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3.4.17

I have been considering a question I heard from my learning partner David Bronson on Bava Metzia chapter 8, Though without a Gemara I might have forgotten some details.The Gemara I think says something like this: Someone went into a field and planted trees. The owner came before Rav. Rav said ''go pay him.'' The owner said, "I do not want to." Rav said ''still you must pay him and ידו על התחתונה'' [He gets the least possible price for his work and for the trees]. The owner said, "I still do not want to." That is the owner was planning on uprooting the trees.
Rav said nothing. The next day Rav was out walking and saw him making a fence around the area with the tree on it. Rav said you have revealed your real thought, that you in fact want the trees and so pay him וידו על העליונה [the higher price for work and trees (See Rashi and the Baal HaMaor what this phrase means).]
What David asked was ''what would have happened if the owner had paid the amount Rav had suggested at first, and then the next day he had come out and saw the man building a fence? Presumably nothing at all. Rav would have assumed he had changed his mind about the trees. So now also, let's just assume he changed his mind and have him pay the lesser amount.'' [See the Ramban  that if in fact he does not want the trees at all and gets rid of them, then he does not pay for anything.] 

What I have been considering here is the idea of גמר דין [the fact that a judgement has been rendered.] At the time of learning with David I had suggested this, but he did not seem thrilled with this answer.
. One answer is דיין שטעה בדבר משנה שחוזר הדין --that is there are cases when a faulty judgment by a judge is reversed  and there are other times when a faulty judgment is not reversed but the judge pays out of his own pocket for the mistake. [So there is something like גמר דין a final judgment that is not reversed even when the was a mistake,and sometimes it is reversed] The other answer is the Ketzot HaChoshen [a famous yeshivish sefer]about this very idea of גמר דין In this case: A person denies and loan and then one witness comes and says he borrowed and then the borrower says "True I borrowed, but paid back". 
The discussion there I would rather not go into this minute but in short the קצות החושן Ketzot Hachoshen says that one can change hi plea from innocent to innocent [מפטור לפטור] as long as he has not already been found guilty. What is important here is that Rav Shach said the Rambam has to agree with the Ketzot and that that fact can I think explain why there would be a difference between a final judgement and before a final judgment.

In short, the basic idea comes from the fact that the Rambam ignores Bar Kapara in Bava Batra page 37. Over there Rava said a person that makes a מחאה (objection on that fact that someone else is occupying his field) has to make this objection every three years. Bar Kapara said "and the objection has to be for the same reason," and the Rambam ignores Bar Kapara. The Rosh over there said the in the first three years he can change his plea because of the law that a person can change his plea from פטור לפטור from one kind of innocence to another kind, but if in the first three years he said the fellow is on his field from גזל [robbery] and in the second three he said משכון [guarantee for a loan] then he is admitting his first plea was invalid and thus the fellow was on the field for three year with no objection from anyone and thus he is presumed to be the owner.
The Rambam ignores this whole thing. Rav Shach says therefore we see the Rambam is just going with the idea that a person can change his plea if it is before a final judgment.  That is even in the second three years, he can still change his plea since the person on the field has not yet acquired it by a חזקה presumption.
Even though the cases are different still we can see that after a decision has been rendered certain kinds of pleas are not considered. In our case in Bava Metzia it is very possible that if Rav's judgement had been accepted then the next day he ha seen the owner building a fence that that would have made no difference after the final judgment had been accepted. 
Or according to my first suggestion it is possible that Rav would have seen his mistake and reversed the judgement.____________________________

This is as short as I can make this. The truth is there is lot more to go into here about the Rambam concerning מנה לי בידך להד''ם באו שני עדים שלווה ופרע ואמר לוויתי ופרעתי that the Rambam seems to need a whole bunch of factors to get to his law that he pays because הוחזק כפרן not because he admitted he owed the money. One factor in fact seem to be that his admission came before there was גמר דין


________________________________________________________________________I have been considering a question I heard from my learning partner on בבא מציעא פרק שמיני. The גמרא says something like this: Someone went into a field and planted trees. The owner came before Rav. Rav said go pay him. and ידו על התחתונה [He gets the least possible price for his work and for the trees.] The owner said, "I do not want the trees." Rav said still you must pay him and ידו על התחתונה. He gets the least possible price for his work and for the trees. The owner said, "I still do not want the trees at all." That is the owner was planning on uprooting the trees.
רב said nothing. The next day רב was out walking and saw him making a fence around the area with the tree on it. רב said you have revealed your real thought, that you in fact want the trees and so pay him וידו על העליונה, the higher price for work and trees. See רש''י and the בעל המאור what this phrase means.
What David asked was what would have happened if the owner had paid the amount רב had suggested at first and then the next day he had come out and saw the man building a fence? Presumably nothing at all. רב would have assumed he had change his mind about the trees. So now also let's just assume he changed his mind and have him pay the lesser amount. See the רמב''ן that if in fact he does not want the trees at all, and gets rid of them, then he does not pay for anything.

What I have been considering here is the idea of גמר דין, the fact that a judgement has been rendered. 


But now I want to think about this from two angles. One is דיין שטעה בדבר משנה שחוזר הדין --that is there are cases when a faulty judgment by a judge is reversed  and there are other times when a faulty judgment is not reversed but the judge pays out of his own pocket for the mistake. So there is something like גמר דין a final judgment that is not reversed even when the was a mistake. The other thing is the קצות החושן about this very idea of גמר דין In this case: A person denies and loan and then one witness comes and says he borrowed and then the borrower says "True I borrowed, but I paid back". 
The discussion there I would rather not go into this minute but in short the קצות החושן  says that one can change his טענה from מפטור לפטור as long as he has not already been found חייב. What is important here is that רב שך said the הרמב''ם has to agree with the קצות and that that fact can I think explain why there would be a difference between a final judgement and before a final judgment.

In short, the basic idea comes from the fact that the הרמב''ם ignores בר קפרא in בבא בתרא page ל''ז. Over there רבא said a person that makes a מחאה , objection on that fact that someone else is occupying his field, has to make this objection every three years. בר קפרא said "and the objection has to be for the same reason," and the הרמב''ם ignores בר קפרא. The רא''ש over there said the in the first three years he can change his plea because of the law that a person can change his plea from פטור לפטור from one kind of innocence to another kind, but if in the first three years he said the fellow is on his field from גזל [robbery] and in the second three he said משכון [guarantee for a loan] then he is admitting his first plea was invalid and thus the fellow was on the field for three year with no objection from anyone and thus his is presumed to be the owner.
The הרמב''ם ignores this whole thing. רב שך says therefore we see the הרמב''ם is just going with the idea that a person can change his plea if it is before a final judgment.  That is, even in the second three years he can still change his plea since the person on the field has not yet acquired it by a חזקה presumption.
Even though the cases are different still we can see that after a decision has been rendered certain kinds of pleas are not considered. In our case in בבא מציעא it is very possible that if the judgement of רב had been accepted, then the next day he had seen the owner building a fence, than that would have made no difference after the final judgment had been accepted. 
Or according to my first suggestion it is possible that רב would have seen his mistake and reversed the judgement. 
 הייתי שוקל שאלה ששמעתי משותף הלמידה שלי על בבא מציעא פרק השמיני. הגמרא אומרת: מישהו הלך לשדה וניטע עציים. הבעלים באו לקמיה דרב. רב אמר ללכת לשלם לו. הבעלים אמרו, "אני לא רוצה."  רב אמר עדיין אתה חייב לשלם  וידו על התחתונה. הוא מקבל את המחיר הפחות עבור עבודתו ועבור העצים. הבעלים אמרו, "אני עדיין לא רוצה בכלל." כלומר הבעלים מתכננים לעקור את העצים. רב לא אמר כלום. למחרת רבא טייל וראה אותו עושה גדר מסביב לאזור עם העצים עליו. רב אמר ברור כי אתה בעצם רוצה העצים וכך לשלם לו וידו על העליונה, המחיר גבוה יותר עבור עבודה ועצים. (ראה רש''י ואת בעל המאור מה זה  הביטוי). מה דוד ביקש היה מה היה קורה אם הבעלים שלמו הסכום שרב הציע בהתחלה, ואז למחרת הוא יצא וראה את האיש בונה גדר? יש להניח שום דבר בכלל. רב היה מניח שהבן אדם שנה את דעתו על העצים. אז עכשיו גם  פשוט אפשר  להניח שהוא שינה את דעתו ויש לו לשלם את הסכום הפחות? עיין רמב''ן שאם למעשה הוא לא רוצה עצים בכלל, אז הוא לא משלם על כלום. מה אני כבר שוקל כאן הוא הרעיון של גמר דין, העובדה שפסק דין הפך לסופי. אבל עכשיו אני רוצה לחשוב על זה משתי זוויות. האחת היא דיין שטעה בדבר משנה שחוזר הדין  וישנם מקרים כאשר שיפוט לקוי על ידי שופט מתהפך ויש פעמים אחרות, כאשר פסק דין פגום אינו מבוטל, אך השופט משלם מהכיס שלו על הטעות. אז יש משהו כמו גמר דין (פסק דין סופי) כי אינו מבוטל גם כאשר הייתה טעות. הדבר השני הוא קצות החושן על הרעיון הזה של דין גמר במקרה זה: אדם מכחיש הלוואה ולאחר מכן עד אחד בא ואמר שהוא לווה ואז הלווה אומר "נכון שלוויתי, אבל שילמתי בחזרה".  בקצרה קצות החושן אומר שאפשר לשנות טענה שלו מפטור לפטור כל עוד הוא לא כבר נמצא חייב. מה שחשוב כאן הוא כי רב שך אמר הרמב"ם מסכים עם הקצות וכי עובדה הזו יכולה לדעתי להסביר מדוע  יהיה הבדל בין פסק דין סופי ולפני פסק דין סופי. בקיצור, הרעיון הבסיסי נובע מהעובדה כי הרמב''ם מתעלם מבר קפרא בבבא בתרא דף ל''ז.  שם רבא אמר אדם שעושה מחאה, התנגדות על העובדה שמישהו אחר שכובש תחומו, יש לעשות את ההתנגדות הזו כל שלוש שנים. בר קפרא אמר "ואת ההתנגדות צריכה להיות מאותה הסיבה," והרמב''ם מתעלם מבר קפרא. הרא''ש שם אמר בשלוש השנים הראשונות הוא יכול לשנות נימוקיו שכן החוק כי אדם יכול לשנות הטיעון שלו מפטור לפטור (מן סוג אחד של  לסוג אחר), אבל אם בשלוש השנים הראשונות אמר  "הוא על המגרש שלי בגזל [שוד]" ובשלושת השנים השניות אמר טענת משכון [ערבות להלוואה] אז הוא מודה שהטיעון הראשון שלו היה לא חוקי ולכן הבן אדם היה על השדה במשך שלוש שנים ללא התנגדות מאף אחד ובכך שלו חזקה כי הוא הבעלים. הרמב''ם מתעלם מעניין בא קפרא. רב שך אומר ולכן אנו רואים שהרמב''ם הולך עם הרעיון שאדם יכול לשנות הטיעון שלו אם הוא לפני פסק דין סופי. כלומר, גם בשלוש השנים השניות הוא עדיין יכול לשנות הטיעון שלו מאז שהאדם על המגרש טרם רכש אותו על ידי חזקה. למרות המקרים שונים עדיין אנו יכולים לראות כי לאחר החלטת הדין כבר ניתנה, סוגים מסוימים של טיעונים לא נחשבים. במקרה שלנו בבא מציעא ייתכן מאוד כי אם פסק הדין של רב היה מקובל, אז למחרת שרא הבעלים עם בניית הגדר, זה לא היה עושה הבדל לאחר פסק הדין הסופי שהתקבל. או לפי ההצעה הראשונה שלי זה אפשרי כי רב היה רואה טעותו ומהפך את פסק הדין.