In Shabat the Rambam decided like Rabbi Yehuda that מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה [work done not for its own sake] is liable. So then why is צידת נחש [capturing a snake so that it does not hurt one] allowed? Because it is פסיק רישא דלא ניחא ליה. [Something not intended but which had to happen by his action and he has no pleasure from the unintended result] (Like the Aruch.) But the obvious question is why is it דבר שאינו מתכווין (something not intended)?
I mean Reb Chaim has a point that it is only in the opinion of Rav Yehuda that it is considered a work done not for its own sake. But here we are not in the opinion of Rav Yehuda. So surely it could be something not intended, but why?
This idea I had yesterday when I was think about Tosphot and then it occurred to me today that it might apply be what Reb Chaim is trying to get at.
The idea is this we find that something not intended can be composed of lots of subsets. We find for example with find even a total accident מתעסק can be liable if there is pleasure involved. And even if one does something he know what he is doing, but makes a mistake in law thinking it is allowed, is also an accident.
And the list goes on and on.
It is for this reason I think that Tosphot (Shabat 94) wanted to confine מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה [work done not for its own sake] to a very limited set, i.e. a small and closed set. That is work done for the purpose for which it was done in the Tabernacle alone is called "work done for its own sake." Everything outside of that is not for its own sake, but it can be intended.
This type of reasoning can help us understand Chaim Soloveitchik
I want to say the reason is because the Rambam is like Tosphot in wanting to define מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה [work done not for its own sake] as a very restricted category and that everything outside of it is in category of דבר שאינו מתכווין. [That is the Rambam will not define it like Tosphot, but he still will confine it to a very restricted area.]
The question on this is that something not intended is not at all the same thing as being obligated a sin offering. So I still have to do some thinking about this way of explaining what Reb Chaim might be getting at. Until I can get this idea past my learning partner I don't want to present it as anything but ad hoc. [I would like to say there is a connection between not intended and normal sin offerings. My idea is that sin offerings need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them.E.g picking up a radish on Shabat that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to Abyee. So some knowledge is needed to be liable--but not too much. And that is what makes something an accident.]
אני רוצה להסביר תירוצו של ר' חיים הלוי על הרמב''ם בעניין דבר שאינו מתכווין ומלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה וצידת נחש. דבר שאינו מתכווין יכול לכלול הרבה דברים, למשל מתעסק במקום שיש הנאה. שם ההנאה מספיקה קצת כוונה בכדי שיהיה חייב קרבן.ו עוד יש טעות בדין או במציאות שנחשבים בכלל אינו מכווין. נראה לי שזאת הסיבה שתוספות רצו לצמצים את גדר מלאכה שצריכה לגופה להיות רק מלאכה הנעשית לצורך מה שהייתה צורכה במשכן. הסברא הזו עוזרת לנו להבין ר' חיים סולובייטשיק.בשבת הרמב''ם פסק כרבי יהודה שמלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה חייבת. ולכן למה צידת נחש מותרת?בגלל שהיא דבר שאינו מתכווין דלא ניחא ליה כשיטת הערוך. אבל למה זו דבר שאינו מתכווין? אני רוצה להגיד שהרמב''ם כמו תוספות רוצה לצמצים את הגדר של מלאכה שצריכה לגופה, וכל מה שחוץ לגדר הזה הוא דבר שאינו מתכווין.
If you look at the book of Reb Chaim you will see why this whole commentary is necessary. Without this explanation it is not clear what he means at all, nor is it not clear how his explanation of the Rambam does not contradict how the Rambam explains דבר שאינו מתכווין in chapter 1 of Laws of Shabat. I think you have to come to this commentary of mine to have the Rambam make sense.
I think I saw the Chazon Ish ask this on Reb Chaim, but I have neither his, nor Reb Chaim's book. I am writing this from memory. Nor do I have the Talmud Shabat in front of me.
Certainly, I remember my learning partner ask this on Reb Chaim. I tried to tell him the basic idea of Reb Chaim, and I remember his first question was from the way the Rambam explains a ''thing not intended.''
I mean Reb Chaim has a point that it is only in the opinion of Rav Yehuda that it is considered a work done not for its own sake. But here we are not in the opinion of Rav Yehuda. So surely it could be something not intended, but why?
This idea I had yesterday when I was think about Tosphot and then it occurred to me today that it might apply be what Reb Chaim is trying to get at.
The idea is this we find that something not intended can be composed of lots of subsets. We find for example with find even a total accident מתעסק can be liable if there is pleasure involved. And even if one does something he know what he is doing, but makes a mistake in law thinking it is allowed, is also an accident.
And the list goes on and on.
It is for this reason I think that Tosphot (Shabat 94) wanted to confine מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה [work done not for its own sake] to a very limited set, i.e. a small and closed set. That is work done for the purpose for which it was done in the Tabernacle alone is called "work done for its own sake." Everything outside of that is not for its own sake, but it can be intended.
This type of reasoning can help us understand Chaim Soloveitchik
I want to say the reason is because the Rambam is like Tosphot in wanting to define מלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה [work done not for its own sake] as a very restricted category and that everything outside of it is in category of דבר שאינו מתכווין. [That is the Rambam will not define it like Tosphot, but he still will confine it to a very restricted area.]
The question on this is that something not intended is not at all the same thing as being obligated a sin offering. So I still have to do some thinking about this way of explaining what Reb Chaim might be getting at. Until I can get this idea past my learning partner I don't want to present it as anything but ad hoc. [I would like to say there is a connection between not intended and normal sin offerings. My idea is that sin offerings need some degree of knowledge but not to actual intend them.E.g picking up a radish on Shabat that one thought was already picked but turned out to be attached to the ground is not liable, but to cut it is to Abyee. So some knowledge is needed to be liable--but not too much. And that is what makes something an accident.]
אני רוצה להסביר תירוצו של ר' חיים הלוי על הרמב''ם בעניין דבר שאינו מתכווין ומלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה וצידת נחש. דבר שאינו מתכווין יכול לכלול הרבה דברים, למשל מתעסק במקום שיש הנאה. שם ההנאה מספיקה קצת כוונה בכדי שיהיה חייב קרבן.ו עוד יש טעות בדין או במציאות שנחשבים בכלל אינו מכווין. נראה לי שזאת הסיבה שתוספות רצו לצמצים את גדר מלאכה שצריכה לגופה להיות רק מלאכה הנעשית לצורך מה שהייתה צורכה במשכן. הסברא הזו עוזרת לנו להבין ר' חיים סולובייטשיק.בשבת הרמב''ם פסק כרבי יהודה שמלאכה שאינה צריכה לגופה חייבת. ולכן למה צידת נחש מותרת?בגלל שהיא דבר שאינו מתכווין דלא ניחא ליה כשיטת הערוך. אבל למה זו דבר שאינו מתכווין? אני רוצה להגיד שהרמב''ם כמו תוספות רוצה לצמצים את הגדר של מלאכה שצריכה לגופה, וכל מה שחוץ לגדר הזה הוא דבר שאינו מתכווין.
If you look at the book of Reb Chaim you will see why this whole commentary is necessary. Without this explanation it is not clear what he means at all, nor is it not clear how his explanation of the Rambam does not contradict how the Rambam explains דבר שאינו מתכווין in chapter 1 of Laws of Shabat. I think you have to come to this commentary of mine to have the Rambam make sense.
I think I saw the Chazon Ish ask this on Reb Chaim, but I have neither his, nor Reb Chaim's book. I am writing this from memory. Nor do I have the Talmud Shabat in front of me.
Certainly, I remember my learning partner ask this on Reb Chaim. I tried to tell him the basic idea of Reb Chaim, and I remember his first question was from the way the Rambam explains a ''thing not intended.''
