Bava Metzia page 102-B, Bava Batra page 105.

When I was going over my notes I had taken when I was learning Bava  Metzia page 102-B with David Bronson I apparently had forgotten or did not understand what he was saying about Bava Metzia page 102B פרושי קא מפרש in Tosphot. However it just occurred to me what probably was bothering David.




I think it was this. Tosphot asks a question on Rashi from Bava Batra page 165B from the Mishna that says if in a document it says So and so borrowed 100 zuzim which are 20 selaim.  (Normally 100 zuz are 25 sela.)The lender gets only 20 selaim. Tosphot answer for Rashi that the words in the document are far apart. What probably bothered David and which bothers me now is that there does not seem to be any difference between the case in Bava Batra page 165 and the cases of אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי nor the case of "I will rent to you this bathhouse for a year for 12 gold coins which is one gold coin per month." So the question of Tosphot seems to apply just as much to the explanation of Tosphot as it does to Rashi and the answer he gives for Rashi does not seem very justified. After all the words "100 zuz" do not seem very far from "20 selaim". The only word that separates them is דאינון "which are" which should serve to connect the words rather than separate them.

The basic sugia as it is brought in Bava Batra page 105 is this. There is a Mishna [Baba Metzia 102a] that says One person says to another I will rent to you this bathhouse for a year for 12 gold coins which are 1 per month. Rav said he would give the whole 13th month to the owner. They ask on this: "Why did Rav need to say this again? He already had said  אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי?" That means תפוס לשון אחרון. We go by the last words. The Gemara answers "we might have said פרושי מפרש"

There are three explanations. The Rashbam and the Ri who both say פרושי מפרש would go on the bathhouse. But they differ in this.The Rashba says If Rav had only stated the case of bathhouse we might have thought the owner meant 12 per year but if it is a leap year then  one gold coin per month. The Ri explains  if Rav had only stated the case of אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי  (which we would know means תפוס לשון אחרון)then when we would come to a case of a bathhouse we would say the owner meant to explain that he meant the rent ought to be paid at the end of every month. Not the end of the year. But that still the whole overall price would be 12 gold coins.
Rashi says פרושי מפרש goes on אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי and that it means a אסתרא גרועה a low value אסתרא. But that would not imply in general to go by לשון אחרון.
The question on Rashi come from Bava Batra page 165. 100 zuz that are 20 selaim where the law is he gets the least amount.20 selaim. Also if the document said 100 zuz which are 30 sela he gets only 100 zuz. This seems to be a question on everyone. Not just on Rashi. And the answer Tosphot gives seems hard since דאינון means "that are" which would seem to connect more than to disconnect.
However Tosphot does bring a different version of the Mishna on page 165 that says 100 zuz דהוו קיימין "that equal". So that might help explain Tosphot. What are the extra words דהוו קיימין there for except to separate? But still it is not clear why the question of Tosphot would not apply equally well to the Rashbam and to the Ri himself.





I must say that in the Mir Yeshiva in NY, the general approach was more "global." This kind of question would not have  occupied much attention by Reb Shmuel Berenbaum, but rather big issue questions like how does this sugia relate to other sugiot as you would see in Reb Haim HaLevi's חידושי הרמב''ם or in Rav Shach's אבי עזרי.
But in Shar Yashuv, this is exactly the kind of question that would have been raised by Rav Naphtali Yeger. 
I also should mention that I assume Tosphot answers this somehow in his laconic language but I just so far have not been able to  see how Tosphot answer this.

It should be mentioned that the Ri himself is hard to understand.He says if we would only have the statement of the איסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי the when we come to bathhouse we would say he gets 12 because it is not a case of two statements but one statement which explains something about the first statement. But our Gemara in Bava Batra is assuming we already have the statement of bathhouse..I can imagine that my learning partner David Bronson might have been wondering about the Ri also. But that much is fuzzy in my mind. I do not recall. But the part about the question from Bava Batra 165 is somewhat clear to me --that he was bothered by that.

In any case the Ri seems more or less clear. He is going on the Gemara in Bava Metzia where we have the statement of אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי and from that we would not know the bathhouse.

My impression is that the Ri held if something changes the basic meaning of an idea, then it can not be called "explaining it". So if the owner said 12 and then 1 per month which in a leap year means 13, then that is not called "explaining".
Other than that I can not see what else the Ri was saying here.














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בבא בתרא ק''ה ע''ב
תוספות ד''ה פרושי מפרש
 תוספות asks a question on רש''י from בבא בתרא page קס''ה ע''ב from the משנה that says if in a document it says "So and so borrowed מאה זוז which are עשרים סלעים." (Normally מאה זוז are עשרים וחמשה סלעים.) The lender gets only עשרים סלעים. Then תוספות answers for רש''י that the words in the document are far apart. What  bothers me now is that there does not seem to be any difference between the case in בבא בתרא page קס''ה and the cases of אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי nor the case of "I will משכיר to you this bathhouse for a year for שנים עשר זהובים which is one gold coin per month." So the question of תוספות seems to apply just as much to the explanation of תוספות as it does to רש''י and the answer he gives for רש''י does not seem very justified. After all the words מאה זוז do not seem very far from עשרים סלעים. The only word that separates them is דאינון (which are) which should serve to connect the words rather than separate them. The basic סוגיא as it is brought in בבא בתרא page ק''ה ע''ב is this. There is a משנה בבא מציעא ק''ב ע''א that says one person says to another I משכיר to you this bathhouse for a year for שנים עשר זהובים which are דינר זהב per month. רב said he would give the whole 13th month to the owner. They ask on this: "Why did רב need to say this again? He already had said  אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי?" That means תפוס לשון אחרון. We go by the last words. Theגמרא answers "we might have said פרושי מפרש" There are three explanations. The רשב''ם and the ר''י who both say פרושי מפרש would go on the bathhouse. But they differ in this. The רשב''ם says If רב had only stated the case of bathhouse, then we might have thought the owner meant שנים עשר זהובים per year, but if it is a leap year then  one דינר זהב per month. The ר''י explains  if we only  had  the case of אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי  (which we would know means תפוס לשון אחרון), then when we would come to a case of a bathhouse, we would say the owner meant to explain that he meant this. The rent ought to be paid at the end of every month. Not the end of the year. But that still the whole overall price would be שנים עשר זהובים. However רש''י says פרושי מפרש goes on אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי and that it means a אסתרא גרועה, a low value אסתרא or a low grade אסתרא. But that would not imply in general to go by לשון אחרון.
The question on רש''י come from בבא בתרא page קס''ה. The משנה says when the document says מאה זוז that are עשרים סלעים  the law is he gets the least amount. That is עשרים סלעים. Also if the document said מאה זוזים which are שלשים סלעים he gets only מאה זוזים. This seems to be a question on everyone. Not just on רש''י. And the answer תוספות gives seems hard since דאינון means "that are" which would seem to connect more than to disconnect. However תוספות does bring a different version of the משנה on page קס''ה that says מאה זוזים דהוו קיימין "that equal". So that might help explain תוספות. What are the extra words דהוו קיימין there for except to separate? But still it is not clear why the question of תוספות would not apply equally well to the רשב''ם and to the ר''י himself.

בבא בתרא ק''ה ע''ב תוספות ד''ה פרושי מפרש. תוספות שואלים שאלה על רש''י מן בבא בתרא דף קס''ה ע''ב מן המשנה שאומרת שאם במסמך כתוב  "פלוני לווה מאה זוז שהם עשרים סלעים." (בדרך כלל מאה זוז הם עשרים וחמשה סלעים.) המלווה מקבל רק עשרים סלעים. ואז תוספות נותנים תשובה לרש''י כי המילים במסמך הן רחוקות אחת מהשניה. מה שמטריד אותי עכשיו הוא שלא נראה כל הבדל בין המקרה בבא בתרא דף קס''ה ואת המקרים של "אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי" ולא המקרה של "אני משכיר לך מרחץ זה במשך שנה עבור שנים עשר זהובים אשר הם מטבע זהב אחד לחודש." אז השאלה של תוספות נראה שחלה באותה מידה להסבר של תוספות כפי שהיא חלה לרש''י והתשובה שהוא נותן עבור רש''י לא נראה מוצדק מאוד. אחרי הכל, המילים מאה זוז לא נראות מאוד רחוקות מעשרים סלעים. המילה היחידה שמפרידה אותן היא דאינון (שהם) אשר היא אמורה לשרת לקשר את המילים ולא להפריד ביניהם. סוגיא הבסיסי כפי שהיא מובא בבבא בתרא דף ק''ה ע''ב זו. ישנה משנה בבא מציעא ק''ב ע''א שאומרת אדם אחד אומר לשני שאני משכיר לך מרחץ זה במשך שנה עבור שנים עשר זהובים אשר הם דינר זהב לחודש. רב אמר שייתן בעבור החודש השלשה עשר כולה למשכיר. הם שואלים על זה: "למה רב צריך להגיד את זה שוב? הוא כבר אמר אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי"? כלומר תפוס לשון אחרון. אנחנו עוברים למילים האחרונות. גמרא עונה התשובה "יכולנו אולי לומר פרושי מפרש". ישנם שלושה הסברים. רשב''ם והר''י  אומרים "פרושי המפרש" ילך על המרחץ. אבל הם נבדלים בזה. רשב''ם אומר אם רב הגיד רק את המקרה של בית המרחץ, אז אנחנו עלולים לחשוב הבעלים מכוונים שנים עשר זהובים לשנה, אבל אם היא שנה מעוברת אז דינר זהב לחודש. ר''י מסביר שאם  רק היה המקרה של אסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי (אשר היינו יודעים אמצעי תפוס לשון אחרון), אז כאשר היינו מגיעים למקרה של מרחץ, היינו אומרים הבעלים  להסביר התכוונו לזה. דמי השכירות צריכים להיות משולמים בסוף כל חודש. לא סוף השנה. אבל עדיין המחיר הכולל כולו יהיה שנים עשר זהובים לשנה. עם זאת רש''י אומר "פרושי מפרש" נמשך לאסתרא מאה מעי מאה מעי וכי פירושו אסתרא גרועה, (ערך נמוך). אבל זה לא היה להגיד בכלל ללכת על לפי לשון אחרון. השאלה על רש''י באה מבבא בתרא דף קס''ה במשנה שאומרת כאשר המסמך אומר "מאה זוז  שהם עשרים סלעים" החוק הוא שהוא יקבל את הסכום הנמוך ביותר. כלומר עשרים סלעים. כמו כן אם מסמך  מאה זוזים אשר שלשים סלעים הוא מקבל רק מאה זוזים. זה נראית שאלה על כולם. לא רק על רש''י. והתשובה שתוספות נותן נראית קשה מאז המילה דאינון (שהם) הקובעת לכאורה לקשר יותר מלנתק. אולם תוספות מביא גרסה שונה של המשנה בעמוד קס''ה שאומרת מאה זוזים דהוו קיימין (ששווים). כך שזה עשוי לעזור להסביר תוספות. מהן מילות  "דהוו קיימין" עושות מלבד להפריד? אבל עדיין לא ברור מדוע שאלת התוספות לא תחול באותה מידה על הרשב''ם ועל הר''י עצמו

I am not sure if the Book of Job is taught in public schools but when I went to high school in California, it was part of the curriculum. So what I am saying about Rav Moshe Lutzato (Ramhal) is very relevant. For I have not heard of anyone so far actually tying in the Ramhal with Job. But the approach of the Ramhal makes the book of Job highly understandable.




[I was in California  because my Dad had gone to Cal Tech for his master's degree, and then liked it so much that he decided to move out West when he began raising a family. His parents were penniless immigrants from Poland. In any case, there was a debate if to have the Bible in public schools. Apparently by the time I got to high school, the issue was settled to have the book of Job in English literature. classes. In Israel, the entire Old Testament is taught in public school.]

That is when a person has mostly sin he gets the reward for his good deeds in this world and the punishment for sin in the next. But Job had mostly good deeds. Therefore he was punished for bad deeds in this world and rewarded in the next.

Part of the reason for the fact that the Ramhal is ignored in the academic world is probably due to the fact that the academic world in understanding Job they think Job was totally righteous. They think the Satan was picking on him for no reason except spite and jealously. Still they have a point that it is hard to see anything wrong with Job. Even in God's answer to Job which is "my ways are inscrutable"[not possible to understand] there is no hint that Job had done anything wrong.

In any case I feel that in high schools is the USA, this approach of the Ramhal ought to be given attention. [And it is in accord with the Talmud  which assumes that Job was not as great as he thought. Also it is in accord with Maimonides who as far as I recall hold the fourth friend was the only one who got the issues right. It also goes along with the Rambam who also has this idea that one can have a certain percent of good deeds and an opposite percent of evil deeds.]
[The Secular world does not recognize this because either they are Christians who believe one is saved or not. It is a simple matter of this or that and nothing in between. Or they are thinking like Kant of radical sin or radical virtue. Once one decides to be righteous in everything then he is totally righteous because of good will. Even if he makes mistakes. One who has not decide to be righteous in everything is by definition radically wicked. That is Kant.  Far be in from me to disagree with Kant. However the opinion of the Ramhal I think also should be considered as it certainly goes along the lines of Hegel. Hegel would more approach virtue as steady progress towards a goal.
[Catholics thankfully do have a concept of Purgatory which is to clean from sins that remain unwashed. [.e. non mortal sins. However Catholics do agree that there are sins for which one stays in Hell. But that is not the same as Purgatory.] In general, in Torah though things are slightly different. In Torah, we have seven levels of Hell, but only the very lowest level is permanent. Otherwise Hell itself is a cleansing process. The Ramhal [Rav Luzato] goes into this a little but it is well known from the Zohar.]



The issue of Job is not if he was sinless. We see later on in the statements of Eliphaz [cira 22 where Eliphaz goes through a whole list of Job's sins. ]that there is reason to believe that Job had some sin. Probably his sins were due to a fact about all good deeds.They always entail something evil. You can see this if you imagine yourself in politics. You know that any good measure your enact will entail some evil consequences and some good.  So you try to maximize the good. But that is not limited to politics. It s the same in every individual's life.
Rather the issue with Job is that he was doing the best he could. So the question the Book of Job raises is not: If objectively a saint can suffer? Rather it is: If a person that is doing the best he knows how can suffer?

Support for Reform and Conservative

The best support for Reform and Conservative groups is the opinion of R. Shimon Ben Yohai that דורשים טעמה דקרא. [We go by the reasons for the verse, not the literal meaning when the two conflict.]
And there is no mystery about the reasons for the verses since the Gemara itself assumes as a simple matter that we in fact do know the reasons. The only question is when the reason conflicts with the literal meaning.
[The sages that disagree with R. Shimon do not say we do not know the reasons for the verses. They agree we know the reasons, but the question is if to go by the literal meaning, or the reason. But in any case, to me it seems clear that the very concept of ends and means to get to that end implies that the end--the goal-has primary importance over the means. That is the simple implication of the idea of ends and means by definition.]


And the Rishonim (including the Rambam) do in fact state openly the reasons for the verses.
And we in fact see a conflict in so far as that often keeping the literal meaning does seriously conflict with the reasons for the verses.
The Rambam gives the basic reasons. To learn to come to good traits [to be a mensch], not to do idolatry, peace of the State. We see most times that people supposedly keeping the Torah are in serious conflict with all three reasons.

[The opinion of R. Shimon is in Bava Metzia circa page 119 and in other places.]

I am not saying that the actual law is like R. Shimon. Rav Shach asks this question as do others and Rav Shach's answer is elegant. He says the law comes out not like R. Shimon nor R. Yehuda  but the first opinion in a Mishna which is a combination of both.


In any case it is hard to know the right path. My basic impression is I should have listened to my parents who knew and understood a lot more about life that I realized at the time. And they were definitely Reform minus some of the problem in Reform like "social justice."
The problem with the religious is they are always looking to add some extra restriction that is not contained in Torah. Then they claim it is from the Torah. And then impose it on everyone else.

And since no one else is convinced of the fraud, they do not accept it. And so the religious do not see secular Jews as human. For any rational human would accept the vast intellectual and moral superiority of the religious people and thus serve them. The religious think being religious absolves them from being decent human beings. They do not realize that Natural Law precedes Divine Law. [The Guide of Maimonides says that the level of natural law revealed to Abraham was needed before there could be the level of Divine Law at Sinai. ]

Rav Shach agreed about the importance of learning Musar [Ethics of Torah] as you can see in the introduction of the Avi Ezri. However Musar can be a distraction. It can lead to one thing that leads to another that eventually gets one away from learning,- sometimes incompletely and other times completely.
In fact, the problem with distractions  has been something that has bothered me for a long time. The Dark Side never comes along and says, "Come and do a sin." It rather finds ways to distract one's attention from things that really matter to things that in fact are trivial.[As the Gra says in the beginning of the Book of Proverbs.]

Thus I found for myself that it  it makes a big difference to find what are the things that really require attention.  Learning Musar can be a big help in that direction because it more or less helps to define what really matters in in Torah. But it can be a distraction in itself --and often it is.
[That is the reason in fact that Brisk--the prime Litvak yeshiva is not a Musar yeshiva. Reb Haim did not agree with the Musar movement.]

On a personal note, I am not in any yeshiva at all, but I found the few years I spent at the Mir in NY to be refreshing and inspiring even many years after I left. And a great deal of that I attribute to the fact that it is a Musar Yeshiva.

Rav Moshe Haim Luzato and the Book of Job

Rav Moshe Haim Luzato has a remarkable approach towards sin that helps to explain the book of Job. The main idea is when one has 51% sin he gets punished in the next world [for the 51% sins] and rewarded for his good deeds in this world. If he has 49% sin or less then he gets punished in this world for his sins and rewarded for his good deeds in the next. [The percentage of sin does not go by just the number of sins, but also their weight.]

He does not tie this in with the book of Job directly, but it still helps to explain the basic issues that come up in the book of Job.

The major problem in the Book of Job is that it seems to be in contradiction to the rest of the Old Testament. The major question is this: Do righteous people suffer?  The answer of the book of Job seems to be "Yes." The rest of the Old Testament answers, "No."
So the רמח''ל Rav Luzato answers as I mentioned above. [In דרך השם and in the other well famous book of dialog, but I forget the title.]
Thus, when the Old Testament calls Job a צדיק and תמים (a saint or a righteous man.) it does not mean without sin. Rather it means 51% good deeds and 49% sins. This corresponds directly with the Rambam who says exactly the same thing in הלכות תשובה (Laws of Repentance.) (The translation in English of תם  for Job is "perfect" but the meaning therefore confuses English speakers who think it means without sin. תם or תמים means more accurately "simple" as in איש תם a simple man).



[The academic world tends to look at the Book of Job as in fact contradicting the rest of the Old Testament as you can hear in the lectures of Christine Hayes at Yale University.]

Sin is a big subject in the Old Testament: that is the question what counts as a sin and how to measure the severity of sins. In the secular world these issues do not come in the same appearance. But there still are sins like lack of tolerance or racism etc. These things however in the Old Testament are not considered sins. Lack of tolerance is praised and to be rid of wicked people  is  a major goal. Racism is also considered a virtue. That is to discern between good and evil even in groups.


[The Christian world dismisses sin since belief nullifies it. The secular world has another set of actions and thoughts that are considered sinful. Being male is considered the primal sin by many people in the USA. That is  a sin for which eternal repentance is declared obligatory.Fasting and prayer are not enough to wipe out that sin.]

Rav Isaac Blazer (the major disciple of Reb Israel Salanter) also goes into the issue of the weight of sins, and shows that one sin can cancel lots of good deeds. He uses this idea to show the importance of learning Musar.

In the two Litvak yeshivas I was in-Shar Yashuv and the Mir of NY the emphasis was on: learning Torah, not to speak lashon hara and kindness in cases of need. That is to say it was considered that certain kinds of good deeds like kindness and learning Torah can cancel sins as the נפש החיים {Soul of Life} by a disciple of the Gra (Reb Haim of Voloshin) brings down.

[Tolerance really began in England as virtue after the disastrous Civil Wars between different Protestant groups.--the dissenters (Puritans, Quakers, etc.) versus the establishment until the Edict of Tolerance. But even then people recognized there were limits to tolerance as Defoe goes into. The colonies in America were supported by the English government all through the 1700's. They did not grow as a result of escaping persecution in England since the Edict had been passed in Parliament.]


Appendix: 1. I have to mention the Gemara in Bava Batra that also takes a negative view of Job. Also the Gemara Shabat--אין יסורים בלי עוון No problems without sin.

2. My own take on all this is thus: that there are major sins [weighty] and minor sins . And that there are major good deeds and minor good deeds. And that Reb Haim from Voloshin was correct that learning Torah  is weighty and can cancel a lot on the other side of the balances. The difference is that I include learning Physics and Metaphysics as the Rambam considered both of these are part of the Oral Law.

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support for the Rambam

The shinning forth of Being of Hegel seems to provide support for the Rambam. After all without that it is hard to see the position of the Rambam that learning Physics and Metaphysics brings one to the fulfillment of the two commandments to (1) Love and (2) Fear God
Even the idea of the Wisdom of God being contained in the work of Creation seems to not bring to what the Rambam is getting at..
However Hegel provides a link in the chain that seems invincible. Hegel wonders about Kant's "mere appearance". (That all we can know is mere appearance.) Hegel wonders about "mere". He says on the contrary the appearance is the shining forth of Being itself. 

Mutual Aid groups

Mutual Aid groups seems like a natural development in the Christian world since kindness towards others is considered the major goal in life and the major way of serving God. But when this is applied to the institutions that are supposedly learning Torah,the whole concept seems to fall flat on its face.  As my learning partner expressed it "They are just private country clubs."
But to gain respectability they do have to present an image of helping others. But in fact the whole thing seems like a kind of scam. Naive people of college age are drawn in by the scam but later experience shows that they are not what they present to the outside world. And woe to the individual that gets taken in by the scam.
There are however legitimate places like the great NY Litvak yeshivas [e.g. Mir, Torah VeDaat, Haim Berlin] that pretty much stick with the basic formula of Reb Haim From Voloshin about what a yeshiva is supposed to be.

I am wondering about the issue of yeshivas and I can see the point of Reb Haim in starting the Yeshiva Movement. [That seems all the more important in so far as the contracts that the "Kahal" had held in Poland were about to be nullified starting with the Russian Czar.]
Still outside of the few great Litvak Yeshivas in NY and Bnei Brak, the whole things looks like a scam.  A way to make easy money. Besides the fact that almost every yeshiva in Israel was made by vegetable stand owners that could not make living any other way than getting a few people to sign up and getting an automatic income--and the people that signed up were mainly interested in getting out of serving in the IDF.
[However I have heard great things about off shoots of Ponoviz, like Tifrah [תפרח]  and in Netivot I was very impressed with Rav Montag's yeshiva which is continuation of Yeshivat HaNegev. 

attacks on Hegel

Hegel has received a series of attacks. The first was in Germany in 1843-1845. Also WWI spelled the end of Idealism and the beginning of  dumb movements in philosophy. But even people that accepted some of his ideas in part like Marx and Kierkegaard were certainly no Hegelians

To me it seems the weak part of Hegel is in politics. When he ties ideas to politics that where he seems to have gotten off on a wrong foot.
Even the attacks on Hegel from Karl Popper and  Dr. Kelley Ross seem to focus mostly on the way his metaphysical system was subsequently applied to politics. But that is what seems to be the weakest part of his system.

[On the other hand looking at the founding fathers of the USA I tend to be very impressed. It seems to me that the geniuses of England and the USA spent a lot of time and thought on politics and that is where their expertise was. In Germany the great minds there simply spent their best efforts in other directions].

But I am not saying the system of James Madison and Thomas Jefferson would be applicable to China or Russia. The founding fathers of the USA were definitely basing themselves on England especially the England of the 1700's. But  that whole foundation depends on the kind of people the English were. You could not transfer that to czarist Russia where the problems were very different.The Czars had an empire that was composed of many groups with high percentages of criminal DNA and bad genes. James Madison had to write a Constitution for people that had good intentions, but their good intentions conflicted with other people's good intentions. That is a whole other ball game. 

U-65 G Minor   [U-65 midi]

[U-65 nwc format]

There is a certain amount of support for respect towards Jesus which can be found in the words of Rav Avraham Abulafia. He is more well known for going to debate a certain pope. Orders were given to arrest him as soon as he  got to Rome but everyone that tried to lay a hand on him died. His attitude can be found easily in his writings. He thought the Catholics were not on the right path. Not just because of ביטול המצוות nullification of the commandments; but also because of the problem of idolatry.  Still his attitude towards Jesus himself is different; and is certainly one of respect.
The way I tend to look at this is that sometimes a saint is born to bring some higher aspect of things into the world. Not only that, but that once they have come into the world -then it is no longer possible to get to that aspect of things without faith in that saint.

We find in the Ari that at the breaking of the vessels שבירת הכלים that the trait of kindness (חסד) fell into foundation (יסוד). And that is what I think happened in this case.


This type of attitude is not usually well received, but it seems to me to be accurate.

I was asked that Rav Abulafia also brings a גמטריה (numerical value of the letters that reflects badly on Jesus.  I have  a few answers for that, but the basic one is that it is fairly well known that גמטריות are often used as זה לעומת זה [This against that]. For example the numerical value of the name of Moses is the same as שמד [heresy] with the value of the word itself being equal to 1.


[In this way I can understand a little of how people with faith in Jesus often act out of kindness that is not found elsewhere.]  [It is fairly well known that the Rishonim say that the Jesus referred to in the Talmud is not the same person because of the fact that the one is the Talmud was in the era of a person that lived around 100 B.C.]

[You can see support for this also in the beginning of Nahar Shalom by Rav Shalom Sharabi and in the Ari himself. Not to mention the well known treatment of this subject by Rav Yaakov Emden.]

Even if this opinion is not very PC [Politically Correct] and is rather unpopular there does not seem to be any reason to reject it.We find that ירבעם בן נבט Jeroboam was afraid of losing the support of the people if they would go up to Jerusalem so he fell into sin. So we see that losing popularity is not  a reason to reject what is true,

What I think Tosphot in Bava Batra 92 [ד''ה וזו]  means is that in the הוה אמינא of the Gemara Ravina had said all virgins have a קול. Therefore the Gemara concludes that witnesses would not help.  Then the Gemara says that what Ravina had really said was that most virgins have a קול. That was therefore a help to Rav that now witnesses would help. Then Tosphot asks from Ketuboth 28 that all we really need is גילוי מילתא בעלמא. So I think what Tosphot means to ask is that it s too big a step to go from witnesses not helping at all to witnesses being believed even as a גילוי מילתא בעלמא להעיד בגדלן מה שראו בקטמן because of the difference between all virgins and most virgins.

What I think תוספות in בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב   means is that in the הוה אמינא of the גמרא רבינא  had said all virgins have a קול. Therefore the גמרא concludes that witnesses would not help.  Then the גמרא says that what רבינא had really said was that most virgins have a קול. That was therefore a help to רב that now witnesses would help. Then תוספות asks from כתובות כ''ח that all we really need is גילוי מילתא בעלמא. So I think what תוספות means to ask is that it is too big a step to go from witnesses not helping at all to witnesses being believed even as a גילוי מילתא בעלמא להעיד בגדלן מה שראו בקטמן because of the difference between all virgins and most virgins.


מה שאני חושב הוא שתוספות בבבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב כיוונו לזה. ההוה אמינא של הגמרא הוא שרבינא אמר לכל בתולות יש קול. לכן הגמרא מסכם כי עדים לא יעזרו. ואז הגמרא אומרת כי מה רבינא באמת אמר היה שלרוב הבתולות יש קול. זה היה אפוא לעזור לרב שעכשיו עדים יעזרו. ואז תוספות שואלים מכתובות כ''ח כי כל מה שאנחנו באמת צריכים זה גילוי מילתא בעלמא. אז אני חושב שמה תוספות רצו לשאול הוא שזה גדול מדי צעד ללכת מן העדים לא עוזרים בכלל לעדים נאמנים  אפילו בתור גילוי מילתא בעלמא להעיד בגדלן מה שראה בקטמן בגלל השוני בין "כל הבתולות" ל"רוב הבתולות"

It is also helpful to learn the books of the Gra and Reb Israel Salanter's disciples.

The path of God --the law of Moses is hard to figure out in a practical sense. There is a great deal of conflict in figuring out the general rules and also in my individual life how to apply the law of Moses in any given case.

It is a sure bet that if things are not going right in one's life --that for sure he has been transgressing on the Law of God. But even things might not be going well even if you have started to walk in God's Law.  The reason is that the ability of repentance to fix things is limited. As the Gemara says עובר על מצוות עשה ועושה תשובה לא זז משם עד שמתכפר לו. עבר על לא תעשה תשובה תולה וים הכיפורים גומר. עבר על לא תעשה שיש בו כרת תשובה ויום כיפור תולים ויסורים מכפרים

You might think that to figure out what the actual obligations of the Law of God are it would be best to open up the book itself along with the Oral Law to see what they say but that is kind of  a long route. The simplest way to go about this is to learn what s called "Musar" which refers to books written during the Middle Ages that more or less explain the basic obligations of the Torah in the most simple fashion possible.
It is also helpful to learn the books of the Gra and Reb Israel Salanter's disciples.

However in terms of what the practical application of Musar I find it best to try to emulate my own parents and my Dad in particular who came about the closest that I can imagine to the true ideals of Torah. [Even though our home was basically Reform and I do think that keeping all the Laws of the Torah is important but in terms of the basic goals of Torah our home was the best thing I have seen in terms of actual fulfillment of the basic obligation of the Torah to be a decent human being and to work honestly for a living and to keep the Ten Commandments etc.]

I am not thinking that I have any great access to "the Truth". Rather my best estimation of the right path is basically based on my parents and what I learned at the Mir Yeshiva in NY.

There is something in the גמרא בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב that I find hard to understand. רב said in money issues we go by the majority. Not like שמואל said. They bring a question on this from כתובות ט''ו ע''ב where it says  a man says his wife was not a virgin and she says she was. If there are witnesses that she went to the marriage with the ornaments of  virgin she gets for her כתובה מאתיים and if not then only מנה.
Since most women are married as virgins, then why not just go by the majority, like רב said.
רבינא answered her majority is weak because there was no קול as is always the case when a virgin gets married.
The גמרא asks on that then if there was no קול, then why does it make a difference if there are witnesses? Since there was no קול even when there are witnesses they are false witnesses.
The גמרא then amends the statement of רבינא to say "Most women are married as virgins  and since most women that are married as virgins have a commotion and this one did not, then her majority is weak. The גמרא here means that there is one majority on one side (most women are married as virgins) and another majority against it (most virgins have a  קול and this one did not). So we have a majority against a majority and it is a doubt. So we go by the witnesses.
First that we would say witnesses are false because of a lack of a קול is curious to me.
It seems a bit hard to figure out this idea that since most virgins have a קול and this woman did not that is  a negative majority.
The two types of majorities to תוספות are not equal. To תוספות the majority of women that are married are virgins is stronger than the majority of virgins have a קול.  But תוספות needs that idea to answer a question he has from כתובות. But then it would seem that then the original question of the גמרא would return. We ought to go by the majority of women that are married are virgins, and so why do we need witnesses? I am not saying this is a strong question, but more along the lines of a comment because I can still see that one majority against another ought to require witnesses.
Furthermore the majority of virgins is a subset of the majority of women. So it is not clear to me that this would constitute a majority against the majority of women. But perhaps that is the exact point of תוספות that it is a weaker majority than the majority of women. The question of תוספות also is hard to understand. The question of תוספות is going on the הווא אמינא of the גמרא. That is the original statement of רבינא, not the amended version of רבינא. So obviously תוספות thinks his question would apply even on the amended version, but it is hard to see why. What I mean is this: The גמרא brings the law we believe her when there are witnesses. The question on רב is why not go by the majority. רבינא answers all virgins have a קול. The גמרא asks if so then why do witnesses help? If there was no קול then the witnesses are false. The גמרא answers רבינא meant most virgins. תוספות asks from the גמרא in כתובות that these witnesses are believed to testify what they saw before they came of age. The גמרא asks why? And they answer this. Because it is just revealing what the facts anyway already suggest to be the case. גילוי מילתא בעלמא.

תוספות asks this. But according to our גמרא here in בבא בתרא,  if there is a קול then we do not need witnesses. If not, then witnesses do not help. But that question of תוספות is only on the  הווא אמינא of the גמרא. If we go with the conclusion that  witnesses help because there is only a majority of virgins that have a קול. So the question of תוספות seems to fall off. Witnesses help because it is only a majority of virgins that have a קול. So witnesses help.
 Furthermore תוספות says his question is not on שמואל. That means since we do not go by the majority then witnesses help. But still one can ask why? If the majority does not help then how can the witnesses testify בגדלן מה שראו בקטנן?

בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב. יש משהו הגמרא בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב שאני מתקשה להבין. רב אמר בדיני כסף הולכים לפי רוב. זה לא כמו ששמואל אמר. הם מביאים שאלה על זה מן כתובות ט''ו ע''ב איפה שכתוב גבר אומר שאשתו לא הייתה בתולה והיא אומרת שהיא הייתה. אם יש עדים שהיא הלכה לנישואים עם קישוטים של בתולה היא מקבלת עבור הכתובה מאתיים, ואם לא אז רק מנה. מאחר שרוב הנשים נשואות כשהן בתולות, אז למה לא ללכת לפי הרוב, כמו שרב אמר? רבינא ענה הרוב שלה הוא חלש בגלל שאין קול כמו שתמיד קורה במקרה כאשר שמתחתנת בתולה. הגמרא שואלת על זה, אז אם לא היה קול, אז למה זה משנה אם יש עדים? מאז לא היה שום קול גם כאשר ישנם עדים הם עדי שקר. גמרא אז מתקן המשפט של רבינא לומר "נשים הנשואות לפי רוב הן בתולות, רוב בתולות יש להן קול ולזו לא היה קול, אז הרוב שלה הוא חלש. גמרא כאן פירושו שיש רוב אחד בצד אחד (רוב הנשים הנשואות הן בתולות) ורוב אחר נגדו (לרוב בתולות יש קול ולזו לא היה קול). אז יש לנו רוב נגד רוב וזהו ספק. אז אנחנו הולכים על ידי עדים. ראשית כי לומר העדים הם שקר בגלל חוסר של קול הוא קצת קשה. עוד קצת קשה. זה נראה קשה להבין את הרעיון הזה כי לרוב הבתולות יש קול ולאישה זו לא, כי הוא רוב שלילי. עוד יש לשאול שני סוגים של רוב לפי תוספות אינם שווים. לתוספות רוב הנשים נשואות כשהן בתולות חזק מרוב בתולות יש קול. אבל תוספות צריך הרעיון כדי לענות על שאלה שיש לו מן כתובות. אבל היה נראה כי אז השאלה המקורית של גמרא תחזור. אנחנו צריכים ללכת על ידי רוב הנשים כי שנשואות כשהן בתולות, ולכן למה אנחנו צריכים עדים? אני לא אומר את זה הוא שאלה חזקה, אבל יותר בכיוון של הערה כי אני יכול לראות כי רוב אחד נגד אחר צריך לחייב עדים. יתרה מזאת יש שאלה. רוב הבתולות היא קבוצת משנה של רוב הנשים. אז לא ברור לי שזו תהווה רוב נגד רוב הנשים. אבל אולי כי היא הנקודה המדויקת של תוספות שרוב הזה חלש מרוב הנשים. שאלה של תוספות גם קשה להבין. שאלת התוספות הולכת לפי ההווא אמינא של הגמרא. (זוהי הגרסה המקורית של רבינא, לא הגרסה המתוקנת של רבינא). אז ברור תוספות חושבים ששאלתו תחול גם על הגרסה המתוקנת, אבל קשה לראות מדוע. כוונתי היא זו: הגמרא מביאה את החוק שאנו מאמינים בה כאשר ישנם עדים. השאלה על רב היא מדוע לא ללכת לפי הרוב? רבינא עונה יש לכל בתולות קול. הגמרא שואלת אם כך אז מדוע עדים עוזרים לה? אם לא היה קול, אז העדים הם שקריים. תשובת הגמרא: רבינא התכוון לרוב בתולות. תוספות שואלים מן הגמרא בכתובות כי עדים אלה הם נאמנים להעיד מה שראו לפני שהגיעו לגיל. הגמרא שואלת למה? והם עונים זו. בגלל זה הוא רק חושף את מה שהעובדה ממילא כבר מציעה שהיה המקרה. גילוי מילתא בעלמא. תוספות שואל על זה. אבל על פי הגמרא כאן בבא בתרא, אם יש קול אז אנחנו לא צריכים עדים. אם לא, אז עדים אינם עוזרים. אבל השאלה של תוספות היא רק לפי ההווא אמינא של הגמרא. אם נלך עם המסקנה כי עדים עוזרים כי יש רק רוב של בתולות שיש להן קול. אז השאלה של תוספות נראית שנופלת. עדים עוזרים כי זה רק רוב של בתולות שיש להן קול. אז עדים עוזרים. זאת ועוד תוספות אומרים שאלה שלו היא לא על שמואל. כלומר, מאז אנחנו לא הולכים לפי רוב אז עדים עוזרים. אבל עדיין אפשר לשאול למה?אם הרוב לא עוזר אז איך יכולים העדים להעיד בגדלן מה שראו בקטנן

These are the simple kinds of questions my learning partner David Bronson would be asking. But so far I have no good answers for Tosphot. I figure I need to spend more time and effort in trying to understand what Tosphot is saying.

With all respect due to the Ran of Breslov who was amazingly insightful about many issues, it seems the emphasis on graves of righteous people seems a bit misplaced.

In Deuteronomy 18:11 we find a problem of "דורש אל המתים" {There should not be found among you one who seeks after the dead.}
Also in Isaiah 65:4 שוהים על הקברים "who remain among the graves" is also accounted as a problem.

The way these references are avoided is to note in the Gemara there is  brought the practice  of going out to graves on a fast day and the Gemara asks why this is done? One opinion is to cause us to break our hearts and repent. Another opinion is to awake them to cause them to pray for us.
The Rambam actually brings this down, and only mentions the first opinion.

Many other sources are brought from Midrash and Rav Isaac Luria.

Still, it is hard to get over the impression that the whole thing seems like an obsession. Not a healthy one at that. The first hint I had about this was when I was learning a law about when building a street one comes across a grave, then one moves it. This was at a time in Israel when this issue was stopping some building project, and I asked someone about it. But they refused to agree with me --it seemed because my opinion was not "PC".

[Just for public information I think to add the basic issue of טומאת מת (the uncleanliness incurred by touching or being in the same house as a dead body). The basic thing is to get clean one needs a red cow [Numbers 19] and to be sprinkled on on the third and last day of a seven day waiting period.

The problem with uncleanliness refers to either coming into the Temple or eating from a sacrifice.

[There are a few kinds of uncleanliness. All those mentioned in the Old Testament are אבות הטומאה (Principle degree) except for טומאת מת [a dead body] which is אבי אבות הטומאה [one level higher than the regular principles]. The next level is one that touches an אב הטומאה [principle] who becomes a תולדה [derivative] or what is known as a ראשון לטומאה [first degree--but one lower than top degree]. Food can become a שני [second]. Truma [tithe of wheat] can become a שלישי [third degree].  Sacrifices can become a רביעי [fourth degree]. [A person that comes into contact with a אב principle degree becomes a first degree ראשון לטומאה but he can not go down to a second degree. Only food can do that.


The general way to look at the Ran from Breslov in the Litvak world is with a great deal of respect, but also a kind of awareness that not everything he said should be taken literally.

Reb Nahman himself was certainly a great tzadik with quite amazing insights. Still that does not mean he was immune from error. But he himself did not claim immunity from error. Still when I was   trying to follow his path simply with no questions I did experience a tremendous surge of light for the years I was in Israel. So I think that major things he emphasized ought to be heeded like his Rosh Hashanah in Uman.
There are plenty of good and great ideas I picked up from reading Reb Nahman's ideas. e.g. talking with God in my own language, the way of learning fast, and other ideas.

[I think he did not come under the category of the חרם (letter of excommunication) of the Gra. The חרם is important but in the case of the Ran of Breslov I think it did not apply.]

There is something in the Gemara [Bava Batra 92 ] that I find hard to understand. Rav said in money issues we go by the majority. [Not like Shmuel said]. They bring a question on this from Ketuboth where it says [15b] a man says his wife was not a virgin and she says she was. If there are witnesses that she went to the marriage with the ornaments of  virgin she gets for her Ketubah 200 zuz and if not then only 100.
Since most women are married as virgins, then why not just go by the majority --like Rav said.
Ravina answered her majority is weak because there was no commotion [קול]  as is always the case when a virgin gets married.
The Gemara asks on that then if there was no commotion, then why does it make a difference if there are witnesses? Since there was no commotion even when there are witnesses, they are false witnesses?
The Gemara then amends the statement of Ravina so say "Most women are married as virgins  and since most women that are married as virgins have a commotion and this one did not, then her majority is weak.[The Gemara here means that there is one majority on one side (most women are married as virgins) and another majority against it (most virgins have a commotion and this one did not). So we have a majority against a majority and it is a doubt. So we go by the witnesses.]

First that we would say witnesses are false because of a lack of a commotion is curious to me.
Lots of other issues here but that is all I can state clearly right now. I mean that it seems a bit hard to figure out this idea that since most virgins have a commotion and this woman did not that is  a negative majority.

The two types of majorities  to תוספות are not equal. To תוספות the majority of women that are married are virgins is stronger than the majority of virgins have a commotion. תוספות needs that idea to answer a question he has from כתובות. But then it would seem that then the original question of the Gemara would return. e ought to o by the majority of women that are married are virgins and so why do we need witnesses? I am not saying this a a strong question but more along the lines of a comment because I can still see that one majority against another ought to require witnesses.
further the majority of virgins is a subset of the majority of women so it is not clear tome that this would constitute a majority against the majority of women. but perhaps that is the exact point of tosphot  that it is a weaker majority than the majority of women.

The question of Tosphot also is hard to understand. Tosphot question is going on the 'I would have thought'' of the Gemara. that is the original statement of Ravina, not the amended version of Ravina. so obviously Tosphot thinks his question would apply even on the amended version but it is hard to see why.




What I mean is this: The Gemara brings the law we believe her when there are witnesses. The question on Rav is why not go by the majority. Ravina answers all virgins have a commotion. The Gemara asks if so then why do witnesses help? If there was no commotion then the witnesses are false. The Gemara answers Ravina meant most virgins. Tosphot asks from the Gemara in Ketuboth that these witnesses are believed to testify what they saw before they came of age.The Gemara asks why. An they answer because it is just revealing what the facts anyway already suggest to be the case.
Tosphot asks but according to or Gemara here in Bava Batra if there is a commotion then we do not need witnesses and if not then witnesses do not help. But that question of Tosphot is only on the  i would have thought of the Gemara. If we go with the conclusion that it is witnesses help because it is only a majority of virgins that have a commotion so the question of Tosphot seems to fall off. Witnesses help because it is only a majority of virgins that have a commotion.



בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב. יש משהו הגמרא בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב שאני מתקשה להבין. רב אמר בדיני כסף הולכים לפי רוב. זה לא כמו ששמואל אמר. הם מביאים שאלה על זה מן כתובות ט''ו ע''ב איפה שכתוב גבר אומר שאשתו לא הייתה בתולה והיא אומרת שהיא הייתה. אם יש עדים שהיא הלכה לנישואים עם קישוטים של בתולה היא מקבלת עבור הכתובה מאתיים, ואם לא אז רק מנה. מאחר שרוב הנשים נשואות כשהן בתולות, אז למה לא ללכת לפי הרוב, כמו שרב אמר? רבינא ענה הרוב שלה הוא חלש בגלל שאין קול כמו שתמיד קורה במקרה כאשר שמתחתנת בתולה. הגמרא שואלת על זה, אז אם לא היה קול, אז למה זה משנה אם יש עדים? מאז לא היה שום קול גם כאשר ישנם עדים הם עדי שקר. גמרא אז מתקן המשפט של רבינא לומר "נשים הנשואות לפי רוב הן בתולות, רוב בתולות יש להן קול ולזו לא היה קול, אז הרוב שלה הוא חלש. גמרא כאן פירושו שיש רוב אחד בצד אחד (רוב הנשים הנשואות הן בתולות) ורוב אחר נגדו (לרוב בתולות יש קול ולזו לא היה קול). אז יש לנו רוב נגד רוב וזהו ספק. אז אנחנו הולכים על ידי עדים. ראשית כי לומר העדים הם שקר בגלל חוסר של קול הוא קצת קשה. עוד קצת קשה. זה נראה קשה להבין את הרעיון הזה כי לרוב הבתולות יש קול ולאישה זו לא, כי הוא רוב שלילי. עוד יש לשאול שני סוגים של רוב לפי תוספות אינם שווים. לתוספות רוב הנשים נשואות כשהן בתולות חזק מרוב בתולות יש קול. אבל תוספות צריך הרעיון כדי לענות על שאלה שיש לו מן כתובות. אבל היה נראה כי אז השאלה המקורית של גמרא תחזור. אנחנו צריכים ללכת על ידי רוב הנשים כי שנשואות כשהן בתולות, ולכן למה אנחנו צריכים עדים? אני לא אומר את זה הוא שאלה חזקה, אבל יותר בכיוון של הערה כי אני יכול לראות כי רוב אחד נגד אחר צריך לחייב עדים. יתרה מזאת יש שאלה. רוב הבתולות היא קבוצת משנה של רוב הנשים. אז לא ברור לי שזו תהווה רוב נגד רוב הנשים. אבל אולי כי היא הנקודה המדויקת של תוספות שרוב הזה חלש מרוב הנשים. שאלה של תוספות גם קשה להבין. שאלת התוספות הולכת לפי ההווא אמינא של הגמרא. (זוהי הגרסה המקורית של רבינא, לא הגרסה המתוקנת של רבינא). אז ברור תוספות חושבים ששאלתו תחול גם על הגרסה המתוקנת, אבל קשה לראות מדוע. כוונתי היא זו: הגמרא מביאה את החוק שאנו מאמינים בה כאשר ישנם עדים. השאלה על רב היא מדוע לא ללכת לפי הרוב? רבינא עונה יש לכל בתולות קול. הגמרא שואלת אם כך אז מדוע עדים עוזרים לה? אם לא היה קול, אז העדים הם שקריים. תשובת הגמרא: רבינא התכוון לרוב בתולות. תוספות שואלים מן הגמרא בכתובות כי עדים אלה הם נאמנים להעיד מה שראו לפני שהגיעו לגיל. הגמרא שואלת למה? והם עונים זו. בגלל זה הוא רק חושף את מה שהעובדה ממילא כבר מציעה שהיה המקרה. גילוי מילתא בעלמא. תוספות שואל על זה. אבל על פי הגמרא כאן בבא בתרא, אם יש קול אז אנחנו לא צריכים עדים. אם לא, אז עדים אינם עוזרים. אבל השאלה של תוספות היא רק לפי ההווא אמינא של הגמרא. אם נלך עם המסקנה כי עדים עוזרים כי יש רק רוב של בתולות שיש להן קול. אז השאלה של תוספות נראית שנופלת. עדים עוזרים כי זה רק רוב של בתולות שיש להן קול. אז עדים עוזרים. זאת ועוד תוספות אומרים שאלה שלו היא לא על שמואל. כלומר, מאז אנחנו לא הולכים לפי רוב אז עדים עוזרים. אבל עדיין אפשר לשאול למה?אם הרוב לא עוזר אז איך יכולים העדים להעיד בגדלן מה שראו בקטנן?

I was disturbed by problems in faith and almost immediately after that I discovered the Kant Friesian site on the Internet of Dr Kelley Ross. [I might have the order of events mixed up. It could be the first time I noticed Dr Ross was in his essay on Spinoza.] In any case his approach to issues of faith and what is called numinous value helped me immensely.
Still however, I do admit that that school of thought [based on Kant and Leonard Nelson] seems a bit too dismissal of Hegel.

In any case, I realized that there are lots of problems in faith that seem to beyond the realm of reason to answer; and also there seem to be values in faith which seem beyond reason to comprehend.
So the whole idea of non intuitive immediate knowledge makes a lot of sense to me.

[I might mention that the approach of Dr Ross is named after Kant and Fries, but is very much based also on Schopenhauer and Popper.]

This is more or less all part of German Idealism. But it intersects with John Locke and natural law in terms of self, the autonomous individual.  English thought all through that time was going in totally different directions. That is,- a lot of the intellectual energy of the English was spent on Protestant issues and the crown. You can more or less trace a straight line in English thought from Henry VIII and the English Dissidents, Daniel Defoe, until the Constitution of the USA.

But there is a point where both streams of thought intersect in natural law and the autonomy of the individual.

The issue of human rights was a major topic in England from the aspect of the King's right as opposed or separate from  Parliament and Parliament as different from the Commons and that as different from the People. All these issues were later reflected in Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson.
[It did not all start just with John Locke.] 

Jeremiah (23) has a tirade against the pastors of Israel and so does Ezekiel (22).  So in the Gemara itself we find a complaint against the judges of Israel. [All troubles that come into the world come only because of the judges of Israel. That is at the end of tractate Shabat. And they bring another verse for a proof.] So when the Ran of Breslov says that the supposed authorities in Torah Law are demons, it should come as no surprise. Even though I was a bit shocked when I first saw this, subsequent events proved it all too well.   [It comes up more often that you would imagine. You can see it also in the Ari {Isaac Luria} and yet I managed to miss the warning until too late.

In any case, I do wonder what really the Ran meant. Does it mean they are possessed? Or that they are simply not human. But whatever he means, the warning seems clear. So why is it ignored?

The connection with Rishonim that warn about tying Torah to money seems relevant. After all, it was the cause of the very first complaints against the Rambam that he had published a warning like this in his commentary on the Mishna. [In Pirkei Avot he goes into length about this.] Later on in Mishne Torah he repeats his warning. [However the major anti Rambam thing was later and it seems to have been because of the Guide.]
[The Mishna that the Rambam talks about is this דאשתמש בתגא חלף One who uses the crown passes away and the Rambam explains that means they lose their portion in the next world. That seems to mean they lose their soul and that would probably be along the same lines that the Ran of Brelov was talking about as far as I can tell.] 

fanaticism is not the path of Torah

Hegel  noted that philosophy tends to be one sided because each philosophy is  a reaction to what came before it. A similar tendency I noted with numinous value. One generation reacts against the over amount of abuse on one side of things and goes overboard on being secular. Then the next generation sees the problem with that, and overreacts and goes in the opposite direction.

The ideal is to find the right balance of values.

[I mean to say like Reb Nahman from Breslov suggested that over excitement in the service of God is also an evil inclination. That is to say fanaticism is not the path of Torah. As God told Moses to warn the people not to go up into the mountain or even to touch it. Saloplsky  says the same exact thing about obsession with numinous value is a sign of  a schizoid personality. That is a whole long lecture in his series.]

The problem with exact rules and an order of daily sessions in the service of God is the subject object aspect that Kant brings. That is objective rules will apply to different people according to their root souls and essential traits and tendencies differently.
Still there are general principles that apply across the board. To have good traits (Midot Tovot).
But plenty of things that at first glance might seem to be worthy practices can often be distractions -to divert one's attention from what is really important.

כל הדרכים בחזקת סכנה All paths are dangerous. No path in the service of God is safe. There are no guarantees.

In the book of Job we find that the Satan is constantly going around the world to see whom he can trick an seduce and fool to think good is evil and evil good. The most dangerous thing is to imagine that one is immune.

[Still the best set of guidelines that I know about is the basic path of Musar. That is to learn the essential set of Medieval Musar books that are well known in Litvak yeshivas.]

U-62 E Flat Major  U-64 D Minor   

U-62 in midi format   u62 nwc  u64 in midi format  u64 nwc

If one marries a girl he thinks is a virgin and it turns out she is not then  one opinion is she is not married. Another is she loses the כתובה of מאתים and gets only מנה. Or gets no כתובה at all?

In terms of a regular מקח טעות [purchase by mistake] there seems to be a similar disagreement of opinion in בבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב. If one buys an ox for plowing and it turns out to be unsuitable because it is not tamable. So the deal is off, but what about the money given to the seller. Does he owe the money as would a borrower? Or is there not deal at all and if he spends he money it is considered that he is  a מזיק? The רשב''ם considers that money is owed even though he thinks of the seller as a מזיק. That is confusing enough all by itself. If the seller is  a מזיק, then it ought to be the case that if the money is still around, then he gives it back; and if not, he pays like any מזיק. And that is in fact exactly what the ר''י says. Thus it is in fact hard to know what the רשב''ם is thinking here. The רשב''ם brings from a ר' חננאל  and that ר' חננאל does seem to consider the  מקח טעות  as being akin to a regular debt. That  is the seller pays back money if he has and שווה כסף if not. That at least makes sense. In any case, what I am trying to say is if the seller is considered to be a מזיק that means he does not own the money. So before he spends the money, it still belongs to the buyer. So then why would it not make a difference if he gives back that money or other money? If the seller would be thought to be a בעל חוב, then I can understand why giving back any money is the same as giving back the actual coins of the transaction. But if he is thought to be a מזיק then the coins were not his at any time.


אם אחד מתחתן עם נערה שהוא חושב היא בתולה ומתברר שהיא לא אז דעה אחת היא שהיא לא נשואה. דעה אחרת היא שהיא רק מאבדת את הכתובה של מאתים ומקבלת רק מנה. או אולי אינה מקבלת שום כתובה בכלל? במונחים של מקח טעות רגיל [רכישה בטעות] נראה שיש חילוקי דעות דומות לאלו הדעות בבבא בתרא צ''ב ע''ב. אם אחד קונה שור לחריש ומתברר כי הוא אינו מתאים משום שהוא אינו בַּר אִלוּף. אז העסקה מבוטלת, אבל מה עם הכסף הנתון למוכר. האם הוא חייב את הכסף כלווה? או האם הוא נחשב כמזיק? הרשב''ם סבור כי  המוכר נחשב מזיק, אבל לא משנה איזה כסף הוא מחזיר. אם המוכר הוא מזיק, אז זה צריך להיות כך שאם הכסף הוא עדיין ברשותו, אז הוא מחזיר אותו; ואם לא, הוא משלם כמו כל מזיק. וזה למעשה בדיוק מה ר''י אומר. לכן קשה לדעת מה הרשב''ם חושב כאן. רשב''ם מביא מן ר' חננאל וכי ר' חננאל כנראה שוקל את המקח טעות כמו חוב רגיל. כלומר המוכר משלם כסף [איזה כסף שיהיה] אם יש לו, ואת שווה כסף אם לא. זה הגיוני. בכל מקרה, מה שאני מנסה לומר הוא שאם המוכר נחשב להיות כמזיק זה אומר שהוא אינו בעלים של הכסף. אז לפני שהוא מוציא את הכסף, זה עדיין שייך לקונה. אז למה זה לא משנה אם הוא נותן בחזרה את כסף או כסף אחר? אם המוכר יהיה נחשב להיות בעל חוב, אז אני יכול להבין למה להחזיר איזה כסף זהה להחזיר את המטבעות בפועל של העסקה. אבל אם הוא נחשב להיות מזיק המטבעות לא היו שלו.  

I do not have a Gemara Ketuboth. However I recall the issue over there if one marries a girl he thinks is a virgin and it turns out she is not that one opinion is she is not married. Another is she loses the Ketubah of 200 and gets only 100. [Or gets no Ketubah at all?]

In terms of a regular מקח טעות [purchase by mistake] there seems to be a similar disagreement of opinion in Bava Batra 92

If one buys an ox for plowing and it turns out to be unsuitable because it is not tamable. So the deal is off, but what about the money given to the seller. Does he owe the money as would a borrower? Or is there no deal at all, and if he spends he money, it is considered that he is  a מזיק [a person that causes damage]?

The Rashbam considers that money is owed even though he thinks of the seller as a מזיק [one that causes damage]. That is confusing enough all by itself. If the seller is  a מזיק [damager], then it ought to be that if the money is still around, then he gives it back;- and if not, he pays like any מזיק [damager]. And that is in fact exactly what the Ri says.

Thus it is in fact hard to know what the Rashbam is thinking here.

The Rashbam brings from a Rav Hananel from Rome [not the other famous one that I think taught the Rif.] and that Rav Hananel does seem to consider the  מקח טעות {a deal done by mistake} as being akin to a regular debt. That  is the seller pays back money if he has and שווה כסף if not.That at least makes sense.

To be short I am not sure how to understand the Rashbam and I also wonder if in fact one can tie this into the case in Ketuboth.

[I also am wondering why when I was learning Ketuboth in Shar Yashuv in NY that the connection with Bava Batra escaped me. To me today it seems highly relevant.]

In any case what I am trying to say is if the seller is considered to be a מזיק that means he does not own the money until he spends it. So before he spends it it still belongs to the buyer. So then why would it not make a difference if he gives back that money or other money? If the seller would be thought to be a בעל חוב then I can understand why giving back any money is the same as giving back the actual coins of the transaction. But if he is thought to be a מזיק the the coins were not his at any time. {I figure there must be an answer for this but it escapes me this minute.}

Rav Avraham Abulafia

Even though Christians take it as a given that Jewish mystics are off limits, still to me it seems that they are by that missing a key element of support for their position.

One example I have mentioned before is Rav Avraham Abulafia. However it was pointed out to me that Rav Abulafia's position is not all that clear.

Another key element of support for their position is the Ari, Rav Isaac Luria. The one place I recall off hand is in one of the books of Reb Haim Vital on the Torah on the very last verses of Genesis concerning Joseph HaTzadik. However in all the writings of the Ari I think there are about three places where those same verses are explained, and I recall the same kind of approach of the Ari in all three places.


The reason I did not take it as a proof against the Christian position the comment of Rav Abulafia concerning the numerical value [Gematria] is mainly that that same kind of proof by means of Gematria is used for Moses himself and other tzadikm to claim זה לעומת זה [this one against that one] in many places. I do not have off hand any examples because I simply am not learning any of this stuff nowadays at all, and have not been learning it for many years. [One example with Moses is משה גימטריה שמ''ד with the value of the word itself being one.]




I could also bring a few proofs for Rav Joseph Karo concerning his opinion on גרי השער {Converts of the Gate} as a different category from גר תושב [a stranger that dwells in the Land] but I do not happen to have that responsa at my fingertips. [The issue over there was that גר תושב is one category but Rav Joseph Karo apparently found some support in the Rishonim that Christians occupy a higher category called גרי השער  Converts of the Gates. ]

At any rate, it is clear that there is some advantage in believing in a true tzadik as mentioned in Pirkei Avot אמונת חכמים (faith in the wise).


Lots of people I should mention have אמונת חכמים faith in the wise  The point is to be able to discern who is a real tzadik. That kind of discernment is hard to come by. So what you might do is take the word of people that are more or less well known to have a kind of perception in that area. That is why I take the word of the Ari and Rav Abulafia and the Gra as evidence.
[My position about the Ari is very positive. However in learning the Ari there is dangerous pitfall. If one can learn the Ari while avoiding the groups under the excommunication of the Gra that is the only way I know that one can come out safe from the whole thing. Otherwise interest in the Ari most often leads people into the Dark Side. Reb Nahman however I think is not under that excommunication for the simple reason that the actual letter of excommunication is more specific than most people realize. And the Ran from Breslov besides that was in fact a great tzadik.]

The trouble is that the Dark Side has managed to wiggle itself into the Torah world to the degree that there is no escape except to the Reform or Conservative.

The effects of any given system. Does it really lead to the great things it promises?

In every generation there is a system  that promises that it is the solution to human problems if only people would accept it. That system is so powerful that its pull is almost impossible to resist. An example is Socialism. About a hundred years ago this was thought to be the solution to all human problems. Even the greatest of intellects actively advocated it. But then that subsided, and then spiritual systems were thought to provide the answers to all questions.   The systems were different, but the idea was the same. Some spiritual system was thought to be the absolute truth-- such that if everyone would accept it, all human problems would disappear.

These are just two examples. But there are others. In any case, in every instance the system that presented itself as the solution ended up being the cause of all human problems. It turned out people would have been better off with no system at all rather that the illusion of one that was thought to be the solution.
[No matter however. Once a person has accepted that system there is no going back. All the evidence in the world will not change his mind. Only later on generations will see the foolishness of the whole thing.]

[One thing I should mention: I am not against Numinous Value. Rather I think it is beyond Pure Reason. So it does not fit squarely into a definable box.  Rather it is like an electron that can be condensed into a particle state only by superposition of many k states [different value of k or momentum..So what I think is rather that one needs a balance of values.]
But while striving for a balance of values often one can fall into the Sitra Akra the Dark Side.. And most often happens by trying to do good. Like the Gra said in Proverbs that the Sitra Akra seduces to sin by means of suggesting to do some good deed. Which leaves one with the question then what can one use for a yardstick?
The thing to do is to identify the major practices to do daily and the major things to avoid. This might be a combination of common sense,  learning from history about the effects of any given system. Does it really lead to the great things it promises?]

My basic approximation of the right path is to look for examples of human excellence like I saw in my parents. Also to follow the path of the Gra as closely as possible--to learn Torah and to have trust in God and to be careful to take his signature on the letter of excommunication as being based on  objective truth. Not some kind of mistake based on faulty information. But rather based on fact.]

There is  a story of the Cock and the Horses. The cock was put to roost in the stable among the horses; and there being no racks or other conveniences for him, it seems, he was forced to roost upon the ground. The horses jostling about for room, and putting the cock in danger of his life, he gives them this grave advice, “Pray, Gentlefolks! let us stand still! for fear we should tread upon one another!”
  There are some people in the world, who, now they are unperched, and reduced to an equality with other people, and under strong and very just apprehensions of being further treated as they deserve, begin, with the cock, to preach up peace and union and the duty of moderation; forgetting that, when they had the power in their hands, those virtues were strangers in their gates!

Even though we tend to look at sins as being separate. On the Day of Atonement we go through a long list. Still I tend to think that they are all connected. A first sin causes the second and so on. But not just that but that in their essence they all boil own to the same thing. Some kind of particular attitude. It might be some small thing that leads to big consequences. Like for the loss of a nail the shoe was lost as that old rhyme goes until it finishes for loss of the battle the kingdom was lost.

It might be some ignoring of the advice of the Gra about the importance of learning Torah and trust in God.  Or other things the Gra emphasized or the books of Musar.

The problem is how to find the right balance. For the sharp blade of fanaticism cuts as deeply and wounds as grievously as any other, and often much worse. 

I learned in Organic Chemistry that a molecule of fat takes twice the energy to break down than a molecule of sugar. After I was in the hospital for a month, my stomach started hurting very badly, and I went to the regional hospital where they gave me four medicines.  They worked immediately. But then recently my stomach stated hurting again, and I went there again. There was only one doctor working, so the line was so long I realized I would be there for  a very long time until the doctor would see me. So I went to the nurses, and they said either tomorrow or Monday there will be three doctors working. [In Uman the "Regional hospital" has a better reputation than the Uman Hospital. However I have had excellent care in the Uman hospital. Both for a kidney stone and my broken foot. However I still decided to go to the regional hospital for my stomach pains. I do not think I could have had better care anywhere in the world.]

So  went back home and on the way back the taxi driver told me he had the same problem and the main thing he said is to stop having fried foods and no fat. Rather vegetables --like a vegetable soup with beets, carrots, potatoes, water and salt and spice [what they call petrushka-- green leaves] but no oil.

David Bronson said something like that in relation to bread that causes the walls of the intestine to expand and makes it harder to digest food. I think David Bronson always has good advice but n this case I think it is too many fat molecules that cause the problem.

My basic impression of the idea of Reb Israel Salanter about the importance of learning Ethics is positive. But like all human systems it can be corrupted. Abuse does not cancel use. Abusus non tollit Usum.

There is something in fact not just about Musar [Ethics] but the emphasis of Musar from the  Middle Ages.


The most relevant questions in one's life are sometimes hard to define. What are the proper questions to ask in the first place. All the more so it is hard to find the proper answers. In older times people would go to some wise man. After the Reformation people would look into the Bible directly.
Also in old times people would try to find the answers in faith. After the Enlightenment people would look for the answers in Reason.

Since the Dark Side is so able to confuse and subvert even good answers to the proper questions, there does not seem to be any accurate guide or yardstick.


There are public questions and personal questions and sometimes they overlap. Still how can one find an answer that works and is accord with reason and faith and not be fooled by the Sitra Akra, the Dark Side?

The thing to do is not to prove or disprove a doctrine, but to ask what are the logical results. What are the results in the past as seen in people that follow that path.

Reason together with faith may not provide all the answers, but it is better than anything else out there. Musar Ethics of the Middle Ages provides the best ground for a synthesis between Reason and Faith and by doing so provides the best answers to human problems.

[What I am getting at is that the first thing is to learn the Books of Ethics from the Middle Ages staring from Obligations of the Heart. Then to go to post Rishonim books like מסילת ישרים.] 

בבא בתרא ע''ו ע''א

ר' יהודה הנשיא holds the opinion that a ship is acquired by מסירה. However ר' נתן holds by pulling.

אביי ורבא said מסירה works in a public domain and משיכה works as a mode of acquisition in an alley. My question is this. If we would go with ר' יהודה הנשיא then how could you ever acquire a ship in an alley?  And if we would be going with ר' נתן, then how could one ever acquire a ship in a public domain?  Now you have to limit the scope of this question. If the ר''י is right that משיכה works everywhere, then to ר' יהודה הנשיא how could you acquire a ship in an alley? If ר' תם is right that מסירה is more powerful then to ר' נתן how could you ever acquire a ship in a public domain? Now to some degree these questions are dealt with. The ראשונים say where one kind of mode is not possible, then you do the other kind. But then what is the point of saying how a ship is acquired at all?


ר' יהודה הנשיא מחזיק בדעה שספינה נקנית במסירה. אולם ר' נתן מחזיק  על ידי משיכה. אביי ורבא סוברים מסירה עובדת בתחום ציבורי ומשיכה עובדת כאופן רכישה בסמטה. השאלה שלי היא כזאת. אם היינו הולכים עם ר' יהודה הנשיא אז איך יכול אי פעם לרכוש ספינה בסמטה? ואם היינו הולכים עם ר' נתן, אז איך יכול אי פעם אחת לרכוש ספינה ברשות הציבור? עכשיו אתה צריך להגביל את היקף השאלה הזאת. אם הר''י נכון כי משיכה עובדת בכל מקום, אז אל ר' יהודה הנשיא איך אפשר לרכוש ספינה בסמטה? אם ר' תם נכון כי מסירה הוא יותר חזקה, אז לר' נתן איך אתה יכול בכלל לרכוש ספינה ברשות הציבור? עכשיו במידה מסוימת השאלות הן מטופלות. הראשונים סוברים היכן שסוג אחד של רכישה בלתי אפשרי, אז אתה עושה את הסוג השני. אבל אז מה הטעם לומר איך ספינה נקנית בכלל

Bava Batra 76a A question in the Gemara.

R.Yehuda Hanasi said a ship is acquired by handing over. R. Natan said by pulling.

Abyee and Rava said handing over works in a public domain and pulling works as a mode of acquisition in an alley.

The kind of obvious question David Bronson, my learning partner, would ask is if we would go with R Yehuda then how could you ever acquire a ship in an alley.  And if we would be going with R. Natan then how could one ever acquire a ship in a public domain? 

Now you have to limit the scope of this question. If the Ri is right that pulling works everywhere then to R Yehuda how could you acquire a ship in an alley?

If R. Tam is right that handing over is more powerful then to R Natan how could you ever acquire a ship in a public domain?

Now to some degree these questions are dealt with. The Rishonim say where one kind of mode is not possible then you do the other kind. But then what is the point of saying how a ship is acquired at all?

In answer to the question I raised yesterday about Tosphot in Bava Batra  page 76a.
What the Ri means to say is this: The Gemara puts the argument between R. Yehuda Hanasi and the sages in a public domain. But that leads to a problem in understanding the sages. We have to say that they mean pulling from a public domain into an alley because there is no kind of acquisition by pulling in a public domain. But if R. Tam would be right that handing over works in an alley then we could say the argument between R Yehuda Hanasi an the sages is simply in alley in the first place and that they are arguing about when the owner said Go and pull as we do say anyway later. This in no way disagrees with what the Gemara is trying to say now that there ought not to be an argument between R Yehuda Hanasi and the two sages R. Natan and the first opinion of R Natan. The Gemara was suggesting ספינה נמי תיקני במסירה, let the ship be acquired by handing over  means that instead of those two sages saying the ship is acquired by pulling let them agree with R Yehuda Hanasi that it is acquired by handing over.


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In answer to the question I raised yesterday about ר''י in תוספות בבא בתרא דף ע''ו ע''א
What the ר''י means to say is this: The גמרא puts the argument between ר' יהודה הנשיא and the sages in a public domain. But that leads to a problem in understanding the חכמים. We have to say that they mean pulling from a public domain into an alley because there is no kind of acquisition by משיכה in a public domain. But if ר' תם would be right that מסירה works in an alley, then we could say the argument between ר' יהודה הנשיא and the sages is in an alley in the first place, and that they are arguing about when the owner said go and pull, as we do say anyway later (in a public domain) . This in no way disagrees with what the גמרא is trying to say now that there is no argument between ר' יהודה הנשיא and the two sages ר' נתן  and the first opinion of ר' נתן . The גמרא was suggesting ספינה נמי תיקני במסירה, let the ship be acquired by handing over  means that instead of those two sages saying the ship is acquired by pulling, Rather let them agree with ר' יהודה הנשיא that it is acquired by handing over.

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בתשובה לשאלה שהרמתי על ר''י בתוספות בבא בתרא דף ע''ו ע''א.  הר''י רוצה להגיד את זה: הגמרא מעמידה את הטיעון בין ר' יהודה הנשיא והחכמים בתוך מרחב ציבורי. אבל זה מוביל לבעיה בהבנת החכמים. אנחנו חייבים לומר כי הם מתכוונים למשוך מן מרחב הציבורי אל תוך סמטה כי אין סוג של רכישה על ידי משיכה בתוך מרחב ציבורי. אבל אם ר' תם יהיה תקין כי מסירה עובדת בסמטה, אז נוכל לומר הטיעון בין ר' יהודה הנשיא והחכמים הוא בסמטה מלכתחילה, וכי הם מתווכחים כאשר הבעלים אמרו ללכת למשוך (אם יש הקפדה), כפי שאנו אומרים בכל מקרה אחר כך (בתוך תחום ציבורי). זה בשום אופן לא חולק עם מה שהגמרא מנסה לשאול כעת למה יהיה ויכוח בין ר' יהודה הנשיא ושני החכמים ר' נתן ואת הדעה הראשונה של ר' נתן (התנא קמא). הם אמרו משיכה ור' יהודה אמר מסירה. למה יש ויכוח

Music for the glory of God

U-60 E Flat Major [u-60 in midi] [u60 nwc] U-61  [u61 in midi format]  u61 nwc

In the Torah the word adultery ניאוף is always used to refer to sex with a married woman as in Leviticus 20. It does not refer to sex outside of marriage. If it would mean sex outside of marriage then even the most righteous kings of Israel  would have been guilty of a crime that carries the death sentence.

Rather the issue of  a concubine--what today would be called a girl friend--is a totally different subject- a debate between rishonim. [Rambam is against it as is well known but not in the way that people think. See the חלקת מחוקק in אבן העזר. To the Rambam it is not זנות but an איסור עשה. To most other Rishonim like the Ramban and Raavad it is totally permitted. Besides the fact that the actual opinion of the Rambam himself is in doubt since the Ramban brings an older version of the Rambam.

The reason this is not well known is that in the New Testament the issue gets mixed up.

The attitude of Paul is  in the letters that are printed is against sex out of marriage, but in the Book of Tecla his attitude is any sex at all even in marriage causes one to lose their portion in the next world.

That is not to imply that sex outside of marriage is a good thing. Rather nowadays, marriage is not marriage. Marriage is no longer  a bond of souls, but a formal financial contract, money for sex. It has lost all semblance of a holy thing.

בבא בתרא דף ע''ו ע''א

The ר''י has a question on ר''ת that to me seems hard to understand. The ר''י holds מסירה is less powerful than משיכה. However ר' תם holds מסירה over is more powerful. [If ר' ת''ם is right, then מסירה  works in an סימטא.. But the ר''י disagrees with that.] The question of the ר''י is based on the following גמרא. A ship is acquired by pulling and אותיות by מסירה. Then ר' נתן agrees with the ship but with a document he needs מסירה and write another document. The גמרא asks this question. Since the first opinion, the תנא קמא, goes like ר' יהודה הנשיא in letters, why does he not also say like ר' יהודה הנשיא by a ship?  For we learn that a ship is acquired by handing over these are the words of ר' יהודה הנשיא. The sages said by pulling. The גמרא answers, no problem. One case is a  רשות הרבים and the other a סימטא. Then the גמרא brings  אביי ורבא that said מסירה works in a  רשות הרבים and משיכה in an alley. Could it be there are going like ר' יהודה הנשיא instead of the חכמים? No. The חכמים agree in a  רשות הרבים one acquires by מסירה. But here they say one needs משיכה because the owner said to the buyer to go acquire the ship by pulling. The ר''י asks if ר' תם would be right, why does the גמרא answer the original question by saying one is in a רשות הרבים and the other in an סימטא? Why not say both are in an alley, but the argument is in a case when the owner said "Go pull". Does the buyer acquire only by pulling, or perhaps also by  handing over?  The question I have is this. The reason the גמרא said "one case is  a public domain and the other an alley" is so that the opinion of the the תנא קמא of ר' נתן would be the same as ר' יהודה הנשיא. That is it would be just one שיטה saying both statements. A ship is acquired by מסירה in a רשות הרבים and in an alley it is acquired by משיכה.  The גמרא was trying to get out of the idea that the first opinion the תנא קמא  would be different than ר' יהודה הנשיא so saying we could say they disagreed would defeat the entire purpose.

בבא בתרא דף ע''ו ע''א
לר''י יש שאלה על ר''ת. השאלה נראית לי קשה להבין. הר''י מחזיק מסירה היא פחות חזקה מאשר משיכה. היינו מסירה היא אופן רכישה חלש ממשיכה. אולם ר' תם מחזיק מסירה היא יותר חזקה. [אם ר' תם נכון, אז מסירה עובדת בסימטא, אבל לר''י לא.] שאלת ר''י מבוססת על הנחות היסוד הבאות בגמרא. הוראה אחת אומרת ספינה נרכשת על ידי משיכה ואותיות על ידי מסירה. אז ר' נתן מסכים עם הספינה אבל עם מסמך הוא מצריך מסירה ולכתוב מסמך אחר. הגמרא שואלת את השאלה הזאת. מאז דעת הראשונה, תנא קמא, הולכת כמו ר' יהודה הנשיא באותיות, מדוע הוא אינו גם סובר כמו ר' יהודה הנשיא בספינה? שהרי אנו למדים כי ספינה נרכשת על ידי מסירה. אלה הם דבריו של ר' יהודה הנשיא. החכמים אמרו על ידי משיכה. גמרא עונה, אין בעיה. מקרה אחד הוא רשות הרבים והשני בסימטא. ואז גמרא מביאה אביי ורבא שסוברים מסירה עובדת בתוך רשות הרבים ומשיכה בסמטה. הייתכן שהם הולכים כמו ר' יהודה הנשיא במקום החכמים? לא, החכםים מסכימים בתוך רשות הרבים שאחד רוכש ידי מסירה. אבל כאן הם אומרים אחד צריך משיכה כי הבעלים אמרו לקונה ללכת לרכוש את הספינה על ידי משיכה. ר''י שואל אם ר' תם יהיה תקין, ומדוע הגמרא  ענתה על השאלה המקורית  ר' יהודה דיבר כשהספינה נמצאת ברשות הרבים והת''ק דר' נתן בסימטא? למה הגמרא לא ענתה שניהם נמצאים בסמטה, אך הטיעון הוא במקרה כאשר בעל הספינה דייק לומר לקונה "לך משוך". האם הקונה רוכש רק על ידי משיכה, או אולי גם על ידי מסירה? השאלה שיש לי היא זו. הסיבה שהגמרא אמרה "במקרה אחד הוא רשות הרבים והשני סמטה" היא כך כי דעתו של של תנא קמא ר' נתן תהיה זהה ר' יהודה הנשיא. כלומר זה יהיה רק ​​ שיטה אחת שאומרת שתי ההצהרות. ספינה נרכשת על ידי מסירה בתחום ציבורי ובסמטה היא נרכשת על ידי משיכה. הגמרא ניסתה לצאת מן הבעיה כי הדעה הראשונה (התנא קמא) תהיה שונה מאשר ר' יהודה נשיא. כך אם אנחנו יכולים לומר שהם לא מסכימים זה יסכל את המטרה כולה.
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Gemara Bava Batra 76-A

The Ri has a question on Rabainu Tam that to me seems hard to understand.
The Ri holds handing over is less powerful than pulling.  Rabainu Tam hold handing over is more powerful. [If R. Tam is right then handing over works in an alley.. But the Ri disagrees with that.]
The question of the Ri is based on the following Gemara.
A ship is acquired by pulling and letters by handing over. R.Natan agrees with the ship but with letters he needs to handover and write another document.
The Gemara asks that since the first opinion (the תנא קמא) goes like R. Yehuda Hanasi in letters why doe he not also say like R.Yehuda Hanasi by a ship?  For we learn that a Ship is acquired by handing over these are the words of Yehuda Hanasi. The sages said by pulling. The Gemara answers, "No problem. One is a public domain and the other an alley."
Abyee and Rava said: "Handing over works in a public domain, and pulling in a alley." Could it be there are going like R. Yehuda Hanasi instead of the sages? No. The sages agree in a public domain one acquires by handing over. But here they say one needs pulling because the owner said to the buyer to go acquire the ship by pulling.
The Ri askes if R.Tam would be right why does the Gemara answer the original question by saying one is in a public domain and the other in an alley? Why not say both are in an alley but the argument is if when the owner said go pull that the buyer must acquire by pulling, not handing over or not.

The question I have is this. The reason the Gemara said "one is  a public domain and the other an alley" is so that the opinion of the the תנא קמא of R.Natan would be the same as R. Yehuda Hanasi. That is it would be just one person saying both statements  a ship is acquired by pulling and a ship is acquired by handing over.  The Gemara was trying to get out of the idea that the first opinion the תנא קמא  would be different than R. Yehuda so saying we could say they disagreed would defeat the entire purpose.

U-59 D Minor

One has a certain amount of control on what groups to join. The general nature of those groups ought to be  a factor in such a decision.. Even if a group has nice sounding ideas, the thing to watch for is the general stereotype. If it is well known as having an over abundance of criminal types or insane people, then you ought to assume there is something behind that reputation.
[But if that is going to be the criterion of how to decide which group to join, that would leave relatively few groups that pass the test.]

[Litvak Yeshivas would probably be the top of the list in terms of good character. However this is not a fast and steady rule. My own  experience with Litvak yeshivas was mixed. In any case, there is a need to find and be part of a group that in fact has a bell curve above average in terms of traits like honesty dependability etc.]

When does the suggestion of a parent become a command that is included in כיבוד אב ואם {honor of one's father and mother}?

Is every suggestion to be included?

From Reb Naphtali Troup (חידושי הגרנ''ט) it certainly looks that when they give a command, that comes under the category of a מצוות עשה (positive command). But how far does this go?

One way of looking at this is by the בן סורר ומורה (the rebellious son) which is a subcategory of the general command of honor of one's parents.

Another way is to look at the events with Rav Masud Abuzeira and his eldest son Reb David. Rav David as a rule took honor of his parents very seriously but one day said a very slight word to his father lacking respect. He then went into exile for a month. But at any rate, from that event t is possible to learn that honor of one's parents is a very wide category to include not just things they say.

Even when parents are against things that are supposedly good things one ought to listen. They are against joining some group? Often groups present themselves as great things and parents might very well be right for being suspicious.

Exodus 23 has a few verses that look something like a mediator. That is to say some thing that does not look to be the way one usually understands Torah to be that one goes directly to G-d. There G-d says he will send an angel before Israel to guide them.And the verses go on beyond that to say one should not disobey the angel because G-d's name is in him.

Besides that I should mention there are many verses in Torah which are not exactly PC. Like the whole case of G-d wanting to kill Moses before he did circumcision on his son. The verses over there certainly do not look PC.

There are plenty of things in the Talmud also that are definitely not PC. Like the barber that gave the haircut to the king of Assyria that the Gemara says things about that do not seem very PC.

The way I generally deal with these kinds of issues is the idea of Kant-that reason  must not venture into the realm of the dinge an sich (things in themselves) as contradictions  inevitably follow.

[There were others who noticed this aspect of Kant and used it to defend faith. In particular you can see this in the Kant=Friesian school.]

To me it seems helpful that faith should be unconcerned with doctrines and more concerned with simply learning Torah and keeping it whether I understand it or not.
In any case, I should mention that non PC stuff comes up all the time in Torah and most of the time there seems to be no good explanation. 

decrees from the sages

There is a debate about decrees from the sages if once the reason for the decree has gone, if the decree itself is automatically null. This is an argument in the Gemara itself [Beiza page 5]. Tosphot takes it as a simple fact that the decree itself is null and so does the Raavad and most other rishonim.

The reason this is relevant is that for most decrees we know the reason for (as they are stated openly in the Gemara itself). In any case, the Rambam disagrees and hold the decree continues until another court of law can be convened to nullify the decree. However that is not the opinion of most Rishonim.

In fact, there is even a debate if there is any authority in the first place to make a decree which is not stated openly in the Torah, the  Law of Moses. This come up in the beginning of אבות דר' נתן which is a commentary on Tractate Avot by an Amora printed in the Vilna Shas at the end of Nezikim.

Besides that there is also the issue of ר' שמעון דורש טעמה דקרא {Shimon ben Yohai goes by the reason for the verse, not the letter of the law. This is actually how the Rambam decided in one place in Mishne Torah. In another place the Rambam decided like the sages that go by the letter of the law. The commentaries on the Rambam are at a loss how to deal with that, however the Avi Ezri answers the question quite well.] In any case I want to point out that Shimon ben Yohai is quite serious about going for the reason for  a verse as you can see in the case of a wealthy widow. He says a lender can take a pledge from her even though the verse openly says one can not do so. The reason is that he goes by the reason for the verse, not the letter of the law.

The Rambam does have an emphasis learning Physics and the Metaphysics. Learning דרך גירסא just saying the words and going on.

Even though the Rambam does have an emphasis learning Physics and the Metaphysics of the ancient Greeks, to me it seems better to learn these two subjects as they are understood today.
Even though the Rambam when he mentions this idea of learning these two things as understood by the ancient Greeks, and that learning these two things are included in what the sages said about מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית [both brought down in the beginning of the book of the prophet יחזקאל Ezekiel], still the actual works of Aristotle on these two subjects look to be not as impressive as the Rambam must have thought they are.

The actual work on Physics of Aristotle seems to be a little antiquated. And besides that here I present a link to a criticism that resounds with sense.
Furthermore the actual Metaphysics of Aristotle also seems a bit antiquated. Not that the moderns have done much better. As for Metaphysics I have already mentioned my basic idea that Leonard Nelson got that basically right basing himself on Kant. [Outside of Nelson I think most of twentieth century Philosophy is unworthy to take up space in a trash can.] [Hegel has some very good points but does not seem all that logical or rigorous as some thought. Once you get past the jargon, it is hard to see much insight. In terms of political thought, I think the founding fathers of the USA were a lot more insightful--see the Federalist Papers.]

As for Physics, the best thing is to get up to String Theory which to me looks about as good as it gets.[That needs a little background in Quantum Field Theory--which in turn needs a drop of background about the harmonic oscillator.]

I ought to add that there is no reason to think the Gra disagreed with the Rambam in this.  His statement about the seven wisdoms shows this."To the degree that one lacks knowledge in the seven wisdom, he will lack knowledge in Torah a hundred fold."

My basic idea of how to do Physics is to say the words in order and no review until you have finished the entire book and then go back over the same book lots of times. This kind of learning is called "Girsa" and to me it makes a lot more sense than getting stuck on every detail and then getting frustrated and then dropping the whole thing. [See the Musar book אררחות צדיקים that goes into this in detail.]

The three  major points of the Gra were to learn Torah, to have trust in God (without effort), and the fact that he put his signature on the letter of excommunication.[note 1]
The founding of institutions to learn Torah was definitely not his "thing." And the time for that seems to have passed. [I am not the first person to notice this.] [note 2]

But the first three things seem to me to be vastly important.

[note 1] I think the Ran from Breslov is not to be considered in the category of the excommunication from the reading of the actual documents and letter that the Gra signed.
[note 2] There is a question if the Gra ever agreed with Reb Haim of Voloshin about this issue. And even though at that time it was "the need of the hour", nowadays the situation is different. It is hard to put my finger on the exact nature of the problem. My learning partner however put this issue succinctly: "They are private country clubs."   [That is to say the whole thing is usually "purchase by mistake." One is not getting what he paid for. In a מקח טעות buying something that turns out to be not what you expected it is not needed that the seller openly makes claims about his product as you can see in Bava Batra 92. It is enough that the buyer is known what he is buying for, If what he gets is different, then the deal is off, an he gets his money back. Some say also the money that is equal to the time and effort he spent. That is later on in the Gemara on around page 94.]


[In any case, to me the whole thing seems to be a subset of the general kind of thinking that was going on in Western Europe at the time. That more or less started with the Revolution in France and then extended  out to intellectual revolutions. The idea was to make movements and institutions all based on some new fashionable idea.    The overthrow of old systems got to be the "in thing."]

To obey one's parents is not considered a worthy thing to do.However that seems to be a mistake. There is one section in חידושי הגרנ''ט the book of Reb Naphtali Troup which goes into this and shows that to obey one's parents is a מצוות עשה positive commandment.

To obey one's parents is not considered a worthy thing to do. However that seems to be a mistake. There is one section in חידושי הגרנ''ט the book of Reb Naphtali Troup which goes into this and shows that to obey one's parents is a מצוות עשה positive commandment. The reason this is not obvious nowadays is that often one's parents are not very worthy. Still the issue seems to be ignored more than I would think to be proper. You can see this in Jeremiah 35 where the grandchildren of יונדב בו רכב Yonadav obeyed his order not to drink wine and were rewarded for that by an exceptional blessing.

The whole issue is gone into in the Tur {son of the Rosh, Rabbainu Asher}. 

The Rambam definitely has a consequentialist view

The Rambam definitely has a consequentialist view of the commandments. He even gives a few times the consequences they are supposed to bring to. This goes along well with the consequentialist theory of political authority. See this paper by Danny Frederick.  The reason that a state has authority does not need to be supported by philosophical arguments, (arguments that are often convoluted) . The reason is much more simple than that. The issue is not just human flourishing. The point is that no human good would be possible without a state.  We all would be subject to the most sadistic  kinds of criminals. Nothing we have, nor our very lives would be safe.

[The consequentialist view of the commandments is from the Gemara itself. There is an argument between  R. Shimon Ben Yohai and the Sages if we go by the reasons for the commandments or by the letter of the law. R. Shimon Ben Yohai holds we go by the reason. But no one argues if we know the reasons or not. The Gemara assumes point blank that we know the reasons an the reasons are obvious but the question is if we use that reason in applying the law or if we go by the letter of the law. 

The argument for the state goes even for states that one does not agree with its laws.
All the more so states that are founded on objective principles of justice like the USA and Israel.


The argument against socialist states is stronger than most people imagine. The issue is not how to justify socialism but rather what are the logical results. Once it can be shown the results are not good then all other arguments for justifying  do not matter.
This argument holds for any system that claims superiority over the USA Constitution or the State of Israel. The question that matters is what are the logical results of any system?

carrying in one's pocket on the Sabbath Day

It might be a good idea to explain why I think carrying in one's pocket on the Sabbath Day is OK. To do that in a structured way.
The basic idea comes from the gemaras [Bava Batra 85] about acquisition. The question is if an object in the vessel of a person is thought to be in the domain of the person or the larger domain. There are differences if the vessel belongs to the seller or the buyer or to a third party. But the fact remains that the major question is if the object is considered to be in the larger domain or the bag. That is how the Rashbam explains it. Then the connection with Shabat comes from the Gemara that equates the two issues in Bava Batra 86.


The reason this is important is that a public domain does not seem to need 600,000. Even though Rashi and Tosphot both say that it does still it is hard to see how this could have been fulfilled in ancient Persia and the Gemaras in Shabat seem to treat the streets there as public domains.