I wanted just very quickly to say that the idea of the Enlightenment of education being the redemption of mankind meant secular education. Also, I wanted to add that Allen Bloom thought that the main idea of the Enlightenment was to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals. But that was because he was a political philosopher. There was an equal part of the enlightenment that was directed towards education.

But this was not in the Yeshiva or religious kind of sense of education. [The Enlightenment thinkers were thinking about secular education.]

On the opposite side of things the other side of the enlightenment was towards spiritual wholeness and a revolt against reason.This side of things received its greatest expression in the Romantic period. But it began right at the start of the Enlightenment.


Each of these areas has positive values and also can decay into negative value.
It was Allen Bloom in his Closing of the American Mind that saw these two streams colliding and creating a crisis, or maybe even an explosion that would destroy both.

In Lithuanian yeshivas there is an attempt to remedy this situation with  a return to the Middle Ages. That is what we call learning Rishonim (medieval authorities). The idea here is that the Middle ages was a time when there was tremendous human effort spent of resolving the clefts between Faith and Reason. [Besides that it is true that Rishonim are on a vastly superior level than later authorities. This is not just propaganda. You can see it almost anywhere.]

But a simple return to the Middle Ages would only reproduce the exact conditions that made the enlightenment necessary and inevitable. Thus I am not in any better place than Allen Bloom to offer any answers. However, I do think the Litvak (Lithuanian) yeshivas are definitely n the right track.

My own approach is to take the Rambam's idea Torah, Physics Metaphysics and just to go with that.
That is I try have a kind of wholeness and balance between the two poles. Balance does not mean unconnected parts. I don't separate Reason and Faith. Think of car parts all lying in a pile. That is you have every single components of a car but they are not connected. That is not a car. A car has the same components, but they are all attached properly. That is the idea of Faith and Reason that I have. For me Faith and Reason are two components that are attached, and work together.

I should mention that I have a lot of reason to think that self education is important. So when I talk about Torah, Physics, and Metaphysics I am not talking about universities but rather what you do in the privacy for your own home. I got this idea from my own father. Also I should mention this was how Abraham Lincoln got his education. He was self taught. And besides that I discovered in university anyway that most of the learning had to be done on my own. The professors were there to bring me up to a higher level of expertise than what I could do on my own. But the ground work always had to be done by myself.
 When the Rambam says  Physics and Metaphysics he is referring to the two books of Aristotle by those names. However he means the  disciplines as the ancient Greeks understood them. You can see this when he says what teh sages of the Talmud call מעשה מרכבה and מעשה בראשית they means Physics and Metaphysics as the ancient Greeks understood them. So even though he had a chance to say he means the books of Aristotle exclusively he did not say so. So he clearly meant the disciplines themselves.

I am not sure who is the "Rashba" in the Nemukai Joseph. The Rashba from Spain? Or Rav Shimshon Ben Avraham? I had to correct my paragraph on Bava Metzia 110 because the NJ brings some idea from the Rashba that disagrees with the first part of our Tosphot there. But is that the same person who in the second part of Tosphot is disagreeing with the Ri? It occurred to me the NJ could very well be meaning the regular Rashba from Spain.

After writing this I decided it was the Rashba from Spain. --that seems clear from Bava Metzia in ch.s 6 and 7




 I might as well tell the general public what the issue is. It is חלב. That is there are certain parts of even a kosher animal that are forbidden These are the parts that would be offered in the Temple if it would be standing. They are the areas of fat that cover the stomach and that whole region. There is some verse about this somewhere in Leviticus I think but I don't know where it is off hand. This is a very serious issue and it involves כרת. That is when the Torah says "One who does such and such a thing will be cut off from his people." On every sin like that one has to bring a sin offering if it was done by accident. This issue is so serious that Reb Shmuel Berenbaum simply never ate meat at all. He would only eat chicken on Shabat. 

songs for the glory of God

q12  [q12 in midi]

q13  [q13 in midi]

q14  [q14 in midi]

q16  [q16 in midi]

q18  [q18 in midi]

q20  [q20 in midi]

q21  [q21 in midi]

q22  [q22 in midi]

q23  [q23 in midi]

q24  [q24 in midi]
q25  [q25 in midi]

Ideas in Shas with new ideas in Sukkah and laws of sin offerings in the Rambam

Ideas in Bava Metzia with new ideas.


I was not sure whether to put in the beginning my background. But it seems relevant. It seems unlikely to me I would be able to learn Talmud at all if I had not been in two great yeshivas. [Mir in New York and Shar Yashuv in Far Rockway, New York State] But I don't want to imply that they would agree with anything I wrote. My mistakes are my own. And I think all the roshei yeshivas [teachers] in both places would have been able to write ideas a million times better than mine. But these are my own minor contributions to Torah study.


[I should mention that my learning partner knows how to learn very well so I really can't say that these books would have been impossible unless I had gone to yeshiva. In any case I certainly would not have had any idea on how to approach Gemara without those two institutions.
I also think I did not appreciate at the time how rare these good places of learning were. It was some gift that I came to places that seriously know the value of Torah and what it means to know how to learn. The idea of knowing how to learn is hard to explain. Mainly it is the difference between  Leonardo Da Vinci and finger painting. 

I wanted to present a subject in Bava Metzia  page 110 side and then Tosphot ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that they did in Babylonia in a city called Sura. In Sura there was a custom to make  a loan and as a guarantee the lender מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה (The borrower) without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the lender has already been there three years. Rav Yehuda said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field."[After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced.] According to Rabbainu Isaac in Tosphot Ravina disagrees with Rav Yehuda and says the borrower is believed. The way Tosphot understands this is that Ravina is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה (lender) says he bought it, still the borrower is believed.

Tosphot asks on the Ri (Rabainu Isaac) from a case in  Bava Batra  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to Rabbainu Isaac is this: If the Ri is  right then in the case in Bava Batra the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a "migo." Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that, but says a weaker plea, [i.e. a plea that is not believed]. Tosphot answers: it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In Bava Metzia page 80 we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an ass to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the ass died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with "He could have said..." in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "He could have said," because there are witnesses against that migo. That is: we don't know about the river, but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in Bava Batra and Bava Metzia  page 110 in Tosphot in which there are no witnesses against the migo. Rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen, he would have said so.

I suggest that this question of mine is the reason that Rabbainu Shimshon ben Abraham disagreed with the Ri in our Tosphot.







========================================================================
This is the same thing as the above paragraphs but with Hebrew additions
I wanted to present a subject in בבא מציעא דף ק''י side and then תוספות ,and then a question.
I have to make a short introduction משכנתא דסורא is a kind of guarantee for a loan that that did in Babylonia in a city called סורא. In סורא there was a custom to make  a loan and as a משכון the  מלווה would get a field and be able to work on it and eat its fruits for some number of years and at the end of that time the field would return to the owner the לווה  without any more obligation on the borrower.  This is different than נכייתא which is reduction of the loan. In  case of נכייתא the field goes back but some part of the loan still remains.

Let's say we have a lender and borrower in either of the above cases and the lender says the agreement was for five years and the borrower says three years. The document was lost. And the מלווה has already been there three years. רב יהודה said the lender is believed because after three years he could have said לקוחה היא בידי "I bought the field." After being there three years he would be believed unless contrary evidence is produced. According to רבינו יצחק הר''י in תוספות רבינא disagrees with רב יהודה and says the borrower is believed. The way תוספות understands this is that רבינא is disagreeing all the way. That is even if the מלווה lender says he bought it still the borrower is believed.

תוספות asks on the ר''י from a case in  בבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א. In that case  there is a field that one person has been for three years or more and he says he bought it and the other says it was stolen. We believe the one who has been there three years because we say if it had been stolen the real owner would have said sometime in the meantime and not waited three years.

The question from this to הר''י is this: If the הר''י is  right then in the case in בבא בתרא the one saying it was stolen should be believed because he could have said it was a guarantee for  a loan. He has a מיגו. Since he could have said it was a guarantee and be believed, so we should believe him even when he does not say that but says a weaker plea.  תוספות answers it is  מיגו  במקום עדים a case of "he could have said" when there are witnesses against him and מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן

In בבא מציעא דף פ we have a case of מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן which looks different from this case. That is my question. There we have two roads one with a river that had to be crossed and the other without  and a person that hired an חמור to carry him. And he was told don't take it on the road with the river. He took it that way and the חמור died and he says when he was there the river had dried up. We say we don't believe him because we don't go with he could have said in a case where there are witnesses. So my question is that on page 80 we don't say "he could have said" because there are witnesses against that מיגו. That is we don't know about the river but we do know he took it the wrong way. This seems very different from our case  in בבא בתרא and בבא מציעא דף ק''י in תוספות in which there are no witnesses against the מיגו. rather the witnesses are against the plea itself. אנן סהדי that if it had been stolen he would have said so. ______________________________________________________________________


רציתי להציג נושא בבא דף ק''י  מציעא דף ק''י ולאחר מכן תוספות, ואז שאלה. אני חייב לעשות הקדמה קצרה משכנתא דסורא הוא סוג של ערבות להלוואה שנעשתה בבבל בעיר הנקראת סורא. בסורא היה מנהג לעשות הלוואה וכמשכון המלווה יקבל שדה ולהיות  ולעבוד על זה ולאכול את פירותיו למספר שנים ובסופו של אותו זמן   השדה יחזור לבעלים (לווה) ללא כל התחייבות נוספת על הלווה. זה שונה מאשר נכייתא שהוא הפחתה של ההלוואה. במקרה של נכייתא השדה חוזר אבל חלק של ההלוואה עדיין נשאר. נניח שיש לנו מלווה ולווה באחד מהמקרים לעיל והמלווה אומר ההסכם היה במשך חמש שנים והלווה אומר שלוש שנים. המסמך אבד. ומלווה כבר היה שם שלוש שנים. רב יהודה אמר המלווה הוא נאמן כי אחרי שלוש שנים הוא היה יכול לומר "לקוחה היא בידי"  היינו "קניתי את השטח". להיות שהיה שם שלוש שנים הוא יהיה נאמן, אלא אם כן ראיות בניגוד מיוצרת. לדברי רבינו יצחק (הר''י) בתוספות רבינא לא מסכים עם רב יהודה ואומר הלווה נאמן. הדרך שתוספות מבין את זה היא שרבינא חולק כל הדרך. כלומר גם אם המלווה אמר שהוא קנה אותו עדיין הלווה נאמן. תוספות שואל על ר''י ממקרה בבבא בתרא כ''ח ע''א, במקרה שיש שדה שאדם אחד היה שם לשלוש שנים או יותר והוא אומר שהוא קנה אותו ובעל דין אומר שזה נגנב. אנו מאמינים מי שהיה שם שלוש שנים, כי אנחנו אומרים שאם זה נגנב הבעלים האמיתיים היו אומרים משהו בינתיים ולא לחכות שלוש שנים. השאלה מזה להר''י היא זו: אם ההר''י נכון, אז במקרה בבבא בתרא שאחד אומר שזה נגנב הוא צריך להיות נאמן כי הוא יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה להלוואה. יש לו מיגו. מאז שהוא היה יכול לומר שזה היה ערובה ולהאמין, ולכן אנחנו צריכים להאמין לו גם כשהוא לא אומר את זה, אבל אומר טיעון חלש. תוספות עונה זה מיגו במקום עדים. המקרה הוא  "הוא יכול היה לומר" כאשר יש עדים נגדו ומיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן. יש שאלה. בבבא מציעא דף פ' יש לנו המקרה של מיגו במקום עדים לא אמרינן שנראה שונה ממקרה זה.  יש  שתי דרכים אחת עם נהר שהיה צריך להיות חצוי ואחר בלי ואדם ששכר חמור לשאת אותו. ואמרו לו לא לקחת את זה על הכביש עם הנהר. הוא לקח את זה ככה וחמור מת והוא אומר כשהוא היה שם לא היה שם הנהר כיוון שהתייבש. אנחנו לא מאמינים לו, כי אנחנו לא הולכים עם "הוא יכול היה לומר" במקרה שבו יש עדים. אז השאלה שלי היא, שעל דף 80 אנחנו לא אומרים ", הוא יכול היה לומר" כי יש עדים נגד המיגו. זה שאנחנו לא יודעים על הנהר, אבל אנחנו יודעים שהוא לקח את  הכביש הלא נכונה. זה נראה שונה מהמקרה שלנו בבא בתרא ובבא מציעא דף ק''י בתוספות שבו אין עדים נגד המיגו. אלא שהעדים נגד הטיעון עצמו. אנן סהדי שאם זה נגנב הוא היה אומר כך.

I had a period in Yeshiva in which I read every paragraph twice. This I think helped me a lot

That is I would take one paragraph of the Talmud and read it once straight through and then the Rashi and understand nothing. Then I would read the Soncino English translation and also understand nothing. Then I would read the paragraph in the Talmud once again and gain understand nothing. But then I would read the Rashi once again and then the whole thing became clear.

This reading the words twice approach helped me for all the years I was in Yeshiva from 18 until about 25.  The idea of review I saw in the Gra and I think it is good for certain kinds of learning, but not all. There were things that even saying them over  a few time s were simply way beyond my league and I found it better just to say the words and go on. Then I would hope the ideas would get into me by osmosis--which in fact often did happen.

The idea of a crisis of the Enlightenment is not the sole product of Allen Bloom. [I think the original person that noticed it was Max Weber.]
The problem of this crisis was the main subject of Allen Bloom's book The Closing of the American Mind.

I think that book is  a major masterpiece and recommend it for everyone. In any case the basic idea was there were two opposing currents of the Enlightenment. And these two opposing currents came to collide in the USA in the lifetime of Allen Bloom. That is the idea of this book in a nutshell.
This same problem was faced by Max Weber.


One part of the Enlightenment was give everyone education (i.e. enlightenment). Teach them reason, and then Utopia will result. And make governments do this. The Enlightenment  was an attempt to take power from Kings and the Priest and give it to the intellectuals.
The other part of the Enlightenment was the intellectual revolt against  reason, a celebration of subjective will and intuition, and a neo-Romantic longing for spiritual wholesomeness.
So far I have said nothing new. Just read Allen Bloom and Max Weber.


The Middle Ages were in spirit was very different from everything that came before or after. It is a time that is almost impossible to understand. And yet one thing stands out from that time--the attempt to combine reason with spiritual wholeness.  This same attempts still continues today in Lithuanian yeshivas. We know learning Rishonim [Mediaeval authorities] has always been the bedrock of Lithuanian yeshivas. Recently this idea has gained in force by the example of some yeshivas that expressly commit to this approach and on purpose avoid Achronim (anyone after the Middle Ages). In some places you can see a similar approach  when then spend their efforts on Thomas Aquinas.  In any case Allen Bloom certainly noticed this because he mentioned in his book that some of his relatives who were observant Jews had as much and better understanding of life and the world just based on their reading the Old Testament and Talmud as others who read the New York Times. But Allen Bloom's answer was to tell people to learn the Republic of Plato and other great books. This seems to me to  lack the numinous, and holy aspect that makes something compelling as opposed to mere intellectual exercise.

The reason Allen Bloom did not think going back to the Middle Ages was a good idea was because of the very problems themselves that had produced the conditions  and problems which made the Enlightenment necessary.  What happens in practice is ad hoc justice, ad hoc adjudication. and widespread injustice. If laws are not equal for all, then they become very unequal. 

The model I have thought best is a kind of continuation of the Rambam approach. The Rambam thought learning Torah was a necessary prerequisite for learning Physics and Metaphysics. That is he saw learning (not knowing) Physics and Metaphysics as the fulfillment of the commandments to love and fear God. But that they don't accomplish this with the proper background of the Oral and Written Law. That is the approach that I take myself even though I have never seen anyone take Rambam approach  seriously. I simply decided not to wait until others wake up. [I am not claiming expertise in any of these fields. Rather it is just my claim that it is proper and important to spend time each day in each of these three areas.]

This longing for spiritual wholeness I think explains the Baal Teshuva movement, and the widespread revolt against reason in those circles and in fact the general seeking of spirituality we see since the 1960's. I certainly have seen my share of this in different cults.