I had two things I wanted to bring here, one about the issue of a public domain on Sabbath (one must not carry anything in a public domain onthe Sabbath) and the other about the famous question on the Rambam about when one forgets the whole 39 types of forbidden work on the sabbath, and has to bring 39 sin offerings, in what way does he remember Sabbath? {If he forgot Shabat completely then he brings only one sin offering. To bring 39, he needs to have remembered Shabat but forgot the 39.} In terms of the first thing I really have little to add except to bring the proof of the Gra that one does not need 600,000 to be a public domain. His proof is from Brachot page 58. Ula said we poskin [the law is known] that there is no multitude in Babylon. And we learn in a braita that a multitude is not less than 600,000.and the gemara in eruvin page 6 side b :Ula said, The ally ways of Mechuza (a city in Babylonia) would be a public domain if not for the fact that they close the gates at night. However, the Rosh Rashi and tosphot might be depending on the Gemaraa that says the public domain has to be like the flags of the desert. andin the flags of the desert where there were 600,000. The other issue is this. R. Yochanan said accidental karet but doing the work on purpose is liable a sin offering. And we poskin that way. But everyone how can one do all 39 and still be liable? surely it cannot be a case of his knowing the punishment but not the prohibition. I answer that that is exactly what the Rambam holds. It is just like the sacrifice of the Passover offering. If one does not bring it, he is liable karet, but there is no prohibition not to bring it. There is only a positive command (i.e.., the command to bring a Passover offering). Even so, if he does not bring it, he is liable karet. So, in terms of Sabbath, there is a positive command to remember Sabbath. So, even if he forgets all 39 types of work, but knows the punishment of karet that comes because of ignoring the positive command, he is liable a sin offering. That is a case where he forgot that all 39 types of work are prohibited but remembers that there is a positive command to rest from each one of them and if not doing so the punishment is karet.-------karet refers dying young before 50 years old according to one opinion in the Gemara

Why knowledge has to be of independent things, things independent of the mind according to H.A. Prichard? The answer: According to the philosopher H.A. Prichard, knowledge requires the object to be entirely mind-independent because the mind's state affects the nature of its presentations. If the object of knowledge were influenced by the mind, it would not be truly known but would instead be a product of the mind's modification, similar to an appearance or an illusion rather than a thing-in-itself. Therefore, for something to be known, it must be something that the mind does not alter in any way; its object must be wholly external to the mind. I think that Quantum Mechanics does not change this fact because if you do the two-slit experiment, the result does not change according to how you think. If you open one slit, the light beam acts as individual photons. If you open two slits, the light beam acts as waves and there is constructive and destructive interference. This goes against German Idealism and Kant in particular. I appreciate Kant an and Friesian school very much that built that system based on the limits of reason, but I think to make knowledge something that affects what it knows means that it knows nothing. I would like to mention here that when Physics says that a nature of light depends on how it is observed does not mean that it is subjective, but rather it means how it is measured.------I asked Dr. Kelley Ross about this.[Dr. Ross is a main representative of the Friesian School who holds knowledge has to be filtered through structures in the Mind.] His answer is: But I'm not sure what anyone means when they say that something is known by "reason." This cannot mean known by means of deduction or rational inference, because that relies on pemises. To Aristotle, premises that are first principles are not known by "reason" (logos) but by "mind" (nous). This means they are self-evident. I don't see how anyone has ever improved on that, except to falsify the self-evidence of such principles, which the Rationalists unintentionally accomplished.----Plato's equivalent are not self-evident. We are not even initially aware of them. Fries and Nelson say they are known by "reason," but, again, I'm not sure what this even means, except that they asume that it comes from a "faculty" of "reason," whose nature is speculative. Otherise, the theory of "non-intuitive" knowledge is the functional equivalent of Platonic Recollection. For Plato, phenomenal objects "participate" in the Forms, without any explanation of how that works.-------- With Fries, we can say that the Forms are in the objects, but non-intuitively. The Forms are Kantian things-in-themselves, but things-in-themselves are, as it says, in themselves. As Paul says: Through a glass darkly. We might say Kant has a version of this: The synthesis of the categories that produces phenomena, also introduces the Moral Law, which is all that is left for Kant of Plato's Forms. Kant says we know the Moral Law through "reason," but this suffers from the same difficulties as any other reference to "reason," and Kant's "reason" in particular underdetermines all the moral content that Kant wants to get out of it.----- That is the end of the reply of Dr. Ross. I might add here that causality to Kant is a priori (as shown by Hume)-and so even physical observation of an object requires an a priori assumption-i.e the assumption that something is causing me to see the object. The knowledge itself that I am seeing something is not contained in the light rays.-- I would also like to add that Dr Ross points out that no one has a better answer about the nature of reason--it is a simple that has a function, but we do not know what its essense is. --------------------------- [The difference between the approach of Kant and Fries and the approach of G.E. Moore and Prichard is important even though they are close as noted by philosophers in the 1800's who were aware of Jacob Fries and yet were edging towards the approaches that became the analytic schools of Russel and GE Moore.] Robert Hanna deals with the problems of Analytic Philosophy and holds that Kant addresses all the same issues in a better way.]---------I might mention here that I think Kant thought that we know concepts, or we are aware of concepts in the mind. But Prichard add GE Moore held we are aware of things outside the mind, not just concepts in the mind. The problem that Kant would have seen with this is that things outside the mind like colour cause the mind to see colour. But causality is not known empirically. And also, it might be argued that not everything has a cause. But I think even random events in Quantum Mechanics do have a cause--the cause is that the law that the atom should emit particles randomly.

za100 B Minor midi file za100 B Minor nwc file [most files that start with a letter go from 1 to 100]some were put on the internet]

za99 C Minor midi file za99 C Minor nwc file

בבא קמא דף כ''ט ע''א. אביי אמר ר' מאיר ור' יהודה חלוקים בשני דברים. בזמן מעידה, ר' מאיר מחזיק נתקל פושע, ור' יהודה מחזיק נתקל לאו פושע. לאחר הנפילה, ר' מאיר מחזיק מפקיר נזקיו אינו פוטר אותו מאחריות, ור' יהודה מחזיק שהוא פטור. אבל מה הוא מייאש החפץ באמצע נפילה? גם אם נתקל פושע, מה אם יש מקרה של נפילה של אונס כמו רוח חזקה לא רגילה. או מה אם יש נפילה על ידי אונס, והוא לא מייאש את החפץ? היה נדמה לי בתחלה שיכול להיות מקרה שהנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס, ובכל זאת הוא לא מפקיר נזקיו, ואולי זו נושא המחלוקת? כמו כן, אולי היה אפשר לחשוב במקרה של נפילה ברשלנות, ולמרות זאת הוא מפקיר את הנזק מיד,ואלי זו נושא המחלוקת? אבל ראיתי את בית יוסף [בשלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, דין ד', ובהגהות הגר''א הערה ח'.] שאף אחד מאלה אינו המחלוקת. אז אני חושב שהמחלוקת היא שמכיוון שלר' מאיר ,נתקל פושע, אז אפילו מפקיר נזקיו לאחר הנפילה לא משחרר אותו מחובת תשלום פיצויים. אבל לר' יהודה, מכיוון שהמעידה היא על ידי אונס, אז מפקיר נזקיו לאחר הנפילה לא יהיה חייב. כמו כן הבנתי שלר' מאיר, אפילו במקרה של נפילה שהייתה על ידי אונס, למשל רוח חריגה באה והפילה דברים מן הגג, ואז הוא נטש את הדברים, הוא עדיין יהיה אחראי עד שהוא יסיר את החפצים מרשות הרבים. אני יכול להזכיר כאן שרצף מחשבות זה עלה לי לאחר שראיתי את התפרת שמואל [המודפסת בגמרא] והוא אומר שלר' יהודה לנטוש את החפץ שנופל ברשלנות לא יפטור אותו מאחריות. לאחר מכן ראיתי זאת נאמר בגלוי בשלחן ערוך ובגר"א באותו דין. אז חשבתי שאולי הוויכוח הוא כאשר הנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס והוא לא נטש את החפץ, אבל השלחן ערוך (גם שם) אומר שהוא אחראי. (כלומר, שר' יהודה סבור שהוא אחראי, והחוק הוא כמו שר' יהודה.) אז, חשבתי שאולי המחולקת נמצאת במקרה שבו אפילו ר' מאיר מסכים שזו נפילה על ידי אונס כמו רוח חזקה יוצאת דופן והוא לא נטש את החפץ. ראיתי גם שם שהשלחן ערוך אומר שהוא אחראי. אז, המקום היחיד שבו אפשר שתהיה שם המחלוקת הוא אחרי נפילה על ידי אונס, והוא אכן נטש את החפץ. ר' מאיר אומר שהוא עדיין אחראי להסירו למרות שהוא הפקיר אותו, ור' יהודה אומר שאין אחריות מכיוון שיש גם שהנפילה הייתה על ידי אונס וגם שהוא אכן נטש את החפץ

Bava Kama page 29a. The argument between the Maharsha and almost all other achronim about the approach of Tosphot in Bava Kama page 29

Bava Kama page 29a. Abaye said R. Meir and R. Judah disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, R. Meir holds tripping is by negligence, and R. Judah holds it is by accident. After the fall, R. Meir holds abandoning the object does not absolve him from liability, and R. Judah holds it does. But what if he abandons the object in the middle of a fall? Even if tripping is by negligence, what if there is case of a fall by accident like a strong wind (that is unexpected and it blows things off the roof that damaage things on the ground)? Or --what if there is a fall by accident, and he does not abandon the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon his property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence, and yet he abandoned the property immediately. But I saw the Beit Yoseph [in Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat chapter 412, law 4, and in the note of the Gra, note 8.] that neither of these are possible. {Not like the Maharsha}. So, I think the argument is that since to R. Meir, tripping is by negligence, then even abandoning the property after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to R. Judah since the tripping is by accident, then abandoning the property after the fall would not be liable. Also, I realized that to R. Meir even a case of a fall that was by accident e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked the things down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the public domain. I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the Tiferet Shmuel [printed in the back of the Gemara], and he says that to R. Judah to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that, I saw this stated openly in the Shulchan Aruch and the Gra on that halacha. I then thought: perhaps the argument is when the fall was by accident, and yet he did not abandon the object? but the Shulchan Aruch (there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the disagreement is in a case where even R. Meir agrees it is a fall by accident (like a strong unusual wind), and he did not abandon the object, but then I saw there too the Shulchan Aruch says he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by accident, and he did abandon the object. R. Meir says he still is liable to remove it even though he abandoned it, and R Judah says there he is not liable since you have both that the fall was by accident and he did abandon the object. ---------------------------------------------------------------------בבא קמא page 29. אביי said ר’ מאיר and ר’ יהודה disagree about two things. At the time of tripping, ר’ מאיר holds נתקל פושע, and ר’ יהודה holds it is by אונס. After the fall, ר’ מאיר holds מפקיר the object does not absolve him from liability, and ר’ יהודה holds it does. But what is he מיאש the object in the middle of a fall? Even if נתקל פושע, what if there is case of a fall by אונס like a strong wind. Or what if there is a fall by אונס and he does not מיאש the object? It seems to me that one might have thought it could be in a case where the fall was by אונס, and yet he did not מפקירhis property. Also, one might have thought it would be in a case of a fall by negligence and yet he הפקיר the property immediately. But I saw the בית יוסף [in שלחן ערוך, חושן משפט תי''ב, law ד', and in the note of the גר''א note ח'.] that neither of these are possible. So, I think the argument is that since to ר’ מאיר ,נתקל פושע then even מפקיר נזקיו after the fall does not release him from obligation to pay for damages. But to ר' יהודה since the tripping is by ,אונס then מפקיר נזקיו after the fall would not be חייב. Also I realized that to ר’ מאיר even a case of a fall that was by אונס e.g. a unusual wind came and knocked things מן הגג down, and then he abandoned the things, he still would be liable until he removes the objects from the רשות הרים I might mention here that this train of thought came to me after I looked at the תפארת שמואל [printed in the back of the גמרא ] and he says that to ר’ יהודה to abandon the object that is falling by negligence would not absolve him from responsibility. After that I saw this stated openly in the שלחן ערוךand the Gra on that דין. I then thought perhaps the argument is when the fall was by אונס and yet he did not abandon the object, but the שלחן ערוך(there also) says he is liable. (That means that R. Judah holds he is liable since the law is like R. Judah. So, I though perhaps the מחלוקת is in a case where even ר’ מאיר agrees it is a fall by אונס like a strong unusual wind and he did not abandon the object by then I saw there too the שלחן ערוךsays he is liable. So, the only place an argument is possible is after a fall by אונס and he did abandon the object. ר’ מאיר says he still is liable to remove it even though he הפקיר it and ר’ יהודה says there is not liable since you have both that the fall was by אונס and he did abandon the object.

Bava Mezia 96.

A borrower of an object or animal is liable more than a paid guard because all the benefit goes to him. The Gemara in Bava Mezia 96 side a has a case where there are two borrowers of an animal, and yet the owner was with only one of the borrowers. [When the owner of the animal is with a borrower at the time the deal was agreed upon, and the animal dies, the borrower is not liable.] So, if the animal dies, then the only borrower who could be liable for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the Ramban and the Ran this might be a source for the law of the Rambam that when there are two borrowers of money on one document each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole loan just like in the case of guarantors] thus the Ramban comes to tell us the Rambam learned this from the case of the borrowers on page 96. Rav Shach (lender and borrower chapter 25, halacha 10) asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the borrowers of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other borrowers and so the first borrowers can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other borrower. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the borrowers of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each borrower is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “all the more so”. If the one borrower of the animal is liable only for his half, all the more so a borrower money is responsible only for his half even f both are signed on the loan.-------------------------------------------A שואל of an object is liable more than a שומר שכר because all theכל הנאה שלו . The גמרא in בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א has a case where there are two שואלים of an animalת and yet the owner was with only one of the שואלים. So, if the animal dies, then the only שואל who could be חייב for his half is the one that was alone without the owner. To the רמב''ן and the ר''ן this might be a source for the law of the רמב''ם that when there are two לווים of money on one שטר, each one is liable only for half. The question is perhaps each should be liable for the whole הלוואה just like in the case of guarantors]. Thus, the רמב''ן comes to tell us the רמב''ם learned this from the case of the borrowers on page צ''ו. ON THIS רב שך asks that this does not seem to be a good proof since the שואלים of the animal must be liable only for one part. The reason is that the other part of the animal was loaned to the other שואל and so the first שואל can not be liable for the other half because the benefit of that half did not go to him, but rather went to the other שואל. While לווים of כסף might be liable for the whole amount. Why should we learn from שואלים of an animal to לווים of money? There is a specific reason the שואל of the animal can only be חייב for his half. My tentative answer for this is that the in the case of the שואלים of the animal, the animal is one whole piece thus is not divided, and yet we still say each שואל is responsible only for his own half. But with borrowing money, there is no reason not to consider the whole amount as dividable. So, we have a “קו וחומר”. If the one שואל of the animal is חייב only for his half, all the more so a לווה OF money is responsible only for his half even If both are signed on the loan.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------- עיין ברב שך מלוה ולווה כ''ה ה''י. שואל של חפץ אחראי יותר משומר שכר כי כל ההנאה שלו. לגמרא בבא מציעא צ''ו ע''א יש מקרה שיש שני שואלים של בהמה, ובכל זאת הבעלים היה רק עם אחד מהשואלים. (כאשר בעל הבהמה נמצא עם שואל בזמן סיום העסקה, והבהמה מתה, השואל אינו חייב.) אז אם בהמה מתה, אז השואל היחיד שיכול להיות חייב על החצי שלו הוא זה שהיה לבד בלי הבעלים. לרמב''ן ולר''ן זה יכול להיות מקור לדין הרמב''ם שכאשר יש שני לווים של כסף על שטר אחד, כל אחד חייב רק בחצי. השאלה היא שאולי כל אחד צריך להיות אחראי לכל הלוואה בדיוק כמו במקרה של ערבים]. לפיכך, הרמב"ן בא לומר לנו שהרמב"ם למד זאת ממקרה השואלים בעמוד צ"ו. על כך שואל רב שך שזו לא נראית כהוכחה טובה מכיוון שהשואלים של הבהמה חייבים להיות אחראים רק לחלק אחד (כל אחד רק חצי). הסיבה לכך היא שהחלק השני של הבהמה הושאל לשואל השני, ולכן השואל הראשון אינו יכול להיות אחראי למחצית השנייה מכיוון שההנאה של מחצית זו לא הלכה אליו, אלא הלכה לשואל השני. בעוד שלווים של כסף יכולים להיות אחראים לכל הסכום. מדוע עלינו ללמוד משואלים של בהמה ללווים של כסף? יש סיבה ספציפית לכך שהשואל של הבהמה יכול להיות חייב רק למחציתו. התשובה הזמנית שלי לכך היא שבמקרה של השואלים של הבהמה, הבהמה היא חלק אחד שלם, ולכן אינה מחולקת, ובכל זאת אנו עדיין אומרים שכל שואל אחראי רק על מחציתו. אבל כשמדובר בהלוואת כסף, אין סיבה לא להתייחס לכל הסכום כמתחלק. לכן, יש לנו "קו וחומר". אם השואל האחד של הבהמה חייב רק על מחציתו, קל וחומר שלווה של כסף אחראית רק על מחציתו גם אם שניהם חתומים על ההלוואה