't remember where or who. It was certainly Reform, but I don't remember what was the name.  But I gained a great deal at Temple Israel. I think the rabbi's name was Nussbaum.
[Later my family had a different rabbi,  Rabbi Roth, who is Reconstructionist. I don't know him very well because I was in NY, and later went to Israel. But he has been the family rabbi for my family for a long time.] [I should mention that I think Reform Temples are good, but we should learn more Torah.]
Incidentally, I see I wrote on my blog a lot of ideas about Shabat that never got into the Hebrew book. Most of the essays I found by typing Chaim Soloveitchik Shabat. But I have to look over them to see what I was saying.
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Ok Here is what I wrote in English that I was looking for:

"The question on this is that something not intended is not at all the same thing as being obligated a sin offering. So I still have to do some thinking about this way of explaining what Reb Chaim might be getting at. Until I can get this idea past my learning partner, I don't want to present it as anything but ad hoc.
I would like to say there is a connection between not intended and normal sin offerings. My idea is that sin offerings need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on Shabat that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to Abyee. So some knowledge is needed to be liable--but not too much. And that is what makes something an accident."


What I seem to be saying is that in the Gemara we have R Yehuda and R Shimon. R Shimon is says מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה  and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not liable. R Yehuda says they are both liable. Shmuel goes by R Yehuda in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like R Shimon in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the Rambam goes. What I seem to be asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all sin offerings that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing--but not too much.

But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me. 

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The question on this is that דבר שאינו מתכווין is not at all the same thing as being מחויב חטאת. But there is a connection between דבר שאינו מתכווין and normal חויב חטאת. My idea is that חטאות need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them. E.g picking up a radish on שבת that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to אביי. So some knowledge is needed to be liable, but not too much. And that is what makes something an שוגג.


In the גמרא we have רבי יהודה and רבי שמעון. The opinion of  רבי שמעון is  מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה  and דבר שאינו מתכווין both are not מחויב. But רבי יהודה says they are both liable. שמואל goes by רבי יהודה in מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה and like רבי שמעון in דבר שאינו מתכווין and that is how the רמב''ם goes. What I am asking is that דבר שינו מתכווין even if it is פסיק רישא still should not be liable. And then I go on to show why it is liable because it is the normal thing in all קרבן חטאת that we need that the fellow had some knowledge of what he was doing, but not too much.

But this is just a guess. Maybe I will merit to review this subject and then get a better idea of what was bothering me. 

השאלה: דבר שאינו מתכווין הוא בכלל לא אותו הדבר כמו להיות מחויב חטאה. אבל יש לומר שישקשר בין הדבר שאינו מתכווין וחויב חטאת. הרעיון שלי הוא שצריך בחטאות מידה מסוימת של ידע, אלא שלא להיות בפועל מתכוון. למשל להרים צנון בשבת שבמחשבתו   הוא כבר הורם אבל התברר להיות מחובר לאדמה אינו מחויב חטאת, אלא לחתוך אותו  מחויב חטאת לאביי. אז יש צורך בקצת ידע להיות מחויב, אבל לא יותר מדי ידע. וזה מה שעושה משהו שוגג. בגמרא יש לנו  רבי שמעון ורבי יהודה. דעתו של רבי שמעון היא מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה ודבר שאינו מתכווין שניהם לא מחויבים. אבל רבי יהודה אומר שניהם מחויבים. שמואל סובר כרבי יהודה במלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה וכמו רבי שמעון בדבר שאינו מתכווין וכך לרמב''ם . מה שאני שואל הוא שהדבר שאינו מתכווין גם אם הוא פסיק רישא עדיין לא צריך להיות מחויב. תירוץ: מדוע היא מחויב? בגלל שזה דבר הנורמלי בכל קרבן חטאת שאנחנו צריכים שהבן אדם קצת ידע על מה שהוא עושה, אבל לא יותר מדי

I should mention that to be obligated in a sin offering one needs one of two lacks of knowledge. He might not know that the action is forbidden. But he knows what he is doing. The other thing is he did something by accident. See the Mishna LeMelech at chapter two of the Rambam's Hilchot Shegagot.
It is this second kind of accident that I am referring to in the above essay.

 If one serves an idol from love thinking that that is allowed then he brings a sin offering. If on purpose then that is the death penalty. If he makes a mistake in material facts like if the statue is in fact an idol, then we see right in the Talmud itself that Abyee says, "that is nothing."



Now we find in tractate Shabat that there is an argument between Abyee and Rava about cutting a radish and it turns out that it was attached. Abyee says he is liable a sin offering. Rava says no.[Shabat 72b]. But in the case where he picked up a radish and it tuned out that it was attached then both agree he is not liable. So what do we have from this? This: if one picks up a radish on shabat thinking that it is allowed to do so then he brings a sin offering. If he did not know it was attached it is nothing. Exactly like idolatry.--except it is not exact. What is the difference between this and cutting the radish?


What I suggest is to look at Shmuel in Kritut where he discusses the Mishna about what kind of accidents are liable and what kind not. [circa pages 19, 20]. The fact is he requires both intention and thought, to be liable. And though it is hard to see how this can help us right now, still I think it is an important area to keep in ind because of the essential fact that the Rambam's opinion about work not intended and work not needed for its own sake comes directly from Shmuel.  So whatever Shmuel thinks is going to be directly related to anything the Rambam says.