Kidushin page 9

 I have been puzzled about a Rambam that says if one writes a document of marriage and it is given to a messenger of the woman, then it must be written with the agreement of the messenger. The Magid Mishna brings there [Laws of Marriage chapter 3-law 18] that the Ramban disagrees with this and says it has to be written with the knowledge and agreement of the woman. This is just like the fact that  a husband  can not say, ''Tell so and so to write a divorce doc and give it to my wife.'' The Ramban is bringing this from a Gemara in Kidushin page 9 that says a doc of marriage has to be written with the knowledge of the woman. [ That is an argument there, but this is the agreed upon conclusion.] What is the puzzle about this to me is the general law, ''Words are not given over to a messenger.''  That means one can appoint a messenger to do things, but not to say things. And for a divorce doc  to be for a particular woman requires the husband to say so. But this in itself is the source of my confusion. Why is it that a scribe could not write a doc of divorce for a particular man and wife?  If we say a scribe  is ok to write the doc, then why should he have to hear it from the husband. If we say the verse says that the husband himself has to write it, then why should a scribe be ok-- even if the husband tells him to write it?

 The sages of the Gemara [Talmud] said that Gog and Magog [Armageddon] would come three times against Israel and that at the third time they will reach Yerushalaim [Jerusalem]. That is based on Yechezkel [Ezekiel] chapters 38 and 39. Then in the next chapters, Yechezkel [Ezekiel] goes into the dimension and building  of the third temple. Now it is clear that Russia, China and Iran are aligned against Israel. So even if Israel would be able to finish off Hamas, that would do nothing to take care of the larger threats. [That is, even if Israel would have any specific targets inside of Gaza. But there is no such thing. The entire population is determined to destroy Israel. There is no specific target.] So what ought to do is to learn Gemara, Rashi and Tosphot every day as the sages said: ''What should one do to be saved from Armageddon--learn Torah.'' [But to learn Torah as a mitzvah means not to take money for doing so. To get paid for learning negates the value.] [And I might add here my basic approach to learning Torah. It is divided into in depth learning in the morning and includes the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, Mathematics, and Physics. The afternoon or evening is for fast learning, I.E., to get through the Talmud with Rashi, Tosphot, Maharsha, and then the Yerushalmi, plus getting through the basic math and physics, Algebraic Topology, Quantum Field Theory, String Theory. There should also be a few hours for exercise.][string theory is important as the only viable explanation of gravity. To see what i mean, take a look at Feynman's papers on Quantum Gravity showing that it is not renormalizable.]

[People are too discouraged from the hard subjects because of lack of faith in God. They ought to believe that by saying the words and going on, that they will eventually understand. This is like the same way trust in God works in other areas where one does a minimum amount of effort and trust God to do the rest.]

 There is a sort of Achilles heel in Breslov in that in spite of the tremendous advice of Rav Nahman, there is a kind of tendency for it to take people away from straight Torah. The advice really works best in a context of a place that is devoted to learning Gemara.--i.e. a regular Litvak yeshiva.  This is hinted at in a letter Rav Nahman wrote to his group in Breslov מאסתי בישיבת ברסלב ''I have become disgusted with Yeshivat Breslov'', -Even though the intension of the letter was to say that he was upset with the town and would no longer dwell there, still there is a hint in that letter.

In the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] Rav Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [There is such a thing a being too smart.]]

Rav Nachman of Breslov said the trait of wisdom spread out [like all the other ten sephirot] until God established a limit for it. You can see this idea in other places in the Le.M [Lekutai Moharan] where R' Nachman explains that wisdom tricks people. [''The main thing is to be simple and straight, for too much smarts tricks a person..]] You can see this same idea in Kant where he wants to expand the role of reason into synthetic a priori [ i.e., what other philosophers call ''universals;;]--but he does place a limit on this role of reason. The limit is that it is applicable only in the realm of possible experience.  [The way to see this is to think of a computer. A bathtub full of computer chips is not a computer. To have knowledge of the real world, one's own computer chips--his way of sensing time space color etc. have to be ordered and structured.[Space and time are the forms of intuition aka sense perception. They are not concepts of reason.] But we do not have sense perception outside of our 3-d world.]

 My basic idea of what to do in these horrific times is to learn Torah. But I should add that I have a very limited idea of what ''Torah'' is--that is only the actual Oral and Written Law. This is like the Rambam wrote, ''Just like one can  not add nor subtract from the Written Law, so one cannot add nor subtract from the Oral Law.''-which is only the actual set of books written down by the Tenaim and Amoraim [Sages of the Talmud and Mishna]. After them, there is no authentic tradition. [The idea here is that just like if one would come along today and claim to prophecy, no one would or should believe him or her because we already have the prophets, and that age is finished. So it is with the Oral Law, that age is finished. So no one could come along after the finishing of the Talmud and claim they found a lost book of the Oral Law, nor make up his own ideas in Torah and call them the Oral Law.]

[Since learning Torah is equal to all the other mitzvot [and out weighs them as shown in Nefesh Hachaim vol 4], thus one ought to take as an obligation on oneself to get through the entire oral and written law, Tenach, the two Talmuds [with Rashi, Tophot and corresponding commentaries], and all the midrashim. Also to have an in depth session in the AVI EZRI of Rav Shach, Mathematics and Physics.] 

The Third Temple.

 The Third Temple is not well  understood by many people including myself. But today, I saw a book by a fellow Izhak Cohen [in a yishuv called Elad] who brings the Rashi and Ramchal on the verses in Ezekiel and does a great job in laying it all out in detail. However to actually build it would require a red cow without which there is no way of getting out of טומת מת [uncleanliness that come from touching a dead body.] [But I imagine nowadays that should be fairly easy by genetic modification]

[I admit to having read Ezekiel, and also seeing the Ramchal without having the slightest understanding until this morning when I looked at that book.]

One of the major reasons the third temple is not understood in the Mishna and Gemara talk only about the second temple. The parts of the gemara that are relevant to the third temple are only the parts about sacrifices

for some odd reason the chapters in Ezekiel which explain all about the Third Temple are almost never studied by anyone.

Of course Muslim would nor be pleased with us Jews for making a third temple, but we are in any case not winning any popularity contests in the Muslim world. Our mere existance is a thorn in their side. Christians also would not be in favor of this because the last chapters of Revelations seem to indicate a third temple that would not be for sacrifices. All the more so Paul is down on keeping the commandments of the Torah which include building a temple. However Paul anyway get into the New Testament for reasons that do not seem valid since he had no first hand information about anything that Jesus never said or did.

advice to school

 Get rid of the social studies pseudo science departments. I do not agree with anything of what the teach. I agree however with art and hard sciences. Also the Old Testament. I would agree with philosophy of Plato, Aristotle and Kant.

 There is one way of learning in depth that I have not mentioned. This is to hold your place where you already are in the book and work around that point. That is to review that page. then go back  one page and then go forward a few more pages.  Then go back a few more pages. But I do not mean this in place of a regular in depth session with review back to the very beginning, nor in place of the sort of very fast learning [called ''girsa'']. 

 no one is asking my opinion, but it seems clear to me that Gaza ought to be flattened. i mean, they have had plenty of chances to become peaceful. they were always saying that if they could have their own area then that is all that would be needed for peace..since they got it all the have done is to try to make war against Israel.  fool me once-shame on you. fool me twice shame on me

 Even though the Litvak world is about as close to the Gra as anyone could get, I still find a few things,  amiss. What about the herem of the Gra that is completely ignored? And I find this to be the root of many other things that are amiss. [Nor do I claim to be innocent in this regard. For I do learn the books  of Rav Nahman of Breslov. bBut I do have a reason for that. That is that after looking at a book that contained the original herems including that of the Gra, I noted that Rav Nahman would not be in that category. ]

 I think it is agreed that the Hegelian attempt to replace Aristotelian logic with his own was not successful. Even though there are fuzzy logics,  they have nothing in common with Hegel. The many attempts to discard Kant and the distinction between a priori and empirical truths have also not proven to be valid as Robert Hanna has pointed out. [Michael Huemer however goes along with Prichard and what are called the intuitionists, that school comes from G.E. Moore and to some degree is the beginning of the Analytic School which Robert Hanna has rightfully put into its place. However, I still can not decide the winner. To me it seems like a draw between the Friesian school based on Kant [i.e. Kelley Ross] and Huemer. 

to get through the two Talmuds

Simchat Torah is the best time to make a commitment to get through the two Talmuds with all the commentaries-every day to do a few pages with Rashi, Tosphot and Maharsha.  Beside that to do a few in depth sessions with the Reb Chaim of Brisk [Chidushai Harabam] and Rav Shach's Avi Ezri.

the Talmud asks since only the light of Torah can bring a person to the revival of the dead, [as is mentioned in the verse -טל תורה מחייה אותו that the dew of Torah will ring a person to be revived at the time of the revival of the dead] then how can women merit to a portion in the next world [since women are not obligated in the commandment to learn Torah -    so they get no reward by doing so]. The Gemara answers by bringing up their children to learn Torah and waiting for their husband to return from the study hall.

 I was looking at the Gate of Intentions by Rav Chaim Vital about Sukot, and it mentions there the importance of repentance on the night of Hoshana Raba. [The 7th day of Sukot after midnight] That is when the memo is given to the angels that was sealed on Yom Kipur. There it says there is still hope to repent before the angel of judgment gets the memo. But how to repent or on what to repent is the question. The most obvious answer is to learn Musar [books of ethics].  This is because every person is on their own path and can't know what they are doing wrong except by seeing what others do wrong. כל הפוסל במומו פוסל, all who cancel cancel with their own defect. SO only by seeing what is wrong with others, can one see what is wrong with himself.

 There is a fine line between exploitation and a  legitimate structuring of society. A hierarchy of a group is a natural phenomenon in all mammals and ants and lobsters.   To see all hierarchy as exploitation is a mistake. But there can be exploitation also--and often it is not easy to see the difference. You need a balance as the ancient Romans had figured out when there was a peasant rebellion, and instead of making war against them, someone had the brilliant idea of creating institutions that would insure the lives and liberties of the people while leaving the patricians in power to insure law and order. Thus was created the office of the tribune.

    Everyone has a place and just because one is low in the hierarchy  that does nor mean he or she is exploited. But there is a line that can be crossed. The advantage of  some systems is they give one the chance to excel based on ability and competence--not birth.

 I am not doing much in depth learning nowadays, but just occurred to me at the beach to ask an obvious question. With a gift we say that if the external circumstances show it was given with a mistaken assumption, then the gift is invalid--even though it was signed and sealed in a legitimate court of law according to halacha. To Tosphot [Ketuboth 37] this applies also to sales. But a forced sale is valid. You might answer that in a forced sale, there is no mistake about the circumstances. But even in the first case, it seems that the mistake in circumstance also ''forced'' the sale.

What I mean here you can see in a few examples. Let's say a person has heard that his son died in a faraway country, and then signs away all his property. Then we discover that his son is alive. We say that gift is invalid. 

But if someone ties up a person, and forces him to sign a document of a sale, that sale is valid- since we say because of the circumstances, he really did intend for the sale to be complete and valid. 

     Even though a lot of the woke and gender insanity depends on the Frankfurt School, that does not mean that Kant and Hegel had nothing to say of importance. Rather it is indicative of where philosophy  went wrong after them. And there were a lot of false leads and trails that veered off into lunacy. But it is hard to get to some sort of '''' birur'' [separating the wheat from the chaff].   High I.Q. does not seem to help much, since the philosophy professors in the USA universities are very smart.  [The highest I.Q.s in universities are the physics and math students and teachers, while the lowest are the teachers in the psychology departments.] 

 My son Izhak held with the importance of Rav Nahman of Breslov but in the way that many do so in the Litvak yeshiva world--that is to accept many of his major principles but not to take it all--especially when it seems not to apply to some present situation.  And I would have to agree with this. After all you do not see real Torah learning except in the Litvak Yeshiva World. and there are clearly no real Torah scholars outside of the Litvak world. 

 You can see in some of the books on ethics from the middle ages the synthesis of faith with reason. But this was not universal. The dividing line seems to be the Geonim from Saadia Gaon down through the Obligations of the Hearts until the Rambam. On the other side [against secular studies] are Rav Hai Gaon Tosphot and the Ramban. 

 But even the side that held with the importance of learning physics and metaphysics there are some differences. Ibn Gavirol went with Plato.In fact his book on platonic philosophy was widely used as an introduction to Plato. And even the system of Ibn Pakuda [author of Obligations of the Hearts] was neo platonic. But Rambam clearly thought Aristotle was superior. [I don't mean that Plato and Aristotle are the end. Rather philosophy did make progress in Plotinus, Kant, Fries, Leonard Nelson.]

[There is a way for everyone to become an expert in Physics and Mathematics; that is mentioned in the gemara tractate Shabat pg 63--to say the words and go on. This is called ''bekiut'' in Litvak yeshivot, but it is not meant tor replace in depth learning, but as a supplement. Even so when Rav Nahman learned in this fast way, it was I think a major part of his learning. See Conversations of Rav Nachman 76 where it is brought that he said in the few minutes in the morning before the morning prayer, began he would go through four pages of the Shulchan Aruch with all the commentaries, i.e., Shach, Taz, Pri Chadash, Beer Hagola etc.

This relates to Bava Batra page 37 where the subject is selling three trees and Arachim page 14

fIntroduction-Rav Huna said one who sanctifies a field with it's trees redeems each one separately, and the Gemara says that is going like the opinion that a person that sanctifies does so with a kind eye. Rav Papa said a statement that the Gemara says means if one sanctifies trees which include the ground, then the redemption is on both together, and as far as one can tell that could be like the opinion that one who sanctifies does o with a selfish eye. The Rambam does bring the part of that statement that one who sanctifies a field brings the trees along with it, but leaves out the part that the redemption is together.[I might mention that to sanctify a field means to offer it to the Temple. Then the owner might redeem it by giving its worth to the temple, plus a fourth, or someone else might redeem it by giving its value to the temple.] According to Rav Shach in his explanation of the Rambam (Laws of Arachim chap 4 halacha 15) if one sanctifies three trees [and thus along with them comes the ground that is between them and around them by the amount one would plow] when he redeems the field, the trees are redeemed along with the field. But if instead, he would sanctify the field with the trees, then when he redeems the field, the trees do not come along with it. each is redeemed separately.But this approach of Rav Shach is based on a few missing words in the Rambam where he says, ''If one sanctifies three trees, the field comes along with them'', but he leaves out that each is redeemed separately. Only when the Rambam writes that ''If one sanctifies more or less than three trees in such a field, that the field and trees are redeemed separately.'' However in no place does the Rambam ever mention the idea or case in which one redeem the field and the trees come along with it. One could argue that since Rav Huna [in Arachim 14 side a] holds that one that sanctifies sanctifies with a good kind eye, then in all cases when one redeems a field with trees, they are always redeemed separately,------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------According to רב שך in his explanation of the רמב''םlaws of ערכים פרק ד' הלכה ט''ו if one sanctifies three trees [and thus along with them comes the ground that is between them and around them by the amount one would plow] when he redeems the field, the trees are redeemed along with the field. But if instead he would sanctify the field with the trees [and thus the trees come along with the field], then when he redeems the field, the trees come along with it. But this approach of רב שך is based on a few missing words in the רמב''ם where he says, ''If one sanctifies three trees, the field comes along with them'', but he leaves out how each is redeemed. Only when the רמב''ם writes that ''If one sanctifies more or less than three trees in such a field, that the field and trees are redeemed separately.'' However in no place does the רמב''ם ever mention the idea or case in which one redeems the field and the trees come along with it. One could argue that since רב הונא [in ערכים י''ד ע''א] holds that one that sanctifies, sanctifies with a good kind eye, then in all cases when one redeems a field with trees, they are always redeemed separately,INTRODUCTION רב הונא said one who sanctifies a field with trees must redeems each one separately. The גמרא says that is going like the opinion that a person that sanctifies does so with a kind eye. רב פפא said a statement that the גמרא says means if one sanctifies trees (which includes the ground), then the redemption is on both together. and that could be like the opinion that one who sanctifies does so with a selfish eye. The רמב''ם does bring the part of that statement that one who sanctifies a field, sanctifies the trees along with it, but leaves out the part that the redemption is on the field and the trees come along with it.. הקדמה. רב הונא אמר המקדש שדה עם עצים חייב לפדות כל אחד בנפרד. הגמרא אומרת שזה הולך כמו הדעה שמקדש עושה זאת בעין טובה. אמר רב פפא אמירה שהגמרא אומר משמע אם מקדשין עצים (שכולל את הקרקע), הרי הפדיון הוא על שניהם יחד. וזה יכול להיות כמו הדעה שמי שמקדש עושה זאת בעין רעה. הרמב''ם אמנם מביא את החלק של אותה אמירה שמי שמקדש שדה, מקדש עמו את העצים, אבל משאיר את החלק שהפדיון על השדה והעצים באים איתו לפי רב שך בביאורו להלכות הרמב''ם של ערכים פרק ד' הלכה ט''ו אם מקדשים שלשה עצים [וכך יחד איתם באה הקרקע שנמצאת ביניהם וסביבם בכמות שהיה צריך מחרישה] כשהוא פודה את השדה, נגאלים העצים יחד עם השדה. אבל אם במקום זה היה מקדש את השדה עם העצים [וכך באים העצים יחד עם השדה], אז כשהוא פודה את השדה, באים איתו העצים. אבל גישה זו של רב שך מבוססת על כמה מילים חסרות ברמב''ם ששם הוא אומר ''אם מקדש שלשה עצים בא עמם השדה'', אבל הוא משאיר איך כל אחד נגאל. רק כשהרמב''ם כותב ש''אם מקדשים יותר או פחות משלושה עצים בשדה כזה, שהשדה והעצים נגאלים לחוד'' אולם בשום מקום הרמב''ם לא מזכיר את הרעיון או מקרה שבו פודה את השדה והעצים באים אתו. אפשר לטעון שמכיוון שרב הונא [בערכים י''ד ע''א] סובר שמקדש, מקדש בעין טובה, אז בכל המקרים כשפודים שדה עם עצים, תמיד נגאלים בנפרד

 I would like to suggest the best way to learn Talmud is to go through half page per day with  Tosphot and Maharsha. [I mean this as the going fast session, not the in depth session.] If people are just starting out learning, the best way to do this half page is with the English Soncino edition [if possible to find it]. But after the first year, the best way is with one finger on the Gemara and the other on Rashi.

As for in depth learning, the best is the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach which goes in the depth of the subject matter. 

Rosh Hashana seems to be a bit ambiguous.

 Rosh Hashana seems to be a bit ambiguous. On one hand, there is the Tosphot in Sanhedrin 10b where the first opinion is the conjunction  [molad] is the day of Rosh Hashanah. But then, most of that Tosphot points out the gemara in tractate Rosh Hashana where you find the time the Sanhedrin would set it was when the new moon was visible which is almost always  a day later. And what makes this confusing is the fact that in Sanhedrin 10b you find that the time of Rosh Chodesh [new moon] depends on heaven. It says, ''If the earthly court sanctifies the new moon on time, then fine. But if not, the the heavenly court sanctifies it anyway''. 

The calendar was adopted from the ancient Greeks. It is the Meton calendar and has little validity except in so far as when Jews were dispersed, no one had a set court that would tell them when the new moon was. At least during the time of the gemara, there was some stability. But at some point there was a revolution in Iraq and the yeshivot were closed for a hundred years. So at some point, Saadia Geon decided to accept the Meton calendar which more or less corresponded to when the Sanhedrin would have decreed Rosh Hashanah. 

[The idea that Hillel the second set the calendar is a fiction. If that had been so, the gemara would have mentioned it.

My opinion is that it is best to go by the molad since there is no Sanhedrin nor any valid semicha. [I mean to say that at least if the was valid ordination, then any court of three judges with valid ordination could sanctify the new moon. But valid ordination disappeared in the beginning of the Talmudic period. [Some of the first Amoraim had ordination like R. Yochanan. But after that, it was lost. Ordination since then has been a fiction. ] [However, the ability to decide halacha was not lost. That ability continued until Ravina and Rav Ashi-as the Gemara says ''רבינא ורב אשי סוף הוראה.'' [''Ravina and Rav Ashi are the end of the ability to render a halachic judgment'']. Later, when the Geonim and Rishonim decide a halacha, they are trying to decide what the gemara holds.

Also I have to add here that I think the gemaras in Sanhedrin and in Rosh Hashana are in conflict. While in most cases Tosphot is right to reconcile gemaras that seem to be at odds, but this is one case that I do not think it possible. 

 The רמב''ם writes הלכות נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' that ''If a wife  says, 'My hands are holy to He who made them,' or took a נדר that her husband should not derive any benefit from the work of her hands, her husband is not forbidden in the work of her hands because that work is under obligation to him. ...but he must revoke her נדר because he might divorce her and then be forbidden  to remarry her.'' The ר''ן asks כתובות נ''ט that that should be only in the case she said ''Her hands will be holy to He who made them'' but not when she forbids the work of her hands because that work has not yet come into existence and so the נדר does not apply to them  at all. And the כסף משנה says that the רמב''ם  is going like רב אשי that holiness of body does apply even to things not yet in existence. רב שך uses that same answer for aש similar question. But this answer is contradicted by רמב''ם  הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה ט''ו והלכה ט''ז . There he writes ''If a man says ''what my animal gives birth to will be holy for the בית המקדש or will be forbidden to me or I will give it to charity,'' even though it does not become holy , still he has to fulfill what he said'' and when he said ''will be forbidden to me'' that is a נדר which is in the category of holiness of body. 

The place where רב שך uses that answer of the כסף משנה is in in רמב''ם הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה ט'  .  But that answer is going on רמב''ם הלכות מעשר שני ט' הלכה ז. ''MODEST  PEOPLE would leave money in the year of שמיטה and say 'anything taken from the fruits of the fourth year that holiness is חל on this money'. The question there is the fruits are not in the possession of the owner, but of him who picked them.  

see below where this question is answered by saying the cases where the vow is valid even on something not yet in existence is where he said ''like a sacrifice''. the fact of the matter is that sometimes the rambam leaves out a few details. i noticed in laws of ''zarat'' on houses where you can see yourself that he leaves out important details about the green green or red red. you can ask why he left things out but never the less that is a fact.  here in this place leaving out a detail that can be filled elsewhere does not seem like a important thing. but over there in zarat, i did not see any place else that could have filled in the details.

הרמב''ם כותב הלכות נדרים פרק י''ב הלכה י' ''אם אומרת אשה 'קדושות ידי למי שעשה אותן' או נדרה שבעלה לא יפיק תועלת ממלאכת ידיה, בעלה אינו אסור במלאכת ידיה כי עבודה זו חייבת לו. ...אבל הוא חייב לבטל את נדריה כי עלול להתגרש ממנה ואז להיאסר להתחתן איתה שנית .הר''ן שאל שזה רק כשאמרה שידיה תהינה קדושות למי שעשה אותן'' אבל לא כשהיא אוסרת את עבודת ידיה כי העבודה ההיא עדיין לא באה לעולם. ולכן הנדר אינו חל עליהם כלל. והכסף משנה אומר שהרמב''ם הולך כמו רב אשי שקדושת הגוף כן חלה גם על דברים שעדיין לא קיימים. רב שך משתמש באותה תשובה לשאלה דומה. אבל תשובה זו בסתירה לרמב''ם הלכות נדרים כ''ב הלכה ט''ו והלכה ט''ז . שם הוא כותב ''אם יאמר אדם 'מה שהבהמה שלי יולדת יהיה קדוש לבית המקדש או יאסור לי או אתן לצדקה' אף על פי שלא נעשה קדוש, בכל זאת יש לו. לקיים מה שאמר'' וכשאמר ''יאסור לי'' זה נדר שהוא בגדר קדושת הגוף.

המקום שבו רב שך משתמש בתשובה זו של הכסף משנה נמצא ברמב''ם הלכות מכירה כ''ב הלכה ט'. אבל התשובה הזאת שייכת לרמב''ם הלכות מעשר שני ט' הלכה ז'. ''אנשים צנועים היו משאירים כסף בשנת שמיטה ואומרים 'כל הנלקח מפירות השנה הרביעית שהקדושה חל על הכסף הזה'. השאלה שם היא שהפירות אינם ברשות הבעלים, אלא של מי שקטף אותם

 נדר בא מהחוק על קורבנות. מי שאומר 'הלחם הזה כמו קרבן לי' אסור לאכול אותו

כדי לענות על שאלה זו על הרמב"ם ועל תשובת הרב ש"ך צריך לעיין ברמב"ם הלכות מעילה ד' הלכה ט' שם הרמב"ם מחזיק חייב בהקרבת קרבן מעילה רק כשאמר, ''חפץ זה יאסור לי כמו קרבן''. אבל אם לא אמר "כמו קרבן", אינו חייב. לפיכך במקרים שלמעלה שבהם הרמב"ם אומר שהנדר או הכסף יכולים להיות '''חל'' אפילו על משהו שעדיין לא קיים שזה חייב להיות במקום שבו אמר ''כמו קרבן''.

 i am not  saying that you can see this idea in the gemara in that being liable a sacrifice for the vow would make it strong enough to settle on something not yet in existence  but it seems to be a possible answer

 The Rambam writes [Laws of Vows 12 law 10] that ''If a wife  says 'my hands are holy to he who made them' or took a vow that her husband should not derive any benefit from the work of her hands her husband is not forbidden in the work of her hands because that work is under obligation to him. ...but he must revoke her vow because he might divorce her and then be forbidden  to remarry her.'' The Ran asks [Ketuboth 59] that that should be only in the case she said ''her hands will be holy to he who made them'' but not when she forbids the work of her hands because that work has not yet come into existence and so the vow does not apply to them  at all. And the Kesef Mishna says that the Rambam is going like Rav Ashi that holiness of body does apply even to things not yet in existence. Rav Shach uses that same answer for a similar question. But this answer is contradicted by Rambam Laws of Buying 22 laws 15 and 16. There he writes ''If a man says ''what my animal gives birth to will be holy for the temple or will be forbidden to me or I will give it to charity,'' even though it does not become holy , still he has to fulfill what he said'' and when he said ''will be forbidden to me'' that is a vow which is in the category of holiness of body. 

The place where Rav Shach uses that answer of the Kesef Mishna is in in Rambam Laws of Sale 22 law 9.  But that answer is going on Rambam Laws of the Second Tithe 9 law 7. ''Modest people  would leave money in the year of shemita and say 'anything taken from the fruits of the fourth year that holiness is settled on this money'. The question there is the fruits are not in the possession of the owner, but of him who picked them.  

 I might mention that a vow comes from the law about sacrifices. One who says 'this bread is like a sacrifice to me' is forbidden to eat it.

To answer this question on the Rambam and the answer of Rav Shach one needs to look at Rambam Laws of Meila 4 halacha 9 where the Rambam holds one is obligated for a sacrifice of meila only when he said this object will be forbidden to me like a sacrifice. But if he did not say ''like a sacrifice'', he is not obligated. Thus in cases up above where the Rambam says the vow or money can be '''chal' even on something not yet in existence that must be where he or she said ''like a sacrifice.''

doing Gemara [learning talmud]

     The way I recommend doing Gemara is to do every day a 1/2 daf [i.e., one whole side of a page] with Rashi, Tosfot, Maharsha and Maharam of Lublin. The way to do the daf itself would be with two fingers--one on the words of the Gemara and the other finger on the Rashi--and thus go through that entire half page with the Gemara and Rashi together and then the Tosphot. If possible to add the Pnei Yehoshua and Aruch Laner.

The main characteristic of Rome is the balance between the patricians and the plebeians, SPQR

 The way that I understand the modern world is a a repeat of the conflict between Athens, Sparta, and Rome. To me the USA always looked like Athens--democracy, individual rights. The USSR always seemed to be some kind of modern version of Sparta--community is everything and warlike. And the analogy can be stretched far. Just like Athens used to push it's weight around to build up an Athenian empire, so does the USA. That was until Sparta knocked it down [with the help of most of Greece, not alone.]. But it did not take long until Sparta itself fell, and both became part of the Roman Empire. [That was not immediate. Sparta was first conquered by Macedon which later was conquered by Rome.] What was unique about Rome? The main characteristic of Rome is the balance between the patricians and the plebeians, SPQR. The senate and the people of Rome.

[Even though the landowning class of the patricians were the only people that could be part of the senate, still they needed to be voted in by vote of the people. No one could hold any public office without being voted in by majority of the people.]

 My son Izhak held with learning in depth but also fast learning,--- that is fast learning in the sense of Rav Nahman of Breslov --to just say the words and go on. Even though I only heard Izhak state the importance of in depth learning--i.e with lots of review and deep understanding, he also held with the general principles of Rav Nahman which certainly includes fast learning. And I do nor mean this to apply to learning gemara only but also to mathematics and physics. [we know that these are also important a stated openly in the Rambam--in the Yad Hachazah [Mishne Torah] and in his other writings.]  but some will complain that not everyone has the math gene--but so what? We do not say that everyone is talented in understanding the Gemara, and yet everyone is obligated to learn and finish the Oral and Written Torah at least once. Learning Torah is a commandment that applies to everyone as the Rambam  puts it, '' young or old, even until the day of death..'' This mitzvah has nothing to do with how smart one is. So also for math and physics and all the seven wisdoms that the Gra and Rambam and other Rishonim hold are obligatory.

 The ancient Greeks understood that there is a deep connection between truth and beauty.  From that insight one can see that trying towards truth is like a Mozartian symphony where every member of the orchestra plays his or her part. But each one needs to play his part alone --and know his place. The violinist ought not to play the part of the cello or piano. That would be as if in an army, the  person standing watch would desert his post and try to fulfill the part of a general. Even if he might be a good general in other circumstances, but still he has deserted his post [and by that cause the city to fall.]. Even on a religious scale we can see how there should be an awareness of this point. Torah has a good point --monotheism. Christians have a good point about kindness. The Torah is also right about law. Where things go wrong is when the violinist goes over to the French horn section and decides that he can play the French horn better that  those in the wind section. Or things can go wrong when one is not following the score. Or people on the outside imply try to interrupt or play music of the dark side [as most music is nowadays.] 

And in the search for truth enlightenment philosophers also played an important role. While on one hand the middle ages were aware of the need for both reason and faith, still the development of both was needed.  Even though Plato Aristotle and Plotinus had gone far in the realm of reason, still a lot was missed and there needed to be Kant to begin to resolve the mind body problem,

There is a prohibition in the Torah not to add or subtract from the commandments of the Torah. There is a four way argument among the Rishonim [mediaeval authorities ] about what this means.  To the Raavad, it refers only to positive commands. The reason is the courts have permission to add restrictions as a fence around Torah.  However as important this subject is, I wanted to add here the fact that Rav Nahman of Breslov mentions a related issue in the Le.M. II chapter 44 and II chapter 86 and in the Conversations of Rav Nahman 235. There it says that one should not seek extra restrictions.   

Most of what the religious world does is adding extra restrictions. And ''כל המוסיף גורע''. ''Anyone that adds [make believe] restrictions ends up subtracting [transgressing real restrictions].'' [That is a common saying in Israel]. in fact even adding restrictions as a ''fence'' is also problematic as is brought in Avot d'Rav Natan on the first Mishna in Pirkei Avot there it says adding a fence around Torah is exactly what Adam, the first man, did. [And that caused the fall of all mankind.]It say there that was wrong, ''Better ten inches that stands, than 100 yards that falls.''

But for many decrees that are from the scribes, the reason for the decree no longer exists, and thus to the Raavad  they are nullified.  [ But to the Rambam, the decree still stands. that comes from beitza pg 5.  but in the gemara in gitin we see that once the reason for a decree i gone, the decree no longer stands.

The Ramban and Raavad, the Rambam and Tosphot are the main sources to look at. but after all is said and done the point that is most important is Rav Nahman's not to keep on adding restrictions all the time like the insane religious world does. 

I would like to suggest that everything about the prohibition of thou shalt not add revolves around the mishna these are the commandment that have no limit. that is there are commandments that once one has done them they are done and one is not allowed to add. there are other commandments like learning Torah that have no upper limit and so the more one does them the better. But for some reason that is not what תוספות says. They  say one can do again even a mitzvah that one has fulfilled. I do not know why תוספות does not make this simple distinction. Especially after the גמרא itself seems to imply this when they ask in סוכה דף כ''ח why is it that if one sleeps in a סוכה on the eighth day of שמיני עצרת he does not get lashes?

 

 אני רוצה להציע שהכל על איסור "אל תוסיף" סובב סביב המשנה שאלו המצוות שאין להן גבול. יש מצוות שברגע שעשה אותן הן נעשו ואסור להוסיף. יש עוד מצוות כמו לימוד תורה שאין להן גבול עליון ולכן ככל שעושים אותן יותר טוב

 i mean  תוספות ראש השנה ט''ז ע''ב says one can do a commandment more than once, but i think this must refer to commandments that have no upper bound. 

כלומר תוספות ראש השנה ט''ז ע''ב אומר שאפשר לעשות מצוות יותר מפעם אחת, אבל אני חושב שזה חייב להתייחס למצוות שאין להן גבול עליון

אבל משום מה זה לא מה שהתוספות אומרים. הם אומרים שאפשר לעשות שוב אפילו מצווה שקיימה. אני לא יודע למה תוספות לא עושות את ההבחנה הפשוטה הזו. בפרט לאחר שהגמרא עצמו נראה רומז לכך כששואלים בסוכה דף כ''ח למה זה שאם ישן בסוכה ביום של שמיני אצרת אינו מקבל מלקות?

My feeling about philosophy is that there were some wrong turns. Mainly I think people ought to get back to Kant, and in particular the Kantian approach of Fries and Leonard Nelson- because in that approach there is room for faith. Now while on one hand, Hegel was trying to reconcile faith and reason, but i think there he tried to make everything about reason [no limit to reason] but I do not think that works very well.

i would like to thank all the people that take the time and efforts to look at my blog. As for the subject in this entry i would like to add that it makes sense to look at the issue here in a bit more detail in the blog of Kelley Ross on the approach of Kant -Fries and Nelson. Also it is very good to look at Robert Hanna who goes into great detail where British American philosophy went wrong. As for Hegel, the political writings leave a lot to be desired but the Logic in the Encyclopedia is outstanding,--a true tour de force. In the Analytic School it is still important to look at Michael Huemer because he ties together the best of the Intuitionists like Prichard and G.E. Moore.

There are good reasons to look at Fries and Leonard Nelson because of some issues in Kant that were noticed even before the ink was dry. That led to Fichte and Schelling and then to the radical approach of Hegel. But as a sensible modification of Kant that remains in the Kantian orbit, I think Fries is the best,

And as for Huemer, my feeling is that he is not really getting into the problem that Kant faced. I think that is not my own criticism but I might have heard it before about the Intuitionist School. [ I admit I have not looked at any of this for a long time--but I am not excusing my ignorance.]

Gemara in Bava Batra 127. Rav Shach brings a question on the Ramban.

Rav Shach [Rambam Laws of Acquisition 22:1] brings a question on the Ramban. However there is some aspect of this question that I find hard to understand. The issue revolves on the opinion of R. Meir and Rav that one can acquire something that has not yet come into the world. The Gemara in Bava Batra 127 askes on this from the law ''yakir' a father can say so and so is my son in order to have the inheritance go to that son. The Gemara askes, "Why do we need that law, if we already have R Meir that holds the father could say, 'All property that I will own will go to my son.''' The gemara answers, "That law is needed for property that comes to him when he is dying." Now the Ramban holds that if he had said, "All property that I will own is acquired to him from now" then he can not retract. The question of Rav Shach is if he can not retract, then the acquisition is complete and he does not need to have ''daat'' (conscious awareness) at the time he is dying. However I would like to ask that if he has no daat at the time he is dying, then how can he acquire anything? Just like Rav Shach holds that he can not cause something to be acquired, so he should not be able to acquire. The point of Rav Shach is that a person dying has no conscious awareness and so he is can not cause something to be acquired as is the case with one who is under age or deaf or insane. But if so how can he be able to acquire property as he is dying?  I know that underage person can acquire and not cause something to be acquired , but my question is based on the fact that Rav Shach is saying a person dying has no daat at all like and insane or deaf person  

Rav Shach says a underage person or insane or deaf can not own anything nor cause anything to be owned because they are eliminated by a verse ''man'' not underage person. not because they have no conscious awareness. but if so then why would a person that is dying not be able to acquire or cause to be acquired in the first place? For  the Gemara says we need yakir for a person dying that would not be able to cause something to be acquired.

______________________________________________________________________________

רב שך brings a question on the רמב''ן. However there is some aspect of this question that I find hard to understand. The issue revolves on the opinion of ר' מאיר and רב that one can acquire something that has not yet come into the world. The גמרא in בבא בתרא קכ''ז  askes on this from the law ''יכיר' a father can say פלוני is my son in order to have the inheritance go to that son. The גמרא askes, "Why do we need that law, if we already have R Meir that holds the father could say, 'All property that I will own will go to my son.''' The גמרא answers, "That law is needed for property that comes to him when he is גוסס." Now the רמב''ן holds that if he had said, "All property that I will own is acquired to him from now" then he can not retract. The question of רב שך is if he can not retract, then the acquisition is complete and he doe not need to have דעת  (conscious awareness) at the time he is dying. However I wרould like to ask that if he has no דעת at the time he is גוסס, then how can he acquire anything? Just like רב שך holds that he can not cause something to be acquired, so he should not be able to acquire. 

The point of רב שך is that a person dying has no conscious awareness and so he is can not cause something to be acquired as is the case with one who is under age or deaf or insane. But if so how can he be able to acquire property as he is dying?

רב שך says a קטין or insane person or deaf person can not own anything nor cause anything to be owned because they are eliminated by a verse ''איש'' not קטין person. not because they have no conscious awareness. But if so then why would a person that is dying not be able to acquire or cause to be acquired in the first place? For  the גמרא says we need יכיר for a person dying that would not be able to cause something to be acquired.

רב שך מביא שאלה על הרמב''ן. עם זאת, יש היבט מסוים של השאלה הזו שקשה לי להבין. הסוגיה נסובה על דעת ר' מאיר ורב שאפשר לרכוש דבר שעדיין לא בא לעולם. הגמרא בבא בתרא קכ''ז שואל על זה מדין "יכיר" אב יכול לומר פלוני הוא בני כדי שהירושה תלך לאותו בן. שואלת הגמרא, "למה אנחנו צריכים את הדין הזה, אם כבר יש לנו את ר' מאיר שמחזיק האב יכול לומר, 'כל הרכוש שיהיה בבעלותי ילך לבני.''' עונה הגמרא, "צריך את החוק הזה. על רכוש שבא לו כשהוא גוסס". עתה גורס הרמב"ן שאם היה אומר "כל הרכוש שיהיה בבעלותי נרכש לו מעתה" אזי אינו יכול לחזור בו. שאלת רב שך היא אם הוא לא יכול לחזור בו, אז הרכישה הושלמה והוא לא צריך דעת (מודעות) בזמן שהוא גוסס. עם זאת אני רוצה לשאול שאם אין לו דעה בזמן שהוא גוסס, אז איך הוא יכול לרכוש משהו? כמו שרב שך סובר שהוא לא יכול לגרום למשהו להירכש, כך הוא לא אמור להיות מסוגל לרכוש

​​רב שך מחזיק שלאדם הגוסס אין מודעות ולכן הוא לא יכול לגרום למשהו להירכש כפי שקורה אצל קטן או חירש או לא שפוי. אבל אם כן איך הוא יכול להיות מסוגל לרכוש כשהוא גוסס?

אני יודע ש קטן יכול לרכוש ולא לגרום למשהו להירכש, אבל השאלה שלי מבוססת על העובדה שרב שך אומר שלאדם גוסס אין שום דעת כמו אדם משוגע או חירש.

רב שך אומר שקטין (או לא שפוי או חירש) אינו יכול להחזיק בשום דבר ולא לגרום לשום דבר להיות בבעלות כי הם מתבטלים על ידי פסוק ''איש'' לא אדם קטין. לא בגלל שאין להם מודעות.. אבל אם כן אז למה שאדם הגוסס לא יוכל לרכוש או לגרום לרכישה מלכתחילה? שהרי הגמרא אומר שצריך יכיר לאדם גוסס שלא יוכל לגרום לרכישת משהו.

I think there is a lack of serious understanding of Torah when one is not proficient in the school of Rav Haim of Brisk.[i.e., the sort of deep learning that Reb Haim was known for.] That had a beginning with the Mishna laMelech but was laid aside for a few hundred years as the later authorities concentrated on Tosphot. But now I think that to really have any kind of decent idea one needs to be proficient in the Chidushei Reb Haim, Reb Shimon Shkopf, the Birchat Shmuel [the two students of Reb Haim], and the Avi Ezri. 

     The major reason that all secular Israeli Jews go to into Far East religions [mainly Tao, the Bhagavad Gita and Buddhism  ]is that the rabanim have given Torah a terrible name. Regular Jews just take one look at the religious teachers and say to themselves, ''I want nothing to do with them''.

i think that many people are unaware of this problem-- if you look at it as a problem. Rav Nahman i think was the only one who pointed out the source of the problem in the few Torah lessons where he referred to rabanim a  Torah scholars who are demons.

I think a lot of what people learn in school is a waste of time. The main things ought to be the oral and written law, Physics, Mathematics for their own sake. I mean that learning Torah loses its value when it is done for the sake of making money. But there are practical disciplines that are also important. But I would suggest that some disciplines that ought not to be learned even if one can make money from them i.e. pseudo sciences.

 Psychology is pseudo science. It can not predict any effect. It's experiments are never repeatable since repeats of the same experiment always led to different results.    It is just a religion with its own priests and kinds of worship

 Even though Rav Nahman  said one should finish the entire writings of the Ari every year I have noticed a small book called Hasdei David from Algiers that sums up the Eitz Chaim of the Ari in a [cliff notes] shorter way but with most of the main details included. [That is printed in the regular editions of the Ari in the third volume of the Eitz Chaim along with the Nahar Shalom of the Reshash [Sar Shalom Sharabi.]   

 I was wondering which churches were  shut down in Ukraine. At first I thought they were only the Russian Orthodox. Now I found out they are also the Ukrainian Orthodox. They arrested the main guy [the ''metropolitan''] and anyone attempting to enter.  That is sad since is knew people that depended on these place for clothes and other sorts of needs.

So both kinds have been shut down. The interesting fact is that there was one time [in the 1970's or 1980's that the Soviets were thinking of shutting down the Russian Orthodox Church, but nothing ever came of that idea.

 My basic feeling about analytic philosophy is that Wittgenstein - Tractatus-was very wrong--as he himself realized and admitted openly. But that did not prevent the Anglo Saxon world of philosophy to sink into the endless mud of linguistics which has nothing to do with objective reality. [But to realize how wrong he was takes at least a year of very hard work to delve into that extremely difficult work Tractatus--his only book that made him into a superstar. He never published another book, but rather a paper years later. ] The last of his works was Logical Investigations.

My own disagreement with Wittgenstein comes from a deeper  problem than what he saw in his own work,  It is: language is 100% subjective, and has nothing to do with objective reality. [the word dog ha zero meaning except for the one who says it and the one who hears it. other than that it has nothing to do with the dog.]

Allan Bloom sees the problem in the USA as the result of a contradiction in Enlightenment though

 Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind points to the source of the problem in universities. and hints to a solution. Bible, the Great Books [that is the classics of ancient Greece and Rome] and Kant. [Not that he says as much openly, but you can see these three bits of advice if you read between the lines]

I would like to add that even though I agree with Allan Bloom, I have a slightly different set of great books i.e., Chiduhei Harambam by Rav Chaim of Brisk, the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, Physics and Mathematics [but  I not to diminish from the point of Allan Bloom]

[Allan Bloom sees the problem in the USA as the result of a contradiction in Enlightenment thought that existed from the very beginning of the Enlightenment. Thus by implication, if one could find a solution to that contradiction, then automatically the problem would be fixed. It seems to Bloom that Kant and Hegel came closet to a solution. 

20th century philosophy was an attempt to get out of Kant and Hegel with no success. These were brilliant attempt in British American analytic philosophy but in the long run were futile and false a Robert Hanna ha pointed out in several books.

The issue is never the issue. What people hold in philosophy is which philosopher holds like their already established opinion in politics, If they are for Hegel, it is because they think he was for socialism. [Not that they understand his approach. 

However I prefer Kant and the new Friesian approach of Kelley Ross which takes Kant as a basis but modifies that approach with immediate non intuitive knowledge -which was used by Fries to repair the transcendental deduction of Kant and indirectly opens the door to faith, To my mind this is a continuation of the medieval approach to combine faith with reason

    The major point of the Gra was learning Torah, but the general path of the religions world to use Torah to make money was thought to be in violation of the command in Pirkei Avot to not make Torah into shovel to dig with. Using Torah  to make money is an old  practice, but no older than murder .

[Torah here means the old testament, two Tamuds and midrash ]

 Rav Nahman says [Le.M I;129] to honor the festivals and/or to be close to a true tzadik helps to rid oneself of pride. The question that I have here is that there is no indication of any method to be able to discern who is a true tadik- as opposed to who is a phony. But I do have a suggestion. In the Le.M  vol II Rav Nahman says to be in a Litvak yeshiva is the same essence as being with a tzadik. 

 There were plenty of books of mysticism during the middle ages and the zohar brings a lot of them. that i why and how Rav Yaakov Emden [the Yaavatz] explains the Zohar. He says some parts of it are from authentic writings of ancient mystics before the time of Moshe Deleon. So while I am not in favor of learning the Zohar, I am in favor of learning the Ari [Isaac Luria].who concentrates on the parts of the Zohar that were ancient teachings. But that is only in connection with Gemara and Tosphot

 Dough prepared to be fed to the dogs that guard the sheep is not kosher for the night of Passover, but if the shepherds eat from it, it is okay to fulfill one's obligation for the first night of Passover since it is kept from water. Thus regular flour is ok to make maza from it on the first night of Passover. [Rambam. Laws of Hametz and Maza 6 law 5]

my point is the dough is  meant for dogs.so even if the shepards eat from it, it was only guarded to not let water fall on it so that it could be given to dogs to eat. That is--so that it should not get moldy. But even regular flour falls into that category--that they owners are careful that water should not fall on it and let fungus grow in it.

My point here is that idea of Rav Nahman of Breslov that one should not search for extra restrictions-.The sources for this are the Le.M of Rav Nahman in vol ii chapter 4 and I think around chapter 86 and the famous hashmata [left out paragraph printed between vol i and vol ii] about the fact that if one wants to serve God, he must  think of himself as being alone in the world and not look at what other are doing.  

 The C.I.A. concentrates on regime  change since the 1990's. A prime example is Kosovo, where there was already tension. The C.I.A. hired  reckless hot heads to throw rocks at the police in Sarajevo thus got an over reaction from the police --which then caused an international outrage. Then  USA forces came in and got regime change. Same in Ukraine in 2014. And now they are doing the same thing in Israel.

Frege, G.E. Moore  Bertrand Russell, and Wittgenstein  were the main founders of the analytic school of philosophy which is the brand of philosophy taught in British and American universities, the unspoken principle of their approach is ''How can we disprove Kant? 

However, a careful analysis by Robert Hanna shows the flaws in their thinking. Thus, there is a need to get back to Kant. But which approach to Kant? Marburg (Hermann Cohen) Epistemology? Or the metaphysical Kant of the first half of the 1800's.

And besides that I would have to agree with Michael Huemer that the best of the Analytic School is G/E/ Moore.

But I think that the Friesian-Leonard Nelson approach to Kant is the best of them all 

Tractate Yevamot page 40, side B. Rambam laws of Yibum and Chalitza 6, halacha 18

 The sister of the chalutza [note 1] is forbidden. \Thus the zara of the sister of the chalutza is forbidden as a decree of the scribes. The reason is she might be mixed up with the zara of the chalutza. But the zara of the sister of the zkuka is not forbidden. Rav Shach brings this fact to show the zika is less than marriage derabanan.  However I do not see how that is so. Perhaps zika is marriage derabanan, but we do not make a decree on a decree. 

[note 1] When a brother has died without children, one of his wives must marry his brother or spit at him and take off his shoe. That is called chalitza. The woman that does  this is called chalutza 

Also I would like to ask this question on the answer of רב  שך on the רמב''ם. The question is this:  the רמב''ם writes this case. There are two brothers. Brother number one dies and so his wife falls to ייבום before brother number two. And after the first brother dies, a third brother is born. The wife of the first brother can never falls to ייבום before the third brother because of the law of ''the wife of one's brother whose was not in the same world.''  If the second brother made a מאמר on the wife of the first brother [that is he marries her by word, but has not yet slept with her,] then both the wife of the first and the other wife of the second brother are forbidden to the third brother. רב  שך askes: Why only מאמר? Should not זיקה alone be enough to forbid both wives to the third? He answers: since the second one died, that is as if there never was זיקה. [That is: רב  שך holds only when the brother is alive, then זיקה is like marriage. The question I have on this answer comes from יבמות ל' ע''ב and רמב''ם הלכות ייבום ו' כ''ה.The case is two brothers married to two sisters. One brother dies. Then a third brother dies and his wife falls to ייבום to the first brother. She can not have ייבום, but only חליצה because she had also זיקה with the second brother and this is צרת אחות of a זקוקה. This raises a question on the answer of רב  שך because the second brother is no longer alive, and so his זיקה should be nullified. But the answer to this seems simple since the זיקה still exists for the first brother so the answer of רב שך stands firm. 

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אחותו של החלוצה [הערה 1] אסורה. לפיכך הצרה [הערה 2] של אחותו של החלוצה אסורה דרבנן. הסיבה היא שהיא עלולה להיות מעורבת עם צרה של החלוצה. אבל צרת אחות הזקוקה אינה אסורה [הערה ג]. רב שך מביא עובדה זו כדי להראות שזיקה [הערה 4] פחותה מנישואין דרבנן. עם זאת, איני רואה כיצד זה כך. אולי זיקה היא נישואין דרבנן, אבל אנחנו לא גוזרים גזרה על גזירה?

 

[הערה 1] כאשר אח נפטר ללא ילדים, על אחת מנשותיו לשאת את אחיו או לירוק אליו ולחלוץ את נעלו. זה נקרא החליצה. לאישה שעושה את זה קוראים חלוצה.

[הערה 2] הצרה היא האישה השנייה.

[הערה 3] המקרה הוא שאחותו של הזקוקה נשואה לאח אחר. לא זה שמת, ולא זה שעושה את הייבום או החליצה. למה שאותו אח שלישי לא יהיה חייב? אולי בגלל שהוא אח שנולד אחרי שהאח הראשון מת [הערה 4] זיקה היא החובה להתחתן עם אחת מנשות האח המת. זה כמו נישואים דרבנן. אבל במקרה אחד הרמב''ם רואה בזה פחות כח מנישואין דרבנן. אז רב שך מחפש איזה הסבר לרמב''ם

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כמו כן ברצוני לשאול שאלה זו על תשובת רב שך על הרמב''ם. השאלה היא כזו: הרמב''ם כותב את המקרה הזה. יש שני אחים. אח הראשון מת וכך אשתו נופלת לייבום לפני אח מספר שתיים. ואחרי שהאח הראשון מת, נולד אח שלישי. אשת האח הראשון לעולם לא תוכל ליפול לייבום לפני האח השלישי בגלל דין "אשת אחיו שלא הייתה בעולמו". אם האח השני עשה מאמר עם אשת האח הראשון. כלומר הוא מתחתן איתה במילה, אבל עדיין לא שכב איתה,] אז גם אשת הראשון וגם אשתו השנייה של האח השני אסורות לאח השלישי. רב שואל: למה רק מאמר? האם אין די בזיקה לבדה כדי לאסור את שתי הנשים על השלישי? הוא עונה: מאז שהשני מת, זה כאילו מעולם לא הייתה זיקה. [כלומר: רב שך מחזיק רק כשהאח חי, אז זיקה זה כמו נישואין. השאלה שיש לי על התשובה הזו מגיעה מיבמות ל' ע''ב ורמב''ם הלכות ייבום ו' כ''ה. המקרה הוא שני אחים נשואים לשתי אחיות. אח אחד מת. ואז אח שלישי מת ואשתו נופלת לאח הראשון. היא לא יכולה לקבל ייבום, אלא רק חליצה כי הייתה לה גם זיקה עם האח השני וזו צרת אחותה של זקוקה. זה מעלה שאלה על תשובת רב שך כי האח השני כבר אינו בין החיים, ולכן יש לבטל את הזיקה שלו

אבל התשובה לכך נראית פשוטה שכן הזיקה עדיין קיימת לאח הראשון ולכן תשובת רב שך עומדת איתן.

 Rav Nahman was very much against learning philosophy and that approach is very much like that of some mediaeval authorities (e.g. Ramban/Nachmanidess).  But this is clearly an argument among the Rishonim. So I have at least some opinion to depend on.

Thus I would like to bring Kant in support of faith. I mean that questions on faith often come up and the answers are not satisfying. To this I answer the when one ventures into the realm of dinge an sich, contradictions arise automatically. what are things in themselves? They are both things stripped of all characteristics supplied by human minds, and starting axioms of reason. and furthermore Kant adds that this applies not just to abstract reason but also to individuals and societies

I see great importance of this approach of Kant and in particular in the Kant Fries school of thought. but i do not share the distain for Hegel that seems to permeate all neo Kantian schools.

Hegel thought that by the dialectic, it is possible to get beyond the limitations of pure reason and empirical reasoning. He did not deny the problem of the ''thing in itself,'' but rather thought that this process, it is possible to get beyond it

I would like here to take an opportunity to recommend a particular modification of Kant by Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson that I think is the best approach in Philosophy even though this also needs a bit of tweaking the variables because the absolute position of Newtonian space and time can not be the fundamental starting place of all possible human reasoning. While Leonard Nelson was right that you have to have starting axioms without which Reason can not start, but Newton's space and time are not them. rather you have to start with Maxwell's equations of electro magnetism and the speed of light being constant.     [If only nelson had realized this in time, the whole Friesian school might have fared better, --in particular Bernays saw right away that the Friesian school needed to deal with Einstein in a more constructive way. IF anyone has the time i highly recommend the phd thesis of dr kelly ross on the friesian approach.    

 Rav Nahman states the importance of true tzadikim [saints] but also brings u the problem of people that are famous for being great tzadikim but in fact are agents from the dark side, In one Torah lesson Rav Nahman calls these phony tzadikim  מפורסמים של שקר [famous frauds] and Rav Israel Odeser said ''If famous then a fraud''.

[That means that people that are famous a being holy and righteous you must know that they are frauds ]

 Rav Shach and all gedolai Torah [Litvak great Torah scholars] in Israel were against  any kind of situation in which Torah learning was combined with secular learning [as I noticed today in a newspaper that was quoting a few letters of Rav Shach to that effect.]and I can see the point of this. But the way I see things, all the social studies and humanities departments of all universities should be thrown into the trash.[Also look at The Closing of the American Mind  by Allan Bloom who reaches the same conclusion.]

my son Izhak

 Even though my son Izhak held with learning in depth, still he recognized the importance of Rav Nahman who strongly held with  the approach of fast learning ["just say the words in order and go further" אין צריכים בלימוד רק לומר הדברים כסדר וממילא יבין    ם "In learning one only needs to ay the words in order and then he will automatically understand and if he does not understand right away, he will eventually understand; and if after all of that, there are still left some things he did not understand, so what? For the greatness of a lot of learning goes above everything else." so one needs a balance, deep learning in the morning and fast learning in the afternoon. This is the compromise that most Litvak yeshivot have arrived at after a few hundred years of experience. he even mentioned in his bookthe importance of being with rav nahman from uman on rosh hashana and rav nahman definitely emphasized the importance of ''girsa''-saying the words in order and going on as mentioned in tractate shabat pg 63. however i have taken the approach that being in israel is mre important than being in uman.