Bohr's concept of Quantum Mechanics and Kant

I wrote to  Dr Ross 

Dear Dr. Ross, your ideas about the connection between Kant and the Bohr concept of  Quantum Mechanics were finally noticed by the academic world. The article in the Stanford Encyclopedia states this connection explicitly.

Sincerely, Avraham Rosenblum

Dear Mr. Rosenblum,

A number of people and sources see similarities between Kant and Bohr.  However, that depends.  The Stanford page seems to assert that Bohr is a metaphysical realist, but that isn't always what he sounds like.  If he is actually a non-realist, which is often what he does sound like, then that would not be Positivism, which makes no metaphysical judgments, but it also would not be Kant, who posits "empirical realism."  Also, the Stanford page says that Bohr somehow agrees with Kant that things-in-themselves "can't be conceived of in causal terms."  This is quite false.  Kant would say that causality applies both to phenomena and things-in-themselves, but we don't know how it applies to things-in-themselves -- although it may allow for freedom.  Also, the idea that quantum mechanics violates causality at all is questionable.  With populations, quantum mechanics is as deterministic as anything.  Schrodinger's Equation is deterministic.  So the only issue is whether the random factor that enters when we consider individuals violates causality.  Or perhaps in quantum events, like the decay of nuclei, we don't detect an efficient cause.  But a lot of this depends on what we mean by causality.  Aristotle meant a lot more than what we do now.  I discuss some confusions about causality in relation to the movie Knowing -- http://www.friesian.com/why.htm#note-2a.

Best wishes,
Kelley Ross



My note: empirical means  things that are immanent in experience (not transcendent). Realism is these things don't depend on us for their existence. 

What Dr Ross is saying here is QM does not violate locality. And that Bell's Theorem has nothing to do with locality at all. It does say the world is dependent on how we observe it just like Kant says. That is there is a subjective and objective element in the representation. The world is not solely objective. [A good way of understanding this is how Schopenhauer puts it- the representation is  half from the subject and half from the object.]


What we call non-locality is you have  an atom that disappears  here it has to appear somewhere else but it could appear far away. Locality means it cant just disappear. Causes an effects are local.

Dr Ross is in between the lines answering the objections of some people on Kant. 

I am bringing here a question on the Rambam. But before I can I have to go through the subject.



Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a sin offering for. [i.e. a female goat or sheep.] A sin offering can only be brought for accidental sin. So here we have a case where there was a piece of forbidden fat cooking the stove. John walks in and eats it. The Peter walks in a minute later and asks where is the piece of forbidden fat I left on the stove? John has to bring a sin offering.
[For the general public let me mention of the 43 a lot concern sexual relationships between family members and the Temple. Besides that there are few others likely idolatry, and Shabat.]


If one eats a piece of forbidden fat חלב, he brings a sin offering [a female goat or sheep]. If he ate a piece and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another piece and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring a one sin offering on each piece.
Not only that but if there was two knowings. That he ate a כזית חלב and then ate another כזית חלב and then he knew about the first piece and then he knew about the second piece he brings two sacrifices.
That is you don't need the knowledge to be in between the two acts of eating.


From Tractate Shabat page 71Rambam 6:9. Laws of Accidental Sins.
That is to say the Rambam decided like Rabbi Yochanan that ידיעות מחלקות not like reish lakish that only bringing the sacrifice is מחלק
If he ate two pieces  in one span of forgetfulness and then knew about the first piece. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third piece, when he brings a sin offering for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second piece. Rambam שגגות 6:11.

The Beit Joseph brings in the name of the Ri bei Rav an answer that is flimsy. And the Kiryat Sefer says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the Rambam himself chapter 8:8

In 8:8 the Rambam brings the exact same law of Rabbi Yochanan that he says in 6:9 except that it is in terms of the guilt offering. And there he says אכל חמשה זיתי חלב. This directly contradicts what the Beit Yoseph said that the difference between 6:9 and 6:11 is in the first it   אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. There was this attempt to say ate and ate is two different acts so they count separately while in 6:11 it says he ate שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת he ate two pieces in one span and that means in one act of eating and so they count together. This is  contradicted in 8:8 where he ate five pieces together and still they count separately.




Rav Shach offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me even though there still seems to be some question that remains about it.



What Elazar Menachem Shach suggests is based on two premises. 1. knowledge causes a sin offering. 2. one span of forgetfulness is one sin. Thus he ate the first two pieces in one state of forgetfulness. And he knew about the first piece. So he brings a sin offering for the first piece. but since the second piece was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the sin offering takes care of both pieces.  But what about if he only remembered that the second piece was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to Rav Shach to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the Rambam says.

What is hard to understand here is this in the last part of this halacha the Rambam says if  he knows about the middle piece and then brings a sacrifice then both the first and last are taken care of and when he knows about the first or the last he does not need to bring any further sin offering.
Here is the question I wanted to bring in the name of my learning partner. "What is dividing the pieces?" That is in the last case he ate a piece and another piece in one span. then he ate a third piece and still does not know. Then he knows about the second. Therefore it is all one span. There is nothing to divide them so obviously there is only one sacrifice.

Now I think Rav Shach does answer this in some way. I think he is saying that the Rambam intends the simple case but also if there was some kind of knowledge in between. But if so then it would be two separate acts and two separate sin offerings. Just think about it. He ate the first and second piece and if someone would tell him abut either then we would have knowledge that would separate completely. So it cant be that he knows anything. Then he ate a third piece. So it was all one span!.
I would like to suggest what kind of answer might help us. It is the fact that is it does not matter if the knowledge was in between the eating. It only matters what he knows. If he eats one piece and then another and then knows about the first is this one span or not? In 6:9 it seems not. Only the knowledge would divide.  I still don't know how this would help us but I suggest that we think along these lines.
If anyone has an idea here I would welcome it.

________________________________________________________________________________

I am bringing here a question on the רמב''ם. But before I can I have to go through the subject.



Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a חטאת for. i.e. a female goat or sheep. A חטאת can only be brought for שוגג. So here we have a case where there was a כזית חלב cooking the stove. ראובן walks in and eats it. Then שמעון walks in a minute later and asks where is the כזית חלב   I left on the stove? ראובן has to bring a sin offering.


If one eats a piece of  חלב, he brings a חטאת a female goat or sheep. If he ate a כזית and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another כזית and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring  one חטאת on each piece.
Not only that but if there was two ידיעות. I mean he ate a כזית חלב and then ate another כזית חלב and then he knew about the first כזית and then he knew about the second כזית, he brings two חטאות.
That is you don't need the ידיעות to be in between the two acts of eating.


From שבת דף ע''א Also  'רמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק  ו': הלכה ט .
That is to say the רמב''ם decided like רבי יוחנן that ידיעות מחלקות not like ריש לקיש that only bringing the sacrifice is מחלק
If he ate two כזיתים  in one העלמה and then knew about the first כזית. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third כזית, when he brings a חטאת for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second כזית. This is from  רמב''ם שגגות 6:11.

The בית יוסף brings in the name of the ר''י בי רב an answer that is flimsy. And the קרית ספר says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the רמב''ם himself chapter 8:8

In 8:8 the רמב''ם brings the exact same law of רבי יוחנן that he says in 6:9 except that it is in terms of the guilt offering. And there he says אכל חמשה זיתי חלב. This directly contradicts what the בית יוסף בשם הר''י בי רב  said that the difference between 6:9 and 6:11 is in the first it   אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. There was this attempt to say אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב is two different acts so they count separately while in 6:11 it says he ate שני זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת he ate two pieces in one העלמה and that means in one act of eating and so they count together. This is  contradicted in 8:8 where he ate five pieces together and still they count separately. אכל חמישה כזיתים בהעלם אחת. According to the Beit Joseph that language would have to mean they are counted as one and yet there in 8:8 the law is they are counted separately.




רב שך offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me.



What רב אלעזר מנחם שך suggests is based on two premises. 1. ידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת. 2. Also העלם אחת היא חטא אחד. Thus he ate the first כזיתי חלב in one state of העלמה. And he knew about the first כזית. So he brings a חטאת for the first כזית. But since the second כזית was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the חטאת takes care of both כזיתים.  But what about if he only remembered that the second כזית was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to רב שך to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the רמב''ם says.

What is hard to understand here is this in the last part of this הלכה the רמב''ם says if  he knows about the middle piece and then brings a חטאת then both the first and last are taken care of and when he knows about the first or the last he does not need to bring any further חטאת.
Here is the question I wanted to bring in the name of my learning partner. "What is dividing the pieces?" I mean in the last case he ate a piece and another piece in one span. then he ate a third piece and still does not know. Then he knows about the second. Therefore it is all one span. There is nothing to divide them so obviously there is only one חטאת.

Now I think רב שך does answer this in some way. I think he is saying that the רמב''ם intends the simple case but also if there was some kind of knowledge in between. But if so then it would be two separate acts and two separate חטאות. Just think about it. He ate the first and second כזית and if someone would tell him abut either then we would have knowledge that would separate completely. So it can't be that he knows anything. Then he ate a third כזית. So it was all one span!.
I would like to suggest what kind of answer might help us. It is the fact that is it does not matter if the knowledge was in between the eating. It only matters what he knows. If he eats one כזית and then another and then knows about the first is this one span or not? In 6:9 it seems not. Only the knowledge would divide.  I still don't know how this would help us but I suggest that we think along these lines.
If anyone has an idea here I would welcome it.


______________________________________________________________________________


אני מביא כאן שאלה על רמב''ם. אבל לפני כן אני חייב לעבור את הנושא. מבוא. יש ארבעים ושלשה סוגים של חטא שצריך להביא עליהם חטאת . כלומר  עז נקבה או כבשה. חטאת ניתן להביא רק לשוגג. אז הנה יש לנו מקרה שבו הייתה כזית חלב על  התנור. ראובן נכנס ואוכל אותו. אז שמעון נכנס לאחר מכן ושואל איפה הוא כזית החלב ששמתי בתנור? ראובן צריך להביא חטאת. אם אוכל חתיכת החלב, הוא מביא חטאת. אם הוא אכל כזית ולאחר מכן ידע שאסור, ואז אכל כזית נוספת ולאחר מכן ידע שהיה אסור, שיש לו להביא אחד חטאת על כל חתיכה. לא רק זה, אלא אם היו שתי ידיעות, שהוא אכל כזית חלב, ולאחר מכן אכל עוד כזית חלב, ואז הוא ידע על כזית הראשונה ואז הוא ידע על כזית השנייה, הוא מביא שתי חטאות.  אתה לא צריך שיהיו הידיעות בין שני מעשים של אכילה. שבת דף ע''א וכן ברמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק ו': הלכה ט'. כלומר הרמב''ם החליט כמו רבי יוחנן שידיעות מחלקות, לא כמו ריש לקיש  שהקרבת הקורבן הוא מחלקת.

אם הוא אכל שני כזיתים כאחד בהעלמה ולאחר מכן ידע על כזית הראשונה. לאחר מכן, באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת השניה אכל כזית שלישית, כשהוא מביא חטאת לחתיכה הראשונה, הוא פוטר את החטא  שלכזית השנייה. זה משגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה י''א. הבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב תשובה. והקרית ספר, אומר תשובה אחרת. שתי התשובות נסתרות בפרק ח' הלכה ח'  ברמב''ם.  הרמב''ם מביא בדיוק את אותו החוק של רבי יוחנן שהוא אומר ב פרק ו' הלכה ט' חוץ מזה שזה במונחים של קרבן אשם. ושם הוא אומר אכל חמשת זיתי חלב. זה ישירות סותר את מה שהבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב שאמר שההבדל בין  פרק ו' הלכה ט' ופרק ו' הלכה י''א שבהתחלה זה אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת. היה הניסיון הזה לומר ''אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב הוא שני מעשים שונים ולכן הם נחשבים בנפרד ואילו בפרק ו' הלכה י''א הוא אומר שהוא אכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת (היינו שהוא אכל שתי חתיכות כאחד בהעלמה אחת) ור''י בי רב  אמר שהכוונה בפעולת אכילה אחת וכך הן ספורות יחד. זה נסתר בפרק ח' הלכה ח' שבו הוא אכל חמש חתיכות יחד ועדיין הן ספורות בנפרד. "אכל חמש כזיתים בהעלם אחת." לדברי הבית יוסף השפה מכוון שהן נספרות כאחד, ובכל זאת יש בפרק ח' הלכה ח' החוק שהן נספרות בנפרד. רב אלעזר מנחם שך מציע תשובה שלישית. מה שרב שך מציע מבוסס על שתי הנחות. 1. הידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת. 2. כמו כן העלמה אחת היא חטא אחד. כך הוא אכל כשתי זיתי חלב  בהעלמה אחת. והוא ידע על כזית הראשונה. אז הדין שהוא מביא חטאת על כזית הראשונה. אבל מאחר שכזית השנייה נאכלה באותו פרק זמן של שיכחה החטאת מכפרת  על שתי הכזיתים.
בחלק האחרון של זו ההלכה הרמב''ם אומר אם הוא יודע על חתיכה האמצעי ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת, אז שתיהם, החתיכה הראשונה והחתיכה האחרונה מתכפרות וכאשר הוא יודע על הראשונה או האחרונה הוא לא צריך להביא עוד חטאת. הנה השאלה שאני רוצה להביא בשמו של השותף הלמידה שלי. "מה היא חלוקת החתיכות?" אני מתכוון במקרה האחרון שהוא אכל חתיכה וחתיכה בהעלמה אחת . ואז הוא אכל חתיכה שלישית ועדיין לא יודע. ואז הוא יודע על השנייה. לכן זה כל העלמה אחת. אין שום דבר לחלק אותן ולכן  ברור שיש רק חטאת אחת. עכשיו אני חושב רב שך  ענה על זה בדרך כלשהי. אני חושב שהוא אומר שרמב''ם מתכוון מקרה הפשוט, אבל גם אם היה איזשהו ידע שביניהם. אבל אם כן אז זה יהיה שני מעשים נפרדים ושתי חטאות נפרדות. רק תחשוב על זה. הוא אכל כזית הראשונה ושנייה, ואם מישהו היה אומר לו שהשנייה הייתה חלב,  גם אז יהיה לו ידע שיפריד לחלוטין. אז זה לא יכול להיות שהוא לא יודע שום דבר. ואז הוא אכל כזית שלישית. אז זה היתה שיכחה אחת ! אני רוצה להציע איזה סוג של תשובה שעשוי לעזור לנו. זה הוא העובדה שזה לא משנה אם הידע היה בין האכילה. זה רק משנה מה שהוא יודע. אם הוא אוכל כזית אחד, ואז עוד אחד, ואז יודע על הראשון היא העלמה אחת  או לא? בפרק ו' הלכה ט'  נראה שלא. רק הידע יחלק. אני עדיין לא יודע איך זה יעזור לנו, אבל אני מציע שאנחנו חושבים לאורך קווים אלה. אם למישהו יש רעיון כאן הייתי מברך אותו.

My basic feeling is it is possible to learn and keep Torah without being a fanatic.
But it is hard. The reason is that for every positive value there is an equal an opposite value. There is Music and anti Music. Literature and anti literature. Natural Science and pseudo science. And each anti-value tries to present itself as legitimate. So without experience and knowledge people can easily fall into cults. What makes the religious issue hard is that when one falls from holiness, he falls into unholiness, that really  bad stuff. That is not the same as falling from Rembrandt or Leonardo Da Vinci into pseudo art.

So we see why Lithuanian yeshivas are so rigid in keeping out cults and cult members. They realize how easy it is for positive value to be corrupted and fall into negative value.

Here is an idea from Steven Dutch which relates to this

The Fundamental Fallacy of Modern Philosophy might be defined as the idea that it makes sense to study structure divorced from content. This is the idea that has given us businessmen who think they can "manage" without knowing anything about what they manage, critics who claim that only the technical excellence of a work of art matters, not its content, and sociologists of science like the one with whom I corresponded who think you can study the Velikovsky affair without regard to the scientific validity of Velikovsky's ideas.


What Steven Dutch is pointing out is that content matters. Maybe external forms do also but the major issue is content, in any field. You may have heard complaints about religious fanaticism but tat totally ignores the question of what people are fanatic about. It places a Catholic nun on the same moral plane as an Islamic suicide bomber. Content matters.

And this leads to the interesting question about  a true tzadik and yet  numerous cults being formed that supposedly follow his teachings. This fact is what  causes Lithuanian yeshivas to have doubts about how to deal with this. They would like to have his books in the yeshiva because of their high value but are nervous about what they can lead to.
The higher and better something is--when it falls it falls to a more negative value.


The best approach I think is that of balance between different areas of value. And also to take one specific area to strive for excellence.  This was how my parents raised me and it makes a lot of sense to me that this is the best approach.

Song of Love for God L44  [L44 in midi format]  l43
[l43 IN MIDI FORMAT]
L39 [L39 in Midi format]

Introduction. There are 43 kinds of sin that one must bring a sin offering for. [i.e. a female goat or sheep.] A sin offering can only be brought for accidental sin. So here we have a case where there was a piece of forbidden fat cooking the stove. John walks in and eats it. The Peter walks in a minute later and asks where is the piece of forbidden fat I left on the stove? John has to bring a sin offering.
[For the general public let me mention of the 43 a lot concern sexual relationships between family members and the Temple. Besides that there are few others likely idolatry, and Shabat.]


If one eats a piece of forbidden fat חלב, he brings a sin offering [a female goat or sheep]. If he ate a piece and then knew that it was forbidden, and then ate another piece and then knew that was forbidden, he has to bring a one sin offering on each piece. From Tractate Shabat 71 Rambam 6:9. Laws of Accidental Sins.

If he ate two pieces  in one span of forgetfulness and then knew about the first piece. Then in the same span of forgetting he ate a third piece, when he brings a sin offering for the first piece, he is absolved for the sin for the second piece. Rambam שגגות 6:11.

The Beit Joseph brings in the name of the Ri bei Rav an answer that is flimsy. And the Kiryat Sefer says another answer which is worse. Both answer are contradicted directly in the Rambam himself chapter 8:8
Rav Shach offers a third answer that makes lot of sense to me even though there still seems to be some question that remains about it.



What Elazar Menachem Shach suggests is based on two premises. 1. knowledge causes a sin offering. 2. one span of forgetfulness is one sin. Thus he ate the first two pieces in one state of forgetfulness. And he knew about the first piece. So he brings a sin offering for the first piece. but since the second piece was eaten in the same span of forgetfulness the sin offering takes care of both pieces. The beauty of this answer is powerful. And it is common to see this in Rav Shach. And he and Reb Chaim from Brisk himself have no problem in dismissing even the greatest of achronim. And the Ri Bei Rav was the one that renewed the semicha. Still we don't say his words are Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai. We don't even say he was right. The reason is clear. There is such a thing as סוף הוראה (the end of the time it is possible to make a Halachic decision.). As the Gemara says and the Rambam brings in his introduction to Mishne Torah רבינא ורב אשי הם סוף הוראה. The idea here is really two ideas. One is there is no true ordination today. [All legitimate yeshivas teach this openly and it is straight from the Gemara and the Rambam. ] The second idea is that even with true ordination as the Ri Bei Rav had still that can't go against סוף הוראה.
In any case, the problem here is this: We understand now the halacha in the Rambam, and also the end of that halacha that if he brings a sin offering for the third piece that takes care of the second piece also. That is fine. But what about if he only remembered that the second piece was forbidden? It certainly makes sense according to Rav Shach to say that everything would be forgiven and in fact that is exactly what the Rambam says. But then what about the fact that he remembered the first piece and the third piece was not eaten in the same span of forgetting! should not then the first and third pieces be considered separately?

Ideas in Bava Metzia

Title page  for bava metzia


Ideas in Talmud


Title page for ideas in Shas

The Rambam combined Torah with Aristotle. This leaves open the question what would he do today?
I do not ask what he would think of 20th century philosophy? That is clear. But the question I ask is more along the lines of what he would do with Kant? [Or the different schools based on Kant--or stemming from Kant?]
I have suggested that he would continue in his approach. That is his way is really a kind of synthesis between Plato and Aristotle. So what I have thought is he would simply continue this process.
Mainly I think he would accept  Kant's structure of the mind but he would justify knowledge by a kind of third kind of knowledge that is not reason and not sensed--but known. [The Rambam was not in the habit of denying the truth based on criteria like, "Who said it?' ]

I wish I could show this more clearly but you can see this idea in this essay on Kelley Ross's site.

See also this article in the this  Philosophy magazine from Cornell.


Here is

my picture of Kant's idea of the way the Mind works.


If you go with the Rambam (Maimonides)  you have to add another kind of knowledge that is known not by sensory perception and not by reason, i.e. immediate non-intuitive knowledge.

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I have seen a good deal of cults. Maybe it is just human nature to be curious about exotic religions. But what people involve in these cults don't seem to get is how it affects their children. Maybe that is in other religions also.  I have heard that Muslims like to train their children as suicide bombers. So apparently the problem of cults is not confined.

The best remedy for this is common sense reason.

The Rambam understood Torah as intending to bring to natural law. Common sense morality. 

The more reason is divorced from belief,  the more problems with cults we get.  When cultural relativism started in the USA, this provided the model for people to look for true values in all kinds of exotic places.

So what I suggest is to reunite Reason and Faith, Natural Law with Torah Law, This was certainly the approach of the Rambam. At any rate you can see why Lithuanian yeshivas are so strict to keep out cults and cult members. They would not have to be so careful if Torah was a secular discipline. It is because Torah is holy that the flies are attracted as to honey.

Every value has an opposite value. And when the positive value loses its purity it decays into it opposite. So when people use the Torah for personal motives, it causes the holiness of the Torah to leave it and in its place is unholiness.

I have heard that Germany is especially concerned with the problem of cults, but I doubt if they made much progress in understanding or dealing with the problem. And I myself only became aware of my own weakness in this area recently. It is a hard problem. I have suggested before the idea of Rishonim. That is if you are Jewish then the best place to learn about it is books from the Middle Ages before cults became a problem and the emphasis was to combine reason with revelation. I suggest that this applies to Christians also. That is to go back to the Middle Ages and read the source material from that time --like Aquinas etc would be the best approach. I got this idea in my first yeshiva and I think it is  the cure for cults. [That is go back to medieaval sources.]

Ideas in Bava Metzia Ideas on the Talmud

In Bava Metzia page 110 we have  a case of נכייתו or משכנתא דסורא. You have a lender and borrower that come to court. Just to make this concrete lets say it is  a case of משכנתא דסורא. That is when a person borrows money and as a guarantee for the loan he lets the lender use his field for some period and after that time the field returns to the borrower even if he did not pay back the loan.
The lender says the period was five years (and has been there three years) and the borrower says it was only for three years. Rav Yehuda says we believe the lender. To Ravina we believe the borrower. (I am saying this according to Tosphot.) Rav Yehuda says we believe the lender because he could have said "I bought this field."
The normal way of a migo is one person could have said a plea and be believed so we believe him when he says a weaker plea. So at first glance this looks like Rav Yehuda and Ravina are agreeing that if the lender would in fact say "I bought it he would be believed". But Tosphot asks on this and says that Ravina disagrees with very premise in itself. He would hold if the מלווה said "I bought it" and the other says it is משכנתא דסורא the borrower would be believed.
On this Tosphot asks according to this way that we understand Ravina then in the normal case in Bava Batra 28 side a of one person says I bought it and the other says you stole it that we would believe the one who says you stole it because he has  amigo and he could have said it was aמשכנתא דסורא.

This question of Tosphot is going only to Ravina. To Rav Yehuda in fact the one that says "You stole it" does not have any option of saying it was a משכנתא דסורא.

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In בבא מציעא page ק''י we have  a case of נכייתו or משכנתא דסורא. You have a לווה and מלווה that come to court. Just to make this concrete lets say it is  a case of משכנתא דסורא. That is when a person borrows money and as a guarantee for the loan he lets the lender use his field for some period and after that time the field returns to the לווה even if he did not pay back the loan.
The lender says the period was five years and has been there three years and the borrower says it was only for three years. רבי יהודה says we believe the lender. To רבינא we believe the lender. I am saying this according to תוספות. In this case רבי יהודה says we believe the לווה because he could have said לקוחה היא בידי.
The normal way of a מיגו is one person could have said a plea and be believed so we believe him when he says a weaker plea. So at first glance this looks like רבי יהודה and רבינא are agreeing that if the lender would in fact say I bought it he would be believed. But תוספות asks on this and says that רבינא disagrees with very premise in itself. He would hold if the lender said לקוחה היא בידי and the other says it is משכנתא דסורא the borrower would be believed.
On this תוספות asks according to this way that we understand רבינא then in the normal case in בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א   of one person says I bought it and the other says you stole it that we would believe the one who says you stole it because he has  a מיגו and he could have said it was aמשכנתא דסורא.

This question of תוספות is going only to רבינא. To רבי יהודה in fact the one that says you stole it does not have any option of saying it was a משכנתא דסורא

בבא מציעא דף ק''י יש לנו מקרה של נכייתא או משכנתא דסורא. יש לך לווה ומלווה שמגיעים לבית המשפט.  מקרה של משכנתא דסורא הוא  כאשר אדם לווה כסף וכערובה להלוואה הוא מאפשר למלווה להשתמש בשדה שלו לתקופה מסוימת ולאחר שהזמן חוזר השדה ללווה בלי כסף.וזה נחשב כמו ששילם את החוב. המלווה אומר התקופה הייתה חמש שנים והיה שם שלוש שנים. והלווה אומר שהתקופה הייתה רק לשלוש שנים. רבי יהודה אומר שאנחנו מאמינים המלווה. לרבינא אנו מאמינים המלווה. [אני אומר את זה על פי תוספות.] במקרה זה רבי יהודה אומר שאנחנו מאמינים המלווה כי הוא יכול לומר לקוחה היא בידי. הדרך הרגילה של מיגו היא אדם אחד היה יכול לומר טיעון ולהאמין. ולכן נאמין לו כשהוא אומר טיעון חלש. אז במבט ראשון זה נראה כמו שרבי יהודה ורבינא מסכימים שאם המלווה היה למעשה אומר שקניתי אותו הוא היה נאמן. אבל תוספות אומר שרבינא לא מסכים עם הנחה  בעצמה. הוא יחזיק אם המלווה אמר לקוח הוא בידי והלווה אומר שזה משכנתא דסורא הלווה יהיה נאמן. תוספות  שואל שעל פי דרך זו שאנו מבינים רבינא, אז במקרה הרגיל בבא בתרא כ''ח ע ' "א של אדם אחד אומר שקניתי אותו והשני אומר שאתה גנבת אותו כי עלינו להאמין האומר "גנבת אותו" כי יש לו מיגו והוא היה יכול לומר שזה היה משכנתא דסורא. שאלה זו של תוספות היא רק הולכת רבינא. לרבי יהודה זה שאומר "אתה גנבת אותו" אין לו שום אפשרות לומר שזה היה משכנתא דסורא .

Education

How to teach children? What subjects should they learn? In particular Jewish children? I have not thought about this much. From what I can tell the Mir yeshiva in New York had the right idea. [I did not go to the high school there but I saw what they were doing.]

In the high school they were learning secular subjects in the afternoon. The morning was devoted to Talmud. And from what I could tell the secular aspect was just as strong as the Talmud aspect. I had friend there in the Mir, Shelomo Berger, and his son was going to the high school there and he got amazingly high scores on the State examinations that they give in NY for each subject desperately.

What it also seems to me is that parents nowadays are kind of messed up. They can't help that. But at least I would say they must to give their children a good education like I saw at the Mir.

In New York I assume there is not much choice about what they teach the kids. But as far as secular subjects go I would stick with natural sciences and the arts. That is things that have value in themselves besides the "parnash" (making a living) issue. If a kid wants to college they could pursue a law degree or go to a technical school. I don't think people should be taught to use Torah for money. Nor should that be held up as a proper example of how to live.
 [In fact in NY you don't see that much, but in Israel, it is considered the highest ideal. That never sat very well with me.]

I see today parents are interested in all kinds of nonsense that it will take them years to see that it is nonsense. At least I suggest to them not to subject their children to that. And some of the know just what I mean--because they  were subject to crazy stuff when they were young and now they know the damage this causes.

Maybe a better way of putting is: Don't go to cults, and don't put your children in one.

But I can understand parents that are confused about education for their children. What sometimes happens is people get sore at the the the religious world for good reasons and so they don't feel there is any worth in teaching their children Talmud. I admit I fell into this trap myself. That is what happens when you have nasty people pretending to keep Torah. It gives Torah a bad name and makes it hard even for simple Jews to give their children a proper Torah background.

In any case if your children are gong to a cult, then get them out now.

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Sometimes people get involved in books that are pseudo Torah and this slowly draws them away from Torah. And then they get to be experts in pseudo Torah and then get called תלמידי חכמים Torah scholars, though they can't learn legitimate Torah.

The Gra I think was advocating a kind of system in which people would learn Torah all day. And in his commentary on Pirkei Avot he says that learning Torah is a mitzvah in itself even if one does not keep anything at all--zilch of what it says. This is on the Mishna  [ch. 5] that one who goes to the Beit Midrash to learn but does not keep Torah gets the reward for learning.

In the Lithuanian yeshivas today that are built on the model of the Gra you can see this attitude played out in life.


The Gra did not write Musar, rather he wrote commentaries on every part of Torah. So you can't really find direct statements of what he holds on lots of issues. But you can see something of what he must have been thinking in the writings of his disciple Chaim of Voloshin. And in his writings you find this statement דבר מנוסה כשישכים אדם בבוקר ויקבל על עצמו עול תורה באמת היינו שיגמור בליבו שלא ישמע לשום אדם, ולא יבטלנו שום טירדה, אזי יצליח ביום ההוא בתורה. וכפי גודל ההסכמה ותוקף הקבלה כן יסירו הטרדות
והביטולים ממנו

The literal translation of this is this: It is a tested fact that when one gets up in the morning and accepts on himself the yoke of Torah in truth, that is, he decides in his heart that he will not listen to any person and he will not allow anything to distract him, then he will succeed in Torah that day. And according to how strong his conviction is and the power of his commitment, to that same degree there will be removed from him the distractions and everything that is wasting his time.





Personally I have found an enormous amount of obstacles in reaching this goal. I still spend practically all my day not learning Torah. And I don't have much of an excuse either.
There is very minor part of my day that I try to do things that might be considered as reasonable excuses for not learning Torah. But if you add them all up they would amount to minuscule amounts of time. Most of all the obstacles are mental and physical.

There are in my mind lots of reasonable things that would require me or others to stop  learning Torah for  a few minutes in order to attend to these matters, and then return to  learning Torah. But what seems to happen is the entire idea of  ביטול תורה (wasting time from Torah) gets thrown to the winds.

While I agree that one should learn an honest profession, get a real job, and not depend on charity. But what happens is that Torah is thrown out completely. Guys are  capable only of concentrating on one thing at a time. If it is Torah, then it's Torah. If you try to combine that with something else, the "something else" becomes primary, and the Torah get shoved to a very secondary place. [I think the Gra was defining Torah in  a limited sense. We find the Rambam also saying this remarkable statement, "Just as anything that one adds to the Written law is not Torah so anything that one adds to the Oral Law is not Torah." Today it is common to teach things that are not a part of the written Law or the Talmud and to say that one is teaching Torah.

Part of the problem is mental. I have  a hard time along with many other people in seeing the point. It takes a large degree of faith to believe  that one is accomplishing anything at all by learning Talmud which at first glance is about as interesting as the New York Phone Book.
It is tempting to learn other things and call them "Torah" --even if for no other reason that they are more fun.

But there are many other reason to not learn Torah. It does happen that just when one starts to learn that the obstacles gain in strength. And people come up to him and say, " Let's go and do some mitzvah." You can't see the effect of learning Torah until a lot of time has passed.

It is funny that there are so many distractions that seem  perfectly legitimate. Sometimes people get involved in books that are pseudo Torah,  and this slowly draws them away from Torah.  I see this all the time. Then they get to be experts in pseudo Torah, and then get called תלמידי חכמים Torah scholars, though they can't learn legitimate Torah.

So what I suggest is this: learn Torah. I can agree with an hour a day of learning a profession in order not to have to use the Torah for money as is so common. And a certain amount of Physics and Metaphysics is also important to the Rambam. But that is not an all encompassing excuse to spend the whole day in extracurricular activities. And drop all pseudo Torah. You know exactly what I mean. I don't have to spell it out.


The justification for this is this learning Torah produces a type of consciousness. And this consciousness is the source of one's deeds.
In any case I got involved in extra curricular activities a long time ago and so it makes plenty of sense to me that I have found so many problems in my life. I think it all flows from ביטול תורה--wasting time from learning Torah.

Trust in God according to the Gra means not to do effort and not to depend on one's own thinking.

I would not say this except that I have found that when I do effort and or depend on my own thinking --either things don't work out or they get worse. To some degree I imagine that some people have a kind of ability to put their minds to something and it gets done. They have success embedded into their fates. But that does not seem to be the case for me. Rather I have found that when I in fact put my trust in God, and do no effort, things work out.

Moving from place to place seems to be an example of this. Once  I went to yeshiva with the idea in mind that God would take care of me. And  that is exactly what happened. God granted to me a wife and children and a living also. Other times I moved from one place to another --not based on trust, but based on the fact that I felt the first place was intolerable and the second seemed to be great.
This type of thinking just got me from the frying pan into the fire.

[See Proverbs chapter 3 at the Gra's comments. Also check  out the Alter of Navardok's book the מדרגת האדם ]. Don't take this the wrong way. I am not giving advice here because I have never managed to walk this fine line very well. Usually when I was trusting in God I was not doing so consciously. I simply did what I believed was God's will -and  I could have been mistaken- but still for some reason God still blessed me.  When I went to Israel I also was doing what I felt was God's will, I certainly was not thinking of how I would be making a living. Yet that was either the peak of my whole life or at least one of the major great periods.

What I suggest from all this is highly personal for each person according to their best understanding. It is not like a kind of thing that you can define well.

connection between Kant and the Ari

Just to give an idea of why I think there is a connection between Kant and the Ari I think it wise to show what Kant is thinking by these simple diagrams. And to mention some aspects of the Ari that reflect this system. The most obvious thing is the תשעה היכלין. The nine palaces. This is clearly here in which each power of the mind creates a representation in the order I have presented here.  [that is 1 to 1; 2 to 2; but reason leads to knowing  synthesis of representations-a kind of perception that does not come from sensibility. ]

. [This is a long subject in the Ari .]

At this point Kant does not stop, and nor does rabbainu the Ari. The mind has this further power of synthesis or Daat that acts on the representations that are given by the male aspect of the Mind.

Kant is going to make a difference upon what kind of representation the Daat {synthesis is going to work on.} This is what produces universals. The Ari himself does not put it in this way but it still is fascinating to see the connection between the Ari and Kant.

Synthesis/Daat is known to have two aspects דעת עליון and דעת תחתון. There is a essay by Reb Chaim Vital about this subject that formed the basis of the Reshash's interpretation of the Ari. But the interesting thing here is that Kant also sees two aspects of Daat. This forms the most fundamental idea in Kant; the Transcendental deduction. That is this synthesis perceives the self and also perceives  and combines universals. This forms the idea of Kant that we can trust synthesis because it gives us our own sense of identity.

[I might mention here that Hegel is most definitely basing himself on the structure of the Ari. He was quite aware of the Ari and even brings down the idea of Adam Kadmon. But he sees a dynamic aspect in the Ari  where each category [sephera] is unfolded. [This is the same as a logical progression of Aristotle's  logic where there is an unfolding - but not in time.] 

See here 

A Map of Hegel's Science of Logic

 http://autio.github.io/projects/scienceoflogic/     

Gra was going with Aristotle.

I have known for a long time that the Gra was going with Aristotle.  You can see hints of it here and there. But it is clearest when he says Genesis chapter one is all potential until the last word  לעשות.
That is God created everything in potential during the six days of creation. The everything in its proper time came into actual existence. A better way of putting this is there is  a ground of existence and there are existing things. When things that are only existing in potential hit the ground of existence they become actually existing things.
Clearly this is how he understood the Ari also. And you can see a hint of this in Shalom Sharabi.
[That is the רש''ש has the sephirot conforming to an Aristotelian pattern in the future after the final correction of all the worlds. He writes about this very little so it is not well known.]


In any case this gives us an idea of what the Rambam must have meant when he said Genesis chapter one is an allegory. We can be fairly sure he did not mean the sephirot like the Arizal. I suggest he meant it like this statement of the Gra.
So when it comes to explain Genesis we now have two ways. The Gra. This would mean that 15 billion years would just be the natural unfolding of potential that was put into place during the six days of creation. The other way is the Arizal.
I should mention that the Ari seems at first glance to be neo Platonic. He builds on concepts of the pre-Soctratics and  then adopts the answers of Plato to the problems they raised and then uses the Neo Platonic interpretation of Plato of Plotinus and then based on that framework he builds his vast and complete system. But the Gra held that the Ari in fact on a deeper level was going with Aristotle and the surface level was just allegorical.

I should mention that to me the Gra presents the path of Torah in an  authentic way. That is in a way that is faithful to original sources. He has no interest to pervert or change the message of Torah to his own liking. And that is rare. This is why I have recommended Lithuanian yeshivas from time to time on because I see them as presenting authentic Torah.

But just in case this is in doubt--I want to make sure no one thinks I am on this path. For reasons unknown to me I have not been able to stick with the path of Torah and my efforts to get back to it have always backfired and made things even worse. I simply do not have the merit needed to be able to stick with Torah. And my life style is completely contradictory to everything the Torah says from the first to the last words. But God has at least granted to me the privilege of recognizance the greatness of Torah and also of knowing what the Torah says. So at least I know how far I am from it. But not just that--I can see when others are far from it also but make a show about how they are keeping it.

I should mention that there is no reason to assume Kant would disagree with the Ari. For example: "In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant is primarily concerned with “pure” [rein] intuition, or intuition absent any sensation, and often only speaks in passing of the sense perception of physical bodies (for example A20–1/B35)." [From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] That is Kant's anschauung is not the same as sensory perception.

And I should mention also: "All of the mental faculties produce representations." [From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] That means even what Kant calls intuition produces representations.
We see Kant could easily be with parallel the Ari. And in fact it was my experience with learning the Ari and being in Israel that convinced me that Kant was better than Hegel. 

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Kant and Hegel

It used to be that the world was divided between people that were unconsciously thinking like Plato and others that were thinking like Aristotle.This expressed itself in Religion and Politics from the time of Plato and Aristotle until Kant and Hegel. Since that time the world has been divided in this new way.


The old division was like you had some mystics like Rav Avraham Abulafia who were going with Plato and Neo Platonic thought as opposed to the Rationalists like the Rambam.
And this original division was based on the ancient question how is change possible? To Plato the forms were unchanging and this imperfect world changes. To Aristotle change is from potential to action.And action is the perfect thing. Aristotle  changed the old paradigm in which change was considered imperfect.


This expressed itself in Christianity also staring from Augustine (Plato)-and going largely towards the Russian Church.The west went with Aquinas (Aristotle) and based on his theory of natural law evolved societies of based on natural rights.


Since Descartes however the major question has been the mind body problem and this found its major type of solution in Kant and Hegel.
Before Kant the question was between the rationalist and empiricists which was a natural division considering the mind body problem. But both thought the mind perceives. To Kant the mind has a
 active part in the representation (that is the way Schopenhauer understands Kant). At any rate, Hegel did not think the mind had any limitations, but progress by a kind of dialectal process.



Since then the world has been divided between these two.

Where things are going to go from here is therefore simple. This same process will simply continue. There will be periods in which individual autonomy seems to be the dominant view. There will be other periods in which the State is the key factor.

I don't know why this is that after two great thinkers, that everyone after that seems to automatically adopt either one or the other's way of thinking,  and considers it totally natural and simple common sense. Clearly Rav Kook was thinking about the State as some kind of Divine goal.


To some degree it is true that Kant opened the door to faith by limiting reason , but he also unwittingly opened it for people to believe in noise and fury.


The ancient question on which all philosophy was based how is change possible seems silly to us today. But the "Mind-Body" question is at the center of all philosophy, and you can't ignore the question of the "State-as opposed to the Individual" either.

I believe this thesis  here is central to understanding the world we live in today and it is likely to be the key for the next thousand years of history. Then at some point some other question will arise and there again will be two thinkers that tackle it in two dramatically different way and they will determine the next thousand years of history etc.

That is the first question was how is change possible? That question had slow beginnings until it reached its peak in Plato and Aristotle. Then had a slow winding down process--resulting in the synthesis of Plotinus. Then the Mind Body Mind Soul problem came to its peak in Kant and Hegel and since then there also has been a kind of winding down process --trying to create synthesis of the approaches of both.  At some point some other unforeseen question will arise and the same process will begin again.

It is important to listen to the Rambam about the importance of learning the Written Law תנ''ך the Oral Law גמרא Physics and Metaphysics. Though the Rambam was referring openly to Plato and Aristotle and Plotinus, still I think Kant and Hegel should be added.

Hegel has been treated unfairly. In my mind, he excels and goes beyond Kant. He was not a statist in the sense that Popper accused him being. In fact Popper's critique on him is mainly false as Walter Kaufman pointed out.

Songs for the glory of the God of Israel

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My parents had a polynomic theory of value. But not being philosophers they did  not put it in that way.

For me that means there is a continuum of positive value and an opposing continuum of negative value.

 Bu my parents added one value-balance. And the general scheme was called by one name "to be a mensch" i.e.  decent human being.

The way I see this is you could take almost any mitzvah and emphasize it. And that would be a good thing to do. Either mitzvahs between God and man  or mitzvot between man and man. Just to give you an idea of what I mean. Take  the importance of talking with God.
The Gra saw the prime value as being learning Torah. I think that no matter how you cut the cake it would be great if a person could spend all day long just talking with God an asking to come close to his service. Or doing some other mitzvah. Or learning Torah. Or doing kindness. Building a hospital or soup kitchen. But I try to strive for some kind of balance between all areas of positive value. And I try to discern in each area of value what its opposing value is --in order to avoid it.

That is there is authentic Torah. And that is holy. And there is pseudo Torah that is unholy. There are the natural  sciences that are good. And there are pseudo sciences that are bad. Same with Music. and Art and literature.

Ideas in Talmud
 Ideas in Talmud Title Page


Ideas in Bava Metzia  [This is a summary of the learning I was doing in Uman with David Bronson up until about page 104 at which point I had to struggle on my own.]



Dear Readers. The Ideas in Talmud book I edited a few times since the last time I printed it. The other one I think is still the same as a month ago. In the meantime I have been trying to learn Rav Shach's book on the Rambam. [I.e the Avi Ezri by Rav Elazar Menachem Shach of Ponovitch] But I don't have a lot to add to his analysis. Mainly I am learning it in order to gain greater clarity in the Rambam. I really don't think I have the merit to learn Torah. The obstacles are so great that even to  to learn one word of Torah is like pulling teeth. But I thank God for even that one word as if I had found a vast fortune.

I also edited the Ideas in Bava Metzia because I think one idea there was a mistake.--on page BM 110. I think when I wrote it I did not understand the idea of Tosphot. Actually I still don't understand what Tosphot is asking but at least I wrote my question properly. --that is that Tosphot wants to ask on Ravina that if he is right the the regular case in Bava Batra about the guy that has  field three years and the other says he stole it the second guy would be believed because he could have said משכנתא דסורא/
I don't get this at all. as far as I can see in our case in Bava Metzia 110 we have two guys that both agree it was  משכנתא דסורא. And there Rav Yehuda holds from a migo for the person that at present still has the field though he is not the owner and Ravina says we believe the owner and does not believe the migo of the other. I might not be writing this right but you get my point. Tosphot question works only to Ravina and Ravina is the one guy that does not hold from a migo. and also in Bava Batra if he would say משכנתא דסורא who says we believe him? We only are believing him here because both agree it is a משכנתא דסורא. I may not be writing this correctly --but I don't have to. I am simply asking two questions. You don't need any standards of rigorous logic to not understand something.

Maybe I should just write this straight in English. Two guys come to court. Both agree the case is that of משכנתא דסורא. A משכנתא דסורא is a case in which one persons loans money to the other. as a guarantee for the loan he gets the filed of the borrower. And he eats the fruits of the field. And after ten years the field goes back to the borrower even if he pays back nothing. But in our case they are arguing if instead of ten years their agreement was for three or five years. Ravina says we believe borrower. That is to say he gets back his field after three years. Rav Yehuda says we believe the lender and he keeps it for five years. The reason is he could have said he bought it.  Tosphot asks if Ravina is right then in the case of two guys coming to court, one says I bought this field and we know it has been in his possession for three years and the other says he stole it the second should be believed because the second could have said משכנתא דסורא. Two questions. Here Ravina does not hold from migo and we have seen that migo is only mentioned by a guard. To learn it elsewhere we need some compelling reason. Maybe Ravina does not hold from it anywhere except by a guard. Another question. Here is a case where both agree it is משכנתא דסורא. Who says in the case in Bava Batra where one says he stole it and the other says he bought it that the accuser would be believed if he saidמשכנתא דסורא?


Now Tosphot answers his question thus: It is  migo to take out. That is a good answer. But I still don't see why Ravina should hold from any migo except the one the Torah says openly.
that is you believe the borrower here because we know he owns the field. the other is just eating teh fruits.We don't believe the other by a migo because it is  migo to take out. and also a migo of the owner would not work after three years in bav batra because it too is  amigo to take out.--i guess? or would you not say here you should believe the migo of the lender because for no the file dis in his temporary possession and the fruit  in any case is in his possession.! If only I had  a Bava Metzia to look this up! But like I said--i was thrown out of almost every yeshiva I ever walked into. And in exile from places of Torah at the best I can only grab a NY minute with Torah from time to time.

About Sucah

In the first Mishna in Sucah the Rav from Bartenura brings the Gemara which says if the sun and branches are even on top then the shadow is more on the bottom so it is kosher. כדאמרי אינשי כזוזא מלעילא כאסתירא לתתא
If you are in a desert and you are trying to spot a fighter plane in the sky, the way to do it is to look for its shadow. The reason is the shadow is always much larger than the plane itself. What is puzzling about this is the fact that the Gemara seems to consider the shadow on the floor to be the determining factor as to whether the Sucah is kosher or  not. It says that being equal is OK because on the bottom the shadow is more.
According to this reasoning then the top סכך (branches) could be much less than the shadow because of the bottom the shadow of the סכך (branches) will be expanded. That means this Gemara is a puzzle because it says on top the סכך (branches) and sun need to be equal.

[I had a small copy of the  Mishna [on Moed] I carried around with me for years so that I would not forget my learning as I was being thrown out from every yeshiva I stepped foot in. For some reason I was not just unpopular, but literally thrown out (sometimes physically, sometimes it was from the sound of people saying I was there for their hot-dogs and other times I was accused of much more horrendous things. But the main thing seemed to be the intent to get rid of me more than the accuracy of the accusations.) from every yeshiva I walked into. Maybe I am not worthy to learn Torah? And if I happened to be married they made sure to correct that situation as fast as they could also. So for me to hold on to Torah was hard,--and still is.
I still have great problems when it comes to keeping Torah, internal and external. This tells you part of the reason that I think Torah with Derech Eretz . Torah with work =  that is a regular job and not to use Torah to make money. That  is  a better approach than Torah all day. It is mainly because the Torah all day approach seems to have the law of limited returns working against it. It is like drinking water. The Torah is after all compared to water. There is a certain point one can get to that drinking more than his stomach can hold can be dangerous.

  Just to be clear yeshivas should throw out people as many as possible, But not people that are  there to learn Torah for its own sake. There is nothing wrong with throwing out trouble makers. But trouble makers are not usually whom they throw out. Just the opposite. It is usually the sincere people that get thrown out.


   But in any case if yeshivas existed in order to learn Torah, then this would be inexplicable. But if they exist in order to use Torah as a business or as a way to get out of army service, then this makes a lot of sense. They don't want people that learn it for free or for its own sake. The solution to this is not easy. But the general direction I would take would be to separate Torah from Money. Torah should not be paying profession because when it is that attracts the flies.




In any case in that copy of the Mishna I wrote a possible solution to this dilemma. My solution is the fact that there is no exact mathematical solution to the problem of diffraction. I mean to say that every shadow has one area that is dark, and another area that is half dark and half light. That area can extend to infinity. So when you say the shadow on the bottom has to be more than the light, it is not clear what that means. The area of the shadow can be infinite.  Therefore the Gemara held only when the shadow and סכך (branches) on top are equal is it kosher.
You could perhaps also suggest to take the dark area as the key factor. You could call it 100% shade. And then when that gets to be 49% light call it not shade.  I don't know why the Talmud did not choose this approach? Besides I wonder if we could go by just the dark area alone? But again the Talmud does not seem to want to focus on the dark area either. Instead it chooses this path where on top they are even and on the bottom the dark area is larger. Maybe a physicist could come up with an explanation of what the Talmud is saying here and why it choose this path?

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In the first משנה in סוכה the רב from ברטנורה brings the גמרא which says if the  סכך and צל are even on top then the צל is more on the bottom so it is kosher. כדאמרי אינשי כזוזא מלעילא כאסתירא מלבר
If you are in a desert and you are trying to spot a fighter plane in the sky, the way to do it is to look for its shadow. The reason is the צל is always much larger than the plane itself. What is puzzling about this is the fact that the גמרא seems to consider the צל on the floor to be the determining factor as to whether the סוכה is kosher or  not. It says that being equal is OK because on the bottom the צל is more.
According to this reasoning then the top סכך could be much less than the shadow because of the bottom the shadow of the סכך will be expanded. That means this גמרא is a puzzle because it says on top the סכך and shadow need to be equal.


In any case in that copy of the משנה I wrote a possible solution to this dilemma. My solution is the fact that there is no exact mathematical solution to the problem of diffraction. I mean to say that every shadow has one area that is dark and another area that is half dark and half light. That area can extend to infinity. So when you say the shadow on the bottom has to be more than the light it is not clear what that means. The area of the shadow can be infinite.  Therefore the Gemara held only when the shadow and סכך on top are equal is it kosher.
You could perhaps also suggest to take the dark area as the key factor. You could call it 100% shade. And then when that gets to be 49% light call it not shade.
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 במשנה הראשונה בסוכה הגמרא אומרת שאם הסכך והצל שווים על גבי הסוכה אז הצל הוא יותר בתחתית כך שהיא כשרה, כדאמרי אינשי כזוזא מלעילא כאסתירא מלבר. אם אתה במדבר ואתה מנסה לזהות מטוס קרב בשמיים, הדרך לעשות את זה היא לחפש צלה. הסיבה לכך היא הצל הוא תמיד הרבה יותר גדול מהמטוס עצמו.  התמוה על זה הוא העובדה שנראה שהגמרא שוקלת צל על הרצפה כדי להיות הגורם המכריע בשאלה האם הסוכה כשרה או לא. זה אומר שלהיות שהם שווים למעלה הוא בסדר כי בתחתית הצל הוא יותר. על פי היגיון זה אז סככת העליון יכולה להיות הרבה פחותה מהצל בגלל שבתחתית הצל של הסכך יורחב. זה אומר גמרא זו היא חידה כי זה אומר על גבי סכך והצל צריך להיות שווה. הפתרון שלי הוא העובדה שאין פתרון מתמטי מדויק לבעיה של עקיפה (דיפרקציה). אני מתכוון לומר שלכל צל תחום אחד שהוא כהה ואזור אחר שהוא חצי אור וחצי כהה. האזור הכהה יכול להאריך עד אינסוף. אז כשאתה אומר הצל בתחתית צריך להיות יותר מןמהאור, לא ברור מה זה אומר. האזור של הצל יכול להיות אינסופי. לכן הגמרא מחזיקה שרק כאשר הצל וסכך על גבי סוכה שווים זה כשר. אתה אולי יכול גם להציע לקחת את האזור הכהה כגורם מפתח. אפשר לקרוא לזה מאה אחוז כהה ואז כשזה הופך להיות ארבעים ותשעה אחוזים  לקרא לזה לא צל. אבל הגמרא לא בחרה בדרך הזו.

Religious fervor and fanaticism

The major problem today is a kind of excess of religious fervor in unhealthy directions.

This takes lots of forms but a good deal of the trouble I think is setting religion above reason as if it was immune to critique. I would like to go into this but I am tired and it has been a long day.
But in short what I see is something that has been named religious fanaticism.
What brings me to this issue of היכלי התמורות. This is actually a long subject in the Zohar.   when people discover  מפורסמים של שקר lunatic charismatic leaders this comes from the fact they get caught in the היכלי התמורות the "Intermediate Zone" [as Aurobindo so aptly put it].[That is the see  good ideas and so they get attracted and get involved  and then drop learning Torah and start following any one of the insane leaders of a movement.

So while fervor to keep the Torah is a great thing what happens is people get sidetracked by false teachers. And they teachers are given amazing powers to do miracles and to know future things by the Dark Side --in order to seduce innocent Jews and other people.

So what I suggest is to learn Torah in a authentic Lithuanian yeshiva--at least part of the day, and to avoid cults with tremendous fervor. If you don't have a Litvak yeshiva in your neighborhood then at least try to start one.  That means in essence learning Talmud from 10 A.M. to 2 P.M. And the afternoon one should go to university. [That is the seder of Chaim Berlin and it was also of the Mir.] You could reverse this also and learn Torah half the day in the afternoon and evening. But it has to be authentic Torah that is straight forward Gemara Rashi and Tosphot.

Religious fervor and fanaticism can be directed towards good goals. One could for example be a fanatic about honoring one's parents. That is after all what the Talmud calls חמור שבחמורות the most important of all important mitzvot. But that is not usually on the agenda of insane, charismatic, religious leaders. The last thing they want is people to listen to their parents.

The main good thing about Breslov as a movement is it saves people from worse movements. But it has the problem that when people are on a good path it derails them.

However there are a lot of movements that are cults, but it is less obvious, because they strive for a good image.
There are some that have trans-personal powers. Some with actual powers from the Dark Side. Not one is a Torah scholar. That is none of them "know how to learn." They get called the name of respect, but they can't learn. They get these powers because the Satan gives them miracles in order to deceive people and push them off of decent paths they are already walking on.


Part of what is happening with religious fanaticism is that reason contributes to the representation of the "ding an sich" (Kant's thing in itself). That is reason is only able to reach into unconditioned realities when there is some aspect of them that is empirical. When it tries to reach into regions of unconditioned realities that have no empirical aspect then it creates anti-monies--contradictions. So this is what is happening in people's minds when they reach into these regions-- they create self contradictions  in their minds. Or maybe that is just some people. I think Yaakov Abuchatzaira and his children and Bava Sali did spend a good amount of time learning Isaac Luria and apparently held very highly from him.

Trinitarian creed

The  Trinitarian creed obligates Christians to believe x=y= z but x not does equal z. [The Father= God= Son but Father does not equal the Son.]
Christians could try to solve this with predicates, but predicates have problems. I forget who noticed this but the idea was that adjectives on God if you make them somehow  part of God they have to be onto-logically first. This makes again problems with Divine simplicity.


See Boethius in his book On the Trinity. He tries to use predicates and he does use divine substance. But Jewish people do not believe that God has any substance or form. Not even spiritual substance. Or infinitely spiritual substance. God has no substance nor form. Even what is called the Infinite light the Sefer Yetzira calls "created light." That is even the light of God is a creation.


There is also the problem of assigning Divinity to a human being.

But  I didn't think that assigning divinity to a human was much of  a problem because we find this in the Talmud in Sanhedrin with the barber that gave to Sennacherib a haircut.
And we know it means it literally because it says if not for the verse then it would be impossible to say. If it was not literal  then it would be possible to say. So it has to be literal.
 But then I mentioned why Christians were forced into this quandary. They want to absorb the Son into the Godhead so as to preserve monotheism. They don't want a fluid boundary between God and his creation. Creaton has to be ex nihilo. They don't want anything to be God except God -- the one and only simple unity. The problem you get when you have neo-Platonic things like emanation is the boundary becomes blurred. And that is characteristic of polytheism.
This provides a defense at least for how Christians were forced into an untenable position. They could also resort to Kant and thus not be worried about contradictions in unconditioned realities. When  pure reason enters into unconditioned realities it encounters self contradictions because unconditioned reality is not a place where reason can go and still be valid.
So there is a defense of Christianity. Still to me it simply makes more sense to drop the Trinity. Why makes such claims? Can't they just follow someone without making him into  a god?


The problem is than anyone that follows a certain human leader tends to get into the problem of Creation ex nihilo.They may not say so but they tend to.

The best approach I think is straightforward Monotheism. God is a simple one. He is not a composite. And he made the world something from nothing. And he is not the world and the world is not him. And no person is God or a part of God. There can be holy people whom it is good and important to follow but it is best not to assign "divinity" to them. That is I think Christians bit off more than they can chew. But I am sympathetic. I realize that for human beings to be decent takes enormous effort. If anyone less than God Himself says be decent humans will always find some reason to be animals. So when they ascribe Divinity to the Son then I say fine if that it what it takes in order to listen to his advice then so be it. [The Alter of Slobadka in the beginning of his book out kindness as the most important principle of Torah. Rabbainu Yerucham of the Mir said the same. So I figure what ever it takes to get people to be decent is good.]

I realize to some people Jewsih identity is the main thing in life and they must look afoul of what I write here in defense of Christians. And I can see their point to some degree. But I concentrate more on Torah and it is vastly more important than Jewish identity.

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My approach would be to make schools based on the Rambam (Maimonides) idea of learning the written Law [Bible] the Oral Law [the Mishne Torah of the Rambam], Physics [String Theory], Metaphysics {Plato, Aristotle, Kant.} 


This seems to me better than any other schools because within Physics is contained areas that are legitimate ways of making a living--for example Mechanical Engineering. Mechanical Engineering is really just a sub-branch of Physics that at a certain point starts veering off into it own directions.
Also learning the Rambam straight was definitely the idea of the Rambam. And he said it contains the entire Oral Law. So when he says to learn the Oral Law later in the Laws of learning Torah he is not referring to Talmud but rather to the Mishne Torah itself.  However to understand the Mishne Torah today I think it is necessary to learn it with the Chidushei HaRambam of Reb Chaim Soloveitchik and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. [Clearly one should look up the specific place in the Talmud from where the Rambam derives his law in order to get a proper idea of what he is talking about in an in depth session. But that should be separate from a session of just reading the Mishne Torah straight.] [One should find the Kapach edition of the Rambam which is based on original manuscripts of the Rambam from Yemen from the time of the Rambam.] In effect this is what Litvak yeshivas do anyway. The morning is preparation for the shiur. The shiur (class session) then is on the Tosphot and Rambam along the lines of analysis of Reb Chaim from Brisk. That means it is in effect learning the Rambam in depth.


When the Rambam says Metaphysics he says he is talking about what the ancient Greeks called Metaphysics. I would like to add that I think he is referring specifically the the 13 volume set of Aristotle called the Metaphysics.

If the idea of the Rambam about Physics and Metaphysics would be his alone I might not take his opinion so seriously. But you can see the same opinion in the חובות לבבות Duties of the Heart. In chapter 2 of שער הבחינה and the מעלות המידות from Binyamin the doctor --another Rishon.
All schools that stemmed from the geonim held from this. The anti Rambam people however did not and that is the reason why today some people are against this. But here I am only trying to present the opinion and approach of the Rambam which I think is the right approach.


There is also an important point here. It is an idea from the Talmud about learning "דרך גירסא", in the way of just saying the words. This is how I think learning should be in general because otherwise people get bogged down.
 You need to start out your learning in the morning  saying the words and going on and then you will be able to get through the entire Written and Oral Law, not just the Rambam but also the two Talmuds and all the midrashim and rishonim and all known Physics and Math,including Abstract Algebra and String Theory--and to understand them better than if you got bogged down on every detail.

In any case I think that learning by saying the words and going on is important. This refers to both Talmud and Physics and Math.

Allen Bloom also thought the Enlightenment project had reached a crisis point in the USA.

MacIntyre  advances the notion that the moral structures that emerged from the Enlightenment were philosophically doomed from the start.
I heard this also from my learning partner. I think he heard it from his father. The idea is that once the pursuit of pleasure is legitimized  then the USA is just going on the natural path that that leads to.

Allen Bloom also thought the Enlightenment project had reached a crisis point in the USA. [In catastrophe theory that would be considered a cusp in which one can jump up or fall down but can't continue in the same path because the manifold stops there. [To jump up the USA would have to return to Judeo-Christian values and get rid of the terrorists.] I can't draw a picture of this but the idea is you have a critical point which has several points where it can veer off to. And sometimes there is no path at all but because of the momentum one is forced to a jump point. Allen Bloom thought the USA had come to such a point. He did not put it in that way but if he had known catastrophe theory I think he would have.

MacIntyre went to Aristotle and  Catholicism and Thomism. That would not be my answer. But my answer would not be far away. But my focus would be Maimonides
This is not so far from MacIntyre.  

In theory I found a few difficulties with the Catholic approach that I think Aquinas did not deal with satisfactorily. Same goes with Aristotle. Besides that I saw in my parents who were Reform Jews  an amazing level of Menschlichkeit [human decency] that would indicate to me that the Jewish approach was a better alternative (with certain limitations.) 
["Reform" but with belief in the Oral and Written Law unlike official Reform doctrine. Probably Conservative would be a better description.]


I might have mentioned this before but I saw a problem in Aristotle's Metaphysics that seemed unanswerable to me. And many other thinkers seemed to have problems. I cant even begin to name them all.   Concern for the moral implications of any social theory is also important to me. And the Kant approach where moral autonomy is central makes a lot more sense to me than system where discipline is imposed on people from some outside authority. It is the most comprehensive and logically rigorous system since Aristotle. I am a bit shocked that people in the west are not aware of it while in the USSR this school of thought was well known--(if only because it was a direct attack on Communism). But at least they did not ignore it.

My approach would be to make schools based on the Rambam idea of learning the written Law [Bible] the Oral Law [the Mishne Torah of the Rambam], Physics [String Theory], MetaPhysics {Plato, Aristotle, Kant.}