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גיטין ס''ז ע''ב. המשנה אומרת, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'תנו גט לאשתי' או לשלושה אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם כותבים אותו ונותנים אותו. אבל הם לא יכולים להגיד לאף אחד אחר לעשות זאת. אבל אם אמר לשלושה אנשים פשוט "תנו גט לאשתי", אז לפי ר' מאיר הם יכולים להגיד לסופר לכתוב אותו ולעדים לחתום עליו והם נותנים אותו לאשתו. ר' יוסי חולק על כך ואומר שגם במצב האחרון הם חייבים לכתוב ולתת אותו בעצמם. שמואל אמר, "אם אומר אדם לשני אנשים 'כתובו ותנו גט לאשתי', הם צריכים לעשות זאת בעצמם. אם יאמרו לסופר לכתוב והם חתמו, הגט אינו תקף, אולם נושא זה עדיין דורש לימוד." הגמרא שואלת על משפט זה של שמואל. היא שואלת מדוע זה דורש לימוד? אולי משום שהוא יכול לחשוב שיש אפשרות שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. השאלה שיש לי על גמרא זו היא זו. הדעה שניתן למסור מילים לשליח היא ר' מאיר והוא מסכים במשנה שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים לתת גט לאשתו, עליהם לעשות זאת בעצמם. (ואף על פי שמקרה של שמואל שונה מהמשנה, כי במקרה של שמואל הוא אמר "כתובו ותנו" בעוד שבמשנה הוא אמר רק "תנו", עדיין זה מחמיר את השאלה שלי, כי הוספת המילה "כתובו" אנו רואים במשנה שזה אפילו מחמיר יותר מאשר אם הוא רק אמר לתת. אם הוא גם אמר כתובו לשלשה, אז ר' מאיר מסכים שהם חייבים לכתוב את הגט בעצמם.) אז אפילו אם שמואל יכול להסכים עם ר' מאיר, עדיין לא אמור להיות ספק לגבי ההלכה. תשובה אפשרית לשאלה זו היא שאולי בנקודה זו הגמרא חושבת שר' מאיר עצמו יכול לחלוק אפילו על תחילת המשנה, לא רק בבא שנייה

Gitin 67b The Mishna says if one says to two people give a get to my wife or to three people write and give a get to my wife they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a get to his wife then according to r Meir they can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. R Jose disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. Shmuel said if one says to two people write and give get to my wife they have to do it themselves. if they tell a scribe to write and they signed, it is not valid however this subject still requires study. The Gemara ask on this statement of Shmuel. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this gemara is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is R Meir and he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give get to his wife that they must do it themselves.(And even though the case of Shmuel is different from the Mishna because in the case of Shmuel he said “write and give” while in the Mishna he said only “give” still this makes my question even stronger because adding the words "write" we see in the Mishna that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also saidto three "write" , then R Meir agrees they must write it themselves.) So even if Shmuel might hold with R Meir there still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to thsi question is that perhaps at this point the gemara is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.---------------------------------------------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''ב The משנה says, "If one says to two people 'give a גט to my wife' or to three people, 'write and give a גט to my wife' they write it and give it. But they can not tell anyone else to do so. But if he said to three people just give a גט to his wife then according to ר’ מאירthey can tell a scribe to write it and to witnesses to sign it and they give it to his wife. ר' יוסי disagrees with this and says even in this last situation they must write and give it themselves. שמואל said, "If one says to two people write and give גט to my wife they have to do it themselves. If they tell a scribe tp write and they signed, it is not valid, however this subject still requires study." The גמרא ask on this statement of שמואל. It asks why does this need study? Perhaps because he might think that there is a possibility that words can be handed over to a messenger. The question I have on this גמרא is this. The opinion that words can be handed to messenger is ר’ מאירand he agrees in the Mishna that if one says to two people to give גט to his wife that they must do it themselves. [(And even though the case ofשמואל is different from the משנה because in the case of שמואל he said “write and give” while in the משנה he said to three only “give” tstill this makes my question even stronger because adding the word "write" we see in the משנה that that is even stricter that if he just said to give. If he also said to three "write" then ר' מאיר agrees they must write it themselves.)] So even if שמואל might hold with ר’ מאירthere still should be no doubt and the law. A possible answer to this question is that perhaps at this point the גמרא is thinking that R. Meir himself might disagree with even the beginning of the Mishna.

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There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. Essay by Michael Huemer

3. Inclinations to Believe 3.1. Types of Inclination There are different ways in which, or reasons for which, you might be inclined to believe X. You might be inclined to believe X because X just seems to be true. Or you might be inclined to believe X because X is emotionally comforting. Or because you think good people believe X. Or because your social group believes X. Notice how the last three are quite different from believing something because it seems correct. So here’s a theory: Unjustified beliefs result when non-appearance-based inclinations influence our credences or outright beliefs. Only appearances are (epistemically) justification-conferring. 3.2. Can We Control our Beliefs? Some philosophers would question whether we can control our beliefs and whether we can believe something on the basis of ordinary (non-epistemic) desires, such as the desire for emotional comfort, or to fit in, or to be a good person. Examples: If I offered you a million dollars to sincerely believe that you are a giraffe, I bet you still couldn’t do it. But maybe this only shows that you can’t believe for practical reasons when you have conclusive evidence that the proposition is false. So consider … If I offered you a million dollars to believe that the number of atoms in the universe is even, I bet you couldn’t do it. In #2, the evidence is evenly balanced; thus, if non-epistemic desires can ever influence belief, they should be able to do so in that example, right? It looks like they can’t, so desires can’t influence beliefs. 3.3. Doxastic Semi-voluntarism Consider two extreme positions: Doxastic Involuntarism: Desires can never have any influence on any beliefs. (Strong) Doxastic Voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs just as easily as they influence ordinary actions. Neither of these is the case. What is correct is Doxastic Semi-voluntarism: Desires can influence beliefs sometimes, but their influence is limited. One cannot believe a thing that is too obviously false, or too obviously unjustified. There is a limit to how epistemically irrational a person can be, even if they want to (this limit varies across people). Thus, you can’t believe you are a giraffe, no matter the reward, because that’s obviously false. Nor can you believe the number of atoms is even, because that is obviously unjustified. But suppose that your child is accused of a heinous crime (say, deadnaming Caitlin Jenner). If the evidence is complex and hard to evaluate, so that it is not too obvious what the right judgment is, then it becomes much easier for your love for your child and desire to believe that she is good to influence your judgment, causing you to believe the child innocent even when the evidence does not justify this. There will be some degree of evidence that would induce you to admit that your child had committed the heinous act, but the evidentiary threshold will just be much higher than it would be for an impartial observer. Everyone knows that things like this can happen; that is why defendants’ family members are not allowed to sit on juries. If you try talking to a political ideologue some time and giving them evidence against their beliefs, you’ll probably become convinced that the same thing is happening to them. So the first thing that enables people to adopt unjustified beliefs is evidential ambiguity. There should be mixed evidence, evidence pointing in different directions, and it should be unclear how to weigh the evidence, perhaps because the evidence for and against X is of different kinds. 3.4. Confusing Feelings with Appearances In some cases, people may confuse their emotions with appearances. When you hear a claim that you don’t like, you may have an aversive reaction, which includes a sense of the clash between that claim and others of your current attitudes. E.g., you hear a negative claim about someone you like, or a positive one about someone you dislike. You might confuse that feeling with an appearance that the claim is factually wrong. Likewise, it is possible to confuse a positive feeling, a feeling of fit with your other current attitudes, with an appearance that a claim is correct. This, in turn, partially disguises the fact that your desired belief is unjustified; it makes this sufficiently unobvious that it becomes possible to adopt the belief. 4. Corruption of Belief-Forming Practices You’re obligated, before forming a belief on a controversial issue, to conduct a responsible inquiry. This typically requires things like: listening to both sides (or multiple sides), looking for counter-evidence, and trying to find objections to arguments that you are initially attracted to. Most people are terrible at this. They only listen to news sources who they already know agree with their political orientation; they accept evidence supporting their favored view at face value, while carefully scrutinizing only the evidence that undermines their favored view (if they happen to accidentally run into some); they don’t think about objections to their views but focus their attention on reasons for their views. This violation of epistemic norms stops many beliefs from being justified (the 3rd kind of irrationality mentioned in sec. 2). Why do people do these things? Again, doxastic semi-voluntarism is important. If involuntarism were true (so that only epistemic reasons could influence beliefs and not desires), then these measures would be impotent. E.g., you could still deliberately select news sources that already agree with you, but then your credences would automatically update on the fact that you did that, and that there were many other news sources that would very likely have given you evidence against your favored view, and that would prevent you from adopting a high credence in your favored view. On the other hand, if strong voluntarism were true (so that we could form beliefs based on our desires just as easily as we take actions based on our desires), then there would be no need for these measures. You would just directly believe X based on your desire to believe it, with no need to select evidence sources, direct your attention away from objections, etc. We do these things because our desires have some power to affect our beliefs, but only when it’s not too clear what epistemic rationality demands. 5. Conclusion Actually, it’s not hard to be irrational. Everybody has non-epistemic belief preferences—desires to believe something for reasons unrelated to truth or evidential justification. These have a limited, direct influence on our beliefs, which is most important when the evidence is ambiguous and when our feelings about a proposition can be confused with appearances. Desires can also directly influence how we conduct inquiry, enabling us to take advantage of our predictable cognitive shortcomings, such as the tendency to under-adjust for biases in our evidence sources. The beliefs that we form after such an inquiry are unjustified due to failure to satisfy obligations of responsible inquiry. This is bad because unjustified beliefs are more likely to be false, and false beliefs can wreak havoc. E.g., false political beliefs prevent us from solving social problems, and often make the problems worse. The mechanisms for generating unjustified beliefs will operate more or less automatically unless you make specific, positive efforts to stop them—which you should do to be a good person. That is why the points developed above are important to know. [After the above essay I might mention here that Michael Huemer is with the school of thought of the intuitionists which is different from the Kant Fries school and also different from Hegel. As for me I see value in all three schools and see each as relating to a different stratum of level of reality phenomenal world, the rational world and the world beyond reason the dinge an sich. All this along the lines of Plotinus the philosopher who was mainly with Plato but used modifications from Aristotle]

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות בראש הדף

גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות ראשון. עלה בדעתי בזמן שהייתי על שפת הים שתוספות מסתמכת על אחת משתי הדעות בגמרא לגבי מה שאדם יכול להתכוון כשאומר לכתוב גט (מסמך גירושין) ולתת אותו לאשתו. האם הוא מתכוון רק שעליהם לחתום, או שעליהם לכתוב אותו ולחתום עליו? בלי ההנחה ש"לכתוב אותו" פירושו רק שעליהם לחתום עליו, תוספות לא תהיה הגיונית. כדי להסביר למה אני מתכוון, הרשו לי להביא את התוספות. הוא שואל זאת. ר' מאיר סבור שניתן למסור מילים לשליח. מילי ממסרן לשליח. לכן הוא יכול לומר לשני אנשים לומר לשני אנשים אחרים לכתוב ולתת גט לאשתו. אבל אנחנו יודעים מר' ירמיה שאם זה החוק, אז הסופר לא יכול לחתום על הגט. אבל אם כן, יש שאלה. המשנה אומרת בגלוי שר' מאיר מסכים שאם אדם אומר לשני אנשים "כתוב ותן גט לאשתי", הם כותבים ונותנים אותו. מכיוון שיש רק שני אנשים במצב הזה, לכן, אחד מהם שכותב את זה גם חותם. התשובה של תוספת היא שהמשנה בעצם אומרת שהם חותמים על זה, וסופר כותב את זה. הבעיה עם תשובה זו היא שאנחנו מתחילים עם הגישה ש"אומר אמרו" אינה תקפה כלל. הסיבה היא שאם זה יהיה תקף, אז לא יכול להיות שחתימת הסופר על הגט (מסמך הגירושין) תהיה בסדר. כלומר, "הוא אומר לומר לאחרים" ("אומר אמרו") אינה תקפה מהתורה דאורייתא. לאחר מכן אנו עונים על סמך שינוי המשמעות הפשוטה של ​​המשנה בגלל גזירה שלא מוזכרת בשום מקום במשנה, ואנו משנים את ההנחה המקורית שלנו ש"הוא אומר, 'אמור'" מלהיות לא תקפה מהתורה לתקפה על סמך ראיות קלושות. ההסבר של תוספת צריך להיות כמו הגישה הזו בדף גמרא ס''ו ע''ב, שלכתוב את הגט פירושו רק לחתום עליו. אבל עם הדעה השנייה שזה מכווין לכתוב ולחתום, אז לתוספת לא תהיה תשובה לשאלתו

Gitin 67 side a Tosphot. it occurred to me while at the sea shore that Tosphot is relying on one of the two opinions in the Gemara about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it Tosphot would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the Tosphot. he asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger. thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. but we know from R. Jeremiah that if that is the law then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The Mishna says openly that "R Meir holds if one says to two people 'write and give a get to my wife' they write and give it." Since there are only two people in this case. Therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of Tosphot is the Mishna really means they sign it, and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say he says say is not valid from the Torah. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the Mishna because of a gezera (decree) that is nowhere mentioned in and Mishna, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of Tosphot has to be like that one approach in the Gemara page 66b that to write the get only means to sign it. but with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then Tosphot would not have an answer for his question.--------------------------------גיטין ס''ז ע''א תוספות. It occurred to me while at the sea shore that תוספות is relying on one of the two opinions in the גמרא about what one might mean when he says write a get (document of divorce) and give it to my wife. Does he mean only that they should sign, or that they should write it and sign it. Without the assumption that “write it” means only that they should sign it תוספות would not make sense. To explain what I mean, let me bring the תוספות. He asks this. R Meir holds words can be handed to a messenger.מילי מימסרן לשליח Thus, he can tell two people to write and give a get to my wife. But we know from ר ' ירמיה that if that is the law, then the scribe can not sign on the get. But if so, there is a question. The משנה says openly that ר' מאיר מסכיםנ if one says to two people write and give a get to my wife, they write and give it. Since there are only two people in this case, therefore, one of them who writes it also signs it. The answer of תוספות is the משנה really means they sign it and a scribe writes it. The problem with this answer is that we start out with the approach that ''he says to say'' is not valid at all. The reason is if it would be valid, then it can not be that the signature of the scribe on the get (document of divorce) is okay. That is to say "he says, 'say'" is not valid from the תורה דאורייתא. Then we answer based on changing the simple meaning of the משנה because of a גזירה that is nowhere mentioned in the משנה, and we change our original assumption that that “he says, ‘say’” from being not valid from the Torah to being valid based on flimsy evidence. The explanation of תוספות has to be like that one approach in the גמרא page ס''ו ע''ב that to write the get only means to sign it. But with the opinion that it means to write and sign, then תוספות would not have an answer for his question.