questions about faith and reason.

 I am surprized that Leonard Nelson' New Friesian School is ignored. For me it answers basic questions about faith and reason. And these question have bothered plenty of people way before me, I can not imagine that no one besides me cares. Christians during the Roman Empire were the first to try to find the synthesis between faith and reason. Boethius. Later Muslims began to search for the right approach. They did not conquer Constantinople but requested Greek scholars from there to teach them about Aristotle and Plato. Then Saadia Gaon, Solomon Ibn Gabirol, and Rambam.

What I figure is that some are satisfied with the ancients and mediaeval authors. But I found the answers were somehow not satisfying --not just because of David Hume, but just because the questions seemed different that needed answers. 

Ramchal (Rav Moshe Haim Luzato) author of one of the four classical Musar [ethics] books, the Mesilat Yesharim

 I have been thinking about the Ramchal (Rav Moshe Haim Luzato). He was one of the greats before the time of the Gra, and the Gra said that if he would have been alive during his lifetime, he would have walked all the way to Italy just to see him. As is well known, he wrote one of the four classical Musar [ethics] books, the Mesilat Yesharim, and lots of other books. [Some more along mystic lines, and others philosophical. All this is well known. But one thing I thought to bring out is that he had a disciple who also wrote what amounts to almost a whole encyclopedia [along the lines of the Ramchal]. I only saw it once in Netivot in the Yemani beit midrash. Apparently it was only printed once in a limited edition. I think that along with all the writings of the Ramchal would make an important addition to the learning of Musar nowadays. 

[I admit to not being able to get through the Ramchal's books except two. While at the Mir Yeshiva most of my time was in Gemara, with the basic commentaries of the  Maharsha and Pnei Yehoshua. There was only a very limited time for Musar.]

halacha/[Jewish law].Thus when religious leaders are in charge, the society they create is a nightmare

Even though halacha/[Jewish law] is important, there is the flaw that Rav Nachman [Breslov] point out. That flaw is Torah scholars that are demons. [Le.M I;12 I:28] [He bring this from the Talmud]. Thus when religious leaders are in charge, the society they create is a nightmare. But that is not a flaw in halacha but in people. For there is no system that can not be subverted. The reason is that no matter what the system is, people will find a way to mess it up.

[The English-American form of government  maximizes freedom, but is being destroyed from with-in. ]

The Importance of Land of Israel and the State of Israel

 Being in the Land of Israel is important because of the verse Deuteronomy chapter 11 verse 9 which says to do all the commandments of God in order to come to the land and when you are in the land to stay --;''...so that you shall have length of days in the land...'

And the anti Israel religious world does not have a legal leg to stand on.  Both Reb Moshe (Feinstein) and Rav Aaron Kotler said: "דינא דמלכותא דינא" the law of the land is the law which means that the State of Israel has the legal (halachic) category of a legitimate state. And the Rav of Satmer (his entire book) is based on one midrash. and midrash  has no halachic validity.

And besides that, Rav Joel of Satmer ignored the League of Nations. 

The midrash  is- "If you go up to the Land as a wall, I will allow your blood to be spilled like the deer of the field''

People did not come to Israel against the will of the nations as the Rav of Satmer had claimed, they came with the will of the nations. Herzel negotiated with the sultan as long as he was in power. The Rothchild's legitimately bought land in Israel from the Ottoman Empire at extremely inflated prices. --In today's currency, that was hundreds of million of dollars. When the empire of the Sultan fell, the League of Nations declared the land of Israel to be for the Jews.

That, at the time, meant all the land of Israel and Jordan. Then they cut it in half. They said in the later "White Paper" that only half would go to the Jews. But there was no time at which they decided that none of Israel would be for the Jews. So the thesis  of Rav Joel simply has no halachic validity. 

  

It is important to know this because the importance of Israel is not well known 

 I  see the world sleep walk into WWIII. and i can not see how anyone can win. but no one listens to me. so i think the best I or anyone can do to help save mankind from disaster is to learn Torah in depth.  But sadly, while I see that some people  learn Torah, it is mixed with the cyanide of the sitra achra [dark side] that the Gra saw is Torah of the kelipot [Torah scholars that are demons]and therefore put into herem [excommunication].

Argument between Jacob Fries and Hegel

 The main argument between Jacob Fries and Hegel is about how to get beyond Kant's iron wall between ''what's out there'' and what is ''in here''. To Fries this is by immediate knowledge which does not come through reasoning through any principles nor any senses. [This includes space and time which to Kant are synthetic a priori. ] To Hegel this is by the dialectic process of what is commonly known from Kant's phrase thesis anti thesis synthesis.

To a large degree, Kant was taken in by Hume who limited pure reason to detecting contradictions in concepts. He repeats this limitation often enough but strangely just assumes it from his experience from teaching Euclid. but that is not to say that there i no difference in types of reasoning from unpacking definitions to reasonable assumptions. 

בירושלמי בפאה פרק ב' משנה ה. רב שך על הרמב''ם מתנות עניים פרק ב' הלכה י''א Yerushalmi in Peah chap 2 Mishna 5

ideas in shas

ideas in Bava Metzia

 I was at the sea again, and it occurred to me on the way back that there is something hard to figure in the Yerushalmi in Peah chapter 2, Mishna 5. My question is this. Let us say one cuts down the whole field up until the one part of sixty (that he is supposed to leave  as peah ("corner of the field"). Then he cuts one more stalk. Then the Yerushalmi says the obligation of peah goes on the fifty nine of sixty. Why could he not still give peah from the one part of sixty (1/60 part) anyway? The reason  is supposed to be that now it is obligated in truma and maassar. But it was anyway obligated in truma and maasar!?

Could it be then that the Yerushalmi considers the measure of one part in sixty to be from the Torah?

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  There is something hard to figure out in the ירושלמי in פאה פרק ב  משנה ה. My question is this. Let us say one cuts down the whole field up until the one part of sixty (that he is supposed to leave  as פאה). Then he cuts one more stalk. Then the ירושלמי says the obligation of פאה goes on the fifty nine of sixty. Why could he not still give פאה from the one part of sixty  anyway? The reason  is supposed to be that now it is obligated in תרומה and מעשר. But it was anyway obligated in תרומה and  מעשר!? Could it be then that the ירושלמי considers the measure of one part in sixty to be דאורייתא?

בירושלמי בפאה פרק ב' משנה ה.

רב שך על הרמב''ם מתנות עניים פרק ב' הלכה י''א

יש משהו שקשה להבין בירושלמי בפאה פרק ב' משנה ה'. השאלה שלי היא כזו. נגיד אחד כורת את כל השדה עד החלק האחד משישים (שהוא אמור לעזוב כפאה). ואז הוא חותך עוד גבעול אחד. ואז הירושלמי אומר שחובת פאה הולכת על החמישים ותשע מתוך שישים. למה בכל זאת הוא לא יכול לתת פאה מהחלק האחד משישים? הסיבה אמורה להיות שעכשיו זה חייב בתרומה ובמעשר. אבל ממילא היה חייב בתרומה ובמעשר.האם יכול להיות אם כן שהירושלמי מחשיב את המידה של חלק אחד משישים דאורייתא