Are men and women really of light and good will and love?

Are men and women really  of light and good will and love?

This does not seem to be so according to the Torah. The Torah states that God wanted to destroy all human beings because "their thoughts are only evil all day." [מחשבות לבו רק רע כל היום] Then he brought the flood. And that did not change anything. So then He decided not to destroy mankind because "their thoughts are only evil,"  so why bother?  What' the use anyway? Why take the trouble? Let them tear each other to pieces. Who could care less?
Rousseau disagrees with this and John Locke also.

 Rousseau paints a picture of someone sitting by the rill of a stream,  away from the corrupt sophistication of
the cities, listening to the whistling of the wind in the reeds and to
the peaceful grazing of cows, and therefore able to get himself into
a state of moral tranquility. This picture is pure fantasy. It is not valid. 

Nature is a world in which every animal rips every other animal to pieces. I would go to the mikveh in a river frozen in the winter and almost every day I saw the remains of birds that had sat down to rest in the cold with no heat or food, and some other animal sneaked  up on them and torn them to pieces.  
The Jewish religious world likes to capitalize on this view of Russeou, painting themselves as people of light and good will, the protector from the forces of evil, the secular Jews and the gentiles.
 Nature is a world in which there is nothing but bloodshed; fearful struggle goes on between various races of animals, even between those of plants. In fact, nature is one enormous slaughterhouse.
A power of violence is permeates everything. Each species  of animal  devours the others. Over all these numerous races of animals man is placed, and his destructive hand spares nothing that lives. He kills to obtain food and he kills to clothe himself. He kills to adorn himself, he kills in order to attack, and he kills in order to defend himself. He kills to instruct himself and he kills to amuse himself. He kills for fun and he kills in anger. He kills to kill. 
 The whole earth, perpetually steeped in blood, is nothing but a vast altar, upon which all that is living must be sacrificed without end, without measure, without pause, until the consummation of things, until evil is extinct, until the death of death.
The earth calls for blood. The whole of the world is filled with
slaughter and the sounds of slaughter. Dark and irrational
forces move men, and  to treat them as if they were creatures
of light, to treat them as if they were rational or benevolent, is
simply an empirical error. Anyone who does so  leads men to their doom.  Anyone who pretends to be a being of light and good will is most certainly leading men to their doom. 

So what is my solution? People that see religious communities as the answer have never lived under the rule of religiosity and pseudo righteousness. Even in religious groups in Israel, things are better because of the secular government which limits the tyranny the religious want, but can not have.

(1) I was looking at the Old Testament and I had just a few random thoughts that I just wanted to jot down.

Caleb the friend of Joshua, the disciple of Moses had more children from his concubines [girl friend] than he had from his wives. His family tree is spelled out in Chronicles I 2:46 (chapter 2 verse 46) and later on the chapter 4 of that same book. The Gra pointed out that this seems to disprove the idea that only a king can have  a concubine. 
(That is to say: The Gra used this fact as a proof against the Rambam and in support of the Raavad and the Ramban and most other rishonim.)


The fascinating thing here is that Caleb seems to be one of the only persons in the Old Testament that never a word of reproach is uttered against by God. He is declared "וימלא אחרי השם" "He went totally after God." Everyone else seems to get some words of critique.
(2) The snake when he wanted to get Eve to eat from the Fruit of the Tree said a true statement. "You will  be like God knowing the difference between good and evil." Later when God threw them out of the Garden of Eden in fact it says He said to his angels "See tat man has become like us knowing the difference between good an evil."

He also said another half true statement.לא מות תמותון You will not die. As God had said on the day that they eat from the fruit they would die. Well again the snake won the debate. They did not die on that day. [But they did die eventually Adam 930 years later.]

Hegel also noticed that the snake at least in his statement, "You will be like God" did not lie. [The Talmud says any lie that does not have some truth mixed with it can not stand.]


(3) I also wanted to mention that it is not clear to me right now if the Rambam [טעון ונטען פרק ו' הלכה ג] hold by the idea of the Ketzot HaChoshen that I mentioned in my previous essays. I still need to do some thinking about that.

(4) Reb Shmuel Berenbaum noted that the same complain about mankind that was used to destroy mankind by the flood was the exact same argument used to save mankind. First it was "I will destroy mankind because his thoughts are only evil all day." Then it was "I will never destroy mankind again because his thoughts are  evil (and therefore what would be the point)?"

(5) Who are the "sons of God" (in Genesis) that came on the daughters of men and gave birth to the great heroes of old? 

The truth is there is lot more to go into here about the הרמב''ם concerning מנה לי בידך להד''ם באו שני עדים שלווה ופרע ואמר לוויתי ופרעתי that the הרמב''ם seems to need a lot of factors to get to his law that he pays because הוחזק כפרן not because he admitted he owed the money. One factor in fact seem to be that his admission came before there was גמר דין

_____________________________________________
האמת היא שיש הרבה יותר להיכנס כאן על הרמב''ם לגבי מנה לי בידך להד''ם באו שני עדים שלווה ופרע ואמר לוויתי ופרעתי כי הרמב''ם נראה צריך הרבה גורמים בדרך ליעדו היינו החוק כי הוא משלם כי הוחזק כפרן לא בגלל שהוא הודה שהוא חייב את הכסף. גורם אחד למעשה נראה כי הודאתו באה לפני שהיה גמר דין.



The in question here is One person comes to court and says to the other you owe me a hundred dollars. The other says "I never borrowed." Two witnesses come and say he borrowed and paid back. He says true I borrowed and paid back. He has to pay because when one  says I never borrowed that is as if he said I never paid back and the other person requires no oath because the borrower here is already considered a liar. The Raavad says "No need for that"--meaning since he already admitted it we do not need the Rambam's reason.


What I mean here is in reference to my previous essay. The idea is to get to the Rambam's law about the לווה paying in that case requires these conditions לא דקדק, מיגו לפני גמר דין and לא לוויתי כאומר לא פרעתי and only then can the Rambam get to his law that the borrower pays because הוחזק כפרן. otherwise the Raavad would be prefect correct that as he said it so simply "No need for that".

I have been considering a question I heard from my learning partner David Bronson on Bava Metzia chapter 8, Though without a Gemara I might have forgotten some details.The Gemara I think says something like this: Someone went into a field and planted trees. The owner came before Rav. Rav said ''go pay him.'' The owner said, "I do not want to." Rav said ''still you must pay him and ידו על התחתונה'' [He gets the least possible price for his work and for the trees]. The owner said, "I still do not want to." That is the owner was planning on uprooting the trees.
Rav said nothing. The next day Rav was out walking and saw him making a fence around the area with the tree on it. Rav said you have revealed your real thought, that you in fact want the trees and so pay him וידו על העליונה [the higher price for work and trees (See Rashi and the Baal HaMaor what this phrase means).]
What David asked was ''what would have happened if the owner had paid the amount Rav had suggested at first, and then the next day he had come out and saw the man building a fence? Presumably nothing at all. Rav would have assumed he had changed his mind about the trees. So now also, let's just assume he changed his mind and have him pay the lesser amount.'' [See the Ramban  that if in fact he does not want the trees at all and gets rid of them, then he does not pay for anything.] 

What I have been considering here is the idea of גמר דין [the fact that a judgement has been rendered.] At the time of learning with David I had suggested this, but he did not seem thrilled with this answer.
. One answer is דיין שטעה בדבר משנה שחוזר הדין --that is there are cases when a faulty judgment by a judge is reversed  and there are other times when a faulty judgment is not reversed but the judge pays out of his own pocket for the mistake. [So there is something like גמר דין a final judgment that is not reversed even when the was a mistake,and sometimes it is reversed] The other answer is the Ketzot HaChoshen [a famous yeshivish sefer]about this very idea of גמר דין In this case: A person denies and loan and then one witness comes and says he borrowed and then the borrower says "True I borrowed, but paid back". 
The discussion there I would rather not go into this minute but in short the קצות החושן Ketzot Hachoshen says that one can change hi plea from innocent to innocent [מפטור לפטור] as long as he has not already been found guilty. What is important here is that Rav Shach said the Rambam has to agree with the Ketzot and that that fact can I think explain why there would be a difference between a final judgement and before a final judgment.

In short, the basic idea comes from the fact that the Rambam ignores Bar Kapara in Bava Batra page 37. Over there Rava said a person that makes a מחאה (objection on that fact that someone else is occupying his field) has to make this objection every three years. Bar Kapara said "and the objection has to be for the same reason," and the Rambam ignores Bar Kapara. The Rosh over there said the in the first three years he can change his plea because of the law that a person can change his plea from פטור לפטור from one kind of innocence to another kind, but if in the first three years he said the fellow is on his field from גזל [robbery] and in the second three he said משכון [guarantee for a loan] then he is admitting his first plea was invalid and thus the fellow was on the field for three year with no objection from anyone and thus he is presumed to be the owner.
The Rambam ignores this whole thing. Rav Shach says therefore we see the Rambam is just going with the idea that a person can change his plea if it is before a final judgment.  That is even in the second three years, he can still change his plea since the person on the field has not yet acquired it by a חזקה presumption.
Even though the cases are different still we can see that after a decision has been rendered certain kinds of pleas are not considered. In our case in Bava Metzia it is very possible that if Rav's judgement had been accepted then the next day he ha seen the owner building a fence that that would have made no difference after the final judgment had been accepted. 
Or according to my first suggestion it is possible that Rav would have seen his mistake and reversed the judgement.____________________________

This is as short as I can make this. The truth is there is lot more to go into here about the Rambam concerning מנה לי בידך להד''ם באו שני עדים שלווה ופרע ואמר לוויתי ופרעתי that the Rambam seems to need a whole bunch of factors to get to his law that he pays because הוחזק כפרן not because he admitted he owed the money. One factor in fact seem to be that his admission came before there was גמר דין


________________________________________________________________________I have been considering a question I heard from my learning partner on בבא מציעא פרק שמיני. The גמרא says something like this: Someone went into a field and planted trees. The owner came before Rav. Rav said go pay him. and ידו על התחתונה [He gets the least possible price for his work and for the trees.] The owner said, "I do not want the trees." Rav said still you must pay him and ידו על התחתונה. He gets the least possible price for his work and for the trees. The owner said, "I still do not want the trees at all." That is the owner was planning on uprooting the trees.
רב said nothing. The next day רב was out walking and saw him making a fence around the area with the tree on it. רב said you have revealed your real thought, that you in fact want the trees and so pay him וידו על העליונה, the higher price for work and trees. See רש''י and the בעל המאור what this phrase means.
What David asked was what would have happened if the owner had paid the amount רב had suggested at first and then the next day he had come out and saw the man building a fence? Presumably nothing at all. רב would have assumed he had change his mind about the trees. So now also let's just assume he changed his mind and have him pay the lesser amount. See the רמב''ן that if in fact he does not want the trees at all, and gets rid of them, then he does not pay for anything.

What I have been considering here is the idea of גמר דין, the fact that a judgement has been rendered. 


But now I want to think about this from two angles. One is דיין שטעה בדבר משנה שחוזר הדין --that is there are cases when a faulty judgment by a judge is reversed  and there are other times when a faulty judgment is not reversed but the judge pays out of his own pocket for the mistake. So there is something like גמר דין a final judgment that is not reversed even when the was a mistake. The other thing is the קצות החושן about this very idea of גמר דין In this case: A person denies and loan and then one witness comes and says he borrowed and then the borrower says "True I borrowed, but I paid back". 
The discussion there I would rather not go into this minute but in short the קצות החושן  says that one can change his טענה from מפטור לפטור as long as he has not already been found חייב. What is important here is that רב שך said the הרמב''ם has to agree with the קצות and that that fact can I think explain why there would be a difference between a final judgement and before a final judgment.

In short, the basic idea comes from the fact that the הרמב''ם ignores בר קפרא in בבא בתרא page ל''ז. Over there רבא said a person that makes a מחאה , objection on that fact that someone else is occupying his field, has to make this objection every three years. בר קפרא said "and the objection has to be for the same reason," and the הרמב''ם ignores בר קפרא. The רא''ש over there said the in the first three years he can change his plea because of the law that a person can change his plea from פטור לפטור from one kind of innocence to another kind, but if in the first three years he said the fellow is on his field from גזל [robbery] and in the second three he said משכון [guarantee for a loan] then he is admitting his first plea was invalid and thus the fellow was on the field for three year with no objection from anyone and thus his is presumed to be the owner.
The הרמב''ם ignores this whole thing. רב שך says therefore we see the הרמב''ם is just going with the idea that a person can change his plea if it is before a final judgment.  That is, even in the second three years he can still change his plea since the person on the field has not yet acquired it by a חזקה presumption.
Even though the cases are different still we can see that after a decision has been rendered certain kinds of pleas are not considered. In our case in בבא מציעא it is very possible that if the judgement of רב had been accepted, then the next day he had seen the owner building a fence, than that would have made no difference after the final judgment had been accepted. 
Or according to my first suggestion it is possible that רב would have seen his mistake and reversed the judgement. 
 הייתי שוקל שאלה ששמעתי משותף הלמידה שלי על בבא מציעא פרק השמיני. הגמרא אומרת: מישהו הלך לשדה וניטע עציים. הבעלים באו לקמיה דרב. רב אמר ללכת לשלם לו. הבעלים אמרו, "אני לא רוצה."  רב אמר עדיין אתה חייב לשלם  וידו על התחתונה. הוא מקבל את המחיר הפחות עבור עבודתו ועבור העצים. הבעלים אמרו, "אני עדיין לא רוצה בכלל." כלומר הבעלים מתכננים לעקור את העצים. רב לא אמר כלום. למחרת רבא טייל וראה אותו עושה גדר מסביב לאזור עם העצים עליו. רב אמר ברור כי אתה בעצם רוצה העצים וכך לשלם לו וידו על העליונה, המחיר גבוה יותר עבור עבודה ועצים. (ראה רש''י ואת בעל המאור מה זה  הביטוי). מה דוד ביקש היה מה היה קורה אם הבעלים שלמו הסכום שרב הציע בהתחלה, ואז למחרת הוא יצא וראה את האיש בונה גדר? יש להניח שום דבר בכלל. רב היה מניח שהבן אדם שנה את דעתו על העצים. אז עכשיו גם  פשוט אפשר  להניח שהוא שינה את דעתו ויש לו לשלם את הסכום הפחות? עיין רמב''ן שאם למעשה הוא לא רוצה עצים בכלל, אז הוא לא משלם על כלום. מה אני כבר שוקל כאן הוא הרעיון של גמר דין, העובדה שפסק דין הפך לסופי. אבל עכשיו אני רוצה לחשוב על זה משתי זוויות. האחת היא דיין שטעה בדבר משנה שחוזר הדין  וישנם מקרים כאשר שיפוט לקוי על ידי שופט מתהפך ויש פעמים אחרות, כאשר פסק דין פגום אינו מבוטל, אך השופט משלם מהכיס שלו על הטעות. אז יש משהו כמו גמר דין (פסק דין סופי) כי אינו מבוטל גם כאשר הייתה טעות. הדבר השני הוא קצות החושן על הרעיון הזה של דין גמר במקרה זה: אדם מכחיש הלוואה ולאחר מכן עד אחד בא ואמר שהוא לווה ואז הלווה אומר "נכון שלוויתי, אבל שילמתי בחזרה".  בקצרה קצות החושן אומר שאפשר לשנות טענה שלו מפטור לפטור כל עוד הוא לא כבר נמצא חייב. מה שחשוב כאן הוא כי רב שך אמר הרמב"ם מסכים עם הקצות וכי עובדה הזו יכולה לדעתי להסביר מדוע  יהיה הבדל בין פסק דין סופי ולפני פסק דין סופי. בקיצור, הרעיון הבסיסי נובע מהעובדה כי הרמב''ם מתעלם מבר קפרא בבבא בתרא דף ל''ז.  שם רבא אמר אדם שעושה מחאה, התנגדות על העובדה שמישהו אחר שכובש תחומו, יש לעשות את ההתנגדות הזו כל שלוש שנים. בר קפרא אמר "ואת ההתנגדות צריכה להיות מאותה הסיבה," והרמב''ם מתעלם מבר קפרא. הרא''ש שם אמר בשלוש השנים הראשונות הוא יכול לשנות נימוקיו שכן החוק כי אדם יכול לשנות הטיעון שלו מפטור לפטור (מן סוג אחד של  לסוג אחר), אבל אם בשלוש השנים הראשונות אמר  "הוא על המגרש שלי בגזל [שוד]" ובשלושת השנים השניות אמר טענת משכון [ערבות להלוואה] אז הוא מודה שהטיעון הראשון שלו היה לא חוקי ולכן הבן אדם היה על השדה במשך שלוש שנים ללא התנגדות מאף אחד ובכך שלו חזקה כי הוא הבעלים. הרמב''ם מתעלם מעניין בא קפרא. רב שך אומר ולכן אנו רואים שהרמב''ם הולך עם הרעיון שאדם יכול לשנות הטיעון שלו אם הוא לפני פסק דין סופי. כלומר, גם בשלוש השנים השניות הוא עדיין יכול לשנות הטיעון שלו מאז שהאדם על המגרש טרם רכש אותו על ידי חזקה. למרות המקרים שונים עדיין אנו יכולים לראות כי לאחר החלטת הדין כבר ניתנה, סוגים מסוימים של טיעונים לא נחשבים. במקרה שלנו בבא מציעא ייתכן מאוד כי אם פסק הדין של רב היה מקובל, אז למחרת שרא הבעלים עם בניית הגדר, זה לא היה עושה הבדל לאחר פסק הדין הסופי שהתקבל. או לפי ההצעה הראשונה שלי זה אפשרי כי רב היה רואה טעותו ומהפך את פסק הדין.

Music T39

T39 A Major

As I mentioned before with the Rambam we have  a four square system of learning.The Tenach [the Written Law and the prophets], the Oral Law [Talmud and Midrash], Physics and Metaphysics.
[The one best book that I think contains the basic essence of the Oral Law is the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach. The best of Metaphysics I think is Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and the Guide for the Perplexed, even though the Rambam was referring specifically to Aristotle. ] [If you have finished the Avi Ezri then I recommend the basic books of the disciples of Rav Chaim Soloveitchik, Baruch Ber, and Shimon Skopf.]




There are a few ideas I had about Physics which mainly are base on the statement in the Talmud לעולם לגרוס ואחר כך להבין One should just say the words in order and after that understand. But along with that I found a few more ideas like review of the same material forty day in a row helpful. That is to read about a hundred page or so and then the next forty day to review the material forwards and backward. That is let's say you have got up to chapter 10, then to go back over chapter 10, then 9, then 8 etc.
But you must not think too hard about what you learn.  The
source of authority must be dark, impenetrable and uncriticisable. Learning Physics is like learning Torah. The inner essence must be beyond human understanding and only by grace does one come to grasp. 

In relation to what I mentioned about honor of ones parents I wanted to add from Naphtali Troup [חידושי הגרנ''ט] that to listen to one's parents is a Positive command. That it it can not negate a negative with a positive command nor a command that has Karet.
Naphtali Troup is usually considered on the same plane as Reb Chaim Solveitchik and his ideas are commonly cited in Litvak yeshivas.[That is in the חידושי הגרנ''ט which I used to own a copy of. After Rav Shach's Avi Ezri I think it is one of the best books I have read. It has that same quality that you find in Rav Shach of being clear and deep all at the same time. ]