Sex in the Five books of Moses is not symmetrical. A woman can be married to only one man. A man can be married to many women.  ניאוף  adultery is when a man has sex with a woman who is married to another man. That gets the death penalty. It is in two lists in Leviticus  that go though the עריות.
Sex outside of marriage is  not ניאוף-adultery. It comes under the category of פילגש concubinage.

There were a good number of people in the Old Testament that had concubines. One well known such person was Calev ben Yefuna (the friend of Joshua, the disciple of Moses). [כלב בן יפונה ] He was not considered a sinner because he had a few wives and few concubines. In the Five Books of Moses he is praised with a kind of praise that is not applied to anyone  else in the Torah, וימלא אחרי השם "He was filled with God." People might not think this is good but they cant call it "sin" in Biblical terms. And when pastors do so they are just displaying their lack of education.

I forget where the list of Calev's wives and  girl friends was. I think it should be in Chronicles one where it lists the people from the tribe of Yehuda that came into Israel. One of them was Calev because Moshe told him and his buddy Joshua that they would merit to enter the land of Israel.
There  are lots of sins in the Bible but typically they have nothing to do with what pastors call sin. And what pastors call commandments are often highly sinful.

If you want to know what the Bible calls a sin just open a Five Books Of Moses and take a look at when it says, "God spoke to Moses saying speak unto the children of Israel say unto them thou shalt not do such and such a thing. and if you do so this and this is the punishment." There are lots of examples. You might say that if God says not to do something that has to count as a sin. There are of course no pastors in the world which do this simple process. It is really not complicated. But instead they have to fish around for other things to call sins.

On the other hand I can see why people just don't jump to the Five Books of Moses. They are afraid of groups that claim to be following these laws. And that is justifiable.  people that claim to be teaching Torah are mainly "Torah scholars that are demons תלמידי חכמים שדיים יהודאים . So that leaves anyone that wants to keep the Law of Moses in a bind. There is no where to go learn how in a practical sense to keep the Torah. If the people that claim to be teaching it are demons, that limits the options.
In real life, we encounter people that are supposedly teaching Torah that are  demons. I think I have probably met quite a few of them.

In any case, what you could do is to simply learn the Five Books of Moses on your own, and then just go through the Mishna and Talmud on your own to discover how to keep the law in a practical sense. That is what I do. If there was  an authentic Lithuanian yeshiva near me I would go there but that is not an option for me now.

Learning Musar [works of ethics of the Middle Ages  like The Duties of the Heart helps to gain physical and mental health. That is what Isaac Blazer said. He was a disciple of Israel Salanter and we can trust that he knew what he was taking about. 

But this takes  a lot of faith in the wise to believe this. There are plenty of world views out there that claim that fear of God is not even a worthwhile goal. And among people that agree that fear of God and good character traits are worthwhile goals there are many opinions that learning Musar does not help and that there are better ways. From what I have seen all  of these alternative claims are false. {And many of the alternative approaches are negative and harmful.} That is based on my experience and observation.
So while learning Musar has limited capacity, at least it does something positive. It may not work magic but we can trust Israel Salanter and Issac Blazer that it has positive benefits. And it benefits far outweigh the benefits I have seen from alternative paths.

The difference between the Musar Movement and I is that I think people should spend an equal amount of time on Medieval books of Philosophy like The Guide for the Perplexed,  and Saadia Gaon's אמונות ודעות (Faiths and Doctrines). This is because I don't think good character is independent of a good world view. I think rather that good character depends on a good world view.

There will be noticed some areas in which the world view of Saadia Gaon and Maimonides are not in accord with the Kabalah. This speaks more to the detraction of kabalah as a source of information than the reverse. Mystics can be very helpful with their insights but can't change the world view of Torah. Knowledge gained by mystic experience remains mystic.
The major philosophers of the Middle Ages with the approach of the Talmud and Torah are Saadia Gaon, Maimonides, Maimonides's son Avraham, Ibn Gavirol, Isaac Abravenal,
Yehudah Abravenal . If one does not know at least what they say it hard to imagine that anything he says on the topic of Jewish world view could be valid or interesting. If one has done the homework then his views can be interesting but not before.
I should mention I hold from the natural law approach of Saadia Gaon and Maimonides-so I respect any system that I feel is striving for natural law. But I have no tolerance for systems that I think are tilting people towards evil.

Songs for the glory of God

q26  q26 in midi format

q27  [q27 in midi]

q28  [q28 in midi]

q29  [q29 in midi]

q30 [q30 in midi]

q31  [q31 in midi]


q36  [q36 in midi]

q37  [q27 in midi]



q38 [q38 in midi]


q40  [q40in midi]

\\q65 f minor   [q65 in midi]




h28  [h28 in midi]

Most of what people worry about I think is  just a distraction. A false flag from the Dark Side to get you distracted from what you need to be thinking about. 

You need רצון razon-- a will to do things right. People need the will to stop depending on handouts and get a real vocation. And  to learn Torah.

That is when I find myself in some difficulty I think to myself what I read in the Shaari Teshuva of Rabbainy Yona--אין יסורים בלא עוון. There are not problems without sin. Based on this idea when I have a problem I often feel that the problem is not because of what other have done or want to do but rather from myself.  I believe all my problems come from the gap between the "is" and the "ought." That is the gap between what I do and what I ought to do. 

Rambam accidental sacrifices 6:11
He eats two pieces of forbidden fat in one span of forgetting. Then he knows about the first one. Then in the same span of forgetting as the second one he eats a third piece. Since knowledge divides he will be required a sin offering for the first piece and the second will be included even if he does not know about it yet. If instead he brought for the third piece the second will also be included.

The end of that law is this: If he remembered the second piece and brings a sin offering for it then the first and third will be included and when he remembers them he will not be required a sacrifice.

 The case is when he remembers the first piece. So what does the Rambam mean at the end when he says when he remembers the first piece after the sin offering? See the entire law and you will see that the third case is just a continuation of the original set up. Rav Shach said the sin offering does not divide.  That means to Rabbi Yochanan [who stated this law ] only knowledge divides, not the sin offering. What this means is the case is the exact set up as we started with. Nothing has changed. He ate the two first pieces in one span of forgetting, and then remembered the first. Then he ate the third in the same span as the second.  Then he brings a sin offering for the second after he remembered the second. The third is included since it was eaten in the same span of forgetting as the second, and the sin offering does not divide.



 Rav Shach wrote is that Rabbi Yochanan holds knowledge alone divides, not atonement. This is an important key. Thus in the case where there are only two pieces and he eats the first and second in one span and then remembers to first and then brings a sin offering for the first he is absolved from the second. That means to Rabbi Yochanan the first knowledge does not divide--only the second and further on. That is to say if we have the same case and he remembers the first and then the second then they are automatically divided.

I thought to explain the end of halacha 11 in ch 6.  The case is similar to the beginning of the halacha but with one difference, He ate the first and second piece and then remembered the second piece and then in the same span of forgetfulness of the first piece he ate the third piece. Now he brings a sacrifice for the second piece. The first and third are atoned for because they were both in the same span as the second but not the same span as each other.


My learning partner  thought if he had remembered the second piece, and then ate the third that that is not in one העלמה.

 I was thinking is that in my way piece 1 and piece 3 are in one העלמה and that the fact that there has not been a second ידיעה that makes it all one העלמה. in this way it is not a trivial case of all being eaten in one העלמה. The sin offering will come after the third piece was eaten and then when he remembers 1 and 3 they will be included. But I highly doubt if my learning partner will budge.

The motivation for my approach is the fact that if in a case where there are only two pieces and he eats 1 and 2 in one העלמה and then remembers 1 and brings a sin offering for 1 alone still 2 is automatically included because there was no second ידיע on 2. But if he had known about 2 before the sin offering he would have to bring another because the second ידיעה does divide.

Next day: I told him my idea. That is I explained 1 and 2 are connected. And then 3 and 1 are connected. Therefore 3 is connected to 2 by means of a bridge through piece 1. he pointed out that that cant be true because then it would work for the beginning of that halacha. That is when 1 and 2 were in one span and then he remembered 1 and then ate 3 in the same span as 2. In that case only 1 and 2 are connected. And when he brings the sin offering only 1 an 2 are taken care of. SO obviously 2 can't bridge between 3 and 1. So 1 can't bridge between 3 and 2. And besides that he noted that the Gemara itself says what he says. גררא אחת אמרינן שתי גררות לא אמרינן. And furthermore it is common sense. If he ate 1 and then remembered it and then ate 2 then piece two is not in the same העלמה. So in my case also. When he remembered 2 that makes 2 and 3 in separate העלמות. So I have to leave this entire essay out of my ideas on Shas book.





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Here is the above writings with a little Hebrew.

רמב''ם שגגות ו:י''א
He eats two כזיתים of forbidden fat חלב in one span of העלמה. Then he knows about the first כזית. Then in the same העלמה as the second כזית, he eats a third כזית. Since ידיעה divides, he will be required a חטאת for the first כזית and the second will be included even if he does not know about it yet. If instead he brought for the third כזית the second will also be included.

The end of that law is this: If he remembered the second כזית and brings a sin offering for it then the first and third will be included, and when he remembers them he will not be required a sacrifice.


 "Knowledge" means his wife walked into the kitchen and asked him, "Where is the forbidden fat I left on the table? I was going to use it to grease the car wheels!"

The next day. I would like to explain רב ש''ך's answer for the רמב''ם in more detail and I would like to  answer  the problem that he raised on the רמב''ם from Chapter 8:8. I want to show how his answer helps us to understand the end of law 11 in chapter 6. רב ש''ך I am pretty sure he meant this but he did not openly say this so I think it is necessary to show what he means.

The first point רב ש''ך makes explicitly is that רבי יוחנן holds knowledge divides not atonement. This is an important key. Thus in the case where there are only two pieces and he eats the first and second in one span and then remembers to first and then brings a sin offering for the first he is absolved from the second. That means to רבי יוחנן the ידיעה ראשונה does not divide, only the second and further on. That is to say if we have the same case and he remembers the first and then the second then they are automatically divided.

******************************************************************************

I thought to explain the end of פרק ו' הלכה י''א.  The case is similar to the beginning of the הלכה but with one difference, He ate the כזית ראשון ושני and then remembered the כזית שני and then in the same העלמה of the כזית ראשון he ate the כזית השלישי. Now he brings a חטאת for the כזית השני. The ראשון and שני are מתכפרים for because they were both in the same העלמה as the שני but not the same העלמה  as each other.

 I went to my learning partner and tried to explain this. He said if he had remembered the כזית השני and then ate the כזית השלישי that that is not in one העלמה.

In my way כזית הראשון and כזית השלישיare in one העלמה and that the fact that there has not been a  ידיעה  שנייה that makes it all one העלמה. In this way it is not a trivial case of all all three כזיתים being eaten in one העלמה. The חטאת will come after the כזית השלישי was eaten and then when he remembers כזית הראשון and כזית השלישי they will be included.

The motivation for my approach is the fact that if in a case where there are only שני  כזיתים  and he eats כזית הראשון and כזית השני in one העלמה and then remembers כזית הראשון and brings a חטאת for כזית הראשון alone still כזית השני is automatically included because there was no second ידיע on כזית השני. But if he had known about כזית השני before the חטאת he would have to bring another because the second ידיעה does divide.

Next day: I told him my idea. That is I explained כזית הראשון and כזית השני are connected. And then כזית השלישי and כזית הראשון are connected. Therefore כזית השלישי is connected to כזית השני by means of a bridge through piece כזית הראשון. He pointed out that that can not be true, because then it would work for the beginning of that הלכה. That is when כזית הראשון and כזית השני were in one span and then he remembered כזית הראשון and then ate כזית השלישי in the same העלמה as כזית השני. In that case only כזית השראון and כזית השני are מחוברים And when he brings the חטאת only כזית הראשון and כזית השני are taken care of. So obviously כזית השני can't bridge between כזית השלישי and כזית הראשון. So כזית הראשון can not bridge between כזית השלישי and כזית השני. And besides that he noted that the גמרא itself says what he says. גררא אחת אמרינן, שתי גררות לא אמרינן. And furthermore it is common sense. If he ate 1 and then remembered it and then ate כזית השני, then כזית השני is not in the same העלמה. So in my case also. When he remembered כזית השני that makes כזית השני and כזית השלישי in separate העלמות.

______________________________________________________________________________

Here is the above ideas in Hebrew

הלכות שגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה ט' והלכה י''א
אני מביא כאן שאלה על רמב''ם. אבל לפני כן אני חייב לעבור את הנושא. מבוא. יש ארבעים ושלשה סוגים של חטא שצריך להביא עליהם חטאת . כלומר  עז נקבה או כבשה. חטאת ניתן להביא רק לשוגג. אז הנה יש לנו מקרה שבו הייתה כזית חלב על  התנור. ראובן נכנס ואוכל אותו. אז שמעון נכנס לאחר מכן ושואל איפה הוא כזית החלב ששמתי בתנור? ראובן צריך להביא חטאת. אם אוכל חתיכת החלב, הוא מביא חטאת. אם הוא אכל כזית ולאחר מכן ידע שאסור, ואז אכל כזית נוספת ולאחר מכן ידע שהיה אסור, שיש לו להביא אחד חטאת על כל חתיכה. לא רק זה, אלא אם היו שתי ידיעות, שהוא אכל כזית חלב, ולאחר מכן אכל עוד כזית חלב, ואז הוא ידע על כזית הראשונה ואז הוא ידע על כזית השנייה, הוא מביא שתי חטאות.  אתה לא צריך שיהיו הידיעות בין שני מעשים של אכילה. שבת דף ע''א וכן ברמב''ם הלכות שגגות פרק ו': הלכה ט'. כלומר הרמב''ם החליט כמו רבי יוחנן שידיעות מחלקות, לא כמו ריש לקיש  שהקרבת הקורבן הוא מחלקת.

אם הוא אכל שני כזיתים כאחד בהעלמה אחת ולאחר מכן ידע על כזית הראשונה. לאחר מכן, באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת השניה אכל כזית שלישית. כשהוא מביא חטאת לחתיכה הראשונה, הוא פוטר את החטא  של כזית השנייה. זה משגגות ברמב''ם פרק ו' הלכה י''א. הבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב תשובה. והקרית ספר, אומר תשובה אחרת. שתי התשובות נסתרות בפרק ח' הלכה ח'  ברמב''ם. הרמב''ם מביא בדיוק את אותו החוק של רבי יוחנן שהוא אומר בפרק ו' הלכה ט' חוץ מזה שזה במונחים של קרבן אשם. ושם הוא אומר אכל חמשת זיתי חלב. זה ישירות סותר את מה שהבית יוסף מביא בשם הר''י בי רב שאמר שההבדל בין  פרק ו' הלכה ט' ופרק ו' הלכה י''א  שלשון "זה אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב בהעלם אחת" משמע אכילות נפרדות. היינו היה הניסיון לומר ''אכל כזית חלב וכזית חלב" הוא שני מעשים שונים ולכן הם נחשבים בנפרד, ואילו בפרק ו' הלכה י''א הוא אומר שהוא אכל שתי זיתי חלב בהעלם אחת (היינו שהוא אכל שתי חתיכות כאחד בהעלמה אחת). ור''י בי רב  אמר שהכוונה בפעולת אכילה אחת וכך הן ספורות יחד. זה נסתר בפרק ח' הלכה ח' שבו הוא אכל חמש חתיכות יחד ועדיין הן ספורות בנפרד. "אכל חמש כזיתים בהעלם אחת." לדברי הבית יוסף השפה מכוון שהן נספרות כאחד, ובכל זאת יש בפרק ח' הלכה ח' החוק שהן נספרות בנפרד. רב אלעזר מנחם שך מציע תשובה שלישית. מה שרב שך מציע מבוסס על שתי הנחות. אחת: הידיעה גורמת חיוב חטאת.הנחה שנייה: כמו כן העלמה אחת היא חטא אחד. כך הוא אכל כשני זיתי חלב בהעלמה. והוא ידע על כזית הראשונה. אז הוא מביא חטאת על כזית הראשונה. אבל מאחר שכזית השנייה נאכלה באותו פרק הזמן של שיכחת החטא  שתי הכזיתים נתכפרות. אבל מה לגבי אם הוא רק זכר שכזית השנייה הייתה אסורה?  הכל נסלח. ולמעשה זה בדיוק מה שרמב''ם אומר. מה שקשה להבין כאן הוא זו, בחלקו האחרון של זה הלכה רמב''ם אומר אם הוא יודע על חתיכה האמצעי ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת אז שני הכזיתים (הראשון ואחרון) נתכפרים. וכאשר הוא יודע על הראשון או האחרון, הוא לא צריך להביא עוד חטאת. עכשיו לתרץ את זו אני צריך להביא את ההסבר של רב שך.
) רמב''ם שגגות ו:י''א הוא אוכל שני כזיתים של חלב  בהעלמה אחת. ואז הוא יודע על כזית הראשון. לאחר מכן, באותו העלמה של כזית השני, הוא אוכל כזית שלישי.  הידיעה מחלקת הראשון מן השלישי. הוא יידרש חטאת לכזית הראשון והשני ייכלל גם אם הוא לא יודע על זה עדיין. אם במקום זאת הוא הביא לשלישי  גם השני ייכלל. סוף החוק שהוא זו: אם הוא נזכר כבזית השנייה ומביא חטאת לזה, אז הראשון ושלישי יהיו כלולים, וכשהוא זוכר אותם הוא לא יידרש להקריב עוד.  אני רוצה להסביר רב ש''ך על הרמב''ם הזה בפירוט. ואני רוצה להראות  תשובה  על סוף  החוק 11 בפרק 6.
  הנקודה הראשונה שרב ש''ך עושה במפורש היא שרבי יוחנן מחזיק ידע מחלק לא כפרה. זה מפתח חשוב. כך במקרה שבו יש רק שתי חתיכות והוא אוכל ראשון ושני בפרק אחד ולאחר מכן זוכר לראשון ולאחר מכן מביא חטאת שהוא פוטר את הראשון והשני. כלומר, לרבי יוחנן  הידיעה הראשונה לא מחלקת, רק שניה ונוסף על. כלומר, אם יש לנו את אותו מקרה והוא זוכר הראשון ולאחר מכן את השני הם מחולקים באופן אוטומטי.  בטעות חשבתי להסביר את סוף  הלכה י''א. חשבתי שהמקרה דומה לתחילת ההלכה אבל בהבדל אחד, הוא אכל כזית ראשון והשני, ואז נזכר בכזית השני, ולאחר מכן באותו העלמה של כזית הראשון אכל כזית השלישי. עכשיו הוא מביא חטאת לכזית השני. הראשון ושלישי מתכפרים לפי שהם היו  באותה העלמה כשני, אבל זה לא אותו הדבר כמו עלמה אחת על כולם.
. בדרך שלי כזית הראשונה וכזית שלישית נמצא  העלמה אחת וכי העובדה שלא חלו ידיעה שנייה שעושה את זה כל עלמה אחד. בדרך זו היא לא מקרה טריוויאלי שכל השלושה כזיתים נאכלו בהעלם אחד. החטאת באה אחרי כזית השלישי נאכל, ואז כשהוא נזכר בכזית ראשון ושלישי הם ייכללו. המוטיבציה לגישה שלי היא העובדה שאם במקרה שבו יש רק שני כזיתים, והוא אוכל כזית ראשון וכזית שני בהעלם אחד ולאחר מכן זכר כזית ראשון ומביא חטאת לכזית הראשון לבד,  כזית שני כלול באופן אוטומטי משום שלא היתה ידיע שני לכזית השני. אבל אם הוא ידע על כזית שני לפני החטאת, הוא יצטרך להביא עוד חטאת כי הידיעה השנייה עושה הפרד.

למחרת: אמרתי להחברותא שלי את הרעיון.  אמרתי שכזית הראשון וכזית השני מחוברים. ולאחר מכן כזית שלישי וכזית ראשון מחוברים. לכן כזית שלישי מחובר לכזית שני באמצעות גשר דרך כזית הראשון.
הוא ציין כי זה לא יכול להיות נכון, כי אז זה יעבוד לתחילת ההלכה. כלומר, כאשר כזית הראשון וכזית השני היו בפרק אחד, ואז הוא נזכר בכזית הראשון ולאחר מכן אכל כזית שלישי באותה העלמה של כזית השני, במקרה שרק  הראשון והשני  מחוברים, וכשהוא מביא חטאת על  הראשון, אז כזית השני מוכלל. אז ברור כזית השני לא יכול לגשר בין  השלישי וראשון. אז כזית הראשון לא יכול לגשר בין השלישי והשני. וחוץ מזה הוא ציין כי הגמרא עצמה אומרת  גררא אחת אמרינן, שתי גררות לא אמרינן. ויתר על כן זה שכל ישר. אם הוא אכל הראשון ואז נזכר בו ולאחר מכן אכל כזית שנייה, אז כזית השני הוא לא באותה העלמה. אז במקרה שלי גם. כשהוא נזכר כזית השני זה עושה כזית השני וכזית השלישי בהעלמות נפרדות.

I was just wondering guards need a type of acquisition [that is to pick it up or other kinds of ways that acquisition is made] to the Rambam. Others say it is enough just to say "Put it down, and I will watch it." But the Rambam also says one can obligate himself without any act of acquisition. I imagine that is just when he writes it in a document of something like that.

I wanted just very quickly to say that the idea of the Enlightenment of education being the redemption of mankind meant secular education. Also, I wanted to add that Allen Bloom thought that the main idea of the Enlightenment was to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals. But that was because he was a political philosopher. There was an equal part of the enlightenment that was directed towards education.

But this was not in the Yeshiva or religious kind of sense of education. [The Enlightenment thinkers were thinking about secular education.]

On the opposite side of things the other side of the enlightenment was towards spiritual wholeness and a revolt against reason.This side of things received its greatest expression in the Romantic period. But it began right at the start of the Enlightenment.


Each of these areas has positive values and also can decay into negative value.
It was Allen Bloom in his Closing of the American Mind that saw these two streams colliding and creating a crisis, or maybe even an explosion that would destroy both.

In Lithuanian yeshivas there is an attempt to remedy this situation with  a return to the Middle Ages. That is what we call learning Rishonim (medieval authorities). The idea here is that the Middle ages was a time when there was tremendous human effort spent of resolving the clefts between Faith and Reason. [Besides that it is true that Rishonim are on a vastly superior level than later authorities. This is not just propaganda. You can see it almost anywhere.]

But a simple return to the Middle Ages would only reproduce the exact conditions that made the enlightenment necessary and inevitable. Thus I am not in any better place than Allen Bloom to offer any answers. However, I do think the Litvak (Lithuanian) yeshivas are definitely n the right track.

My own approach is to take the Rambam's idea Torah, Physics Metaphysics and just to go with that.
That is I try have a kind of wholeness and balance between the two poles. Balance does not mean unconnected parts. I don't separate Reason and Faith. Think of car parts all lying in a pile. That is you have every single components of a car but they are not connected. That is not a car. A car has the same components, but they are all attached properly. That is the idea of Faith and Reason that I have. For me Faith and Reason are two components that are attached, and work together.

I should mention that I have a lot of reason to think that self education is important. So when I talk about Torah, Physics, and Metaphysics I am not talking about universities but rather what you do in the privacy for your own home. I got this idea from my own father. Also I should mention this was how Abraham Lincoln got his education. He was self taught. And besides that I discovered in university anyway that most of the learning had to be done on my own. The professors were there to bring me up to a higher level of expertise than what I could do on my own. But the ground work always had to be done by myself.
 When the Rambam says  Physics and Metaphysics he is referring to the two books of Aristotle by those names. However he means the  disciplines as the ancient Greeks understood them. You can see this when he says what teh sages of the Talmud call מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית they means Physics and Metaphysics as the ancient Greeks understood them. So even though he had a chance to say he means the books of Aristotle exclusively he did not say so. So he clearly meant the disciplines themselves.