Tractate Bava Metzia, page 48 side a. Tractate Avoda Zara, page 63 side a. And Tosphot and Rav Shach.

Tosphot asks what is the difference between meila and etnan? For meila we have the din in Bava Meztia money acquires [he gave money of hekdesh to a large store he transgresses meila], but for a etnan only pulling acquires. I mentioned beforehand that to the Rambam this is no question. When it comes to a gentile, money acquires, and those cases in Bava Metzia are referring to a gentile. But, Tosphot asks this, and gives an answer that is hard to understand. Rav Shach uses the idea of the Baal HaMeor in order to explain Tosphot. When it comes to meila, all we need is for the bathhouse owner or the retail store to acquire. But for the sheep to be an etnan, we need there to be the impossibility of nullifying the deal since etnan requires not just acquisition, but also that the giving of it should be final. [After the act of sex, that part of the deal cannot be nullified, but he can pay for it, and thus he can nulify the acquisition of the sheep.]]-------------------תוספות (עבודה זרה דף ס''ג)asks what is the difference between מעילה and אתנן? For מעילה we have the דין in בבא מציעא money acquires [ אם he gave money of הקדש to a retail store, he transgresses מעילה], but for a אתנן only משיכה acquires. I mentioned beforehand that to the רמב''ם ,this is no question. When it comes to a gentile, money acquires, and those cases in בבא מציעא מ''ח ע''א are referring to a gentile. But, תוספות asks this, and gives an answer that is hard to understand. רב שך uses the idea of the בעל המאור in order to explain תוספות. When it comes to מעילה, all we need is for the bathhouse owner בלןor the סיטון to acquire. But for the sheep to be an אתנן, we need there to be the impossibility of nullifying the deal since אתנן requires not just acquisition, but also that the giving of it should be final. [After the act of sex, that part of the deal cannot be nullified, but he can pay for it, and thus he can nulify the acquisition of the sheep.]---To rava in bava metzia to trangrssss meila one needs only change of domain and therefoe that braita (he gave it to a bath-hous keeper transgresses only because no need for pulling or picking up).----------------- But according to the Rambam, R Yochanan holds one needs only to derive benefit from the hekdesh in order to transgresses meila, therefore that braita is no question. Also, buying from a gentile transgresses because he derives benefit, but if he buys from a Jew without picking up the object, no sale has gone through, and so there is no benefit as the Or Sameach pointed out.------------------But according to the רמב''ם, ר' יוחנן holds one needs only to derive benefit from the הקדש in order to transgresses מעילה, therefore that ברייתא is no question. Also, buying from a gentile transgresses because he derives benefit, but if he buys from a Jew without picking up the object, no sale has gone through, and so there is no benefit as the אור שמח pointed out.

Just for background information. The Rambam decided that a gentile can acquire by means of picking up or by money. Picking up comes from the gemara in Avoda Zara page 71a where Ameimar said a gentile acquires by pulling. [This is against Rav Ashi there.] The Rambam also decided like the gemara Avoda Zara page 63 where giving a sheep to a gentile prostitute it becomes the payment of a prostitute. [The sheep is used as money to pay for the sex.] See the Gra in Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat chapter 194, Paragraph 10 in the notes of the Gra.] רק למידע רקע. הרמב''ם החליט שגוי יכול לרכוש באמצעות משיכה או על ידי מעות. דין משיכה בא מהגמרא ע''ז דף ע''א ע''א שם אמימר אמר נכרי רוכש במשיכה. [זה נגד רב אשי שם.] גם הרמב''ם הכריע כמו הגמרא עבודה זרה דף ס''ג שם נתינת כבש לזונה גויה זה הופך לתשלום לזונה. [הכבשה משמשת כסף לתשלום על המין.] ראה הגר''א שו''ע חושן משפט סימן קצ''ד בהגהות הגר''א ס''ק י'.

שמתי לב לתשובתו של האור שמח שמנסה לענות על השאלה ברמב"ם פרק ו' הלכה י' של מעילה. האור שמח רואה בצדק שהרמב"ם לעולם אינו מזכיר מעילה במונחים של שינוי רשות. הוא מביא אותה רק בנוגע להשגת תועלת מהקדש או פגיעה בערך הקדש. לכן, כאשר הרמב"ם אומר שיהודי שקונה חפץ מיהודי אחר בכסף הקדש, אך אינו אוסף [ או מושך] את החפץ, אינו מתחייב במעילה, זאת משום שרכישתו של היהודי אינה תקפה, שכן חכמים קבעו שכסף רוכש דאורייתא, אך ישנה גזירה שצריך גם למשוך את החפץ הנרכש. הבעיה עם תשובה זו היא שהיא צריכה לחול גם על מקרה שבו יהודי קונה מגוי, מה שלא קורה.[היהודי חייב הגם שלא משך.]. ולכן יש לומר שהרמב''ם תלוי במשנה (ובברייתא) שאומרים אם אדם משתמש בכסף של הקדש כדי לזכות בכניסה לבית מרחץ, עובר על מעילה. רבא אמר שזו הוכחה לריש לקיש, אבל רק בגלל איך שרב הסביר את זה. אבל ר' יוחנן יכול לומר בפשטות שברייתא היא רק דוגמה אחת לאופן שבו אפשר לעבור על מעילה. דוגמה אחת שנתן כסף של הקדש לבלן עכו''ם. עוד דוגמה, שנתן אותו לספר. עוד דוגמה שנתן אותו לספן וכו The question is why when the Jew gives money of the temple to pay a non Jew for some purchase he transgress the prohibition of using money of the Temple, but not when he gives it to a Jew.השאלה היא מדוע כאשר יהודי נותן כסף של המקדש כדי לשלם לגוי עבור קנייה כלשהי, הוא עובר על איסור השימוש בכסף הקדש, אך לא כאשר הוא נותן אותו ליהודי. אבל הוכחה להלכה שהרמב"ם כותב נמצאת בעבודה זרה דף ס''ג, שם הגמרא מבהירה שאם נותן כבש כדי לשלם עבור יחסי מין עם זונה שהיא עכו"ם, הכבש הזה הוא אתנן. משמעות הדבר היא שזה נכלל באיסור הבאת קרבן בהמה שהוא תשלום עבור זונה. משמעות הדבר היא שהכבש נרכש למעשה על ידי הזונה. אבל אם הוא נותן כבש לזונה שהיא יהודייה, היא לא רוכשת אותו אלא אם כן שהיא מביאה אותו לרשותה, שכן חכמים ביטלו רכישה בכסף ורכישה מוחזקת מתרחשת רק על ידי הרמה או משיכה של החפץ.

zb26 G Minor, a midi file zb26 a nwc file

bava metzia pg 47b to 48a.

I noticed the answer of the Or Sameach who tries to answer the question on the Rambam chapter 6 law 10 of Meila. The Or Sameach rightly sees that the Rambam never mention meila in terms of change of domain. He brings it only concerning gaining benefit of hekdesh or damaging the value of hekdeh. Thus, when the Rambam says a Jew that buys an object from another Jew with money of hekdesh, but does not pick up the object, he does not commit meila, that is because the Jew’s acquisition is not valid since the sages held that money acquires from the law of the Torah, but there is a decree that one also needs to pick up the acquired object. The problem with this answer is that it should applies as well to the case where a Jew buys from a gentile, which it does not. Therefore, you have to say that the Rambam depended on the the Mishna (and braita) that say if one uses money of hekdesh to gain entrance to a bathhouse, he transgresses meila. Rava said that is a proof to Reish Lakish, but only because of how Rav explained them. But R Yochanan can simply say that braita is just one example of how one can transgress meila. That is by using money of hekesh to pay a gentile.but a proof to the law that the Rambam writes is in avoda zara pg 63 where the gemara makes clear that if one gives a sheep to pay for sex with a zona that is a non Jew, that sheep is an etnan. That means it is included in the prohibition of bringing an animal sacrifice that is the payment of a prostitute. That means the sheep was in fact acquired by the prostitute. But if he gives a sheep to a prostitute that is a jew, she does not acquire it she brings it into her domain since the sages nullified acquisition by money and held acquisition occurs only by picking up or unless pulling of the object I noticed the answer of the אור שמח who tries to answer the question on the רמב''ם chapter ו' הלכה י' of מעילה. The אור שמח rightly sees that the רמב''ם never mention מעילה in terms of change of domain. He brings it only concerning gaining benefit of הקדש or damaging the value of הקדש. Thus, when the רמב''ם says a Jew that buys an object from another Jew with money of הקדש, but does not pick up the object, he does not commit מעילה, that is because the Jew’s acquisition is not valid since the sages held that money acquires דאורייתא, but there is a decree that one also needs to pick up the acquired object. The problem with this answer is that it should applies as well to the case where a Jew buys from a gentile, which it does not. Therefore, you have to say that the רמב''ם depended on the משנה (and ברייתא) that say if one uses money of הקדש to gain entrance to a bathhouse, he transgresses מעילה. BUT רבא said THIS is a proof to ריש לקיש, but only because of how רב explained them. But ר' יוחנן can simply say that ברייתא is just one example of how one can transgress מעילה. That is by using money of הקדש to pay a gentile. [The question is why when the Jew gives money of the temple to pay a non Jew for some purchase he transgress the prohibition of using money of the Temple, but not when he gives it to a Jew.]but a proof to the law that the Rambam writes is in עבודה זרה דף 63 where the גמרא makes clear that if one gives a sheep to pay for sex with a זונה that is a עכו''ם, that sheep is an אתנן. That means it is included in the prohibition of bringing an animal sacrifice that is the PAYMENT of a prostitute. That means the sheep was in fact acquired by the prostitute. But if he gives a sheep to a prostitute that is a jew, she does not acquire it she brings it into her domain since the sages nullified acquisition by money and held acquisition occurs only by picking up or unless pulling of the object

בבא מציעא מ''ח ע''א

ר' יוחנן אמר שעל פי דין התורה, כסף רוכש. אולם, בגלל החשש שהמוכר יאמר לקונה "החיטים שלך נשרפו בעליית הגג שלי", גזרו חכמים ש"משיכה קונה". הוא אומר שגזירת משיכה נועדה להסיר את הבעיה האפשרית של התעלמות הבעלים המקורי מהחיטים שנשרפו לאחר שהם נרכשו על ידי הקונה. הבעל המאור אומר שאם החיטים נשרפו, אז אף אחד מהם לא יכול לחזור בו מהמכירה. כל מטרת החוק הייתה להבטיח שהבעלים או הקונה יוכלו לבטל את העסקה עד משיכת החפץ. אבל אף אחד מהם לא יכול לבטל את העסקה אלא אם כן גם הכסף וגם החפץ עדיין קיימים. אני מתקשה להבין זאת. חכמים לא רצו שהמכירה תבוטל לאחר שהושלמה. רק שהם שינו את זמן השלמתה לזמן מאוחר יותר. למה לא פשוט לומר מה שיגיע מאוחר יותר משלים את המכירה, בין אם הכסף ובין אם משיכת החפץ? לכן, יש להשאיר את חוק התורה במקומו, ולומר שגם לאחר רכישה בכסף, כל אחד יכול לחזור בו מהמכירה אלא אם כן החיטים נשרפן. כמו כן, אפשר לשאול שאם החיטים נשרפו, אז הקונה בכל מקרה הפסיד, מכיוון שהוא לא יכול לחזור בו מהעסקה לפי בעל המאור (מכיוון שהחיטים נעלמו).

R Yochanan said that according to the law of the Torah money acquires. However, because of the worry that the seller might say to the buyer your wheat was burned up in my attic the sages decreed that pulling or picking up acquire. He says the decree of pulling or picking up was to remove the possible problem of the original owner ignoring the wheat being burnt up after that it has been acquired by the buyer. The Baal Hameor says that if the wheat has been burnt up then neither can renege on the sale. The whole purpose of the law was to ensure that the owner or the buyer can nullify the deal until picking up of the object. But neither can nullify the deal unless both the money and the object still exist. I am having trouble understanding this. The sages did not want the sale to be nullified after it has been completed. Only they changed the time of completion to a later time. Why not just say which ever comes later completes the sale, either the money or the piking up of the object. So, leave the law of the Torah in its place, and say that even after acquisition by money, each can renege on the sale unless the wheat has been burnt. Also, one might ask that if the wheat has been burnt up, then the buyer is anyway at a loss, since he can not renege on the deal according to the Baal Hameor at that point (since the wheat is gone).-------------------------------------ר' יוחנן said that according to the law of the Torah, money acquires.[מעות קונות] However, because of the worry that the seller might say to the buyer, "Your wheat was burned up in my attic," the sages decreed that משיכה קונה acquire. He says the decree of pulling or picking up was to remove the possible problem of the original owner ignoring the wheat being burnt up after that it has been acquired by the buyer. The בעל המאור says that if the wheat has been burnt up then neither can renege on the sale. The whole purpose of the law was to ensure that the owner or the buyer can nullify the deal until משיכהof the object. But neither can nullify the deal unless both the money and the object still exist. I am having trouble understanding this. The sages did not want the sale to be nullified after it has been completed. Only they changed the time of completion to a later time. Why not just say which ever comes later completes the sale, either the money or the piking up of the object. So, leave the law of the תורה in its place, and say that even after acquisition by money, each can renege on the sale unless the wheat has been burnt. Also, one might ask that if the wheat has been burnt up, then the buyer is anyway at a loss, since he can not renege on the deal according to the בעל המאורat that point (since the wheat is gone). ------I asked my learning partner, David Bronson, about this type of thing where a decree of the sages can can change a law of the Torah, and he opened up the Sefer Hamitzvot of the Rambam in which there is a discussion about this type of thing.