I was again by the Litvacks [that stick with the principles of the GRA] and I was looking at the ideas of Rav Nachum of the mir. So later coming back from the sea it occurred to me a few things which I had not realized beforehand. One is that there is a strong question on the raavad but also on the Rambam. in short, the issue of admission in part seems to have little relevance to the law. Let’s say one person says you gave me [as a pledge or deposit] wheat and the other says it was barley. He owes nothing. If it is a case there is also a deposit of money or anything else to which the other agrees, then it would be a case of admission in part and he would take an oath, and pay the part he admits to, and not pay the other part. But why would the Rambam write this law specifically by admission in part? It might be he had a reason to hold it there, while in another case where there is only a disagreement if he has wheat or barley, or a pledge or a deposit and one claims "I owe you wheat" and the another says "You do not owe me that, but rather barley." There maybe the Rambam would hold he is not liable. At least in terms of wheat or barley and admission in part the Raavad holds these are two separate types and he would not owe the other part nor take an oath. Furthermore, the Raavad and maybe the Rambam here seem to be going against two known principles, “Anyone who says ‘I did not borrow’ is as if he said ‘I did not repay,’” and a person is believed about himself like a hundred witnesses. According to these principles, if he says he owes barley, then the court should take him at his word even if the lender claims nothing.----------------------- I was again by the Litvacks [that stick with the principles of the GRA] and I was looking at the ideas of רב נחום of the מיר. So later coming back from the sea it occurred to me a few things which I had not realized beforehand. One is that there is a strong question on the ראב’’ד but also on the רמב’’ם. in short, the issue of admission in part seems to have little relevance to the law. Let’s say one person says you gave me [as a pledge or deposit] wheat and the other says it was barley. he owes nothing. If it is a case there is also a deposit of money or anything else to which the other agrees then it would be a case of admission in part, and he would take an oath, and pay the part he admits to and not pay the other part. \But why would the רמב’’ם write this law specifically by admission in part. It might be he had a reason to hold it there while in another case where there is only a disagreement if he has wheat or barley, or a pledge or a deposit and one claims I owe you wheat and the another says you do not owe me that but rather barley. There maybe the רמב’’ם would hold he is not liable. At least in terms of wheat or barley and admission in part the ראב’’ד holds these are two separate types and he would not owe the other part nor take an oath. Furthermore, the ראב’’ד and maybe the רמב’’ם here seem to be going against two known principles, “Anyone who says ‘I did not borrow’ is as if he said ‘I did not repay,’” and a person is believed about himself like a hundred witnesses. According to these principles, if he says he owes barley, then the court should take him at his word even if the lender claims nothing.