Allan Bloom sees the problem in the USA as the result of a contradiction in Enlightenment though

 Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind points to the source of the problem in universities. and hints to a solution. Bible, the Great Books [that is the classics of ancient Greece and Rome] and Kant. [Not that he says as much openly, but you can see these three bits of advice if you read between the lines]

I would like to add that even though I agree with Allan Bloom, I have a slightly different set of great books i.e., Chiduhei Harambam by Rav Chaim of Brisk, the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach, Physics and Mathematics [but  I not to diminish from the point of Allan Bloom]

[Allan Bloom sees the problem in the USA as the result of a contradiction in Enlightenment thought that existed from the very beginning of the Enlightenment. Thus by implication, if one could find a solution to that contradiction, then automatically the problem would be fixed. It seems to Bloom that Kant and Hegel came closet to a solution. 

20th century philosophy was an attempt to get out of Kant and Hegel with no success. These were brilliant attempt in British American analytic philosophy but in the long run were futile and false a Robert Hanna ha pointed out in several books.

The issue is never the issue. What people hold in philosophy is which philosopher holds like their already established opinion in politics, If they are for Hegel, it is because they think he was for socialism. [Not that they understand his approach. 

However I prefer Kant and the new Friesian approach of Kelley Ross which takes Kant as a basis but modifies that approach with immediate non intuitive knowledge -which was used by Fries to repair the transcendental deduction of Kant and indirectly opens the door to faith, To my mind this is a continuation of the medieval approach to combine faith with reason

    The major point of the Gra was learning Torah, but the general path of the religions world to use Torah to make money was thought to be in violation of the command in Pirkei Avot to not make Torah into shovel to dig with. Using Torah  to make money is an old  practice, but no older than murder .

[Torah here means the old testament, two Tamuds and midrash ]

 Rav Nahman says [Le.M I;129] to honor the festivals and/or to be close to a true tzadik helps to rid oneself of pride. The question that I have here is that there is no indication of any method to be able to discern who is a true tadik- as opposed to who is a phony. But I do have a suggestion. In the Le.M  vol II Rav Nahman says to be in a Litvak yeshiva is the same essence as being with a tzadik. 

 There were plenty of books of mysticism during the middle ages and the zohar brings a lot of them. that i why and how Rav Yaakov Emden [the Yaavatz] explains the Zohar. He says some parts of it are from authentic writings of ancient mystics before the time of Moshe Deleon. So while I am not in favor of learning the Zohar, I am in favor of learning the Ari [Isaac Luria].who concentrates on the parts of the Zohar that were ancient teachings. But that is only in connection with Gemara and Tosphot

 Dough prepared to be fed to the dogs that guard the sheep is not kosher for the night of Passover, but if the shepherds eat from it, it is okay to fulfill one's obligation for the first night of Passover since it is kept from water. Thus regular flour is ok to make maza from it on the first night of Passover. [Rambam. Laws of Hametz and Maza 6 law 5]

my point is the dough is  meant for dogs.so even if the shepards eat from it, it was only guarded to not let water fall on it so that it could be given to dogs to eat. That is--so that it should not get moldy. But even regular flour falls into that category--that they owners are careful that water should not fall on it and let fungus grow in it.

My point here is that idea of Rav Nahman of Breslov that one should not search for extra restrictions-.The sources for this are the Le.M of Rav Nahman in vol ii chapter 4 and I think around chapter 86 and the famous hashmata [left out paragraph printed between vol i and vol ii] about the fact that if one wants to serve God, he must  think of himself as being alone in the world and not look at what other are doing.  

 The C.I.A. concentrates on regime  change since the 1990's. A prime example is Kosovo, where there was already tension. The C.I.A. hired  reckless hot heads to throw rocks at the police in Sarajevo thus got an over reaction from the police --which then caused an international outrage. Then  USA forces came in and got regime change. Same in Ukraine in 2014. And now they are doing the same thing in Israel.

Frege, G.E. Moore  Bertrand Russell, and Wittgenstein  were the main founders of the analytic school of philosophy which is the brand of philosophy taught in British and American universities, the unspoken principle of their approach is ''How can we disprove Kant? 

However, a careful analysis by Robert Hanna shows the flaws in their thinking. Thus, there is a need to get back to Kant. But which approach to Kant? Marburg (Hermann Cohen) Epistemology? Or the metaphysical Kant of the first half of the 1800's.

And besides that I would have to agree with Michael Huemer that the best of the Analytic School is G/E/ Moore.

But I think that the Friesian-Leonard Nelson approach to Kant is the best of them all 

Tractate Yevamot page 40, side B. Rambam laws of Yibum and Chalitza 6, halacha 18

 The sister of the chalutza [note 1] is forbidden. \Thus the zara of the sister of the chalutza is forbidden as a decree of the scribes. The reason is she might be mixed up with the zara of the chalutza. But the zara of the sister of the zkuka is not forbidden. Rav Shach brings this fact to show the zika is less than marriage derabanan.  However I do not see how that is so. Perhaps zika is marriage derabanan, but we do not make a decree on a decree. 

[note 1] When a brother has died without children, one of his wives must marry his brother or spit at him and take off his shoe. That is called chalitza. The woman that does  this is called chalutza 

Also I would like to ask this question on the answer of רב  שך on the רמב''ם. The question is this:  the רמב''ם writes this case. There are two brothers. Brother number one dies and so his wife falls to ייבום before brother number two. And after the first brother dies, a third brother is born. The wife of the first brother can never falls to ייבום before the third brother because of the law of ''the wife of one's brother whose was not in the same world.''  If the second brother made a מאמר on the wife of the first brother [that is he marries her by word, but has not yet slept with her,] then both the wife of the first and the other wife of the second brother are forbidden to the third brother. רב  שך askes: Why only מאמר? Should not זיקה alone be enough to forbid both wives to the third? He answers: since the second one died, that is as if there never was זיקה. [That is: רב  שך holds only when the brother is alive, then זיקה is like marriage. The question I have on this answer comes from יבמות ל' ע''ב and רמב''ם הלכות ייבום ו' כ''ה.The case is two brothers married to two sisters. One brother dies. Then a third brother dies and his wife falls to ייבום to the first brother. She can not have ייבום, but only חליצה because she had also זיקה with the second brother and this is צרת אחות of a זקוקה. This raises a question on the answer of רב  שך because the second brother is no longer alive, and so his זיקה should be nullified. But the answer to this seems simple since the זיקה still exists for the first brother so the answer of רב שך stands firm. 

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אחותו של החלוצה [הערה 1] אסורה. לפיכך הצרה [הערה 2] של אחותו של החלוצה אסורה דרבנן. הסיבה היא שהיא עלולה להיות מעורבת עם צרה של החלוצה. אבל צרת אחות הזקוקה אינה אסורה [הערה ג]. רב שך מביא עובדה זו כדי להראות שזיקה [הערה 4] פחותה מנישואין דרבנן. עם זאת, איני רואה כיצד זה כך. אולי זיקה היא נישואין דרבנן, אבל אנחנו לא גוזרים גזרה על גזירה?

 

[הערה 1] כאשר אח נפטר ללא ילדים, על אחת מנשותיו לשאת את אחיו או לירוק אליו ולחלוץ את נעלו. זה נקרא החליצה. לאישה שעושה את זה קוראים חלוצה.

[הערה 2] הצרה היא האישה השנייה.

[הערה 3] המקרה הוא שאחותו של הזקוקה נשואה לאח אחר. לא זה שמת, ולא זה שעושה את הייבום או החליצה. למה שאותו אח שלישי לא יהיה חייב? אולי בגלל שהוא אח שנולד אחרי שהאח הראשון מת [הערה 4] זיקה היא החובה להתחתן עם אחת מנשות האח המת. זה כמו נישואים דרבנן. אבל במקרה אחד הרמב''ם רואה בזה פחות כח מנישואין דרבנן. אז רב שך מחפש איזה הסבר לרמב''ם

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כמו כן ברצוני לשאול שאלה זו על תשובת רב שך על הרמב''ם. השאלה היא כזו: הרמב''ם כותב את המקרה הזה. יש שני אחים. אח הראשון מת וכך אשתו נופלת לייבום לפני אח מספר שתיים. ואחרי שהאח הראשון מת, נולד אח שלישי. אשת האח הראשון לעולם לא תוכל ליפול לייבום לפני האח השלישי בגלל דין "אשת אחיו שלא הייתה בעולמו". אם האח השני עשה מאמר עם אשת האח הראשון. כלומר הוא מתחתן איתה במילה, אבל עדיין לא שכב איתה,] אז גם אשת הראשון וגם אשתו השנייה של האח השני אסורות לאח השלישי. רב שואל: למה רק מאמר? האם אין די בזיקה לבדה כדי לאסור את שתי הנשים על השלישי? הוא עונה: מאז שהשני מת, זה כאילו מעולם לא הייתה זיקה. [כלומר: רב שך מחזיק רק כשהאח חי, אז זיקה זה כמו נישואין. השאלה שיש לי על התשובה הזו מגיעה מיבמות ל' ע''ב ורמב''ם הלכות ייבום ו' כ''ה. המקרה הוא שני אחים נשואים לשתי אחיות. אח אחד מת. ואז אח שלישי מת ואשתו נופלת לאח הראשון. היא לא יכולה לקבל ייבום, אלא רק חליצה כי הייתה לה גם זיקה עם האח השני וזו צרת אחותה של זקוקה. זה מעלה שאלה על תשובת רב שך כי האח השני כבר אינו בין החיים, ולכן יש לבטל את הזיקה שלו

אבל התשובה לכך נראית פשוטה שכן הזיקה עדיין קיימת לאח הראשון ולכן תשובת רב שך עומדת איתן.

 Rav Nahman was very much against learning philosophy and that approach is very much like that of some mediaeval authorities (e.g. Ramban/Nachmanidess).  But this is clearly an argument among the Rishonim. So I have at least some opinion to depend on.

Thus I would like to bring Kant in support of faith. I mean that questions on faith often come up and the answers are not satisfying. To this I answer the when one ventures into the realm of dinge an sich, contradictions arise automatically. what are things in themselves? They are both things stripped of all characteristics supplied by human minds, and starting axioms of reason. and furthermore Kant adds that this applies not just to abstract reason but also to individuals and societies

I see great importance of this approach of Kant and in particular in the Kant Fries school of thought. but i do not share the distain for Hegel that seems to permeate all neo Kantian schools.

Hegel thought that by the dialectic, it is possible to get beyond the limitations of pure reason and empirical reasoning. He did not deny the problem of the ''thing in itself,'' but rather thought that this process, it is possible to get beyond it

I would like here to take an opportunity to recommend a particular modification of Kant by Jacob Fries and Leonard Nelson that I think is the best approach in Philosophy even though this also needs a bit of tweaking the variables because the absolute position of Newtonian space and time can not be the fundamental starting place of all possible human reasoning. While Leonard Nelson was right that you have to have starting axioms without which Reason can not start, but Newton's space and time are not them. rather you have to start with Maxwell's equations of electro magnetism and the speed of light being constant.     [If only nelson had realized this in time, the whole Friesian school might have fared better, --in particular Bernays saw right away that the Friesian school needed to deal with Einstein in a more constructive way. IF anyone has the time i highly recommend the phd thesis of dr kelly ross on the friesian approach.    

 Rav Nahman states the importance of true tzadikim [saints] but also brings u the problem of people that are famous for being great tzadikim but in fact are agents from the dark side, In one Torah lesson Rav Nahman calls these phony tzadikim  מפורסמים של שקר [famous frauds] and Rav Israel Odeser said ''If famous then a fraud''.

[That means that people that are famous a being holy and righteous you must know that they are frauds ]

 Rav Shach and all gedolai Torah [Litvak great Torah scholars] in Israel were against  any kind of situation in which Torah learning was combined with secular learning [as I noticed today in a newspaper that was quoting a few letters of Rav Shach to that effect.]and I can see the point of this. But the way I see things, all the social studies and humanities departments of all universities should be thrown into the trash.[Also look at The Closing of the American Mind  by Allan Bloom who reaches the same conclusion.]

my son Izhak

 Even though my son Izhak held with learning in depth, still he recognized the importance of Rav Nahman who strongly held with  the approach of fast learning ["just say the words in order and go further" אין צריכים בלימוד רק לומר הדברים כסדר וממילא יבין    ם "In learning one only needs to ay the words in order and then he will automatically understand and if he does not understand right away, he will eventually understand; and if after all of that, there are still left some things he did not understand, so what? For the greatness of a lot of learning goes above everything else." so one needs a balance, deep learning in the morning and fast learning in the afternoon. This is the compromise that most Litvak yeshivot have arrived at after a few hundred years of experience. he even mentioned in his bookthe importance of being with rav nahman from uman on rosh hashana and rav nahman definitely emphasized the importance of ''girsa''-saying the words in order and going on as mentioned in tractate shabat pg 63. however i have taken the approach that being in israel is mre important than being in uman.

Gitin 73, Rambam Laws of divorce 9:18 and 19 that is: "Things in the heart are not things". The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]] that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear,

Later note. However Rav Shach understands that the cases in giving a divorcee document are not dependent on ''Things in the heart" because  the statement "This is your divorce if I do not recover from this illness" can mean either that the husband is establishing the time of the divorce, or it might mean that it is a condition. And if it is a condition, it would include an unusual event. It would not matter what was in the heart of the husband. But if so, then how does one explain the case of selling a field under all conditions, and then when some unusual event occurs, the sale does not go through? Tht i clearly a condition and yet the sale is not valid

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גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט:י''ח י''ט that is: "דברים שבלב אינם דברים ". The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band of robbers robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear

Later note. However רב שך understands that the cases in giving a גט are not dependent on ''Things in the heart" because  the statement "This is your גט if I do not recover from this illness" can mean either that the husband is establishing the time of the divorce (שעה אחת לפני מיתה), or it might mean that it is a תנאי. And if it is a תנאי, it would include an unusual event. It would not matter what was in the heart of the husband. But if so, then how does one explain the case of selling a field under all conditions, and then when some unusual event occurs, the sale does not go through? That  clearly a condition, and yet the sale is not valid

גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט: י''ח י''ט. המקרה הוא כשמישהו אומר: "זה הגט שלך אם אני לא אקום מהמיטה החולה הזו", ואיזה אירוע לא צפוי קורה כמו אריה אוכל אותו. יש ספק אם הגירושין תקפים. כמו כן, יש מקרה שבו מוכרים משהו וקובעים שהמכירה תקפה גם אם מתרחש אירוע בלתי צפוי כמו להקת שודדים שודדת אותו. אבל אז מתרחש אירוע שהוא כל כך נדיר שאף אחד לא יכול היה לחשוב עליו כגון הנהר שהיה משקה אותו נפסק. אז המכירה לא תקפה והקונה מקבל את כספו בחזרה. השאלה שלי היא "דברים בלב הם לא דברים". אז למה זה צריך לשנות אם אירוע היה צפוי או לא? התשובה חייבת להיות כמו תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב שיש מקרים שברור מן הנסיבות [אומדנא דמוקח ]שכוונת המוכר ברורה.

אולם רב שך מבין שהמקרים במתן גט אינם תלויים ב''דברים שבלב'' כי האמירה 'זה הגט שלך אם לא אבריא מהמחלה הזאת' יכולה להיות משמעות או שהבעל קובע את זמן הגט (שעה אחת קודם מיתה), או שאולי זה אומר שזה תנאי. ואם זה תנאי, זה יכלול אירוע חריג. לא היה משנה מה היה בלב הבעל. אבל אם כן, אז איך מסבירים את המקרה של מכירת שדה בכל התנאים, ואז כשמתרחש אירוע חריג כלשהו, ​​המכירה לא יוצאת לפועל? ברור שזה תנאי, ובכל זאת המכירה לא תקפה

Rambam laws of acquiring 11 laws 8 and 9. Rav Shach brings there the Rema [Shulchan Aruch Choshen Mishpat 207 law 4] that there are some Rishonim that hold that we say, "Things in the heart are not things'' in buying and selling, but not in the case of a gift. I think this opinion comes from the Gemara Ketuboth page 79b. There, there is a case of a woman who became a widow, and she wanted to remarry. But she did not want her next husband to get possession of her property, so she wrote a document giving it all to her daughter. Then she got married and divorced, and came to the court of Rav Nahman asking for her property back from her daughter. Rav Nahman tore up the document, and so she got her property back. Thus we see "things in the heart are things" in the case of a gift. 

I am being a bit short here. For to Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]  there are cases when one needs to state the conditions. There are other cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear and he do not need to state the conditions of the sale openly. and there are other cases when a sale is final, no matter what the intentions were. But the case of the Rema is that even when you can not tell from the circumstances what the intentions were, [circumstances pointed in that direction but were not absolutely clear [אומדנא דמוכח ], still by a gift we say ''things in the heart are things.''

This opinion that we say thing in the heart are things for gifts can not  come from Bava Batra 146b because there there are circumstances that show his intention. That is how Rav Nahman shows that the opinion of the Mishna [that when there are circumstances that show his intention we say things in the heart are things] comes from from R Shimon ben Nuri. But the Rema needs a proof that for a gift we say things in the heart are things even when the circumstances do not show it. 

 Gitin 73, Rambam Laws of divorce 9:18 and 19.  The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like Tosphot [ketuboth 97b]] that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear,

   

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רמב''ם הלכות מכירה י''א הלכה ח' וט'.There רב שך brings  the רמ''א שלחן ערוך חושו משפט ר''ז ס''ק that there are some ראשונים that hold that we say, "דברים שבלב לא הווי דברים  in buying and selling, but not in the case of a gift. I think this opinion comes from the גמרא כתובות ע''ט ע''ב. There there is a case of a woman who became a widow, and she wanted to remarry. But she did not want her next husband to get possession of her property, so she wrote a document giving it all to her daughter. Then she got married and divorced, and came to the court of רב נחמן asking for her property back from her daughter. רב נחמן tore up the document, and so she got her property back. Thus we see "דברים שבלב הווי דברים" in the case of a gift. 

I am being a bit short here. For to תוספות כתובות צ''ז ע''ב 97b]there are cases when one needs to state the conditions. There are other cases when it is clear from the circumstance that the intention  of the seller is clear and he do not need to state the conditions of the sale openly. and there are other cases when a sale is final, no matter what the intentions were. But the case of the רמ''א is that even when you can not tell from the circumstances what the intentions were [circumstances pointed in that direction but were not absolutely clear [אומדנא דלא מוכח ],  by a gift we say things in the heart are things   ---------

This opinion that we say "things in the heart are things" for gifts can not  come from בבא בתרא קמ''ו ע''ב  because there there are circumstances that show his intention. That is how רב נחמן shows that the opinion of the משנה [that when there are circumstances that show his intention we say things in the heart are things] comes from from ר' שמעון בן נורי. But the רמ''א needs a proof that for a gift we say "things in the heart are things" even when the circumstances  do not show it/

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גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט:י''ח י''ט. The case is when one says: "This is your divorce if I do not get up from this sick bed", and some unexpected event happens like a lion eats him. There it is a doubt if the divorce is valid. Also there is a case when one sells something  and states that the sale is valid even if an unexpected event occurs like a band of robbers robs it. But then some event occurs that is so rare that no one could have  thought of it. Then the sale is not valid and the buyer gets his money back.  My question is "Things in the heart are not things". so why should it make a difference if the even was expected or not? The answer must be like תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב that there are cases when it is clear from the circumstance [אומדנא דמוכח ]that the intention  of the seller is clear

  

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רמב''ם הלכות מכירה י''א הלכות ח' וט'. שם רב שך מביא את הרמ''א שלחן ערוך חושן משפט ר''ז ס''ק   ד' שיש ראשונים שגורסים שאנו אומרים "דברים שבלב לא הוי דברים" בקנייה ומכירה, אבל לא במקרה של מתנה. אני חושב שדעה זו באה מהגמרא כתובות ע''ט ע''ב. יש מקרה של אישה שהתאלמנה, וכן היא רצתה להתחתן בשנית. אבל היא לא רצתה שבעלה הבא יקבל את הרכוש שלה, אז היא כתבה מסמך שמסרה הכל לבתה. ואז היא נישאה והתגרשה, ובאה לבית הדין של רב נחמן ובקשה רכוש בחזרה מבתה. רב נחמן קרע את המסמך, וכך היא קיבלה את רכושה בחזרה. כך אנו רואים "דברים שבלב הוי דברים" במקרה של מתנה.

 

אני קצת מקצר כאן. כי לתוספות כתובות צ''ז ע''ב יש מקרים שצריך לציין את התנאים. וישנם מקרים נוספים בהם ברור מהנסיבות שכוונת המוכר ברורה ואין הוא צריך לציין את תנאי המכירה בגלוי. ויש מקרים אחרים שבהם מכירה היא סופית, לא משנה מה היו הכוונות. אבל המקרה של הרמ''א הוא שגם כשאי אפשר לדעת מהנסיבות מה היו הכוונות, במתנה אנו אומרים דברים שבלב הם דברים.

דעה זו שאנו אומרים "דברים שבלב הם דברים" למתנות אינה יכולה לבוא מבבא בתרא קמ''ו ע''ב כי יש נסיבות המעידות על כוונתו. כך מראה רב נחמן שדעת המשנה [שכאשר יש נסיבות המראות את כוונתו אנו אומרים דברים שבלב הם דברים] באה מר' שמעון בן נורי. אבל הרמ''א צריך הוכחה שבשביל מתנה אומרים "דברים שבלב הם דברים" גם כשהנסיבות אינן מראות זאת. 

היינו הנסיבות הצביעו בכיוון זה אך לא היו ברורות לחלוטין [אומדנא  שאינו מוכח

גיטין ע''ג ע''א, רמב''ם הלכות גיטין ט: י''ח י''ט. המקרה הוא כשמישהו אומר: "זה הגט שלך אם אני לא אקום ממיטת החולה הזו", ואיזה אירוע לא צפוי קורה כמו אריה אוכל אותו. יש ספק אם הגירושין תקפים. כמו כן, יש מקרה שבו מוכרים משהו וקובעים שהמכירה תקפה גם אם מתרחש אירוע בלתי צפוי כמו להקת שודדים שודדת אותו. אבל אז מתרחש אירוע שהוא כל כך נדיר שאף אחד לא יכול היה לחשוב עליו כגון הנהר שהיה משקה אותו נפסק. אז המכירה לא תקפה והקונה מקבל את כספו בחזרה. השאלה שלי היא "דברים בלב הם לא דברים". אז למה זה צריך לשנות אם אירוע היה צפוי או לא? התשובה חייבת להיות כמו תוספות כתובות צ'''ז ע''ב שיש מקרים שברור מן הנסיבות [אומדנא דמוקח ]שכוונת המוכר ברורה.

 I do not agree with most of modern education, I my mind the thing to concentrate on are Mathematics Physics and the Avi Ezri of Rav Shach  But I would also agree to learning Mechanical Engineering -which after all was what my father father majored in in school. But you might ask, "What if I am not talented in Math?" To answer that question I have mentioned that to some Rishonim, learning Physics and Metaphysics is in the category of learning the Oral Law.  [These would be Rishonim that were going by Rav Saadia Gaon Ibn Pakuda and the Rambam] That means that it is a mitzvah to learn them whether one i talented or not.

 רב לכם בני לוי In the chapters that we read this week in parshat Korah, both Moses  and the congregation of Korach accuse each other of being the rav of the "kelipa"[that is rav *(religious teacher) of the Dark Side] [This is how Rav Isaac Luria explains these verses]. For in the congregation of Korah were the greatest teachers of Torah in that generation as the second Rashi in the Parsha explains--that they were the 250 heads of the sanhedrins

[background note--Korah and his group were against Moses [Moshe], At  the beginning of their revolt they said to moses [''we have had enough of you children of Levi. Literally that is "That is too much of you Children of Levi" But the language also can mean, "You have a Rav (of the kelipa)" and Moses threw at them the exact same accusation "You have a Rav (of the kelipa)"  

One flaw in John Locke and the Declaration of Independence is the assumption that all men are created equal. This is a fiction. Just like in animal species, there is a divergence into different species, so the human species is diverging into separate species. And we know that the Constitution of the USA was never meant to work for  vastly different kinds of groups as the Founding Fathers said openly. It was meant mainly for a homogenous group of people: White Anglo Saxon Protestants. Other groups with a different kind of value system might need a different kind of government. One example is the former Soviet Union, even though it was founded on a flawed system of economics, still the brutality of the later czars gave people the idea that a system that favored working people [the proletariat ]  would be better that being slaves to the parasitic nobles and aristocracy.  And when the system failed, many people felt that they had fallen into chaos, not a liberal free democracy. For there to be any safety to walk on the street, there had to be unofficial war lords in charge of each area of a city in order to preserve peace and order.

 The world is shifting from the USA to the Russian -Chinese alliance. The Chinese space station is a case that already shows this shift. Rewarding merit instead of racial or sexual preference shows up in actual accomplishment.

[This is enough for me to wonder if Hegel actually had some good points as an extension of Kant. There is something odd going on in the USA, and it makes me wonder if perhaps there might be some essential flaw in the system itself? I admit to being somewhat in favor of Hegel because the only Hegel I read was  the Logic part of the Encyclopedia--almost the last thing he wrote which is closely reasoned--rather than the earlier works where most people start. Plus McTaggart who is a formidable proponent of Hegel. But I am not saying either that McTaggart got everything right either--even in Hegel.   

Idea Bava Metzia ch.8-9

Continued from yesterday. Rav Shach   never actually wrote that the argument between Tosphot and the Rambam depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that Tosphot must hold the law of a pledge comes from a decree of the Torah where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. Tosphot in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her 100 zuz and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the mana [100 zuz"] she would in fact be by that married. In other words, if he just says, "You are married to me by  a mana that I will give you, and here is a  pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.

But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the mana. And thus she is married. 

This is similar to the question on the law that if lashon hara/slander is said in front of three people one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it i considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known. 

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 רב שך   never actually wrote that the argument between תוספות and the רמב''ם depends on how you understand the category of a pledge. It seems what he meant was that תוספות must hold the law of a pledge comes from a גזירת הכתוב where it is in the case of a loan. Thus it must come only in the case where there is a obligation. תוספות in fact holds if he would give her a document saying he must give her מאה זוז and say that "You are hereby married to me by this document, and here is a pledge until I give the מנה'" she would in fact be by that married. In other words if he just says "You are married to me by  a מנה that I will give you, and here is a  pledge until I give it," she is not by that married because he has no obligation to give the mana.

But here one can ask: Let the law be that by that statement she is thus married, and then he will be obligated to give her the מנה. And thus she is married. 

This is similar to the question on the law that if לשון הרע is said in front of three people, one is allowed after that to say it. The reason is that since there are already three people making it known, it  considered already known. But let the law be that one can not say it even though it was said in front of three people and then there will not be three people making it known. 

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רב שך מעולם לא כתב שהוויכוח בין תוספות לרמב''ם תלוי איך אתה מבין את הקטגוריה של משכון. נראה שמה שהוא התכוון היה שתוספות חייב להחזיק שחוק המשכון מגיע מגזירת הכתוב שבו הוא נמצא במקרה של הלוואה. לפיכך היא חייבת לבוא רק במקרה שישנה התחייבות. תוספות מחזיק אם היה נותן לה מסמך שאומר שהוא חייב לתת לה מאה זוז ולומר ש"את נשואה לי בזאת במסמך הזה, והנה משכון עד שאתן את המנה" היא בעצם תהיה על ידי זה שנשוי. כלומר אם רק יאמר "את נשואה לי במנה שאתן לך, והנה משכון עד שאתן", היא לא נשואה בזה כי אין לו חובה לתת את המנה. אבל כאן אפשר לשאול: יהא הדין שעל ידי האמירה ההיא היא נשואה כך, ואז הוא יהיה חייב לתת לה את המנה. ועכשיו היא נשואה. הדבר דומה לשאלה על הדין שאם נאמר לשון הרע בפני שלושה אנשים, מותר לאחר מכן לומר. הסיבה היא שמאחר שיש כבר שלושה אנשים שמודיעים, זה נחשב כבר ידוע. אלא שיהא הדין שאי אפשר לומר זאת אף על פי שנאמר בפני שלושה אנשים, ואז לא יהיו שלושה אנשים שמפרסמים

Kidushin 8. Rambam Marriage chapter 5 halacha 23

If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a pruta [penny], and here is a pledge until I give the pruta." She is not married because there is no pruta [penny], and there is no pledge. Thus sayeth Rava in Kiduhin. What does this mean, "There is no pledge?" Tosphot holds there is no pledge because there is no obligation to give the pruta. But if had written a document saying that he would give a pruta or had made kinyan sudar [acquisition by a scarf] she would be married, But what is the regular case of a pledge? Is it specifically from a decree of the Torah that there is such a thing as a pledge --. If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But is a pledge is a general sort of thing that a pledge can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how Rav Shach seems to explain the Tosphot.

 But on the other side, there is the Rambam and Rashba that hold she is not married and there is no pledge because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of Rav Shach is that this approach of the Rambam and the Rashba goes according to the way of understanding a pledge as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the Rambam and Rashba either. I admit I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender  either,

So Rav Shach must mean the opposite. A pledge is only in a case of an obligation  as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. and this is the reasoning of Tosphot that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the Rambam and Rashba is that there is in general  an acquiring of a pledge that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition. But if so, then in the case of kidushin, why is the pledge any  less than any other pledge that is given on condition? 

So what the Rambam and Rashba mean  is that even though this pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no kidushin. This is the same reason why  a present on condition to return also does not cause a category of a kidushin  

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If one says to a woman, "You are married to me by a פרוטה and here is a  משכון until I give the פרוטה." She is not married because there is no פרוטה and there is no משכון. Thus sayeth רבא in קידושין ח. What does this mean, "There is no משכון?" And תוספות holds there is no  משכון because there is no obligation to give the פרוטה. But if had written a שטר saying that he would give  פרוטה or had made קניין סודר  (handkerchief)  she would be married. But what is the regular case of a משכון? Is it specifically from a גזירת הכתוב that there is such a thing as a משכון . If so, that is only in the case of a loan. But if a משכון is a general sort of thing that a משכון can be given until some obligation is fulfilled? This is how  רב שך  seems to explain the תוספות. But on the other side, there is the רמב''ם and רשב''א that hold she is not married and there is no משכון because nothing of monetary value reached her. The implication of  רב שך is that this approach of the  רמב''ם and רשב''א goes according to the way of understanding a משכון as being from a decree of the Torah, that it is for a loan. But that does not seem to fit the  רמב''ם and רשב''א either.  I have been puzzled about this subject for in the case of the Torah, (the case of a loan), nothing of value has reached the lender  either, So רב שך must mean the opposite. A משכון is only in a case of an obligation  as per the decree of the Torah in the case of a loan. And this is the reasoning of תוספות that if there had been a document obligating him, Then she would be married. And the reasoning of the  רמב''ם and רשב''א is that there is in general  an acquiring of a משכון that is simply acquiring an object on condition that the loan is not paid or any other condition.

But if so, then in the case of קידושין, why is the pledge any  less than any other pledge that is given on condition? 

so what the  רמב''ם and רשב''א  mean  is that, even though the pledge has a true category of a pledge, still by the fact that it does not remain with her, there is no קידושין. This is the same reason why  a present on condition to return also does not cause a  קידושין   

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אם אומר לאישה "את נשואה לי בפרוטה והנה משכון עד שאתן פרוטה". היא לא נשואה כי אין פרוטה ואין משכון. כה אומר רבא בקידושין ף ח. מה זה אומר "אין משכון?" תוספות מחזיק אין משכון כי אין חובה לתת את הפרוטה. אבל אם היה כותב שטר שייתן פרוטה או עשה קניין סודר (מטפחת) היא נשואה. אבל מהו המקרה הרגיל של משכנתא? האם זה ספציפית מגזירת הכתוב שיש דבר כזה משכון. אם כן, זה רק במקרה של הלוואה. אבל אם משכון הוא מעין דבר כללי שאפשר לתת משכון עד שתתקיים חובה כלשהי? כך נראה רב שך שמסביר את התוספות. אבל מהצד השני יש את הרמב''ם והרשב''א שמחזיקים שהיא לא נשואה ואין משכון כי שום דבר בעל ערך כספי לא הגיע אליה. המשמעות של רב שך היא שגישה זו של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הולכת לפי דרך הבנת משכון כנגזרה מגזרת התורה, שהיא להלוואה. אבל נראה שגם זה לא מתאים לרמב''ם ורשב''א. התלבטתי בנושא זה כי במקרה של התורה, (במקרה של הלוואה), גם שום דבר בעל ערך לא הגיע למלווה, אז רב שך חייב להתכוון להיפך. משכון הוא רק במקרה של התחייבות לפי גזירת התורה  כגון במקרה של הלוואה. וזהו נימוק התוספות שאם היה מסמך המחייב אותו, אז הייתה נשואה. והנימוק של הרמב''ם ורשב''א הוא שיש בכלל רכישת משכון שפשוט רכישת חפץ בתנאי שההלוואה לא תשולם או כל תנאי אחר

אבל אם כן, אז במקרה של קידושין, מדוע המשכון פחות מכל משכון אחר שניתן בתנאי?

אז מה שהרמב''ם והרשב''א מתכוונים זה שאף על פי שלמשכון הזה יש קטגוריה אמיתית של משכון, עדיין על ידי זה שהוא לא נשאר אצלה, אין קידושין. זו אותה סיבה שגם מתנה בתנאי להחזיר אינה גורמת לקידושין

 Rav Nahman did not hold with learning philosophy nor any secular studies. He echoed Rav Hai Gaon. But this was not the approach of Ibn Pakuda and Rambam. I went with the approach of Rav Nahman for a few years and yet my experiences with the more or less ghetto [frum] ultra religious world gave me reason to  reconsider. And so with due respect to Rav Nahman, I tend to the approach of Ibn Pakuda, Rambam and Gra who all held from the importance of some secular disciplines - but with a lot of limitations. In the long run, I have to conclude that certain philosophers of the ancient Greeks are important, and Kant also. The natural sciences also. However psychology is pseudo  science. See Karl Popper for the reason.

[In the approach of the Rambam, physics and metaphysics are apart of the mitzvah to learn Gemara. in laws of learning Torah where he says divide the learning into three parts--written law, oral law, gemara. and the subjects brought in the first four chapters are in the category of gemara.]

a good argument for the role of faith that goes beyond reason

There is a good argument for the role of faith that goes beyond reason, This is in Kant when he showed

even to begin reason one needs categories of space and time and causality that can not be known by reason. Nor can they be known by empirical reasoning as Hume showed 

 Whitehead suggested a third kind of fact that is not a mind fact  nor a physical fact in order to escape the Mind -Body Problem. {Process and Reality published 1929}. This has been excluded  from academia from around 1980. But this idea dovetails nicely with the Friesian kind of third source of knowledge that i non intuitive immediate knowledge.[And that too has been excluded from Academia]. [The third kind of fact is what is known by the third kind of knowledge.]

For someone like me this sort of thing that Whitehead suggested make a lot of sense because I am used to seeing in Quantum Mechanics formulations based on Lagrange [Kinetic without potential energy] or Hamilton. In these formulations f Physics the electron knows where to go. It goes where there is minimum of energy, the lowest energy level. But it doe not try out other venues before it does so. So how does the electron know? 

The advantage of Whitehead and Fries is in the categories of Kant. The Kant proof of their validity has been a problem almost immediately after  the ink was dry on The Critique of Pure Reason

 In the beginning of Roman history there is an event that is brought about ''the gods that avenge parents''.[This was the event that caused the downfall of the last Roman king at which it became a republic.] While on one hand, we do not believe in  other gods, but we are also aware that God has angels and archangels  that are appointed over certain tasks (as is brought in the Gemara). To be aware that there are Furies that will never forgive nor ever forget can be helpful to remind one that there is a Judge and there is judgment, people may think they have no responsibility to honor and obey their parents and to blame all their troubles on their parents as Saint Freud taught. And even their parents may forgive and forget. But the gods that avenge parents will never forget  nor forgive and will always collect payment- sooner or later , because they are the ''Furies''--the gods that even the gods of Mount Olympus fear. No sacrifice can appease them. No  prayer can turn away their wrath.